As Passover 2024 approaches, Israel confronts a daunting array of security and political challenges that will shape its standing and threat landscape for years to come. Overcoming these trials will be an immense test due to several compounding factors – the sheer number of threats, their geographic spread, the intricate connections between them, the grave consequences of missteps, and the lack of consensus on prioritization amidst urgent timelines.

Adding complexity, for the first time Israel must navigate this perilous environment while grappling with the plight of 133 captives held in Gaza and thousands displaced from the north. Withstanding this pivotal moment requires societal resilience mirroring the national unity after the October 7 attacks, coupled with robust military capabilities and deft statecraft.

The sweeping objectives Israel must secure across multiple fronts underscore the magnitude of the challenge:

Iran

Iran’s nuclear ambitions, long the paramount security imperative, take on heightened urgency after its brazen strike against Israel. Neutralizing Iran’s missiles, proliferation networks, and proxy forces is equally vital. With the nightmarish scenario of an atomic Iran inching toward reality, Israel aims to capitalize on this window to spur decisive American leadership against the Iranian regime’s nefarious pursuits, while preparing contingencies should that falter.

Syria

Syria: Israel must continue its operations to thwart Iran’s entrenchment in this arena, and not allow any change to the rules of the game that it has dictated until now.

Lebanon and Hezbollah

It is proper to set a target date for the return of residents of the northern communities to their homes, while physically distancing Hezbollah’s Radwan forces outside of the threat range, and until then – to continue the active defense strategy, strike at commanders and capabilities, and maintain freedom of operation in this arena.

The Gaza Strip

Israel needs to achieve the three ultimate objectives it defined for the war, which have not yet been accomplished: the release of the captives, the toppling of Hamas’ governance, and the dismantling of its military capabilities. A significant increase in pressure will serve all three. Beyond action in Rafah, which should also include the border crossing area and the Philadelphi Route, Israel must crush the committees and mechanisms that Hamas utilizes within the territory, and systematically eliminate Hamas’ leaders abroad.

Regarding the “day after” issue – as long as Hamas remains the central power in the Strip, any attempt to establish an alternative in its place, without its consent, is bound to fail. This reality will only change if Hamas is defeated, which is what should be focused on at this stage.

The West Bank and Palestinian Authority

Israel’s first objective is to prevent attacks and demolish terrorist networks, of any kind and from any element. It is proper to maintain the offensive approach displayed by the security establishment in this arena since October 7 and improve readiness for scenarios that could develop inspired by Hamas’ attacks. In a long-term view, the lessons of the reality that developed in Gaza should inform us as we counter any pressure or temptation to upgrade the Palestinian Authority’s status or limit Israel’s freedom of operation in this arena.

Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom understood the potential Iranian threat against it even before the attack from Tehran. The possible threat from the “Axis of Resistance” on the border between Israel and Jordan requires both sides to adopt an appropriate response while capitalizing on the advantages of security coordination.

The regional arena 

The success of the coalition of states in halting the Iranian attack presents an opportunity to consolidate and expand the partnership. The fact that the peace agreements continue to stand firm despite the war fosters optimism regarding the ability to broaden and deepen cooperation.

Saudi Arabia

Establishing relations with the kingdom will continue to be an important goal for Israel, but it is doubtful whether this can be achieved in the time remaining until the US elections. It is proper to continue down this path but not at the expense of pursuing the defeat of Hamas.

Sudan

Its rapprochement with Iran should worry Israel – especially given its past when it served as a transit point for arms smuggling to the Gaza Strip at the behest of Iran. Israel and the US can also curb this trend now.

Above all else, topping the list of Israel’s foreign policy objectives is cementing and strengthening relations with the US. President Joe Biden has again proved his commitment to Israel’s security, despite the disagreements and tensions. Beyond the appreciation he deserves for this, it is proper to confine the disputes to substantive issues and lower their public profile.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 20, 2024.

Iran concludes this chapter of confrontation with Israel with a mixed cost-benefit balance sheet: On one hand, it crossed the Rubicon, disregarded President Joe Biden’s explicit warning, and use its own territory to carry out the largest missile and UAV attack any country has ever launched against another country. In doing so, according to its view, it will cause Israeli decision-makers to think twice before approving strikes on Iranian elements.

On the other hand, it exposed itself to a direct response, led to the formation of a coalition of countries against it, provided an opportunity to showcase an impressive array of air defense capabilities against Iran, opened the door for Israel to extricate itself from the political travails it found itself in due to the situation in Gaza, led the US to intensify measures against it, and caused internal tension and escalation in American political climate.

In addition to preserving deterrence, Israel’s main goals vis-à-vis Iran are dismantling its nuclear capabilities and neutralizing the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s proxy forces, chief among them Hezbollah. In response to the pressure Washington is exerting on Israel to refrain from retaliation, its willingness to join a practical plan with a binding timeline for achieving these goals should be examined.

In any case, Israel need not rush to respond. It would be wise to keep Iranian nerves in tense anticipation, allowing the Iranian rial to continue plummeting and enabling internal criticism of the regime to intensify.

Iran concluded this chapter of confrontation with Israel in a worse geopolitical position than it began: It invested in building proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, but ultimately became embroiled in a direct clash with Israel. The attack it carried out against Israel was impressive in scale but encountered an effective air defense array and did not cause significant damage. It prompted a cohesion of regional states and provided them with a successful experience of regional cooperation against it – which could encourage such a trend, contrary to its desires.

