If press reports are accurate, not only Hezbollah but Iran itself is preparing to launch an all-out attack on Israel. Such an attack could include up to seven fronts, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, along with Iran itself, Gaza, Judea and Samaria.

We likely stand on the precipice of the next phase in this war: The direct showdown between the Islamic Revolution of the Iranian regime and Israel.

Although this grave reality is seizing headlines around the world, most appear to be missing how big a moment it is.

Iran faces a classic sunk investment in which whatever money has been made is history, the net balance is now a loss and sinking more money into it only promises more loss.

Such is Iran’s great “ring of fire” war against Israel. The war started on Oct. 7 with an Iranian victory via its proxy Hamas and immense growth in stature and influence. Iran was especially successful at seizing the region’s strategic and geopolitical momentum to the benefit of itself, its axis of rogue states and its geopolitical great-power allies of Russia and China.

But since Israel entered Rafah and severed Gaza from the rest of the world by seizing the Philadelphia corridor, Iran’s successful war to redefine the region around its eclipsing power has become a retreat.

Operationally, the IDF is beginning to reach peak performance, much like the U.S. armed forces by the late spring of 1942. The IDF is now fielding weapons that did not exist half a year ago. It is a heavily trained, well-equipped force and morale remains astronomical. It is exercising power unimaginably far beyond anything it possessed in Oct. 2023.

Any further conflict and thus any form of Iranian escalation invites an Israeli response that delivers gallopingly increasing marginal returns that ravage Iran’s assets and strength—from Iran’s proxies to its own territorial forces.

Given how dangerous Israel has become and how the relative balance of military power is shifting towards the IDF, Tehran ought to be desperate to cut bait and walk away. It ought to “take the win” of Oct. 7 and shut everything down.

But it cannot. At this point, Israel’s recent blows—seizing the Philadelphia corridor and Rafah, Muhammad Deif’s demise, Fouad Shukr’s demise, Ismail Haniyeh’s demise, several top Hezbollah operational sector heads’ demise—devastated Iran’s initial success and have shifted the strategic momentum of the war.

For Iran, all this is a terrible humiliation. As such, if these defeats are left unanswered by the Iranian regime, the regime’s weakness will be exposed in full. In turn, the Iranian people—who long ago divorced themselves from their rulers—will smell fear and impotence. That is how repressive regimes fall.

So, the mullahs of Tehran have to act and sink more into their investment of destroying Israel. But the more they do and the more Israel deals them yet further defeats and humiliations, the more Israel strengthens, seizes strategic momentum and emerges as the strong horse of the region. This steadily whittles away or outright demolishes Iran’s assets, real strength and reputation.

The only thing that can save the regime in Tehran is an imposed ceasefire, which it might try to claim hampered it from its inevitable victory, now receding faster than Yul Brenner’s hairline.

But the mullahs cannot accept a ceasefire that leaves their most recent humiliations without retaliation, to which Israel is waiting to respond, likely in devastating ways, against Iran itself. So the mullahs face a Hobson’s choice with no good path forward.

Moreover, the Iranians have always managed to survive and strategically win by being far more sophisticated in the arts of manipulation and seduction than their opponents. They are the masters of playing strategic chess; unrivaled by any on the face of the Earth.

But all strategies anchored to manipulation depend on an opponent who is predictable, sane and rational. Israel’s strategic behavior is increasingly possessed and thus unpredictable, wild, dangerous and impossible to manipulate.

In such a situation, the normally strategically sophisticated and supremely controlling Iranian strategy leads to outright paralysis. Iran has been forced to fall back on the pattern of what has worked before. But that is precisely what Israel’s possession has rendered useless.

Iran is thus strategically seized up and finds itself reacting to an unpredictable and unmanageable deadly rival. This is precisely the position it always wants to impose on its opponents rather than have imposed on Iran by its opponents. Iran thus finds itself upside down. It can only act—or rather react—out of habit rather than strategic intelligence.

We may be seeing the beginning of the end of the Iranian regime. The impotence of a tyranny whose sole currency is based on a reign of terror is being exposed. It has revealed the facade of a weak, defeated and humiliated regime not long for this world.

And if that happens…

Published in JNS, Augast 1. 2024.

Since October 7, Israel has been engaged in a war of necessity, with the primary – albeit unspoken – goal of restoring deterrence. This deterrence had gradually weakened and was utterly shattered by Hamas’s surprise attack. The achievements of the prolonged fighting in Gaza, the ability to simultaneously address other fronts and the effort to free the hostages, despite the political pressures and complex economic and social challenges, are central elements in rebuilding this deterrence.

Added to this are the daring operations to rescue the hostages, the Israeli Air Force’s strike on Al-Hudaydah port, and the assassinations of senior Hezbollah and Hamas figures in Beirut and Tehran (for the latter, no Israeli responsibility was claimed). These actions not only demonstrate the high intelligence and operational capabilities of their executors but also show a willingness to take risks within the lion’s den at its peak alertness, despite the potential costs of success or failure. Moreover, they reflect the political leadership’s confidence in the security agencies’ abilities, which also impacts Israel’s standing in the eyes of its enemies.

A coordinated and sustained response

Iran’s deep involvement and its encouragement of proxy organizations to wage its war increase the risks of direct confrontation and escalation into a regional war. On the other hand, dealing with its proxies while leaving Iran itself out of the conflict circle is precisely the model Iran seeks to implement. Such an approach would also influence its confidence in advancing its military nuclear capabilities. Israel’s brinkmanship requires readiness for severe scenarios.

As these lines are written, security tensions are at their peak. Senior Iranian officials are discussing with representatives of Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, and the Houthis the possible responses to Israel. Each of them has unresolved issues with Israel, and a coordinated response is expected. It is uncertain whether this will be executed in one method or phase.

For Iran, the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh is a severe blow to national pride. If such a high-profile figure can be targeted on the President’s day, at the guesthouse of the “Revolutionary Guards” in Tehran, and when Iranian security forces are at their highest alert, no one is safe within the country’s borders.

Moreover, this assassination comes less than a day after Fuad Shukr was killed in Beirut and not long after the airstrike on the Hodeida port and the assassination of Mohammed Deif in Gaza. In this respect, the elimination of Haniyeh places Iran on par with its proxies, its protégés.
Additionally, from a broader regional perspective, Tehran increasingly understands that, by the end of this war, Iran’s octopus-like network will lose at least one of its arms. Hamas in Gaza will not be able to meet the expectations placed on it by the regime in Tehran. Israel will be freer to deal with the octopus and its other arms and to establish a regional anti-Iran coalition from a position of strength.

The understanding that the first attempt to manage a quasi-state based on “Muslim Brotherhood” principles is doomed to be etched in historical memory as a colossal failure that brought disaster upon many Muslims is what prompted Erdogan’s militant declaration regarding Israel this week. This realization is also penetrating Iran, as its concern naturally focuses on the implications of this development for the “Axis of Resistance.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei threatened that Israel “will be severely punished” for the assassination of Haniyeh. According to a “New York Times” report, he instructed that the attack should directly target Israel. Given Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas’s strong desire for revenge against Israel, it is likely that they will make an effort to encourage Iran to retaliate harshly, even if this means taking greater risks than in the past.

Against this backdrop, Nasrallah’s statement yesterday (Thursday) that “between us, in the coming days and nights, the battlefield will be determined” can be interpreted as a desire to limit the response to a few days of fighting rather than a broad war. However, his remarks pertain solely to Hezbollah’s role, and in any case, Nasrallah also understands that in war, dynamics are uncontrollable and unpredictable.

The Israeli-American cooperation, which proved effective during the Iranian attack in April, will be beneficial now. The clear statement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense on this matter is welcome. Thwarting the Iranian attack is an interest not only of Israel but also of the U.S. and other regional countries that fully understand Iran’s intentions towards them as well.

