Alongside examining the viability of Donald Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza, it is worth considering its implications for Iran and, accordingly, Tehran’s expected response if the plan is implemented. On the surface, the proposal appears to improve Israel’s strategic position: it is supposed to secure the release of all hostages from Hamas, dismantle the terrorist organization’s weapons infrastructure, and seemingly eliminate the need for Israel to occupy the Strip.

Given Iran’s conspiratorial mindset and Khamenei’s deep suspicion of US actions, Tehran is likely to view the plan as a move aimed squarely at undermining the regime. The leadership may suspect that Trump’s plan is designed to complete the weakening of another arm of Iran’s regional proxy network—Hamas. This would add to Hezbollah’s current difficulties in Lebanon, the decline of Shiite militias in Iraq, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. In Tehran’s eyes, all this points toward the main goal of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump: toppling the Iranian regime.

Iran’s state media has already framed Trump’s proposal as an “imperialist plan designed to perpetuate the occupation of Palestine.” The plan threatens Iran because it explicitly weakens Hamas and its grip on Gaza. Should Hamas accept, control of the Strip would pass to a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day governance under the oversight of an international transitional body—”the Peace Council”—led by Trump and joined by figures such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The positive reception of the plan by Arab states and Israel undermines the regional policy Iran has tried to lead since Israel’s attack in Qatar. At the Islamic summit in Doha, Tehran pushed for a unified front against Israel, urging not only condemnations but also harsh action, including economic and diplomatic boycotts. Trump’s plan flips this strategy on its head. Now Israel and key Arab states appear to be aligned, not opposed. Moreover, if Hamas rejects the plan, as it is expected to, the tacit approval from the US and indirect backing from Arab states for Israel to occupy Gaza runs counter to Iran’s regional strategy.

How might Iran respond?

Several factors fuel Tehran’s opposition: Khamenei’s distrust of the Trump administration, Iran’s desire to block a US-led regional order, and its aim to leverage the Swords of Iron War, and the Israeli attack in Qatar in particular, to shape a pro-Iranian regional order. Tehran also fears that Israel seeks to renew direct confrontation with Iran, thereby pushing Arab states to avoid any cooperation with Jerusalem in such a scenario.

From Iran’s perspective, Trump’s plan could pose dangerous consequences for its national security. Tehran will likely attempt to pressure Arab states diplomatically to oppose the plan. It will also seek consultations with Hamas on how to exploit it, using the proposal to stall Israeli military action in Gaza and to prevent even temporary Palestinian displacement, while simultaneously blaming Israel for obstructing implementation or pushing for Hamas allies to infiltrate the proposed technocratic administration.

The requirement that all hostages be released before Israeli withdrawal prevents Iran and Hamas from pursuing a deception strategy, extracting concessions from Israel, such as avoiding a full occupation of Gaza, without Hamas delivering on its side. Tehran and Hamas are also expected to seek Qatari mediation for support in navigating the bind the Trump plan has created. Even if Hamas ultimately rejects the proposal, Iran will likely try to reassure its leaders of the necessity of resistance, offsetting Hamas’ concerns about the strong backing Arab states have shown for the plan.

Ultimately, Trump’s initiative appears to undercut Hamas’ most valuable leverage: it demands the release of hostages upfront while forcing disarmament. It also contradicts Hamas’ strategy of leveraging the October 7 attack as a long-term asset, even at the cost of losing control of Gaza. Despite mounting pressure from Arab leaders, Hamas is expected to reject the plan or, at the very least, turn to Qatar to negotiate changes that would hollow it out.

Israel, meanwhile, is already benefiting from the proposal. Even before implementation, the plan has thwarted Iran’s attempt to build a unified Islamic front against Israel. Still, it risks stoking Iranian fears that Israel and the US are preparing for war, this time aimed at a regime change. The danger of Iranian miscalculation, including the possibility of a sudden strike against Israel, is a scenario both Washington and Jerusalem must now take seriously.

Senior Iranian officials such as Yahya Rahim Safavi, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, have already called in mid-August for a surprise attack on Israel. Those calls could now gain momentum, particularly after the activation of the “snapback” mechanism, which increases the chances of Iranian miscalculation.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 01, 2025.

According to Iran researcher Dr. Raphael BenLevi, the blow that Israel dealt to Tehran not only thwarted a serious strategic threat, but heralds a profound change in the status and role of the Jewish state. The tendency to explain global conflicts solely in military and economic terms, he says, misses the ideological war between West and East and between oppression and freedom.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 04, 2025.

Over the past year, the Iranian regime and Hezbollah have suffered unprecedented blows at the hands of Israel, which has severely damaged not only their military capabilities but also the nature of the strategic relationship between them.

