Among the questions related to the attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, Shin Bet security agency experts will also try to answer whether this event heralds the return of suicide terrorism to our daily routine.

The “work accident” that caused the explosive device to detonate and the terrorist to die before carrying out his plan shifts the spotlight to the new-old danger lurking at our doorstep: suicide attacks. This pattern can develop today as a result of the combination of four factors: high motivation among Palestinians from the West Bank to harm Israel, availability of weapons, explosives and laboratories for manufacturing and assembling bombs, guidance from command elements on the ground or abroad, and the fourth factor is the many breaches in the defense along the seam zone.

If indeed a decision has been made to return to this pattern of activity, it can be seen as evidence of the success of the IDF and Shin Bet in thwarting the terrorist elements to achieve effectiveness through typical methods. Suicide terrorism is perceived as the “weapon of the weak,” and its use is not free from criticism even by supporters of terrorism, given its implications and the damage it causes to the organization’s image, especially after the ISIS phenomenon.

To prevent the emergence of this type of terror wave, immediate implementation of the lessons Israel learned after the waves of attacks in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, which caused about 700 fatalities, is required.

First and foremost, tightening security and closing breaches in the seam zone – while significantly increasing penalties and administrative sanctions against those involved in bringing illegal residents into Israel, harboring them, or employing them in Israel.

The linkage between these components and their importance was well described by the Haifa District Court in a ruling given in January this year, “The security system invests billions of shekels in building and maintaining a security fence, whose purpose is to prevent the entry of unauthorized persons, in diagnosing the population requesting entry permits to Israel and issuing permits to those who do not pose a security risk to the state’s citizens, in deploying battalions whose task is to catch infiltrators into the country, in deploying police forces responsible for their arrest after entry. When the enforcement policy is not strict, not deterrent and not preventive, the scope of the phenomenon is wide and its spread is expected.”

“In this situation, the chances of the security forces succeeding in the mission of thwarting infiltration are significantly reduced. This simple truth is true in times of calm, it is seven times truer in times of war.”

An increase in the pace and intensity of proactive operations in cities and refugee camps is also required, to eliminate “laboratories,” weapons stockpiles, and armed organizations – the offensive approach of the security forces since Oct. 7 has achieved many successes and forced the heads of terrorist gangs to invest efforts in hiding and protecting their lives, this should be continued and intensified.

In addition, increased efforts to prevent smuggling of weapons and dual-use materials used for explosives production, from Israel or Jordan, into the West Bank. Also, demolishing the homes of terrorists involved in such attacks, regardless of the attack’s outcome or the terrorist’s place of residence and status. This, as a deterrent measure in light of the severity of these attacks and in the absence of other deterrent measures against potential terrorists.

Another necessary step is preventing glorification and inspiration – preventing ceremonies, public exposure of the circumstances of terrorists’ recruitment for these missions, as far as it involves their exploitation against the background of personal distress or deception by terrorist elements.

We must not accept a situation where authorities allow early release of terrorists from prisons in Israel or hesitate to carry out security arrests due to the shortage of detention facilities. The State of Israel has known how to deal with greater challenges than the need to quickly prepare detention facilities, and it is certain that it will know how to do so today, in line with the needs of the hour.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 20, 2024.

While tensions rise on the northern front and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continue operations in Rafah and eastern Gaza City, the Jenin area serves as a stark reminder of the deteriorating security situation in northern Samaria and the challenges it poses to Israel.

The escalation in the preparation and use of explosive devices against IDF forces on access roads to Palestinian settlements and refugee camps in Samaria demonstrates the increasing capabilities and learning curve of terrorist elements in this region. Their threats against Israeli communities along the border area indicate their intentions.

The “Gazafication” process in this area began well before Oct. 7, but inspired by the war in Gaza and after adapting to IDF operational patterns, it could accelerate and amplify the challenges of multi-arena warfare if not swiftly addressed.

Jenin has a long history of violence. It is geographically, politically, socially, and economically peripheral. Central government control has always been weak there. This was true even in the 1930s during the British Mandate, when its forces eliminated Izz ad-Din al-Qassam in the nearby village of Yabad, whose name later became an inspiration and symbol for Hamas terror cells.

During the Second Intifada, this area was seen as a stronghold of Palestinian resistance. The battle in the Jenin refugee camp is considered one of the most difficult events in Operation Defensive Shield. Even then, the collaboration between different groups in this camp was notable, as was the use of explosive devices and booby traps, and the reliance on civilians and civilian facilities for hiding and storing weapons. Jenin’s resistance ethos became a symbol for terrorist organizations and inspired Palestinian attackers from all areas.

In the decade following “Defensive Shield,” this area re-established itself as a terrorist stronghold in Samaria and a hub for exporting attackers and attacks throughout the West Bank and Israel. Exactly a year ago, the IDF launched a major operation in this sector aimed at curbing the growth of terrorism and reducing its capabilities. The goal was to create conditions allowing Israeli forces to carry out routine prevention operations without requiring large troop deployments and special efforts. The operation achieved its goals, but as is often the case in such conflicts, its conclusion merely set the stage for a new cycle of escalation and preparation for future confrontations.

Since the outbreak of the war, IDF forces have arrested more than 4,200 terrorist operatives from the West Bank, averaging about 16 operatives per day. Of those arrested, 1,750 are Hamas operatives. These figures not only demonstrate the scale of the security forces’ preventive efforts but also reveal the terrorist potential in the West Bank that’s reaching a boiling point.