It provided legitimacy for striking it directly, and unlike Israel, it is less protected. It gave Israel leverage to pressure the US, so that even if it does not attack, it can extract concessions that will make things difficult for Iran. Russia and China, its allies, stood on the sidelines. It exacerbated Iran’s domestic situation, created a sense of tension and anxiety, and impacted the value of the rial.  

What does Iran still have in its arsenal that it has not yet employed against Israel? It mainly boils down to Hezbollah. The terrorist group’s set of considerations is broader and not solely focused on Iranian interests.

The Biden administration, which once again impressively stood by Israel’s side and assisted in forming a coalition of states that participated in thwarting the Iranian attack, fears a widening of the regional war due to the geostrategic and economic implications and the possibility of being dragged into intervening, especially in an election year. 

Therefore, it is trying to amplify the achievement against Iran, settling for that and a few diplomatic steps whose significance regarding neutralizing Iran’s capabilities is unclear. From Washington’s perspective, the developments reinforce its approach to hasten the establishment of a strategic regional alliance, and it will try to push for that to happen.

Israel, for its part, even if the prospects are unclear, must examine the possibility of seizing the opportunity created to advance its over-arching goal: Thwarting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If that is a concession that can be obtained at this time – restraint on its part would be justified.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone attack against Israel last night is the pinnacle of a decades-long Iranian campaign that has been ongoing since the Islamic regime took power during the 1979 revolution. Over the years, Iran has gradually built a sophisticated proxy system and, with the exception of very few instances, has preferred to fight Israel via its proxies. Hiding behind them is part of Tehran’s calculated strategy, which strives to distance Iran from war or any punishment for acts of terror, despite the Islamic Republic’s key role in training, funding, directing, and, at times, actively dispatching its proxies.

Now, feeling obligated to restore its eroded deterrence vis-à-vis Israel following the targeted killings attributed to the latter in Damascus in early April, Iran has chosen to take a public stand and attack Israel directly using its advanced drones and missiles. This is not a comprehensive strategic shift on Iran’s part. As soon as the strike ended, and before its scope had even been confirmed, Tehran clearly signaled, via its UN embassy, that it wished to end this historical event and return to normal.

Israel cannot go back to October 6. It must not allow Iran to surround it with a tightening ring of fire while making intolerable threats of a potentially nuclear nature.

However, Israel does not operate in a vacuum either and is required to coordinate its actions with the Biden administration, both by virtue of the strategic alliance forged between the two countries and in view of the implications of an Israeli assault against Iran on local US forces and interests. Tehran seems to regard the United States as the weaker player in this arena, and therefore, since the Israel-Hamas War broke out, has instructed its proxies to carry out dozens of attacks against US interests in Iraq and Syria, in an effort to make President Biden pressure Israel to stop the war. The partial US response to the lethal drone strike in early January by Iran’s Iraqi proxy, Kataib Hizballah, killing 3 US troops, appears to have only partially and temporarily deterred Tehran. The United States had, once again, chosen to retaliate against the Iraqi proxy, instead of its Iranian master.

Thus, although Quds Force Commander, Ismail Qaani, has reportedly instructed Iraqi Shiite militia groups to desist attacks against US interests, and has probably attempted to convince the Houthis in Yemen to do the same, the Iraqi militias have renewed (albeit not significantly) their assaults against US forces in Syria, while the Houthis continue to attack US sea vessels. Tehran itself, during its strike against Israel last night, threatened to attack any US forces that would help Israel in its retaliation against Iran. It is therefore clear that Iran views the United States as the weakest link and more easily pressured player.

Israel must formulate a comprehensive strategy for a high-intensity campaign against Iran, that could include peaks during which Iran would attempt to take direct action against Israel. Otherwise, Tehran would probably prefer to go back to operating via its proxies, given that direct Iranian actions against Israel would help form a regional coalition against Tehran, composed primarily of Jordan and Egypt, and supported by the United States, United Kingdom, and France (as seen in action last night). Such a coalition could shift from defensive to offensive mode since Iran is threatening to take action against any country supportive of Israel’s defense efforts.

Israel appears to have certain latitude vis-à-vis Iran, despite US pressure. The Biden administration opposes broad conflict that would run the risk of regional war. At the same time, if Israel and the United States choose to restrain their response, Iran would interpret their inaction as permission to attack Israel, the United States’ ally, directly, as well as other US partners in the region (to which Iran poses a threat) without paying the price for doing so. Furthermore, war breaking out between Iran and Israel still seems a long way off, allowing Israel to take action against Iran without necessarily leading the region to war. For instance, Israel could utilize the unprecedented Iranian attack to strike Iran kinetically when it is most suitable and convenient, whereas Tehran, which suffers from an acute domestic legitimacy crisis and can still collectively recall the destruction and aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), would think twice before aggravating its conflict with Israel. The cyberattack weapons that Israel has developed over the years could also serve it to repay Iran by damaging its essential infrastructure in an arena where responsibility is not unequivocally assumed by anyone.

Israel’s updated security strategy should include various aspects, primary among which are: the desirable modus operandi vis-à-vis Iran; increased coordination with the United States on efforts to thwart the drone, missile, and terror infrastructure in Iran and the region; strengthening the IDF’s force buildup so that it would tally with the challenge posed by Iran; and closing the various gaps that enable Iran to carry out cyberattacks and influence campaigns in Israel.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Israel is simultaneously dealing with several fronts, but it is precisely those that appear to be quieter that are most worrisome, primarily the Jordanian arena. 

