“The region will become hell for our enemies if the attacks on Iranian infrastructure expand,” Ebrahim Zolfaqari, spokesman for the supreme operational headquarters of Iran’s armed forces, said Sunday. He issued that threat even before President Donald Trump’s angry warning that “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one” if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened.

Less than 24 hours before the expiration of the ultimatum set by the US president, the chances of an agreement between Washington and Tehran appear slim. Public rhetoric does not always reflect what is happening through back channels, but this time the anger appears genuine and the gap between the sides wide. Nothing is final, and last-minute changes are not uncommon. The exchange of threats and insults has, presumably, mainly led mediators to use what little time remains to try to prevent the expected escalation. For now, Tehran continues to project a combative, uncompromising line.

An indication of the mood there could be found in the harsh criticism directed at former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif over the conciliatory approach he presented. In an article published over the weekend in Foreign Affairs, he proposed striving for a comprehensive peace agreement with the US and laid out a formula for ending the war that included limits on the nuclear program and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. The response to his proposal was swift: At several rallies in Tehran, pictures of him were burned and regime associates called for him to be put on trial for treason.

The regime’s leaders in Tehran are aware of the heavy price Iran has paid and may continue to pay for its obstinacy. At the same time, they believe that the passage of time is increasing the pressure on Trump far more than it is wearing down the regime. In their view, the war of attrition they are waging will force Washington to bend and will eventually bring concessions from the US that will not only ensure the regime’s survival, but also free it from the economic stranglehold around its neck. To guarantee that, or at least preserve the chances of it, they are willing to keep paying in cash.

Iran’s strategy is to continue wearing down the US and its partners through a combination of control over the Strait of Hormuz, influence over the global energy market and continued missile launches toward Israel and the Gulf states. At the same time, it is trying to achieve tactical gains against the forces operating against it, capitalize on their mishaps and entanglements, raise the cost and deepen divisions over the war through information campaigns and psychological warfare.

At the same time, regime officials are closely attuned to developments on the home front. They continue to invest in reinforcing a “consciousness of victory,” restricting the flow of information and tightening internal oversight in order to thwart any effort to organize against the regime and topple it.

What does Trump want? The messages coming from his spokespeople, as well as from Trump himself, are fairly clear. He is seeking a deal that will complete what the impressive military achievements have not been able to deliver, while also framing a victory.

Trump is aware that any agreement with representatives of the regime would not only mean giving up on the aspiration of toppling it, but would also provide the regime with legitimacy and resources and pave the way for its renewed strengthening. He presumably also assumes that as long as this regime remains in place, regardless of who its representatives are, it will not change its ambitions or abandon its path. On the contrary, the current war will provide it with a clear justification for the view that only military nuclear capability can guarantee its survival, and as a result it will spare no effort to achieve that.

Where are things headed? It would not be a risky bet to assume that in the coming 24 hours, various “mediating parties” will place before Trump or his advisers a request to extend the ultimatum yet again. To that end, they may present additional “gifts” in the form of temporary and limited easing in the Strait of Hormuz that Tehran would be willing to offer in order to buy time. This is, of course, another step in trapping Trump in a war of attrition, and one can only hope he does not accept it.

The second possibility is that they present a willingness by the Iranians for a short ceasefire, but on Iran’s terms, with the Strait of Hormuz under its control, and not on the terms Trump set. The ceasefire would be presented as a window for talks on a permanent arrangement. In such a situation, negotiations would take place with Iran freed from military pressure and holding a bargaining chip, while pressure would be exerted on the other side. Trump, it is reasonable to assume, will not accept such an offer.

The third possibility is an escalation in military pressure: a shift away from a policy of selective strikes toward attacks on national infrastructure. Signals in that direction were evident in the latest Israeli and US strikes, and that is what Trump’s remarks appear to point to. It may be assumed that the use of this course would be measured and controlled and would be accompanied by keeping the door open to diplomatic negotiations. It could, of course, unfold in a multi-stage process, with shorter intervals between phases and varying levels of intensity.

This scenario could have contradictory effects on public behavior in Iran. On one hand, it could accelerate civil unrest. On the other, it could rally the public around the regime as the focus shifts from damage to the regime to the destruction of state infrastructure. In such a reality, the US and Israel would have to invest special effort in channeling local energies toward bringing down the regime.

Do not give up on toppling the regime

From Israel’s point of view, its strategic position today is vastly better than it was on the eve of the war: Iran’s strategic capabilities have suffered a severe, even if not irreversible, blow; the regime’s stability has been shaken, even though it is still standing; Israel has once again demonstrated to the countries of the region and the world its security strength; and it has also positioned itself as a leading strategic partner of the US, not as a dependent or a client state.

And yet, the truth must be told: The fundamental change we hope to see in Iran will occur only when the ayatollahs’ regime reaches the end of its road. Without that, everything that has been achieved could prove temporary.

Therefore, that aspiration must not be abandoned under any circumstances. Whatever course President Trump chooses, Israel’s interest is to preserve sanctions on the regime, because that is what will bring the masses out against it. That is how we will ensure that the current campaign becomes another milestone in the regime’s decline on the way to its fall, which, even if delayed, will come.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 07, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

In recent months, a new narrative has gained momentum among scholars and experts, arguing that the war in West Asia has led to a competition among newly formed axes. On one side stands the “Indo-Abrahamic” alliance — the high-tech trio of India, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. On the other stands a Sunni bloc comprising Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan.

It is a compelling narrative, anchored in concrete steps these countries recently took to strengthen their security cooperation. The Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), signed in September 2025 in Riyadh, reinvigorated a long-standing defence relationship, adding a formal commitment to mutual defence in the face of aggression. Qatar received a similar overture from Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari during a visit to Doha in late 2025.

When Turkey signalled its interest in joining this arrangement in early 2026, the “axis” narrative seemed to solidify into something real, a kind of “Sunni NATO”, comprising Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and even Egypt. Although such a framework would stop short of a mutual defence clause, it carried the potential to meaningfully deepen cooperation among the most influential states in the Arab world and to form a defence corridor stretching from West Asia into South Asia.

