On Saturday night, amid a large-scale aerial strike by the Israeli military on Iranian targets, the Iranian regime faced another attack on its forces. Though the incident was relatively contained, the number of Iranian casualties reportedly exceeded those from the Israeli strikes.

Ten Iranian border guards were killed in an assault in Sistan and Baluchestan province. According to Iranian claims, these border guards died in combat on a local road against members of Jaish ul-Adl (Army of Justice), a Sunni terrorist group seeking independence for the Baluchi minority. This organization frequently ambushes and plants explosives targeting Iranian and Pakistani security forces.

Sistan and Baluchestan is a persistent trouble spot within Iran, a hotspot of internal conflicts. Just a week before, the area made headlines due to a violent incident in which hundreds of people were killed: Iranian border guards reportedly opened fire on Afghan refugees attempting to cross from Pakistan into Iran, killing approximately 250 people, according to reports.

Initially, Iran denied the incident’s occurrence, which had been reported by local human rights organizations. Yet afterwards, Tehran’s ambassador to Kabul stated that taking “lawful” action against illegal entry is a legitimate right of all nations, and that border guards are mandated to prevent the entry of unauthorized foreigners. Given that the casualties were Afghan citizens, the Taliban government in Kabul launched an investigation, and the United Nations also sought to look into the incident. UN special rapporteur for human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, expressed concern about its implications.

These two events highlight some of Iran’s challenges along its eastern border, particularly at the tri-border area with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This isn’t the first incident of Iranian border guards opening fire on refugees trying to cross the border this month. Tehran doesn’t publicize these incidents, often denying them outright, but various reports indicate that at least 13 migrants were killed along the border, in this exact same area.

The issue of Afghan refugees is a sensitive one in Iran. Many have fled Taliban rule in recent years, with estimates suggesting over a million have entered Iran since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Overall, Iran claims to host around six million Afghan refugees, many of whom have escaped war, poverty, and hardship over decades. Even the UN refugee agency estimates about four million Afghans are currently in Iran.

These refugees place a significant strain on Iran, whose economy is already burdened by international sanctions and struggling with internal challenges. Iran also diverts substantial resources to support armed militias and terrorist organizations across the Middle East and beyond. This international support strains local resources, especially with the added burden of feeding millions more.

To address the refugee issue, Iran is not only taking border measures against migrants but actively deporting refugees back to Afghanistan. Reports indicate that only in September, Iran expelled over 100,000 people. Many refugees report being beaten, denied basic access to food and water, and detained in special camps by Iranian authorities.

Taliban officials claim that since the beginning of the year, nearly half a million refugees have entered Afghanistan from Iran, with the rate increasing. Iran has now set an ambitious target to deport two million undocumented Afghan refugees within six months.

However, Iran is not alone in this approach. Both Turkey and Pakistan are also expelling Afghan refugees despite the humanitarian consequences and global outcry. Concerns over the dangers awaiting these refugees back in Afghanistan—economic hardship and potential Taliban persecution—haven’t deterred authorities in Tehran, Ankara, or Islamabad from taking these measures. Iran’s planned mass deportation program is moving forward, forcibly sending refugees back without judicial oversight or international intervention.

Regional conflict with Pakistan

In the border regions with Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran also faces threats from ethnic separatist movements like the one responsible for killing Iranian border guards on Saturday.

The Jaish ul-Adl terrorists represent Iran’s Baluchi minority, around three percent of the country’s population. Alongside Kurds, Sunni Baluchis are among the most persecuted minorities in Iran, which is governed by a Shiite majority. They live in Sistan and Baluchestan in severe poverty, with high unemployment and limited access to basic infrastructure and essential resources such as food and water. Many locals turn to smuggling goods, such as fuel or food, and some are involved in drug trafficking. The conditions in this region have been likened to certain impoverished areas in Africa.

Jaish ul-Adl is perhaps the primary voice of Baluchi dissent and terrorism within Iran. Tehran accuses Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in supporting the organization, with hints of Israeli backing as well. This organization has a bloody history with Iranian security forces: in 2019, for example, Jaish ul-Adl killed 13 officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Zahedan, following up with other attacks on Iranian targets.

As recently as September, the group claimed responsibility for two attacks on Iranian police, killing three people. In June, they kidnapped nine individuals linked to the Revolutionary Guards, and in April, they carried out five coordinated attacks on Iranian military bases and other sites.

These escalations prompted Iran to intensify its response. The Iranian military launched drones and missiles into Pakistani territory, targeting what it claimed were extremist training camps linked to Israel. In retaliation, Pakistan carried out a nearly identical strike on Iranian “terrorist targets,” resulting in seven Iranian deaths.

This confrontation led to diplomatic repercussions: Pakistan expelled the Iranian ambassador and withdrew its own representative from Tehran, temporarily downgrading relations. Ten days later, however, the crisis was resolved, with both countries restoring diplomatic ties, and Pakistan even inviting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian for a visit.

Despite this, the diplomatic incident doesn’t appear to have soured Pakistan’s overall stance towards Iran. Following Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian targets, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued a harsh condemnation, accusing Israel of full responsibility for escalating regional tensions.

A broader regional and global trend

After its unsuccessful efforts to stem terrorism or mass migration from Afghanistan through attacks on its neighbors, Iran is now taking another approach. Since mid-month, Iran has resorted to crackdowns on refugees and initiated the construction of physical barriers to control its border.

The new initiative began last January, when Iran started building a border fence, wall, and other obstacles along its long eastern border. The project began in Baluchestan with a four-meter-high wall spanning 300 kilometers of Iran’s vast border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The plan aims to cover 1,000 kilometers on each border, with Iran spending an estimated $3 billion on construction, expected to be completed within three years.

According to Iranian military officials, the wall aims to control border crossings and stop Afghan refugees from entering. Commentators suggest that the wall represents a shift in Iran’s security strategy, emphasizing defensive measures to manage cross-border threats without escalating to open conflicts, as seen in its recent clashes with Pakistan.

This trend of constructing physical barriers aligns with similar measures worldwide. While modern threats like drones or rockets often bypass physical defenses, walls still provide protection against terrorism, illegal migration, and trafficking. Pakistan, for instance, is considering similar initiatives along its borders with Iran, just as it has along its Afghan border.

