Strengthening Israel-Sudan Ties and Preserving the Abraham Accords

written by David Aaronson | 11.03.2024

Key Points:

  • Sudanese Transitional Sovereignty Council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken major steps to demonstrate his commitment to peace with Israel. Israel must welcome and embrace this serious commitment, rather than taking it for granted.
  • Iran’s destabilizing activities in Sudan can be countered by stronger security cooperation between Israel and Sudan. Such cooperation would help prevent Sudanese territory from being used to smuggle Iranian weapons to Hamas in Gaza.
  • Sudan, as the third-largest country in Africa, has the potential to become a major exporter of wheat and agricultural products. This potential can be realized through cooperation with Israeli agri-tech companies, which can provide the necessary technology to develop the fertile Sudanese land.
  • Just as peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia is still possible despite Saudi Arabia re-establishing ties with Iran, peace between Israel and Sudan is still possible despite Sudan re-establishing ties with Iran.

  Four years ago, on February 3rd, 2020, a dramatic meeting took place against all odds and expectations in the Middle East. While on a working visit in Uganda, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a meeting with the leader of Sudan, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The meeting was a breakthrough for numerous reasons. First and foremost, until that point, Sudan was most notable in Israeli history for hosting the Arab League Khartoum Summit of 1967. This summit, which followed Israel’s decisive victory in the Six Day War, established the Arab League’s “Three Nos” – “No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.”

The meeting between Netanyahu and Burhan in 2020 helped shift the mindset of Arabs and Israelis, leading them to realize that the region was changing for the better. It became obvious that Netanyahu’s successful campaign of expanding Israel’s engagement with Africa (“Israel is returning to Africa and Africa is returning to Israel”) was producing positive results in the Arab world as well. The immediate publication of the meeting in a statement to the press – as agreed by both Netanyahu and Burhan – showed that Sudan wanted this relationship to be public.

Three days later, on February 6th, 2020, Burhan announced that Sudan would allow Israeli planes to use its airspace. This move significantly reduced the flight time between Tel Aviv and Johannesburg, as well as to other destinations. Indeed, on February 16th, 2020, the first-ever commercial Israeli flight entered Sudanese airspace, a historic moment that proved Burhan’s commitment to normalizing ties with Israel.

Eventually, on October 23rd, 2020, a three-way telephone call was held between Burhan, Netanyahu, and then-US President Donald Trump. In that phone call, it was agreed that Sudan would sign the Abraham Accords and normalize ties with Israel. In exchange, the United States would remove Sudan from its list of state-sponsors of terror. On January 6th, 2021, Sudan formally signed the Abraham Accords and on April 20th, 2021, Burhan canceled the official Sudanese boycott of Israel.

Since then, however, there has been little progress made on reaching a full normalization agreement. The Biden Administration, as well as the Bennett-Lapid government, both chose to maintain distance from Burhan. Sadly, potential avenues for collaboration were overlooked. But Burhan was patient and remained optimistic that Israel would eventually advance its normalization with Sudan. This is evidenced by the fact that in September 2022, Burhan said in an interview that he would visit Israel if and when invited – as well as in November 2022, when he was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Netanyahu on his return to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.

Unfortunately, the rebellion launched by rival forces in April 2023 pushed Sudan into a devastating civil war, which has made the situation even more difficult. Burhan has managed to retain control of much of Sudan, while the rebel forces were repeatedly sanctioned and condemned by US and Western officials.

Burhan also made significant trips to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which remain supportive of him. Additionally, Burhan represented Sudan at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2023 and also met with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine.

Eventually, given the lack of robust support from the US, Israel and other Western nations in the context of the Sudanese civil war, Burhan reluctantly accepted Iranian offers to re-establish diplomatic relations and sign arms deals. This unfortunate development highlights an important reality which Israel must recognize: When Israel neglects its relations, anywhere in the world, our enemies quickly expand their influence. Wherever Israel is not actively pursuing peace, prosperity and security – Iran is actively pursuing terrorism, war, and genocide.

Like the Saudis, Burhan would have preferred not to do a deal with the devil in Iran. This can be seen from his recent decision to prohibit the construction of an Iranian Naval Base in Port Sudan. But just as the decision by Western leaders to distance themselves from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led Saudi Arabia to draw closer to China and Iran, the West’s similar approach to Burhan has led to the rekindling of Sudan-Iran ties. Just as peace with Saudi Arabia is still possible despite the Saudis re-establishing ties with Iran, finalizing Israel’s peace agreement with Sudan is still possible despite Burhan’s deal with Iran.

