The Houthi Strike on Ben-Gurion: A Joint U.S.-Israel Imperative to Confront Iran’s Proxy War

Earlier this morning, a ballistic missile launched by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi terror group struck near Israel’s Ben-Gurion International Airport, injuring several people and causing significant disruptions to air traffic.This brazen attack on Israel’s primary international gateway underscores the growing danger of Iran’s proxy war against the West, and reinforces the urgent need for a strategic shift, from reactive restraint to overwhelming deterrence against the Houthis.Since the October 7th attacks by Hamas, the Houthis have escalated their attacks on Israel, ostensibly in solidarity with Palestinians, however undeniably as one of the proxy groups at the behest of the Iranian regime.Most Houthi strikes to date, armed by advanced Iranian technology, including ballistic missiles and drones capable of striking over 2,000 miles away, have been intercepted by Israel’s arrow missile defense system and the U.S.-deployed THAAD, however, today’s missile managed to circumvent the defenses.The attack on Ben-Gurion Airport – Israel’s primary international gateway – was a calculated attack, that represents a grave national security threat to the Jewish state. It is also a clear Crime of Aggression, pursuant to both the UN Charter and Rome Statute, and a War Crime under the Laws of Armed Conflict and Geneva Conventions, given that a civilian airport with no military utility was deliberately targeted.No nation—not Israel, the United States, or any other—can accept a slow drip of ballistic missile attacks against its civilians and vital infrastructure.Thus far, Israel’s response to Houthi attacks, has been relatively restrained, with some exceptions, deferring largely to Washington’s strategic prioritization of the situations in Gaza and Lebanon, allowing the United States to lead the charge against Houthi aggression from the U.S. Central Command.However, today’s attack, which exposed some vulnerabilities in Israel’s air defenses, demands an urgent reassessment. Israel should launch targeted strikes on Houthi leadership, missile sites, command centers, and supply lines in Yemen, prioritizing the destruction of their Iranian-supplied weaponry. Such operations, while logistically complex, are within the Israel Defense Forces’ reach, as demonstrated by previous long-range strikes on Houthi targets in December 2024. The IDF must also bolster its multilayered defense systems, addressing gaps revealed by the failure to intercept today’s missile. Iran’s export of advanced weapons to non-state actors like the Houthis is not a localized problem—it is part of a region-wide strategy to undermine sovereign nations and destabilize the Middle East.The United States, under President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, also has a critical stake in this fight—not only as Israel’s closest ally, but because America’s own security, economic and maritime interests, and global credibility, are directly threatened by Iran’s expanding proxy network.

Since mid-March, the U.S. military has conducted over

1,000 precision strikes on Houthi targets, primarily aimed at protecting Red Sea maritime traffic, which has declined by 90% since late 2023 due to Houthi interference. President Trump’s March 15 announcement

of “decisive and powerful” military action and “overwhelming lethal force”, along with his warning to Iran to cease support for the Houthis, signaled a robust posture, however, it may be time to reassess that, and up the ante, given it appears the message has not been received in Yemen, or Tehran.

Ultimately, whether it’s rocket fire from Hamas, missiles from Hezbollah, or drones from the Houthis, make no mistake: the common thread that weaves all this together, is the Iranian regime pulling the terror strings from Tehran.

In a subsequent March 17th statement, President Trump was unequivocal, when he stated: “Let nobody be fooled! The hundreds of attacks being made by Houthis … all emanate from, and are created by, IRAN” and that “every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible.”

Going forward, Washington, in close collaboration with Israel, and other regional allies, should intensify its strikes, particularly targeting Houthi leadership and the Iranian logistical supply chains that enable their missile program.In the meantime, the United States should recalibrate its diplomatic approach to Iran, making clear that continued support for proxy attacks—like those by the Houthis—will carry real consequences. As President Trump warned on March 17, any further Houthi aggression will be viewed as an attack orchestrated by Iran itself, warranting direct and decisive response. The international community must stop pretending that the Houthis are a localized Yemeni movement. They are an expeditionary arm of the Islamic Republic’s war machine.Ultimately, without confronting Iran’s role, any response to the Houthis will be incomplete. Today’s strike on Ben-Gurion Airport is a wake-up call not just for Israel, but for the entire international community.The time for half-measures is over. Israel must act decisively to eliminate the threat, and the United States must continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally in this mission.This article was written with John Spencer, executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute.Posted on Twitter on May 4, 2025




Coordination Between Israel and the US Regarding Nuclear Talks with Iran

“If the Americans continue to adopt a constructive approach and refrain from making unreasonable demands, we will reach a good agreement,” said Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi last week, on the eve of his visit to China to renew Beijing’s support for Tehran’s position.

President Trump’s conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and his subsequent statement that “we are on the same side on all issues,” did not cause any particular concern in the palace of the Supreme Leader. Neither did the postponement of the technical team meeting, originally scheduled for last week, now set for this coming Saturday alongside the meeting of the heads of delegations.