Though countries like Israel and the US have faced criticism for building such barriers, this trend continues to grow globally. Despite high costs, walls help control sprawling borders and prevent crises from escalating into broader conflicts.

This situation also underscores Iran’s need to manage threats on multiple fronts beyond its ongoing tensions with Israel, including resource demands on defense, personnel, and weapons. Iran recently announced a 200% increase in its defense budget—a huge rise reflecting the complex priorities it must balance amid escalating international sanctions and its nuclear ambitions. With rising pressures, Tehran may soon need to make strategic choices on its long-term focus and capabilities.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 30, 2024.

Judging by statements from Tehran, especially those by Iranian Leader Khamenei and President Pezeskhian, it appears that the Iranian regime is pulling out all the stops and currently leaning toward containing the attack.

In his yesterday’s speech Khamenei has referred the decision on the matter to the Regime’s top brass, the Supreme National Security Council; Pezeskhian has limited his response to a non-binding statement that Tehran would give an “adequate response.”

It should be noted that a potential threat to Iran’s nuclear facilities is at stake, should Tehran choose to enter a round of strikes against Israel.

For now, however, the Iranian regime seems inclined to contain the attack by downplaying its importance and success, rejecting calls for an overwhelming response, such as the one from Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari.

Additionally, Tehran has reportedly reached out—or will reach out—to the Biden administration to restrain Israel, as indicated by Mojtaba Yousefi, a parliament member’s appeal yesterday for the U.S. to intervene and restrain Israel.

Judging by the reported damage incurred in the Israeli attack, it seems that Khamenei and the Iranian regime feel vulnerable. As they assess the extent of the damage, it may shape their subsequent decisions.

At the same time, the Iranian regime is currently focused on its image, especially in front of the Iranian people and in the region to “prove” its strength, despite the blow it received from Israel. This effort is evident in its statements through senior officials and media mouthpieces who try to downplay the value of the attack and deny its successes.

Published in I24, October 28, 2024.

Based on very initial knowledge and limited information, I would conclude the following results of Israel’s three-wave Oct. 26 strike on Iran, which were partly strategic, but mostly tactical:

1. Israel finally broke the aura of Iranian invincibility. It dispelled the 30-year obsession in the West that a strike would have apocalyptic consequences, and established precedent for hitting Iran directly.  This is no small thing, and lifts an analytical and policy straight-jacket that paralyzed Israel and others for decades. Iran has been exposed as weak; its bluffs and bluster called. The emperor has only old, threadbare underwear.  Not quite nude, but close.
2. ⁠Israel started normalizing striking Iran in the same way that, over the years, Israeli strikes on Syria have become routine and barely noticed.
3. ⁠Israel set itself up well for a strike that truly devastates the Iranian regime in the unlikely event that it responds.
4. ⁠Israel showed itself to be a tactical genius and a military power rivaled by none in competence—a true pride of the Jewish people.

On the negative side of the ledger, the bottom line represents a failed strategic result, for the following reasons:

1. Israel finally broke the aura of Iranian invincibility. It dispelled the 30-year obsession in the West that a strike would have apocalyptic consequences, and established precedent for hitting Iran directly.  This is no small thing, and lifts an analytical and policy straight-jacket that paralyzed Israel and others for decades. Iran has been exposed as weak; its bluffs and bluster called. The emperor has only old, threadbare underwear.  Not quite nude, but close.
2. ⁠Israel started normalizing striking Iran in the same way that, over the years, Israeli strikes on Syria have become routine and barely noticed.
3. ⁠Israel set itself up well for a strike that truly devastates the Iranian regime in the unlikely event that it responds.
4. ⁠Israel showed itself to be a tactical genius and a military power rivaled by none in competence—a true pride of the Jewish people.

On the negative side of the ledger, the bottom line represents a failed strategic result, for the following reasons:

1. The United States wanted Israel to hit mostly that which is aligned with what the administration defines as U.S. priorities: anything that helps to harm Russia’s war against Ukraine. Those sites were, in fact, hit.
2. ⁠Israel limited itself to those sites and the ones that Israel needs to strike in order to operate over Iran. Those sites, namely anti-aircraft, were hit.
3. ⁠Israel did not hit any site that hurts Iran’s regime and could lead to escalation as defined by Iran’s pre-strike chest-thumping: nuclear, oil, infrastructure, regime figures or symbolic targets.
4. ⁠So after a year in which Iran and its proxies killed 2,000 Israelis; destroyed up to 60% of cities in the north; sent 250,000 Israelis to be internal refugees; launched a global campaign of Nazi-level antisemitism; launched 600 missiles and drones into Israel; shut down half of Israel’s ports and caused all international airlines to indefinitely stop flying to Israel; tried to kill several of the most senior Israeli officials; and sent a drone to hit the sitting prime minister’s house, Israel launches a strike that protects Ukraine but leaves everything else untouched.
5. ⁠In other words, after a month of bluster that Israel will change the face of the Middle East, it appears to have returned to the Oct. 6 strategic concept of “we showed them” and deterrence, rather than conducting a strike that shakes the foundations of the Iranian regime and maintains strategic strategic momentum. Instead, it let the United States finally achieve its goal of strategically leashing Israel and forcing it back essentially into a strategically reactive, de-escalatory posture.
6. ⁠Israel thus let Iran’s chest thumping, which was designed to panic Washington, succeed in reshaping Israel’s reaction—in essence, giving Iran control over what Israel would hit.
7. ⁠The key strategic gain Israel had in the last months was that it brought “victory” as understood in terms of regional culture and grasp— that Israel had “lost it,” was “possessed by the jinn” and the master of the house went crazy. But that concept, appropriate for the region, was traded in again for a failed Western understanding of conflict management—“Restraint is strength,” “We showed them,” “Iran got the message”—deterrence.
8. ⁠In short, Iran, whose entire strategy is based on manipulation, chess and using your soul as a weapon against you—all of which depend on your being rational, predictable and manipulatable—used the power of the U.S. as Israel’s strategic Achilles heel to transform the strategic reality of defeat, retreat and fear it faced in the last two months as Israel has become a dangerous uncontrollable and unpredictable force into a successful effort to return Israel into a controllable, reactive and manipulatable position. From there, Iran now can reassert its domination over setting the agenda; manipulate events to reverse its retreat; return the strategic momentum it had lost; and enter a long-range confrontation with Israel on its terms.
9. ⁠Regionally, Israel no longer appears to be the strong horse that can replace indispensable U.S. power, but instead has reverted to being a dependent U.S. vassal in terms of strategic behavior.  Everyone knows this was not the strike Israel needed and could have executed, but that it was the strike that Washington imposed.
10. ⁠Israel’s limiting its strike undermines chances for real peace with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were looking for a strong horse that replaces U.S. power. Instead, they see now that Israel is nothing more than an American vassal—which is useless to them.