The findings of the quarterly survey by the PSR Institute (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research), headed by Khalil Shikaki and published in early June, indicated strengthening support for Hamas in the West Bank. The survey found that 73% of residents in this area expressed support for Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, while 79% believed Hamas would win the war in Gaza. Overall support for Hamas among West Bank residents increased compared to the previous survey.

This situation requires the security forces to adopt a firm and uncompromising approach towards terrorism in the West Bank. The “Gazafication” process should also be applied by Israel towards terrorist centers, increasing pressure on them. If Jenin chooses to behave like Gaza, it will face consequences similar to Gaza.

It is advisable to increase efforts to thwart bomb-making laboratories and destroy buildings suspected of being used for the preparation or storage of explosive devices. Combining this with airstrikes is recommended, in part to reduce risks to Israeli forces. Activities to prevent the smuggling of explosives should continue, including stopping the entry of dual-use materials used for this purpose.

Consideration should be given to implementing enhanced security measures in the border area, including specific instructions for opening fire. This is to prevent ideas for carrying out attacks on communities inspired by Oct. 7.

The West Bank is currently defined as a secondary arena in Israel’s multi-arena campaign. Successfully addressing these challenges will help maintain this definition and prevent the area from deteriorating into a situation that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas would like to see.

In a gradual process, akin to the “boiling frog” metaphor, Israel may find itself returning to the pre-Oct. 7 reality in Gaza if clear red lines are not drawn for Israeli policy on Gaza-related issues and the many dilemmas they present.

As long as the war goals have not been achieved and a deal for the release of hostages has not been formulated within the parameters defined by political leadership, there is no reason to reduce pressure on Hamas or adopt a more moderate security approach in areas that may affect the achievement of these goals. In fact, the opposite is true.

Examples include special security measures in the security perimeter (including the size of the buffer zone), policy on using force against Hamas’s governance efforts, policy towards participants in the Oct. 7 attack who are not officially affiliated with terrorist organizations, removing potential threats from Gaza to targets in Israel (instead of fortifying the southern railway infrastructure or worrying about the tall buildings in the city of Sderot), humanitarian aid entry policy (quantity, sources, coordination, and inspection methods), policy on introducing dual-use items into Gaza (including for humanitarian facilities), and approach to infrastructure work in Gaza (such as connecting the desalination plant to electricity).

While these issues may seem minor in the context of the larger war, their cumulative effect on Hamas governance, its recovery chances, and changes to the regional security situation require political leadership to thoroughly examine these matters.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 30, 2024.

It would be nice if Palestinian Muslims in Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would approach their holy month of Ramadan (which begins this weekend) as intended by their religion – as a month of fasting, charity, prayer, contrition, and reflection.

Many devout Muslims do so, but it is also true that Ramadan frequently has been celebrated with Muslim, especially Palestinian, violence. Ramadan is exploited as an excuse for ramped-up holy war against Israel.

Those with long memories will remember that Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 – during the month of Ramadan. In many Arab circles, it is still called the “Ramadan War.” Somehow the prayer, contrition, and reflection did not inhibit that sneak attack that slaughtered 2,700 Israelis.

Neither did the fasting. Egyptian and Syrian soldiers were given an exemption from fasting because they were engaged in the religious duty of killing infidels.

Those with short-term memories, which excludes many individuals in the Biden White House and Blinken State Department, can easily ascertain that Israel’s enemies have long used Ramadan to murder Jews. In 2016, Hamas gleefully labeled the murderous attack on the Sarona Market in Tel Aviv the “Ramadan Operation” and celebrated the “First Attack of Ramadan.” Other terrorist attacks on Jews soon followed, making that year’s Ramadan a particularly bloody month in Israel.

It is not even limited to Jews. In 2016 and 2017, ISIS twice bombed a popular street in Baghdad during Ramadan, killing hundreds of Muslims. During that same 2016 Ramadan, a radical Muslim attacked the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, murdering 49 people. These are not isolated examples. Arabs have historically fought vicious wars against each other during Ramadan.

And sure enough, again this year, everybody fears “escalation” during Ramadan, especially since Hamas and its mouthpiece the Al Jazeera broadcasting network are religiously calling for expansion of the “Al Aqsa Flood” (i.e., the current war launched by Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack) to Jerusalem and the West Bank via terrorism and uprising.

And so, the defense establishment in this country is warning Israeli leaders to pay deference to Ramadan, to be extra cautious during Ramadan, and to do nothing to “provoke” Muslims on Ramadan – especially in and around Jerusalem’s Temple Mount – because Muslim emotions are oh-so-very sensitive during that month.

President Biden even has gone as far as to hint that Israel should halt its war against Hamas in Gaza to allow Muslims to piously observe Ramadan and, supposedly, tap into some of that famous Ramadan charitable spirit, leading Hamas to reverently melt toward a magnanimous hostage deal. (Halevai, I wish it were to be so.)

To a Jew and an Israeli, such sentiments sound bizarre, because they are bizarre. As the sage Rabbi Steven Pruzansky (formerly of Teaneck NJ and now of Modi’in) brilliantly has written, “I do not recall ever becoming so agitated over the Ten Days of Repentance between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur that I felt the urge to run out and attack innocent gentiles, or even guilty ones. Nor have I ever heard of that passion afflicting any Jew.”

“For that matter, it is inconceivable to any Jew – or any normal, moral, right-thinking person – to yell “God is Great” as a prelude to murdering, raping, marauding, beheading, exploding, stabbing, shooting innocent people, for whatever reason. Perhaps good Muslims should use this Ramadan for soul searching and how best to uproot this savage evil from their midst.”

