/*! elementor - v3.21.0 - 30-04-2024 */
.elementor-widget-image{text-align:center}.elementor-widget-image a{display:inline-block}.elementor-widget-image a img[src$=".svg"]{width:48px}.elementor-widget-image img{vertical-align:middle;display:inline-block}

The prevailing axiom regarding the Palestinians and their right to a state must be reexamined, at least and for the most part following the October 7 attack. It is also necessary in light of the non-functioning as a properly governing ethno-national entity since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority as part of the Oslo Accords.

The widespread political support of Hamas and its leaders among the Palestinian public signals an in-depth problem in Palestinian psychological foundations and requires rethinking as to whether the Palestinians are primed for the establishment of an independent, responsible, functioning and peace-seeking state.     

An independent entity does not necessarily mean an independent state as currently presumed. There may be other creative models, certainly under the conditions of a new regional architecture that will undoubtedly generate currently uncharted new opportunities.    

What distinguishes the Welsh, Basques, Catalans, Kurds, and perhaps several other groups from the Palestinians? These are all ethno-national groups with a national history and a distinct cultural heritage that do not live in their own independent states.

Without debating the different historical circumstances, and given that Palestinian civil status must be resolved, the prevailing axiom regarding the Palestinians and their right to a state must be reexamined, at least and for the most part following the October 7 attack. It is also even more necessary in light of Palestinian non-functioning as a properly governing ethno-national entity since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority – what was supposed to be an independent governing body on the path to statehood as part of the Oslo Accords.

Three decades have passed since initial implementation of the Oslo Accords and establishment of the Palestinian Authority. During this period several failed attempts were made to reach an agreement that would lead to the establishment of an independent, responsible, and functioning Palestinian nation-state alongside the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish People.

From an historical perspective, Palestinian leadership has not invested efforts in building an independent Palestinian state by cultivating a civil society and developing functioning state institutions, an economy and national infrastructures. Instead, it has directed most of its energy to thwart and dismantle the Zionist project. The Palestinian leadership’s historic and tragic failure has been its inability and unwillingness to undergo a process of change from a revolutionary national movement to nation-building. Instead, the Palestinian resistance ethos and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s modus operandi were copied and replicated in the Palestinian Authority’s code of operation.

The way in which Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip, followed by elections in the Palestinian Authority in which the US imposed on Israel and the Palestinian Authority the participation of Hamas in the elections, led to Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip. This engendered a deep rift in the Palestinian arena and created two competing Palestinian entities hostile to each other. The result is well known. Hamas, which built Gaza as the most fortified and armed place in the world, plunged the area into a regional war with a security-undermining and destabilizing global impact.

The war in Gaza is in no way a local Israeli-Palestinian event. It is only the tip of a much larger and broader process. Hamas and the Gaza Strip are an important component of the Iranian strategy in its drive to regional hegemony through two vectors. The first – the non-conventional, consists of building its nuclear capabilities, and the second – the conventional, is based on establishing a network of proxies throughout the Middle East in the aim of encircling Israel in a ring of fire.

The October 7 attack, which even if Iran was not a partner to its timing, was a full partner to its planning and preparation, has turned into a multi-arena regional war driven by Iranian proxies. Its intent and purpose is to systematically weaken Israel towards its full and complete destruction, whether by undermining the normalization processes and Israel’s integration in the region, or through a high-intensity war of attrition aimed at debilitating Israel’s society and economy, exhausting its army and sowing division and tension between Israeli society and the government and army, and between the army and the government. This in addition to systematically eroding international legitimacy for Israel’s very right to self-defense in the first stage, and its very existence going forward.

The fact that this axis of resistance is also supported by Russia and China, and that the war has intensified a wave of radical protest led by the green-red coalition on US campuses and on the streets of Europe, turns this regional war into an event with global implications. In many ways this is World War III between the free world and radical Islam which is supported by the two revisionist superpowers, Russia and China.[1] Israel is perceived as an arm of the free world led by the US, with calls for its extinction or dismantling and its portrayal as illegitimate and as the root of all evil heard in organized and orchestrated demonstrations and disorderly protests throughout the free world.