I realize this is harsh. I realize Iran may strike back, so Israel might have a second chance. But it’s doubtful that Iran will take the bait.

Israel’s strike is a form of strategic victory for Iran in regional terms, no matter how much our Western minds try to rationalize it as an objective show of strength. Iran will far more likely respond in ways that continue to reassert its manipulative control over events, rather than lash out in a way that allows Israel a second chance.

In conclusion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered this strike under withering pressure from every direction inside Israel and from abroad. The leaked plans, hostile demeanor and slightly veiled threats coming from Israel’s key ally and soul-mate, the United States, were wounds that are not easily dismissed.

Israel has a small population, less than a 10th of Iran’s, while fighting an eight-front war alone and with its allies slowly choking off its arms supply. It must look over its shoulder at international institutions that are engage in lawfare to annihilate it, and is plagued by an unimaginative defense establishment that suffers deeply from the Western malady of having forgotten the meaning of victory in war.

So, Israel not only acted alone, but with a strong headwind from every direction, even that of its allies. Netanyahu’s perseverance despite these forces of sabotage will earn him a hallowed place in history. He has emerged as the only leader in power with such vision and resolve to defend Western civilization.

But a sober analysis must identify and overcome the internal forces and hopefully still deliver the strategic victory that, at this point, only Netanyahu has the talent to properly grasp and achieve.

Published in JNS, October 27, 2024.

In what has become a decades-long shadow war, Iran has persistently worked to undermine Israel through an intricate web of proxy organizations encircling its borders. This strategy, employing Hamas, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemen, forms part of Tehran’s broader regional ambitions.

The nuclear program has always been Iran’s trump card – its path to reshaping the regional balance of power. But here’s the irony: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s miscalculation has upended Tehran’s carefully orchestrated plans. Instead of managing a controlled conflict, Iran now watches as Israel responds with unprecedented force, striking at the heart of Iran’s military capabilities and challenging its carefully cultivated image of invincibility.

From Israel’s perspective, this presents a rare strategic opportunity to reshape the deterrence balance and weaken Iran’s regional grip. The operation serves a broader strategic purpose: to delay or potentially derail Iran’s nuclear program. With hundreds of aircraft operating across the region, Israel is striking various targets that serve Iran’s military infrastructure – and while these strikes don’t include the nuclear sites themselves, the combined blow to Iran’s channels of influence serves to significantly weaken its position.

Make no mistake: The Iranians – master strategists in this regional chess game – fully grasp the significance of Israel’s newly demonstrated capabilities. Logic suggests they will now seek to minimize their losses, preventing Israel from exploiting any additional vulnerabilities.

Tehran’s strategic patience might well lead them to a familiar playbook: waiting out the 2024 US elections, hoping for a more accommodating administration. They understand that a hardline US stance would impose painful constraints, even if falling short of completely dismantling their nuclear ambitions. This could mean maintaining their position on the regional chessboard until 2040, as originally planned, or until political winds shift in their favor.

Yet there’s another possibility that shouldn’t be dismissed: wounded pride and mounting internal pressure could push Iran toward hasty retaliation, perhaps through another missile barrage against Israel. Should this occur around the US elections, it could provide Israel with the momentum needed to launch more focused strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Last night’s operations have surely driven home a crucial message to Tehran: Israel can operate with remarkable freedom in the Middle East’s most sensitive areas, treating Iran’s airspace as if it were its own. Had it not been for Washington’s diplomatic and military constraints on Israel’s prime minister, we might already be witnessing the first signs of Iran’s nuclear program being rolled back. Tehran’s leadership certainly grasps this reality. While their strategic calculus might favor patience, one can hope that their sense of humiliation will prompt them to take another risk – one that could prove costly.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 26, 2024.

Israel and Iran have been clashing directly and through the Islamic republic’s proxies over the past year. These confrontations occur in the air, on land, at sea, and even in the cyber front, often unnoticed by those not directly involved.

One surprising, not very central, front operates far from daylight: underwater. This new front offers with many opportunities and risks, mostly far from Israel’s limited coastlines. Nevertheless, we are also involved, and our adversaries are not ashamed to extend their reach beneath the waves. For Israel, the main importance of this front lies in safeguarding strategic assets such as gas rigs in the Mediterranean Sea — Israel cannot afford to neglect this area.

The focus on the underwater front in the region began mainly after the Houthis’ attacks on shipping routes leading from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea. This was driven by two primary threats posed by the Yemeni rebels — attacks on ships using underwater means, and damage to the underwater communication cables that run from the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea, from Asia to Europe.

In March, three of the 14 underwater communication cables in the Red Sea were cut, reportedly affecting 25 percent of the region’s internet traffic at the time. As a result, companies started exploring alternatives to bypass the Red Sea, considering re-routing network traffic through other regions.

One of the mysteries surrounding this event was how the Houthis allegedly managed to damage the cables, which lay on the seabed. It requires the ability to dive to depths of hundreds of meters, and even today, it’s unclear if the Houthis possess the means for such a task. Of course, they denied having targeted the cables. One possible explanation raised at the time was the deliberate dropping and dragging of anchors along the seabed until they hit the cables. It’s also possible that the cables were cut by the anchors of ships attacked by the Houthis.

At the time the cables were damaged, six additional cables were planned for installation in the region, where 90 percent of internet traffic between Asia and Europe is concentrated. It’s possible the conflict will now change the plans of some companies. However, since this is a vast network of cables, most of which do not pass through the Red Sea, there is no danger that intercontinental internet traffic will stop completely.

Even though it seems unlikely that the Houthis have the ability to dive hundreds of meters, they certainly possess the ability to operate below the surface. Evidence of this came a month earlier, when the Americans encountered an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) operated by the Yemeni rebels and destroyed it. According to them, this vessel, along with three anti-ship cruise missiles—whether the vessel launched them or they were part of another incident remains unclear—was intercepted “due to the threat they posed to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the area.”