It is the soft bigotry of low expectations that so-called security experts, politicians, diplomats, and statesmen nod their heads and say, “Well, of course, tensions always run high during Ramadan, and as such Jews should keep a low profile, because Muslim violence must be anticipated during the holy month.” Such a sentiment insults the majority of the world’s Muslims, as well as our intelligence. It is the very definition of surrendering to bullies rather than confronting them and vanquishing them.

This leads me to Palestinian-Jordanian impudence and Israeli infirmity in and around the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Look at how the government of Israel was tied-into-fits this week with urgent consultations on how and whether to impose anti-riot limits on Arab visitors to the two Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount during the upcoming Ramadan month.

This comes against the background of the threats described above, and stepped-up Jordanian and the Palestinian Authority efforts in the international arena to warn of the “dangers of any attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo at the holy site,” and “to reaffirm Jordan’s role as custodian of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.”

They describe Israeli visits to the Temple Mount and the quiet, unofficial Jewish prayer quorums that sometimes gather there as “stormings” and “violent incursions” into Al-Aqsa, and as the “Judaization” of Jerusalem and its Muslim holy sites.

The inversion of truth contained in the above presentation is utterly galling! If anybody has unilaterally, brazenly, and violently changed the status quo on the Temple Mount over the past 25 years, it is radical Palestinian and Islamic actors who have turned it into a base of hostile operations against Israel, instead of protecting it as a zone of prayer and peace.

Israel, on the other hand, has acted with utmost restraint in the face of Arab assaults.

The Wakf and Islamic movement provocateurs have attacked Jewish visitors to the Mount, Jewish worshipers at the Western Wall below the Mount, and Jewish worshippers on their way to the Western Wall. They have attacked Emiratis and Bahrainis praying in Al-Aqsa mosque (because these countries signed Abraham Accord peace treaties). They have greatly restricted visitation rights to the holy mount for all non-Muslims and hijacked the pulpits in the mosque on the mount to preach hatred and violence against Israel.

The Wakf also has conducted vast, illegal construction projects on the mount and beneath it, willfully destroying centuries of Jewish archaeological treasures. (Four hundred trucks full of archaeologically rich rubble were unceremoniously dumped by the Wakf into the Kidron Valley. Thousands of artifacts from the temple periods have been since found in this rubble.)

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas continues to stoke a broad-scale campaign against the authenticity of Israel’s historic rights in Jerusalem. In September 2015 he screeched about “filthy” Jewish feet that were “desecrating” holy Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. “Al-Aqsa is ours and so is the Church of the Holy Sepulcher,” he bellowed. “They [the Jews] have no right to desecrate them with their filthy feet. We won’t allow them to do so, and we will do whatever we can to defend Jerusalem.”

At the same time, the PA-controlled Wakf has allowed ISIS, Hamas, Islamic Movement, and Turkish flags to fly on the Temple Mount in violation of all understandings, as well as blood-curdling banners with calls to annihilate Israel and the Jewish people.

This inflamed and despicable discourse now is being picked up by gullible (and not-so-gullible) Western progressives, who blabber about Israel’s “unprovoked” and “unacceptable” actions on the Temple Mount, “excessive” force, and “violations” of the “status quo.”

Even well-meaning Western spokespeople, like the State Department spokesman, have fallen victim to the Big Lie, with mollycoddling mumbo-jumbo about the need for “all sides to de-escalate and respect the sanctity and status quo of holy sites in Jerusalem.”

All sides should de-escalate? Status quo? Sanctity of holy sites? What the heck are they talking about? There is only one side, the Arab side, that purposefully has escalated the violence in Jerusalem and defiantly defiled Har HaBayit over the past 25 years! It is the Palestinians who have turned Al Aqsa and the entire mountain plaza into extra-territorial headquarters for the propagation of blood-curdling Big Lies about Israel.

In fact, Palestinian violence and Islamic exclusivism have become the new Temple Mount status quo. This is the status quo Western leaders demand that Israel preserve?

Alas, the governments of Israel seem to have gone mute in the face of the slanders at the heart of the Palestinian-Islamic narrative regarding the Temple Mount and the Jewish presence in Zion. Even now, when Hamas and its allies in Judea and Samaria are at war with Israel, Israeli leaders continually prefer to keep things quiet and “restore calm” after every wave of Palestinian assault and to swear fealty to a “status quo” that is long dead.

To top it all off, Jordan has the nerve amidst all this to ask Israel for additional water allocations. Even as Jordanian Queen Rania continues to deny and downplay the October 7 attacks, and Prime Minister Bisher Al-Khasawneh and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi lambaste Israel with the most vicious anti-Israel rhetoric, Jordan wants an additional 50 million cubic meters of water over and beyond amounts Israel is obligated to provide under the 1994 peace treaty. This is chutzpah par excellence.

But hey, in the pious spirit of Ramadan, what’s 50 million cm. of water among friends?

Published in The Jerusalem Post, March 9, 2024; and in Israel Hayom. March 10,  2024.

Executive Summary 

• The present policy that prevents Palestinian laborers from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) from entering Israel should be continued for the time being.

• The case for allowing them back into Israel is based on concern that economic distress, frustration and unemployment in Judea and Samaria will lead to violence against Israel by the already frustrated population. An additional consideration is the impact of the closure on the Israeli economy and particularly on the construction sector.
• The counterargument is based on concern about terror attacks carried out in Israel by Palestinian laborers . The current war in Gaza drives a desire for revenge attacks, especially in light of the images and messages that Al-Jazeera constantly broadcasts.
• From the perspective of the Israeli economy, especially from a long-term perspective, it is a mistake for the construction industry to rely on Palestinian workers.
• Instead of bringing back Palestinian laborers, the arrival of foreign workers from other countries should be encouraged, and barriers to the operation of foreign construction companies in Israel should be reduced. Also, Israelis need to be drawn into the construction sector.
• Quotas on foreign workers should be cancelled and the employment of foreign workers in all sectors should permitted, while levying appropriate taxes on their employment.