Since its foundation, the Kingdom comprised a high percentage of Palestinians, some of whom are citizens of the Jordanian state, while the rest have remained in “refugee” status for decades. 

To this, masses of Syrian refugees who fled from the massacre perpetrated by the Syrian president were added in recent years.

All this, while the Hashemite regime, that controls Jordan is not Palestinian and well understands the dangers inherent in the composition of the population to its survival and stability. 

It is doubtful if what was done against the coup attempt in “Black September” by the Jordanian regime in the 1970s will be feasible to emulate by the current regime, even at the cost of the Kingdom itself, both due to the weakness of the current rulers and to the fact that Queen Rania is Palestinian.

Despite the Jordanian understanding of the potential internal danger lurking at home, it sometimes appears that the regime acts almost against its own interests.

In fact, Jordan insists on continuing to adhere to an outdated syllabus, which encourages hatred and incites the Jordanian crowd against Israel and Jews. 

Anyone who understands anything about the Arab world knows that the blatant antisemitism, which unfortunately has become an integral part of the value system of every Jordanian, does indeed encourage the public to divert tensions and frustrations away from the economic situation and the ills of society and vent anger against the “Zionist enemy.”

 But violent demonstrations against Israel and Jews tend to turn into fierce opposition to the government itself.

This happened, more than once, in Egypt and in Jordan. Furthermore, Israel and the US are essential for the continued survival of the Jordanian regime, on the economic, military, and intelligence levels. 

Incitement against Israel and the US spurs the Jordanian public to attack the Jordanian regime, if and when it adopts a policy that reflects cooperation with one of them, even when this cooperation is necessary for the national security of the Kingdom.

AND THAT brings me to the second point – in preserving this incitement-ridden education system, the Jordanian regime obliges itself to adhere to a harsh anti-Israel rhetoric, which is often contrary to Jordan’s security interests. 

Thus, we have almost become accustomed to hearing, every year during the month of Ramadan, senior Jordanian officials compete with Hamas as to who is more radical in their hatred of the “Zionist entity,” in order to prove to their own public that they are, indeed, deserving of this public support.

According to Muslim tradition, the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan was entrusted with the responsibility of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, an asset that over the years has become one with the potential to enthuse the entire Muslim world. Therefore, the “ownership” or the “protection” thereof is desired by many groups in the Muslim world.

In recent years the Hamas movement – with Iranian encouragement – began to try and “seize ownership” of the Mosque, in order to create instability among the Arabs of Israel, the Arabs of east Jerusalem, and Muslims throughout the world.

During Ramadan in recent years, the Hamas terrorist group has adopted inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, accusing it of trying to damage and/or occupy the Mosque, while the Jordanian regime intensified the tone against Israel, in a manner of competition for the same “ownership” over this holy site.

Parallel to the above, Iran began to advance – methodically and with endless patience, starting in 1979 – its policy of taking over the Arab region first, and the West. 

This, while sowing instability and chaos in every country that it could do that in and that is in order to gain a foothold and influence and to establish some kind of military presence there – at times in the form of Shia militias and at times via a local Arab proxy.

Thus, it leveraged Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, starting in 2006, to establish its position in the southern periphery of Israel. It also strengthened its hold in that region, via support of the Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups.

Furthermore, Tehran also operated over the years in Judea and Samaria by strengthening Hamas and undermining the Palestinian Fatah rule, under the auspices of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), which advocates a secular ideology that is contrary to the religious view of Hamas and other Islamic movements.

In Lebanon, Iran strengthened Hamas above and beyond its unwavering support for Hezbollah as a voice in the region. All this, while undermining Lebanon on the economic and political levels to the core.

In Syria, Iran established an army of Shi’ite militias, and acted in the same manner in Iraq, which over the years and since the withdrawal of the United States, has become an Iranian stronghold on the borders of little Jordan.

BUT TEHRAN is yet unsatisfied and strives to create territorial continuity in the entire area up to the Jordanian border with Israel. Quietly and cunningly, Iran works to strengthen radical elements among the Palestinians in Jordan itself, and to strengthen the presence of Hamas in Jordanian territory.

The destabilization of the Kingdom is intended to further weaken the government in the country, and in due time cause masses of Palestinians to flock to the Jordanian-Israeli border, over 300 km. long – a situation that the IDF will have a hard time stopping.

Only in the last few weeks, the Kingdom seemingly “awakened” when King Abdullah II spoke out harshly against blatant attempts by the Hamas movement to “undermine the stability of the kingdom,” in his words.

When Israel recently hit a distinct Iranian target on Syrian soil, it actually targeted the Iranian Mullah regime’s world view, according to which a world-wide Sharia-based caliphate must control of the entire region and the West, by exploiting local extremist elements and without involving its own people and/or territory in the campaign.

All this, while Tehran continues almost uninterrupted, in equipping itself with unconventional weapons and nuclear capabilities for military purposes.

It is interesting to note that there were no overly harsh condemnations of the Israeli action from many Arab countries in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and more – since all of those countries, despite their difficult rhetoric against Israel, well understand the magnitude of the challenge that Iran poses to the entire world. 