From the Iranian perspective, the mere continuation of negotiations yields several benefits:

  1. Immunity from military attack on Iran for as long as negotiations continue.
  2. Precious time to restore air defense capabilities damaged by the Israeli strike in October and to increase stockpiles of offensive weapons.
  3. A potential escape route from fateful decisions for Iran that may emerge from the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9. That discussion is expected to determine whether Iran is meeting its commitments under the nuclear agreement. Based on its conclusions, a decision may be made to activate the snapback mechanism to reimpose the sanctions lifted following the 2015 agreement.
  4. Erosion of US opening positions against it. Iran already can count as a success the limitation of the negotiations to the nuclear issue alone and American willingness to discuss approval of a civilian nuclear program in Iran.
  5. Moral reinforcement for regime elements and possible relief from domestic pressure due to the encouraging message the talks convey about the prospect of developments that might bring a positive change to the economic situation.
  6. A temporary (at least) boost to Iran’s regional and diplomatic status due to diminished expectations of a military resolution.
  7. Creation of (real or simulated) tension between Jerusalem and Washington, especially with such a pro-Israel administration at the start of its term.In this situation, Israel needs to coordinate with the US on three key issues: 1. The red lines for an agreement. 2. The timetable for concluding the talks. 3. The measures to be taken if no agreement is reached.

    The “red lines” must include the complete elimination (destruction or removal from Iranian hands) of capabilities that could be used for a military nuclear program – materials, components, and facilities; the imposition of restrictions on Iran’s missile program; establishment of an effective inspection mechanism and automatic penalties for violations; and restrictions and penalties for involvement in terrorism, weapons proliferation, and the use of proxy forces.

All of this must be permanent and without an expiration date.

Regarding a timetable, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 should serve as the deadline. It would be prudent to agree on this while the US continues its efforts to activate the snapback option for renewed sanctions.

As for measures if no agreement is reached, it would be wise to minimize public discussion and reserve this for internal deliberations.

Israel’s concern over the possibility of a bad agreement is understandable, but it should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. Trump understands the risks of such a deal. After all, he was the one who labeled the JCPOA of 2015 a “terrible agreement” and detailed its weaknesses.

The arguments against that agreement have only grown stronger since then. One does not need a vivid imagination to understand the danger posed by a radical Islamic regime with advanced missile technology and nuclear capabilities.

If the diplomatic channel does not yield the expected results from Trump’s perspective (assuming they reflect Israel’s position as well), this would not only justify but obligate other courses of action to remove the Iranian threat. And for that as well the US and Israel must prepare.




The UK can’t back human rights and Qatar

In 2022 Sir Keir Starmer, then leader of the opposition, boycotted the football World Cup in Qatar due to the country’s appalling human rights record. Two years later, he invited the Emir to tea and scones at 10 Downing Street, hosting his first state visit as Prime Minister.

During that meeting, Starmer hailed the “strong relationship” between the two countries, commending “Qatar’s leadership” in the Middle East. The meeting came on the back of a £1 billion Qatar investment in British climate technology.

As Britain trumpets its role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, while repeatedly lecturing Israel on international law, it shows a remarkable tolerance for Qatar’s rather questionable role in the region and dubious human rights record at home.

Qatar likes to present itself as an honest broker and partner for peace but the reality is rather different. Doha is an enabler of Islamic extremism, the primary patron of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, by offering Qatar as a base and providing financial, ideological and media support, while also serving as a leading purveyor of anti-Western propaganda through its sponsorship of Al Jazeera. It is the very antithesis of what this British government purports to stand for.

Qatar’s duplicity became particularly evident after the October 7 massacre, when Hamas launched the deadliest single-day attack against Jews since the Holocaust. As the world recoiled in horror, as Israeli (and British) hostages remained captive and with Gaza in ruins, Hamas leaders watched it all unfold from the comfort of five-star hotels in Doha, providing a safe haven for those who orchestrated the carnage.

We need to be crystal clear: Qatar is no bystander here. Along with Iran, it is the leading patron and financial sponsor of Hamas, funneling at least £1.5 billion to the UK-designated terror group since 2012, according to a Deutsche Welle investigation. Hamas spent billions to build its terrorist infrastructure, including tunnels, weapons and October 7 war plans.

While states like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are forging ahead with normalisation plans and regional integration with Israel under the Abraham Accords, Qatar remains intransigent in its rejectionism, inflammatory rhetoric and support for Hamas.

As foreigners often confuse Qatar’s glitzy skyscrapers with Western values, the country’s human rights records is deplorable. While Qatari citizens are among the wealthiest in the world, most of the population are non-citizens with no political rights and few civil liberties, according to Freedom House, which calls Qatar one of the least free countries in the world. Leading human rights organisations have also accused Qatar of “slavery” and “forced labour”, particularly prior to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, where it is estimated that some 6,500 migrants died in preparation of the tournament and events.