Israel should consider offering Burhan options for security cooperation that would allow Sudan to cancel its agreement with Iran, or at the very least, to reduce its need for Iranian military assistance. This could include presenting Burhan with possibilities for cooperation with Israeli defense companies, including those that have expanded their relationships with other Abraham Accords countries since the signing of the Accords. It is imperative that Israel – not Iran – have a strong relationship with the Sudanese military and security forces. Particularly as Israel’s war against Hamas continues, Israel and Sudan should work together to prevent Sudanese territory from being used to smuggle Iranian weapons to the Gaza Strip. This security coordination would strongly bolster Israel’s regional deterrence.

Sudan also has potential to help bring prosperity to the region, including through enhanced agricultural cooperation with Israel. Sudan is the third-largest country in Africa and home to expansive stretches of fertile farmland. In the past, Sudan served as a major exporter of wheat and cotton. As a result of the Russia-Ukraine War, Sudan has the potential to once again become a major supplier of wheat to Europe and Africa. It can partner with Israeli agri-tech companies to do so. This would be a major achievement for both the Israeli and Sudanese economies. It would cause the people of the region to benefit from the fruits of this peace in the most literal sense.

Some continue to question Burhan’s commitment to normalize relations with Israel. As noted, Burhan has openly demonstrated his seriousness on peace with Israel by meeting publicly with Israel’s Prime Minister, annulling Sudan’s boycott of Israel, opening Sudanese airspace to Israeli flights, and joining the Abraham Accords. The various rebel groups in Sudan have taken no such steps towards normalization with Israel – certainly not in public.

Initiatives for security and economic cooperation with Burhan and his government, despite the civil war in Sudan, and the Israel-Hamas conflict, would help ensure that Sudan remains inside the Abraham Accords. As a result of this crucial cooperation at such a critical time, Israel and Sudan could finally sign the long-awaited normalization agreement and realize the potential of peace.



Supporting a Saudi-US defense pact; rejecting nuclearization

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 11.03.2024

Mohammed bin Salman’s statements on normalization with Israel attest to the seriousness of his efforts in this process and are also designed to prepare public opinion in the kingdom.

The three leaders – Joe Biden, bin Salman, and Netanyahu – have many reasons to try hard and reach a peace deal. The narrow window of opportunity for the three has had them explore the maneuvering room they have and find creative solutions in order to overcome the hurdles on the way: Saudi Arabia demands uranium enrichment capabilities, a defense pact, and real progress in the Palestinian track. Another issue that needs to be decided in Israel is a US-Israel defense pact. If the Israeli defense establishment becomes convinced that the pros outweigh the cons, then the current point in time presents an opportunity to reach such a deal as part of a grand bargain.

The laundry list that Saudi Arabia has sought to get from the US is long. Not only do some pose no real problems for Israel – but they also benefit it. Thus, Israel should not be opposed to a US-Saudi defense alliance. Jerusalem has a vested interest in bolstering the US commitment to its allies in the region, and therefore it should support such a development, even in public.

As for providing advanced US weapon systems to Saudi Arabia, Israel should condition its support on having Washington take steps to cement its qualitative edge. This could take the form of bolstering Israel’s capabilities if the arms sold to Saudi Arabia are deemed to be chipping away at Israel’s superiority. There is a big dilemma when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s demand for US support in setting up a civilian nuclear program, which would include the ability to enrich uranium. You don’t need to be a nuclear expert to understand what purpose this could serve. Having Riyadh join the nuclear club will expand nuclear proliferation in the region, with other countries racing to get enrichment capabilities on their territory.

As far as Israel is concerned, the ideal response from Biden would be along the lines of Saudi Arabia will not have nuclear enrichment, and neither will Iran. Namely, rather than have Saudi Arabia try to keep up with Iran by getting enrichment capabilities, the US will act to bring an neutralize Iran’s threatening capabilities. This response will not only make Saudi Arabia less concerned but will also prevent a nuclear arms race in the region and send a clear message as for the global standard that has to be upheld when it comes to nuclear capabilities.