Those who fail to understand this are in the West, whose democracies makes them more vulnerable to infiltration by hostile elements, such as Sunni Muslim Brotherhood activists on the one hand and Shi’ite Hezbollah cells and Iranian influence on the other.

MEANWHILE, IRAN does not stop at all from doing everything it possibly can, to destabilize Israel itself from within. 

Recognizing the existing political rifts in Israeli society, just as it recognized similar rifts in all the other countries which Iran had undermined and dismantled from within, Tehran is constantly at work to deepen the chasm inside Israel.

It does this by impersonating Israelis from different camps on social networks, pretending to take extreme positions on the Right and the Left. 

It does this through unceasing attempts to create Shi’ite cells also among Sunni Israeli Arabs in Arab cities in the country – although so far, with little success. It does this through incessant attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to elements of the Arab sector in Israel, belonging to the criminal network.

Therefore, in order to understand the nature and quality of the hostile activity against Israel in each of the aforementioned arenas, one must understand the picture as a whole and stop burying one’s head in the sand. The West in general and Israel in particular – are at least for now at the forefront of the world struggle – do not have the privilege to ignore the scale of the issue. 

If Iran has already succeeded in disintegrating Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, significant parts of Yemen, and Sudan, is on its way to disintegrating Jordan and has literally “bought” the corrupt ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, by erasing the huge debt it had accumulated, then it will try with all its might, and may even succeed, to destabilize the State of Israel from within.

This is The Plan. All we have to do, is not cooperate with the plot and understand that unity is more than just a naive cliché, but a matter of national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2024.

Executive Summary

 Over the past two decades, Iran’s strategy of gaining influence through building proxy forces has transformed the political landscape of the Middle East in favor of Tehran’s overarching aim of regional hegemony. The current conflict with Israel is a direct result of this strategy, and has demonstrated the effectiveness of attacks coordinated between multiple Iranian proxies. After the initial Hamas attack, Hezbollah has begun a war of attrition with Israel in the north, the Houthis are threatening international shipping in the Red Sea and specifically targeting Israel, while over 100 attacks on US forces in Syria and Iraq have been launched by Iran-backed militias.

This research paper outlines the effect that Iran’s proxy strategy has had in each part of the region, from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon to Yemen, and how this strategy has brought the region to a crossroads embodied in the current war. It then outlines a number of policy avenues to be pursued in order to counter Iran’s strategy.

Iraq. Iraq is the first and most central focus of Iranian foreign activities, as it is the key gateway to broader influence to Iraq’s west and south. Iraq served as a proof-of-concept between 2003-2011 in which the IRGC empowered sympathetic third-parties with training and weapons. By the time of the withdrawal of the majority of US forces from Iraq in 2011, Iran had established significant levers of influence over Iraq’s political, security and media actors. The Iran-backed militias have become more politically active and are wealthier and more militarily capable than the other militias active in Iraq. Through all these efforts, Iran has prevented the Iraqi state from maintaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its territory, and as a result Tehran has become highly influential in Iraqi political, economic and security affairs.

Syria. When the period of instability began in Syria in 2011, Iran considered it a strategic imperative to intervene to keep the Assad regime in power. In 2012, Iran took active role in the Syrian civil war, beginning with small advisory teams and training units tasked with ensuring regime survival and control of major urban centers. These aims later grew to include the establishment of a network of militias in Syria loyal to Tehran designed to pursue Iranian interests and to pose a direct threat toward Israel by establishing a presence in Southern Syria. These steps served to strengthen Iran’s hold on Syria relative to its two rival regional axes: Sunni Islamism supported by Qatar and Turkey and Arab traditional monarchies led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

As part of its intervention, Iran established an air-transport corridor to Syria in which the IRGC flew civilian and military aircraft to bring in advisors, munitions, and UAVs to its militias. The turmoil of the 2000s in Iraq and the 2010s in Syria also presented the prospect to realize an Iranian land-corridor from Iran, crossing through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. Much of Iran’s opportunity was created by third-parties who have eroded the authorities of the previous regimes in Iraq and Syria, resulting in the expansion of Teheran’s strategic reach through the Arab world and into the Eastern Mediterranean.

Hezbollah. No other proxy is more important to Iran, or more closely aligned ideologically, than Hezbollah. Decades of Iranian investment have changed Hezbollah from a small guerilla force, to a non-state political actor with conventional military capabilities which include a vast rocket, missile and UAV arsenal as well as a network capable of conducting terror operations abroad. It has also become the dominant force in Lebanese politics and security policy and serves as mentor to additional Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. Thanks to Iran’s assistance, between 2006 and today, Hezbollah evolved along multiple dimensions. Its rocket and missile arsenal has grown from approximately 12,000 in 2006 to 150,000 today. The missiles in its arsenal are more precise and of much longer range. Hezbollah’s fighters have gained proper military experience through fighting in Syria. Its manpower grew with recruitment of tens of thousands of additional operatives. Finally, its regional influence has grown, as it has taken on a key role in training other terrorist militias.

Houthis. In the first decade of the 2000s, Iranian support for the Houthis was limited. As the Houthis’ success grew, so did Iran and Hezbollah’s support for the movement. This assistance began with small arms shipments and expanded into funding, weapons and training that played an important role in the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014. Within a year, the Houthis controlled significant parts of Yemen, including multiple ports, and have since acquired extended range ballistic missile, UAVs, sea mines and more, which they have used to attack strategic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, conduct targeted assassination attempts, and threaten Israeli shipping and international commerce in the Red Sea.