Meanwhile, the Gulf behemoth continues to buy up real estate, turning parts of London into “Little Doha”, to pour billions of pounds into British investments and universities, and to disseminate extremist propaganda through its state-funded Al Jazeera channel, broadcasting freely from London.

At the same time Israel, a loyal and democratic ally in the fight of her life to rescue hostages being held captive by Qatari-sponsored Hamas jihadists, is bearing the brunt of British lecturing on compliance with international law, sanctions and arms embargoes – none of course which apply to Qatar.

This is not only a moral contradiction, but a glaring policy failure, that undermines Britain’s own national security and stated commitment to promoting peace in the Middle East.

Given the flood of money into the UK from Doha, the Starmer government and the British parliament ought to initiate an inquiry into Qatari funding, to ensure transparency and safeguard against foreign influence operations, in a similar way they had done against Russia.

At the same time Al Jazeera, which has already been banned by a number of Gulf and other Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE over supporting incitement and terror, as well as Israel, after Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists were caught by the IDF masquerading as journalists, cannot continue operating unabated in the UK.

The UK should also insist that Qatar take verifiable steps to improve its abysmal human rights record and pressure Hamas to release the remaining hostages.

Simply put, the UK cannot credibly claim to oppose terrorism while embracing those who promote extremism. Nor can it support peace and stability in the Middle East while turning a blind eye to those who bankroll terrorists.

If Britain is serious about standing up for the rule of law and promoting peace in the Middle East, it must stop courting Qatar and start treating it as the duplicitous actor it is.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, April  07, 2025.




Trump strikes Houthis, sending clear message to Tehran

Unafraid to use force:The US military operation in Yemen serves as a direct signal to Iran, indicating a shift in American policy. This is an exceptionally forceful military campaign designed to achieve tangible results, rather than merely sending a message. Meanwhile, Iranian officials are attempting to distance themselves, claiming, “We are not involved in setting Ansar Allah’s policy.” The latest escalation presents an opportunity to dismantle Iran’s proxy model and reshape the regional order.

The Houthis have given Trump an opportunity to showcase his administration’s shift in Middle East policy and to demonstrate that he is unafraid to use military force to establish a new regional order. These messages serve the White House’s strategic positioning on the global stage, but they are especially aimed at Tehran in light of tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and its sponsorship of proxy groups.

Even if the process takes time, dismantling Iran’s proxy model and holding Tehran accountable for its operatives’ actions remain key objectives in the US and its allies’ strategy to counter the axis of evil. Now is the time to target not only the proxies but also the hand that controls them.

US goal: Eliminating threats

“Iran is not involved in setting the national policy of any faction in the resistance front, including Ansar Allah in Yemen,” said Major General Hossein Salami, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), following the extensive US attack on Yemen and Trump’s warning against supporting the Houthis.

Salami responded to these warnings by stating that Iran would react “decisively and destructively” against any enemy that turns threats into action.

This is not the first time Tehran’s leadership has attempted to downplay Iran’s involvement in the activities of its proxies. In recent months, Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran does not control proxy forces but rather supports groups that share its ideological beliefs and operate independently in their respective countries. Regardless, the US offensive against this stronghold of the “resistance axis” has heightened concerns in Tehran.

While Washington’s stated goal in attacking the Houthis is to remove threats to maritime traffic and ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Europe, the operation also serves broader strategic interests for the Trump administration.

First and foremost, the campaign signals a decisive shift in American policy and a proactive approach to shaping the new regional order. Secondly, it aims to restore the confidence of Middle Eastern allies, who had distanced themselves due to President Biden’s policies and sought closer ties with Russia and China. Thirdly, it delivers a clear message to Iran about Trump’s resolve to achieve his objectives, including through military force.

The Yemen operation is unusual not only in the scale of firepower and number of targets struck but also in the deliberate targeting of senior figures during the attack. Reports from US officials suggest that airstrikes will continue for several more days, indicating Washington’s determination to secure concrete achievements rather than merely sending a warning.

Economic pressure and curbing Iranian oil exports

This escalation coincides with rising tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. The Trump administration is ramping up economic pressure on Tehran, seeking to minimize its oil exports and aggressively enforce sanctions. The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report highlighted Iran’s nuclear advancements and the alarming quantity of 60%-enriched uranium in its possession. According to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, “No non-nuclear state produces such quantities.”

Iranian officials, for their part, insist that they will not submit to external dictates or agree to a deal under pressure. They appear to be testing Trump’s resolve, further underscoring the significance of the Yemen operation.

Assuming the attack on the Houthis is just the beginning of a broader campaign, Trump is positioning himself as the leader in confronting IRGC-backed forces that threaten global trade routes and respond only to force. Early in his presidency, the Houthis have presented the American leader with an opportunity to correct a long-standing distortion that allowed Iran to deploy proxies to achieve its destructive ambitions without facing consequences.