But the Biden administration has so far gone in the other direction, and it could not be expected to take such a radical turn back. One can assume that the proposals that will be put forward will focus on the various arrangements that would ensure that the US keeps control over a Saudi nuclear program in a way that would prevent it from having military dimensions. A US-Saudi defense pact will also provide various means for the US to keep oversight over Riyadh’s actions. All this will be able to reduce the threats, but it would not be enough to assuage Israel’s fears or prevent a nuclear arms race in the region. As for the Palestinian issues, the expectation in Riyadh is that a meaningful process will put this back on the table and give the Saudi Peace Initiative from 2002 more weight when it comes to ending the Israeli-Arab conflict. The US administration may have been holding on to this prospect to put more pressure on Israel and to have the Palestinian issue move forward along the lines it wishes. This could result in Israel being asked to make concessions that it cannot realistically make. The main criteria under which Israel has to formulate its stand is reversibility: Israel must not agree to concessions that are irreversible (or that the price of reversing them is too steep).

At this point, it is hard to assess whether one should support or oppose a defense pact between Israel and the US, as this would ultimately boil down to what the details of such a deal will be once negotiations conclude. Just like there is medicine without unwanted side effects, such processes always come with drawbacks. Israel should determine its stance based on the overall calculus.

The more the proposed draft bolsters Israel’s deterrence, guarantees its freedom of operation and its ability to defend itself by itself while increasing the US commitment to bolstering the Israeli military capabilities and qualitative edge, and if it all deepens the bipartisan commitment toward the Jewish state, then the Israeli stance will lean more toward a “yes.” One such option is having the US be bound to help Israel only when there is an existential threat, thus potentially resolving the issue of limiting Israel’s freedom of action in this regard, Israel will ask that the overall factors take into account the Saudi component. The combustible security situation has increased the risk of violent incidents in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, as well as in Israeli prisons and on the northern border. This could adversely impact the overall public opinion on the Arab street, which wields power in decision points. In such a situation, any mini-crisis could become a big obstacle.

Published in Israel Hayom, October 25, 2023.



The message: Neutralizing Iran comes befor normalization with Riyadh

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 11.03.2024


Enthusiasm but caution: How Israel should approach Saudi peace deal

written by David M. Weinberg | 11.03.2024

Israel needs to approach the emerging peace arrangements with Saudi Arabia and accompanying understandings with the US with enthusiasm but also caution.

Too much zeal for a deal in Jerusalem will boomerang in Israel’s disfavor. Washington and Riyadh need the peace accord as much or more than Israel does right now, so they should pay for it – and not at Israel’s expense.

Alas, it seems to me the over-ardor for a deal that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed in the US last week weakens Israel’s bargaining hand. I hope that in behind-the-scenes negotiations Israel is playing a tougher game.

Let there be no mistake: I think that Israel stands at the brink of a grand, mega-historic diplomatic breakthrough. Peace with Saudi Arabia, and by extension an effective end to 100 years of Arab-Israeli conflict, truly is at hand.This is a near-messianic advance that if actualized would cement Israel’s permanence in the region and its standing in the world. It would gut 120 years of Arab world ideological warfare against the Jewish return to Zion and deal a death blow to the progressive-woke assault on the legitimacy of Israel – especially if the peace is brokered by a Democratic US president.

Thus, I am wholly in favor of grabbing the opportunity and driving forward to the completion of the deal. The opportunity should be embraced, even by Republicans who dislike the boost that President Joe Biden’s administration would get from a deal – and even by left-wing Israelis and liberal Diaspora Jews who detest the boost that Netanyahu would receive.

At the same time, overeagerness narrows Israel’s maneuvering space. The rapidly evolving diplomatic gambit brings to the fore a series of defense issues with long-term impacts that require delicate decisions.

PERHAPS JERUSALEM should be slowing down the discussions. Too rushed an accord could impair critical Israeli strategic interests. Too hasty an accord could undercut the even more important campaign against the nuclearization of Iran.

One such issue is the possibility of a US-Israel Defense Treaty, which the Biden-Harris Administration is seeking to accompany a likely US-Saudi Defense Treaty. The administration understands that without a matching treaty with Israel, it will have difficulty in getting a treaty with Riyadh through the Senate in a two-thirds majority vote.

Israel should not be opposed to a US-Saudi defense alliance. In fact, Israel has a vested interest in seeing the US extend further commitments to its allies in the region. But does Israel itself need or want a formal defense treaty with the US?

Might this not degrade Israel’s standing in the eyes of the US public (as a ‘dependent’ on the US), or tie Israel’s hands behind its back (especially and pointedly in a looming confrontation with Iran)? And if Israel is nevertheless going to go forward with such a treaty, what exactly can Israel ask for and gain from such an accord? In short, such a treaty needs to be negotiated guardedly.