Hamas. The Iran-Hamas relationship is not based on shared theology, but arose for pragmatic reasons. The common goal of eradicating Israel has been sufficient for Iran to provide Hamas with approximately $70 million dollars per year, alongside training and weapons. Hamas would never have been able to undertake the atrocities of its attack on October 7, 2023 without the decades of assistance from Iran.

The aim of this research is to outline the depth and breadth of Iran’s malign influence and to clarify what can and should be done to reverse this trend. Allowing Iran to realize its vision is tantamount to enabling Iran to become the regional hegemon, placing it in control of a large amount of the world’s energy and critical waterways for international shipping, which would make it an invaluable strategic partner for China and Russia in their bid to upend the US-led order in East-Asia and Europe. This is the vision to which Iran is committed and to which it has made great strides toward achieving in the past two decades. Ultimately, Iran is the central actor in the anti-Western axis in the Middle East and a critical fixture in the great power struggle between the US, China and Russia.

Though Iran’s progress toward realizing the Shiite crescent of regional dominance has been great, its ultimate success is far from inevitable. It can be countered by a regional alliance led by Israel and the Gulf states and backed by the United States. This however, would require a decision on the part of Washington to abandon its attempts to come to a grand accommodation with Iran, and instead return to a policy of maximum pressure on all fronts. Actions to that end should include: Taking decisive military action against Hezbollah and Houthis; raising and enforcing macro-economic sanctions on Iran; targeting the IRGC and its sources of income directly; supporting Iran’s domestic opposition; and increasing military strikes against supply lines to proxies.

Download the full study here

From a historical point of view, the deadly drone attack that resulted in the death of three American soldiers in Jordan did not necessarily reflect an escalation in the relationship between Iran and the U.S.

 However, it did reflect the expansion of attacks carried out by pro-Iranian Iraqi militias against the U.S. in recent months in Iraq and Syria.

 Since the 1980s, Iran has been promoting a terrorist campaign against the U.S. as a central anchor in its ambition to achieve regional hegemony and push the U.S. from the region.

 In 1983, through Hezbollah, Iran committed a deadly incendiary attack against the bases of the multinational force in Beirut, where 241 American soldiers and 58 French soldiers were killed. Its leading role in the attack was revealed by the American National Security Agency (NSA), which intercepted a transmission from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence to the Iranian ambassador in Damascus in which the order was passed to encourage the attack carried out by Hezbollah and with the help of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Forces.

 Since Iran activated its strategy of proxy warfare, in a process spanning decades, it has established and nurtured an impressive array of militias and Shiite and Sunni terrorist organizations in the Middle East, all financed, trained, and armed by Tehran. This is how it managed to fight the U.S. (and its main rivals in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia) while not being attacked in return, except for the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.

 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iran used this proxy network to fight Saddam Hussein and to punish Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for their support in Iraq. In the 1990s, the network of proxies expanded to al-Qaeda, which received significant aid from Tehran for the devastating attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 7, 1998), in which 224 civilians were killed and 4,000 were injured.

 After the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Iranian terrorist sponsorship also included the Taliban (albeit to a lesser extent), which received funding, training, and military personnel to fight the Americans.

 In the Iraq War (2003-2011), Iran operated a terrorist array that included four Shiite militias and two Sunni ones; its goal was to prevent the U.S. from establishing a forward base where they could operate militarily against Tehran. According to a 2019 assessment by the Pentagon, through an activation of proxies, Iran was responsible for the killing of 608 American soldiers and contractors during the Iraq War.

 One decade later, during the Syrian civil war, Iran expanded its network of proxies and succeeded in preventing the ouster of Assad. They accomplished this by sending in a variety of Iraqi Shia militias, an Afghani militia, a Pakistani militia, and the Lebanese Hezbollah to Syria.

 In recent months, statements from Tehran and Shia militias in Iraq have asserted that attacks against Americans in Iraq and Syria will stop if the U.S. instructs Israel to stop the war in Gaza. This leaves no room for doubt about Iran’s standing behind these attacks. They are carried out by the group Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which also accepted responsibility for the attack in Jordan. This organizational framework includes several pro-Iranian militias in Iraq; chief among them is Kataib Hezbollah, the spearhead of the Iranian formation in Iraq.

 Since the drone attack, in various briefings to the American media, the Biden administration has signaled its intention not to engage in a conflict with Iran. Indeed, immediately after the attack, senior Iranian officials rushed to emphasize that Tehran was not related to the responsible organization, though it did welcome it.

 Differentiating Iran from its affiliates is an essential part of the Iranian strategy of proxy warfare. Accordingly, the American retaliatory attacks in Syria, Iraq and Yemen focus only on IRGC-backed militias, and aren’t likely to cause an escalation between the U.S. and Iran.

 Basically, the Biden administration is absolving Tehran of responsibility for its terrorist proxies. The administration still seeks to “restore trust” between Tehran and Washington, with the ultimate aim of restoring the JCPOA nuclear deal from President Obama’s time in office.

 Published by i24news 06.02.2024

Israel must take action against Iran as part of its post-Oct. 7 updated doctrine of security. To protect its borders, Israel can no longer be content with fighting Iran’s proxies, but rather must target Iran itself, in keeping with that country’s critical role in the destabilization of Israel’s security. 

