Iran is facing a severe demographic crisis as birth rates continue to plummet and its population rapidly ages, with officials warning the Islamic Republic could lose half its population by 2101. The government’s attempts to reverse previous family planning policies have failed to convince Iranian women to have more children, highlighting growing tensions between state policies and social realities.

The demographic crisis facing Tehran is starkly illustrated by a billboard in a typical Iranian city. It depicts a solitary cyclist with a single child, rendered in dreary monochrome, trailing behind a vibrantly colored family of six on an oversized bicycle – father, mother, and four balloon-wielding children who appear to race past the wistful onlookers. The message, displayed in both Persian and English, proclaims: “More children, happier life.” Some variations feature rowing boats instead of bicycles, but the underlying message remains unchanged.

This public messaging campaign attempts to address one of the most critical challenges confronting Iran over the past decade: a steadily declining birth rate that is rapidly approaching crisis levels. The situation has become so dire that Iran stands on the brink of negative population growth. At this point, deaths will outnumber births, gradually decreasing the country’s population.

While the statistical evidence of this phenomenon requires careful interpretation – given the sometimes contradictory and inconsistent reporting by various Iranian officials – one fact remains undisputed: this represents a fundamental challenge that deeply concerns Tehran’s authorities. The gravity of the situation is evident in the frequency of international media coverage of high-level discussions in Tehran, the regime leadership’s repeated references to the issue, and multiple attempts to address the problem. Propaganda articles, official speeches, and statements by senior government officials consistently indicate that the situation continues to deteriorate rather than improve or stabilize.

The Iranian fertility crisis involves three interconnected trends: first, the decline in population growth approaching zero and potentially turning negative; second, a significant increase in life expectancy, mirroring global trends; and finally, most concerning to regime leaders, Iran’s rapidly aging population – meaning an increasing proportion of citizens are classified as “elderly.”

Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi recently offered a stark forecast: by 2101, Iran’s population could shrink to half its current size, with 50 percent of survivors belonging to the elderly demographic. Such a scenario, where Iran’s population dwindles to just 42 million people, would fundamentally alter the nation’s character.

Recent data reveals that Iran’s birth surplus – the excess of births over deaths – has reached its lowest level in years. Furthermore, births in 2023 decreased by 17,000 compared to 2022, continuing a multi-year trend of declining births in the Islamic Republic.

The range of fertility rates among Iranian women varies according to different reports: some claim it remains slightly above two births per woman – the minimum required for population stability, where each pair of parents raises two children. Others cite lower figures, around 1.6 births per woman. This was apparently the rate in Tehran last year, significantly below the golden number of two children per family.

For comparison, Israel – a much smaller and more developed country than Iran – recorded a fertility rate of slightly more than three children per woman in 2022, the highest among OECD countries. That year, Israel’s population grew by 1.86 percent. Iran’s neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan, also enjoy impressive population growth. If Iran fails to reverse the trend, it will soon have the lowest birth rate in the Middle East.

According to official figures, Iran currently has approximately 89 million inhabitants. On the eve of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the population was much lower, estimated at about 37 million. At that time, Iran was far more Western-oriented, and family planning was part of normal life there.

Two parallel processes occurred after the revolution: the religious clergy who took control of Tehran encouraged childbirth, and the Iran-Iraq war sparked an unprecedented baby boom. During the 1980s, as a result, Iran’s fertility rate was among the world’s highest, with each average woman giving birth five or six times. The government urged citizens to produce “an army of 20 million” to fight for the Islamic Republic in Allah’s name.

Growth was so rapid that the country’s population nearly doubled within 15 years. At some point, Tehran’s leadership realized the country lacked infrastructure to support such accelerated population growth. The war with Iraq had also left the national treasury empty, without the ability to advance extensive construction projects to meet the growing population’s needs.

Therefore, in 1988, an internal reversal occurred in the Iranian approach: that year, Tehran’s Supreme Court ruled that contraception and family planning were religiously permissible. The republic’s leadership launched a campaign titled “fewer children, better life” and subsidized contraception, vasectomies, and more.

From then until 2010, Iranian fertility declined sharply: the average number of births per woman plunged from five or six to 1.7 or less. Over the past 15 years, the decline has moderated but remains consistent. The government campaign thus succeeded far beyond expectations, leading the country to ever-diminishing growth. Since then, the Islamic Republic’s leaders have tried to encourage the population to reverse the trend and have more children, so far without success.

Among other measures, the government has launched a series of campaigns and programs to encourage childbirth. For example, the declared target for the current five-year period is to raise the birth rate per woman to 2.5. Since various measures on this issue have failed for a decade, this represents an ambitious goal. The government offers citizens various benefits for expanding their families, including extended maternity leave, grants, scholarships, low-interest loans, health insurance, housing assistance, and more. Iran has canceled subsidies for all contraceptives and offers free medical treatments to encourage fertility. This past August, for example, a new propaganda campaign was launched, offering substantial scholarships for any initiative promoting childbirth.

How much does the continued situation worry regime leaders? Here’s an example: a senior imam of one southern city defined it as “more harmful to Iran than war,” saying the reduction in births affects national identity, religion, economy, and all residents. The deputy health minister warned that if the situation doesn’t improve soon, “we will fall into a demographic black hole, and it will take us about 150 years to compensate for it.”

The highest-ranking official notable in his attention to the matter is none other than Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The man who set policy in Tehran understood at the beginning of the last decade where the wind was blowing and came out openly against family planning policy. He called it a “hostile Western policy” designed to harm Muslim countries and called on all Iranian mothers to mobilize for the nation.

Already in 2012, Khamenei declared that expanding the Iranian family was a strategic goal and published a series of steps and programs to encourage childbirth. The target set by Khamenei, which he has repeated several times, is to increase Iran’s population to 150 million people by 2050. The ability of Iran to support such a large population doesn’t worry the supreme leader, nor does the welfare of ordinary citizens who would have to bear the burden of such great pressure on state resources.

The birth crisis stems from several sources. The first is a sharp rise in the marriage age in Iran, which naturally affects the age at which women give birth. Findings from recent surveys in Iran reveal that the average marriage age for women in the country has reached 24, while men marry on average at 28. Moreover, the marriage rate in the republic has dropped dramatically: in 2010, almost 900,000 couples married in the country, while this year, just under half a million couples registered for marriage. Accordingly, the average age for first births for women in urban areas of the country approaches 28, while men in Tehran have children at an average age of 34.5 – a statistic that indicates the depth of the crisis. The situation is better in villages, but even there, women only start giving birth on average at age 24 and above.

Another characteristic of the phenomenon that the government wages a war of extermination against is abortions. According to estimates, more than 300,000 abortions are performed in Iran each year, only 10 percent of which are legal, meaning they stem from health reasons. With an average of about a thousand abortions per day in the Islamic Republic, they constitute about one-third of the country’s birth potential. Senior officials have defined the act as “execution” and claimed that abortions are an enemy plot against Iran.