Senior officials on both sides who were involved in security decision-making and managing the strategic relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah were eliminated one after another. A newly released archive photo published in Iran on June 26 shows Ali Shadmani and then-Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah together, revealing another chapter in this strategic alliance, one that will likely never return.

According to reports from Iran, Shadmani was killed during the war, after being appointed as the successor to Gholam Reza Rashid, who was eliminated in Israel’s opening strike. Shadmani had served as head of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, the body responsible in routine times for threat assessment, force-building direction, and readiness assessment, and in wartime, for managing the entire military campaign under the direct authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

His death was officially reported in Iran only on June 25, following reports that he had been seriously wounded in a targeted strike about a week earlier and did not recover.

Shadmani had a long and distinguished military career. He joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) upon its founding in 1979 and commanded the Ansar al-Hossein Division during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988).

He went on to hold a series of senior positions, but the significance of the photo with Nasrallah lies in the period during which it was likely taken, after 2005. From 2005 to 2012, he held a senior role in the Operations Directorate of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, including during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. From 2012 to 2016, he headed the directorate and later became the deputy coordinator of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters before ultimately taking command.

In this role, Shadmani oversaw the integration of all Iranian operational plans across the various arenas. Therefore, the very fact that a meeting between him and Nasrallah took place, now publicly revealed, adds another layer to the deep strategic relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah.

While it was known that Nasrallah regularly met with Quds Force commanders, Khamenei’s advisors and Iranian foreign ministers, it now emerges that he also held meetings with senior officials in the Operations Directorate of Iran’s General Staff. This connection underscores his elevated status within the Iranian regime’s decision-making processes and Tehran’s operational planning.

Nasrallah served as a strategic linchpin not only for Hezbollah but also for the Iranian regime and its management of relations with the organization. His assassination on September 27, 2024, marked a profound rupture for both Tehran and Hezbollah, which, in the current war, chose to remain on the sidelines.

In doing so, the organization made a historic decision that sharply contradicts Nasrallah’s past declarations that Hezbollah would join any war if Iran were attacked.

The Iranian regime must now undertake a complex process of rebuilding, not only of its military command structure, but also of its cooperation with Hezbollah.

The loss of Shadmani and other senior commanders who were eliminated by Israel, including Saeed Izadi, head of the Quds Force’s Palestinian branch (reportedly also responsible for facilitating Iranian support to Hezbollah), and Behnam Shahriyari, head of the Quds Force smuggling unit, presents a serious challenge.

Added to this are the deaths of Quds Force commanders for Lebanon and Syria, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, and his successor, Abbas Nilforoushan, in previous months.

In such circumstances, reconstructing the Iran–Hezbollah “Axis of Resistance” appears especially daunting, particularly in light of Israel’s clear determination to prevent any attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the foreseeable future.

Published in JNS, June  30, 2025.

As Israel celebrates Jerusalem Day – marking the historic return of Jerusalem, the capital of the ancient Kingdom of David, to full Jewish sovereignty after two thousand years – it is crucial to recall Iran’s openly declared ambition to destroy Israel and “liberate” Jerusalem, with the Al-Aqsa Mosque as its symbolic centerpiece. This aspiration was vividly illustrated in a provocative poster published in May 2020 by the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, under the chilling title “The Final Solutio” – a term borrowed directly from Nazi Germany’s lexicon.

The poster depicts armed terrorists from various Iran Quds Force-backed militias gathering triumphantly in Jerusalem, having supposedly succeeded in eliminating Israel. Visible among them are operatives from Hezbollah, Hamas, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and Iraqi Shiite militias holding images of Jamal Abu al-Mohandes, the Kata’ib Hezbollah commander killed alongside Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. These militants operate under the ideological influence of Khomeini, Khamenei, Soleimani, Abu al-Mohandes, [late Hamas founder] Ahmed Yassin, and [late Hezbollah number 2] Imad Mughniyeh, whose portraits adorn their vehicles.

In May 2021, about a year after the release of that poster, then-Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah introduced a new strategic equation: Any Israeli action deemed a “violation of Jerusalem” would justify a regional war. In a speech delivered just days after the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls, Nasrallah signaled his intent to join a future multi-front campaign against Israel, drawing upon the emotionally charged religious symbolism of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa. He declared:

“Israelis must understand that whoever harms the sanctities of Islam will not face only the resistance in Gaza. The new equation after the last confrontation is that anyone who attacks Jerusalem or Al-Aqsa will face a full-scale armed resistance… Gaza surprised its allies and enemies alike by entering the battle in response to actions in Jerusalem… The historic shift in the ‘Sword of Jerusalem’ campaign was that Gaza went to war to defend Jerusalem—not itself.”

