Iranian regime shows signs of weakening

Kamal Kharazi, chairman of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, is one of the closest advisors to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In an interview published last week on Khamenei’s official website, Kharazi laid out his vision of what he called “the primary threat posed by the Zionist regime to the world.”

Presented as a geo-strategic analysis, Kharazi’s remarks in fact revealed dangerous, classical antisemitism, cloaked in diplomatic language. His statements only proves the antisemitic nature of Iran’s regime, and offers another glimpse into the ideological justification Tehran promotes for the destruction of Israel.

Kharazi warned that Israel seeks to establish a “Greater Israel” spanning from the Nile to the Euphrates – a goal, he claimed, rooted in promises made in the Torah. He accused Israel of following a 24-point plan allegedly crafted by the Freemasons in a clear reference to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the notorious 19th-century antisemitic forgery that fueled persecution of Jews in Europe. Kharazi added that “the Jews are a small minority seeking to control the world,” thereby explicitly embracing the conspiratorial narrative of the “cosmopolitan Jew” pulling the strings behind global powers. His deliberate mention of the Freemasons was also no coincidence, reviving the old antisemitic myth that Jews secretly control this shadowy group, a theme common in late 19th-century propaganda promoting the notion of a global Jewish takeover.

A ‘just’ Jihad

Kharazi also likened Israel to the Islamic State terrorist organization, claiming that like ISIS, Israel too promotes “sacred violence.” This is a familiar dehumanizing tactic used in Iranian regime rhetoric, aimed at framing aggression against Israel and Jews as legitimate self-defense, even as a service to humanity. Tehran thus attempts to lend a moral veneer to its hatred of Israel, portraying the fight against it as a righteous jihad.

At a regional conference in Qatar this past May, Kharazi had already urged regional states to unite against Israel’s expansionist ambitions. Now, it seems that his remarks, widely disseminated by Khamenei’s English-language media arm, were intended not only for governments and peoples in the region but also aimed at leveraging the global surge in antisemitism since October 7, to draw broader Western audiences into Iran’s orbit.

These statements were no off-the-cuff remarks. Kharazi was quoted directly on the supreme leader’s official website, one of the regime’s top platforms for broadcasting carefully coordinated messaging both internally and externally. The conclusion is clear: Antisemitism is a central pillar in the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic. The religious justification provided by Khamenei and other regime figures for the October 7 massacre stems from this antisemitic worldview. Kharazi’s rhetoric helps set the ideological stage for another such atrocity.

In doing so, Kharazi joins a long list of Iranian officials, led by Khamenei himself, who have transformed “the Jewish question” into a political and propaganda weapon. Instead of criticizing specific Israeli policies, they adopt a religious-mythological narrative of a cosmic battle against the “Zionist entity,” which they view as a direct continuation of the biblical “Jew.” Even after Operation Shield and Arrow and the blow dealt to Iran’s axis of resistance in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war known as Operation Iron Swords, Tehran continues to pursue its vision of Israel’s annihilation. In his recent speeches, Khamenei reaffirmed this goal, effectively instructing his subordinates to redouble efforts toward its realization, especially in light of the disruption of their previous plan, stemming from a lack of coordination with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

Riding the wave

While Iran publicly claims to distinguish between Jews and Zionism, it is actively laying the groundwork for yet another war crime in the mold of October 7. Israel must intensify its efforts on the international stage to expose and highlight the antisemitic discourse promoted by the Iranian regime. Such a campaign would undermine Iran’s legitimacy, shed appropriate light on the dangerous ideology it espouses, and bolster Israel’s international legitimacy in countering Tehran.

At the same time, Kharazi’s statements may also suggest the regime’s growing weakness, and its attempt to ride the wave of global antisemitism to muster support, both globally and regionally. The lack of regional response to his call in May, the blow suffered by Iran and its proxies in the war, and the broader upheaval in the Middle East that followed, including the rise of an anti-Hezbollah government in Lebanon, have led Tehran to once again play the antisemitic card, in an effort to compensate for its strategic setbacks and weakening position.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 23, 2025.




Tehran’s Post-War Reset: Deterrence, Missiles, and Regional Ambitions

With the end of the Gaza War, the Islamic Republic of Iran is summing up a tumultuous two-year period of warfare that drew it into the circle of fighting and fire, contrary to its pre-war strategy. As a result of the blow it received from Israel in the twelve-day war between Israel and Iran, and the severe damage to its network of operatives, Tehran is taking a series of actions in an attempt to strengthen its deterrence capability, which suffered an unprecedented setback, signalling its intention to renew the “ring of fire” around Israel. This is especially so in light of increasing threats against it, including the activation of the snapback (UN Security Council sanctions) and the trauma from being caught off guard by Israel.