Experts point to various reasons for the birth crisis, chief among them being the economic situation in the country, which has pushed almost a third of residents below the poverty line and sharply raised inflation. Meanwhile, exposure to Western norms through illegal technological means, along with desires for personal advancement, have changed the preferences of many in the Iranian population, especially in less religious sectors. Bottom line, it appears that large parts of the Iranian public don’t believe in the country’s future, and children are not their primary life goal.

The challenge that declining births pose to Iranian authorities is particularly severe when accompanied by the aging problem. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, life expectancy in the country has risen significantly, similar to other countries worldwide. In 1979, it stood at 57, and today, Iranian women are expected to live to age 78 on average and men to 76. This means the Islamic Republic is currently dealing with a growing population defined as “elderly” or “senior citizens” – meaning older than 60. About 10 percent of Iran’s population, approximately 9 million people, currently fall into this category.

The forecast for the future is even bleaker: according to estimates, by 2050, this group will grow to become about one-third of Iran’s population and will be the largest of its kind in the Middle East. Of those aging citizens, by 2050, almost 4 percent of the population is expected to be older than 80. In fact, the only country in the world where this problem is more severe is South Korea, which, unlike Iran, is not dealing with a failing economy and strict international sanctions.

This crisis has broad implications: the expansion of the “dependent” group in Iran will place an additional burden in coming decades on the social and economic system in the country, on health and nursing services, and more. The government needs to redesign the pension system, which is not adapted for such a large population segment, and examine how it will be able to assist an especially large number of elderly who will need help dealing with physical and mental difficulties.

However, Iran’s political and military choices have brought heavy international pressure upon it, deeply affecting its economy. The sanctions make it difficult for the government to allocate funds for such long-term programs, and studies have found they also directly affect ordinary citizens. For example, surveys conducted in Iranian households found that the sanctions particularly negatively affected the elderly population, especially those without organized pensions. Additionally, since elderly people often rely on family support, the economic damage to the entire country affects citizens’ ability to help their elderly relatives.

A lot could also change around the rise of the new administration in the US. If President-elect Donald Trump takes a hard line toward Iran and even implements a “maximum pressure” campaign against it from the start of his term “to bring it to its knees” – as already reported in American media – this will not help the regime in Tehran face such internal challenges.

Experts suggest that one way to deal with the crisis is to better utilize the existing workforce in Iran. They particularly mean the low participation rate of women in the economy, which could boost local production and help deal with aging problems in the medium term. The problem, of course, is that policies to promote women are not at the top of Iran’s priorities, and it also somewhat conflicts with the desire to encourage high fertility in a traditional society. It’s no coincidence that Iranian women interviewed by international media expressed suspicion that Tehran’s fertility encouragement policy is meant to keep women “in their proper place, at home,” in their words.

That statement reflects the general attitude of Iranian citizens toward their leadership on this issue, along with their unwillingness to obey Khamenei’s entreaties or cooperate with his plans to encourage childbirth. The supreme leader himself repeatedly declares the problem and formulates plans, grants, and additional incentives – but the people ignore him. This is further evidence of the disconnect between large parts of the Iranian population from the conservative and extreme leadership in the country and the leadership’s alienation from entire segments of the Iranian people.

Here, for example, are words that Goya, a Tehran resident, told a French media network about one of the new laws to encourage childbirth and against abortion: “It’s ridiculous, interfering in citizens’ private lives. Instead of solving economic problems, the authorities want to interfere more in our lives. It’s not their business. It’s my decision. We are used to restrictions in this country and will find a way around them.”

Published in  Israel Hayom, November  24, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

A month after the unprecedented Israeli attack on twenty different targets across Iran, the scope of which is slowly becoming clearer, Iran is still waiting to respond due to forced circumstances. Iran’s air defense systems were significantly damaged in the attack and the US elections also contributed to the postponement of the attack, due to Tehran’s desire not to promote Trump’s chances of winning. Various senior Iranian officials are again declaring Tehran’s desire to respond to Israel with a third direct attack after the attacks in April and October. As part of the media debate in Iran surrounding the issue, the daily Khorasan, affiliated with the Conservative camp, called on the Iranian regime in its Thursday, November 21 article to launch a ground invasion of Israel from the Syrian Golan Heights.

The daily explained that pro-Iranian Shiite militias have already been deployed in this area, and that Assad is expected to approve such an action since he has the right to take military action to liberate the Golan Heights. The daily estimated that such an attack is already in the planning stages; this is backed by the fact that this outline was discussed in recent meetings held in Damascus and Tehran, between Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh and Iranian leader Ali Khamenei’s aide, Ali Larijani, with Assad, and Syrian Foreign Minister and senior officials in Tehran. Khorasan also expressed concern for Syrian President Bashar Assad’s life if the outline were to be implemented, and called on Tehran to devote significant attention to protecting him from Israel.

Iran’s “toolbox” in Syria is rich and diverse, and includes the Imam Hussein Division, established back in 2016 under the command of the then-Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani. The division consists of thousands of operatives of various nationalities from across the Middle East. The pro-Iranian militias of the Afghan Fatemiyoun, the Pakistani Zainabiyoun, and, of course, Lebanese Hezbollah are also operating in Syria. Alongside these, in recent months, it was reported that dozens of Houthi operatives have taken the initiative to invade Israel by land via the Syrian border with the assistance of the Quds Force; Tehran may choose to use them if it does indeed wish to advance a ground invasion of Israel.

It is worth noting that the Khorasan article also claimed that senior Hezbollah figures led by top commander Ibrahim Aqeel, killed by the IDF on September 20, had already been planning a ground invasion of Israel from the Syrian Golan Heights as a response to the July assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.

However, according to the daily, the planned attack was thwarted by the preemptive strike carried out by Israel. The daily explained that the goal of the ground invasion could not be to “liberate” the Golan Heights, but rather to pressure Israel to end the war in accordance with Hamas and Hezbollah’s terms. As Khorasan admitted, Iran’s missile attacks against Israel have limited success in this regard and cannot serve this purpose of halting the war and forcing Israel to accept a cease fire under the term of the Axis of Resistance. 

How should Israel respond?

As a lesson of the October 7 massacre, Israel cannot ignore that Tehran is again toying with the idea of ​​planning a ground invasion of Israel. Alongside the continued IDF initiative on the Syrian side of the border, Israel must prepare diplomatically and militarily to make it clear to both Iran and Assad that they will bear all consequences if the plan is implemented. Despite the ongoing attack on senior members of the “Golan File” – the Hezbollah force responsible for establishing a terrorist infrastructure in the Syrian Golan – Iran’s motivation to operate on the ground through Syria still exists. Therefore, alongside the continued fortifications on the border of the Golan Heights, Israel must make clear to Iranian leaders that Israel will continue to attack Iran directly, including sensitive targets throughout the country and senior members of the Quds Force operating in the area.