Background

 The regulation of Palestinian labor in Israel began in the late 1960s. However, there have been several times during which Israel significantly reduced the number of Palestinian workers, during the intifada periods and during terror attacks, after the disengagement, during the Covid pandemic[1] and during times of heightened security sensitivity.

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of Palestinian workers in Israel, particularly after the permit reform that Israel passed in 2022.[2] As of the first quarter of 2023, over 150,000 Palestinian workers worked in Israel, of whom 30,000 did not have a permit. The construction industry was the largest employer of Palestinian workers in Israel; it employed some 125,000 non-Israeli workers, of whom 104,000 were Palestinians.

The Problem

Integration of Palestinian workers in Israel also has negative economic aspects. The substantial demand that exists demonstrates the dependence of the Palestinian labor market on the Israeli economy. Bank of Israel statistics from as far back as 2014 show that work in Israel is very important to the Palestinian economy. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian workers in the Israeli economy made up 11.7% of the Palestinian labor force in Judea and Samaria, and their total wages in 2013 were equivalent to 12.3% of the Palestinian economy in Judea and Samaria.[3] Since then the number of Palestinian workers in Israel has risen from 92,000 to over 150,000.

Because the majority of Palestinian workers work in Israel in professions that do not require training involving study courses or academic degrees, but instead are manual labor positions in construction and agriculture, this situation creates a disincentive to pursue studies and higher education, and does not encourage workers to work in their fields within the Palestinian Authority. Wages in Israel are sometimes twice as high as in the Palestinian Authority, including in jobs that require professional training or studies.[4] This created a body of workers within the PA who enjoy wages that are significantly better than those workers who do not work in Israel. As a result, a dynamic is created of economic pressure to give permits to workers from the PA, subject to Shin Bet authorization, with all that this implies.

In addition to the substantial growth in work permits given to Palestinian laborers in 2022, Bank of Israel statistics indicate that 15,000 Palestinian workers without permits (illegally present) were employed in the construction sector during this period. Other assessments place the number higher, at 40,000 or more illegally present workers. Some sleep in their places of work, such as construction sites. In total, the number of Palestinian laborers Israel brought into its territory, with and without permits, reached some 160,000, almost all men working in manual labor.[5]

From the point of view of the Israeli economy and from a long-term perspective, the reliance of the construction sector (as well as other sectors) on low-cost Palestinian labor causes several problems. These include: A disincentive to invest in improving sector productivity through investment in physical capital and advanced technology; harm to the wages and employment of low-education Israeli workers, especially Arab young people (which increases the phenomenon of crime in Arab society in Israel); significant harm to these sectors during periods of closures and temporary cessation of entry of Palestinian laborers (which are typically sudden and unplanned), as is occurring now – and as a result of this harm, creation of heavy lobbying and political pressure by the heads of organizations from the industry (contractors, farmers and more) for emergency assistance from the government, while imposing the costs on the public at large.

Entry by Palestinian Laborers from Judea and Samaria to Israel should be Prevented for Security Reasons 

1. There is a real security concern from terror attacks inspired by or imitating Gaza.
2. Revenge attacks for the IDF’s widespread and unprecedented action in the Gaza Strip: workers who have family members in the Gaza Strip and who are fed by Arab press outlets broadcasting the dimensions of Israeli attacks in Gaza and the scope of damage there, from within the Strip, are likely to carry out revenge attacks on Israeli territory.
3. Revenge attacks for Israeli activity in Judea and Samaria: In this arena as well, Israeli security forces are working to eliminate and topple Hamas, which is causing destruction and not a few deaths.
4. The security system needs to focus on Gaza. The entry of Palestinian workers from Judea and Samaria will demand constant monitoring and intelligence gathering by security forces, especially the Shin Bet. This is a time when maximum attention should be paid to the ongoing fighting in Gaza.
5. A “margin of error” must be taken into account before reexamining the policy of bringing Palestinian workers into Israel who have been checked and granted permits, in light of testimonies that Palestinian workers from Gaza who entered Israel to work in the Gaza Envelope region gathered intelligence for the 7.10 massacre and assisted Hamas-ISIS. “Those who have been burned by scalding water, must be careful even with cold water.”

Economic Gaps caused by Non-Entry of the Workers 

The primary sectors harmed by the non-entry of the Palestinian workers are construction, agriculture, industry, health, restaurants, and cleaning.

Each of these sectors will require specific solutions that are independent of one another, but there are broad steps that can be taken to reduce gaps.

Considering the war and the ban on Palestinian worker entry, there are many pressures from employers, especially in the construction sector, to massively increase the quotas for foreign workers designated for work in this sector. There are already quotas today that are not being fully exploited; foreign workers are very fearful of coming to Israel during wartime; and foreign governments will not rush to sign new bilateral agreements. It should also be taken into account that, as fighting continues, construction workers from China could be asked by their families or by their government to leave due to worsening relations with Israel. This took place with many Thai workers, after foreign agricultural workers in the Gaza Envelope were seriously harmed on Black Saturday, 7.10. Over 30 foreign workers from Thailand and 10 from Nepal were murdered; some were held in Hamas captivity, and some were injured.[6] The medium-long term damage will be heavy; massive increases in quotas, especially for the construction sector (which already enjoys high quotas today in comparison to the rest of the economy) will make advancing a reform in the future very difficult.

