The two illegal weapons warehouses attributed to Iran and its proxies uncovered recently in the suburbs of Amman, the capital of Jordan, and revealed in the media, express the culmination of Iran-led Axis of Resistance activities in Jordan. Iran’s subversive activity in Jordan aims to make it a fertile ground for the implementation of Khamenei’s 2014 order to arm the West Bank. To this end, Iran consistently increases its violation of Jordanian sovereignty and exploits weaknesses in the Hashemite kingdom. Reports in recent months have shown that there has been a significant increase in attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank.

The current affair further sharpens the urgent need for Israel and Jordan to tighten security cooperation to curtail Iran’s activities and subversion in the Jordanian region. Jordan relies heavily on intelligence assistance from Israel and the US, and tightening cooperation between Jerusalem and Amman will help ease tensions between them against the background of the war in Gaza. Israel is urgently required to complete its renewed preparations on the border with Jordan, to close the loopholes, and to strengthen the fence in weakened areas.

The December 2023 call by Revolutionary Guards chief Hossein Salami for the Palestinians to carry out another Al-Aqsa flood attack from the south, north, and east of Israel should serve as a sharp warning sign for the Israeli security establishment. One must also remember the plan by elements of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, revealed in the Israeli media last March, to infiltrate Israel from Jordan and carry out a large-scale attack on localities in its territory. The plan was dropped from the agenda because the plot was exposed, but it still serves as a wake-up call given the seriousness of the threat from the east.

At the beginning of April, a New York Times investigation revealed that Shiite militias supported by the Quds Force, as well as Iranian operatives in Tehran’s terrorist organization, are carrying weapons from Syria to Jordan. From there, the armaments are transferred at the border to Bedouin smugglers, who then transport the weapon to the Israeli border, where it is transferred to criminal organizations who take it to the West Bank. From a Shin Bet countermeasure operation last March, we see the types of advanced armaments that Iran seeks to distribute in the West Bank, including cluster munitions, Iranian anti-aircraft mines, thunderbolts, anti-aircraft shoulder-fired missiles, RPGs, hand grenades, pistols, and assault rifles.

Israel does not have the privilege of waiting for the end of the war in Gaza – which will last for years. They need to design a new security doctrine that will immediately fit the reality of the aftermath of October 7. The tangible threat to Iran’s leadership is not limited only to its nuclear program but rather to the tightening stranglehold set by Iran and its proxies. This has already created an unprecedented security zone in northern Israel. Israel, after October 7th, cannot stand by but must retaliate against Iran to ensure its national security. Some recommended courses of action would be to restrain Iran by various means, such as arrest operations on Iranian territory of Iranian terrorist operatives; this has been done before.

In April 2022, it was reported that the Mossad arrested – in Iran – Mansour Rasouli, an operative in Unit 840 of the Quds Force (a secret operational unit which is responsible for planning and establishing terrorist infrastructures outside of Iran, against Western and Israeli targets). Rasouli admitted that he planned to assassinate one of the employees of the Israeli consulate in Istanbul and even planned to assassinate a senior American general in Germany and a journalist in France.

The multi-arena challenge from Iran is now fully activated for the first time in what is known as the convergence of the arenas. Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and, to a certain extent, Syria are attacking Israel in the current war. In doing so, they bring to fruition the Iranian ambition to choke Israel with a stranglehold and place it under an existential threat.

The situation in the north is still limited and has not turned into an all-out war; the multi-aspect challenge is not yet operating in full force. Israeli activity against Iran, as well as a joint struggle with Jordan against Iranian subversion in Jordanian territory, would make it clear to Tehran that it will bear the consequences and pay a price for promoting terrorism against Israel.

At the same time, the activity would help Israel restore its deterrence against the Iran-led axis of resistance and its image before the regional Sunni countries, to whom the Iranian subversion in Jordan reminds them that behind the smiles that Tehran spreads are hidden dark intentions.

Published in I24, July 4, 2024.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seizes every opportunity to criticize the IDF’s moral fighting in Gaza, echoing the false Palestinian “resistance” narrative and depicting murderous Hamas operatives as “freedom fighters.”

It’s time for Israel to respond in kind.