Hamas is the Palestinian spearhead of the war against Israel, with its leaders spicing up their savage, barbaric and murderous actions with religious edicts and a messianic vision of the Islamic caliphate, beginning with the destruction of Israel and liberation of Al-Aqsa as a necessary step on the path to establishing the caliphate. The widespread political support of Hamas and its leaders among the Palestinian public signals an in-depth problem in the Palestinian’s psychological foundations and requires rethinking as to whether the Palestinians are primed for the establishment of an independent, responsible functioning and peace-seeking state.[2] Worse still, it is important to understand that the establishment of a Palestinian state on the heels of the barbaric attack of October 7 will be viewed as no less than a prize to terror and a veritable recipe for the expansion and strengthening of the radical entities in the area. This will be the case even if Hamas does not remain the governing and military entity in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas leadership’s commitment to continue to slaughter Jews and to carry out many more October 7-like attacks, coupled with Palestinian public support of the attack, demonstrate just how sick Palestinian society is. This in addition to the fact that not even one senior or significant Palestinian Authority official saw fit to condemn the murderous attack, several senior Palestinian Authority officials even promise more October 7’s to be launched from Judea and Samaria, and the widespread public and popular support of Hamas and of the murderous attack among the Palestinian general public.[3] This is a sure recipe for perpetuation of the conflict and its accompanying violence, legitimizing and even favoring unbridled ruthlessness.

Two states living in peace side by side is no longer a viable paradigm. This is the case even if there are those in the international community and in the US making every effort to revive this paradigm, born out of dedication to an idea that represents the founding values of the Western world and which in their eyes reflects the right geo-strategic interests – even if this does not demonstrate a geostrategic understanding of the reality in the Middle East.

Moreover, the international community expressly and emphatically applies this value system and ideational standard to Israel, but not to other ethno-national groups and to state actors in other conflict zones in the Middle East. This is the case for example with respect to the Kurds and Turkey. In the face of this reality, Israel will have to use its full power of persuasion to explain that the establishment of a Palestinian state is comparable to prescribing short-term pain killers to a terminally ill patient. It will be another failed state in a region rife with such entities, a bedrock of regional instability, whether security, economic or political, with not only regional but also global ramifications. Hence the consequences of failed states such as Syria, Libya and Yemen. The ripple effect of these state failures goes beyond the Middle East, permeating Europe as well as the US and Australia.

As such, with no horizon of a Palestinian state, what is the proposed alternative? First, it is important to understand that the elimination of Hamas is the cornerstone of any process and a necessary condition for effective regional action against Iran and its proxies. Eradication of Hamas begins with its destruction as a military and governing entity in the Gaza Strip and with an in-depth rigorous process of de-Hamasification in the Gaza Strip, and going forward also in Judea and Samaria. Elimination of Hamas is critical, and Israel must complete this undertaking at any price, in Rafah, in the central camps, and wherever there are residual military and governing capabilities.

If this process of dismantling the Hamas and exiling its leaders, those who remain alive, can be completed by means of a regional coalition backed by the US that will render superfluous a military operation in Rafah, it is in Israel’s best interest to leverage this option as a pivotal point and an exit strategy from the war. Such an exit strategy will create the conditions for achieving the goals of the war and will provide a possible route for attaining complete victory – by dismantling the Hamas, changing the security and political reality, removing the security threat from Gaza, increasing Israel’s integration in the region based on the normalization process, and building an axis that will weaken Iran and its proxies in the area, and all alongside the resettlement and flourishing of the communities along the Gaza border.

If such a process will not be possible Israel will face a moment of truth and will have to complete the operation in Gaza. This must take place even at the cost of a conflict with the US.

Dismantling Hamas’s governing and military systems will not eliminate all the organization’s terrorists, or the Hamas ideology ingrained in their hearts and minds. Several hundred Hamas operatives remain in northern Gaza, a fighting force capable of endangering IDF forces. Furthermore, local police are enforcing the public order as Hamas operatives in an attempt to take control of food distribution, directly or through middlemen, increasing Hamas’s chances of survival and of rehabilitating itself. Hamas as a hybrid organization will continue to carry out terror attacks and guerrilla warfare, which means that fighting in Gaza will continue for many years. Hence the need for an infrastructure that will provide a stable security and civil presence in Gaza.