It is reasonable to assume that the Iranians will not stop there and will try to target Israeli individuals or institutions. Increasing security and preventive efforts is a necessary step in this regard.

There must also be preparations for the possibility of “quality attacks” within Israel by Hamas or elements directed by Iran’s various proxies. This is also the time to improve defensive measures along Israel’s eastern border.

All these achievements in various arenas over the past ten months and Israel’s recent actions should clarify to Tehran and Beirut not only Israel’s capabilities but also its determination and audacity. Presumably, this will also be taken into account.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 2, 2024.

Introduction

The Biden administration adheres to the “two states for two peoples” plan, viewing it as a key component in shaping the Middle East after the “Swords of Iron” war. At this stage, the main players in the Israeli political system (Likud, the National Camp, and Yesh Atid) understand the current impracticality of establishing a Palestinian state, which would reward terrorism. However, it is possible that under American pressure and over time, some may agree to the division of the land and the establishment of a Palestinian state. We believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to Israel because it would quickly become a platform for Iran and its Axis of Resistance  to eliminate Israel. Given Hamas’s popularity in Judea and Samaria, it is expected to take over this area easily and without violence. Its control there will serve as a catalyst for its cooperation with Iran and the realization of their shared vision of Israel’s destruction. This article aims to present how Iran is expected to use a Palestinian state to advance its plan to destroy Israel.

A. The Iranian Modus Operandi Against Israel: Encircling Israel Under an Existential Threat

Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has made the destruction of Israel a central tenet of its ideology, as articulated by the regime’s founder, Ruhollah Khomeini, and his successor since 1989, Ali Khamenei. However, Iran’s actions suggest that from the outset of its revolutionary era, it has designated for itself a supporting role to fulfill this vision, instead aiming to destroy Israel through its network of proxies. Despite the historic direct confrontation between Iran and Israel in April 2024, we assess that Iran remains committed to this proxy-based strategy. This is mainly because it has been proven that using proxies is profitable for Iran. The strategy allows Iran––which recognizes the inherent risk in direct combat against Israel––to wage war against the Jewish state while dodging the price for these actions. Therefore, Tehran has been promoting a method of action, particularly in the last two decades, aimed at empowering its proxies against Israel. This includes training and arming its network of proxies with advanced weapons such as heavy rockets, cruise missiles, and precision missiles, upgrading the capabilities and offensive power of these proxies. Statements by senior IRGC officials indicate that a plan has gradually developed to encircle Israel with existential threats through a network of proxies: in November 2014, for example, IRGC Air Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh proudly stated that “thanks to Iran’s support, Tel Aviv is now under a crisscross of fire from Gaza and Hezbollah fighters.” In September 2019, the then head of IRGC’s operations command, Abbas Nilforushan, declared Iran’s success in encircling Israel and threatening it from all sides. The declaration followed significant advancements in the proxy strategy, especially regarding Iran’s increased support for the Houthis, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the “Imam Hussein” division in Syria, and deepened Iranian support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Accordingly, at the end of this month, IRGC Chief Salami declared that “this mission of eliminating the Zionist regime is no longer a vision but an achievable task.” It should be noted that in addition of strengthening Tehran’s involvement in different fronts, it looks to deepen its foothold in Jordan next, seeing it as the last barrier to arming Judea and Samaria.

In the Palestinian arena, Hamas and Islamic Jihad stand out as the spearhead of Iran’s plan to destroy Israel. Hamas, the most popular organization in the Palestinian arena, has ruled Gaza since 2007; Islamic Jihad, a protégé of Iran, is falling under Tehran’s increasing influence due to the ideological proximity between the parties; and, in the background, Hezbollah, Iran’s strategic arm in the region, poses a significant threat to Israel from southern Lebanon. Alongside these, Iran also supports other organizations and Palestinian factions that support armed struggle against Israel, primarily the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fatah – Munir al-Maqdah. Iran’s close cooperation with Fatah elements is evidenced by the investigation of the Karine-A arms ship detainees and the involvement of Fuad Shubaki, who was not only Arafat Adminitrations’ “Finance Minister” but also the mastermind behind the attempt to smuggle this arms ship from Iran to Gaza.

Alongside these organizations, Iran, with Hezbollah’s assistance, is trying to establish terrorist cells in East Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria to maximize its penetration into the Palestinian arena and assist Palestinian terrorist elements harm, bleed, and exhaust Israel. Munir al-Maqdah’s activity stands out in this context. Recent Shin Bet investigations revealed that al-Maqdah, a Palestinian-descended resident of Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh, works increasingly closely for the IRGC and Hezbollah vis-a-vis the Palestinian arena, recruiting elements in Judea and Samaria to carry out attacks, promoting the smuggling of Iranian weapons, and transferring funding through various channels to Judea and Samaria terrorist cells.

Two examples stand out in this context: On July 21, 2020, the Shin Bet and IDF thwarted a Popular Front-affiliated (and directed by Iran and Hezbollah) terrorist cell’s attempt to carry out serious attacks, including a planned attack in Harish and a plot to kidnap a soldier to be used as a bargaining chip to get prisoners released from Israeli jails. The investigation revealed that one of the cell’s members was expected to go to Lebanon for military training organized by Hezbollah, including shooting, manufacturing weapons, operating drones, and more. Then, in September 2020, the Shin Bet reported that Yasmin Jaber, a resident of East Jerusalem, was arrested on suspicion of being recruited by Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Quds Force to help recruit more operatives among Israeli citizens and residents of Judea and Samaria. The subsequent investigation revealed that Jaber was identified by Hezbollah operatives during her participation in a conference in Lebanon in 2015. During another visit to Lebanon in 2016, she was recruited by a Hezbollah operative named Jafar Qubeisi, known to the Shin Bet for his involvement in other recruitment attempts of elements in Israel and Judea and Samaria for terrorist activities. Since her recruitment by Hezbollah, Jaber had been in covert contact with her handler through social networks, according to security briefings and instructions received from Hezbollah.

B. The Advanced Iranian Terror Network and the Danger to Israel

Amidst the intense struggle between Iran and Israel and the growing activity of the Iranian terror network, various units spearheading the network have been exposed. These units are responsible for training, smuggling arms, financing, and providing other forms of support to Tehran’s proxies, including various Palestinian terror organizations. A Palestinian state, if established, would serve as a prime target for these units for weapons smuggling, planning, and promoting terror attacks aimed at exhausting Israel and striving for its destruction. The main units of this type are as follows:

