

Jihadists surrounding al-Sharaa haven't abandoned extreme vision

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 22.07.2025

Meir Ben Shabbat: The events in Syria provided the whole world with an opportunity to see again what Jolani's [Ahmed al-Sharaa] 'base' looks like. This does not mean that Israel should give up on the possibility of political arrangements while exploiting Jolani's current weakness, but it requires calibrating expectations and ensuring that we do not give up on other interests just for the chance of an agreement.

Israel's intervention had been a strategic necessity to secure its border.

The takeover of this region by extremist Sunni elements could allow the establishment of hostile elements and jihadist terrorists near the border and across the entire southern Syrian Golan. Israel's intervention was intended to send a clear message: there will be no change in the balance of power in the southern Syria region without Israel's consent, nor will there be a deployment of capabilities that could threaten Israel within a distance determined by it (in other words: defining a demilitarized zone).

Published in JNS, July 22, 2025.



Why Israel Stands by Syria's Druze

written by Ruth Wasserman Lande | 22.07.2025

Ruth Wasserman Lande: We have a very amazing minority in Israel, a Druze minority, largely in the north of the country. All of them are very loyal citizens and civilians of Israel, most of whom serve in the IDF, and some of them have even fallen in the war since October 7. This is like a brotherhood between Jewish Israeli civilians and Druze Israeli civilians. Many of the people in Suweida are in fact family members of those Druze in the north of Israel.

So it is expected by our own civilians, our own citizens, that the Israeli IDF would protect their family members from literally slaughter—and what we experienced on October 7th, which is similar to what happened actually in Suweida.

The interview took place in Al Arabiya on July 18, 2025.

Calculated Risks and Costly Mistakes

written by Prof. Kobi Michael | 22.07.2025

Prof. Kobi Michael: It was evident the Israeli military did take “some risks” when it comes to “collateral damage” when the “importance of a Hamas target is very high.” In other cases, there were “unfortunately some mistakes.”

Published in NBC NEWS, July 16, 2025.



The Key Is in Qatar - U.S. Pressure Still Insufficient

written by Prof. Kobi Michael | 22.07.2025

Prof. Kobi Michael: The American administration comes closer and closer to the understanding that they didn't do or have not done enough with regard to Qatar. They have to increase the pressure on Qatar.

The idea that Hamas leaders still live in a very comfortable zone, which is Qatar — Doha — with all of their money, with all of the facilities that they use there, and they believe that they are with the upper hand and they can put demands in front of Israel and in front of the mediator including the Americans, is something that indicates that they are in a deep misperception with regard to their understanding the reality.

The interview took place on ILTV on July 15, 2025.

The Quiet Alliance Against the Shiite Axis

written by Ruth Wasserman Lande | 22.07.2025

Ruth Wasserman Lande: Basically, there has been a lowkey behind the scenes cooperation and uh coordination with the Gulf countries for certain because of course they see the Shiite access something which is horrific. As I said, it's first and foremost, and I'm sorry if I'm sounding like a clock gone wrong, but this is the thing that It's all about the Shiite and the Sunni war.

And what are they worrying about to create an Islamic caliphate? I'm talking about the extremist is Islam is not all of them an Islamic caliphate based on Sharia depending on which Sharia Shiite or Sunni. Now the Saudis see the Shiite threat as something quite horrific. I mean the Iranians have been feeding the

Houthis that have been attacking the Saudis and their oil refineries and so on for years. Likewise, the United Arab and so on. Did they come out and say that openly? No. But have you ever visited the Arab League? Everything is said in between the lines.

A lecture in Washington to the Israel on Campus Coalition (ICC), 14 July, 2025.

Highest levels of decision-makers in Egypt view Israel as imperialist

written by Ruth Wasserman Lande | 22.07.2025

Ruth Wasserman Lande: The Egyptian leadership operates under a deeply ingrained, distorted perception of Israeli intentions. There is no rational motive for Egypt to build a force that is essentially offensive against Israel. It doesn't make sense.

For this, one needs to understand the Egyptian state of mind, which perceives, at the highest decision-making levels, the State of Israel as an imperialist state that aspires to expand, with an emphasis on the current government. That is, the highest echelons [in Egypt] see steps taken by Israel as steps whose purpose is imperialistic.

Published in JNS, July 11, 2025.



Israel insists on keeping troops in Gaza. That complicates truce talks with Hamas

written by Prof. Kobi Michael | 22.07.2025

Prof. Kobi Michael: Controlling the Morag corridor might allow for military operations further north against Hamas, potentially paving the way for a conclusion to the conflict, which Israel is determined to escalate until it neutralizes Hamas. That would allow Israeli troops to operate further north without Palestinian civilians getting caught in the crossfire,

Published in The Minnesota Star Tribune, Click Orlando, SSBCrack News, July 09, 2025.



Israel Has Proven It Can Be Flexible Without Crossing Its Red Lines

written by Ruth Pines-Feldman | 22.07.2025

Ruth Pines Feldman: Israel has proven it can be flexible while still upholding its red lines. Israel's ability to sway the US administration against a deal with Iran while also convincing Trump that the US needed to join in on the attack has proven its aptitude in applying pressure. Also contributing to the American decision was Iran's stalling of negotiations, which further pushed Washington to choose the military option against Iran.

There is an American desire to end the war in Gaza, coupled with a willingness to negotiate and pressure on Israel. But because of Hamas' lack of flexibility, Israel

will be successful in changing the American position to understanding its red lines.

Published in The Media Line, July 09, 2025.



The War Must End on Israel's Terms

written by Prof. Kobi Michael | 22.07.2025

Prof. Kobi Michael: We could have achieved the military goal two months ago — maybe even earlier, since the end of the last ceasefire on March 18. The cabinet had a clear plan: occupy 70% of Gaza, push the population to the south into safe zones, and fully besiege the remaining 30% — mainly Gaza City. Anyone remaining would be considered a Hamas militant, and have only two options: surrender or be killed. Unfortunately, we didn't stick to that plan.

If we choose the negotiation path, we must follow it to the end — without hesitation. If we choose the military path, we must break Hamas completely. We can't keep wavering.

The interview took place on ILTV, on July 7, 2025.

Iran Will Retaliate — The Houthis Won't Back Down

written by Noa Lazimi | 22.07.2025

Noa Lazimi: In fact, Iran is highly motivated to retaliate now. And in my view, it's only a matter of time until it does so. Now, as for the Houthis, despite the fact that they don't seem to possess a relatively high level of threat to Israel, what worries me most is their consistency and their radical ideology. I mean, they're not showing any signs of backing down. And you would expect them to be extremely weakened or at least not as motivated to provoke Israel after the major hit that Iran suffered. And obviously that did impact their weapon supply and also taking into account the American air sites on Yemen. But still for them it's important to show even with a few missiles that they're still in the picture that they're here to stay and we have to take them into account in the regional order.

The interview took place on Channel I24, on July 3, 2025.