US military aid to Israel

THIS BRINGS us to the second, related matter, which is guarantee of very long-term US military aid to Israel, including some of the weapon systems that the US thus far has refrained from supplying to Israel (like long-range refueling tankers, heavy-lift bomber aircraft, and bunker-buster bombs).

The current 10-year US-Israel military aid package (or FMS, foreign military sales, giving Israel billions of dollars in credit for the purchase of US platforms like the F-35 jet fighter) expires in less than three years. Now is the time to lock in a new package for many decades forward, in the context of new US commitments to a broad coalition of Middle East allies.

A third issue at hand is nuclearization of the Middle East. For two decades, Israel has sought to block the Iranian nuclear program because it is clearly aimed at producing multiple nuclear weapons aimed at Israel. Now Saudi Arabia is asking for US support for a Saudi civilian nuclear program that includes uranium enrichment.

Can Israel swallow this in the context of regional peace, or is the danger too high that a Saudi nuclear program could become military down the road? Wouldn’t Israeli acquiescence in a Saudi program almost assuredly guarantee and legitimize Turkish and Egyptian nuclear programs? Israel always has feared such broad nuclearization of its immediate neighborhood, and thus this may be an issue on which Israel cannot compromise without the most rigorous of security regimes.

A fourth issue is the Palestinian Authority which Israel can “bolster” but not reward because it remains thoroughly antisemitic, violent, rejectionist, and corrupt. But if Israel makes commitments to the US and/or Saudi Arabia about steps to calm the situation in the territories, and if the Saudis begin investing billions in propping up the PA (as their way of compensating for the peace with Israel) – what will be when Israel must, inevitably, strike at its enemies? Will Israel’s hands be tied?

What will be when the IDF again must raid Jenin to kill terrorists, or launch another operation against Hamas in Gaza, push back much harder against Hezbollah provocations in the north, or even conduct an all-out sustained campaign to confiscate the vast amounts of weaponry that have flooded into Israeli Arab leading to both terrorist and intra-Arab political killings at frightening levels?

Will the Saudis be in a position to demand and expect Israeli “restraint” because Jerusalem “owes” Riyadh big time for the peace accord? This is not a dynamic that Israel wants to see develop, and thus these issues must be discussed and quietly fleshed out in advance.

THE FIFTH and most substantial issue of them all is the need to neutralize Iran’s threatening nuclear and other military capabilities. Israel cannot acquiesce in a dynamic whereby the Biden administration expects Israeli silence on the Iran file in exchange for Biden’s brokering of a Saudi-Israel peace accord.

On the contrary, especially in the context of US commitments to a regional pro-Western strategic alliance involving Saudi Arabia and Israel, Jerusalem must insist on a tougher-than-ever stance by Washington against Iran’s nuclear juggernaut.

Unfortunately, unless there has been a real change of heart at the apex of the current Democratic administration, I don’t see this emerging. Consequently, Israel must not give off any signals that it is going to dial down its own interdiction efforts against Iran, under any circumstances.

As my colleague Meir Ben-Shabbat, head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy (and former national security adviser to the prime minister) has written, “The more a proposed draft US-Israel Defense Treaty (and I add, other understandings between the US and Saudi Arabia) bolsters Israel’s deterrence and guarantees its freedom of operation and its ability to defend itself by itself while increasing the US commitment to bolstering Israeli military capabilities and qualitative edge, and if the overall gambit doesn’t undercut the struggle against Iran, and if all this deepens bipartisan commitment in the US toward the Jewish state – then we have a good thing going.”

If and only then, Israel should embrace the opportunities while swallowing and trying to minimize the difficulties and standing prepared to navigate a brave new world.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, October 29, 2023; and Israel Hayom, October 1, 2023.



Sabotaging Saudi-Israeli Peace

written by David M. Weinberg | 11.03.2024

Actors on the US hard left are seeking to scuttle normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem. They will not tolerate any breakthrough in ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel during the tenure of Prime Minister Netanyahu and certainly not until they get their long-groused-about Palestinian state.

Worse still is that the Biden administration seems hell-bent on once again offering the mullahs of Tehran a sweetheart deal with the US: the release of $10 billion or more in frozen Iranian assets and clemency for Iran’s near-breakout nuclear advances of recent years, in exchange for Iranian release of American hostages and warmed-over pious Iranian pledges to freeze the Shiite atomic bomb program at a near-breakout point.