One of the main justifications for this grouping was the crisis around Somaliland. When Israel officially recognised Somaliland’s independence in December 2025, bolstering the UAE’s strategic management of the Port of Berbera, it sent shockwaves through the Arab League. Saudi Arabia’s immediate pivot towards the central government in Mogadishu, supported by Turkish and Egyptian military aid, looked like a confrontation with the UAE-Israel partnership. The underlying UAE-Saudi rivalry, already simmering over diverging interests in Yemen and Sudan and competing economic ambitions, added further fuel.

Another accelerant was the Israeli strike against Hamas leadership on Qatari soil in September 2025. For Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, witnessing the growing defence ties between Israel, India and the UAE was not merely diplomatic theatre; it was a strategic threat signal. The fear of exposure to similar actions in the future demanded a coordinated response.

Then came the war against Iran, and it reshuffled the deck entirely. Yesterday’s apparent rivals found themselves facing a common adversary, and regional interests began to converge in ways that cut across the supposed dividing lines. The axis narrative collapsed like a house of cards.

Although the war against Iran might appear to reinforce the case for a “Sunni NATO”, it exposes the structural weaknesses of the security pacts between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Egypt. More tellingly, it cannot explain the converging interests between some of these players and the international efforts to stabilise the region. Here is why the axis competition narrative is weak.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have maintained a “special” defence relationship for decades, built on Saudi capital and Pakistani nuclear deterrence. What we are seeing now is merely an upgrade and formalisation of an existing insurance policy. Strengthening ties with Ankara and Islamabad does not mean Saudi Arabia is choosing sides or drifting from the United States.

The decisive proof came when Iran attacked Saudi Arabia — Pakistan did not respond militarily. A country that had committed, only months earlier, to defend Saudi Arabia in the event of aggression stood aside. It was optics. Moreover, Pakistan leveraged the war to position itself as a credible mediator between Iran and the United States, working directly with Tehran to ensure the continued stable flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, regardless of Saudi interests.

Qatar proved to be a valuable US partner throughout the war against Iran, paying the political price of hosting Al-Udeid (the largest American military base in West Asia). More striking still, one of the core motivations that had driven Qatar towards broader security arrangements — the Israeli strike on its territory — underwent a complete reversal. Following Iran’s attack on Qatar, Doha signalled to Washington its willingness to expel Hamas leadership from its territory. A state that for years financed and cultivated one of Iran’s most important proxies was now drawing a line and getting closer to the United States in the process.

India, nominally placed in the UAE-Israel camp by axis theorists, remained conspicuously quiet throughout the Iran war. This is no surprise. India’s interests pull in opposite directions simultaneously. On one hand, IMEC (the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) depends on UAE ports, Saudi railways and Israel’s Mediterranean gateway. On the other hand, India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port is its only land link to Central Asia and its critical bypass around Pakistan, and it had to guarantee energy flows to India following disruptions in the Hormuz Strait.

Caught between these two structural imperatives, India demonstrated a multifaceted policy, reducing the negative implications of the Iran war by maintaining direct dialogue with Tehran, while deepening cooperation with Israel, the UAE and the US, which, in return, granted a waiver to India for Russian oil imports.

The balancing act between protecting its equities in Iran and its deepening partnership with Western-oriented partners defines India’s position more accurately than any axis framework can.

Beneath all of this lies the factor that axis narratives consistently underweight: the United States. Every country in these supposed competing camps operates within a security architecture managed in Washington. None of them, including Turkey or Saudi Arabia, wants to see the US exit the region. The opposite is true. It is no coincidence that every country mentioned above is also a member of the peace framework led by President Trump, with India participating as an observer.

When Saudi Arabia pushed behind the scenes for strikes against Iran, as leaked reports from March 2026 confirm, it did so knowing that only American or Israeli power could deliver the blow. When the UAE builds ports in Somaliland, it does so with the tacit understanding that the US Navy secures the surrounding waters. The “axes” are not fracturing away from the centre. They are jockeying for a better position within it.

The core mistake of the axis narrative is its linearity. It assumes that friendship with A requires enmity towards B. In contemporary geopolitics, this logic has long been obsolete. The Iran war confirmed it once more: there is no zero-sum game here.

Dismissing the axis narrative does not mean dismissing all of the dynamics that fed it. The structural argument is weak, but the security relationships developing beneath it are worth close attention.

The deepening defence ties between Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia deserve careful monitoring. Not because they constitute a coherent anti-Western bloc, but because their long-term trajectory directly affects Israeli and Indian interests in the region. Turkey and Pakistan, in particular, warrant close attention. Both have demonstrated willingness to act as independent security actors in ways that complicate the stability that Israel and India depend on.

Pakistan’s nuclear capability, combined with its deepening military relationship with Turkey, including drone technology transfers and joint military exercises, represents a qualitative shift that should not be normalised simply because it has not yet been directed at a specific adversary.

At the same time, the weakening of Iran adds a further dimension. With Iran diminished, Turkey faces a more open field. Ankara has already demonstrated its appetite for regional power projection. A post-Iran regional order could accelerate Turkey’s bid to position itself as the dominant force in West Asia, bringing it into direct competition with Saudi Arabia over influence, trade routes, and the future architecture of regional security. This dynamic, while a source of concern, may also push Saudi Arabia and the broader Arabian Peninsula closer to Israel.

For Israel and India, this is not an abstract concern. A Turkey-Pakistan security partnership, even an informal one, creates new risk calculations for IMEC, for Israel’s Red Sea access, and for India’s strategic partnerships across West Asia. Thus, Riyadh, New Delhi and Jerusalem should pay close attention to these trends post-Iran war.

In any scenario this war unfolds, it has already proved that, in international relations, there is no zero-sum game. Understanding this is crucial in navigating a multi-dimensional geopolitical system wisely.

Published in First Spot, April 03, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

“We destroyed Iran, we took them out of the game. They’re out, and in a big way. We need to move now on the Abraham Accords,” President Donald Trump told Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

In a speech in Florida over the weekend, the US president described his contacts with the Saudi leader. Trump said the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, were cooperating closely with Washington in the campaign against Iran, and voiced hope that all of them would join the Abraham Accords.

Yet the main concern among Gulf rulers these days is the possibility that the US and Israel will stop the war without “finishing the job.” In that case, the Iranian regime would recover, do everything possible to protect itself from future attacks and settle scores with everyone who helped carry them out. In that scenario, they believe, their countries would rank high on Iran’s target list.