Thus, concurrent with eliminating the residual Hamas fighting forces in southern Gaza action needs to be taken in northern Gaza to further destroy the terror infrastructure. In addition, a governing alternative to Hamas must be built while maintaining and enhancing IDF ability to operate from the Gaza Strip border to continuously thwart any attempt to rebuild terror capabilities and to carry out operations from Gaza.

The idea of placing Palestinian Authority entities in Gaza does not stand the test of reality as to the Authority’s capabilities, not to mention its willingness, mainly given Hamas’s remaining capabilities in the Gaza Strip. The attempt to promote and implement this idea may prove to be both a strategic and moral failure.

What’s more, such a step may be perceived as a prize to terror. After all, the Palestinian Authority has not even condemned the attack of October 7, and it continues to pursue Israel in the international arena in the aim of undermining its international legitimacy so that it is denounced and persecuted while some of its senior officials promise many more October 7’s launched from areas under the Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, such a move will instantly abolish the chance for a genuine process of reforms and change that must take place in the Palestinian Authority as this is a corrupt, terror-supporting entity that lacks legitimacy and does not function in a manner that will enable it to control the entire area, even less so the Gaza Strip.

An alternative governing entity to Hamas in Gaza must be found or established as a component of the strategy to decisively defeat and dismantle the organization. In the absence of any other concrete alternative at this time, the only possible option to remove the Hamas from the centers of power in the Gaza Strip is to impose temporary Israeli military governance in the aim of creating an opportunity to find local civilian governing entities that are not Hamas. This while the IDF will have to maintain full security control of the area as it does in Judea and Samaria.

Before it will be possible to initiate the next stage, that of implementing feasible ideas or models of an independent Palestinian entity, an independent and responsible Gazan administration must be entrenched and functional, and in-depth and comprehensive change must be carried out in the Palestinian Authority. These two processes require time, commitment, and supervision. Such an independent entity does not necessarily mean an independent state in its familiar format. There may be other creative models, certainly under the conditions of a new regional architecture that will undoubtedly create currently uncharted new opportunities.

[1] Gabi Siboni and Kobi Michael, An Historical Perspective: Iron Swords is Israeli’s WW II, Misgav Institute, 16 April 2024.

[2] Kobi Michael and Elie Klutstein, The Psychological Foundation of Palestinian Society Remains Rigid, Misgav Institute, 10 April 2024.

[3] See the poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki.

https://pcpsr.org/en/node/969

/*! elementor - v3.19.0 - 28-02-2024 */ .elementor-widget-image{text-align:center}.elementor-widget-image a{display:inline-block}.elementor-widget-image a img[src$=".svg"]{width:48px}.elementor-widget-image img{vertical-align:middle;display:inline-block}

The evacuation of communities from the Gaza Envelope settlements, including the city of Sderot, following the events of October 7^th  – and the ruin left in the area in their wake – is a traumatic event for the settlers, a scar in the soul of the Israeli people, evidence to what many perceive as a disgraceful failure of the State’s systems, and no less importantly, a substantial psychological achievement for Hamas, the Palestinians, and our other enemies in the area. Every day that the Western Negev stands devoid of its residents amplifies the enemy’s achievements, provides further tailwind for its continued struggle against Israel, and further incentivizes it to continue on the path of terrorism, and to support its inciters and sponsors.

Settlement in this area, and along the Israeli border as a whole, is part of the Zionist ethos of inhabiting and defending Israel, reclaiming and making agricultural use of the land – both as a value and as a crucial component of the State’s economy and resilience. Any delay in restoring the settlements of the Gaza Envelope to their former glory – and in expanding, developing, and supporting them – further erodes the Zionist ethos.

No less importantly, though – any delay in restoring this region, returning its citizens to their rightful place, and making it thrive again serves to deepen the crisis of faith between these residents and the State and its institutions, as well as the crisis of faith between Israeli society and its leadership – all while making the physical and mental scars of the evacuated residents run even deeper. This, of course, is compounded by the economic aspects of this ongoing situation – partially due to the direct costs of hosting thousands of families in hotels, but mostly due to indirect costs from loss of income, the impaired production capability and continuous supply of agricultural produce, and the future indirect costs of the mental and physical rehabilitation of those thousands of families and of entire communities.