Washington expects Israeli acquiescence in the emerging US surrender to Iran in exchange for a series of other things important to Israel. These include US backing for Israel against escalated Palestinian assaults expected this fall in UN forums; toning down US criticism regarding settlement and security matters (at a time when the IDF is going to have to intensify its anti-terrorist operations in Judea and Samaria); an easing of US pressures on Israel in connection with domestic matters (like judicial reform); a warm Washington visit for Prime Minister Netanyahu (which is not just a political concession but rather is critical to Israel’s overall deterrent posture); and most of all, significant American moves towards reconciliation with Saudi Arabia (which is critical to driving a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi ties).

In a nasty 6,000-word essay last month, New York Times columnist Tom Friedman tied all these issues together into one big bang-up assault on Israel. He started by comparing the forward-looking agenda of Saudi Arabia under its young leader Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman with the backwardness of Israel under the nationalist-haredi coalition headed by Netanyahu. Friedman then called upon the Biden administration to play hardball with Israel.

“Biden should only invite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Oval Office if he will answer two questions: One, (do you admit to) occupying the West Bank and (are you) committed to resolving its permanent status through negotiations with the Palestinians, or do you see Israel’s current control of the Palestinians as the permanent status, never to be changed? We need to know once and for all.”

“And two, are you committed to ensuring that any major changes to Israel’s court system will be implemented with broad public support to ensure political stability, because the US has a huge interest in its most important military ally in the region not descending into civil war over judicial reform?”

Friedman barked that “For the last 75 years Israel has been a trusted and vital strategic partner of the United States, but that was always based on shared interests and shared values. If those values aren’t shared any longer, we need to know that. We need to get behind those Israelis who want to preserve Israel as a democracy — and keep locking the White House gates to anyone who doesn’t.”

Now, Friedman takes his animus one step further, applying a bludgeon to the nascent détente between the Jewish state and the most important country in the Arab and Islamic world. He is frightened that “by rewarding Bibi with the ultimate prize of diplomatic relations with Riyadh, the Saudis could cement Netanyahu’s extremist coalition in power for years —without any Israeli concessions to the Palestinians in the West Bank.”

Simply put, Friedman and the Biden officials he is fronting for prefer sandbagging Netanyahu and pumping runaway Palestinian statehood to breakthrough diplomacy that would transform the Mideast. They fancy promoting Mahmoud Abbas and the rickety Palestinian Authority to advancing America’s regional strategic interests and Israel’s core security interests. And they favor another sell-out US deal with Iranians to a win-win-win deal that draws the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia together.

Alas, delaying Saudi normalization with Israel, and holding back on a courtesy visit to Biden’s Washington for Netanyahu until Israel concedes to maximalist Palestinian demands, is a dead-end path for regional peace and stability. It is a recipe for another 100 years of unnecessary Arab-Israeli conflict, and would be yet another prize for the mullahs of Tehran.

Irony of ironies! It is not the Saudis who are placing Palestinian rights in the way of Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, but rather American pundits and politicians obsessed with the Palestinians (no matter how many wrongs the Palestinians commit).

Every serious interlocutor I know who has spent significant time in Riyadh in recent months says that Saudi leaders no longer insist on Palestinian statehood as a condition for movement towards Israel. The Saudis realize, as did the Emiratis, Bahrainis, and the Moroccans, that current Palestinian leaders are incapable of compromising for peace – and they see no reason to be held back any longer by Palestinian rejectionism.

What the Saudis need are not hackneyed exhortations and stale formulas related to Palestinians. What they need and want are concrete understandings with Washington on security and economic matters, and partnership with Israel.

THE SOUR AND REJECTIONIST approach described above is characteristic of the reluctance of progressives to fully embrace the Abraham Accords. Alas, many of them still consider the Accords a Trump-tainted gimmick or a Netanyahu-stained end-run around the Palestinians, and not an authentic breakthrough for peace and security in the Middle East.

It is hard for them to swallow the fact Arab countries are band-wagoning with Israel pointedly because Arab leaders view Israel demonstrably as a force for good, knowledge, prosperity, and stability in the Middle East.

It is even harder for the extremists among them to accept the blunt refutation inherent in the Abraham Accords of the ongoing Palestinian campaign to deny and criminalize the Jewish people’s historic rights in Israel.