Since Oct. 7, an ongoing dispute has emerged as to the extent of Iran’s involvement in Hamas’s fatal attack, with an emphasis on the question of whether Iran knew of the attack in advance and took part in planning it. Even if Tehran was not aware of the attack, its responsibility for the massacre and the horrific terror committed by Hamas is clear to all. In point of fact, Hamas would not have been able to carry out the attack without the systematic assistance it has been receiving from Tehran for decades.

Some of the information disclosed since the attack has served to reveal with greater clarity the extent of Iran’s responsibility and involvement. First the heads of Hamas’s military wing had been in regular contact with the heads of Iran’s security apparatus, sharing with them their plans for taking actions against Israel. In an interview on Iranian media on November 8, Esmaeil Kowsari, currently a member of the Iranian Majles’ Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and formerly a high-ranking commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (among other positions, he served as head of the IRGC forces in Tehran), stressed the part taken by the head of the IRGC’s Qods Force, Qasem Soleimani (who was eliminated by the U.S. in January 2020), in the planning of Hamas’s attacks.

Kowsari stated that the Head of Hamas’s military Wing, Mohammad Deif, had planned many of Hamas’s operation in concert with Soleimani, and that accordingly, “The capability required for that operation is not a matter of a day or two, but rather goes back several years.” Beyond the planning, Kowsari mentioned Tehran’s responsibility for building up Hamas’s force, saying that “The resistance front empowered Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and as a result Hamas carried out this operation with high capabilities.” This intensive collaboration continued even after Soleimani’s elimination and survived the crisis which took place in the Iran-Hamas relationship following Hamas’s support of the Syrian insurgents. As may be recalled, in the first few years following the outbreak of the war in Syria, Hamas relocated its command posts from Syria to Qatar, and terrorists from its military wing even took part in the battles, fighting at the side of the rebels against Assad’s forces.

Yet Hamas later changed its policy, and did so to an even greater extent once it became clear that Assad had managed to survive thanks to the support he had received from Russia and Iran. The relationship between Assad and Hamas has not been fully restored since (despite the historic meeting held in Damascus between Assad and top Hamas officials Khalil al-Hayya and Osama Hamdan in October 2022). However, it appears that the collaboration between Iran and Hamas’s military wing persisted over the years, despite Iran’s attempt to undermine Hamas in Gaza, primarily by establishing a competing organization, Al-Sabireen, in 2014.

Thus, in a paper published in December, Leila Seurat, a researcher of the Palestinian sphere from the research institute “The Arab Centre for Research and Political Studies” who had demonstrated her access to Hamas by holding interviews with the heads of the organization in Gaza and Lebanon, explained that the top officials of Hamas’s military wing, most notably the wing’s deputy commander Marwan Issa, have over the years maintained a strong relationship with Iran, notwithstanding the damage caused to Iran-Hamas relations by the war in Syria. As part of that relationship, she notes, “Issa would regularly visit Tehran whenever he was able.”

Moreover, statements issued by Tehran have also helped in better understanding its crucial contribution to the development of Hamas’s tunnel system. In an interview with Iranian media in mid-November, Iranian commentator Amir Moussaoui, who is allegedly an IRGC official and is considered one of the regime’s principal mouthpieces in the Arab media, recounted that Soleimani had provided Hamas with advanced technologies so that the organization could enhance its subterranean system. According to him, Hamas was able to enhance that system owing to Soleimani’s direct supervision of the technological equipment provided to Hamas by the Qods Force, thanks to which Hamas successfully constructed a sophisticated subterranean system across Gaza. In this context, he explained that the Hamas terrorists constructed the tunnels to be resistant to attempts to flood them with either poisonous gases or water.

Furthermore, in early January the IDF revealed terrorism infrastructure and components for the manufacture and development of precision rockets of Hamas, carried out under Iranian guidance in Darj Tufah in the Gaza Strip. This revelation makes it clear that Iran has been smuggling advanced knowledge into the Gaza Strip, in the form of training courses provided by it to Hamas and Islamic Jihad experts in its territory (as publicly stated by the Islamic Jihad’s representative in Tehran, Nasser Abu-Sharif, in an interview with the media in November 2018). The training provided in Tehran to Mohammed Zouari (who was eliminated in 2016), one of the significant founders of Hamas’s UAV array, also demonstrates Iran’s determination to export its knowledge to Hamas in Gaza, with the aim of supplementing the tunnel system, which has been facing certain difficulties after El-Sisi’s Egypt has been taking action against it to a certain extent.

The Iran-Hamas relationship is not one of authority, but rather a strategic partnership, in which Tehran equips Hamas with the best of technologies and weaponry available to it. As part of the new security doctrine which Israel is now called upon to formulate, Israel cannot tolerate Iran’s subversive influence in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, as a complementary act to Israeli military control of the Gaza Strip and to the establishment of a thwarting array on or near the Philadelphi Route, it must take direct action against Iran. This is due to the fact that Iran forms the “head of the octopus” and the principal supplier which trains, funds, arms and equips Hamas; and past experience has shown that it will soon strive to rebuild Hamas after the war is over.