Thus, as the fighting in the Gaza Strip advances and operational achievements accumulate, it would be prudent to bring the residents back to the Gaza Envelope settlements. As published in early January, some of the residents at the Hof Ashkelon and Shaar HaNegev regional councils have already started returning to their homes. Now, however, is a good time to systematically act to restore the settlements in their entirety – something that harbors much significance for a variety of reasons, including reasons of state sovereignty and regional security, community and personal aspects, the psychological and national resilience element – and finally, for economic reasons.

The State of Israel must reassert its sovereignty over the entire country, including the Gaza Envelope. Reasserting sovereignty and security is fundamental to the State’s duties towards its citizens. Thus, we must act quickly to exercise sovereignty and restore our hold over the areas of the nation that were evacuated and abandoned. To this end, two fundamental terms must be met – the first of which is disrupting the capabilities of Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist organizations to attack the settlements. The IDF’s mounting achievements and the building of a security buffer and military defense envelope will make it very difficult for the enemy to launch infiltration or standoff firing attacks in the direction of the settlements – and will eventually, through a prolonged process, negate its capabilities for massive rocket fire towards the settlements as well. The IDF had already begun implementing a broad-scope plan to defend the settlements and respond to their security needs by reinforcing the settlements’ rapid response teams, providing proper equipment and regular training, alongside integration of the IDF’s area defense into the settlements and installation of various deterrents such as indicative fences, smart cameras, Command and Control rooms, etc.

An important tool for restoring sovereignty and security would be growing the population of the Gaza Envelope area through reviving the Nahal program and establishing Nahal settlements in the Gaza Envelope area – after two decades during which not a single Nahal settlement was established and converted into a civilian settlement. Beyond increasing the population, further settlement of the area by Nahal core groups would enable reclaiming this geographical era in a productive and principled manner, serving as a lodestone for a reformed ethos of pioneering, inhabiting and working the land, alongside active defense of the area – the sickle and the sword as a foundation for volunteering and harnessing the national spirit to establish new settlements and restore security to the area.

In the personal-community aspect, keeping entire communities out of their natural environment may jeopardize their social cohesion and their ability to recover from the traumatic event. The sooner these communities return to their settlements, rehabilitate them, and establish routines of daily life, the more effective their recovery process will be.

In the national context, the settlements thriving and prospering once again will constitute a victory for the State of Israel – radiating strength both inwards into Israeli society and outwards, demonstrating the resilience of Israeli society and its perseverance in the Zionist endeavor. The residents’ return to the Gaza Envelope settlements will also boost the recovery of the area’s community and education systems – including that of schools, other educational institutions, medical services, public transport, and a variety of needful community services. This process cannot be serial – it must occur concurrently with the residents’ return and brooks no delay. In this manner, community systems could be rehabilitated in a vibrant, healthy way.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the psychological dimension. Restoring and developing settlements will necessarily radiate on the Israeli society’s sense of capability, on trust in the State’s institutions and its capability to recover from severe trauma and devastation whilst harnessing national resources and capabilities for planning and execution – and no less importantly – on the sense of cohesion, solidarity, and mutual responsibility. All these are expressions and aspects of social and national resilience. National resilience is a fundamental and essential component of national strength – and thus, of national security in its broad sense. We cannot ignore the difficulties and the trauma caused by the events of October 7^th, or their impact on our sense of capability, security, trust, and resilience. Since October 7^th, Israeli society has gone a long way in the process of rehabilitation and recovery – but the process cannot be completed without restoring settlement, exercising sovereignty, re-establishing communities, agriculture, and industry in the area – and in particular, continuing its development and expansion as an appropriate Zionist reply to the bloodthirsty destructiveness that Hamas demonstrated during the murderous terrorist attack of October 7^th. Through its communities, Israeli settlement shall set exercising sovereignty and reclamation of the land through agricultural work against Hamas’ destructive efforts. Renewing the settlement efforts, restoring them to their former glory, developing and expanding them will constitute the true Israeli victory in this war – the triumph of the Zionist ethos of building and development, reclaiming and settling the land, over Hamas’ ethos of ruin and devastation.