That small Houthi submarine is what’s known as an “unmanned underwater vessel” (UUV) or “unmanned underwater vehicle” (UUV). While not much is known about the Houthis’ particular vessel, it’s believed to be a relatively unsophisticated autonomous vehicle. Nevertheless, even such a simple device can pose a significant threat to ships in the area and is a greater challenge than conventional threats like drones or surface vessels.

Such vessels can release mines, launch torpedoes, or carry explosives for “kamikaze” attacks on targets. Even if their range is only tens of kilometers, these submarines could still threaten ships entering the Red Sea. While they likely aren’t equipped with advanced guidance systems, they are extremely hard to detect. Most current defense systems in the region are simply not designed to deal with such threats, and sonar systems and other underwater tracking tools will be needed to combat them.

Where do the Houthis, operating in one of the world’s poorest countries, get such capabilities? As usual, the answer is, of course, Iran. In February, US Central Command intercepted a shipment of weapons from Iran to the Houthis, which included components for surface and underwater unmanned vehicles. According to images published by the Americans, the shipments contained propellers typically used for UUVs, which Tehran is known to have in its military.

Iranian UUVs, according to reports, resemble torpedoes in appearance but are slower. They are particularly effective against stationary or slow-moving ships. It’s believed they can be equipped with vision systems for target observation, and they may have been used in attacks on targets off the coast of the UAE.

Threats from the north and south

Iran’s military is no novice when it comes to underwater capabilities. Its first submarine series dates back to the 1990s, including three Russian-made “Kilo” class submarines. These are relatively old, but Iran has been working to refurbish them as of last year. Another series, Iran’s domestically produced “Ghadir” class midget submarines, is believed to include at least ten active vessels. These submarines, weighing 125 tons, are equipped with diesel engines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and torpedoes. These replaced Iran’s only other submarine from the “Nahang” class, a 115-ton midget submarine.

Iran’s most advanced submarine is the “Fateh” class, weighing around 600 tons, equipped with advanced sonar systems and four 533-mm torpedo tubes. It can also carry mines and anti-ship cruise missiles. According to local reports, this submarine can dive to a depth of 200 meters and remain at sea for up to five weeks without refueling. Currently, Iran is believed to be building three more of these submarines, but only one has been operational since 2019.

Aside from submarines, Iran also operates UUVs. These vehicles can reportedly dive to depths of 200 meters and stay underwater for up to 24 hours. They are capable of carrying mines and deploying them in deep waters to target enemy ships.

Tehran is also investing in underwater defense measures. Near strategic facilities, Iran maintains an underwater sensor network, sonar systems, advanced helicopters equipped with underwater tracking systems, torpedoes, and mines. All of these are in addition to air defense systems designed to protect these facilities from drone or cruise missile attacks.

Iran is not keeping these advanced capabilities only for its favored rebels in Yemen. Hamas, for example, has also begun building such underwater capabilities in recent years. In 2021, the IDF thwarted an attack by Hamas using such a vessel “launched toward Israel’s maritime territory.” The intended target was not specified, but in addition to Navy ships, it could have been aimed at Israel’s gas rigs, located dozens of kilometers from its coast.

In general, Hamas developed its underwater capabilities before the “Operation Guardian of the Walls” war. In addition to autonomous vessels, it trained divers and naval commando units, developed explosive boats, and more. During ground operations in Gaza, the IDF also discovered—sometimes within tunnels—workshops for producing additional such underwater vehicles. These are not advanced systems, and at this stage, they are likely torpedo-like missiles guided by GPS, packed with dozens of kilograms of explosives. Still, they pose a serious threat to both the Israeli Navy and Israel’s gas rigs.

The maritime threat is also present in the northern Israeli front. Hezbollah, as is well known, possesses anti-ship missiles, which it used with deadly effect against the Israeli Navy’s INS Hanit during the Second Lebanon War. It has naval commando units, and according to expert assessments, it may also possess versions of Iran’s Ghadir submarines and attack or “suicide” UUVs, which were smuggled into Hezbollah’s hands from Iran.

A different approach to armament

The underwater threat from Iran’s axis has not gone unnoticed by Western powers or even by countries friendly to the Islamic Republic. In recent years, Persian Gulf states have begun arming themselves with underwater capabilities in an effort to protect their coastlines against such threats.

The UAE, for example, began this year building and testing “Cronus” class midget submarines, which feature advanced mobility capabilities, diesel-electric engines, and torpedoes. These submarines can dive to depths of 100 meters and accommodate around ten crew members.

At the start of the year, Saudi Arabia signed a contract with the Thales company for the purchase of towed sonar systems, which can be connected to new patrol ships that the Saudis bought from Spain. Riyadh sees the Houthi underwater threat as a serious danger, requiring preparation in case the Yemen conflict erupts again. The Saudis are also negotiating with a Chinese company to purchase UUVs and are exploring possible avenues for acquiring light submarines for anti-ship operations and underwater surveillance.

Another country making moves in this field is Qatar. The Qataris purchased two small submarines from Italy, at a value of over $200 million, which will allow them to carry out covert missions on the seabed and even lay mines.

In addition to these countries, the anti-Houthi coalition, led by the United Kingdom and the United States—two traditional maritime powers—also operates in the region. The US, of course, has advanced underwater capabilities, but in recent years it has found itself lagging behind another naval power: China. The US has been responding to developments related to warfare in the Red Sea and monitoring events in Ukraine, where Kyiv and Moscow have been battling each other in the Black Sea.

At the same time, the US has been investing relatively little of its resources in the field of unmanned underwater vehicles. The budget for medium and small UUVs in the US this year stands at $172 million, and next year it will drop to just over $100 million. By comparison, the White House’s proposed budget for the entire US Navy next year amounts to $63 billion. It appears the US prefers to invest in building giant ships, even though market trends are moving towards autonomous vehicles.

What about Israel?

There’s no need to go into detail about Shayetet 13’s capabilities or the IDF’s submarine fleet, which includes five diesel-powered “Dolphin” class submarines. Additionally, Israel has developed a UUV called the “Blue Whale,” designed for intelligence gathering, submarine detection, and reconnaissance. This UUV is intended to be part of Israel’s defensive efforts against Iran’s increasing naval capabilities.