For Israel, the Houthis’ threats must be taken seriously, whether they materialize through drones, rockets, missiles, or other methods, some of which have been showcased in the group’s propaganda videos.

While Israel must continue defending itself against this threat, it should also actively engage in countermeasures, either independently (in coordination with Washington) or as part of US-led operations. It is essential to increase offensive efforts and target energy infrastructure, electricity grids, ports, economic assets, and water supplies. While the Israeli Air Force plays a central role, other military branches must also contribute.

Following the Iranian axis’s setbacks, including Hezbollah’s defeat in Lebanon, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and the dismantling of Hamas’s military framework in Gaza – this moment presents an opportunity to neutralize the Yemeni branch of Iran’s proxy model and bring about its complete collapse.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 17, 2025.




Legal Analysis of Israel’s Gaza Aid Halt

An international law summary regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu’s announcement that “the entry of all goods and supplies to the Gaza Strip will be halted.”

In short, Israel’s actions in halting aid are entirely just and legitimate under international law.

Israel is not obliged to provide aid to an enemy in time of war, especially when it has been shown to be used for military purposes.

Under customary international law, Israel’s obligations are limited to not unreasonably hampering or preventing the entry of aid by third parties … unless there are valid reasons for doing so.

In the present circumstances, Article 23 of the 4th Geneva Convention is the only applicable provision that governs Israel’s obligation to allow free passage of humanitarian supplies.

However, Art. 23 is extremely limited in both scope and application and only obliges Israel to allow the free passage of supplies to a limited category of persons, including medical supplies necessary for the purposes of religious worship or food for children under the age of 15. HOWEVER, this is provided there are no serious reasons to believe these supplies are being diverted from their destination or used for military purposes.

Both the U.S. Defense Department Law of War Manual and the UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict reiterate and mirror Art. 23 of 4th Geneva Convention.

In this regard, there has been ample evidence that since the beginning of the Oct 7th war initiated by Hamas, and including following the commencement of Phase 1 of the hostage – ceasefire deal, Hamas has continued to both syphon / divert aid, and usurp it for military purposes and to maintain the ongoing captivity of hostages.

Notwithstanding Israel is at war in Gaza, it is not occupying Gaza, so we can dismiss this claim altogether and the responsibilities that entails, not least given Hamas still remains the de-facto rulers in the Gaza Strip.

Israel is also entirely permitted to halt the supply of aid into Gaza, provided that doing so is not intended to starve the local civilian population (see Geneva Conventions, U.S. Defense Department Law of War Manual, UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, The Hague Convention IV, plus Customary Int’l Law). In this regard, it is important to underscore that there is no starvation in Gaza. Since commencement of Phase 1 of the hostage – ceasefire deal on Jan 19th, over 25,000 trucks have entered Gaza (about 600 per day), carrying a total of 57,000 tons of food. This is at a greater level to pre-war aid deliveries. Meantime, water continues to be provided through Israeli pipelines as well. It is estimated, that based on current provisions, there is at least 4 months adequate supply of aid in Gaza.

In summary, Israel’s actions in halting aid are entirely just and legitimate under international law.

Those who seek a resumption of further aid into Gaza, would be well advised to direct their outrage and pressure on Hamas (and their sponsor Qatar) to accept the Witkoff framework for the continuation of a temporary ceasefire during the Ramadan and Passover period, and to demand the immediate and unequivocal release of all the remaining hostages being held captive in Gaza.




US-Turkey ties: How Trump and Erdogan’s new and old problems may impact Israel

Despite past claims of a strong working relationship and personal rapport, several contentious issues strained ties between President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during Trump’s first term. Now, as the US president embarks on his second term, many of these key disputes remain unresolved, while new frictions have emerged – some of which could significantly impact Israel.

Turkey’s support of Hamas and opposition to Gaza relocation plan

The most pressing issue at present is Trump’s vision for relocating Gaza’s population and reconstructing the enclave as the “Riviera of the Middle East.” Predictably, Turkey’s fierce opposition was swift. Erdogan dismissed the proposal as “unworthy of discussion,” asserting that “no one has the authority to uproot the Palestinians from their homeland.”

A staunch supporter of Hamas, Erdogan may leverage Turkey’s NATO membership to pressure US officials into dropping the plan. Given the widespread opposition to Trump’s Gaza statements among even moderate Arab states – alongside German-Turkish efforts to revive the two-state solution – Israel must highlight Turkey’s deep ties to Hamas and ensure these pressures do not cause Trump to abandon his initiative, reducing it to a mere rhetorical threat against the terrorist group.