Since the Swords of Iron War began, Erdoğan has insisted on portraying Hamas as a liberation movement and presenting himself as the flag bearer of the Palestinian struggle. Recently, he proudly announced that over 1,000 Hamas operatives were being treated in hospitals across Turkey and lamented that the Greeks view Hamas as a terrorist organization rather than a resistance movement.

Erdoğan’s blatant alignment with Hamas is in line with other hostile actions by Ankara against Israel in recent years, especially since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, including the unprecedented decision to sever trade relations with Israel.

However, this also provides Israel with an opportunity it has not yet utilized: to shift from the defensive posture that has characterized its public diplomacy for years and to actively counter the hypocrisy entrenched in the false Palestinian narrative of occupation and dispossession that Erdoğan promotes on every possible platform.

In fact, there is no better example than Turkey to illustrate the depth of Erdoğan’s hypocrisy regarding the “Israeli occupation.” For decades, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has functioned as a de facto state despite lacking international recognition. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek coup attempt against the legitimate Cypriot government, using the pretext of protecting the Turkish population on the island.

In violation of a U.N. ceasefire, Turkey then launched another operation, revealing its true aim: the partition of Cyprus. During this operation, Turkey forcibly expelled over 200,000 Greek Cypriots who were replaced by new settlers from Turkey, successfully establishing control over more than a third of Cyprus’s territory.

Turkish aggression continues today with the presence of over 40,000 Turkish troops in the north of the island, illegal construction on Greek Cypriot-owned property, ethnic segregation and the destruction of Christian cultural heritage.

Similarly, while Erdoğan boasts of standing alongside the “oppressed” Palestinian people, he denies political and cultural rights to Turkey’s Kurdish minority.

After the failed coup attempt in July 2016 by a military faction loyal to Erdoğan’s hated rival Fethullah Gulen, Erdoğan embarked on a major purge that extended far beyond Gulen’s supporters. Leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), members of parliament and thousands of party members across Turkey, including senior officials of various municipalities, were arrested.

A year earlier, during clashes between Turkish security forces and Kurdish insurgents, Erdoğan’s harsh measures to suppress the violence in the southeastern part of the country reached unprecedented levels. Turkey imposed curfews in many Kurdish areas and suspended essential services for the residents, leading to a massive humanitarian crisis and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens from their homes.

To be sure, Erdoğan gives “equal” treatment to Kurdish autonomies beyond the border. Since 2016, Turkey has launched a series of attacks against PKK bases in the Kurdish region of Iraq and its associated organizations in Syria. Under the guise of fighting terror, Turkey’s president carried out a de facto annexation, significantly violating the human rights of the area’s residents.

Since 2018, Turkey has transferred around 400,000 Arabs and Turkmen into the Kurdish enclave in Syrian Afrin, reducing the Kurdish population, which previously constituted 80% of the local population, to less than a quarter.

Even the war against ISIS did not alter Erdoğan’s priorities. When Turkey finally joined the coalition forces’ campaign against the murderous organization, it was used by Turkey as a cover story to land a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria, investing far fewer resources in destroying ISIS strongholds.

And what can be more ironic than Erdoğan pretending to show concern for the welfare of Gazans in early October 2023, while at the same time striking about 140 civilian targets in northern Syria, including bombing hospitals?

Turkey also behaves as an occupying force in places where there is no direct threat to its security. To ensure the survival of the Libyan regime and reap economic as well as other benefits, in January 2020 Ankara sent drones and soldiers—including jihadist mercenaries from Syria—to support the Islamist “Government of National Accord” against the opposing forces led by Khalifa Haftar.

Turkey’s military entrenchment in Libya has worsened the human rights situation in Libya and its overall stability, and continues to raise concerns for Egypt, which fears the spillover of terrorism into its territory.

The next time Erdoğan waves terms like “occupation,” “resistance” and “freedom fighters,” Israel must not remain silent. It must remind the international community who the real occupier is.

Published in JNS, June 9, 2024.

Since the 1979 signing of their peace agreement, Israel-Egypt relations have mainly been characterized by fruitful cooperation in everything related to military, security, and regional issues.

At the same time, there has been an almost total disconnect between the two nations.