Arab leaders in the region also see matters through the lens of time. Trump will leave office in 33 months, and no one knows what comes after him. Iran’s leadership, by contrast, does not operate on electoral terms; patience and endurance are natural elements of its conduct. That is why these leaders would rather absorb Iran’s blows in silence, despite the humiliation that comes with them. It is reasonable to assume they shrink in their seats every time Trump praises their contribution.

If bin Salman and other Gulf rulers join the Abraham Accords now, it will be only out of a desire to secure protection now against Iran’s future threats. They would certainly prefer the war to end only after the regime is toppled, bringing an end to the era of fear it has imposed.

From Israel’s point of view, its strategic position is far better today than it was on the eve of the war: Iran’s strategic capabilities have suffered a severe, even if not irreversible, blow; the regime’s stability has been shaken, even though it is still standing; and Israel has once again demonstrated its military strength and established itself as a major strategic partner of the US, not a dependent or a client state.

As for the aspiration to replace the regime, it should not be abandoned. Otherwise, everything achieved so far could prove temporary. Israel needs to frame the current campaign as a milestone in the process of replacing the regime, a process that may be delayed but will ultimately come.

In the meantime, Israel is making the most of the opportunity to deepen the damage to Iran. In addition to sites linked to the nuclear program and military industries, Israel has also acted against major economic facilities, without violating the temporary immunity Trump granted to energy infrastructure. Thus, the strike on Iran’s three largest steel plants, the second most important sector in the Iranian economy, caused damage estimated in the billions of dollars, as did the attack on the heavy water production plant in Arak, which generated tens of millions of dollars a year in profits for the regime in Tehran. These strikes do allow the regime to rally the public against Israel, but they also deepen its distress and preserve the potential for protest against it.

Trump’s range of options now runs from reaching a comprehensive arrangement with the Iranian regime to escalating the fighting, with the possibility in between of ending the war through a ceasefire without a broader agreement. Under all of these scenarios, Israel’s interest is that as long as the current Iranian regime remains in place, the sanctions imposed on it should not be lifted, no limits should be placed on Israel’s freedom of action against it or its proxies, and the partnership with the US should not be harmed.

Do not let the Houthis divert attention

The Houthis’ entry into the war should not have come as a surprise. In fact, their prolonged restraint was what raised questions. Two active arms of the Iranian octopus, the Hezbollah terrorist organization and the Houthis, are willing to pay a heavy price to prevent the worst possible outcome: being left without leadership.

From Tehran’s perspective, it is reasonable to assume that bringing in the Houthis was meant not only to open another front against Israel, but also to improve the regime’s bargaining position מול the US. Blocking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea could harm a route that partially compensated for the restrictions imposed on transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis can threaten naval reinforcements the US may send through the Mediterranean, and they can take part in coordinated launches toward Israel and other countries in the region, similar to the model that emerged with the Hezbollah terrorist organization.

Be that as it may, Israel’s focus should remain on Iran. It is the cornerstone of the threats, and it is where the main opportunity lies. The day of reckoning with the Houthis, the Hezbollah terrorist organization and the rest of the proxies will come, and it is better for that to happen when the Iranian regime has become, for them, a broken reed.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 30, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The notion of overthrowing hostile regimes and replacing them with pro-Western, ostensibly moderate alternatives has long been embedded in Western and Israeli strategic thinking.

In the current Iranian context, it is frequently argued that the collapse of the Ayatollahs’ regime would lead to a fundamental transformation in Iran’s foreign policy – most notably, a reduction in its hostility toward Israel.

However, a careful historical examination of the Middle East, alongside comparative international cases, raises substantial doubts regarding the validity of this assumption.

Regional experience, in particular, should have tempered expectations surrounding the emergence of a “new regime.” King Farouk of Egypt, despite his reliance on Britain and the West, nevertheless participated in the 1948 war against Israel. His successor, Anwar Sadat – who adopted a markedly pro-Western orientation and expelled Soviet advisors in 1972 – subsequently led Egypt into the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The Jordanian case further reinforces this pattern. Both King Abdullah I and King Hussein, widely regarded as pragmatic and pro-Western leaders, took part in military confrontations with Israel, including the wars of 1948 and 1967, and were engaged in prolonged periods of tension and conflict.

A similar dynamic can be observed in Iraq. King Faisal II and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, both closely aligned with Western powers, nevertheless joined other Arab states in the 1948 war against Israel. Lebanon, often described as a pro-Western state, has likewise been involved in multiple military confrontations with Israel over the decades.

Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offers a more contemporary illustration of the limitations inherent in the assumption that alignment with the West ensures moderation. Despite its NATO membership since 1952 and its long-standing strategic, economic, and diplomatic ties with the United States, Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years has grown increasingly assertive – and at times confrontational – within the regional arena. Even the personal rapport emphasized by U.S. President Donald Trump, who referred to Erdoğan as a “friend,” did little to restrain these tendencies.

Pakistan provides an additional instructive example. Often characterized as a pro-Western state, and whose current military leader, Asim Munir, has been received with considerable honor in Washington, Pakistan nonetheless pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons with determination, ultimately achieving this objective in the late 1990s. Its regional policy has remained consistently assertive, particularly toward India, including explicit nuclear threats. Moreover, Pakistan has repeatedly been accused of supporting Islamist extremist organizations.

Taken together, these cases challenge the assumption that regime change – particularly toward governments perceived as pro-Western – necessarily produces more moderate or conciliatory foreign policies.

At the same time, it is important to critically reassess the widely invoked notion of the “brave Iranian people.” While acknowledging the constraints imposed by repression and fear, one cannot ignore the recurring mass mobilizations in which millions have chanted slogans such as “Death to Israel.” Although it is inherently difficult to assess genuine public sentiment under authoritarian conditions, it would be imprudent to assume that hostility toward Israel is limited solely to the ruling elite. Indeed, it is plausible that, in the event of significant harm inflicted upon Israel, segments of the Iranian public would respond with approval – whether expressed openly or privately.

In light of these considerations, the expectation that regime change in Iran would automatically yield a fundamentally more moderate and less hostile foreign policy appears, at the very least, highly questionable.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 24, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Listen to the snotty statements coming out of Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Paris since the start of World War III – the assault launched this month by the US and Israel against the globe’s top exporter of terrorism, against a nearly nuclear radical Islamic hegemon that seeks to destroy Israel and bring the US and the West to its knees.

In a first stage of reactions to operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, Western leaders took to the high hills of condescension against the US and Israel.