Israel must also make it clear to Assad that his regime will pay a heavy price for carrying out this potential attack, to pressure him into refusing the Iranian request to operate from his territory. Israel can also work with Russia to restrain Assad and make it difficult for him to allow Iran to advance a ground invasion plan and to explain that the consequences of such an attack would lead to chaos in Syria, resulting in its losing its grip on the country.

Another possible lever for Israel is the United Arab Emirates which maintains close ties with Assad. According to reports, the UAE has already conveyed to Assad, in coordination with the Biden administration, a message immediately after the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war: don’t intervene in the war in Gaza. It seems that Israel has a lot of room to maneuver against Assad especially since the Syrian front is the least active of the seven arenas fighting Israel in the current war.

Published in I24, November 24, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

When people think of Iran, the image of a vast desert nation, filled with endless stretches of sand and intense heat, often comes to mind. But in reality, that is not the case. Tehran, for example, is located at an elevation of over 900 meters, with some areas reaching as high as 1,800 meters, situated at the foot of a high mountain range. In winter, snow often falls there, and the cold strikes harshly.

Therefore, authorities in the country have already begun preparing for the freezing winter, trying to conserve vital energy resources for heating, transportation, and other needs. As a result, Tehran recently began implementing planned daily two-hour electricity outages. In a city of about 9.5 million residents—nearly the same as the entire population of Israel—this is no small decree. However, Tehran can count itself lucky: in other parts of the country, power outages last for a third of the day, about eight hours daily. This situation naturally impacts many sectors in Iran, harming industries, commerce, sanitation, and more.

A energy giant in crisis

This phenomenon is particularly surprising, given that Iran is one of the largest energy powers in the world. Only two countries hold larger oil reserves than the Islamic Republic—Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Tehran boasts the second-largest natural gas reserves in the world. More troubling is that the energy crisis in Iran is so severe, and the demand is only growing, that the Islamic Republic is forced to import gas from Russia to meet its citizens’ needs even during times without planned outages. In July, the government in Tehran reached an agreement with its northern neighbor, Turkmenistan, on another deal to increase gas imports from Ashgabat, in an attempt to open an additional channel of gas supply.

Incidentally, even in the summer, the capital’s residents suffered from widespread power outages. When the heat rises and residents turn on air conditioners, the electricity grid cannot meet the demand—and collapses. Last summer, for instance, Tehran’s temperatures neared 40°C, which naturally increased the demand for air conditioning. In July, as a result of the extreme heat and power outages, authorities decided to reduce working hours in public institutions, partly to prevent deaths from dehydration and heatstroke.

Given these difficulties, it is no wonder that Iranian citizens feel harmed. Some have even dared to complain anonymously to media outlets affiliated with the opposition abroad. One of them, for example, noted, “The officials speak of war against Iran, yet they squandered Iranian resources by funneling funds to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, leaving the entire nation to suffer the consequences.” Another resident added, “For years, you waged a global war over nuclear energy, but you can’t even guarantee stable electricity for the entire country.”

Even in Bushehr, the city home to the country’s nuclear power plant—nuclear power plants being considered particularly efficient for electricity production—residents suffer from power outages. One resident described the situation during the summer months: “It’s not just the heat; it’s the unbearable summer humidity,” he said. “This August, the heat was so intense that if you went outside in sandals, as many do in southern Iran, the skin on your feet would get burned.” During the same period, Bushehr residents faced another blow: the extreme heat forced authorities to ration water supplies in addition to electricity.

According to opposition reports, the electricity crisis remained unresolved during the summer, leading to protests in many cities across the country, including Tehran. Merchants in the capital took to the streets and blocked roads in protest of the government’s failure.

This crisis has wide-ranging impacts across various sectors: for example, agriculture suffers greatly because farmers cannot pump water from wells due to the lack of electricity, alongside crop damage caused by the extreme heat. Electrical appliances break due to sudden power outages, traffic jams form in cities where traffic lights stop working, and industrial factories report significant economic damage. Many people find themselves trapped in elevators due to unannounced outages. If the situation continues, it is expected to affect even heavy industries such as the steel industry. Overall, estimates suggest that power outages alone could cost the Iranian economy between $5 billion and $8 billion annually.

Why continue exports amid shortages?

Why does this happen? How can a country with so much oil and gas be forced to conserve energy for winter and fail to supply electricity to its citizens—a basic modern commodity?

The electricity shortage in Iran during the summer was so severe, for example, that it required twice the amount of electricity produced by neighboring Azerbaijan to meet the needs of the Persian giant’s residents. This is no trivial figure: Azerbaijan exports about 10% of its electricity production to Russia, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey in deals collectively valued at over $400 million. Based on this calculation, experts noted, the cost of producing enough electricity for Iran’s entire population during the summer alone could reach $8 billion.

The gap between electricity demand and supply is currently about 20%, according to some estimates. This is partly due to the burden in a country of nearly 90 million people, which has suffered from years of neglect and insufficient electricity infrastructure. The nuclear power plant in Bushehr can supply, according to one estimate, only 1% of Iran’s electricity demand—far from sufficient to meet the needs of the entire nation.

Root causes of the crisis

The root of the problem lies in several factors. The government has failed to invest adequately in electricity infrastructure for many years, has not built advanced power plants in recent decades, and the electricity grid is outdated. Rising oil prices have disrupted the balance that previously existed between supply and demand. Authorities have neglected maintenance of the crumbling electricity grid, which continues to deteriorate—leading to summer blackouts.

In winter, additional factors worsen the crisis: the government is trying to reduce its reliance on mazut, a low-quality and highly polluting byproduct of oil refining. Experts explained that fueling three power plants in the country with mazut posed health risks and caused air pollution, prompting the government to halt its use. As a result, and due to the government’s decision not to use diesel in the power plants of Arak, Isfahan, and Karaj, Iran is forced to provide less electricity to its citizens.

Iran’s infrastructure is so outdated and inefficient that a significant portion of its electricity generation potential is lost and unused. For example, 13% of the electricity produced in the country is lost during transmission from power plants to the national grid and from there to homes. In addition, Iran’s thermal power plants, which produce over 90% of the country’s electricity, are fueled by natural gas. Gas usage in Iran is inefficient, and the country already lacks enough gas to fuel these plants—one reason it is seeking additional sources for gas imports. Experts predict that this winter, Iran will face a gas shortage of 260 million cubic meters per day.

Moreover, Iran faces high demand for transportation fuel, which depletes the country’s oil reserves. However, fuel refining for vehicles in Iran is of very poor quality, serving old and inefficient vehicles that do not make optimal use of the fuel. Public transportation infrastructure in the country is underdeveloped, forcing most citizens to rely on private vehicles. This reliance is further encouraged by Iran’s extremely low fuel prices, among the cheapest in the world, at about 2 cents per liter. Recently, President Masoud Pezeshkian publicly questioned the government’s need to subsidize fuel. This sparked rumors of a potential price increase, which has certainly not helped public morale. In 2019, fuel price hikes led to riots in which hundreds were reported killed or even more.