Missile Program and Intercontinental Ambitions

First, Tehran is focusing on increasing the range of its ballistic missiles to intercontinental levels, i.e., 5,500 km and above. Parliament member Mohsen Zangeneh revealed in an interview (September 20) on Iranian television that the “unidentified lights” seen in Iranian skies two days earlier, which sparked public curiosity and attention, were a successful intercontinental missile test. It is possible that this was the Khorramshahr-5 ballistic missile, expected to reach a range of 12,000 km, which, according to Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh (August 21), has not yet entered operational service. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi denied Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claim, following the test, that Tehran is developing intercontinental missiles capable of threatening Washington and New York. However, Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, confirmed the matter. In an interview with Iranian media, he stated that Khamenei had lifted the previous limit of 2,200 km on Iran’s missile range, and that Iran “is now developing its missile program as far as it wishes,” because it must “strengthen its most important military power factor, namely its missile program, without any limitation.”

Pressure for Nuclear Weapons Development

At the same time, pressure is growing from senior regime officials on Khamenei to approve nuclear weapons production. In this context, Ali Shamkhani, Khamenei’s senior advisor and formerly long-time head of Tehran’s nuclear program, called (October 12) for the regime to produce nuclear weapons, stating that it would have been better if Tehran had developed nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Earlier, on September 22, it was reported that 70 parliament members sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council, the senior institution where strategic decisions are made in Iran, demanding authorisation for nuclear weapons development. The legislators emphasised that their request was to permit the development and possession of nuclear weapons, but not their use, for deterrence purposes. In addition, nuclear scientist Mahmoud-Reza Akhami, President of Beshtehi University in Tehran, which is under U.S. and European sanctions due to its links to Iran’s nuclear program, stated (October 15) that “if one day it is required to build an atomic bomb, we could do it in the best possible way.” He stressed that “we have the capability and resources to develop nuclear weapons, but we have no intention to do so.”

Rebuilding the Proxy Network

Furthermore, Tehran is signalling its determination to rebuild its network of proxies despite the significant changes in the geopolitical map following the war. As revealed (September 30) by the Mossad’s Persian-language account on X, Abdollah Saberi was appointed to replace Saeed Izadi, who was eliminated in the twelve-day war, as head of the Palestine branch in the Quds Force. In this role, Saberi will coordinate the reconstruction of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip (as well as in Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank), including the process of strengthening and building capabilities and transferring financial and military assistance. Saberi is expected to rely on various special units of the Quds Force, including Unit 840, responsible for special operations. Its advanced weapons smuggling and ‘reality-altering’ activities targeting terrorist elements in the West Bank have been repeatedly thwarted by the IDF and Shin Bet in recent years; Unit 340, the technological support unit providing knowledge and equipment for Iran’s regional operative network, engaged in technology projects related to weaponry; and Unit 190, responsible for smuggling weapons to the operative network, whose commander, Behnam Shahryari, was also eliminated in the war.

As stated (September 24) by Parliament Speaker and Supreme National Security Council member Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Tehran sees nurturing the “Resistance Axis” as a fundamental component of its national security. Qalibaf also expressed Iran’s ambition to renew the “ring of fire” around Israel, explaining that if Tehran does not fight Israel in the Golan Heights, it will fight it on its own borders. He also stressed that Iran’s channel for transferring assistance to Hezbollah remains open, even though it has become more difficult due to regional developments. This signals Iran’s extensive motivation to rebuild and restore Hezbollah. As part of its motivation to rebuild its network of proxies, on October 11, Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ali-Reza Tangasiri boasted of Tehran’s ability to export missiles, drones, and warships.

Continued Trauma and Alertness

At the same time, signs of nervousness and alertness are still evident in Tehran, arising from concerns that Iran may again be attacked by Israel unexpectedly. The insecurity felt by the regime’s leadership, due to its failure to read deep regional and external developments and thus the approaching Israeli strike, remains apparent. These signs were clearly reflected in the suspicion with which, in early October, Putin’s message from Netanyahu was received, stating that Israel does not intend to resume the war against Iran. In response, Foreign Minister Araghchi (October 11) said that Iran’s forces remain on alert for the possibility of renewed conflict, as it may be an Israeli deception operation.