Meanwhile, Israel’s Navy must continue working hard to deal with the wide range of threats facing the IDF. For example, it’s unclear whether we have enough tools for prolonged and broad combat at sea. Experts estimate that the IDF needs to make adjustments to its naval defense systems, including for detecting and neutralizing UUVs, developing a coherent naval combat doctrine, and cooperating with other countries to share knowledge and experience for protecting strategic assets at sea.

Although drones currently pose a significant threat to Israel’s home front, Iran is undoubtedly a power in the naval front. The development of autonomous waterborne threats is not an unrealistic scenario, and we must prepare for it. Unlike the trend in the air, Israel might need to consider adopting a different approach at sea. Until now, Israel has invested heavily in developing precise and expensive systems to counter the Iranian threat, but from a budgetary standpoint, this is an unfair competition. The drones launched by Iran and its proxies are cheap, while Israel’s missiles and defense systems cost exponentially more. This cannot continue for long, and Israel eagerly awaits the completion of laser-based interception systems to change the situation fundamentally.

In the naval front, which is not necessarily Israel’s strongest area, we might need to consider a different approach. Perhaps we should initially focus on cheaper, less advanced, and less precise solutions that can be deployed on a larger scale. This would allow us to produce large quantities of low-cost defense systems and position them to counter any attempt to attack our strategic assets.

At the same time, Israel can and should cooperate with countries such as Ukraine, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia to develop, based on their shared experiences, the most suitable tools to combat these threats. The future of the maritime front is already here, and artificial intelligence will only exacerbate the dangers it poses to us. We must not neglect addressing the underwater front.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October  20, 2024.

A former Israeli national security advisor contends that Iran’s network of proxy organizations is unraveling, potentially weakening Tehran’s strategic position against Israel. The analysis examines the impact of recent conflicts on Iran’s allies and suggests that Israel should capitalize on the current circumstances to neutralize threats and potentially influence Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently boasted that “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has set the Zionist regime back 70 years,” marking the first anniversary of the October 7 attack. Yet, while Khamenei tweeted this in Hebrew, his oil minister was busy managing tankers and storage facilities at the Kharg Island terminal, wary of potential Israeli strikes.

From Tehran’s perspective, a year into the war, the broader regional picture suggests that its network of proxy organizations arrayed against Israel is beginning to unravel. Although not publicly acknowledged, questions about this strategy are likely already being raised within government circles. The Iranian influence is losing two critical footholds it had established on Israel’s borders, while another in Yemen is also suffering significant setbacks.

Furthermore, these proxy organizations have inadvertently become negative ambassadors for Iran. Across the Middle East and beyond, there’s a growing recognition that Iranian involvement often brings destruction and instability. Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen continue to serve as stark examples of this pattern.

Ironically, the proxy organizations Iran cultivated to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries are now entangling Tehran in precisely such scenarios. While Iran attempts to distinguish its direct attacks as responses to strikes on its sovereignty or personnel, separate from proxy combat events, these nuanced distinctions are lost in the fog of war.

In the blurred lines between Iran and its proxies, especially with the continued flow of instructions, weapons, and funding, Tehran finds itself being drawn into direct conflict scenarios it sought to avoid. This occurs at a time when Iran’s capabilities are constrained, and US support for Israel remains unwavering.

From Israel’s standpoint, despite being drawn into this conflict rather than initiating it, the strategic objective is to dismantle the threat Iran has constructed around its borders. This approach aims to weaken both Iran and its regime while exploiting the current circumstances to advance measures to halt Iran’s nuclear program.

The recent Iranian missile attack on Israel demands a response. Failure to exact a significant price could embolden Iran to normalize such attacks and gradually escalate their intensity.

However, Israel need not rush its retaliation. There’s strategic value in allowing Iranian nerves to fray during a tense waiting period, permitting the Iranian currency to continue its decline, and giving space for internal criticism of the regime to intensify. Despite differing approaches, coordinating principles with the Americans without overly constraining Israel’s options is advisable.

On the public front, there’s no need to divulge information about potential targets, objectives, considerations, or timelines. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s statement that any attack on Iran would be “lethal, precise, and surprising. They won’t understand what happened and how” aligns well with the required approach of maintaining ambiguity, preparing for various scenarios, and letting actions speak louder than words.

The primary stated goal for the IDF’s operation in Lebanon is to enable northern residents to safely return home. Achieving this requires meeting three conditions: First, eliminating the threat of incursions into Israeli territory by ensuring the absence of tunnels or Hezbollah forces in the border area. Second, neutralizing the threat of anti-tank fire from Lebanese territory toward Israel, requiring the removal of Hezbollah forces from within striking range. The third condition involves maintaining this new status quo over time.

The optimal approach to achieve these objectives is by establishing a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, devoid of civilian presence and under Israeli surveillance and fire control. This “buffer zone” model isn’t unique to Israel; Turkey implemented a similar strategy in northern Syria over the past decade to enhance its security, a move that the international community has largely accepted.

From Israel’s perspective, although drawn into this conflict, the strategic aim remains to dismantle the Iranian-built threat network, thereby weakening both Iran and its regime, while leveraging the situation to advance measures to halt Tehran’s nuclear program.

The IDF’s military achievements against Hezbollah thus far have expanded Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering room regarding post-conflict conditions. For Israel, the paramount goals are disarming Hezbollah and implementing security arrangements to prevent its rearmament. These objectives take precedence over considerations of stabilizing Lebanon’s government or influencing its composition.

In a recent speech commemorating the October 7 attack, Khaled Mashal praised the achievements of “Al-Aqsa Flood.” He claimed, “This battle accomplished in one year what years couldn’t achieve; even Zionist public opinion has lost confidence in itself.” Mashal called for opening “additional fronts against the enemy.”

Despite the Israeli security apparatus being fully engaged, there’s a growing sentiment that this high-ranking terrorist figure should be prioritized on their target list.

Israeli journalist Zeev Schiff, in “Earthquake in October,” wrote, “The Yom Kippur War shook Israel to its foundations. Excessive confidence gave way to doubts. Self-assurance was shaken. Suddenly, long-suppressed questions surfaced: Will we forever live by the sword?”

Five decades later, this question continues to gnaw at the Israeli psyche. While the distant future remains unpredictable, for the foreseeable future, Israel sees no choice but to prevail.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October  15, 2024.