Perplexing energy exports

Against this backdrop, it is particularly puzzling that Iran continues to export gas and electricity to countries like Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The amount of electricity it exports is not very large, estimated by experts to be equivalent to about 1% of its total production. However, when citizens are suffering such severe shortages, why is any electricity being exported at all?

There are several reasons for this: first, because electricity prices in Iran are subsidized, exporting it generates nearly eight times the revenue for Iran’s central electricity company, Tavanir. This is perhaps one reason why Tavanir often operates at a financial deficit, forcing it to seek any alternative source of income—hence the need for exports.

In addition, although summer and winter see high electricity demand, during the fall and spring, Iran has excess electricity and must export it to retain foreign customers. A similar situation exists in Iran’s gas market. Finally, commentators note that electricity exports serve as a tool for political influence. Iraq, for example, depends significantly on Iranian electricity, giving Tehran substantial leverage over Baghdad’s leadership.

The nuclear dilemma

Iran’s energy crisis is exacerbated by its international stance and its conflict with Western countries over its nuclear program. If in the past North Korea was attributed with the statement that its leadership would prefer its citizens to eat grass rather than abandon its nuclear program, then the Iranians are approaching a similar situation today.

Beyond the fact that Tehran funnels enormous funds to its proxy organizations in the Middle East and its nuclear program—estimated to fund Hezbollah alone at about $1 billion annually—the confrontation between Iran and the US has led to a strict sanctions regime on the Islamic Republic, which over the years has crippled its ability to meet its citizens’ basic needs.

For example, sanctions prevent it from advancing nuclear developments or building additional nuclear power plants beyond the one in Bushehr. Iran also cannot refurbish its electricity infrastructure or construct new conventional power plants. Sanctions further prevent Iran from developing its vast gas fields, leaving valuable resources unexploited. The reason is that Iran struggles to attract investors who could assist it economically, and international experts avoid the country. Moreover, Iran lacks some of the components necessary for such projects, such as compression platforms for its gas fields.

Renewables, a missed opportunity

One potential solution to the energy crisis may lie in transitioning to renewable energy. Currently, only a negligible portion of the country’s electricity is generated from renewable sources. Iran has minimal infrastructure for such projects, and what little exists is not connected in a way that would allow for significant savings in fuel consumption or reduce electricity lost through the national grid.

If in 2023, the Islamic Republic built infrastructure for about 75 megawatts of renewable energy production, other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey, constructed facilities with production capacities 40 to 50 times higher. The government in Tehran had set a target of achieving renewable energy production capacities of nearly 3,000 megawatts, making this a clear failure.

In some parts of Iran, the sun shines for 300 days a year, making solar power generation especially ideal for Iranians. However, to secure the necessary financial guarantees for such initiatives, Iran needs relief from the sanctions regime. This is one of the goals set by President Pezeshkian when he assumed office following the untimely death of his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi. The smiling face Pezeshkian presents to the West is partly intended to promote the resolution of the electricity problem with the help of international entities.

Ironically, if Iran were permitted to build additional nuclear power plants, it could improve its electricity sector. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is supposed to benefit from the expertise and knowledge accumulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the field of civilian nuclear power. However, because Iran is suspected of pursuing military nuclear capabilities, both the IAEA and other nations worldwide refuse to share nuclear technologies such as reactors and fuel, fearing they could be diverted for non-civilian purposes.

Another obstacle facing Iran is that it appears on blacklists for money laundering and financing terrorism, placing it among a group of nations denied access to advanced technologies of certain kinds. This means that as long as Iran continues to fund its regional proxies, it will struggle to provide for its citizens and modernize its national electricity grid.

Trump’s return and rising tensions

To all this, one must add the new reality Iran is facing these days. After several years in which a Democratic administration in the US somewhat eased the burden of sanctions on it, Donald Trump’s re-election to the White House raises significant Iranian concerns about what lies ahead. Just days after his victory, reports emerged that on his first day in office, he intends to renew the “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran, attempting to bring it to its knees over its nuclear program. Such a scenario will not contribute to Tehran’s economic recovery and certainly will not assist in rehabilitating its electricity infrastructure. During his previous term, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical industry, and it is likely that this sector will again be a focus of sanctions.

Additionally, following Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1, it was reported that among the targets considered by the IDF for retaliation were Iranian refineries, oil fields, and nuclear facilities. Although it is unlikely that Israel would target an operational nuclear power plant like the one in Bushehr, and would instead focus on sites such as Fordow and Natanz, oil infrastructure could be another possible target. Such an attack would not only risk fluctuations in the global oil market but would also have extensive implications for the local electricity market in Iran.

As usual, in such a case, the Iranian citizens themselves would bear the brunt of the consequences rather than the leadership, which would undoubtedly be safely ensconced in fortified bunkers equipped with advanced generators. However, one of the key questions facing the Iranian leadership regarding its ongoing direct confrontation with Israel is how far it can stretch the suffering of its citizens before they rise up to consign it to the dustbin of history.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November  21, 2024.

On Saturday night, amid a large-scale aerial strike by the Israeli military on Iranian targets, the Iranian regime faced another attack on its forces. Though the incident was relatively contained, the number of Iranian casualties reportedly exceeded those from the Israeli strikes.

Ten Iranian border guards were killed in an assault in Sistan and Baluchestan province. According to Iranian claims, these border guards died in combat on a local road against members of Jaish ul-Adl (Army of Justice), a Sunni terrorist group seeking independence for the Baluchi minority. This organization frequently ambushes and plants explosives targeting Iranian and Pakistani security forces.

Sistan and Baluchestan is a persistent trouble spot within Iran, a hotspot of internal conflicts. Just a week before, the area made headlines due to a violent incident in which hundreds of people were killed: Iranian border guards reportedly opened fire on Afghan refugees attempting to cross from Pakistan into Iran, killing approximately 250 people, according to reports.

Initially, Iran denied the incident’s occurrence, which had been reported by local human rights organizations. Yet afterwards, Tehran’s ambassador to Kabul stated that taking “lawful” action against illegal entry is a legitimate right of all nations, and that border guards are mandated to prevent the entry of unauthorized foreigners. Given that the casualties were Afghan citizens, the Taliban government in Kabul launched an investigation, and the United Nations also sought to look into the incident. UN special rapporteur for human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, expressed concern about its implications.

These two events highlight some of Iran’s challenges along its eastern border, particularly at the tri-border area with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This isn’t the first incident of Iranian border guards opening fire on refugees trying to cross the border this month. Tehran doesn’t publicize these incidents, often denying them outright, but various reports indicate that at least 13 migrants were killed along the border, in this exact same area.

The issue of Afghan refugees is a sensitive one in Iran. Many have fled Taliban rule in recent years, with estimates suggesting over a million have entered Iran since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Overall, Iran claims to host around six million Afghan refugees, many of whom have escaped war, poverty, and hardship over decades. Even the UN refugee agency estimates about four million Afghans are currently in Iran.