At the same time, in an effort to mitigate the significant drop in the national currency and alleviate public fears that could spark protests, the regime is sending reassuring messages to the public. This is done through senior security officials who state in the media that “the enemy will not dare to resume the war” and therefore “the likelihood of renewed conflict is low.” The heads of the security apparatus, IDF Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi, and IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour, also emphasised in a media statement at the end of a joint working meeting (September 29) that Iranian forces are “fully prepared” for a powerful confrontation against any kind of threat or possible aggression. In addition, Pakpour conducts tours of operational IRGC units to examine their readiness for the possibility of renewed war.

The Challenge of Steering Iran’s Strategy

Khamenei extensively outlined in his televised speech on September 23 his concern that renewing negotiations with the U.S. would be a move whose harm outweighs its benefit, as it would symbolise surrender to Trump and trigger additional U.S. demands in missile development and more. Nevertheless, the moderate and reformist camps are questioning his policy, as evidenced by the sharp criticism over the rejection of President Pezeshkian’s invitation to attend the Sharm el-Sheikh summit chaired by Trump. In their view, participation could have opened the door to renewed U.S.-Iran negotiations and eased tensions between them. However, due to Khamenei’s deep suspicion and lack of trust toward Trump, it currently appears that he will continue to impose strict conditions on resuming negotiations and pursue a policy aimed at successfully navigating the Trump period.

Published in Midstone Centre, October 19, 2025.




Will Trump’s plan push Iran to attack Israel?

Alongside examining the viability of Donald Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza, it is worth considering its implications for Iran and, accordingly, Tehran’s expected response if the plan is implemented. On the surface, the proposal appears to improve Israel’s strategic position: it is supposed to secure the release of all hostages from Hamas, dismantle the terrorist organization’s weapons infrastructure, and seemingly eliminate the need for Israel to occupy the Strip.

Given Iran’s conspiratorial mindset and Khamenei’s deep suspicion of US actions, Tehran is likely to view the plan as a move aimed squarely at undermining the regime. The leadership may suspect that Trump’s plan is designed to complete the weakening of another arm of Iran’s regional proxy network—Hamas. This would add to Hezbollah’s current difficulties in Lebanon, the decline of Shiite militias in Iraq, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. In Tehran’s eyes, all this points toward the main goal of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump: toppling the Iranian regime.

Iran’s state media has already framed Trump’s proposal as an “imperialist plan designed to perpetuate the occupation of Palestine.” The plan threatens Iran because it explicitly weakens Hamas and its grip on Gaza. Should Hamas accept, control of the Strip would pass to a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day governance under the oversight of an international transitional body—”the Peace Council”—led by Trump and joined by figures such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The positive reception of the plan by Arab states and Israel undermines the regional policy Iran has tried to lead since Israel’s attack in Qatar. At the Islamic summit in Doha, Tehran pushed for a unified front against Israel, urging not only condemnations but also harsh action, including economic and diplomatic boycotts. Trump’s plan flips this strategy on its head. Now Israel and key Arab states appear to be aligned, not opposed. Moreover, if Hamas rejects the plan, as it is expected to, the tacit approval from the US and indirect backing from Arab states for Israel to occupy Gaza runs counter to Iran’s regional strategy.

How might Iran respond?

Several factors fuel Tehran’s opposition: Khamenei’s distrust of the Trump administration, Iran’s desire to block a US-led regional order, and its aim to leverage the Swords of Iron War, and the Israeli attack in Qatar in particular, to shape a pro-Iranian regional order. Tehran also fears that Israel seeks to renew direct confrontation with Iran, thereby pushing Arab states to avoid any cooperation with Jerusalem in such a scenario.

From Iran’s perspective, Trump’s plan could pose dangerous consequences for its national security. Tehran will likely attempt to pressure Arab states diplomatically to oppose the plan. It will also seek consultations with Hamas on how to exploit it, using the proposal to stall Israeli military action in Gaza and to prevent even temporary Palestinian displacement, while simultaneously blaming Israel for obstructing implementation or pushing for Hamas allies to infiltrate the proposed technocratic administration.

The requirement that all hostages be released before Israeli withdrawal prevents Iran and Hamas from pursuing a deception strategy, extracting concessions from Israel, such as avoiding a full occupation of Gaza, without Hamas delivering on its side. Tehran and Hamas are also expected to seek Qatari mediation for support in navigating the bind the Trump plan has created. Even if Hamas ultimately rejects the proposal, Iran will likely try to reassure its leaders of the necessity of resistance, offsetting Hamas’ concerns about the strong backing Arab states have shown for the plan.