• Branch 2500 (Palestine Branch) of the Quds Force: This operational unit of the Quds Force is responsible for assisting Palestinian terror organizations, primarily Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The unit is commanded by the shadowy figure Saeed Izadi, who was recently captured on rare footage. The effort Izadi invests in strengthening the terror capabilities of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria was reflected in the warning (2019) of Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon. The warning recognized Said Izadi’s central role in Iran’s and Saleh al-Arouri’s (who led Hamas’s terror array in Judea and Samaria) attempt to turn this area into another against Israel.
• Unit 840 of the Quds Force: This secret operational unit is responsible, among other things, for planning and establishing terror infrastructures outside of Iran, against Western and Israeli targets, and for promoting special operations against Israel. The unit operates worldwide, and in mid-2021, its attempt to assassinate two Israeli businessmen in Colombia was foiled. Led by Asghar Bakeri. The unit leads terror operations against Israel, also pushing them into Judea and Samaria, as recently demonstrated by the foiling of its attempt, along with the IRGC’s Operations Division (4000)’s, to smuggle advanced weapons into Judea and Samaria.
• Division 4000: The special operations division of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The division is headed by Javad Ghafari, who until his removal from his post in 2021 commanded the Syrian corps of the Quds Force. In March 2024, the IDF and Shin Bet foiled the smuggling of advanced weapons, including anti-tank mines, RPG launchers, fragmentation mines, 50 pistols, and more, from Iran to Judea and Samaria. The operation was led by the special operations division of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (4000) in cooperation with the special operations unit of the Quds Force (18840) in Syria, under the sponsorship of Unit 840’s head, Asghar Bakri.
• Unit 190: The IRGC’s smuggling unit, led by Behnam Shahriari. The unit uses various air, sea, and land routes to advance smuggling operations to the terror proxies operating in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian arena. The smuggled goods are disguised as innocent commerce, violating several UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting Iran from exporting weapons, including Resolutions 1929 (2010) and 2105 (2013). The unit uses Iranian and other airlines, most of which continue to operate despite American sanctions. The unit is responsible for various smuggling operations to Gaza, including using civilian ships that transport weapons on the Iran-Sudan-Egypt-Gaza route. We can asses that over the years, the unit has not only instrumentalized the Gaza- Sinai tunnel network but may also used humanitarian organizations, primarily the Iranian Red Crescent and the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, which operate in Gaza and have been exposed as operating on behalf of the Quds Force.
• Unit 340: The Quds Force’s technological assistance unit, providing knowledge and technological equipment for Iran’s proxy network in the region. The unit deals with technological projects related to weaponry. It is headed by Hamid Fazei, a mechanical engineering doctor from Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. According to reports, among the projects the unit is working on in the missile field are improving accuracy, extending range, and increasing the destructive capabilities of the missiles Tehran supplies to its proxy network, including Islamic Jihad.

In addition to these units, Iran’s diplomatic representations in the region serve as a cover for Quds Force activities. Notably, the ambassador role in key countries in Iran’s regional proxy network is held by a Quds Force officer. Accordingly, it is known that Iran’s ambassadors in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime – Hassan Kazemi-Qomi (2005-2010), Hassan Danaeifar (2010-2017), Iraj Masjedi (2017-2022), and Mohammad Kadhim al-Sadeq (2022-present) – are all senior Quds Force officers. Additionally, Iran utilizes diplomatic positions as cover for its intelligence officers, as was prominently revealed in the case of Assadollah Asadi, who served as a counselor at the Iranian embassy in Austria while he was actually an intelligence officer for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Asadi was sentenced in 2020 in Belgium to twenty years in prison but was released in 2022 as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Belgium and Iran. Asadi was arrested in 2018 in Germany and extradited to Belgium after transferring a device containing 500 grams of explosives to an Iranian-Belgian couple in Luxembourg to carry out an attack against a gathering of the Iranian opposition organization, MojahedinKhalq, in a Paris suburb (Villepinte). Notably, the meeting was expected to include participation by Rudy Giuliani, lawyer of then-president Donald Trump. The attack was foiled by the Mossad in cooperation with French, German, and Belgian intelligence services.

In light of all this, Israel will find it difficult to prevent the presence of Quds Force elements in the hypothetical Palestinian state because, as a sovereign state, the Palestinians will be entitled to decide who will serve as an ambassador to their state. Moreover, even if a buffer zone were to be established to separate Jordan from the Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria, the Quds Force will find a way to circumvent the obstacle using front organizations and various covers by exploiting infrastructure that ostensibly serves civilians. This infrastructure includes a series of charity organizations and humanitarian and religious associations, including the Iranian Red Crescent, the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, the Headquarters for the Restoration of Holy Sites, Al-Mustafa International University, the World Assembly of Ahl al-Bayt, and others.

Additionally, Hezbollah’s Unit 133, responsible for recruiting Palestinian agents -including Israeli Arabs and some from the village of Ghajar- and carrying out attacks, is similarly expected to advance Palestinian terrorism with the establishment of a Palestinian state. Alongside carrying out attacks, the unit promotes drug and weapons smuggling, as well as intelligence gathering. Within the unit also operates Jawad, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s son. Unit 133, led by Muhammad Ataya, conducts some of its activities through face-to-face meetings abroad, coded phone calls, and encryption means. According to the Shin Bet, experienced in dealing with Hezbollah’s recruitment efforts in the Palestinian arena, the preferred method for recruiting Palestinians––including Israeli Arabs––is the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, located in Saudi Arabia. Other recruitment is done through internet mediation, focusing on social networks, and meetings in Scandinavian countries. Since its establishment about two decades ago, the Shin Bet and IDF have thwarted various cells recruited by the unit among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs.

One of the prominent thwartings was the arrest of “Haaretz” journalist, CEO of the Ittijah organization, and one of the heads of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, the spy Amir Mahoul, who was arrested in 2010 and imprisoned for nine years for serious espionage and conspiracy to assist Hezbollah.

C. Past Experience in Gaza: How Iran Assisted Hamas Become a Terror Monster

Since the 1990s, Iran has been increasingly assisting Hamas with military and technological training while also providing significant funding to the organization. Iran has supported Hamas since its early days in the late 1980s. This support increased after the assassination of its spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in 2004, who, as a Sunni theologian, limited the cooperation of the terror organization with Shiite Iran. However, even during Yassin’s period, ties between Hamas and Iran were established. The 1998 meeting between Yassin and Khamenei in his Tehran office represents a significant development in the relationship. Soon thereafter, Iran began providing millions of dollars in aid to Hamas, alongside military and technological training. Iranian support increased significantly after Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, imported into Gaza through a sophisticated smuggling network primarily utilizing the underground tunnels along the Philadelphi Route. Both sides even overcame a crisis in their relations following the 2012 establishment of a unity government between Hamas and Fatah and Hamas’ active support for the rebels in Syria against Bashar al-Assad.

Throughout the period, Iran did not cease to support Hamas’s military wing, with Sinwar meeting with Khamenei in February 2012 (a few months after his release from prison in the Gilad Shalit deal) in Iran as part of a Palestinian delegation led by Ismail Haniyeh. He essentially served as the architect of the deepening of relations between Hamas and Tehran. After Iran’s 2014 attempt to establish a rival organization to Hamas in Gaza (Al-Sabireen) failed, Tehran also realized the seniority and popularity of Hamas in the Palestinian arena. As Iranian official Hossein Sheikholeslam, who played a key role in the relations between Iran and its proxies, put it: “Hamas needs weapons, so it cannot separate from Iran, and Iran cannot separate from Hamas.” Sinwar’s election in 2017 in the internal elections to lead Hamas in Gaza helped accelerate the trend of strengthening relations with Tehran. As various senior officials in Tehran admitted after the October 7 attack, the Quds Force played a senior role in promoting and enhancing Hamas’s underground network, and the head of Hamas’s military wing, Mohammad Deif, even used to plan many Hamas operations together with Quds Force Commander Soleimani. Simultaneously, Tehran maintained regular contact with the deputy head of the military wing, Marwan Issa, who “used to visit Tehran whenever possible.” Meanwhile, alongside the military efforts in Gaza, the IDF revealed in early January 2024 components for the production and development of precision missiles for Hamas under Iranian guidance in the Daraj Tuffah area in northern Gaza. This revelation underscores Iran’s role in smuggling advanced knowledge into Gaza through the training it provides to Hamas and Islamic Jihad experts in its territory. This was publicly declared by the Islamic Jihad representative in Tehran, Nasser Abu Sharif, in an interview with Iranian media (November 2018). The training received in Tehran by Muhammad Zawari (assassinated in 2016), one of the key founders of Hamas’s UAV array, also illustrates Tehran’s determination to export its knowledge to Hamas in Gaza as a complementary leg to the tunnel network, which encountered some difficulty after Sisi’s Egypt took action against it, albeit to a very limited extent.