These refugees place a significant strain on Iran, whose economy is already burdened by international sanctions and struggling with internal challenges. Iran also diverts substantial resources to support armed militias and terrorist organizations across the Middle East and beyond. This international support strains local resources, especially with the added burden of feeding millions more.

To address the refugee issue, Iran is not only taking border measures against migrants but actively deporting refugees back to Afghanistan. Reports indicate that only in September, Iran expelled over 100,000 people. Many refugees report being beaten, denied basic access to food and water, and detained in special camps by Iranian authorities.

Taliban officials claim that since the beginning of the year, nearly half a million refugees have entered Afghanistan from Iran, with the rate increasing. Iran has now set an ambitious target to deport two million undocumented Afghan refugees within six months.

However, Iran is not alone in this approach. Both Turkey and Pakistan are also expelling Afghan refugees despite the humanitarian consequences and global outcry. Concerns over the dangers awaiting these refugees back in Afghanistan—economic hardship and potential Taliban persecution—haven’t deterred authorities in Tehran, Ankara, or Islamabad from taking these measures. Iran’s planned mass deportation program is moving forward, forcibly sending refugees back without judicial oversight or international intervention.

Regional conflict with Pakistan

In the border regions with Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran also faces threats from ethnic separatist movements like the one responsible for killing Iranian border guards on Saturday.

The Jaish ul-Adl terrorists represent Iran’s Baluchi minority, around three percent of the country’s population. Alongside Kurds, Sunni Baluchis are among the most persecuted minorities in Iran, which is governed by a Shiite majority. They live in Sistan and Baluchestan in severe poverty, with high unemployment and limited access to basic infrastructure and essential resources such as food and water. Many locals turn to smuggling goods, such as fuel or food, and some are involved in drug trafficking. The conditions in this region have been likened to certain impoverished areas in Africa.

Jaish ul-Adl is perhaps the primary voice of Baluchi dissent and terrorism within Iran. Tehran accuses Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in supporting the organization, with hints of Israeli backing as well. This organization has a bloody history with Iranian security forces: in 2019, for example, Jaish ul-Adl killed 13 officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Zahedan, following up with other attacks on Iranian targets.

As recently as September, the group claimed responsibility for two attacks on Iranian police, killing three people. In June, they kidnapped nine individuals linked to the Revolutionary Guards, and in April, they carried out five coordinated attacks on Iranian military bases and other sites.

These escalations prompted Iran to intensify its response. The Iranian military launched drones and missiles into Pakistani territory, targeting what it claimed were extremist training camps linked to Israel. In retaliation, Pakistan carried out a nearly identical strike on Iranian “terrorist targets,” resulting in seven Iranian deaths.

This confrontation led to diplomatic repercussions: Pakistan expelled the Iranian ambassador and withdrew its own representative from Tehran, temporarily downgrading relations. Ten days later, however, the crisis was resolved, with both countries restoring diplomatic ties, and Pakistan even inviting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian for a visit.

Despite this, the diplomatic incident doesn’t appear to have soured Pakistan’s overall stance towards Iran. Following Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian targets, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued a harsh condemnation, accusing Israel of full responsibility for escalating regional tensions.

A broader regional and global trend

After its unsuccessful efforts to stem terrorism or mass migration from Afghanistan through attacks on its neighbors, Iran is now taking another approach. Since mid-month, Iran has resorted to crackdowns on refugees and initiated the construction of physical barriers to control its border.

The new initiative began last January, when Iran started building a border fence, wall, and other obstacles along its long eastern border. The project began in Baluchestan with a four-meter-high wall spanning 300 kilometers of Iran’s vast border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The plan aims to cover 1,000 kilometers on each border, with Iran spending an estimated $3 billion on construction, expected to be completed within three years.

According to Iranian military officials, the wall aims to control border crossings and stop Afghan refugees from entering. Commentators suggest that the wall represents a shift in Iran’s security strategy, emphasizing defensive measures to manage cross-border threats without escalating to open conflicts, as seen in its recent clashes with Pakistan.

This trend of constructing physical barriers aligns with similar measures worldwide. While modern threats like drones or rockets often bypass physical defenses, walls still provide protection against terrorism, illegal migration, and trafficking. Pakistan, for instance, is considering similar initiatives along its borders with Iran, just as it has along its Afghan border.

Though countries like Israel and the US have faced criticism for building such barriers, this trend continues to grow globally. Despite high costs, walls help control sprawling borders and prevent crises from escalating into broader conflicts.

This situation also underscores Iran’s need to manage threats on multiple fronts beyond its ongoing tensions with Israel, including resource demands on defense, personnel, and weapons. Iran recently announced a 200% increase in its defense budget—a huge rise reflecting the complex priorities it must balance amid escalating international sanctions and its nuclear ambitions. With rising pressures, Tehran may soon need to make strategic choices on its long-term focus and capabilities.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 30, 2024.

Judging by statements from Tehran, especially those by Iranian Leader Khamenei and President Pezeskhian, it appears that the Iranian regime is pulling out all the stops and currently leaning toward containing the attack.

In his yesterday’s speech Khamenei has referred the decision on the matter to the Regime’s top brass, the Supreme National Security Council; Pezeskhian has limited his response to a non-binding statement that Tehran would give an “adequate response.”

It should be noted that a potential threat to Iran’s nuclear facilities is at stake, should Tehran choose to enter a round of strikes against Israel.

For now, however, the Iranian regime seems inclined to contain the attack by downplaying its importance and success, rejecting calls for an overwhelming response, such as the one from Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari.

Additionally, Tehran has reportedly reached out—or will reach out—to the Biden administration to restrain Israel, as indicated by Mojtaba Yousefi, a parliament member’s appeal yesterday for the U.S. to intervene and restrain Israel.

Judging by the reported damage incurred in the Israeli attack, it seems that Khamenei and the Iranian regime feel vulnerable. As they assess the extent of the damage, it may shape their subsequent decisions.

At the same time, the Iranian regime is currently focused on its image, especially in front of the Iranian people and in the region to “prove” its strength, despite the blow it received from Israel. This effort is evident in its statements through senior officials and media mouthpieces who try to downplay the value of the attack and deny its successes.

Published in I24, October 28, 2024.

Based on very initial knowledge and limited information, I would conclude the following results of Israel’s three-wave Oct. 26 strike on Iran, which were partly strategic, but mostly tactical:

1. Israel finally broke the aura of Iranian invincibility. It dispelled the 30-year obsession in the West that a strike would have apocalyptic consequences, and established precedent for hitting Iran directly.  This is no small thing, and lifts an analytical and policy straight-jacket that paralyzed Israel and others for decades. Iran has been exposed as weak; its bluffs and bluster called. The emperor has only old, threadbare underwear.  Not quite nude, but close.
2. ⁠Israel started normalizing striking Iran in the same way that, over the years, Israeli strikes on Syria have become routine and barely noticed.
3. ⁠Israel set itself up well for a strike that truly devastates the Iranian regime in the unlikely event that it responds.
4. ⁠Israel showed itself to be a tactical genius and a military power rivaled by none in competence—a true pride of the Jewish people.