Ultimately, Trump’s initiative appears to undercut Hamas’ most valuable leverage: it demands the release of hostages upfront while forcing disarmament. It also contradicts Hamas’ strategy of leveraging the October 7 attack as a long-term asset, even at the cost of losing control of Gaza. Despite mounting pressure from Arab leaders, Hamas is expected to reject the plan or, at the very least, turn to Qatar to negotiate changes that would hollow it out.

Israel, meanwhile, is already benefiting from the proposal. Even before implementation, the plan has thwarted Iran’s attempt to build a unified Islamic front against Israel. Still, it risks stoking Iranian fears that Israel and the US are preparing for war, this time aimed at a regime change. The danger of Iranian miscalculation, including the possibility of a sudden strike against Israel, is a scenario both Washington and Jerusalem must now take seriously.

Senior Iranian officials such as Yahya Rahim Safavi, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, have already called in mid-August for a surprise attack on Israel. Those calls could now gain momentum, particularly after the activation of the “snapback” mechanism, which increases the chances of Iranian miscalculation.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 01, 2025.




Staying alert: A new strategic phase in the Israel-Iran confrontation

Iran emerged battered and humiliated from the recent “12 Day War,” as it is referred to in Tehran, after suffering a blow that included the elimination of many of its senior security officials, leading nuclear scientists, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities, security centers, regime symbols, and repression hubs.

Nevertheless, Iran also has a sense of achievement, due to the damage its missile strikes inflicted on Israel, and its success in maintaining functional continuity during the war. Tehran claims its main achievement is the preservation of the Islamic regime, based on the assumption that this was Israel’s primary goal by waging the war.

Since the war ended, Iran’s media has focused on two main issues. First, regarding the potential renewal of nuclear negotiations with the US, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is facing criticism from both conservative and radical-conservative factions. This stems from his desire to resume talks on the condition that Tehran receives guarantees from Washington that it will not be attacked again by the US, and from the implicit trust he still places in US President Donald Trump.

Second, in response to voices within Iran claiming that Tehran emerged victorious and therefore has no need to attack Israel, the radical-conservative daily Vatan-e Emrooz reported on Sunday that senior Iranian political and security officials are “seriously considering” launching a preemptive strike against Israel.

Growing anxiety in Tehran

The paper explained that this consideration comes in light of threats made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz to take enforcement action if Iran renews efforts to develop nuclear weapons or expands its ballistic missile program. In addition, with reports of US arms shipments to Israel since the war ended, the daily assessed that another Israeli strike is likely.

It therefore called on the Iranian regime to prepare for a preemptive attack “a day, a few hours, or even just one hour” before a potential Zionist strike, if Iranian security leaders conclude that such an attack is imminent. To prepare Iranian public opinion for this scenario, the daily argued that such a move could decisively end the issue of attacks on Iran and serve as a basis for long-term deterrence.
Meanwhile, signs of growing anxiety are evident in Tehran, due both to the consequences of the war and to threats from France, Britain, and Germany to support the reactivation of the UN Security Council’s snapback sanctions mechanism against Iran in mid-October 2025. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with French media (July 10) that, in Tehran’s view, the reactivation of snapback sanctions would be equivalent to a military attack.

In parallel, Mehdi Mohammadi – a strategic adviser to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and a former member of Iran’s nuclear negotiation team between 2007 and 2013 – posted on Instagram (July 12) a story showing a simulated nuclear strike on Israel.

After the controversial post began attracting headlines and widespread attention, Mohammadi deleted it within minutes, explaining that it had been posted by his page administrator. He clarified that, in his view, a nuclear weapon would enhance Iran’s deterrence capabilities.

The beginning of a new phase

Israel and Iran stand on the threshold of a new phase in their strategic confrontation. Israel has demonstrated both its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and its advanced capabilities to support that policy.

Iran, for its part, remains suspicious, vengeful, and alert, as reflected in its senior officials’ statements. It is important to note that after the war ended, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on June 26 that Tehran had not agreed to a ceasefire, but only to halting attacks against Israel, and only if Israel did the same. This increases the likelihood of an Iranian miscalculation, and as a result, the possibility of a surprise missile strike on Israel.

Israel’s main challenge in this new phase is to combine heightened intelligence alertness with strategic coordination with the US, in order to block any Iranian attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, and to prevent a miscalculation that could trigger renewed war. Concurrently, Israel must reach the most accurate possible assessment of the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program so it can plan its next steps accordingly.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, July 16, 2025.




‘The protective wall of all civilization’

According to Iran researcher Dr. Raphael BenLevi, the blow that Israel dealt to Tehran not only thwarted a serious strategic threat, but heralds a profound change in the status and role of the Jewish state. The tendency to explain global conflicts solely in military and economic terms, he says, misses the ideological war between West and East and between oppression and freedom.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 04, 2025.