The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah closes a circle for Israel. It’s not just the precise execution in the heart of Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut, the infamous underground bunker of Nasrallah’s, supposedly impenetrable, or the additional surprise suffered by the terrorist organization, which perhaps didn’t think Israel would dare to carry out such an operation. Beyond all these, the assassination is a move with profound significance in the long-term strategic view, which can also point to the next options open to Israel.

Since the IDF stepped up operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah, it has demonstrated superiority on all fronts, especially in intelligence – the main area where it failed last October. Who would have believed less than a year ago that these are the capabilities we would demonstrate today?

Looking back at the past year, some optimistic trends are nevertheless revealed: Hamas has been dealt a crushing blow. The Gaza terrorist organization has not been eliminated, but most of its leadership has been wiped out, its military structure dismantled, and it is no longer capable of harming Israel in the same way as before October 7. Israel, of course, needs to continue the pressure on it, advance the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza by any means possible, and not let up until it succeeds in eliminating the entire threat posed by Hamas. However, the intensity of the fighting in Gaza has decreased and is not expected to return to the same scale as before. As Israel continues to carry out targeted operations, it will further erode the capabilities of the terrorist organization and its members, and the threat from it will continue to diminish.

In the northern arena, Hezbollah has been revealed in many ways as a paper tiger. Apart from rocket fire, it has not carried out significant actions so far, despite all the blows inflicted on it in the last two weeks. Although we shouldn’t underestimate the Shiite organization and its capabilities, the elimination of many of its senior officials, including its senior military commanders, the head of the Southern Front Ali Karaki (who was killed with Nasrallah), the leader of the organization himself, and the heads of the Radwan force, greatly reduce its ability to carry out quality terrorist operations against Israel. This doesn’t mean it can’t carry out sporadic rocket fire – in recent days, we’ve seen only a trickle of rockets, though nothing close to the pessimistic forecasts heard here – but the motivation has been hit, the fear has increased, and the capabilities have decreased.

It’s also worth taking into account the shock the terrorist organization has entered, its fear of using means of communication and the many surprises it has suffered within a few short weeks. In the absence of an orderly command structure, this is a blow that will be very difficult to recover from quickly. In these weeks, it should be noted, Israel has suffered almost no casualties at all, while Hezbollah counts its dead in many dozens, including almost all of its military leadership. May it stay that way.

It’s also worth dwelling a bit on the implications of the organization leader’s departure from the scene: Nasrallah is not just another senior commander of the organization. He is not one of many. Nasrallah is not ostensibly a military commander, not a field man who guides the soldiers, but he is the charismatic figure, the gifted orator, the supreme leader to whom the fighters of the Shiite organization look up. He is their absolute symbol.

But in many ways, Nasrallah is much more than that. He turned Hezbollah into the largest and most heavily armed terrorist organization in the world. Since he took over the position previously held by Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, who was also eliminated by Israel, Nasrallah managed to position the Shiite organization at the forefront of the struggle against Israel, drive it out of Lebanon, inflict a painful blow on it in the Second Lebanon War and establish deterrence against it. Nasrallah also armed his organization with tens of thousands of missiles and rockets, advanced weapons, explosive devices, and missiles, using his connections with Iran and the money his patrons from Tehran poured on him. His absence in Hezbollah will be felt greatly, and he leaves behind very big shoes to fill.

One thing can probably be said with quite high certainty: a large part of Israel’s deterrence has been restored. The cheers of many citizens in Syria over the IDF’s successes in recent weeks can be heard all the way to the northern Golan Heights, and it’s hard to believe there are many in the Sunni Arab states who are now crying over the bitter fate of the arch-terrorist from Beirut. The leaders in Arab capitals are certainly looking at Israel with renewed respect after the last three weeks, even if they publicly expressed condolences over his death.

When talking about a new regional architecture, whose promotion in the form of normalization with Saudi Arabia may have been cut short with the outbreak of the war, this is the kind of behavior that Israel needs to adhere to in order to rehabilitate this opportunity. In the Middle Eastern neighborhood, alliances are not made with the weak and fearful, but with the strong. Israel is restoring its status and, incidentally, the possibilities for true normalization from a correct position of strength, facing countries that will see it as equal to them and even more powerful, one that has the ability to assist them in times of trouble. Thus, for example, the statement published this week and attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, that he’s not really interested in Israel’s actions in Gaza – didn’t come in a vacuum.

That’s why Israel must not fold now, must not stop. We need to continue pressing the pedal in Lebanon as well to bring about a new reality for the border residents. We must continue to act in Gaza and in other arenas.

Now we must also set our sights on the one big problem that still hovers over Israeli heads, which has not been dealt with since the beginning of the war: the Iranian nuclear program. In addition to the many reports in recent years about the accumulation of highly enriched uranium in quantities sufficient to build several bombs, recently, it has also been claimed that the Iranians may have begun to restart the activities of the “weapons group” – the group responsible for turning the fissile nuclear material into an actual bomb, and then assembling it on a missile.

Now is the most appropriate time to act against the Iranian nuclear program for other reasons as well: The Iranians are looking at the close election system in the US and fear another term of Former President Donald Trump in the White House. Despite his conciliatory words in recent days in favor of reaching an agreement with Tehran on the nuclear program, they know that he is not a predictable person and that he sometimes also advocates using force to achieve his goals.

Therefore, they understand that the few weeks remaining until the elections themselves, and also the weeks between the elections and the entry of the new president into the White House, are critical to presenting the Americans with a reality in which an Iranian nuclear bomb is a fait accompli. Now, they must push forward in order not to reach a situation where there will be another option in the White House to do something about it.

From Israel’s perspective, a strike on Iran would now come at a convenient time from an international perspective as well. The Americans may not be pleased with the Israeli moves and the escalation against Hezbollah, but President Joe Biden also doesn’t want to be recorded in the annals of American history as the president who allowed Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The fact that the president is a lame duck until after the elections means that he will find it difficult to stop significant moves that Israel chooses to make.

If Israel knows how to “sell” the attack to the president correctly, it can also paint it as something that will give the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, an electoral boost. Instead of an agreement with Saudi Arabia or a ceasefire in Gaza, eliminating the Iranian nuclear program can be perceived in Washington as a first step towards truly shaping the new regional architecture. It is certainly much more significant than a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, which will lead to nothing in the long run, and it will greatly increase the Israeli standing in the eyes of the Saudis, for example.