On the negative side of the ledger, the bottom line represents a failed strategic result, for the following reasons:

1. Israel finally broke the aura of Iranian invincibility. It dispelled the 30-year obsession in the West that a strike would have apocalyptic consequences, and established precedent for hitting Iran directly.  This is no small thing, and lifts an analytical and policy straight-jacket that paralyzed Israel and others for decades. Iran has been exposed as weak; its bluffs and bluster called. The emperor has only old, threadbare underwear.  Not quite nude, but close.
2. ⁠Israel started normalizing striking Iran in the same way that, over the years, Israeli strikes on Syria have become routine and barely noticed.
3. ⁠Israel set itself up well for a strike that truly devastates the Iranian regime in the unlikely event that it responds.
4. ⁠Israel showed itself to be a tactical genius and a military power rivaled by none in competence—a true pride of the Jewish people.

On the negative side of the ledger, the bottom line represents a failed strategic result, for the following reasons:

1. The United States wanted Israel to hit mostly that which is aligned with what the administration defines as U.S. priorities: anything that helps to harm Russia’s war against Ukraine. Those sites were, in fact, hit.
2. ⁠Israel limited itself to those sites and the ones that Israel needs to strike in order to operate over Iran. Those sites, namely anti-aircraft, were hit.
3. ⁠Israel did not hit any site that hurts Iran’s regime and could lead to escalation as defined by Iran’s pre-strike chest-thumping: nuclear, oil, infrastructure, regime figures or symbolic targets.
4. ⁠So after a year in which Iran and its proxies killed 2,000 Israelis; destroyed up to 60% of cities in the north; sent 250,000 Israelis to be internal refugees; launched a global campaign of Nazi-level antisemitism; launched 600 missiles and drones into Israel; shut down half of Israel’s ports and caused all international airlines to indefinitely stop flying to Israel; tried to kill several of the most senior Israeli officials; and sent a drone to hit the sitting prime minister’s house, Israel launches a strike that protects Ukraine but leaves everything else untouched.
5. ⁠In other words, after a month of bluster that Israel will change the face of the Middle East, it appears to have returned to the Oct. 6 strategic concept of “we showed them” and deterrence, rather than conducting a strike that shakes the foundations of the Iranian regime and maintains strategic strategic momentum. Instead, it let the United States finally achieve its goal of strategically leashing Israel and forcing it back essentially into a strategically reactive, de-escalatory posture.
6. ⁠Israel thus let Iran’s chest thumping, which was designed to panic Washington, succeed in reshaping Israel’s reaction—in essence, giving Iran control over what Israel would hit.
7. ⁠The key strategic gain Israel had in the last months was that it brought “victory” as understood in terms of regional culture and grasp— that Israel had “lost it,” was “possessed by the jinn” and the master of the house went crazy. But that concept, appropriate for the region, was traded in again for a failed Western understanding of conflict management—“Restraint is strength,” “We showed them,” “Iran got the message”—deterrence.
8. ⁠In short, Iran, whose entire strategy is based on manipulation, chess and using your soul as a weapon against you—all of which depend on your being rational, predictable and manipulatable—used the power of the U.S. as Israel’s strategic Achilles heel to transform the strategic reality of defeat, retreat and fear it faced in the last two months as Israel has become a dangerous uncontrollable and unpredictable force into a successful effort to return Israel into a controllable, reactive and manipulatable position. From there, Iran now can reassert its domination over setting the agenda; manipulate events to reverse its retreat; return the strategic momentum it had lost; and enter a long-range confrontation with Israel on its terms.
9. ⁠Regionally, Israel no longer appears to be the strong horse that can replace indispensable U.S. power, but instead has reverted to being a dependent U.S. vassal in terms of strategic behavior.  Everyone knows this was not the strike Israel needed and could have executed, but that it was the strike that Washington imposed.
10. ⁠Israel’s limiting its strike undermines chances for real peace with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were looking for a strong horse that replaces U.S. power. Instead, they see now that Israel is nothing more than an American vassal—which is useless to them.

I realize this is harsh. I realize Iran may strike back, so Israel might have a second chance. But it’s doubtful that Iran will take the bait.

Israel’s strike is a form of strategic victory for Iran in regional terms, no matter how much our Western minds try to rationalize it as an objective show of strength. Iran will far more likely respond in ways that continue to reassert its manipulative control over events, rather than lash out in a way that allows Israel a second chance.

In conclusion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered this strike under withering pressure from every direction inside Israel and from abroad. The leaked plans, hostile demeanor and slightly veiled threats coming from Israel’s key ally and soul-mate, the United States, were wounds that are not easily dismissed.

Israel has a small population, less than a 10th of Iran’s, while fighting an eight-front war alone and with its allies slowly choking off its arms supply. It must look over its shoulder at international institutions that are engage in lawfare to annihilate it, and is plagued by an unimaginative defense establishment that suffers deeply from the Western malady of having forgotten the meaning of victory in war.

So, Israel not only acted alone, but with a strong headwind from every direction, even that of its allies. Netanyahu’s perseverance despite these forces of sabotage will earn him a hallowed place in history. He has emerged as the only leader in power with such vision and resolve to defend Western civilization.

But a sober analysis must identify and overcome the internal forces and hopefully still deliver the strategic victory that, at this point, only Netanyahu has the talent to properly grasp and achieve.

Published in JNS, October 27, 2024.

In what has become a decades-long shadow war, Iran has persistently worked to undermine Israel through an intricate web of proxy organizations encircling its borders. This strategy, employing Hamas, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemen, forms part of Tehran’s broader regional ambitions.

The nuclear program has always been Iran’s trump card – its path to reshaping the regional balance of power. But here’s the irony: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s miscalculation has upended Tehran’s carefully orchestrated plans. Instead of managing a controlled conflict, Iran now watches as Israel responds with unprecedented force, striking at the heart of Iran’s military capabilities and challenging its carefully cultivated image of invincibility.

From Israel’s perspective, this presents a rare strategic opportunity to reshape the deterrence balance and weaken Iran’s regional grip. The operation serves a broader strategic purpose: to delay or potentially derail Iran’s nuclear program. With hundreds of aircraft operating across the region, Israel is striking various targets that serve Iran’s military infrastructure – and while these strikes don’t include the nuclear sites themselves, the combined blow to Iran’s channels of influence serves to significantly weaken its position.

Make no mistake: The Iranians – master strategists in this regional chess game – fully grasp the significance of Israel’s newly demonstrated capabilities. Logic suggests they will now seek to minimize their losses, preventing Israel from exploiting any additional vulnerabilities.

Tehran’s strategic patience might well lead them to a familiar playbook: waiting out the 2024 US elections, hoping for a more accommodating administration. They understand that a hardline US stance would impose painful constraints, even if falling short of completely dismantling their nuclear ambitions. This could mean maintaining their position on the regional chessboard until 2040, as originally planned, or until political winds shift in their favor.