And the Biden administration? Sadly, it has spent the past three years sitting on the sidelines of this historic transformation.

Instead of embracing the Abraham Accords early-on and investing in their expansion, the administration effectively has sabotaged them. It has prioritized a renewed nuclear deal with Iran while beating-up on Israel and Saudi Arabia for their democratic and/or human rights deficits.

For a while Biden’s aides even refused to speak the term “Abraham Accords.” Only recently has the administration started talking about appointing a special envoy to drive expansion of the Accords, and only because the Saudis effectively have threatened to bolt their alliance with West.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration has cozied-up to Qatar which sits securely in Iran’s regional camp, even extending non-NATO major ally status to Doha. And as mentioned above it seems about to agree to another bad deal with mullahs of Iran.

US policy must change. Despite “Trumpian residue” on the Abraham Accords and Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Abraham Accords dynamic – things that clearly bother Biden’s people; and even though Saudi-Israeli ties would be a political win for Netanyahu – something that clearly bothers Biden’s people too, doubling-down on the Accords should be a priority US foreign policy goal, a “no brainer.”

Expansion of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia might even move peace with Palestinians closer. It would most emphatically signal Palestinian leadership that the time to compromise with Israel has come. Perhaps Mohammed bin Salman might be able to convince Palestinians to accept the Jewish People’s historic rights in Israel and reach an amicable settlement.

For this and so many other reasons, Biden administration officials and mainstream Democrats in Congress ought to move beyond their Trump traumas, Netanyahu antipathies, and Iran illusions to get behind the Abraham Accords, bringing Riyadh into the regional peace revolution.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 9, 2023; Israel Hayom, June 11, 2023; and in expanded form in In Focus, summer 2023



Yes to Peace with Riyadh

written by David M. Weinberg | 11.03.2024

“If there’s a fire burning in their backyard, it’s going to be a lot tougher, if not impossible, to actually both deepen the existing agreements, as well as to expand them to include potentially Saudi Arabia,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently said about the message Washington has been communicating to senior Israeli officials. During his speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, he said that the effort to have Israel and Saudi Arabia normalize ties was “incredibly challenging” but also said that it is “a real prospect.”

We shouldn’t underestimate the impact that the current security situation in Judea and Samaria may have on the normalization efforts. Public sentiment sensitivities play a role; leaders in most countries try to avoid a situation in which they go against the overall prevailing opinion of the masses. The images coming out of Judea and Samaria do not add sympathy to Israel, to say the least. They provide easy propaganda fodder for Islamists, pro-Palestinian groups, and other anti-Israel elements. When Israel is viewed in a negative light on the street, everyone has to keep a lower profile until things calm down.

That said, it appears that Blinken is keen on capitalizing on Israel’s strong urge to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia by using it as leverage on the Jewish state on the Palestinian issue. The Biden administration has yet to reach any significant accomplishment on normalization, and despite clearly showing it wants to expand the Abraham Accords, Washington doesn’t have much to show for it.

Not only have no new countries joined the accords, but the progress in the existing agreements is also only through the bilateral channels established during the previous administration. Apart from the Negev Forum, whose importance was in that it actually convened, there have not been significant projects or initiatives on a multi-national scale since the accords were signed.

The agreement with Sudan has yet to have been completed and is currently in limbo because of the ongoing civil war. Even with Morocco, with which relations have been expanding and deepening as of late, there has yet to be a shift in the political echelons that would allow a full-fledged embassy to be opened in both countries, and the king has yet to meet Israeli officials.

The truth must be said: Israel’s conduct may be a factor in how the Saudis decide on normalization, but it is not the crucial factor. The US and its policies in the region have had a much strong effect on shaping the current reality. America’s weakening and its conduct in the region drove Saudi Arabia to the arms of the Chinese and as a result – albeit unintentionally – hurt the momentum with Israel.

Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is a vested US interest and the West, not just in Jerusalem and Riyadh. It will drive the kingdom farther away from the Chinese-Iranian-Russian orbit and will grant the advantage it needs in the competition over the new world order. It has the potential to turn Saudi Arabia into an international hub that would connect Europe, Africa, and Asia, thus revolutionizing international trade.

As far as Israel is concerned, normalization with Saudi Arabia is an important objective, but not at all costs. Concessions on Iran and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, as well as security-related gestures on the Palestinian theater, do not give enough bang for the buck, despite the major boon normalization would be.