President Emmanuel Macron stuck his nose up in the air in typical French diplomatic fashion to distance himself from US President Donald Trump and Israel Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, whom he views as hotheads. He said that France would remain “calm, composed, and determined” – meaning superior, aloof, and disengaged.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer also took refuge in ersatz “high principles” to rebuff the US-Israel offensive. “We stand by principles, which I believe are shared by the British people, to base our decision on a calm, level-headed assessment of the British national interest” – meaning that London rejects the interests of Washington and Jerusalem as feverish and foolish.

Behind this is perverse denial of the 47-year war waged by Iran against America, the West, and Israel; irritating fealty to something nebulous and immobilizing called the “rules-based international order”; bitter hostility to Trump and to the State of Israel; and disintegration of national identity and purpose.

In a second stage of reactions, these Western leaders bent a tad to begin talking about “the defense of allies in the region,” basically meaning Gulf states but not Israel.

On March 1, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom said that they were “appalled” by the indiscriminate and disproportionate missile attacks launched by Iran against countries in the region, including those who were not involved in initial US and Israeli military operations.” I read this as “especially” or “mainly” those countries not involved in striking Iran – again, specifically excluding Israel.

France added that it “would be reliable with our allies,” clearly meaning Arab allies. Paris got a little hot under the collar when Iranian fire hit French forces in Iraq and the UAE. And then Paris along with Bonn got particularly perturbed mid-week when Israel struck Iran’s largest gas facility and Iran assaulted oil facilities in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. That got their cahoonas into gear – not 500 massive and deadly ICBMs fired by Iran into Israel.

On March 15, the UK Ministry of Defense highlighted Britain’s role “in air protection over the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Cyprus in defense of British people and British interests, and to support our allies across the region.” Again, no mention of Israel and no recognition of the suffering of Israelis or the damages incurred by Israel throughout this war.

In fact, nobody in London has felt the need at any time over the past three weeks to talk about defending Israel. Maybe because Britain no longer truly considers Israel an “ally”?

In truth, Israel does not need or want these countries to physically defend the Jewish state. We will settle for recognition of the justice of the war against Iran, some acknowledgement of the sacrifice of Israeli civilians and heroism of Israeli pilots, and a modicum of rehabilitation relief for battered Israel – say, one-one-hundredth of the massive European and Canadian humanitarian assistance for Lebanese citizens.

Do any of the above-mentioned leaders even know that 3,500 Israelis have been made homeless by Iranian missile attacks, and almost 4,000 Israelis injured?

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney also has discounted the broad context of the necessary war and its strategic aims, muttering only about “defending Canadians” and “defending our allies when it makes sense” – whatever that means.

What about helping to eviscerate Iran? No way. Carney harrumphed that “Canada will play no offensive role against Iran,” and averred that Ottawa is bravely focused on getting Canadians out of the region and assuring that the Canadian Armed Forces remain out of harm’s way.

Not to be rhetorically outdone by her prime minister, Canadian foreign minister Anita Anand huffed and puffed: “We were not consulted on the offensive military operation. We did not participate in the offensive operation. We have no intention of participating in the military operation period.”

Under pressure from Washington, Carney’s defense minister, David McGuinty, allowed that Canada is “leaving the door open” to military support in the region, meaning that “the question of assistance to Gulf countries is one that we’re considering.” (Again, no thought of assisting Israel).

And in a striking moment of honesty, McGuinty admitted that neither strategic principle nor tangible commitment to allies stands at the core of Canadian policy but rather the question of how Ottawa maneuvers around, about, and over Trump. “We will continue to consult, but we’ve always managed to find a way to manage our relationship with the United States, and we will manage our way through this as well,” McGuinty gulped without a smidgeon of embarrassment.

ALL THESE “leaders” have withstood pressure from Trump to join an international naval coalition to force open the Strait of Hormuz, even though Europe is much more dependent on oil from the Arabian Gulf than is the US.

Essentially, they say: Iran is not such a threat to global peace and security. Israel and the US may be the greater shared threat. Therefore, this is not our war. We will only defend our narrowest-of-narrow interests a bare bit.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has sought to wrap repudiation of the US and Israel in highfalutin diplomatic terms. “We lack a mandate ​from the United Nations, ​the European Union, or NATO for the war,” he said. “Diplomacy and deescalation” are the preferred route for handling Iran, he predictably added.

Yeah, sure. As if “mandates” from impotent international edifices are more important than winning the war that has been engaged. As if European-led diplomacy ever has effectively defanged or dissuaded Iran from pursing its path of genocidal aggression.

I say that such studied neutrality in the great struggle against Iran is collusion with the enemy. All the “calm and level-headed” excuses for sitting out this war (of course, excepting “defensive assistance” to several oil-rich Gulf countries) is a grand collapse of Western spine and principle.

I also cast-off anodyne sentiments about “heartfelt feelings for all victims of conflict in the region” and other such throwaway international statements. Without determination to quell Iran – and again, without specific expressed concern for Israel and Israelis too – these mushy musings equal profound moral failure.

Indeed, the frostiness exhibited by the “leaders” described above recalls the adage that you rudely discover who your true friends are (and are not) when the chips are down.

ALAS, the ethical limpness and political animosity described here regarding struggle against Iran is of a piece with the rotten global standard in relation to Arab-Israeli conflict, going back decades.

The response of UN and EU leaders to every Palestinian-Israeli conflagration long has been to condemn the “continuing cycle of violence” (and then press for endless negotiations while boosting Hamas blood libels about Israeli war crimes). As if Israel and the Palestinians each were cavalierly engaging in murder just for fun or out of comparable burning hatred. As if “both sides” were “suffering casualties” and equally responsible for the “cycle” of warfare.

What is missing from the above comments in relation to both the Iranian and Palestinian fronts is no-nonsense diagnosis of enemy aggression. Few are willing to reference Tehran’s almost five-decade-long record of assault against non-Shiite Arab, Western, and Israeli interests. Nobody has the guts to remark upon the death-glorifying political culture of Palestinians that repeatedly chooses war and terrorism over peace negotiations.

This nonalignment keeps the storyline in a neat, supposedly non-judgmental, and purportedly “level-headed” comfort zone – bereft of any right-minded backbone, free from any commitment to explicitly recognize and concretely fight evil. Alas, such detachment is tantamount to betrayal of Israel and the US, and is perfidy against the future of Western civilization.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 20.03.2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

As Israel and the United States undertake operations of unprecedented scale against Iran, with a regional war now underway and global implications mounting, many critics are asking why this is necessary.