Yet there’s another possibility that shouldn’t be dismissed: wounded pride and mounting internal pressure could push Iran toward hasty retaliation, perhaps through another missile barrage against Israel. Should this occur around the US elections, it could provide Israel with the momentum needed to launch more focused strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Last night’s operations have surely driven home a crucial message to Tehran: Israel can operate with remarkable freedom in the Middle East’s most sensitive areas, treating Iran’s airspace as if it were its own. Had it not been for Washington’s diplomatic and military constraints on Israel’s prime minister, we might already be witnessing the first signs of Iran’s nuclear program being rolled back. Tehran’s leadership certainly grasps this reality. While their strategic calculus might favor patience, one can hope that their sense of humiliation will prompt them to take another risk – one that could prove costly.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 26, 2024.

A former Israeli national security advisor contends that Iran’s network of proxy organizations is unraveling, potentially weakening Tehran’s strategic position against Israel. The analysis examines the impact of recent conflicts on Iran’s allies and suggests that Israel should capitalize on the current circumstances to neutralize threats and potentially influence Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently boasted that “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has set the Zionist regime back 70 years,” marking the first anniversary of the October 7 attack. Yet, while Khamenei tweeted this in Hebrew, his oil minister was busy managing tankers and storage facilities at the Kharg Island terminal, wary of potential Israeli strikes.

From Tehran’s perspective, a year into the war, the broader regional picture suggests that its network of proxy organizations arrayed against Israel is beginning to unravel. Although not publicly acknowledged, questions about this strategy are likely already being raised within government circles. The Iranian influence is losing two critical footholds it had established on Israel’s borders, while another in Yemen is also suffering significant setbacks.

Furthermore, these proxy organizations have inadvertently become negative ambassadors for Iran. Across the Middle East and beyond, there’s a growing recognition that Iranian involvement often brings destruction and instability. Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen continue to serve as stark examples of this pattern.

Ironically, the proxy organizations Iran cultivated to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries are now entangling Tehran in precisely such scenarios. While Iran attempts to distinguish its direct attacks as responses to strikes on its sovereignty or personnel, separate from proxy combat events, these nuanced distinctions are lost in the fog of war.

In the blurred lines between Iran and its proxies, especially with the continued flow of instructions, weapons, and funding, Tehran finds itself being drawn into direct conflict scenarios it sought to avoid. This occurs at a time when Iran’s capabilities are constrained, and US support for Israel remains unwavering.

From Israel’s standpoint, despite being drawn into this conflict rather than initiating it, the strategic objective is to dismantle the threat Iran has constructed around its borders. This approach aims to weaken both Iran and its regime while exploiting the current circumstances to advance measures to halt Iran’s nuclear program.

The recent Iranian missile attack on Israel demands a response. Failure to exact a significant price could embolden Iran to normalize such attacks and gradually escalate their intensity.

However, Israel need not rush its retaliation. There’s strategic value in allowing Iranian nerves to fray during a tense waiting period, permitting the Iranian currency to continue its decline, and giving space for internal criticism of the regime to intensify. Despite differing approaches, coordinating principles with the Americans without overly constraining Israel’s options is advisable.

On the public front, there’s no need to divulge information about potential targets, objectives, considerations, or timelines. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s statement that any attack on Iran would be “lethal, precise, and surprising. They won’t understand what happened and how” aligns well with the required approach of maintaining ambiguity, preparing for various scenarios, and letting actions speak louder than words.

The primary stated goal for the IDF’s operation in Lebanon is to enable northern residents to safely return home. Achieving this requires meeting three conditions: First, eliminating the threat of incursions into Israeli territory by ensuring the absence of tunnels or Hezbollah forces in the border area. Second, neutralizing the threat of anti-tank fire from Lebanese territory toward Israel, requiring the removal of Hezbollah forces from within striking range. The third condition involves maintaining this new status quo over time.

The optimal approach to achieve these objectives is by establishing a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, devoid of civilian presence and under Israeli surveillance and fire control. This “buffer zone” model isn’t unique to Israel; Turkey implemented a similar strategy in northern Syria over the past decade to enhance its security, a move that the international community has largely accepted.

From Israel’s perspective, although drawn into this conflict, the strategic aim remains to dismantle the Iranian-built threat network, thereby weakening both Iran and its regime, while leveraging the situation to advance measures to halt Tehran’s nuclear program.

The IDF’s military achievements against Hezbollah thus far have expanded Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering room regarding post-conflict conditions. For Israel, the paramount goals are disarming Hezbollah and implementing security arrangements to prevent its rearmament. These objectives take precedence over considerations of stabilizing Lebanon’s government or influencing its composition.

In a recent speech commemorating the October 7 attack, Khaled Mashal praised the achievements of “Al-Aqsa Flood.” He claimed, “This battle accomplished in one year what years couldn’t achieve; even Zionist public opinion has lost confidence in itself.” Mashal called for opening “additional fronts against the enemy.”

Despite the Israeli security apparatus being fully engaged, there’s a growing sentiment that this high-ranking terrorist figure should be prioritized on their target list.

Israeli journalist Zeev Schiff, in “Earthquake in October,” wrote, “The Yom Kippur War shook Israel to its foundations. Excessive confidence gave way to doubts. Self-assurance was shaken. Suddenly, long-suppressed questions surfaced: Will we forever live by the sword?”

Five decades later, this question continues to gnaw at the Israeli psyche. While the distant future remains unpredictable, for the foreseeable future, Israel sees no choice but to prevail.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October  15, 2024.

The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah closes a circle for Israel. It’s not just the precise execution in the heart of Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut, the infamous underground bunker of Nasrallah’s, supposedly impenetrable, or the additional surprise suffered by the terrorist organization, which perhaps didn’t think Israel would dare to carry out such an operation. Beyond all these, the assassination is a move with profound significance in the long-term strategic view, which can also point to the next options open to Israel.

Since the IDF stepped up operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah, it has demonstrated superiority on all fronts, especially in intelligence – the main area where it failed last October. Who would have believed less than a year ago that these are the capabilities we would demonstrate today?

Looking back at the past year, some optimistic trends are nevertheless revealed: Hamas has been dealt a crushing blow. The Gaza terrorist organization has not been eliminated, but most of its leadership has been wiped out, its military structure dismantled, and it is no longer capable of harming Israel in the same way as before October 7. Israel, of course, needs to continue the pressure on it, advance the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza by any means possible, and not let up until it succeeds in eliminating the entire threat posed by Hamas. However, the intensity of the fighting in Gaza has decreased and is not expected to return to the same scale as before. As Israel continues to carry out targeted operations, it will further erode the capabilities of the terrorist organization and its members, and the threat from it will continue to diminish.