It may also be the case that in the future Palestinian workers will be permitted to return to Israel, but it will be difficult to impossible to rapidly reduce the number of foreign workers in the sector. Furthermore, the future economic influence of Palestinian and foreign workers on the Israeli labor market is likely to be much more serious than it was in the past decade, when the macroeconomic situation was very good, and the unemployment rate of low-skilled Israeli workers was relatively low.

Solutions 

In light of the war, the government began to operate to reduce the economic damage caused by the non-entry of Palestinian workers: it increased the foreign workers quota from 30,000 to 50,000 in four tranches.[7] Government ministries that deal with this subject are likely to sign bilateral agreements with different countries to bring workers, including India, Sri Lanka, China and Moldova.[8] Furthermore, the Ministry of Housing streamlined the allocation process for foreign employment companies, which currently handle 12,000 workers, and will be increase by another 3,000 workers.

In addition to these actions, the gaps and needs in the economy caused by the non-entry of Palestinian workers can be overcome by taking the following proposed actions:

Recommendations

1. Employment of foreign workers in all sectors, while taxing their employment appropriately, at rates that will constitute fair compensation for the government and the public for the negative impact of employing foreign workers (economically and socially). Under the current policy in Israel, there are quotas for foreign workers in specific industries, which are the subject of positive discrimination in relation to other industries – these should be cancelled. The quotas for these specific industries have yet to prove their value, at least for some of them, and it appears that the industries that enjoy this benefit are those that managed to apply the most effective political pressure. Responding to these pressures would be a serious mistake from a socioeconomic perspective. The taxation that exists today in most industries that receive quota allocations is insufficient and does not cover the external costs to the market and to society. On the other hand, a blanket ban on bringing foreign workers other than in those specific industries is not optimal and creates an imbalance amongst employers in different sectors, incorrect market resource allocation and harm to productivity and growth.
2. Reducing regulation and other barriers that prevent foreign companies from participating in the Israeli economy. For example, there is no special reason to bring workers from China to work for Israeli contractors, if a Chinese construction company can carry out a project more efficiently and for a lower price, while bringing its own workers from China.
3. Encouraging populations in Israel that have high rates of unemployment to enter the workforce in affected industries, by offering tax benefits and economic incentives, and strengthening the interface between the construction sectors and the Israeli Employment Service.
4. Encouraging automation processes, the use of robotics and AI (for example promoting “smart agriculture” in Israel) in various businesses and markets harmed by the war. The government can temporarily promote this end via limited-term support and subsidies.

[1] “Palestinian employment in the Israeli economy during the Covid crisis,” Bank of Israel, 29 December 2020. https://boi.org.il/publications/pressreleases/29-12-20 [Hebrew]

[2] Government decision no. 1328 from 27 March 2022. https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/dec1328_2022  [Hebrew]

[3] “Section of a Bank of Israel report for 2014 that will be published soon: Expanded Palestinian employment in Israel and its characteristics”, Bank of Israel, 3 March 2013. https://boi.org.il/publications/pressreleases/קטע-מדוח-בנק-ישראל-לשנת-2014-שיתפרסם-בקרוב-התרחבות-התעסוקה-הפלסטינית-בישראל-ומאפייניה/  [Hebrew]

[4] Haggay Etkes, “The impact of employment in Israel on the Palestinian labor force”, Bank of Israel, November 2011 https://www.boi.org.il/media/qpclxnvw/dp201111h.pdf  [Hebrew];

Haggay Etkes and Esteban Klor, “A proposal for improving the fiscal and economic situation of the Palestinian Authority,” Institute for National Security Studies, 16 June 2022. https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/pa-fiscal

[Hebrew]

[5] Yuval Nisani, “90,000 Palestinian laborers work in construction. Who will replace them?” Globes, 27 October 2023 https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001461063 [Hebrew]; Sonia Gorodisky and Hili Yaakobi-Handelsman, “Within two years – the number of illegally present workers in Israel doubled,” Israel Hayom, 19 May 2022 https://www.israelhayom.co.il/business/article/11099138 [Hebrew].

[6] “Issues relating to labor migrants due to the Iron Swords War,” Kav Laoved Worker’s Hotline, 29 October 2023. [Hebrew]

[7] Government decision no. 1002 from 27 October 2023, increasing quotas for foreign workers in the construction industry due to the Iron Swords War and amendment to government decision. https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/dec1002-2023  [Hebrew]

[8] Yaara Shapira, “The program to replace Palestinian workers in the Israeli economy – permanently.” Kan, 31 December 2023 https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/666536 [Hebrew]

Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni and Prof. Kobi Michael are leading development of a national strategy for internal security, and the “Israel 2.0” research project, both at the Misgav Institute.

• Following the events of October 7, a comprehensive overhaul and rethinking are required regarding the defense of Israeli settlements, towns, and cities. Internal security arrays cannot be disconnected from other national defense systems.
• Analyzing the needs and practically addressing Israel’s internal security requirements requires categorizing the country’s settled areas based on a distinction between rural towns, outlying settlements, and large cities and the center of the country or metropolitan areas. Based on such categorization (as outlined in this paper) the principles for ensuring the security of settlements can be derived.
• The following security threats must be addressed: Attack by hostile entities (Israeli citizens and enemies) on cities including mixed towns, ambushes along traffic routes, as well as the blocking of traffic routes.
• In-depth consideration must be undertaken of the option of entrusting a National Guard with the overarching responsibility for settlement security arrays.
• Emergency or rapid-response squads in rural areas and along the borders (the external buffer zone) must prepare to be able to independently defend all civilian areas for up to six hours. The IDF, the police and rescue entities in these regions must be ready to intervene and provide defense within a time range not exceeding six hours. This means appropriate training, qualification, and equipment of rapid response squads, and command-and-control systems for coordination.