Trump’s potential pullout of Syria

FOR NEARLY A decade, America has supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) – an offshoot of Ankara’s arch-enemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 2019, as Turkey prepared to invade Syria, Trump initially refrained from intervention, ordering the withdrawal of US troops from northern Syria, only to later reverse course.

Today, however, Trump appears far less hesitant on the matter. Pentagon officials are reportedly drafting plans for a complete US withdrawal from Syria, a process expected to take up to three months.

For Israel, this development is deeply concerning. An American pullout would facilitate the expansion of pro-Turkish Islamist forces and other hostile actors in neighboring Jordan – a country already threatened by Iran’s ambitions to destabilize the monarchy and launch attacks on Israel from the east bank of the Jordan River.

In light of this, Israel must insist on maintaining at least a partial US military presence in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan border triangle.

Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system

Another major point of friction between Washington and Ankara has been Turkey’s controversial purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. Following the delivery of the first batch in July 2019, Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet production program and canceled the planned sale of 100 F-35s to Ankara.

Erdogan further antagonized NATO by obstructing Sweden and Finland’s accession to the alliance for an extended period, only relenting after securing what appears to be an American concession – a deal to upgrade Turkey’s air force with 40 new F-16 fighter jets.

IN LIGHT OF these developments, Israel would be well advised to urge the US to curtail Turkey’s increasingly destabilizing behavior – both in its backing of Hamas and in the Syrian theater, where Erdogan is spearheading a radical Sunni Muslim Brotherhood axis, supported by Qatar.

One potential pressure point would be reinstating high tariffs on Turkish aluminum and steel imports, a measure Trump previously implemented. Given Turkey’s fragile economic recovery from a prolonged financial crisis, such a move could serve as a significant leverage tool.

Additionally, Israel and the US must closely monitor Turkey’s evolving relationship with Iran. Despite their historic rivalry, particularly in light of the recent weakening of the Shi’ite axis in Syria, Ankara and Tehran have demonstrated their ability to set aside differences and collaborate when mutual interests align.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 23, 2025.




Disarmament is the key to a new regional order

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump are set to meet in Washington next week. The significance of this meeting cannot be overstated. Beyond the message it conveys by taking place just two weeks after Trump’s inauguration, and being his first meeting in this term with a foreign leader, the meeting’s objectives and expected outcomes are of critical importance. The two leaders will engage in strategic coordination on a wide array of bilateral and regional issues with far-reaching short- and long-term implications. The directives stemming from this meeting will guide the efforts of the political and security establishments in both countries.

Netanyahu will arrive at the White House with a long list of thanks for the steps and decisions Trump has already taken in his first days in office. In addition to the hostage deal, this list includes the decision to unfreeze the delivery of heavy bombs and bulldozers to Israel, sanctions imposed on the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the reversal of sanctions that the Biden administration had placed on Israeli organizations and individuals, the halting of US funding to UNRWA, and, of course, the invitation extended to Netanyahu for this visit.

Trump, who has already demonstrated in his early days that he is unafraid to break conventions and paradigms, will seek a clear Israeli stance on his initiative to resettle Palestinians from Gaza in other countries. While he will understand Israel’s official silence on the matter, he will emphasize that Israeli support is a prerequisite for his administration’s efforts to explore this course of action.

The core of the visit will focus on two major issues – Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, it will quickly become evident that everything is interconnected, making it difficult to separate these matters from those concerning Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon.

Regarding Saudi Arabia, its demands for a defense pact with the US and for civilian nuclear capabilities appear solvable. The obstacles to normalization are tied to the issues of Gaza and the West Bank. Netanyahu will be asked to prioritize between resuming military operations in Gaza and completing the next phase of the hostage deal, as well as advancing negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Any formula that aims to achieve all three goals must also take into account the element of timing and its implications.

Another hurdle is Saudi Arabia’s demand for the opening of a “political pathway leading to a Palestinian state.” Netanyahu will likely make clear that in the wake of October 7, any talk of a “Palestinian state” would be a reward for Hamas. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority itself indirectly supports terrorists and struggles to combat terror even in the areas under its control, as evident in Jenin and Tulkarem.

Returning to Gaza: Statements from senior US officials that Hamas will not rule the Strip are important, but they require two presidential clarifications. First, the fight must not be limited to toppling Hamas rule; the more crucial objective is the complete demilitarization of Gaza, eliminating any military capabilities or future threats to Israel. Second, the US must not support any governance model that allows Hamas to operate from behind the scenes under its protection. Israel has already seen this play out in Lebanon, and the lessons remain fresh.

Above all, there is Iran. The US must immediately change its approach toward Tehran. The Biden administration’s diplomatic overtures toward Iran have only emboldened the regime and weakened America’s regional standing. In Tehran, these gestures were interpreted as weakness and as an insurance policy against the use of force. At the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran is “stepping on the gas pedal” in its uranium enrichment efforts. Iran poses a threat to global peace and stability, as evidenced by its recent missile attacks on Israel. However, Israel’s successes and Iran’s domestic turmoil provide reason for optimism in the just fight against the regime.