מללמת תרבות shutterstock - Joseph Sohm -




Crushed by Israel, Iran’s regime doubles down on fear, lies, and internal control

In a pre-recorded televised speech aired on June 18, while Iran was under heavy and systematic attack by the Israel Air Force, Ali Khamenei instructed his men and supporters:

“Do not let the enemy sense that you fear him, that you feel weak. If the enemy senses that you are afraid of him, he will not let go of you. Continue the same behavior you have shown until now, and continue it with strength.”
In the coming days and weeks, the Iranian regime is expected to increase the repression of the Iranian people. It will conduct broad internal inquiries about Israel’s significant penetrations and the failure of the “Axis of Resistance,” mainly Hezbollah, to come to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s aid during the 12 days of fighting.
Tehran will work to restore its nuclear program and missile infrastructure, both of which were damaged during the war.
The regime will carry out in-depth investigations into how Israel managed to strike so intensively against nuclear facilities and so successfully against top regime officials, military bases, and symbols of authority. At the same time, it will strengthen its image and intensify its psychological warfare efforts, directed primarily toward the Iranian public, regional countries, and global powers.
The Iranian regime cannot afford to be perceived as weak; such a perception could encourage opponents of the regime to unite under a nationwide protest movement. In Khamenei’s view, any sign of frailty would be an admission of the Islamic Revolution’s failure and would embolden enemies in the West to help the Iranian people overthrow the government.
Khamenei, who is often credited with long-term strategic vision, insisted in his speech after the ceasefire reached between Israel and Hezbollah in November 2024 that the “Axis of Resistance” remained intact and that Iran’s regional standing was unaffected, even after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and other top Hezbollah leaders.
Khamenei misunderstood Middle Eastern shifts, Israel’s capability to tackle Tehran
Yet this statement masked a deeper failure: Khamenei misread the profound regional shifts underway and underestimated Israel’s resolve and capability to confront the Iranian threat head-on.
As part of its substantial psychological campaign to save its image, Khamenei’s regime is carrying out deceptive efforts aimed at convincing the Iranian public that the Islamic Revolution is still on track.
To this end, it has been pushing its supporters to the streets since Israel’s initial strike: On Saturday, June 14, the Shi’ite holiday of Ghadir – marking the Prophet Muhammad’s appointment of Ali as his successor; on June 20, in Friday sermons across Iran; and, most recently, last Tuesday evening during the “victory celebrations” in Tehran.
The regime is also stepping up propaganda efforts through its media apparatus: state television channels, newspapers, news websites, and social media propagandists, along with indoctrination campaigns within the security forces themselves.
To further the plan, regime institutions will attempt to obscure from public view the depth of damage and shock suffered by the regime at the hands of the Israelis, beyond what simply cannot be concealed: the elimination of senior figures and the destruction of military bases throughout the country.
Under Khamenei’s directive, the regime will strive to preserve and also project its (faltering) image as a victorious force.
Behind the boasts, however, lies a deep fear of what comes next. This anxiety will likely drive a dual strategy: intensifying domestic repression, while simultaneously offering economic incentives and populist gestures to mitigate the regime’s growing legitimacy crisis.
For now, having ended its war with Israel, the regime appears poised to turn inward – to wage a war of survival against its own people.
Published in The Jerusalem Post, June  29, 2025.



Shadmani, Nasrallah and the collapse of Iran’s Axis of Resistance

Over the past year, the Iranian regime and Hezbollah have suffered unprecedented blows at the hands of Israel, which has severely damaged not only their military capabilities but also the nature of the strategic relationship between them.

Senior officials on both sides who were involved in security decision-making and managing the strategic relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah were eliminated one after another. A newly released archive photo published in Iran on June 26 shows Ali Shadmani and then-Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah together, revealing another chapter in this strategic alliance, one that will likely never return.

According to reports from Iran, Shadmani was killed during the war, after being appointed as the successor to Gholam Reza Rashid, who was eliminated in Israel’s opening strike. Shadmani had served as head of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, the body responsible in routine times for threat assessment, force-building direction, and readiness assessment, and in wartime, for managing the entire military campaign under the direct authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

His death was officially reported in Iran only on June 25, following reports that he had been seriously wounded in a targeted strike about a week earlier and did not recover.

Shadmani had a long and distinguished military career. He joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) upon its founding in 1979 and commanded the Ansar al-Hossein Division during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988).