Introduction

The events of October 7, 2023 must lead to rethinking in many areas of security, including internal security as an integral part of national security. The incursion by Hamas terrorists into Gaza Envelope settlements and into IDF camps in that region not only caught IDF forces off-guard, but also demonstrated the extent of the collapse of the settlements’ regional defense concept. This was the result of a prolonged process in which the strength of rapid-response squads was sapped. In many places, local emergency teams had been stripped of their weapons or been forced to deposit weapons in inaccessible bunkers, preventing their real-time use in defense against attack.

The sequence of events which began on October 7 requires swift action to enhance settlement security both in frontier areas and in the center of the country. There is a real danger of broader conflict led by Hezbollah, Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, and – in the event of a serious deterioration in the security situation – also potentially violence on the part of Israeli Arabs in the center of the country.

 The Significance of October 7 for Internal Security

 Despite feats of heroism by rapid-response squads in the towns and farms of the Gaza Envelope, and even some local successes in stopping the tides of assault – in most places the emergency squads were unable to provide an adequate response to the threat. Though they clearly could not entirely thwart the massive assault, obviously more could have done given appropriate preparations.

The events revealed a systemic failure concerning the coordination and cooperation arrays between the military and police and the settlements. In most Gaza Envelope settlements, defense was haphazard at best. It was only the initiative and bravery displayed by combat soldiers of the IDF, the police and the Border Police who arrived in the area independently (rather than as properly organized and outfitted units) that partially saved lives.

A comprehensive overhaul and rethinking are required regarding the formation of settlements’ defensive arrays and of appropriate defensive arrays in cities. Such arrays cannot conduct themselves only independently and separately from the other security systems: the military, the police, the rescue entities and soon the National Guard as well. At this time, a broad and comprehensive systemic and nationwide perspective is required to enable the conceptual foundation for creating the arrays, bolstering the coordination and collaboration between them, outfitting, training and professionally qualifying them on a regular basis and, primarily, institutionalizing their patterns of operation and action.

The Threat

 In the context of the internal security concept in light of the war, the threat can be broken down into two components. The first concerns a (security) threat arising from action taken by hostile entities (though a clear distinction is required between hostile Israeli citizens and enemies of the state). The second is a (criminal) threat arising from the risk of weaponry falling into the hands of criminal and hostile entities, as well as misuse of such weaponry for purposes other than the one for which it was distributed.

A security assessment also must address the following possibilities: An attack by hostile entities (Israeli citizens and enemies) on settlements and populated areas, including mixed cities, ambushes along traffic routes, and the blocking of such traffic routes. This does not necessarily refer only to primary traffic routes but also to secondary routes and even to settlements’ access and escape routes, and to incidents of mass disorderly conduct which could evolve into such an attack. The attacks may be limited to a single settlement or to a region where hostile activity is taking place in several settlements and along several routes.

Categorizing Israeli Cities and Settlements

 To analyze and practically address the issue, Israeli cities/towns must be categorized based on a distinction between rural or outlying settlements and large cities and the center of the country or metropolitan areas. It is from this categorization that the principles for ensuring the security of the Settlement Project and of the rest of the country’s settlements must be derived. For this purpose, we have developed the following initial categorization:

Border-Adjacent Towns

 The threat to this group comprises the following components:

• An enemy incursion across the border in a scenario similar to that of October 7, with the key attribute being activity on an organized and planned “military” level including forces and assignments, taking place across the entire region and accompanied by a bombardment of mortar, rocket and missile fire.
• The enemy is armed with standard means, including light and heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, explosives and incendiaries and multiple vehicles outfitted for combat and mobility.
• This threat also includes the blocking both of primary and secondary traffic routes and junctions across the area, alongside a concurrent attack on IDF camps and outposts in the area.
• All these can take place in conjunction with an aerial threat in the form of drones/UAVs.
• This threat can occur without advance warning and with only a short time passing from the moment it breaks out until the enemy enters the settlements.

Second-Line Border Cities

Such settlements include, for example: Ashkelon, Ofakim and Netivot in the south, Kiryat Shmona in the north, etc.

• A threat similar to the one posed to border-adjacent settlements, but with longer time and space constants.
• Such settlements could also suffer from the development or outbreak of mass disorderly conduct, which, as stated above, could evolve into an assault.

Seam Line Towns

The threat to this group comprises the following components:

• An attack by organized, partially organized, or sporadic and disorganized groups on settlements. Such an attack will presumably not be accompanied by a massive bombardment (there may be local use of makeshift explosives). The attackers will presumably use standard, makeshift weaponry, as well as vehicles not outfitted for combat.
• An attack waged by the Palestinian Authority’s armed forces. (We assess this to be a low likelihood, but in view of the escalating security situation in Judea and Samaria and the accelerating trend of the PA’s weakening, this threat should be given due consideration.)
• Ambushes along traffic routes, as well as blocking them.
• The attacks may be limited to a single settlement or to a region where hostile activity is taking place in several settlements and along several routes, as well as incidents of mass disorderly conduct which, as stated above, could evolve into an assault.