Some pundits and academics have sought to play down the threat of a nuclear Iran, claiming that the logic of nuclear deterrence would apply to it just as in the Cold War, and that despite the regime’s belligerent rhetoric toward Israel, in practice it would act with restraint under threat of mutually assured destruction.

In reality, however, even a minimal nuclear arsenal in the hands of this regime would have grave implications for Israel, the region, and the world. So grave that the price of preventing it by force—with all the regional escalation and disruption in energy flows that this entails—is almost negligible compared to the alternative: life in the shadow of a nuclear Iran, which until last week was on a swift path to becoming a reality.

The Threat of Nuclear Escalation as a Tool for Iranian Regional Hegemony

Since the revolution, Iran has been a revisionist power seeking to remake the Middle East in its image by establishing a sphere of regional dominance extending from the Zagros Mountains to the Mediterranean and Red Sea on its western flank and through Pakistan and Afghanistan to its east. Iran has pursued this vision through a three-pronged strategy of building nuclear capacity, amassing a vast ballistic missile arsenal and nurturing terror proxies.

Iranian hegemony would place a large share of the world’s energy resources under its influence, alongside critical waterways for international shipping, and make it an invaluable strategic partner for China and Russia in their bid to upend the US-led world order.

A nuclear Iran would certainly use the threat of nuclear escalation to gain leverage in its regional struggles and would intensify efforts to assert hegemony over the broader Middle East. It would leverage its nuclear capability to deter Israel from escalating during a conventional conflict with Hizballah. It could launch missile and drone attacks on Israel and then threaten that any Israeli retaliation might provoke nuclear escalation.

Tehran would also likely adopt a more aggressive posture in the Persian Gulf and beyond, working to destabilize regimes across the region. It would severely constrain US freedom of action in the region, as any use of force would raise the specter of nuclear war.

This strategic shift would place intense pressure on regional states to align with Iran or, at the very least, adopt conciliatory policies toward it. Gulf states might cease resisting Iranian influence and even consider expelling US military bases or denying overflight rights.

Achieving a nuclear bomb would significantly bolster the Iranian regime’s long-term survivability by functioning as an insurance policy against efforts to undermine or militarily intervene against the regime.

Undermining of US Credibility Worldwide 

The emergence of a nuclear Iran would greatly damage US credibility worldwide, given that every US administration has declared for decades that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and that all options are on the table.

While it is possible that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states may respond by strengthening their security ties with the US to balance against Iran, it is more likely that America’s failure to uphold its longstanding pledge to prevent a nuclear Iran would undermine confidence in such guarantees and they may prefer looking to Beijing to rein in its partner in Tehran.

A nuclear Iran would significantly strengthen the anti-Western axis of China-Russia-North Korea-Iran and China and Russia would have an interest in deepening cooperation with a now-invincible Iran.

The resulting instability in the Middle East would itself likely raise energy prices globally, as well as the prices of commodities passing through the region, as all would be held hostage to Iran and its terror proxies.

Regional Proliferation and Weakening of the NPT 

A nuclear Iran would serve as a strong incentive for other regional powers to pursue nuclear weapons of their own, chief among these Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Israel, too, would likely no longer be willing to rely on a policy of nuclear ambiguity when faced with an explicitly nuclear-armed enemy. Any American offers of a nuclear umbrella to these states would be unsatisfactory given Washington’s loss of credibility having failed to act to prevent a nuclear Iran.

Such a scenario would severely undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), demonstrating that it is possible to acquire nuclear weapons despite prolonged opposition from the international community.

Similarly, it is likely that a nuclear Iran would export its nuclear expertise to like-minded countries seeking similar capabilities.

Even a Rational Iran might Start a Nuclear War

Despite the insistence of academics who imagine the world as a virtual computer model, deterrence in real life is never perfect, and even during the Cold War there were numerous cases in which the delicate balance nearly collapsed into nuclear war. There is always the risk of miscalculation due to a misreading of the adversary’s intentions—an error that could stem from the deep mutual distrust between two countries and result in a nuclear launch that neither side actually intended.

As Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities are vast and constantly improving, a nuclear Iran would be able to threaten Europe, and eventually the US mainland. But even focusing only on Iran and Israel, a balance of terror would be highly unstable. The distance between the US and the Soviet Union allowed both sides thirty minutes of missile flight time to confirm that alerts were not false alarms. In contrast, the distance between Iran and Israel allows for only a few minutes. This becomes exponentially more unstable with multiple nuclear actors.

There remains the possibility that the regime might transfer an operational nuclear bomb to a terror proxy to use against Israel with Iran denying any connection. Control over the warheads could also fall into the hands of an unaccountable terror group.

Finally, in a scenario where the regime is on the verge of collapse, there is a real possibility that it would launch a nuclear attack on Israel, as the regime’s survival would no longer be a relevant constraint.

The Threat of Deliberate Nuclear War 

The possibility of a surprise nuclear attack on Israel cannot be dismissed. The ideology of the regime is, above all, Islamist revolutionary, and profound hatred of Israel is one of its core tenets. The veneration of the figure of the martyr (shahid) is deeply embedded in Iran’s Shiite culture, and the same assumptions of rationality that applied to the Soviet Union during the Cold War cannot be relied upon in this case. In 1979, Khomeini stated: “We do not worship Iran; we worship Allah. For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say, let this land burn. I say, let this land go up in flames, as long as Islam emerges victorious in the rest of the world.” In 2001, President Rafsanjani stated: “The use of a nuclear bomb against Israel would destroy Israel completely, while the use of it against the Islamic world would only cause damage… Such a scenario is not inconceivable.”

These statements illustrate the potential of the Iranian regime to act in ways not necessarily bound by Western notions of rationality, including the acceptance of mass Iranian casualties.

Preventing these outcomes is why Israel had to act—and why the United States ultimately chose to act as well. The costs of confronting Iran today are serious. The costs of living with a nuclear Iran would be far worse.