In Egypt’s view, since the establishment of a Palestinian entity was significant pillar of the peace agreement, its lack allowed the Mubarak-led Egyptian regime to refrain from promoting bilateral cooperation with Israel in the fields of trade, culture, tourism and more.

Hence, most of the other pillars upon which the peace agreement was based, were not realized.

Egypt adopts anti-Israel rhetoric

Over the years, Egyptian leadership has permitted, and at times even encouraged, the adoption of distinctly anti-Israel rhetoric, as, among other things, a mechanism to distract public attention from internal hardships.

This trend has been reflected in all the newspapers and magazines published in Egypt, whether identified with the opposition or official government mouthpieces.

Beyond anti-Zionist rhetoric, the media often includes clear antisemitic messages, such as the use of cartoons and illustrations.

Israelis are not allowed to appear in the Egyptian media, resulting in all discussions on the subject of Israel taking place without any Israeli representation.

The Qatari-owned-and-controlled Al-Jazeera channel has been outlawed in Egypt more than once – due to its harsh criticism of former president Hosni Mubarak and more recently of President Mohammed Al-Sisi. However, the general Egypt public continues to be exposed to other Arab social media sources providing a significant dose of antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment.

Israel has never insisted that Egypt change its syllabus and alter its negative messaging concerning Israel and the Jews.

Egypt’s duality vis-à-vis Hamas 

There is little doubt that official Egypt understands very well what Hamas is and the nature of its affiliation and kinship with the Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamist movement established in 1920s Egypt, that has been outlawed in the country for years.

The Egyptian constitution prohibits any organized political activity based on religion. Egyptian intelligence carefully monitors any hint of activity on behalf of Islamist organizations inside Egypt, its law enforcement agencies adopting an iron fist policy to contain it.

Egypt is doubtless worried about an influx of Palestinian refugees from Gaza due to the certain infiltration of Hamas operatives among them. In addition, it does not wish for the “temporary” sojourn of Palestinians to become a permanent settlement, as has happened with many Palestinian populations in Arab countries.

This weakened population is ripe for poverty, crime, extremism, and the potential for terrorist infiltration by radical Islamist elements, such as ISIS, Al Qaida, The Muslim Brotherhood.

What, then, caused official Egypt to turn a blind eye to the dozens of tunnels crossing from Gaza into Egypt that the IDF uncovered upon entering Rafah? Their existence must have sounded every single alarm.

Musa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, stated in a 2013 interview that the previous head of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, had assisted Hamas by preventing any attempt to dismantle the tunnels.

His words, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact remains that the discovered tunnels exist. Their very existence has aided Hamas to arm itself in a way that, after October 7, is hard to dispute.

Furthermore, and since 2017, there appears to have been an improvement in Egypt’s relations with Hamas in Gaza, after its leaders published an updated version of the its charter, dissociating themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The considerable extent of the tunnels that were discovered is indicative of a strategic decision at a senior level, or at the very least, a deliberate “blind eye” at the highest level.

One can assume that Egypt sought to preserve its key position as a mediator between Hamas and Israel – thus ensuring its supremacy over Qatar, Turkey and other countries – by allowing Hamas this smuggling outlet as leverage. Cairo’s pursuit of regional hegemony remains an important national interest.

Yet, can that explain Egypt’s willingness to risk playing with fire, after, the 2008 Hamas intrusion into its territory and the murder of Egyptian officers? The characteristic duality of Egyptian policies serves to decipher this particular decision.

On one hand, Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel and strives to create trade routes and cooperation with the US, on the other, it feeds the Egyptian public anti-West and especially anti-Israel messages.

It nurtures an abysmal hatred for Turkey and Qatar, whose rulers have humiliated and criticized Egyptian rulers over the years and supported the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement, which threatened the Egyptian regime; and at the same time it promotes paths of reconciliation and understanding with those countries.

[Egypt had demanded that Turkey and Qatar end their support of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a precondition to normalizing ties.]

This Egyptian duality has cultivated a long-standing rivalry with and suspicion of Shi’ite Iran, where, for many years, one of its capital’s main streets was named after the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s murderer – while Egypt buried the exiled Persian shah with great splendor in one of the most beautiful and impressive places in the center of Cairo.

Egypt recently hosted a senior Iranian delegation, producing a certain questionable rapprochement between the two countries.