Khamenei’s poster was neither symbolic nor coincidental. In a speech delivered in November 2023, six weeks after the outbreak of the current war, IRGC Commander Hossein Salami called for a repeat of the October 7 massacre – this time in a more sophisticated fashion and launched from the east, south, and north – with the aim of destroying Israel. For decades, Iran’s regime has used “International Quds Day” (instituted by Khomeini on the last Friday of Ramadan) to incite crowds in Tehran, Gaza, Beirut, Baghdad, Sana’a, and elsewhere to chant, “Death to Israel.”

The October 7 massacre carried out by Hamas served as irrefutable evidence – if any was still needed – that Israel must take its enemies’ threats with absolute seriousness. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that Tehran has been actively developing a detailed operational plan to destroy Israel for at least the past seven years. In 2018, senior Iranian official Hossein Amir-Abdollahian – who later served as foreign minister under President Raisi and was killed alongside him in a 2024 helicopter crash – declared that Iran had a concrete plan to implement Khamenei’s 2015 directive to wipe Israel off the map within 25 years.

In addition to addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israel must consider the threat of a mass-casualty assault aimed at its destruction with the gravity it demands. In fact, late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar described the future attack with remarkable clarity in a speech to thousands in Gaza on December 17, 2022. He declared: “We will come at you, God willing, in a roaring flood. We will come at you with endless quantities of rockets. We will come at you with a limitless tide of fighters. We will come at you with millions of our people, again and again.” Given this, Israel must regard Salami’s call for a more advanced and comprehensive massacre attack as a credible threat. This is especially true in light of reports that, during the war, circles in Tehran considered the possibility of launching ground invasions of Israel from Syria (prior to former president Bashar Assad’s removal) and from Jordan.

Israel must work systematically to deny its enemies both the capability and the motivation to carry out such plans. This requires a proactive and offensive strategy targeting the Iranian regime and its regional proxies. Simultaneously, Israel must complete the construction of its border with Jordan and take advantage of diplomatic opportunities in the region to prevent Iran from entrenching its presence and expanding its influence. Such opportunities may arise in light of significant regional changes, foremost among them the ousting of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah’s position and power in Lebanon.

Another major lesson from the current war is the urgent need to strengthen Israel’s defense independence by developing an advanced domestic military industry. Reliance on weapons systems, ammunition, and equipment from foreign powers – especially the United States – leaves Israel vulnerable, often awaiting critical supplies or facing constraints tied to political considerations that do not necessarily align with its national security interests. Israel must create a robust and sovereign industrial and technological base, enabling rapid, precise, and independent responses to security threats – guided by a clear strategic imperative: Protecting its citizens, even when that requires decisions made without external approval or support.

Published in I24, May 26, 2025.

The battle over a nuclear deal with Iran will not only determine the fate of the bomb – it will shape the regional order for years to come.

While shifting geopolitical realities in the Middle East have backed Iran into a corner, paradoxically, the current negotiations are working in its favor. As the US administration hesitates on its approach to Tehran, Iran continues to systematically enrich uranium, advance its weapons group, and acquire critical knowledge that could enable it to produce a nuclear weapon, should its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei choose to give the order.

Despite sanctions, economic pressure, and international isolation, Iran is achieving significant gains. Its defensive and offensive capabilities are improving and defeating it in a future military confrontation appears increasingly difficult. This is precisely why Israel and the United States must adopt a firm and uncompromising diplomatic posture – without delay.

A weak agreement – something akin to a “JCPOA 2” – would work against American interests. Such a scenario would buy Iran time to recover economically, bolster the regime’s domestic position, and enable it to rehabilitate the “Axis of Resistance,” after being severely weakened by Israeli actions and thus restoring Tehran’s national security. Even if the deal were to temporarily restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it would still allow Tehran to maintain its status as a nuclear-threshold state, while further destabilizing the region. Eventually, when the time seems ripe, Iran would likely move ahead with its operative plan to destroy Israel.

In light of this, Israel should urge US President Donald Trump to revive the ultimatum he issued against Iran in March – which has since been abandoned – and bring it back to the forefront. A natural window for this would be June, during the upcoming session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, where a critical decision is expected on reinstating sanctions via the “snapback” mechanism.

Simultaneously, Israel should lead a broad public diplomacy campaign aimed at the US administration, thought opinion leaders, and the American public, emphasizing a core message: A lenient nuclear agreement will weaken the US, endanger its allies, and throw a lifeline to a radical ideological regime. Conversely, a strong stance toward Iran will reinforce America’s regional influence, encourage more nations to join the Abraham Accords, and pave the way for a more stable geostrategic reality.