D. How a Palestinian State Will Look – The Expected Takeover by Hamas

We assess that given Hamas’s immense popularity in Judea and Samaria, it is likely that a hypothetical Palestinian state would fall into Hamas’s hands like ripe fruit. Hamas’ popularity was well reflected in a June 2024 poll published by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, chairman of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. The poll, conducted between May 26 and June 1 in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, found that 73% of Judea and Samaria Palestinians support Hamas’s decision to carry out the massacre of October 7, 71% prefer Hamas to rule Gaza after the war (compared to 11% who prefer a new Palestinian Authority with an elected president to rule Gaza), and 41% declare themselves Hamas supporters (compared to 17% who said they were Fatah supporters).

Therefore, Hamas is expected to take over the Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria without difficulty and without violence. Once it wins the elections, it will impose its authority by force to suppress any signs of resistance, and in this context, it is expected to use significant violence even against security mechanisms identified with Fatah, just as it did in Gaza in 2007.

In such a situation, Hamas will rely on Iran to advance their shared vision of destroying Israel. Iran will push the Palestinians to carry out more massacres following the model of October 7. As much can be gleaned from the statement on December 1, 2023 of IRGC Commander Hossein Salami that another such raid from the south, north, and east of Israel is enough to destroy Israel; and from Khamenei’s statement (June 3, 2024) that the region “urgently needed” such an attack; as well as his statement (October 10, 2024) that “we kiss the foreheads and hands of the young people who carried out the attack and those who planned it.” It should be emphasized that even before Hamas carried out the massacre, there were signs in Iran of such an attack against Israel when Khamenei’s office published in May 2020 the illustration titled “The Final Solution,” showing militants from various militias supported by Iran (including Hezbollah and others) celebrating the liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque with their weapons in hand.

We assess that before Hamas organizes to carry out raids and massacres, the areas evacuated by Israel in Judea and Samaria will become forward bases for Hamas to terrorize Israelis living on the border and to launch missiles against strategic facilities in Israel, primarily the Dimona reactor, Ben Gurion Airport, and Air Force bases. In fact, as early as August 20, 2014, the Kayhan daily, close to Khamenei, determined that arming the West Bank would serve as a strategic step for Iran that “would completely change the balance of war” because “this area is in the heart of Palestine and very close to the occupied areas.” He continued, “Therefore, if a missile is launched from the West Bank to Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ashdod, or even the Zionist regime’s nuclear center in Dimona, there will be no need for missiles with a range of 80-100 km, but 15-20 km range missiles will suffice.”

A Palestinian state led by Hamas will therefore make it easier for Khamenei to realize his vision of arming Judea and Samaria, which he has publicly called for since 2014. It should be noted that the statements of senior Iranian officials between August 2022 and January 2023 reflect Iran’s eagerness to deepen its foothold in Judea and Samaria. Hezbollah, led by Nasrallah, would also be expected to expand its terrorist activities throughout Israel in the hypothetical Hamas-led Palestinian state in order to realize Nasrallah’s ambition to destroy Israel and pray in the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

E. Policy Recommendations

The pressures from the Biden administration and the “dowry” offered in the form of normalization with Saudi Arabia do not justify taking the immense risk inherent in establishing a Palestinian state in the heart of the country. Hamas’s significant popularity in Judea and Samaria and its extensive cooperation with Iran constitute a recipe for disaster, endangering Israel’s very existence. Instead of being a leverage for promoting the end of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, we assess that a prospective Palestinian state might serve as a significant springboard for advancing Hamas’ and Iran’s goal of destroying Israel.

Israel must wage an all-out war against Hamas and formulate a persistent and prolonged fight against the organization’s infrastructure, its leaders, its pool of operatives, its economic apparatus, and even its Da’wah network (religiously inspired terror operative recruitment) in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria. As seen by its declarations since October 7^th massacre, Hamas intends to repeat it, and there is no doubt that it has only been prevented from doing so because of the war Israel has so far waged against it.

Israel’s advocacy networks must effectively convey to the Biden administration and the international community that a Palestinian state will serve as a significant reward for Palestinian terrorism, carried out under Iranian auspices. Israel must engage in detailed advocacy about the various units of the Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organization that will operate in Judea and Samaria and assist Hamas in promoting the joint aspiration of Hamas and Iran to destroy Israel. Such advocacy should incorporate various examples of the different attempts of these Iranian units to advance terrorist activities against Israel, while also explaining the severe danger that a hypothetical Palestinian state that would pose as an instrument to tighten Iran’s noose against Israel. Importantly, Israel must clarify to the Sunni bloc countries in the region that a Hamas-led state in Gaza and Judea and Samaria under Iranian influence would also be contrary to their security interests, as it would significantly strengthen the Iranian Shiite-led Axis of Resistance in the region and might harm their security as well.

Moreover, a Palestinian state in Gaza would render Israel’s victories against Hamas so far as pointless. Hamas would be able to gradually rebuild its damaged capabilities and, with Iran’s assistance, reestablish its sophisticated underground tunnel network and missile arsenal, and even upgrading them through the missile precision project. Hamas’s underground tunnel network under the Philadelphi Route proves that Israel cannot let a foreign force become the guarantor of its security. Israel must maintain its hold on the Philadelphi Route, which serves as a primary economic-military lifeline for Hamas. Furthermore, Israel must pursue Hamas’s financiers, including the middlemen who assist it circumvent sanctions, in order to make it financially difficult for Hamas to rebuild itself.

Israel cannot focus solely on pursuing Hamas and Islamic Jihad and ignore the source of their support: Iran. Limiting the confrontation to Iran’s Palestinian proxies will not constitute a lasting national security strategy. Therefore, Israel’s updated national security doctrine following the events of October 7th must include a response to the challenge Iran poses to Israel through its proxy network. Israel cannot tolerate the smuggled weapons that Iran delivers to its Palestinian proxies, so it must target the UAV and missile networks in Iran before they reach the Palestinian terror organizations. To this end, it must search for the formula that will facilitate operations against Iran, especially the Quds Force, utilizing all the power components it developed (kinetic, cyber, and influence operations), and efficiently exploiting Tehran’s weaknesses – mainly its aversion to a direct war against Israel.

Additionally, given the increasing activity of the Axis of Resistance led by Iran against Israel from the Jordanian arena, Israel must accordingly improve its preparedness on this border. This includes completing the border fence and reinforcing the fence at weak points to make it difficult for Iran and its partners to smuggle in weapons or terrorist operatives. Furthermore, security coordination with Jordan must be enhanced according to the vital interest of both parties, in light of Iran’s intensive pressures against the Jordanian royal family.

Published in I24, July 22, 2024.

Around 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) more or less, separate Israel from the sites of Iran’s nuclear program. These facilities are scattered across the distant enemy nation, fortified and protected. In recent weeks, reports have repeatedly surfaced that the nuclear program continues to progress: The International Atomic Energy Agency warned in late May that Iran possesses enough material to produce at least three nuclear warheads. On the other hand, senior Israeli officials assert that the IDF knows how to deal with this threat. The claim that Israel is capable of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has been heard for many years, including from the country’s prime ministers.

“A big clock is ticking over us,” said Prime Minister Menachem Begin in June 1981, during the cabinet meeting that approved the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Even today, a big clock is ticking over us. Military experts estimate that in recent years, the Israeli Air Force has been training for long-range missions, among other things, to prepare for traversing the vast distance; but from a technical and operational standpoint, it’s unclear whether an effective strike on the nuclear program is indeed a feasible mission. Destroying Iran’s nuclear program requires simultaneously hitting numerous fortified sites, an unparalleled complex challenge. Is there substance to Israel’s assertions? Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert estimated just four months ago that Israel cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear program because it lacks suitable bombs and aircraft with sufficient operational range.