Accordingly, and in light of Iran’s additional responsibility for promoting terrorism on Israel’s northern border, Israel must adopt a new and current strategy as self-defense against the activity being promoted by Iran striving to destroy Israel by encircling it and subjecting it to an untenable significant threat. The purpose of that strategy will be to prevent the rise and establishment of a militia backed by Iran on Israel’s borders. Within that scope, alongside its ongoing efforts in the Gaza Strip, Israel must also directly strike within Iran, against the capabilities conferred by Iran on its proxies in the region, while also taking further action against the Qods Force. Thus, it must carry out targeted strikes against Iran’s UAV capabilities and missile program, on the well-founded assumption that any weaponry currently in Iranian hands will eventually come into the possession of its proxies across the region.

Concurrently with that course of action, Israel can no longer permit Hamas’s continued funding by Iran. Therefore, alongside the policy of sanctions, which has proved to be ineffective in completely preventing the continued Iranian financing, Israel must cut off the financial resources used by Iran to remit the funding, including money changers used as intermediaries in Hawala transactions with changers from the Gaza Strip.

The proposed Israeli intensive action against Iran is not expected to bring about a war with Iran; first, because Tehran would fear that such war would be playing into Israel’s hands since it would legitimize an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Second, in light of the prolonged crisis of legitimacy suffered by the Iranian regime, it is highly doubtful that it would willingly choose to enter a war which could risk its domestic survival. Third, Tehran understands that, in the scenario of a war with Israel, the U.S. would find it difficult not to intervene and would be forced to join the fray due to Israel’s strategic importance for the American policy in the region and due to the shared values forming the foundation of the deeply entrenched alliance between Israel and the U.S.

Over the past two months, the Houthis have disrupted navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, attacking Israeli-owned ships and other commercial vessels heading to Israel.

In response, on December 10 the United States announced the formation of an international naval coalition of 10 countries to counter the Houthis’ ongoing aggression and restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Unfortunately, the announcement not only failed to deter the Yemeni armed group but was met with a daring ultimatum: If action was taken against them, the Houthis would go as far as to attack American warships in retaliation.

Tensions escalated quickly and Iran, which has so far assisted the planning and directing of the Houthis’ attacks, primarily through its spy ship, is now deeply involved in the turmoil. On December 23, Iran launched a suicide drone at a vessel affiliated with Israel in the Indian Ocean. Tehran has even threatened to block additional sea routes, including the Mediterranean.

These worrying developments call for a decisive Western response that would mark a shift from the overly cautious attitude currently held by Washington. Judging by various news reports, the recently formed naval coalition’s activities are limited to patrols across the Red Sea and intelligence gathering. Assignments of this kind indicate a defensive stance, contrary to the more assertive posture necessary to suppress the unbridled militia.

Along the same lines, it is difficult to justify the feckless US containment policy that persisted even in the face of yet another Red Sea incident carried out by the Houthis as recently as December 26. According to US Central Command, the 12 drones and five missiles aimed at Israel were intercepted by the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group with no reported injuries. Still, it remains a puzzle why President Joe Biden has not consequently ordered a harsh offensive.

While it appears that the Biden administration has been trying to avoid a direct confrontation for fear of sparking a greater conflict, failure to push back against the continuous Houthi provocations and increasing Iranian involvement signals that such acts of aggression can go unpunished. If Iran and the Houthis don’t pay a heavy price for their attempt to impose a naval blockade, not only will international trade be severely jeopardized, but so will the security of the entire region. Thus, to effectively deter both Iran and its Yemeni strategic partner, Washington must take more robust military action.

It is important to remember that Iran has been backing the Houthi rebels consistently for over a decade, exploiting the weakness of the Yemeni government and the country’s crisis. By arming and training the rebel group, Tehran aims to create a pro-Iranian stronghold in northern Yemen – the area controlled by the Houthis – that would dominate the strategically critical Bab Al-Mandab straits.

Indeed, the US has long targeted Iranian operatives responsible for coordinating and facilitating assistance to the Houthis, such as Abdul Reza Shahla’i, whose assassination attempt in 2020 failed. Another such senior operative named Abu Fathima was recently reported in a research by The Washington Institute to have attended strategic meetings organized by the rebels.

In accordance with these measures, the US must redesignate the Houthis as a terrorist organization – after their prior removal from the list by President Biden in a somewhat baffling move. The sanctioning of Iranian and Yemeni individuals involved in financial aid transfers to the Houthi insurgents would be another step in the right direction.

As for Israel, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has rightly stated that Israel would be closely observing the American response to the Houthi attacks. If the US-led naval coalition proves futile, Israel will have to act on its own using targeted attacks, economic sanctions, and cyber warfare.

Israel should also designate the rebel group as terrorists and enhance its intelligence efforts regarding the Yemeni arena.

Lastly, Jerusalem will have to exact a direct price from the Iranian regime. The December 26 attack further emphasized the urgent need to destroy ballistic missile and drone facilities on Iranian territory.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2024

Since the outbreak of “Swords of Iron,” top officials in Teheran, most notably Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have denied Iran’s involvement in planning the October 7 massacre as well as Houthi aggressions in the Red Sea. These proclamations are meant to distance Iran from the attacks made by its strategic partners. At the same time, they reveal Iran’s fear of open, full-scale war and Tehran’s preference to keep its regional meddling and muckraking behind the scenes.

This Iranian fear, and preference for proxy war only, stem from a combination of considerations relating to Tehran’s domestic and international standing.