He went on to hold a series of senior positions, but the significance of the photo with Nasrallah lies in the period during which it was likely taken, after 2005. From 2005 to 2012, he held a senior role in the Operations Directorate of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, including during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. From 2012 to 2016, he headed the directorate and later became the deputy coordinator of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters before ultimately taking command.

In this role, Shadmani oversaw the integration of all Iranian operational plans across the various arenas. Therefore, the very fact that a meeting between him and Nasrallah took place, now publicly revealed, adds another layer to the deep strategic relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah.

While it was known that Nasrallah regularly met with Quds Force commanders, Khamenei’s advisors and Iranian foreign ministers, it now emerges that he also held meetings with senior officials in the Operations Directorate of Iran’s General Staff. This connection underscores his elevated status within the Iranian regime’s decision-making processes and Tehran’s operational planning.

Nasrallah served as a strategic linchpin not only for Hezbollah but also for the Iranian regime and its management of relations with the organization. His assassination on September 27, 2024, marked a profound rupture for both Tehran and Hezbollah, which, in the current war, chose to remain on the sidelines.

In doing so, the organization made a historic decision that sharply contradicts Nasrallah’s past declarations that Hezbollah would join any war if Iran were attacked.

The Iranian regime must now undertake a complex process of rebuilding, not only of its military command structure, but also of its cooperation with Hezbollah.

The loss of Shadmani and other senior commanders who were eliminated by Israel, including Saeed Izadi, head of the Quds Force’s Palestinian branch (reportedly also responsible for facilitating Iranian support to Hezbollah), and Behnam Shahriyari, head of the Quds Force smuggling unit, presents a serious challenge.

Added to this are the deaths of Quds Force commanders for Lebanon and Syria, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, and his successor, Abbas Nilforoushan, in previous months.

In such circumstances, reconstructing the Iran–Hezbollah “Axis of Resistance” appears especially daunting, particularly in light of Israel’s clear determination to prevent any attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the foreseeable future.

Published in JNS, June  30, 2025.




Israel did the West a favour by attacking Iran’s nuclear program

In the early hours of Friday morning, Thursday night in Canada, Israel launched a preemptive military strike deep inside Iranian territory — targeting nuclear infrastructure, military sites and senior officials.

First, let’s be clear: this was not an act of aggression by Israel, but a lawful act of self-defence and a last resort against the genocidal regime in Tehran, which has, for decades, vowed to destroy the world’s only Jewish state — and now stood on the cusp of doing so.

Under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, every nation has the inherent right to defend itself. Iran is the only UN member state that openly calls for the annihilation of another, Israel. This is not rhetorical flourish. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has called the Jewish state a “cancerous tumour” that” must be eradicated.” That genocidal intent has also been matched by action.

For years, Tehran has funded and armed a global terror network: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria. These are not mere “proxies,” they are tentacles of the same regime in Tehran that have also attacked American troops, disrupted global shipping and attacked western allies in the Mediterranean, South America and Europe.

Then came Oct. 7, 2023 — the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. This atrocity was carried out by Hamas, with Iranian money, training and weapons. Just as the Nazis sought to annihilate the Jewish people, the Islamic Republic of Iran has vowed, repeatedly, to annihilate the Jewish state.

Through it all, Israel showed remarkable restraint. It absorbed blow after blow, responding proportionately while Iran raced toward nuclear breakout. In the meantime, satellite imagery and intelligence confirmed that Tehran was enriching uranium to near-weapons grade, testing long-range missiles and constructing fortified underground facilities. This week, the International Atomic Energy Agency formally declared Iran in violation of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The writing was on the wall, and Iran was racing toward the point of no return.

U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly vowed that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon. While his administration has rightly prioritized diplomacy to avert conflict, he also warned that military action would be inevitable if Iran did not agree to a deal. Immediately after the strike, the president reiterated that, “I gave Iran chance after chance to make a deal. I told them (if they don’t) it would be much worse than anything they know.… It will only get worse!”

Ultimately, Israel acted not out of choice, but out of necessity. Although the cost of action may be high, the price of inaction for the world’s only Jewish state would be existential.

But let’s be clear: this is not just Israel’s war. Iran’s goal has never been limited to wiping the Jewish state off the map. Its aim is to challenge and destabilize the entire western-led world order. It doesn’t just chant “Death to Israel” — it chants “Death to America,” too. It arms and directs terror groups that have attacked U.S. forces, targeted European interests and disrupted global energy and trade routes.

For years, Israel has taken the hits so others wouldn’t have to. It has fought Iran’s terror proxies on its borders, absorbed missile fire and exposed nuclear violations — all while the rest of the world looked the other way and lectured the pesky Jewish state.