Its sharp reaction in view of Israel’s determination to operate in Rafah evidenced that it was not happy about exposing the tunnels crossing from Gaza to its territory. This discovery raises further questions about other potential revelations, such as the infiltration of senior Hamas officials into Egyptian territory; smuggling of hostages into Egypt; or even beyond.

In this context, Cairo’s joining the South African effort at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague stands out.

Is this also an attempt to intensify pressure on Israel to prevent it from advancing into Rafah, while leveraging Egypt’s power in the international arena?

Or is there more to it and like South Africa, whose ruling party, the ANC has “sold its soul to the Iranian devil” in exchange for clearing its accumulated debts, is Egypt also expected to reap some sort of reward from Tehran for its efforts? Assumptions should be examined more closely and one should not rely on speculations.

What is clear, however, is that official Egypt could not help but know about and/or allow what took place in the large-scale tunnels discovered in Rafah.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 4, 2024.

Since October 7, Türkiye has been hardening its stance towards Israel in a manner uncharacteristic of the behavior exhibited by the Turkish administration in previous crises with Israel. More specifically, Türkiye’s decision to sever trade relations with Israel as an act of solidarity with Hamas reflects a troubling shift from its typical hostile rhetoric to inflicting actual economic damage. Although Türkiye later retracted from its sweeping boycott, this move marks a significant escalation in Erdoğan’s anti-Israel stance.

In the wider context, Türkiye’s growing presence in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean poses significant challenges for Israel and its Western allies. Erdoğan’s Türkiye leads a radical Islamist line and undertakes actions that undermine the existing regional order while harming crucial Israeli interests.

First and foremost, Türkiye’s support of Hamas, its attempts to force Israel to comply with its demands on the humanitarian aid issue, as well as other initiatives aimed at gaining a foothold in post-war Gaza, act as a considerable obstacle to achieving one of Israel’s main war objectives: the defeat of Hamas.

Moreover, despite the heavy consequences suffered by Ankara after sending the Turkish aid flotilla to Gaza in 2010, Türkiye has been preparing to launch a second Marmara under the supervision of the IHH, which was designated as a terrorist organization by Israel in 2008. This initiative is currently delayed after the Republic of Guinea-Bissau requested the removal of its flag from two of the ships, however, the organizers vow to overcome the obstacles and end the siege on Gaza.

These steps, along with the unprecedented announcement of cutting all economic ties with Jerusalem, position Türkiye as a hostile nation willing to deteriorate its relationship with Israel, with whom it previously maintained reasonable relations despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, even at the cost of severe damage to its already struggling economy.

Israel should also be concerned about Türkiye’s involvement in East Jerusalem, manifesting in the agitation of the local Muslim population against Israel while weakening Jordan’s role in administering the Muslim holy sites. Under the guise of tourism and religious activity, Türkiye strives to gain a foothold in the mosques on the Temple Mount and plays an active role in incitement and provocation against non-Muslim visitors. It is not unreasonable to assume that the stabbing incident of an Israeli Border Police officer by a Turkish tourist in Jerusalem about a month ago is a result of this incitement.

Ankara’s efforts in recent years to thwart cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the gas sector, alongside demonstrating military presence in Libya and other places, further illustrate that Ankara has become a factor that undermines regional stability while infringing on the sovereignty of its neighbors.

The escalation in Türkiye’s attitude towards Israel is particularly concerning given that, unlike in the past, Türkiye is now willing to abandon pragmatism and realpolitik in favor of ideological considerations and domestic public opinion, a trend that, if continues, could turn Ankara from a mere rival into an active enemy. If the Biden administration doesn’t exert significant pressure to curb Türkiye’s dangerous foreign policy, this threat is only likely to grow in the foreseeable future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 2, 2024.

The current geostrategic situation in the Middle East appears at times impossible and even hopeless. Contrary to popular opinion, however, I am not taken with this fatalistic line of thought. Cleaning up the current regional “mess” requires courage and vision, yet it is, indeed, possible.