Moreover, the Iranians are also in an inferior position vis-à-vis other Western countries after being caught transferring UAVs to the Russians for the war in Ukraine and connecting to the “bad guy” of the neighborhood. They suffered sanctions and lost a lot of the legitimacy they might have had before. In addition, the IAEA declared publicly that it is unable to know what is happening in Iranian nuclear facilities and monitor them, and in fact, has made any possibility of cooperation now meaningless.

But the most important fact from Israel’s point of view is that the most powerful “whip” that Iran held over our heads, Hezbollah, is now perceived as something that can be dealt with. Even before that, following the attack in April, Israel understood that Iran is not a significant threat to its security – even when it launched hundreds of missiles and UAVs towards us. At the same time, the Lebanese terrorist organization is not what it was three weeks ago, and along with it, Iranian deterrence towards us following a possible attack on nuclear facilities has decreased greatly.

Perhaps the fact that should most indicate this is the claim that Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, was taken to a “hidden and safe” place following Nasrallah’s assassination. Even in routine, the Iranian leader is certainly tightly secured, with the best defenses Iran has to offer, but his concealment indicates that the Iranians don’t know exactly what to expect now. These things are added to the publication that even the Revolutionary Guards stopped using their communication devices following the operation against Hezbollah, which indicates their fear of Israeli penetration.

Now is the time to act. Israel has already proven in April that it can attack in Iran, and later did something similar in Yemen. The IDF and security forces have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to operate in distant arenas and Israel’s excellent intelligence. The rise in Israeli morale and reconnection following recent successes can increase internal legitimacy for an attack now. In addition, our defense arrays are on high alert and in immediate readiness.

However, we must not act alone. We must convince the America and our other allies to join the struggle against the Iranians before it’s too late. We need to emphasize to them how the region might look if Iran has nuclear weapons and what could have developed after October 7 if Tehran had a nuclear umbrella sheltering the head of Hamas and Hezbollah. This reality must be prevented now.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 30, 2024.

Why is it that Iran and Hezbollah have not retaliated significantly (or at least, not yet) to the targeted assassinations of Faud Shukr in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran?

Part of the answer is Israel’s explicit threat to wreak devastation on these enemies if they escalate the conflict, and part is the unprecedented American naval presence in the region, backing up Israel. For the moment, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently have been deterred from escalating the conflict.

True, Hezbollah attempted to pinprick central Israel earlier this week, and both enemies are still seeking to reciprocally assassinate Israeli leaders. But the massive regional conflagration and even broader world war that was feared a month ago seems to have dissipated.

I strongly suspect that a central reason for this is a US payoff, meaning that Washington is luring these bad actors with strategic coin, by negotiating with them to reach long-term understandings about their “legitimate” sway in the region.

That is the only possible explanation for the dramatic announcement this week by Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei (Iran’s “supremely disturbed leader,” as Prof. Gil Troy has monikered him) that Iran is now willing to resume nuclear talks with the US – something Khamenei has adamantly and angrily refused to consider since US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action deal in 2018.

US PRESIDENT Joe Biden has all but begged Khamenei for the past four years to re-engage or renegotiate the JCPOA, to no avail. In response, Khamenei riotously mocked Biden, defiantly ramped-up Iran’s nuclear enrichment and weaponization work, repeatedly defied international nuclear inspectors, and spoke more openly than ever before about developing nuclear weapons to destroy Israel.

So why the current turnabout? Because in semi-secret talks with Iran that have taken place in Qatar and Oman, Washington may have baited Tehran in pursuit of grand regional de-escalation.

America is seeking a grand deal that will avoid both a broader Iran-Israel war and a Hezbollah-Israel war, end Iranian militia attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria, end Houthi attacks on international shipping off the coast of Yemen, and magically facilitate a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel.

To achieve all this, I deduce that the US is now offering profligate nuclear concessions to Iran, including more sanctions relief and a fluid-dangerous redefinition of the nuclear threshold.

Of course, such US understandings with Iran won’t remove Iranian nuclear or hegemonic threats, but rather kick the can down the road – leaving Iran as a long-term problem for Israel and Sunni countries, and punting the problem to a different administration farther off in the future.

IN NORMAL TIMES, news of Khamenei’s willingness to reengage the US in nuclear talks would have been above-the-fold lead news in every newspaper in the world, and even more so here in Israel.

But because the media is obsessed with the day-by-day ups and downs in hostage negotiations (even though the entire exercise is, sadly and probably, an exercise in self-deception), and is consumed by daily accounts of IDF fighting on various war fronts – Khamenei’s bombshell statement has barely rated back-page mention.

“For our plans, we should not wait for approval by the enemies,” Khamenei said in a video broadcast by Iranian state television. By “enemies” he meant the US. “We do not have to pin our hope to the enemy…” but “it is not contradictory to engage the same enemy in some places – there’s no barrier.”

And note: In a meeting this week between Khamenei and the new Iranian cabinet headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, guess who showed up? Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who negotiated the JCPOA back in 2015; this tells me that Iran senses an opening to renewed “understandings” with the US, a development that can only be viewed with the greatest concern in Israel.

But what is needed today are not soft understandings between Washington and Tehran, but rather a strategic reset based on overwhelming American power and determination. As the dominant global superpower, and as Israel’s ally, it is incumbent on the US to neutralize the Iranian nuclear juggernaut, to counter Iran’s hegemonic march across the region, and to thwart Iran’s dangerous proxies (the three H’s: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis).

HOW CAN America ignore the fact that Iran is establishing air and naval bases on the Mediterranean and Red seas, and especially in Syria, to project regional power? Or that the belligerent Islamic Republic seeks control of the Horn of Africa and the entrance to the Red Sea – a critical strategic choke point on international shipping; and through the Houthis, it has brought about a 70% drop in shipping from Asia to the West through the Suez Canal?

How can Washington ignore the fact that Iran is fomenting subversion in Mideast countries that are Western allies, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan?

(It is particularly focused on destabilizing the Hashemite regime in Jordan to gain access to Israel’s longest border and from there to penetrate the Jewish state’s heartland – and given the massive amounts of top-tier weaponry the IDF is discovering in Jenin and Tulkarm, it seems that Iran has been succeeding in this.)

How can Washington ignore the fact that Iran is sponsoring terrorism against Western, Israeli, and Jewish targets around the world, including unambiguous funding, logistical support, planning and personnel for terrorist attacks that span the globe, from Buenos Aires to Burgas?