Published in The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, March  15, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has placed the vision of Israel’s destruction at the core of its ideology and state policy. In 2015, Ali Khamenei set a target date for realizing this vision: 2040. In 2018, senior Iranian official Hossein Amir-Abdollahian revealed that the Islamic regime is advancing an operational plan to implement, but added he could not disclose its details to the media. Documents seized by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza during Operation Iron Swords exposed coordination between Hamas, Hezbollah, and Tehran in carrying out the October 7^th massacre attack. However, Yahya Sinwar initiated the attack without waiting for final coordination between the parties.

An examination of the motivations driving Iran’s vision of Israel’s destruction reveals a complex web of ideological, religious, geopolitical, political, and historical factors that together shape Tehran’s policy toward Israel.

First, at the core of Iranian hostility lies a deep antisemitic element rooted in the ideology of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini. In his central work, “Islamic Government,” Khomeini portrayed the Jews, “enemies of Islam”, as a cunning force operating throughout history to harm and weaken Islam. According to his view, Jews have sought since the early days of Islam to undermine its expansion and even distort the Qur’an. This worldview continued under his successor, Ali Khamenei.

Although Khamenei has claimed his opposition is directed at Zionism rather than Jews, in practice, he has promoted a clearly antisemitic policy. He has repeatedly denied the Holocaust, hosting Holocaust deniers from around the world, described Israel as a “cancerous tumor,” and advanced antisemitic propaganda through the education system and state-controlled media. Cultural and educational materials in Iran have likewise depicted Jews as pursuing global domination.

Alongside the antisemitic dimension, hostility toward Israel is also rooted in an anti-imperialist worldview. According to the regime’s ideology, Israel is perceived as a forward outpost of Western imperialism, led by the United States, in the Middle East. This perception was heavily influenced by the Islamic Revolution’s key theorist, Ali Shariati, who blended Marxist ideas with Islamic interpretation. Ruhollah Khomeini adopted the terms “oppressors” and “oppressed,” but infused them with a theological meaning, in contrast to Shariati’s socio-economic framing.

In Khomeini’s view, the “oppressed” are Muslim peoples suffering under Western domination, while the “oppressors” are Western powers and their regional allies. Within this framework, the struggle against Israel is presented as part of a broader confrontation with American and Western hegemony. Accordingly, Israel’s destruction is viewed by Iran’s leadership as a necessary condition for liberating the region from Western influence and establishing a new regional order in which Iran would be the central power.

Another key motivation is geopolitical. The struggle against Israel serves Iran as a central tool for gaining influence in the Arab and Muslim world. Despite being a Shiite-Persian state in a predominantly Arab-Sunni region, Iran has managed to leverage the Palestinian issue to build regional legitimacy and export the Islamic revolution. As early as 1979, Khomeini declared “Quds Day,” held annually on the last Friday of Ramadan, as a platform for demonstrating support for the struggle against Israel.

By emphasizing its commitment to the “liberation of Palestine,” Iran has appealed directly to Arab publics while bypassing regional governments. Through this strategy, Iran gradually established the so-called “Axis of Resistance”, a network of organizations and militias, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, and others. In this way, opposition to Israel has become a kind of “shared language” enabling Iran to consolidate regional influence while mitigating Sunni suspicion of its ambitions.

Alongside the ideological and geopolitical drivers, there is also a religious–jurisprudential justification. According to a doctrine consistently promoted by the regime’s religious leadership, the territory of the Land of Israel/Palestine is considered a “waqf,” a religious endowment that cannot be relinquished. From this stems the claim that Jewish sovereignty in the area violates divine law.

Accordingly, the conflict is framed not merely as political, but as a religious struggle over sacred land. Within this framework, Khomeini issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to act toward Israel’s elimination, granting the struggle the status of a religious obligation. Some senior figures, including Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani (December 2021) and Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ali Fadavi (July 2017), as well as senior Ayatollah Nuri Hamedani (23 October 2023), have linked Israel’s destruction to the appearance of the “Hidden Imam,” who, according to Shiite belief, is destined to emerge at the end of days. In this view, victory over Israel and the weakening of the West could hasten the Hidden Imam’s reappearance and bring about the redemption of the Shiite world.

Another layer of hostility is rooted in a historical memory of struggle against the Pahlavi Shah. In official Iranian discourse, Israel is portrayed as having helped and trained the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, including in interrogation and torture methods used against opposition activists, among them Khomeini’s disciples, who later came to power. As a result, Israel’s destruction is sometimes framed as “historical justice” and as revenge for that period. Finally, hostility toward Israel also serves as a domestic political function. The regime frequently attributes its economic and social failures to Israel and the United States. The presence of an external enemy helps consolidate support around the leadership and justify the system’s authoritarian nature. Without such an enemy, the regime would likely struggle to explain its persistent crises.

In conclusion, Iran’s drive to destroy Israel is not the product of a single motive, but of a combination of ideological antisemitism, anti-imperialism, geopolitical interests, religious justifications, historical memory, and political utility, each reinforcing the others. This framework makes the struggle against Israel central to the regime’s identity and regional strategy. As a result, a significant change in this policy is unlikely, whether under Mojtaba Khamenei or any other figure, so long as it remains grounded in the ideology of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, the overthrow of the Islamic regime must remain the central strategic goal in Israel’s historic struggle against Iran. In any reality where the regime remains in power, it will seek to rehabilitate its offensive capabilities and the “Axis of Resistance,” and once again advance, at the opportune moment, the vision of Israel’s destruction, in order to fulfill the legacies of Khomeini and Khamenei.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 23, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

As long as the radical ayatollah regime remains in power in Iran, it will always pose a grave threat to Israel, the United States, and the entire Middle East. Israel and the U.S. must therefore remain steadfast and determined in pursuing the goal of creating the conditions for the Iranian people to retake their country and shape a peaceful future. The aim of this position paper is to present concrete measures which Israel and the United States can take in order to achieve this goal.

In announcing Operation Epic Fury on February 28, U.S. President Trump addressed the “great, proud people of Iran” and declared: “The hour of your freedom is at hand…take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be, probably, your only chance for generations… Now is the time to seize control of your destiny.”

On March 1, President Trump repeated this message. stating: “I call upon all Iranian patriots who yearn for freedom to seize this moment, to be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country. America is with you.”

Similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declared on the first day of the operation: “Our joint action will create the conditions for the brave Iranian people to take their destiny into their own hands. Therefore, I turn to you, the citizens of Iran: Do not miss this opportunity…soon your moment will arrive when you will be called to take to the streets to finish the job, to topple the regime of horrors that embitters your lives.”