This effort must also address concerns in the US about being dragged into a costly regional war. Even if military conflict does erupt, Iran is in no position to engage in serious hostilities against the US and Israel. Its proxies are weakened, and the Houthis – the only remaining active outpost – cannot be counted upon to provide the necessary support. Moreover, an Israeli strike, especially with US backing, would significantly impair Tehran’s offensive and defensive capabilities.

Given Iran’s technological, intelligence, and military inferiority compared to the US, it is doubtful that its leadership would choose to enter a full-scale war, particularly at a time of eroding public support and a deteriorating proxy network. Tehran’s decision-making appears driven by survival instincts, making it unlikely that the regime would yield to hardliners like Revolutionary Guards Commander Hossein Salami, who call for direct confrontation.

A targeted public diplomacy campaign could both undermine appeasement efforts in Washington and present Iran with a firm and unequivocal position, forcing it to choose between escalation, which could threaten the regime’s survival, or full acceptance of American demands. The latter would mean drinking the “poisoned chalice,” akin to Khomeini’s painful but calculated decision to end the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. As with Iran’s limited response to the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020, there remains a significant gap between Tehran’s operational capabilities and its willingness to use them.

Even if Israel ultimately has to accept a deal focused solely on the nuclear issue, it must reach a clear understanding with Washington on a comprehensive strategic plan to weaken Iran’s regional proxies and missile program. These issues need not necessarily be part of the negotiations with Tehran. Instead, they can be addressed through other means, including kinetic and cyber operations, which will convey unequivocally that both Israel and the US are committed to drawing red lines on terrorism and missile proliferation. This would signal a new strategic reality to Iran and force it to reconsider its offensive ambitions in these arenas.

Diplomacy must rise to meet this moment of decision. The outcome of the nuclear negotiations will not merely settle the question of the bomb – it will determine the future shape of the regional order. Israel must therefore act intensively with the US to ensure it can influence the proposal presented to Iran and help define the path forward in the ongoing struggle against Tehran.

Published in I24, May 11, 2025.

The Iranian explosive charge, discovered near Kibbutz Alumim and carried by Hamas terrorists during the brutal onslaught of October 7, is not a random artifact – it is yet another direct piece of evidence of Tehran’s involvement in the October 7 massacre.

Iran has never concealed its broad support for Hamas. On the contrary, it proudly boasts of arming, training and funding the terrorist group’s infrastructure for years. Supreme Leader Khamenei openly praises the massacre but attempts to shirk responsibility. Yet as more evidence surfaces, including Hamas documents seized by the IDF during fighting in Gaza, Iran’s denials ring increasingly hollow.

The documents reveal that the Quds Force, particularly its Palestinian branch led by Saeed Izadi, was actively involved in planning a wide-ranging terror campaign against Israel. Ultimately, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar proceeded without final coordination with Tehran or Hezbollah, thus averting an even more lethal combined assault.

Arms, training and planning: Iran’s fingerprints on Gaza terror

The explosive charge found near Alumim is not merely a piece of ordnance, it is a symbol of Iran’s direct involvement in one of the worst atrocities in Israel’s history. Tehran has blood on its hands not only for its part in the massacre itself but also for its long-standing investment in building up Hamas’ and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wings.

Iran’s deep involvement is evident in every aspect of Gaza-based terrorism: from smuggling Sayyad sniper rifles used by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to kill IDF soldiers, to years of training for terrorists, to the diverse weaponry it has provided, including drones and rockets, either smuggled in or manufactured locally with Iranian know-how. Iran has also helped develop Hamas’ vast tunnel network across the Gaza Strip, allowing it to conceal hostages and mobilize fighters undetected.

Despite this profound role in orchestrating the October 7 massacre, Tehran has yet to face proper international condemnation. President Donald Trump continues to claim he wants to solve the Iranian nuclear challenge and help Iran become a “successful country.” But the international community must not allow the regime to obscure its direct responsibility. Israel – and the world – must treat Iran not only as a sponsor of terrorism, but as an active partner in crimes against humanity.

Israel’s public diplomacy teams must use this Iranian explosive device, along with documented meetings and correspondence between Saeed Izadi and Hamas leaders, to go on the offensive against Iran. These materials should be presented at international forums and diplomatic summits attended by Iranian representatives, clearly laying out Tehran’s significant role in one of the most barbaric attacks in modern history.

It must be remembered that during this assault, hundreds of people – including babies, children, women and the elderly – were kidnapped. Horrific crimes were committed, including systematic rape, mutilation, and the incineration of entire families, infants in their cribs among them. The world must recognize Iran’s culpability and act accordingly.

At the same time, the presence of this Iranian-made charge highlights why it is essential for Israel to maintain full security control over Gaza. Israel must do everything in its power to prevent the reestablishment of Iran’s deadly smuggling routes into the Strip. Only firm Israeli control can block their return, and protect Israeli citizens from recurring threats.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 06, 2025.