Finally, the return of the Gaza Envelope’s residents to their homes holds economic significance of the highest order, for several reasons. First, the direct costs of hosting evacuated individuals in alternative residences and in hotels and guest houses.  An analysis of the proposal for increasing the 2023 budget suggests that the scope of addition to the budget required to support the expenditures of assisting evacuated individuals was more than ILS 6 billion. [1] This budget is expected to grow even further in 2024. Diverting funds from direct aid to the evacuated individuals into developing and rehabilitating the Gaza Envelope settlements will yield great returns and generate income for the national economy, made possible by restoring the Gaza Envelope’s economy to a functional state – albeit partially, at first. Second – bringing the residents back would necessitate the provision of economic benefits – both for individual residents and on the community-settlement level. The State is required to invest in developing the area and the settlements, and to provide a variety of economic benefits in the form of tax breaks, grants, and aid in developing settlements, in a manner that would serve all national needs. This investment should be considered a substantial part of the war costs and one of the tools for winning it.

Many residents will wish to return to their homes as soon as possible, given the right conditions. The right time is now, and we must act to return the settlers to the Gaza Envelope. Uprooting these communities from their settlements was a necessary evil at the start of the war, but now we must put our full strength behind making these settlements prosper again. The leadership of the State must take the reins on this national challenge – this national mission –through relevant government ministries and State institutions. It is also the time for local leadership and community leadership – as well as for the communities themselves and their settlers – to shine. Now is the time for pioneers to take the van – the time for the nation to step forward in its journey to rise again and make its way towards the establishment of Israel 2.0. [2]

Settlement in this area, and along the Israeli border as a whole, is part of the Zionist ethos of inhabiting and defending Israel, reclaiming and making agricultural use of the land – both as a value and as a crucial component of the State’s economy and resilience. Any delay in restoring the settlements of the Gaza Envelope to their former glory – and in expanding, developing, and supporting them – further erodes the Zionist ethos.

No less importantly, though – any delay in restoring this region, returning its citizens to their rightful place, and making it thrive again serves to deepen the crisis of faith between these residents and the State and its institutions, as well as the crisis of faith between Israeli society and its leadership – all while making the physical and mental scars of the evacuated residents run even deeper. This, of course, is compounded by the economic aspects of this ongoing situation – partially due to the direct costs of hosting thousands of families in hotels, but mostly due to indirect costs from loss of income, the impaired production capability and continuous supply of agricultural produce, and the future indirect costs of the mental and physical rehabilitation of those thousands of families and of entire communities.

Thus, as the fighting in the Gaza Strip advances and operational achievements accumulate, it would be prudent to bring the residents back to the Gaza Envelope settlements. As published in early January, some of the residents at the Hof Ashkelon and Shaar HaNegev regional councils have already started returning to their homes. Now, however, is a good time to systematically act to restore the settlements in their entirety – something that harbors much significance for a variety of reasons, including reasons of state sovereignty and regional security, community and personal aspects, the psychological and national resilience element – and finally, for economic reasons.

The State of Israel must reassert its sovereignty over the entire country, including the Gaza Envelope. Reasserting sovereignty and security is fundamental to the State’s duties towards its citizens. Thus, we must act quickly to exercise sovereignty and restore our hold over the areas of the nation that were evacuated and abandoned. To this end, two fundamental terms must be met – the first of which is disrupting the capabilities of Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist organizations to attack the settlements. The IDF’s mounting achievements and the building of a security buffer and military defense envelope will make it very difficult for the enemy to launch infiltration or standoff firing attacks in the direction of the settlements – and will eventually, through a prolonged process, negate its capabilities for massive rocket fire towards the settlements as well. The IDF had already begun implementing a broad-scope plan to defend the settlements and respond to their security needs by reinforcing the settlements’ rapid response teams, providing proper equipment and regular training, alongside integration of the IDF’s area defense into the settlements and installation of various deterrents such as indicative fences, smart cameras, Command and Control rooms, etc.

An important tool for restoring sovereignty and security would be growing the population of the Gaza Envelope area through reviving the Nahal program and establishing Nahal settlements in the Gaza Envelope area – after two decades during which not a single Nahal settlement was established and converted into a civilian settlement. Beyond increasing the population, further settlement of the area by Nahal core groups would enable reclaiming this geographical era in a productive and principled manner, serving as a lodestone for a reformed ethos of pioneering, inhabiting and working the land, alongside active defense of the area – the sickle and the sword as a foundation for volunteering and harnessing the national spirit to establish new settlements and restore security to the area.