Now, with Iran on the verge of the point of nuclear no return, equivocation is not an option. In moving to eliminate the Iranian threat, Israel was not acting alone, but in defence of the West. And it is doing what much of the world has lacked the will to do: confront a genocidal regime before it is too late.

Israel just did the West a favour. The least the West can do is say “thank you.”Published in the National Post, on June 13, 2025




Iran’s vision for Jerusalem’s ‘Liberation’ – A strategic threat to Israel

As Israel celebrates Jerusalem Day – marking the historic return of Jerusalem, the capital of the ancient Kingdom of David, to full Jewish sovereignty after two thousand years – it is crucial to recall Iran’s openly declared ambition to destroy Israel and “liberate” Jerusalem, with the Al-Aqsa Mosque as its symbolic centerpiece. This aspiration was vividly illustrated in a provocative poster published in May 2020 by the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, under the chilling title “The Final Solutio” – a term borrowed directly from Nazi Germany’s lexicon.

The poster depicts armed terrorists from various Iran Quds Force-backed militias gathering triumphantly in Jerusalem, having supposedly succeeded in eliminating Israel. Visible among them are operatives from Hezbollah, Hamas, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and Iraqi Shiite militias holding images of Jamal Abu al-Mohandes, the Kata’ib Hezbollah commander killed alongside Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. These militants operate under the ideological influence of Khomeini, Khamenei, Soleimani, Abu al-Mohandes, [late Hamas founder] Ahmed Yassin, and [late Hezbollah number 2] Imad Mughniyeh, whose portraits adorn their vehicles.

In May 2021, about a year after the release of that poster, then-Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah introduced a new strategic equation: Any Israeli action deemed a “violation of Jerusalem” would justify a regional war. In a speech delivered just days after the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls, Nasrallah signaled his intent to join a future multi-front campaign against Israel, drawing upon the emotionally charged religious symbolism of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa. He declared:

“Israelis must understand that whoever harms the sanctities of Islam will not face only the resistance in Gaza. The new equation after the last confrontation is that anyone who attacks Jerusalem or Al-Aqsa will face a full-scale armed resistance… Gaza surprised its allies and enemies alike by entering the battle in response to actions in Jerusalem… The historic shift in the ‘Sword of Jerusalem’ campaign was that Gaza went to war to defend Jerusalem—not itself.”

Khamenei’s poster was neither symbolic nor coincidental. In a speech delivered in November 2023, six weeks after the outbreak of the current war, IRGC Commander Hossein Salami called for a repeat of the October 7 massacre – this time in a more sophisticated fashion and launched from the east, south, and north – with the aim of destroying Israel. For decades, Iran’s regime has used “International Quds Day” (instituted by Khomeini on the last Friday of Ramadan) to incite crowds in Tehran, Gaza, Beirut, Baghdad, Sana’a, and elsewhere to chant, “Death to Israel.”

The October 7 massacre carried out by Hamas served as irrefutable evidence – if any was still needed – that Israel must take its enemies’ threats with absolute seriousness. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that Tehran has been actively developing a detailed operational plan to destroy Israel for at least the past seven years. In 2018, senior Iranian official Hossein Amir-Abdollahian – who later served as foreign minister under President Raisi and was killed alongside him in a 2024 helicopter crash – declared that Iran had a concrete plan to implement Khamenei’s 2015 directive to wipe Israel off the map within 25 years.

In addition to addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israel must consider the threat of a mass-casualty assault aimed at its destruction with the gravity it demands. In fact, late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar described the future attack with remarkable clarity in a speech to thousands in Gaza on December 17, 2022. He declared: “We will come at you, God willing, in a roaring flood. We will come at you with endless quantities of rockets. We will come at you with a limitless tide of fighters. We will come at you with millions of our people, again and again.” Given this, Israel must regard Salami’s call for a more advanced and comprehensive massacre attack as a credible threat. This is especially true in light of reports that, during the war, circles in Tehran considered the possibility of launching ground invasions of Israel from Syria (prior to former president Bashar Assad’s removal) and from Jordan.

Israel must work systematically to deny its enemies both the capability and the motivation to carry out such plans. This requires a proactive and offensive strategy targeting the Iranian regime and its regional proxies. Simultaneously, Israel must complete the construction of its border with Jordan and take advantage of diplomatic opportunities in the region to prevent Iran from entrenching its presence and expanding its influence. Such opportunities may arise in light of significant regional changes, foremost among them the ousting of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah’s position and power in Lebanon.