The United States and Israel have to date advanced this goal both by eliminating senior regime figures, first and foremost Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, as well as by bombing regime targets and symbols, including internal security and police headquarters. In order to advance the creation of conditions for regime change, the two nations should take the following steps:

1. Preserve the momentum of regime degradation and deterioration: Preserving the momentum created by the successful opening strikes will require sustained effort on all fronts, in order to continuously degrade the regime and take it from one low point to the next. The Iranian people must become convinced that the regime is on an irreversible decline, and that there can be no hope for a better future as long as the regime clings to power. In order to accomplish this, it is important to emphasize that the current operation is not time-limited, and to close the door on an agreement which will enable the regime to remain in power. This will help convince the people that the U.S. and Israel do not intend to stop short and allow the regime to survive, rebuild, and take revenge against its opponents.

2. Sustained disruption of the efforts to appoint a successor to Ayatollah Khamenei: Israel and the U.S. should work to eliminate the regime’s “interim leadership”, as well as potential heirs from the hardline camp. This includes Khamenei’s son and potential successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, a hardliner with close ties to the IRGC. Another important target is Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who, while not a cleric, holds broad powers and is functioning as the “CEO” of Iran.

3. Deepen the physical and communications disconnect between the Iranian leadership and people: The leaders’ need to hide underground already creates barriers between them and the public. To intensify this, Israel and the U.S. should disable the media outlets and internet channels through which the Iranian regime communicates with the public and transmits propaganda messages.

4. Intensify damage to the regime installations used for internal control and repression: A special emphasis should be placed on bases and installations serving the Basij and other regime elements involved in repressing protests. The strike on the headquarters of the Internal Security forces was highly significant in this regard.

5. Strikes against prison facilities and personnel: Strikes that enable the escape of thousands of regime opponents and political prisoners held in the regime’s jails.

6. Encourage defections of senior Iranian figures and units from Iran’s regular army (Artesh), which is run separately from the IRGC: The combination of military pressure with intensified economic stress and a sense that there is no hope for the regime’s survival will increase the chances of widespread defections. Achieving this goal will naturally require intensive covert activity by intelligence organizations.

7. Actively support armed Kurdish groups in Iran and other armed militias operating along the country’s borders: Encourage cooperation among militias and opposition groups, and coordination with protest leaders, in order to enable the emergence of an opposition leadership. Enlist Reza Pahlavi and other opposition figures capable of influencing the public until an agreed-upon leadership for the opposition is established.

8. Encourage the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to intensify their steps against Iran: This may include kinetic action against Iran, and should certainly include the severing of diplomatic and economic ties. This will help strengthen the regime’s isolation and the sense that its path leads only to a dead end.

The U.S. and Israel now face a once-in-a-generation opportunity to create the best conditions possible for the Iranian people to retake their country and shape a brighter and more peaceful future for their nation. It is critical that the successes of the first days of the war not lead to undue euphoria or complacency. We are only in the first stages of this effort, and the road ahead is long and complex. It must be remembered that in its war against Iraq, the Iranian regime demonstrated substantial stamina and capacity for suffering.

The U.S. and Israel must therefore avoid temptations to agree to calls for a premature ceasefire or to engage in futile political talks. If the two allies remain steadfast and determined, they have the opportunity to not only open the door to a better future for Iran, but to shape a new regional and global order based on peace through strength, partnership, and prosperity.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 02, 2026.  

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

With critical security clocks ticking on all fronts from Gaza to Iran, residents of the State of Israel find themselves sitting on shpilkes – a Yiddish phrase for living on pins and needles, in a state of extreme uncertainty, in nervous anticipation.

We totter between reports of an imminent massive military strike on Iran (and the expected Iranian counterattack on Israel) and contradictory reports which suggest foolish diplomatic dealing that once again lets Iran off the hook.

We wonder who will prevail: US President Trump’s ego or Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s eschatology? Trump’s tenacity or Khamenei’s sitzfleish? American super-power or Iranian expertise at rope-a-doping American presidents?

We speculate on the degree of damage the Israeli homefront will have to absorb in a war-to-end-all-wars with Iran and guesstimate what level of miraculous Divine interventions will have to kick-in to protect Israel as they did last June.

In the meantime, we try to book a haircut only to learn that our barber is on emergency call-up duty in the air defense reserves. We plan an expensive family event or a complicated professional conference half-expecting it to be cancelled, likely leaving us with a substantial financial hit.

We hold concert tickets for next week but are skeptical that the band or audience will be able to show. We plan a large Purim party but know that we may be drinking wine alone in our mamad (bombproof home bunker).

We book airline tickets for a Passover getaway, or make hotel reservations for a summertime vacation, and then buy every possible travel cancellation insurance at exorbitant fees because everything is a safek, at question, in doubt.

We fall into bein hashemashot (literally, between the suns). In Jewish tradition and religious law, this is the twilight period between sundown and nightfall, between one day and the next. It is a time where decision-making is indeterminate and confusing. Things can go any which way.

We fall into catalepsy, a psychological condition characterized by trance or temporary paralysis. It is hard to function with any degree of comfort in this grey zone, this liminal space. It is nightmare time.

In short, the current moment of personal insecurity is unnerving. We all feel that willy-nilly it is time for forthright, audacious moves.

THE CURRENT period of defense and diplomatic ambiguity holds strategic danger too. The muddied situation cannot be too prolonged. The dillydallying is destructive.

Aside from the fact that Iran is using the time to advance its nuclear and missile programs and prepare its global offenses, the main danger here is fragmentation on the political level. Overextension of the current holding period could lead to collapse in US-Israel ties – which of course is exactly what the enemy is hoping for.

Already there are signs of dissolution in Washington. Pro-Iranian and isolationist forces are disseminating lies about the “disaster” that would result from US military action against Iran. Tucker Carlson: “Thousands of Americans would almost certainly be killed at bases throughout the Middle East.”

Nasty wags like Thomas Friedman are accusing Israel of dragging the US into war – “spitting in America’s face,” and “playing Trump for a sucker and American Jews for fools.”