First, as a matter of principal, Iran’s tends to avoid direct engagement in regional or global conflicts. Iran instead flexes its power by supporting a wide range of proxy forces that launch terror attacks against its enemies, mainly the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has conducted numerous extraterritorial operations without having to mobilize its own troops. Instead, it employs terror clients in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. This strategy has driven Iran to several strategic achievements such as US withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s and the retribution exacted on Saudi Arabia in 2019 for its prime role in promoting the American oil sanctions imposed on Iran (following President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal).

Second, deeply ingrained in the Iranian consciousness is the Iran-Iraq War. This war is viewed by leadership as a momentous event that demonstrated significant national sacrifice. The war cost Iran heavily in casualties (at least 220,000 dead) and trillions of dollars worth of damage to critical infrastructure. Considering this high toll on human life and strategically vital assets, Iran has since refrained from engaging in additional frontal wars. Its leaders repeatedly boast that, despite the various upheavals afflicting the region, the country has remained an “island of stability.”

Third, the Iranian regime has been dealing with a prolonged crisis of legitimacy, as evidenced by the historic low voter turnout in the 2020 parliamentary elections (42%) and by the Amini protests (September 2022-March 2023). With declining levels of public support, the Iranian regime cannot afford to embark on a military adventure which would risk its very survival.

Fourth, Iran is restricted by its military and technological capabilities, which undeniably are inferior to those of its American rival. This is most probably why Tehran had settled for a limited offensive against Washington in retaliation for the January 2020 assassination of former Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani.

This stance was expressed by the IRGC’s aerospace commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, one of the most hawkish figures in the Iranian security apparatus, who admitted that Tehran didn’t want to engage in a direct war with the US. Another testimony reflecting this sentiment can be found in the words of Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, Ayatollah Khamenei’s advisor and son-in-law. In a recent interview, Adel explained that Iran’s initiating a military offense against Israel would serve an Israeli plot to cause a clash between Iran and the US.

The combination of these factors help explain Iran’s decision not to directly enter a full-scale war fray. After all, Iran’s proxy warfare strategy has proved effective enough. In the Iraq War (2003-2011), Iran fought against American and British forces indirectly through the Shi’ite terrorist apparatus it had nurtured (Jaysh al-Mahdi, Liwa’ al-Yawm al-Maw’oud, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq), alongside Sunni Islamist groups (Al-Qaeda Iraq and Ansar al-Islam) that received its backing. This also was the case during the Second Lebanon War, in which Iran played an important role in supporting Hezbollah’s warfare against Israel.

Iran also credits itself with the achievements obtained by the resistance terror organizations in their rounds of fighting against Israel. In February 2012, Khamenei proudly stated that Iran “was involved in the resistance campaign against Israel, and the result was manifested in the victory (Hezbollah’s) in the 33-Day War (the 2006 war), as well as in the (Hamas’) victory in the 22-Day War (Operation Cast Lead, December 2008-January 2009). Ever since, we have stood behind every nation and every organization fighting against the Zionist regime, everywhere, and we have no fear of saying so. That is the simple truth.”

Khamenei is known for his ideological teachings calling for the destruction of Israel by force. However, in stark contrast to this position, he recently stated that Iran does not wish to “throw either the Jews or the Zionists into the sea,” blatantly lying about such past statements. (For example, in February 2020 IRGC Commander Salami urged Israelis to “take a good look at the Mediterranean, because that will be your [their] final dwelling.”)

During “Swords of Iron,” Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials have denied any role in the attacks against Israel in Gaza or from Yemen. It also denies responsibility for Iraqi Shi’ite militia attacks on American targets in Iraq and Syria.

In any case, it is plainly obvious that Tehran supports the elimination of Israel trough proxy warfare. The massacres perpetrated by Hamas on October 7 are a direct result of Iran’s significant, decade-long support of the terror organization. Hamas’ murderous ideology is also compatible with Khamenei’s antisemitic teachings and anti-Jewish hatred, which seems to have permeated all branches of the Iranian regime. Religious rulings issued by Khomeini and Khamenei permit the killing, including by suicide attacks, of all Jewish citizens of Israel on the pretext that they are the “Occupiers of Palestine.”

Not only does Iran not hide its desire to destroy Israel, but it also says so openly on every possible platform. On Khamenei’s order, Iranian athletes boycott Israel at international competitions, making sure not to grant Israel even a shred of legitimacy.

Despite violating the UN treaty that prohibits any state from actively seeking the destruction of another, Iran has paid no price for expressing such views. On the contrary, it continues to be courted by European nations which, in their attempt to appease Iran, are disturbingly indifferent to the threat posed to their national security by the Iranian subversion efforts across the continent.

Perhaps even more puzzling is the fact that while Tehran strengthens ties with Russia and China, the US persists in its efforts to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, never once entertaining the military option as a practical course of action.

Against this background, it appears that Khamenei is under no pressure to cease his anti-Israel activity. At the same time, he continues, at least formally, to distance Iran from the comprehensive terror campaign aimed at Jerusalem from various staging grounds. He is well aware of the dangers to Teheran’s nuclear program and to regime stability were Iran to enter full-scale warfare.

In this regard, the announced Iranian campaign to recruit volunteers for the battlefield in Gaza is not genuine. Although Teheran boasts that the effort has reached 10 million people, among them 142 members of the Parliament, this is only a symbolic effort.

Israel ought to leverage this situation for its own advantage. Israel has space to hit the IRGC Qods Force in Iran and across the region without undue risk of escalation. Again, Iran will shy away from full-scale regional war.