How can Washington ignore the fact that Iran is providing Russia with armed attack drones for President Putin’s war against Ukraine, or the fact that (according to the US Director of National Intelligence!) Iran is funding protests against Israel (and against America) on college campuses across the US?

And most of all, how can Washington ignore the fact that, according to the IAEA, Iran has enriched uranium to near-bomb-ready levels (84%, which is very close to the 90% level necessary for a nuclear weapon) and is accumulating weapons-grade uranium for production of an estimated five nuclear weapons within three months?

GIVEN ALL THIS, “de-escalation” with Iran seems to be the wrong goal. From Israel’s long-term perspective – especially after the October 7 attack, Hezbollah’s entry into the war, and Iran’s attempts to ignite a third intifada in Judea and Samaria – escalation of the confrontation with Iran is inevitable, and at this point perhaps even preferable.

“Peace Now” is not a realistic option

Indeed, it has dawned on most Israelis and Israeli leaders that Israel faces a decade of war of attrition against Iran and its proxy armies, and that an escalation in combat with these enemies is necessary, not something to be shied away from. “Peace Now” is neither a realistic nor advantageous option in diplomatic or military terms. Peace (or at least stability) might come much later, if at all, following decisive victories over the Iranian camp.

In short, Israel cannot live with an Iranian “ring of fire” around its neck. Washington should not countenance this either, especially since Iran’s jihad is not just to strangle Israel but to subdue the US, too.

Alas, the Obama-Biden (and perhaps Harris) administrations in Washington evidently see the US role in the region differently. They have been and are still seeking to reset the region through conciliation with Iran: through compromise and concession, not confrontation. This completely ignores the fact that Iran does not hide its overarching revolutionary and genocidal ambitions – to export its brand of radical Islamism globally, to dominate the region, and to destroy Israel.

Considering Khamenei’s announcement, and Nasrallah’s relative quietude, one must wonder what the Biden-Harris duo is promising them in exchange for their restraint. And one must wonder what Israel will have to “pay” for the de-escalation package Washington is crafting, beyond the handcuffs that the US has already slapped onto Israeli military operations against Hamas and Hezbollah.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 30, 2024

Intense debate persists regarding continued Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah crossing from Egypt to Gaza. In this context, one must note the deadly consequences of systematic Iranian arms smuggling to Hamas over the years through this border.

Everyone is aware of the years of armed support that Iran has been providing to terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, mostly led by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. The leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, confirmed this publicly in his statement on July 23, 2024, in which he ordered his men to arm the West Bank just as they do the terrorist organizations in Gaza: “I believe that the West Bank should be armed as well as Gaza. All those who care about the fate of the Palestinians, if you want to do something for them, this is what must be done.”

Tehran has smuggled into Gaza a significant arsenal of UAVs, missiles, rockets, weapons, and more. It also has provided Hamas and PIJ terrorists with terrorist training in Iranian-based camps as well as training for their experts to transfer that knowledge to the terrorist elements within Gaza.

The large amount of weaponry seized by the IDF during the takeover of the Karine A weapons ship in 2002 reflected Iran’s strong motivation to arm the Gaza Strip with a wide range of deadly weapons. The captured ammunition included rockets, mortar bombs, sniper rifles, mines, and more, with a total weight of about 50 tons.

In the current war, it seems that one of the dominant Iranian weapons used by Hamas and the PIJ is the “Iranian Sayyad.” This is a rifle from the Austrian company Steyr Mannlicher, which in February 2004 sold eight hundred units of the Steyr HS .50 caliber rifle (a heavy and modern sniper rifle) to the Islamic Republic. The weapon is marketed as a tool to eliminate enemy snipers and penetrate difficult materials at an effective range of 1,500 meters. The sale was made with the consent of the Austrian government, which claimed that the weapon was intended for units that fight drug trafficking in Iran.

Since its transfer to Iran, however, the weapon has been manufactured there under the name AM-50 Sayyad, and from there, the sniper rifles are systematically and massively transferred to Iran’s proxies. Accordingly, in 2005, the US imposed sanctions on the Steyr Mannlicher company.

HEZBOLLAH USED this sniper rifle against the Syrian rebels as part of its long-term participation in the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah also uses the rifle in the current war, boasts about it in its publications, and showcases it as an effective weapon against the IDF. Iran also smuggled the sniper rifle into the hands of its proxies in Iraq, who used it against American forces in the country.

Additionally, Iran smuggled the rifle to the Houthis in Yemen through the Quds Force’s sophisticated smuggling apparatus, despite American efforts to thwart this. (America succeeded in intercepting at least one shipment of weapons from Iran to the Houthis, which included this weapon, in May 2021).

Iran has also smuggled the AM-50 Sayyad to terrorist organizations in Gaza, who are using it extensively. Hamas has not hidden the receipt of the sniper rifle and, in May 2021, even showcased it in one of the military displays held by Hamas’s military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades.

According to published documentation, the terrorists who carried out the massacre attack on October 7 used this weapon (among others). Since the outbreak of the war, Hamas and the PIJ have been using it extensively against IDF soldiers operating in the Gaza Strip, as evidenced by their repeated publications documenting their deadly attacks.

Recently, a lawsuit against Iran was filed in a US court by some of the victims of the October 7 massacre. The Iranian aid that strengthens Hamas and the PIJ’s power, as manifested in the smuggling of the deadly “Sayyad,” is further evidence of why Tehran should pay for its part in the horrific attack.

Considering the efficiency of the Sayyad, it is no wonder that the Mashregh News website, which is closely tied to security circles in Iran (allegedly to the intelligence organization of the Revolutionary Guards), boasted in a July 4 article about the “hunting of the Zionist child-killers by the Iranian Sayyad” through Hamas. Mishrak reported that this weapon allows Hamas to effectively confront the IDF, enhancing its resilience against the Jewish state.

Israel must assume that weapons in Iran’s possession always reach its proxies. Tehran is the primary actor flooding the region with a variety of dangerous weapons.

The war obliges Israel to urgently redesign its strategy vis-a-vis Iran, which aims to strengthen its array of emissaries and tighten its “circle of fire” surrounding Israel. The smuggling of the Sayyad sniper rifle from Iran to Gaza, as well as to other Iranian proxies in the region, is carried out as part of this strategy.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2024.