In the northern arena, Hezbollah has been revealed in many ways as a paper tiger. Apart from rocket fire, it has not carried out significant actions so far, despite all the blows inflicted on it in the last two weeks. Although we shouldn’t underestimate the Shiite organization and its capabilities, the elimination of many of its senior officials, including its senior military commanders, the head of the Southern Front Ali Karaki (who was killed with Nasrallah), the leader of the organization himself, and the heads of the Radwan force, greatly reduce its ability to carry out quality terrorist operations against Israel. This doesn’t mean it can’t carry out sporadic rocket fire – in recent days, we’ve seen only a trickle of rockets, though nothing close to the pessimistic forecasts heard here – but the motivation has been hit, the fear has increased, and the capabilities have decreased.

It’s also worth taking into account the shock the terrorist organization has entered, its fear of using means of communication and the many surprises it has suffered within a few short weeks. In the absence of an orderly command structure, this is a blow that will be very difficult to recover from quickly. In these weeks, it should be noted, Israel has suffered almost no casualties at all, while Hezbollah counts its dead in many dozens, including almost all of its military leadership. May it stay that way.

It’s also worth dwelling a bit on the implications of the organization leader’s departure from the scene: Nasrallah is not just another senior commander of the organization. He is not one of many. Nasrallah is not ostensibly a military commander, not a field man who guides the soldiers, but he is the charismatic figure, the gifted orator, the supreme leader to whom the fighters of the Shiite organization look up. He is their absolute symbol.

But in many ways, Nasrallah is much more than that. He turned Hezbollah into the largest and most heavily armed terrorist organization in the world. Since he took over the position previously held by Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, who was also eliminated by Israel, Nasrallah managed to position the Shiite organization at the forefront of the struggle against Israel, drive it out of Lebanon, inflict a painful blow on it in the Second Lebanon War and establish deterrence against it. Nasrallah also armed his organization with tens of thousands of missiles and rockets, advanced weapons, explosive devices, and missiles, using his connections with Iran and the money his patrons from Tehran poured on him. His absence in Hezbollah will be felt greatly, and he leaves behind very big shoes to fill.

One thing can probably be said with quite high certainty: a large part of Israel’s deterrence has been restored. The cheers of many citizens in Syria over the IDF’s successes in recent weeks can be heard all the way to the northern Golan Heights, and it’s hard to believe there are many in the Sunni Arab states who are now crying over the bitter fate of the arch-terrorist from Beirut. The leaders in Arab capitals are certainly looking at Israel with renewed respect after the last three weeks, even if they publicly expressed condolences over his death.

When talking about a new regional architecture, whose promotion in the form of normalization with Saudi Arabia may have been cut short with the outbreak of the war, this is the kind of behavior that Israel needs to adhere to in order to rehabilitate this opportunity. In the Middle Eastern neighborhood, alliances are not made with the weak and fearful, but with the strong. Israel is restoring its status and, incidentally, the possibilities for true normalization from a correct position of strength, facing countries that will see it as equal to them and even more powerful, one that has the ability to assist them in times of trouble. Thus, for example, the statement published this week and attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, that he’s not really interested in Israel’s actions in Gaza – didn’t come in a vacuum.

That’s why Israel must not fold now, must not stop. We need to continue pressing the pedal in Lebanon as well to bring about a new reality for the border residents. We must continue to act in Gaza and in other arenas.

Now we must also set our sights on the one big problem that still hovers over Israeli heads, which has not been dealt with since the beginning of the war: the Iranian nuclear program. In addition to the many reports in recent years about the accumulation of highly enriched uranium in quantities sufficient to build several bombs, recently, it has also been claimed that the Iranians may have begun to restart the activities of the “weapons group” – the group responsible for turning the fissile nuclear material into an actual bomb, and then assembling it on a missile.

Now is the most appropriate time to act against the Iranian nuclear program for other reasons as well: The Iranians are looking at the close election system in the US and fear another term of Former President Donald Trump in the White House. Despite his conciliatory words in recent days in favor of reaching an agreement with Tehran on the nuclear program, they know that he is not a predictable person and that he sometimes also advocates using force to achieve his goals.

Therefore, they understand that the few weeks remaining until the elections themselves, and also the weeks between the elections and the entry of the new president into the White House, are critical to presenting the Americans with a reality in which an Iranian nuclear bomb is a fait accompli. Now, they must push forward in order not to reach a situation where there will be another option in the White House to do something about it.

From Israel’s perspective, a strike on Iran would now come at a convenient time from an international perspective as well. The Americans may not be pleased with the Israeli moves and the escalation against Hezbollah, but President Joe Biden also doesn’t want to be recorded in the annals of American history as the president who allowed Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The fact that the president is a lame duck until after the elections means that he will find it difficult to stop significant moves that Israel chooses to make.

If Israel knows how to “sell” the attack to the president correctly, it can also paint it as something that will give the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, an electoral boost. Instead of an agreement with Saudi Arabia or a ceasefire in Gaza, eliminating the Iranian nuclear program can be perceived in Washington as a first step towards truly shaping the new regional architecture. It is certainly much more significant than a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, which will lead to nothing in the long run, and it will greatly increase the Israeli standing in the eyes of the Saudis, for example.

Moreover, the Iranians are also in an inferior position vis-à-vis other Western countries after being caught transferring UAVs to the Russians for the war in Ukraine and connecting to the “bad guy” of the neighborhood. They suffered sanctions and lost a lot of the legitimacy they might have had before. In addition, the IAEA declared publicly that it is unable to know what is happening in Iranian nuclear facilities and monitor them, and in fact, has made any possibility of cooperation now meaningless.

But the most important fact from Israel’s point of view is that the most powerful “whip” that Iran held over our heads, Hezbollah, is now perceived as something that can be dealt with. Even before that, following the attack in April, Israel understood that Iran is not a significant threat to its security – even when it launched hundreds of missiles and UAVs towards us. At the same time, the Lebanese terrorist organization is not what it was three weeks ago, and along with it, Iranian deterrence towards us following a possible attack on nuclear facilities has decreased greatly.

Perhaps the fact that should most indicate this is the claim that Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, was taken to a “hidden and safe” place following Nasrallah’s assassination. Even in routine, the Iranian leader is certainly tightly secured, with the best defenses Iran has to offer, but his concealment indicates that the Iranians don’t know exactly what to expect now. These things are added to the publication that even the Revolutionary Guards stopped using their communication devices following the operation against Hezbollah, which indicates their fear of Israeli penetration.

Now is the time to act. Israel has already proven in April that it can attack in Iran, and later did something similar in Yemen. The IDF and security forces have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to operate in distant arenas and Israel’s excellent intelligence. The rise in Israeli morale and reconnection following recent successes can increase internal legitimacy for an attack now. In addition, our defense arrays are on high alert and in immediate readiness.

However, we must not act alone. We must convince the America and our other allies to join the struggle against the Iranians before it’s too late. We need to emphasize to them how the region might look if Iran has nuclear weapons and what could have developed after October 7 if Tehran had a nuclear umbrella sheltering the head of Hamas and Hezbollah. This reality must be prevented now.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 30, 2024.