The question of whether it is possible remains relevant, as the Iranians are also preparing for the US presidential election. In Tehran, they remember the tense relations with the Republican candidate Donald Trump during his presidency and understand that if he is elected, it may be more difficult for them to continue developing their nuclear program. Perhaps they will decide that now is the time to break out for the bomb. Experts estimate that the breakout time is a matter of just a few months or even weeks. If Tehran wants to present the next American president with a fait accompli, it may act now. Accordingly, if Israel wants to thwart the nuclear program, these very days could be the last opportunity.

Iran’s plan to acquire an atomic bomb is not an end in itself but a means. It is part of Tehran’s vision of wiping Israel off the map. Along the way, Iranian proxy forces, an existential threat in every respect, are being deployed. A lack of Israeli initiative will only bring us closer to war.

Much is hidden from view on this sensitive issue. Israel does not disclose its capabilities, so one can only assess the situation based on informed individuals, publicly available data, and analyses of the mission requirements. In a sense, one can also consult the Iranians: The IAEA chief reported in April, shortly after the Iranian missile attack on Israel, that fearing an Israeli response, Tehran had closed its nuclear facilities – an indication that from an Iranian perspective, Israel may be able to attack them, perhaps even successfully. One can always hope that Israel has a few cards up its sleeve that we don’t know about and that there are more surprises in store.

An Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, in any case, would not be the result of a spur-of-the-moment decision. It is reasonable to assume that all preparations for such a large-scale operation cannot be completed in a short time. Moreover, since such an attack could only be the opening salvo of a much larger war, Israel will likely want to improve its defenses ahead of the moment of truth. Perhaps precisely now, with the IDF already on high alert, is a good time for such an attack.

What might it look like? In general, one can assume that we will need to send dozens, perhaps hundreds, of aircraft into the air to successfully hit targets deep behind enemy lines. To do so, we must have accurate and up-to-date intelligence on all of Iran’s nuclear sites and the locations of equipment and materials; reach Iran undetected, without being shot down by other countries en route or having the attack exposed; deploy aircraft capable of making the entire distance or refueling them in the air and on the way back, and provide the pilots with a support and protection envelope; and also use bombs capable of causing damage deep underground. Such an operation would require coordination with several countries, including the United States, so that Israel does not receive a “Don’t” while the planes are in the air or a cold shoulder after the attack.

A senior officer who previously discussed the issue noted that preparations for such an operation require a high level of secrecy, and it’s unclear whether Israel’s security forces can indeed keep such a secret for an extended period.

The circle of those privy to the secret is relatively wide: the IDF and Mossad, members of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, cabinet members, and perhaps even the opposition leader. This was the case in the past with the attacks on the reactors in Iraq and Syria. The legitimacy challenge, both domestically and internationally, is also particularly significant: Most nations will not look favorably upon such an attack, and even some Israeli citizens may not support it. These days, everything is political; it’s hard to see how even this issue could escape being divided into “pro-Bibi” and “anti-Bibi” camps. Our strength lies in our unity, and our weakness in its absence. To prepare for such a major move, which could drag Israel into a protracted and difficult war, we must do much to increase our shared sense of destiny at home.

Bunkers inside the mountain

The targets Iran’s nuclear program, unlike Iraq’s reactor and Russia’s, is not located at a single facility. Iran has disclosed to the IAEA 21 sites related to the nuclear program, and there are also other sites where the agency has reported finding traces of highly enriched uranium. It is almost certain that there are additional sites that Iran does not declare. It is also possible that Iran has transferred some of the technology or materials to secret, fortified sites, which Israel needs to use its intelligence capabilities to uncover. Preserving some of the equipment and materials would allow Iran to restart the nuclear program at a relatively advanced stage, even if Israel achieves more success than anticipated.

The large number of sites raises the possibility that Israel may only be able to preemptively attack some of the most critical facilities, which form the core of Iran’s nuclear program and its nuclear strike capabilities. The best-known sites are Natanz and Fordow, and others that can be listed include the conversion facility in Isfahan, the heavy water reactor in Arak (ostensibly closed under the 2015 nuclear deal), and the testing site in Parchin.

Even if focusing solely on the most critical sites, attacking them is a formidable challenge. The facilities are located in fortified bunkers: Satellite imagery showed that in Natanz, an underground uranium storage facility was built at a depth of around 100 meters (320 feet) – a depth that even bunker-busting bombs may not be able to penetrate, it seems. Since the above-ground portion of the site was damaged in an explosion in 2021, Iran has accelerated the construction of the underground facility there. The enrichment center in Fordow was built from the outset into the side of a mountain to protect it from attack. At the Parchin research center too, concrete trenches and bunkers lead into the mountain’s side, where testing is conducted. This site, too, appears to be protected from a simple attack.

Getting there is also a complex matter. There are three main routes from Israel to Iran: through Turkey, through Jordan and then Iraq, or through Saudi Arabia. The last option would extend the route and fuel requirements. The first option does not seem feasible, given Turkey’s defense capabilities; the Turks would not cooperate with Israel on a security issue, even though Ankara, too, fears Iran’s ascendancy. A fourth possibility is to take off from Azerbaijan, which borders Iran. According to foreign reports, Baku cooperates with Israel in many areas, including intelligence and security, but the likelihood that it would allow a large-scale operation against its neighbor’s nuclear facilities from its territory is not high. It would not want to get embroiled in such an adventure, which would invite great Iranian wrath – and perhaps even the risk of war.

The aircraft not only need to reach the target but also return from it. In other words, they must exit Iran, even if not through the same route. Additionally, it is impossible to dispatch bombers alone on the mission. An escort envelope is required, including aircraft to attack Iran’s air defenses; fighter jets to accompany the bombers and protect them from airborne threats; jamming and electronic warfare aircraft; reconnaissance and signal intelligence, relay, and command aircraft; and of course, rescue forces in case of casualties. To attack just a few sites would require dozens to hundreds of aircraft, all operating at a distance of over a thousand kilometers from the State of Israel.

This entire operation must pass through or near the airspace of foreign countries or enemy states, and the entire force must return safely. The assessment is that the air force knows how to reach the target undetected, but it must still be vigilant.

Moreover, countries that are in direct contact with us (unlike Iraq, for example) would need to receive advance warning – even if brief – that Israel is using their airspace for an attack, to prevent severe diplomatic damage, and also to eliminate the possibility of our planes being shot down if detected. Even the US, Russia, and even Turkey have intelligence assets and radar stations across the Middle East, and they too could detect Israel and expose the attack prematurely.

Technical challenges: fuel, munitions, and defense

We have already mentioned the need for refueling. Except for taking off from Azerbaijan, any other flight path would require the Israeli Air Force aircraft to refuel in the air. The maximum weight limitation that a plane can carry would even force F-35s to refuel if they carry their full munitions load and take off with full fuel tanks, making the whole story much more complex. After considerable delays, Israel has acquired the KC-46 refueling tankers from the US, but they are only supposed to arrive in Israel next year. Israel has asked to expedite their delivery; it is unclear if this has indeed happened. In any case, the air force has older refueling tankers, and it can also use externally carried fuel tanks, but using them would make the already complex mission even more intricate and risky.

Upon reaching Iran, our pilots would encounter the air defense forces. Iran is not an air defense superpower, and according to foreign reports, Israel has managed to overcome its defenses in the past. Nevertheless, Iran does use the advanced Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system, which could make things difficult for the pilots and perhaps even down our planes. Iran is also seeking to acquire the more advanced S-400 systems from Russia, but for now it does not appear to have them, and their deployment would also require additional time.