Trump is determined to advance regional peace, but he will not be able to achieve this without addressing the Iranian issue. He must set a deadline for diplomatic efforts, especially ahead of the upcoming “snapback” mechanism deadline in October, and continue building on the progress he made at the end of his first term.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 15, 2025.




The Iranian challenge awaits Trump

The Iranian challenge facing Donald Trump at the outset of his second term is significant and has reached a critical juncture. Iran is notably weaker now than it was during Trump’s first term, at least in three key respects.

First, its national security has been compromised as its network of proxies has suffered severe blows in the ongoing conflict, a fact publicly acknowledged by political figures in Tehran. Second, the unprecedented Israeli assault in October inflicted heavy damage, forcing Iran to absorb its devastating consequences. Third, the regime’s domestic support base has eroded, as evidenced by declining voter turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections between 2020 and 2024. Despite these setbacks, Iran remains the central issue the Trump administration will need to address while tackling the broader crises in the Middle East.

A closer examination of the challenges Iran poses to the Trump administration reveals a complex picture:

  

Trump will need to rectify the policies of his predecessor. According to data published by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) in October 2024, despite oil sanctions on Iran, the country’s oil revenues during Biden’s first three years in office (January 2021 to January 2024) surged to $144 billion, $100 billion more than its oil revenues during Trump’s first term. While Biden tightened sanctions on Iran’s oil sector, his administration failed to enforce them, allowing Tehran to secure billions that bolstered its struggling economy. The Trump administration must therefore prioritize the strict enforcement of sanctions.

However, sanctions alone are insufficient. Iranian officials boast of their expertise in circumventing sanctions, and the economic hardships endured by the Iranian public seem to concern them only insofar as they do not lead to widespread protests. Sanctions exert limited influence on decision-makers in Tehran, underscoring the need for a credible military threat. Trump may hesitate to threaten military action directly but could leverage Israel’s operational capabilities, supporting them with advanced munitions and refueling aircraft to enhance their ability to target Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Iran’s nuclear progress adds urgency to the situation. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi warned that Iran is “stepping on the gas” in uranium enrichment. The country now possesses 200 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60%, a quantity sufficient, with further enrichment, to produce five nuclear warheads. Moreover, as the October 2025 expiration of UN Security Council sanctions (via the snapback mechanism) looms, Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and revise its nuclear doctrine.

The horrific October 7 massacre underscored the extent of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism. A lack of coordination between Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, Iran, and Hezbollah may have prevented a broader plan to attack Israel from both the north and south simultaneously. Trump will confront Iran’s involvement in every regional conflict, as Tehran seeks to rebuild Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad’s capabilities. This sponsorship aligns with Iran’s goal of regional hegemony and the destruction of Israel. If Trump’s administration were to secure a nuclear deal with Iran, it risks inadvertently enabling Iran to strengthen its terror infrastructure through the economic dividends it would reap.

Delaying direct confrontation with Iran allows the regime to develop advanced weaponry and technologies, raising the potential costs of future conflict. While Iran has failed to acquire Russia’s advanced Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, it continues to develop satellite capabilities, precision missiles, and other technologies. History shows these advancements are not limited to Iranian use but also benefit its “resistance axis,” primarily aimed against Israel.

As Trump stated during his inaugural address, he dreams of achieving peace in the Middle East. However, this goal is unattainable without addressing the Iranian problem. While significant voices in Iran advocate dialogue with Trump, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s ban on negotiations remains a formidable obstacle. Nevertheless, Trump should allocate time for diplomacy, particularly as the snapback sanctions draw near in October.

Iran, having lost much of its influence in Syria and seen its proxy network significantly weakened – apart from the Houthis – is adapting to the new reality. Evidence of this shift includes Mahan Air flights, a known supplier to the Quds Force, operating routes through Turkish airspace to Beirut’s airport, indicating the establishment of a smuggling corridor to Hezbollah to compensate for the loss of a ground corridor.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard-affiliated magazine Sobhe Sadeq recently called for a strategic approach to thwart US policies in the region, as it claims Iran did in the early 2000s during the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as during the subsequent crises involving ISIS and the Syrian Civil War.

Iran is weaker, more vulnerable, and the threat it poses is clearer than ever. The Trump administration must combine diplomacy with strategic collaboration with Israel to take preemptive and preventative measures. This approach should aim to force Iran’s leadership into a defensive posture, diverting its focus to survival after decades of pursuing aggressive strategies that expanded Iranian influence in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza. This influence culminated in the seven-front conflict against Israel during the Swords of Iron War.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 28, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**




What Does Trump Mean by promising “Hell” for Hamas

President-elect Donald Trump said this week: “If the hostages are not back by the time I get into office, all hell will break out in the Middle East.” Since December 2, he has repeated this stark message, without embellishment or ambiguity. “The consequences will be unprecedented. Those responsible will be hit harder than anyone has been in the long history of the United States,” he has threatened. When asked a few days ago about the practical implications of his words, he clarified: “It won’t be a ‘don’t’; it will be hell.”