Judea and Samaria Settlements

Here there is a threat similar to the one posed to Seam Line settlements, but much more serious. The escalating security situation in Judea and Samaria and the ongoing weakening of the PA increases security risks. The settlements are at risk of terrorist attack, even an attack like October 7, with Palestinian security forces participating in attacks and inflamed mob breaching the fences, while the PA’s security apparatus being either unable or unwilling to prevent the mob from breaking into the settlements.

Other Cities

 The threat to this group comprises the following components:

• A large number of terrorist squads infiltrating Israel on foot (in conjunction with, or separately from, the motorized incursion).
• Continuous massive and indiscriminate gunfire, including the use of grenades and other weapons, and including in conjunction with an aerial threat of drones/UAVs firing at the settlement’s residents on several sectors, while carrying out actions of murder, pillaging and burning.
• Entering residents’ homes to murder and abduct residents and burn their houses down.
• Firing at bus stops / public institutions or at crowds, cars, and public transportation.
• Vehicular attacks – running over people standing at bus stops and hitchhiker stops, including open-air stops.
• A ‘bargaining’ (hostage-taking) attack.

Further Steps

 A series of questions must be considered including: What must be addressed; what were the key points of failure; what role does settlement play in, or how does it contribute to, domestic and general security; where does the line pass between the police and the military and the interactions between the emergency squads and the military and police; and why did emergency squads fail? Formulating organizing principles to address all this requires an in-depth understanding of the importance of settlement and the security rationale of buffer zones and borders.

From buffer zone inwards, settlements serve as a defensive belt for settlements located deeper in the heart of the country, hence the link to domestic security – a National Guard. From buffer zones outward, they defend Israel’s borders and sovereignty, hence the link to military security – regional defense and the IDF.

This dual security rationale requires rethinking and translation into developing a mechanism for achieving connection / synchronization / synergy and integration between defense and security organizations and between them settlement rapid-response squads.

Discussion of the principles for coordination and collaboration must begin from the core –settlement emergency squads. From there, we must proceed to the regional buffer zone, breaking it down to the military and the police and to the connection and synchronization between them and the rescue entities and the National Guard. Within this framework, we must formulate an organizational structure, principles for coordination and collaboration, as well as command and control. An in-depth review of these subjects will be presented in the comprehensive document.

We estimate that serious consideration should be given to the option of entrusting a National Guard with the overarching responsibility for the settlement security arrays. All this is contingent on the assumption that a National Guard indeed will be created and will act in a manner which grants it the abilities and powers to be entrusted with such responsibility and to implement it. This also hinges on the size of said National Guard. As we understand it, a standing force must be created, alongside a large scale of forces consisting of about 20 brigades, organized by region.

Recommendations

The events of October 7, which are yet to be investigated and studied, suggest three immediate and paramount takeaways:

• Emergency squads in the rural sphere and along the borders (the external buffer zone) must be ready to capably and independently defend a settlement for up to six hours. This determination carries implications pertaining to the emergency squads’ size, training, the type of equipment they will possess, the rationales of action and the principles of command and control, as well as the coordination with the military, police and rescue entities.
• In light of the above, the IDF, the police and the rescue entities in those regions must be ready to intervene and provide a defense and aid response within a time range not exceeding six hours. The immediate implication of this directive is in organizing, preparation, training and qualification, equipment, a command-and-control system and principles for coordination and cooperation between the entities. In this context, mention should be made of the place and role of a National Guard; a subject worthy of in-depth consideration. In this context, defense entities are required also to build up capability of opening traffic routes forcibly blocked by enemy forces.
• A consideration of the response requires the categorization of the various settlements according to their character, location, and the threat level they face, with a mantle of relevant action capabilities and rationales being formulated and tailored for each cluster or category.

Conclusions

The failures of October 7 regarding security for towns along the border with the Gaza Strip and on Israel’s northern border, as well as in second-line cities such as Netivot and Ofakim, require a reconceptualization of the nature and purpose of the Israeli settlement project – in terms of national security and regarding the relationships between internal security and military and national security. This challenge calls for expansive and profound thought and work processes, which will include an in-depth discussion of the current security snapshot, analyzing the failures of October 7 and presenting rationales for potential responses and recommendations for operating principles and a relevant organizational structure.

In this brief document, we have sought to inspire that thought process and introduce to public discourse several substantial points as foundation for the broader, more comprehensive process necessary in repairing this critical area of national security.

On Simchat Torah October 7, the “Black Sabbath,” some 3,000 Palestinian terrorists broke through the Gaza border fence in 29 places, swarming into nearby Israeli communities to commit mass murder. The frontline Hamas fighters were heavily armed and penetrated as far as Ofakim. The military and civilian Israeli defenders on hand, sparse and skeletal as they were, fought desperately and heroically until reinforcements arrived, in most cases much too late.

There are hundreds of Israel cities, towns, villages, and neighborhoods along Israel’s northern, eastern, and southern borders, straddling the Green Line in the center of the country, in Judea and Samaria, and in the Jerusalem environs that are similarly threatened. Exposed, insufficiently defended, and unprepared.

Therefore, the training and equipping of civilian rapid-response security squads on a massive scale everywhere in this country is more necessary and urgent than ever. This requires both government investment and volunteer civilian mobilization.

The threat is real. Hamas only beat Hezbollah to the punch, with the latter known to have long planned a broadscale invasion of northern Israel. The Jordanian army has been practicing offensive maneuvers right-up on the Jordan River border for months. Israeli Arabs previously have rioted and blocked major arteries in the Negev and Galilee – locking-down Israeli-Jewish townships.