The same applies to the Iranian air force. Currently, it has outdated aircraft such as the MiG-29 or F-14s purchased before the revolution, and it is unclear how successful it has been in maintaining their operational readiness given the international sanctions, the arms embargo, and the fact that this is aging technology suffering from a shortage of spare parts and technicians. A few weeks ago, Tehran announced that it had completed a deal to purchase advanced Sukhoi-35 jets from Russia: This would increase the airborne threat to our planes, but they would likely be able to overcome it, and in any case, it would take time to fully integrate the modern aircraft into operational service.

The most technically challenging component is the bombs. To strike sites like Fordow or Natanz, and especially the deep bunker that Iran has begun building there, Israel needs the most powerful bunker-busting bombs – and even those may not suffice. We are referring to the GBU-57 type bombs, which weigh over 13 tons and are capable of penetrating to a depth of up to 60 meters, according to the US military. Israel has other types of bunker-busting bombs, the GBU-72 and GBU-28, which are much lighter – around 2,000 to 2,500 kilograms (4,000 to 5511 lbs) – and have lower penetration capabilities. During the war, the US supplied some additional bombs, and Israel’s defense establishment has also developed its own bunker-busting bombs weighing hundreds of kilograms each, but it is unclear whether they would cause damage at great depth.

Another problem is that even if Israel had the heaviest bunker-busting bombs, it would be difficult to deliver them to the target. According to estimates, Israel may be able to modernize F-15s to carry GBU-57 bombs, along with additional fuel and munitions. This is a technically complex task, but sometimes even the impossible gets done. Other aircraft, in any case, would likely be unable to carry these large bombs, and the F-15s too would need aerial refueling to do so.

Even if we overcome all the obstacles mentioned here, it must be remembered that this is a high-risk mission for the lives of dozens or hundreds of pilots, and an unprecedented logistical challenge. The economic cost of such an operation would also be immense, although it would probably be just a fraction of the total cost of the war that could ensue.

In addition to an air strike, Israel is estimated to have other potential courses of action. According to foreign reports, Israel could use conventionally armed ballistic missiles like the Jericho 2, which can carry 750 kg (1650 lbs) warheads over a range of 2,500 km (1500 miles). These missiles are highly accurate. A Turkish researcher previously estimated that using several dozen such missiles could destroy or severely damage the above-ground facilities at Natanz, Arak, and Isfahan. The logistical and safety advantages are clear, but there are also downsides: The accuracy is not perfect, and it’s unclear whether the missiles can cause damage to the deeply buried sites.

Another possibility, according to a Financial Times report, is firing missiles from Israeli submarines or using drone swarms for the attack. It is unclear whether these vectors would achieve the objective, and it was previously noted that Israel may not have enough submarines for such an attack. Of course, an air strike, ballistic missile launches, submarine missile attacks, and drone swarms could be combined, but the bulk of the mission would fall on Israeli pilots’ shoulders. In any comprehensive attack of this nature, Israel would expose most of its strategic arsenal, depleting the element of surprise; on the other hand, if it is not used to neutralize the greatest threat facing us, what is its purpose?

Strategic Considerations: Failure risks, success, and inaction

Our military and political leadership is aware of all these considerations and is deeply familiar with the capabilities, advantages, and shortcomings. Even after the construction of the deep tunnels in Natanz was revealed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel would know how to deal with the threat. “We are confident and sure that we can deal with any threat on our own, and by other means as well,” he said exactly a year ago. Netanyahu has committed many times that Israel will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Since this seems to be of paramount importance to the prime minister, these statements should not be dismissed or taken lightly. Perhaps Israel will ultimately pull the rabbit out of the hat. But even if we succeed in the mission, before setting out we must add strategic dimensions to the tactical and operational considerations.

An Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would almost certainly mean a broad, regional all-out war. Hezbollah – Iran’s proxy – would undoubtedly attack with all its might in such a scenario, launching hundreds and thousands of missiles and rockets towards Israel daily, especially in areas adjacent to the Lebanese border, some 40 km away. And how would the world’s nations react? Would they defend Israel, or would it face even more severe international isolation? Would sanctions be imposed on it? Another possibility is that the “aggressive action” would grant legitimacy to Iran’s nuclear program, this time with approval rather than a wink.

The worst-case scenario is a failed attack. In such a case, Israel would not only expose its capabilities but also lose assets and lives while failing to achieve its objective. It would lose its deterrence, and could even provide the Iranians with justification to accelerate the program, saying that no one can stop them now. We would eat the rotten fish, get whipped, and be banished from the city.

Even a success would not necessarily achieve the ultimate goal of the attack. If Israel manages to destroy all facilities and fissile materials, the Iranian know-how would likely be preserved. The facilities would go up in flames, but the plans stored on numerous Iranian computers would remain intact, and many scientists (who have not been eliminated) could restart the program – with much more knowledge and experience. At most, Israel would delay the completion of Iran’s nuclear project by a few years; and next time, Iran would be more prepared and poised, building all capabilities with much higher security levels from the outset.

What is the point of such an attack?

One could consider the deterrent and psychological aspects. An attack would show that Israel is willing to go to the brink and do whatever it takes to prevent the threat. It is a statement of casus belli, a red line, an act that must not be committed. This is what Israel has declared for years would happen, and if at the moment of truth it does not act – it would be caught with its pants down. Its deterrence, already severely eroded these days, would be further damaged. It is even possible that the declarations were intended from the outset to entrap ourselves, leaving us no choice but to fulfill our statements, whatever may come.

On the other hand, one could argue that a successful strike on the nuclear sites would shift the international community’s attention to Iran’s actions, strengthen global recognition of Israel’s commitment to preventing an Iranian bomb, and of course bolster Israeli deterrence. The air force would demonstrate its capabilities and resolve, making absolutely clear what Israel’s red line is. In the Iranian attack on Israel on the night of April 13-14, Tehran spoke of a “new equation” it had created vis-a-vis Israel; a successful strike on the nuclear program would erase any other precedent and truly set a new equation regarding Iran and Israel’s tolerance for its actions.

There is also the matter of the alternative cost. If Israel does not attack, it is likely that within a few years it will face the existence of an Iranian bomb. This would ostensibly mean a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and perhaps the loss of Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Above all looms the existential threat to the State of Israel: A nuclear umbrella for the array of terrorist organizations that Iran supports in the region. It is important to remember that Iran’s plan to acquire an atomic bomb is not an end in itself but a means. It is part of Tehran’s grand vision of war against Israel and the West, and an important part of that vision is wiping Israel off the map. Along the way, Iranian proxy forces surrounding Israel, an existential threat in every respect, are being deployed. The more Israel waits and does not act, even out of fear of a regional war, the more it indirectly boosts the Iranians’ self-confidence, making them believe they are immune. A lack of Israeli initiative will only bring us closer to the very regional war – at a time when Iran is getting ever closer to a rapid nuclear breakout.

It is clear that deciding to bomb is not easy. The implications are fateful, the demands enormous, the preparations extensive. It is no wonder that such an attack has not materialized so far. It poses a logistical, operational and diplomatic challenge of the highest order, and entails the risk of many lives. But if not now, when Israel’s leaders see this program as an existential threat to the State of Israel, then when?

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 16, 2024.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser: The Biden administration wants to avoid any confrontation with Iran. They are afraid that if they move into confrontation, confrontational Iran may actually move towards having a bomb. But maybe [Iran’s leaders] believe that Trump is going to become the next president. They might actually try to break out a bomb now. They have enough material to produce the fissile material that is necessary for three bombs within a month.

It was published on tps, June 6, 2024.