Trump’s declaration is not merely another important expression of identification and solidarity with Israel. It goes far beyond the supportive statements about hostage release of other world leaders, as significant as they may be. When the President-elect puts his prestige on the line and subjects himself to a test with clear metrics for success and with a defined end date (by his inauguration) – he is signing a commitment to deliver results.

Trump understands that his success or failure in this matter will influence his standing and American ability to tackle other challenges, from China to Russia and Iran, and from the Houthis in Yemen to global jihad organizations.

The Israeli public is accustomed to a gap between declarations and actions, and thus may welcome Trump’s approach but cannot rely on it. This skepticism stems from the fact that it is difficult to influence extreme non-state actors with the tools used against states, as well as from the sense that Israel has reached its limits in exerting force on Hamas on its own. As Osama Hamdan, a member of Hamas’ political leadership, said, “Hell is not a threat to Palestinians who are already living in hell.”

One hopes that this sentiment is not shared by Israel’s senior diplomatic and defense leadership, and that it is working to formulate concrete recommendations for the incoming administration on how exactly Trump can deliver the promised “hell” to Hamas.

A plan to dish-out “hell to Hamas” will require, first and foremost, removal of American restraints and handcuffs on the IDF. It should include the following components:

  1. Complete support for Israel’s position in negotiations versus Hamas.
  2. Tightening the siege on Gaza: Reducing fuel and food supplies to Gaza to the bare minimum and preventing Hamas control over them. This includes support for establishing an Israeli military administration in Gaza and blocking the transfer of non-critical supplies from foreign states and international entities.
  3. Backing intensive, high-intensity Israeli military operations: Removing limitations on armament, territorial occupation, and the movement of large populations from combat zones. These operations aim to eliminate the Hamas terrorist threat and to destroy its capabilities. Although Hamas has been hit hard by the IDF, it has not yet been dealt fatal and irreversible blows. Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza with thousands of fighters and operatives, who await the “day after” an IDF withdrawal and meanwhile inflict losses on Israel through local guerrilla actions.
  4. Elimination of the Hamas external command structure: Hamas’ leadership in Qatar, Turkey and elsewhere remains intact, turning this from a local problem into a regional issue. Neutralizing Hamas power centers, including assassination of Hamas leaders, would severely harm the organization and its recovery capabilities.
  5. Drying up funding sources: It is critical to target Hamas fronts such as the “Coalition of Charity Organizations” and its various components.
  6. Utilizing American influence on mediators in negotiations: Egypt and Qatar’s influence on Hamas is neither unlimited nor negligible. Given Trump’s statements on the hostages, it is appropriate to demand that they exert all possible leverage on Hamas to produce results.

Published in Jewish Policy Center, January 13, 2025.




Strategic warning: Escalation ahead

What does American backing for Israel mean in the current wars? Hopefully, the scope and depth of American backing will improve dramatically in the move this month from President Joe Biden to President-elect Donald Trump.

From the day that Hamas savagely attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the Biden administration has backed Israel in its counterattack to rout Hamas and end its rule in Gaza. The US has given Israel weapons and diplomatic support, blocking dozens of anti-Israel resolutions at the UN, as well as providing negotiation services in the attempt to obtain hostage release.

At the same time, however, Washington unpardonably has insisted that Israel fuel Gaza (read: Hamas), literally and figuratively, every step of the way. It has forced Israel to supply an enemy in wartime with hundreds of thousands of tons of goods ranging from cigarettes and flour to fuel.

Everybody but everybody knows and admits (even UN chiefs and fierce anti-Israel “humanitarian” NGOs) that Hamas has absconded much if not most of the supplies trucked in by Israel, which it then sells to its “own people” (i.e., poor Palestinian civilians) at exorbitant prices – to fuel the Hamas war effort, to keep itself in power, and to continue to torture Israel as Israeli hostages die out, probably day by day.

Washington has also counterproductively restrained the Israeli military. It has been annoyingly mistaken every step of the way, riding Israel’s brakes. Don’t invade Gaza City, said Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan – speaking in Biden’s name. Don’t take Shifa Hospital. Don’t enter Khan Yunis. Don’t take Rafah or the Philadelphi Corridor. Don’t try to move civilian populations from the battle zones. Don’t use large-diameter or heavy ordnance bombs. Don’t, don’t, don’t…

The net result of the delays and restraints imposed by America has been the grind in which the IDF now finds itself: A house-by-house slog through Hamas hideouts that is drawing precious blood with Israeli soldiers needlessly falling almost every day – without there being a decisive result.