In the personal-community aspect, keeping entire communities out of their natural environment may jeopardize their social cohesion and their ability to recover from the traumatic event. The sooner these communities return to their settlements, rehabilitate them, and establish routines of daily life, the more effective their recovery process will be.

In the national context, the settlements thriving and prospering once again will constitute a victory for the State of Israel – radiating strength both inwards into Israeli society and outwards, demonstrating the resilience of Israeli society and its perseverance in the Zionist endeavor. The residents’ return to the Gaza Envelope settlements will also boost the recovery of the area’s community and education systems – including that of schools, other educational institutions, medical services, public transport, and a variety of needful community services. This process cannot be serial – it must occur concurrently with the residents’ return and brooks no delay. In this manner, community systems could be rehabilitated in a vibrant, healthy way.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the psychological dimension. Restoring and developing settlements will necessarily radiate on the Israeli society’s sense of capability, on trust in the State’s institutions and its capability to recover from severe trauma and devastation whilst harnessing national resources and capabilities for planning and execution – and no less importantly – on the sense of cohesion, solidarity, and mutual responsibility. All these are expressions and aspects of social and national resilience. National resilience is a fundamental and essential component of national strength – and thus, of national security in its broad sense. We cannot ignore the difficulties and the trauma caused by the events of October 7^th, or their impact on our sense of capability, security, trust, and resilience. Since October 7^th, Israeli society has gone a long way in the process of rehabilitation and recovery – but the process cannot be completed without restoring settlement, exercising sovereignty, re-establishing communities, agriculture, and industry in the area – and in particular, continuing its development and expansion as an appropriate Zionist reply to the bloodthirsty destructiveness that Hamas demonstrated during the murderous terrorist attack of October 7^th. Through its communities, Israeli settlement shall set exercising sovereignty and reclamation of the land through agricultural work against Hamas’ destructive efforts. Renewing the settlement efforts, restoring them to their former glory, developing and expanding them will constitute the true Israeli victory in this war – the triumph of the Zionist ethos of building and development, reclaiming and settling the land, over Hamas’ ethos of ruin and devastation.

Finally, the return of the Gaza Envelope’s residents to their homes holds economic significance of the highest order, for several reasons. First, the direct costs of hosting evacuated individuals in alternative residences and in hotels and guest houses.  An analysis of the proposal for increasing the 2023 budget suggests that the scope of addition to the budget required to support the expenditures of assisting evacuated individuals was more than ILS 6 billion. [1] This budget is expected to grow even further in 2024. Diverting funds from direct aid to the evacuated individuals into developing and rehabilitating the Gaza Envelope settlements will yield great returns and generate income for the national economy, made possible by restoring the Gaza Envelope’s economy to a functional state – albeit partially, at first. Second – bringing the residents back would necessitate the provision of economic benefits – both for individual residents and on the community-settlement level. The State is required to invest in developing the area and the settlements, and to provide a variety of economic benefits in the form of tax breaks, grants, and aid in developing settlements, in a manner that would serve all national needs. This investment should be considered a substantial part of the war costs and one of the tools for winning it.

Many residents will wish to return to their homes as soon as possible, given the right conditions. The right time is now, and we must act to return the settlers to the Gaza Envelope. Uprooting these communities from their settlements was a necessary evil at the start of the war, but now we must put our full strength behind making these settlements prosper again. The leadership of the State must take the reins on this national challenge – this national mission –through relevant government ministries and State institutions. It is also the time for local leadership and community leadership – as well as for the communities themselves and their settlers – to shine. Now is the time for pioneers to take the van – the time for the nation to step forward in its journey to rise again and make its way towards the establishment of Israel 2.0. [2]

[1] Description and Analysis of the Proposal to Increase the 2023 National Budget and a Macro-Economic Review. Knesset Information and Research Center, December 2023.

[2] https://www.misgavins.org/siboni-michael-israel-2-0-project-launch

The Misgav Institute National Security and Zionist Strategy is launching the Israel 2.0 project,[1] whose purpose is to lay down a vision and updated conceptual foundation for the State of Israel over the coming decades.