/*! elementor - v3.21.0 - 30-04-2024 */
.elementor-widget-image{text-align:center}.elementor-widget-image a{display:inline-block}.elementor-widget-image a img[src$=".svg"]{width:48px}.elementor-widget-image img{vertical-align:middle;display:inline-block}

While the United States and Israel focus on threats from the Iranian-dominated Shia crescent stretching from Lebanon to Yemen, Tehran is quietly laying the groundwork for a second Iranian crescent that will soon pose a grave threat to U.S. interests. In Africa’s strategic Sahel region, Iran is taking advantage of Western weakness to deepen its economic and military influence, access critical materials, threaten moderate regimes, and undermine Israeli-Arab normalization.

The U.S., Israel, and their allies must take bold steps to counter this growing threat before it is too late.

The Sahel region has suffered widespread instability since 2020. Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Gabon, Chad and Sudan have all seen coups or the rise of military governments, driven by economic difficulties, governmental mismanagement, frustration over continued Islamist terror, and in some cases, growing hostility towards the West. The U.S. has distanced itself from these new governments, creating a void which Iran, Russia and China have been eager to fill.

In Sudan, for example, Iran is seeking to take advantage of the ongoing civil war in order to expand its military presence. Sudan, under the leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, current chair of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, joined the Abraham Accords with Israel in October 2020, in return for U.S. promises of support. However, after al-Burhan dissolved Sudan’s governing council in 2021, the U.S. backtracked on its promises and pressured Israel not to upgrade its relations with Khartoum. This lack of Western support contributed to the eruption of the devastating Sudanese civil war in 2023.

Al-Burhan continues to desire to move Sudan closer to the West and has no illusions about the Iranian regime. However, in the absence of Western support, he has been left with little choice but to turn to Tehran for the security assistance and aid necessary to defeat the rebels. Iran was willing to quickly provide Sudan with military support, while asking to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Such a base, together with those of Iran’s Houthi proxy in Yemen, would give Iran far-reaching control over one of the world’s most vital waterways. To date, Sudan has resisted the Iranian request, but it is not clear how long Khartoum will be able to withstand Iranian pressure.

Iran is also seeking to expand its influence in Niger, home to 5 percent of the world’s uranium output, a vital resource which can serve Iran’s illicit nuclear program. There are indications that Iran has already taken steps towards acquiring Nigerian uranium. Similar efforts by Iran to deepen its ties are taking place in Mali, Burkina Faso, and other countries of the Sahel.

In addition, Iran has set its sights on Chad, which reestablished ties with Israel in 2019 but has since become disappointed by the lack of Western assistance, as well as on Mauritania, a vital gateway to Africa for Iran’s bitter rival, Morocco.

A crescent of Iranian influence in the Sahel would allow Tehran to destabilize Egypt and threaten Israel and Saudi Arabia in a pincer movement from the north and south. Just as Iran and its proxies have sown terror and destruction across the Shia crescent stretching through Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, a second Iranian crescent would enable Tehran to further spread instability and violence.

Of course, Iran is not the only threat to Western interests in the Sahel. Russia has been quickly filling voids created by the exit of Western troops, sending former Wagner fighters and other military personnel to assist the new governments. China, too, continues to offer ready economic assistance to the region’s leaders, who are desperately seeking solutions to their countries’ socioeconomic woes.

The U.S. and its allies now face a choice. They can continue to distance themselves from the governments of the Sahel, while reducing or cutting off economic and military support. The result will be greatly increased Iranian, Russian, and Chinese influence in the region. The ayatollahs in Tehran will expand their efforts to create a new Iranian crescent, which will pose a grave threat to U.S. allies such as Israel, Egypt and Morocco, while giving Iran access to critical resources and undermining the Abraham Accords.

Instead, the U.S. and its allies, including Israel, should find ways to work with the region’s governments and deliver on previous commitments, while continuing to urge these countries to improve their records on democracy and human rights. Such a strategic approach would help counter the expansion of Iran’s nefarious influence in the Sahel, and prevent disastrous consequences for Africa, the Middle East, and regional peace.

Published in Newsweek, May 28, 2024.

The presumed Israeli attack on Iran was a message that was delivered very precisely, in the exact strength that was necessary. It clarified to the Iranians that whereas we are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out but seems that it was in a creative manner. It is good that a question mark hovers over the question of what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The way it was executed was very professional. It has kept everybody satisfied. Nobody wants to see an escalation, so the strike was conducted in a way that doesn’t have to lead to escalation. That is not something our partners should be worried about, neither the Americans, Europeans or the Arab states.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and airforce was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel.

I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment. The main mission on our agenda is to finish the war in Gaza. We have hostages to release. We have Hamas to destroy. We must focus on that.

At the same time, however, the strike indicates that our option are open to take further action at the time of our choosing.

Published in The jewish Chronicle, April 19, 2024.

As Passover 2024 approaches, Israel confronts a daunting array of security and political challenges that will shape its standing and threat landscape for years to come. Overcoming these trials will be an immense test due to several compounding factors – the sheer number of threats, their geographic spread, the intricate connections between them, the grave consequences of missteps, and the lack of consensus on prioritization amidst urgent timelines.

Adding complexity, for the first time Israel must navigate this perilous environment while grappling with the plight of 133 captives held in Gaza and thousands displaced from the north. Withstanding this pivotal moment requires societal resilience mirroring the national unity after the October 7 attacks, coupled with robust military capabilities and deft statecraft.

The sweeping objectives Israel must secure across multiple fronts underscore the magnitude of the challenge:

Iran

Iran’s nuclear ambitions, long the paramount security imperative, take on heightened urgency after its brazen strike against Israel. Neutralizing Iran’s missiles, proliferation networks, and proxy forces is equally vital. With the nightmarish scenario of an atomic Iran inching toward reality, Israel aims to capitalize on this window to spur decisive American leadership against the Iranian regime’s nefarious pursuits, while preparing contingencies should that falter.

Syria

Syria: Israel must continue its operations to thwart Iran’s entrenchment in this arena, and not allow any change to the rules of the game that it has dictated until now.

Lebanon and Hezbollah

It is proper to set a target date for the return of residents of the northern communities to their homes, while physically distancing Hezbollah’s Radwan forces outside of the threat range, and until then – to continue the active defense strategy, strike at commanders and capabilities, and maintain freedom of operation in this arena.

The Gaza Strip

Israel needs to achieve the three ultimate objectives it defined for the war, which have not yet been accomplished: the release of the captives, the toppling of Hamas’ governance, and the dismantling of its military capabilities. A significant increase in pressure will serve all three. Beyond action in Rafah, which should also include the border crossing area and the Philadelphi Route, Israel must crush the committees and mechanisms that Hamas utilizes within the territory, and systematically eliminate Hamas’ leaders abroad.

Regarding the “day after” issue – as long as Hamas remains the central power in the Strip, any attempt to establish an alternative in its place, without its consent, is bound to fail. This reality will only change if Hamas is defeated, which is what should be focused on at this stage.

The West Bank and Palestinian Authority

Israel’s first objective is to prevent attacks and demolish terrorist networks, of any kind and from any element. It is proper to maintain the offensive approach displayed by the security establishment in this arena since October 7 and improve readiness for scenarios that could develop inspired by Hamas’ attacks. In a long-term view, the lessons of the reality that developed in Gaza should inform us as we counter any pressure or temptation to upgrade the Palestinian Authority’s status or limit Israel’s freedom of operation in this arena.

Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom understood the potential Iranian threat against it even before the attack from Tehran. The possible threat from the “Axis of Resistance” on the border between Israel and Jordan requires both sides to adopt an appropriate response while capitalizing on the advantages of security coordination.

The regional arena 

The success of the coalition of states in halting the Iranian attack presents an opportunity to consolidate and expand the partnership. The fact that the peace agreements continue to stand firm despite the war fosters optimism regarding the ability to broaden and deepen cooperation.