Most stark of all is the threat of Palestinian swarm attacks on settlement communities in Judea and Samaria and on cities straddling the Green Line in the center of the country like those in the Emek Hefer region. This is not an imaginary scenario. It is a clear and present danger.

Just this week, the IDF conducted a drill simulating an October 7-style attack in Judea and Samaria. The drill was dictated by the escalation of Palestinian terrorist attacks over the past two months.

In the nine weeks since Hamas launched its cross-border attack from the Gaza Strip, there have been 1,388 Palestinian terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria, including 569 stoning assaults, 287 attacks with explosives, 143 fire-bombings, and 70 drive-by shooting attacks. Three Israelis (a civilian, a soldier, and a Border Police officer) have been murdered in Judea and Samaria since October 7 and at least 52 Israelis sustained injuries.

On Monday, 27-year-old Mevaseret Cohen was wounded when terrorists fired on the car in which she, her husband, and their six-week-old baby were traveling near the Jewish town of Ateret in Samaria. Her baby and husband were unharmed. The terrorist, who fired at least six bullets at the car, escaped, despite being fired back at by the bold husband/driver.

(But of course, the international media covers none of this. Like biased UN agencies and hostile so-called “human rights” NGOs, the media is instead obsessed with practically and comparatively non-existent “settler violence” against Palestinians.)

According to investigative journalist Nadav Shragai of Israel Hayom, the Palestinian Authority itself is preparing for battle against Israel, right under our noses. A scenario whereby Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) turn their guns against IDF troops and Israeli civilians is rapidly developing into actuality.

Dozens of terrorist attacks on IDF forces and the civilian population in Judea and Samaria have been propelled since the beginning of 2023 by Palestinian policemen, by members of the Preventive Security Forces, and members of other PA units.

A similar picture arises in relation to counter-terrorist activity too. Alongside the considerable number of successful targeting operations carried out by the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members over the course of the last year, dozens of Fatah “fighters” have also been killed. This has involved Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which since 2021 has taken up arms once again, and prior to the October 7 massacre in the Gaza envelope communities made an express appeal for mass killing of Israeli Jews.

Shragai points out that since the outbreak of the current war some 2,200 Palestinians have been arrested in Judea and Samaria, with 1,100 of them being Hamas-affiliated activists or terrorists. No information is available regarding the organizational affiliation of the other 50 percent.

One must dive deep into reports on the Palestinian side to understand that alongside members of the PIJ and “unidentified individuals,” many of them belong to organizations affiliated with Fatah, the beating heart of the PA, or its security forces.

Israel blurs or covers-up this information because it seeks to preserve what minimally remains of security cooperation with the PASF and to discourage attacks by additional members of the PASF.

But as Palestinian Media Watch has showed, the PA itself makes no attempt to conceal the escalated involvement of its institutional “martyrs” in attacks on Israelis. In fact, it is rewarding them with “pay for slay” stipends and formal PA military funerals. Declarations in support of the October 7 massacre and the express desire for a similar slaughter assault in Judea and Samaria have become standard discourse in the PA-controlled media over the last two months, with top PA officials joining the melee. Palestinian social media are inundated with AI-generated videos of terrorist swarm attacks into Samarian settlements, mimicking the Gaza envelope attacks.

And one cannot just ignore the unmistakable offensive military exercises conducted in recent weeks by PASF battalions, which now number 45,000 men: exercises to conquer installations and infiltrate settlements, commando incursions into urban territory, etc. This is a far cry from the “strong police force” imagined by the Oslo Accords tasked with merely guaranteeing “public order and internal security.”

A not-yet-published analysis by Professors Kobi Michael and Gabi Siboni of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy assesses that Israeli cities and settlements need professionally trained and well-equipped rapid response platoons with the ability to fend-off invaders for up to six hours (before arrival of military troops and helicopter gunships). They attempt an initial mapping and categorization of Israeli cities by level of immediate threat and make a rough estimation of the concomitant force structure required.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, a former deputy IDF chief-of-staff and OC Central Command, similarly has written about the need to develop “active defensive capabilities” for settlements and even for “pre-1967” Israeli cities like Kfar Saba and Rosh HaAyin to initially defend themselves, with serious training and tight incorporation into IDF defense planning.

Again, this will require significant government investment. But also volunteer civilian mobilization. Where will all the volunteers come from? Well, part of the answer ought to be, needs to be, hopefully can be – from the haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) community, which until now has refused any national security service.

But as Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer of The Tikvah Fund haredi division and haredi journalist Yakov Plevinsky have shown, there is an awakening at least on the fringes of haredi society regarding the obligation to contribute to the national security burden, regarding the need to protect their own communities and those beyond haredi community walls too.

Quietly there are many initiatives underway to incorporate haredi men in a range of defense and relief capacities, ranging from rapid-response squads to fire and rescue services, and from the Homefront Command to medical first-responders like Zaka, Hatzala, and Mada – where some haredi men already are involved.

The challenge is to make such service mainstream and “honorable” in haredi society. Plevinsky and others argue that the way to do so is by soft peddling the demand for formal enlistment and “uniforming” of haredi men, instead settling for their volunteer absorption, by osmosis and out of uniform, in the “soft” security frameworks described above.

(Nobody argues that this is fair or equitable in comparison to the national security service burden on non-haredi Israeli society, only that it now might be realistic.)

Success in this endeavor, supremely important in my eyes, requires wise and far-sighted leadership from both government and haredi community leaders alike.

In any case, the necessity of forming hefty rapid-response squads in all parts of the country should be clear, long before Israel’s other enemies seek to copycat Hamas attacks.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 22.12.2023 and Israel Hayom 24.12.2023