The importance of the project lies in the formative significance of the invasion on Shabbat/Simchat Torah of October 7, 2023, a calamity that has been burned into Israel’s collective national consciousness for the coming generations. Post October 7 Israel is no longer the country it had been until then, and Israel will not be able to revert to being the same country. The invasion abruptly overturned a long list of basic assumptions and historical paradigms that were a key facet of its national security. Many of them are no longer relevant to the new reality that Israel now faces. These paradigms are do not allow for the development of tools and ideas for ensuring the State of Israel’s existence, security, and prosperity under the new conditions that have formed.

The war that began on October 7 is not just a war between Hamas and Israel. It is a regional war being fought on six active fronts at different levels of intensity, including the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Syria, western Iraq, and Yemen. It can be assumed that one of the reasons for the murderous attack was the wish to stop and reverse the process of building a regional architecture based on normalized relations between Israel and Arab countries in the region, with emphasis on Saudi Arabia.

Because Washington considers such a new regional order to be a US strategic interest with positive influence on American international standing, the war also impacts the international scene. Russia and China, which dispute global US hegemony, chose to support the axis of resistance that attacked Israel, seeking to weaken the US, undermine its vital interests, weaken its global status, and allow for a new, multipolar global order to be formed in which their influence as global powers could be expressed.

Here we share a number of basic assumptions about the future of Israel that require reexamination. These are but examples of matters that need to deep consideration and analysis. For example, it must be examined whether Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians is territorial by nature and resolvable by dividing up the country, or whether this matter is an identity-existential conflict that cannot be solved at this time; and if so, what must be done given this insight.

Another example pertains to the question of whether Israel is indeed capable of deterring enemies that are arming to destroy Israel, or whether Israel is unlikely to stand firm against the

Another example pertains to the question of whether Israel is indeed capable of deterring enemies that are arming to destroy Israel, or whether Israel is unlikely to stand firm against the radical axis. In this regard, it is necessary to revalidate the “Iron Wall” concept and adapt it to the changing circumstances and the characteristics of existential threats.

Forming a renewed vision for Israel (“Israel 2.0”) also requires examining the IDF, owing to the failures and omissions that were readily apparent on that terrible Saturday October 7. It will be necessary to examine the size and structure of the military, including the scale, equipment and training of its reserve force. It will also be necessary to examine the process of promoting officers to various functions, their training, and the duration of their postings in the IDF. Also worthy of scrutiny is the recruitment model and a redefinition of the nature of the people’s army model. Another component that must be examined and updated pertains to the IDF’s operational planning and adapting this to the range of threats that Israel is contending with. And above all these, relations between the military and Israeli society and the civil system must be examined, combined with increased civil oversight and refinement of the military.

Alongside these, a new look at Israel’s vision for the future will require in-depth examination of everything related to public (internal) security in a broad terms. An overarching plan must be developed for civil protection of Israel’s communities, including integration and coordination of rapid response squads with police, emergency and rescue agencies, with a National Guard force (once formed), and with the IDF, particularly regarding frontier towns. The size, organizational structure, and operating concept of a new National Guard force requires serious attention.

Civil mobilization to defend local communities also pertains to changes in the national ethos, to the strengthening a “mobilized nation” concept. Public security also involves coping with property and violent offenses, organized crime, agricultural crime, uncontrolled, illegal immigration, and many other aspects.

An updated vision for Israel will also necessitate an understanding that settling and cultivating land has a key function not just in the context of national or local security, but also a core value of possessing land and maintaining the state’s sovereignty.

One of the key subjects that requires examination pertains to the nature of Israel’s relations with the United States. Deep US involvement, manifesting in the historical precedent of active participation by the US secretaries of state and defense in war cabinet meetings, combined with changes in American demographics and politics, require attention to the future of Israel’s relations with the US and the need to maintain this as a fundamental facet of Israel’s national security.

This also applies to the US contribution in deterring Hezbollah (and Iran) through rapid deployment of a military force to the area and forming a coalition to secure navigation in the Red Sea. It will be necessary to examine whether these moves serve as a problematic precedent in relation to the Israeli principle of “defending itself by itself.” American intervention may have helped Israel project power while it is focused on the war in Gaza,[2], but this necessitates rethinking of Israel’s ability to cope independently with a regional war on a broad, intense scale.