Saudi Arabia

Establishing relations with the kingdom will continue to be an important goal for Israel, but it is doubtful whether this can be achieved in the time remaining until the US elections. It is proper to continue down this path but not at the expense of pursuing the defeat of Hamas.

Sudan

Its rapprochement with Iran should worry Israel – especially given its past when it served as a transit point for arms smuggling to the Gaza Strip at the behest of Iran. Israel and the US can also curb this trend now.

Above all else, topping the list of Israel’s foreign policy objectives is cementing and strengthening relations with the US. President Joe Biden has again proved his commitment to Israel’s security, despite the disagreements and tensions. Beyond the appreciation he deserves for this, it is proper to confine the disputes to substantive issues and lower their public profile.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 20, 2024.

Iran concludes this chapter of confrontation with Israel with a mixed cost-benefit balance sheet: On one hand, it crossed the Rubicon, disregarded President Joe Biden’s explicit warning, and use its own territory to carry out the largest missile and UAV attack any country has ever launched against another country. In doing so, according to its view, it will cause Israeli decision-makers to think twice before approving strikes on Iranian elements.

On the other hand, it exposed itself to a direct response, led to the formation of a coalition of countries against it, provided an opportunity to showcase an impressive array of air defense capabilities against Iran, opened the door for Israel to extricate itself from the political travails it found itself in due to the situation in Gaza, led the US to intensify measures against it, and caused internal tension and escalation in American political climate.

In addition to preserving deterrence, Israel’s main goals vis-à-vis Iran are dismantling its nuclear capabilities and neutralizing the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s proxy forces, chief among them Hezbollah. In response to the pressure Washington is exerting on Israel to refrain from retaliation, its willingness to join a practical plan with a binding timeline for achieving these goals should be examined.

In any case, Israel need not rush to respond. It would be wise to keep Iranian nerves in tense anticipation, allowing the Iranian rial to continue plummeting and enabling internal criticism of the regime to intensify.

Iran concluded this chapter of confrontation with Israel in a worse geopolitical position than it began: It invested in building proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, but ultimately became embroiled in a direct clash with Israel. The attack it carried out against Israel was impressive in scale but encountered an effective air defense array and did not cause significant damage. It prompted a cohesion of regional states and provided them with a successful experience of regional cooperation against it – which could encourage such a trend, contrary to its desires.

It provided legitimacy for striking it directly, and unlike Israel, it is less protected. It gave Israel leverage to pressure the US, so that even if it does not attack, it can extract concessions that will make things difficult for Iran. Russia and China, its allies, stood on the sidelines. It exacerbated Iran’s domestic situation, created a sense of tension and anxiety, and impacted the value of the rial.  

What does Iran still have in its arsenal that it has not yet employed against Israel? It mainly boils down to Hezbollah. The terrorist group’s set of considerations is broader and not solely focused on Iranian interests.

The Biden administration, which once again impressively stood by Israel’s side and assisted in forming a coalition of states that participated in thwarting the Iranian attack, fears a widening of the regional war due to the geostrategic and economic implications and the possibility of being dragged into intervening, especially in an election year. 

Therefore, it is trying to amplify the achievement against Iran, settling for that and a few diplomatic steps whose significance regarding neutralizing Iran’s capabilities is unclear. From Washington’s perspective, the developments reinforce its approach to hasten the establishment of a strategic regional alliance, and it will try to push for that to happen.

Israel, for its part, even if the prospects are unclear, must examine the possibility of seizing the opportunity created to advance its over-arching goal: Thwarting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If that is a concession that can be obtained at this time – restraint on its part would be justified.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone attack against Israel last night is the pinnacle of a decades-long Iranian campaign that has been ongoing since the Islamic regime took power during the 1979 revolution. Over the years, Iran has gradually built a sophisticated proxy system and, with the exception of very few instances, has preferred to fight Israel via its proxies. Hiding behind them is part of Tehran’s calculated strategy, which strives to distance Iran from war or any punishment for acts of terror, despite the Islamic Republic’s key role in training, funding, directing, and, at times, actively dispatching its proxies.

Now, feeling obligated to restore its eroded deterrence vis-à-vis Israel following the targeted killings attributed to the latter in Damascus in early April, Iran has chosen to take a public stand and attack Israel directly using its advanced drones and missiles. This is not a comprehensive strategic shift on Iran’s part. As soon as the strike ended, and before its scope had even been confirmed, Tehran clearly signaled, via its UN embassy, that it wished to end this historical event and return to normal.

Israel cannot go back to October 6. It must not allow Iran to surround it with a tightening ring of fire while making intolerable threats of a potentially nuclear nature.

However, Israel does not operate in a vacuum either and is required to coordinate its actions with the Biden administration, both by virtue of the strategic alliance forged between the two countries and in view of the implications of an Israeli assault against Iran on local US forces and interests. Tehran seems to regard the United States as the weaker player in this arena, and therefore, since the Israel-Hamas War broke out, has instructed its proxies to carry out dozens of attacks against US interests in Iraq and Syria, in an effort to make President Biden pressure Israel to stop the war. The partial US response to the lethal drone strike in early January by Iran’s Iraqi proxy, Kataib Hizballah, killing 3 US troops, appears to have only partially and temporarily deterred Tehran. The United States had, once again, chosen to retaliate against the Iraqi proxy, instead of its Iranian master.

Thus, although Quds Force Commander, Ismail Qaani, has reportedly instructed Iraqi Shiite militia groups to desist attacks against US interests, and has probably attempted to convince the Houthis in Yemen to do the same, the Iraqi militias have renewed (albeit not significantly) their assaults against US forces in Syria, while the Houthis continue to attack US sea vessels. Tehran itself, during its strike against Israel last night, threatened to attack any US forces that would help Israel in its retaliation against Iran. It is therefore clear that Iran views the United States as the weakest link and more easily pressured player.

Israel must formulate a comprehensive strategy for a high-intensity campaign against Iran, that could include peaks during which Iran would attempt to take direct action against Israel. Otherwise, Tehran would probably prefer to go back to operating via its proxies, given that direct Iranian actions against Israel would help form a regional coalition against Tehran, composed primarily of Jordan and Egypt, and supported by the United States, United Kingdom, and France (as seen in action last night). Such a coalition could shift from defensive to offensive mode since Iran is threatening to take action against any country supportive of Israel’s defense efforts.

Israel appears to have certain latitude vis-à-vis Iran, despite US pressure. The Biden administration opposes broad conflict that would run the risk of regional war. At the same time, if Israel and the United States choose to restrain their response, Iran would interpret their inaction as permission to attack Israel, the United States’ ally, directly, as well as other US partners in the region (to which Iran poses a threat) without paying the price for doing so. Furthermore, war breaking out between Iran and Israel still seems a long way off, allowing Israel to take action against Iran without necessarily leading the region to war. For instance, Israel could utilize the unprecedented Iranian attack to strike Iran kinetically when it is most suitable and convenient, whereas Tehran, which suffers from an acute domestic legitimacy crisis and can still collectively recall the destruction and aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), would think twice before aggravating its conflict with Israel. The cyberattack weapons that Israel has developed over the years could also serve it to repay Iran by damaging its essential infrastructure in an arena where responsibility is not unequivocally assumed by anyone.

Israel’s updated security strategy should include various aspects, primary among which are: the desirable modus operandi vis-à-vis Iran; increased coordination with the United States on efforts to thwart the drone, missile, and terror infrastructure in Iran and the region; strengthening the IDF’s force buildup so that it would tally with the challenge posed by Iran; and closing the various gaps that enable Iran to carry out cyberattacks and influence campaigns in Israel.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.