Another major lesson from the current war is the urgent need to strengthen Israel’s defense independence by developing an advanced domestic military industry. Reliance on weapons systems, ammunition, and equipment from foreign powers – especially the United States – leaves Israel vulnerable, often awaiting critical supplies or facing constraints tied to political considerations that do not necessarily align with its national security interests. Israel must create a robust and sovereign industrial and technological base, enabling rapid, precise, and independent responses to security threats – guided by a clear strategic imperative: Protecting its citizens, even when that requires decisions made without external approval or support.

Published in I24, May 26, 2025.




Israel must act against Iran – the clock is running out

The battle over a nuclear deal with Iran will not only determine the fate of the bomb – it will shape the regional order for years to come.

While shifting geopolitical realities in the Middle East have backed Iran into a corner, paradoxically, the current negotiations are working in its favor. As the US administration hesitates on its approach to Tehran, Iran continues to systematically enrich uranium, advance its weapons group, and acquire critical knowledge that could enable it to produce a nuclear weapon, should its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei choose to give the order.

Despite sanctions, economic pressure, and international isolation, Iran is achieving significant gains. Its defensive and offensive capabilities are improving and defeating it in a future military confrontation appears increasingly difficult. This is precisely why Israel and the United States must adopt a firm and uncompromising diplomatic posture – without delay.

A weak agreement – something akin to a “JCPOA 2” – would work against American interests. Such a scenario would buy Iran time to recover economically, bolster the regime’s domestic position, and enable it to rehabilitate the “Axis of Resistance,” after being severely weakened by Israeli actions and thus restoring Tehran’s national security. Even if the deal were to temporarily restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it would still allow Tehran to maintain its status as a nuclear-threshold state, while further destabilizing the region. Eventually, when the time seems ripe, Iran would likely move ahead with its operative plan to destroy Israel.

In light of this, Israel should urge US President Donald Trump to revive the ultimatum he issued against Iran in March – which has since been abandoned – and bring it back to the forefront. A natural window for this would be June, during the upcoming session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, where a critical decision is expected on reinstating sanctions via the “snapback” mechanism.

Simultaneously, Israel should lead a broad public diplomacy campaign aimed at the US administration, thought opinion leaders, and the American public, emphasizing a core message: A lenient nuclear agreement will weaken the US, endanger its allies, and throw a lifeline to a radical ideological regime. Conversely, a strong stance toward Iran will reinforce America’s regional influence, encourage more nations to join the Abraham Accords, and pave the way for a more stable geostrategic reality.

This effort must also address concerns in the US about being dragged into a costly regional war. Even if military conflict does erupt, Iran is in no position to engage in serious hostilities against the US and Israel. Its proxies are weakened, and the Houthis – the only remaining active outpost – cannot be counted upon to provide the necessary support. Moreover, an Israeli strike, especially with US backing, would significantly impair Tehran’s offensive and defensive capabilities.

Given Iran’s technological, intelligence, and military inferiority compared to the US, it is doubtful that its leadership would choose to enter a full-scale war, particularly at a time of eroding public support and a deteriorating proxy network. Tehran’s decision-making appears driven by survival instincts, making it unlikely that the regime would yield to hardliners like Revolutionary Guards Commander Hossein Salami, who call for direct confrontation.

A targeted public diplomacy campaign could both undermine appeasement efforts in Washington and present Iran with a firm and unequivocal position, forcing it to choose between escalation, which could threaten the regime’s survival, or full acceptance of American demands. The latter would mean drinking the “poisoned chalice,” akin to Khomeini’s painful but calculated decision to end the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. As with Iran’s limited response to the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020, there remains a significant gap between Tehran’s operational capabilities and its willingness to use them.

Even if Israel ultimately has to accept a deal focused solely on the nuclear issue, it must reach a clear understanding with Washington on a comprehensive strategic plan to weaken Iran’s regional proxies and missile program. These issues need not necessarily be part of the negotiations with Tehran. Instead, they can be addressed through other means, including kinetic and cyber operations, which will convey unequivocally that both Israel and the US are committed to drawing red lines on terrorism and missile proliferation. This would signal a new strategic reality to Iran and force it to reconsider its offensive ambitions in these arenas.

Diplomacy must rise to meet this moment of decision. The outcome of the nuclear negotiations will not merely settle the question of the bomb – it will determine the future shape of the regional order. Israel must therefore act intensively with the US to ensure it can influence the proposal presented to Iran and help define the path forward in the ongoing struggle against Tehran.

Published in I24, May 11, 2025.