This also applies to the US contribution in deterring Hezbollah (and Iran) through rapid deployment of a military force to the area and forming a coalition to secure navigation in the Red Sea. It will be necessary to examine whether these moves serve as a problematic precedent in relation to the Israeli principle of “defending itself by itself.” American intervention may have helped Israel project power while it is focused on the war in Gaza,[3], but this necessitates rethinking of Israel’s ability to cope independently with a regional war on a broad, intense scale. This has far-reaching implications for Israel’s national security concept, from which lessons for many other fields will be derived. This matter also bears on the shaping of a new regional architecture and Israel’s part in it.

The attack of October 7 found Israel in a crisis after nine months of protests related to judicial reform. The crisis created a schism in Israeli society, allowing many to view it as a divided, quarrelsome society that had lost its characteristic social solidary. This may have led various factions of the axis of resistance to interpret the developments as erosion of Israel’s social and national resilience, impacting on the strength of the IDF and on the ability of decisionmakers to respond to security threats.

But the traumatic atrocities of the invasion overwhelmed the divides and rifts, instantaneously restoring Israeli societal solidarity to its full glory. A spirit of voluntarism and national recommitment multiplied across all sectors of Israeli society, including the Arab sector. The fighting spirit and heroism of IDF soldiers, unity in the ranks of all military units, alongside a setting-aside of political disputes in deference to the war aims – are a source of astonishment.

The power of national cohesion displayed is critical, a clear indication that the Israeli public understands the existential threats stemming from enemy unwillingness to accept Israel’s right to exist in any borders.

The judicial reform initiative that led to Israel’s constitutional and social crisis in 2023 has been dropped from the national agenda (at least for now). Nevertheless, the Israeli Supreme Court published two judgments during the war pertaining to the judicial reform effort. This is problematic. The judgments passed by a bare majority, and rekindle the debate over judicial reform when this is unhelpful to the national war effort.

Therefore, in the context of our “Israel 2.0” project this matter also will need to be addressed, particularly the core issue of the balance of power between the three executive arms of the state. Also to be discussed: How to manage social and public discourse in general, and the destructive effect of extremist rhetoric and protest.

Another issue that calls for extensive attention is majority-minority relations in Israel. The Ultra-Orthodox sector, the Arab sector and other minorities in Israel have been affected by the war, with parts of these communities seeking greater integration in Israeli society. These trends must be deepened and consolidated both to improve the standing and wellbeing of Israel’s minority communities and to secure foundations of Israeli national solidarity as a whole.

Even if it seems that after the Simchat Torah invasion Israeli society bonded as never before, it is nevertheless necessary to act to intensify and sustain such this positive trend.

Israel’s great dependence on the US calls for reexamination of Israel’s foreign relations as a whole, based on an understanding that in emergencies and wartime Israel will have difficulty asserting its own security interests in the face of American pressure. This examination also will necessitate rethinking of Israel’s relations with the international community, including the UN and other international organizations.

The intensification of antisemitism around the world in the wake of the current war may cause many Jews to consider moving to Israel over the coming decade. Israel needs to be ready to with communal, economic, and social foundations for successful absorption of hundreds of thousands of Jews. At the same time, Israel will be required to deepen its ties with Diaspora Jews to strengthen their affiliation with and support for Israel as a manifestation of the Jewish People’s cohesion, and to ensure their sense of security and minimize the loss of whole communities to ongoing assimilation.

Until October 7 and for about eight decades, Israel existed in the spirit of Jewish sovereign tradition; a tradition that must be overhauled. The Hamas invasion of October 7 is no less than a wakeup call for the State of Israel and Israeli society. The attack has changed national priorities, requiring Israel to recover quickly, adapt and change. Israel must now go through a process of overhauling its governmental systems, combined with a change in national ethos. In many senses, the war should be considered a moment of national revival, in which a strong light will emerge from an abyss of darkness. This is “Israel 2.0” that will materialize out of great crisis.

[1] The title “Israel 2.0” is drawn from the software world (i.e., a new, advanced version) and suggests the renewal of Israel in the wake of the Simchat Torah invasion.

[2] The title “Israel 2.0” is drawn from the software world (i.e., a new, advanced version) and suggests the renewal of Israel in the wake of the Simchat Torah invasion.

[3] This is effectively a historical precedent, except for a case of Israel’s skies being defended by a French squadron during the Suez Crisis.