(Tommy Friedman can always be counted upon to pop-up at critical moments to slander Israel and undermine US-Israel relations. This week he excreted from his bottomless cave of Netanyahu-hatred to accuse Israel of “threatening broader US interests in the Middle East and the security of Jews all over the world” because of its “morally reckless,” “messianically driven,” and “apartheidlike” approach to Palestinian issues and its “nonsense” about Iran. He managed to use the epithets apartheid, pariah, and ethnic cleansing regarding Israel six times one op-ed column.)

All this eats away at America’s deterrent power and Trump’s maneuvering room versus Iran.

BECAUSE of Carlson, Friedman, and their ilk, it is necessary to remind the global policy community of the necessity to truly end Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and threatening abilities.

Of course, regime change leading to a democratic Iranian government not guided by radical Islamic theology would be sweet. But since nobody knows how to bring this about in the near term, we need to be clear about the parameters of a deal “that would be just as good as if you won militarily” (– a phrase used recently by Trump).

Such a win would entail complete Iranian disarmament – full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s uranium and plutonium production assets; anytime-anywhere inspections; and an end to nuclear weapons R&D.

It would also mean termination of Iran’s ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone arsenals; an end to Iran’s illicit nuclear and missile imports and exports; and especially to its nuclear, missile, and arms agreements with Russia, China, and North Korea. And an end to Tehran’s longtime support for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other proxy forces.

All this would require super-invasive monitoring of Iran’s bank accounts, uranium mines, mills, ore processing facilities, military and missile bases, ports and airfields, along with destruction of Iran’s underground bunkers for nuclear activities and weapons storage.

In my view, the likelihood that Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei will agree to anything remotely resembling such an evisceration of Iranian sovereignty and supremacy – is nil.

After all, Tehran has spent four decades and hundreds of billions of dollars developing its military power and regional ascendancy, accompanied by considerable suffering (“sacrifice”) of the Iranian people to this end. All this, based on deep ideological-religious conviction, on a dark eschatological vision that involves genocide against Israel and West and downright destruction of enemy civilization.

Which leaves the military option. Get on with it. Destroy Iran’s key nodes of military power and revolutionary repression. Perhaps help Iranians free themselves from the ayatollahs. And free Israelis from suspense, from sitting on existential shpilkes.

Published in The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom 20.02.2026

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently confronting one of the most complex and dangerous challenges in its history. This is not merely an economic or diplomatic crisis but an existential one, pitting the regime’s survival against the erosion of national sovereignty.

Against the harsh reality confronting the regime on the domestic front and in the regional and international fronts, internal voices within Iran warn that the public has reached the limit of its endurance. At the same time, senior political figures fear that any retreat would mark the start of a “slippery slope” ending in total capitulation. On the political margins, the regime led by Khamenei is, for now, blocking calls for a preemptive strike against Israel, while stressing that its “finger is on the trigger” and that preparations for war have been completed.

“The public is exhausted”

The reformist camp is visibly split into two groups. One, which includes leaders of the Green Movement protests, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, is calling for the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a new system of government. The other, which includes former president Mohammad Khatami and others, is urging maximum flexibility and a willingness to cross the red lines set by Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Senior reformist activist Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi gives voice to the bleak mood on Iran’s streets. According to him, the public is “exhausted” by sanctions, by the negotiations themselves, by insecurity and by the soaring cost of living. Karbaschi points to the latest protest waves as an unprecedented breaking point “not only in the history of the revolution but in Iran’s history as a whole,” expressing shock at the killing of about 3,000 people during the protests, while opposition figures claim that 36,500 people were killed.

The solution he proposes to President Masoud Pezeshkian is a “Rafsanjani-style move.” Just as Hashemi Rafsanjani, who managed the war against Iraq in the 1980s, pressed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to end the war once he realized the country’s resources had been exhausted, and proposed tying the decision to his own assumption of responsibility and resignation, so too should Pezeshkian bear the political cost and lead the way to an agreement with the US. For this camp, the deadlock is a ticking socio-economic time bomb that only a political compromise can defuse.

Fears at the top

By contrast, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi outlined a worldview in remarks at a conference at Iran’s Foreign Ministry in Tehran on February 8, portraying concessions as a “deadly poison.” In the regime’s senior leadership view, as expressed by Araghchi, and against the backdrop of the unprecedented US operation involving the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the world has returned to the “law of the jungle.” In this reality, the US is pursuing a policy of “peace through strength” while showing contempt for international law. The central fear, therefore, is that any meaningful concession would be interpreted as weakness and lead to further demands “with no end.”

In a world where “the weak are trampled,” Araghchi’s proposed solution is the exact opposite: steadfastness and strengthening. Diplomacy, under this approach, is not meant to reach compromise but to keep “Iran’s flag flying high” while projecting power. This lies at the heart of the deadlock, the understanding that compromise is essential for domestic calm but is perceived as strategic suicide in the face of an external enemy.

Within this tangle, Iran is seeking room to maneuver. Ali Shamkhani, recently appointed secretary of the Supreme Defense Council, proposed a limited compromise in a media interview: reducing uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent in exchange for “appropriate compensation,” while stressing that negotiations would be confined solely to the nuclear issue. Given President Donald Trump’s statements and the unprecedented buildup of US forces around Iran, there is considerable doubt that Washington would accept such a negotiating framework. Accordingly, Iran continues to prepare for a military scenario.

Iran’s chief of staff of the armed forces, Abdolrahim Mousavi, said his forces were prepared for a prolonged war against the US and emphasized that while Iran does not seek a regional war that would set the region back, including Iran itself, by years, it would not hesitate to respond with force.

Khamenei’s strategic choice 

Ultimately, Iran has found itself in an unprecedented situation primarily due to a strategic choice made by Khamenei himself. The decision to depart from a doctrine based mainly on the use of proxies and to respond directly to Israel from Iranian territory, following the killing of Hassan Mahdavi, commander of the Syria and Lebanon Corps, in April 2024, pulled Tehran into a circle of direct confrontation that it had avoided for decades.

This came despite pleas from reformist circles urging Khamenei in advance to show restraint, warning that this was a strategic trap set by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, designed to drag Iran into an open and direct clash. Thus, in the name of projecting strength and deterrence, the regime has found itself more exposed than ever, without an effective regional buffer, facing growing external pressure and an intensifying internal crisis. This convergence of factors underscores the depth of the dead end in which Iran now finds itself. Accordingly, it appears that during his upcoming visit to Washington, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s mission will be to ensure that Trump does not stray from his promise to demonstrators that “help is on the way.”

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 09, 2026.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.