In the operations in northern Gaza since October aimed at clearing terrorists from Jabaliya, Beit Hanun, and Beit Lahiya – again – more than 80 soldiers have been killed. Tragic and outrageously avoidable.

And, sure enough, despite Israel’s (unfortunately shackled) effort, Hamas retains administrative and terrorist capabilities in northern Gaza, as well as in southern Gaza cities like Rafah, where the IDF was forced by America to tiptoe through the tulips; not to mention the fact that the IDF has not yet operated in 30% of Gaza.

In short, Biden wanted Israel to win the war but simultaneously undermined Israel’s ability to do it

All this is part of Biden’s mania for regional de-escalation. After Iran fired hundreds of missiles toward Israel last April and October (assaults that fortunately were scuttled by Israeli, US and other forces), Biden warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the US “would not be involved” in any Israeli counteroffensive against Iran.

His spokesman said “We don’t seek a wider war in the region. We don’t seek escalated tensions in the region. We don’t seek a wider conflict. We don’t seek a war with Iran.” More “don’ts.”

America went on to assure its European and Mideast allies and the Iranians that it “was not involved” in Israel’s intensive campaign of strikes against Hezbollah missile depots and military installations; “not involved” in the Israeli strike on senior Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil; “not involved” in the beeper bombing of Hezbollah operatives; “not involved” in the assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran or Hezbollah chieftain Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, etc.

Each time, the US predictably prattled that the US “was not involved,” and that it “does not want to see an escalation.”

You get the picture: America has not sufficiently backstopped Israel with American commitment and power in the confrontation against Iran and its terrorist proxies. Rather, its de-escalation mantra has hemmed-in and handcuffed Israel.

Like the Obama administration, the Biden-Harris administration all along and even since October 7, still has sought to reset the region through conciliation with and concession to Iran, not confrontation. It has postured the US less as the leader of a regional coalition against Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance,” and more as a mediator between it and Israel.

The problem is that you cannot defeat evil, never mind truly crush Hamas alone, by posing as a mediator and fetishizing de-escalation.

FORTUNATELY, the neutering by Israel of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Iranian-backed Assad regime in Syria, as well as the stripping naked of Iranian air defenses by the IAF (a strike, once again nonsensically opposed by the US), makes space for a different policy. Even Blinken belatedly admitted this week (in a self-congratulatory New York Times interview) that Israel has wrought a “Mideast transformation.” No thanks to him.

This now allows for an even more decisive reset of the regional strategic architecture; a reset that will neutralize the Iranian nuclear juggernaut and counter Iran’s hegemonic march across the region.

With President-elect Donald Trump returning to the White House in ten days’ time, there is reason to believe that he will give Israel room to maneuver, meaning the American backing or active collaboration necessary to truly cut Iran down to size, something that blessedly might lead to regime change in that country.

This also entails freeing Israel from the burden of fueling Hamas – what the international community naively (or mendaciously) insists on calling “humanitarian aid” to Gaza when it is far more than that. I expect that after January 20, Israel will act to deny Hamas of this supply lifeline.

The IDF will completely clear northern Gaza of civilians and re-direct civilian supplies to southern Gaza only, use massive ordnance to eliminate residual Hamas terrorist cells and infrastructures, and finally clear the way, perhaps, for Palestinian governance that is not under the Hamas thumb.

One hopes and assumes that we will not hear from Trump administration officials the insidious Kamala Harris qualifier “but” – which conditions Israel’s legitimacy and strips it of the ability to defeat its enemies.

Israel “could” defend itself

OUTGOING VICE President Harris allowed that Israel “could” defend itself, “but how it does matters.” Repeatedly she said: “Israel has the right to defend itself, but too many innocent Palestinians have been killed, children, mothers…”

Each time, she went on to proclaim that Israel could fight “only” if this leads rapidly towards a two-state solution “where the Palestinians have security, self-determination, and the dignity they so rightly deserve.”

Since no one in Washington has a recipe for defeating an enemy that hides behind and beneath civilians without causing significant collateral damage, and nobody in the region any longer believes that swift establishment of a full-fledged Palestinian state would truly bring stability or peace – Kamala’s “but” and “only” lingo effectively neutered the IDF and weakened Israel.

Again, one hopes and assumes that Trump, incoming Vice President JD Vance, and Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio will adopt an entirely different tone and more resolute policies. I suspect that is what Trump means when he says that if Hamas does not immediately release all Israeli hostages “all hell will break loose in Gaza.” Handcuffs off.

Readers should consider this article a strategic warning. The current interregnum in intense combat in Gaza, as well as what appears to be a pause in confrontation with Iran, is about to end.

Hostilities are about to escalate – yes “escalate” – purposefully and usefully so. Israel’s use of force will be overwhelming – necessarily so. The international community can and will scream about the need for “immediate” ceasefires, but Israeli leaders will ignore global received wisdom – appropriately and defiantly so.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2024