Beyond the significant threat to our citizens in the form of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, in recent years, the Judea and Samaria region has also become the Wild West, given the Iranian-backed growth of radical movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Currently, only a significant IDF presence prevents disaster for the residents of nearby Jewish towns and villages in the northern Sharon area, well within undisputed Israel, as Israel’s enemies make no secret of their wish to eradicate all of Israel’s citizens and destroy the entire state.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), officially ruling the Palestinians in that area, has proven over the years that it is, indeed, more moderate than Hamas, yet it is still very far from being a terror-free bed of roses.

Recently, along with the gradual and obvious weakening of PA President Mahmoud Abbas (a phenomenon clearly encouraged by the Israeli government over the last decade), the military arm of his political faction, Fatah, has begun competing with Hamas to see who kills more Israeli civilians. Clearly, the situation certainly does not look very promising. So, where is the light at the end of this dark tunnel?

Owing to the fact that in the current state of affairs, the State of Israel depends on the United States to a significant degree in terms of its security and its assistance in the international arena, Israel must creatively recruit Washington and other countries to help when it comes to dealing with the aforementioned threat in question.

A sustainable quiet

THE BIDEN administration is interested in creating “a sustainable quiet” between Israel and Hamas. Washington has a clear interest in calming the current strife between Israelis and Palestinians, especially in the months prior to the November elections in the US. In other words, Israel has inherent leverage with the US due to the Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip and the fact that it can produce a temporary “calm” if it so wishes.

Furthermore, dealing a decisive blow to all hostile terrorist activity in Gaza will be difficult to achieve in a short period of time, as the IDF has already publicly announced in recent days. This will entail a long-standing confrontation against a bitter and stubborn enemy. On the other hand, Jerusalem cannot and should not allow the continued existence of an enemy that declares its readiness to kill, rape, burn, and eliminate its people – and hence, has little choice but to continue to strike. There is little point in doing so, however, without three basic conditions being fulfilled at the same time.

The hostages must be returned, either via a deal or by force, given that Israel cannot violate the unwritten contract between itself and its citizens, who were brutally kidnapped from their homes and held in terrible conditions by a bitter enemy. However, I am not optimistic about Hamas’s intention to release all of them. In fact, to do so would be an antithesis to their worldview and the martial theory they adopted in the first place. There is much room for massive pressure from the US on Qatar with regard to the presence of the Hamas leadership in its territory and until now, such American leverage has not been fully applied.

A clear plan for the temporary civilian management of the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria must be adopted, along with the continued military presence of the IDF. As long as such an Israeli plan is not proposed, any and all in the international arena will view themselves as authorized to come up with a “road map” of one kind or another, without it being viewed and/or sanctified by Israel and regardless of whether it would suit the preservation of Israel’s security interests.

The international arena, with the US and the United Kingdom at its helm, must take responsibility for the temporary civil management of the Palestinians, while the IDF maintains a temporary military presence to prevent terror against its own civilians, Palestinians living in the Strip, and US and UK nationals who would be present. I do not accept the voices according to which certain political parties would not agree to this. What is true is that neither they nor any others would wish to be dragged into the Gazan and Palestinian mud. But this must be the temporary price for taking care of the Palestinian civilian population – until the establishment of a demilitarized political entity of one kind or another, after a decade or another time frame to be determined by the parties.

Throughout that interim period, constructive” regional parties (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.) would lend a hand to civilian aid, but above all, there would be one specific party – the United Arab Emirates – that would take care of the re-education of the population in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria, but also- and not less important (and in full coordination with the Hashemite Kingdom) in Jordan. Without this significant, long-term reeducation plan, consistent with Western values and devoid of incitement and hateful and murderous messaging – with which Palestinian and Jordanian youth are currently being brainwashed – the mentality will not change and the brainwashing will continue to create more and more terrorists.

The United Arab Emirates has already proved that it is willing and able to change the entire education system in its own territory, to the point of replacing teachers who did not adapt themselves to the renewed content. Also, the UAE has great interest in taking extremely harsh steps against the Muslim Brotherhood and its subsidiary organization, Hamas. It has been doing this tirelessly for years within its own borders, where it is strictly forbidden to act, identify with, or support the Muslim Brotherhood or anyone on their behalf, and anyone who does so feels the iron arm of the local law.

As someone who has lived for several years in an Arab country and learned Arabic, as well as to understand the mentality and even the core and vital elements of Islam, I do not recognize attempts to weaken the aforementioned proposals by epithets such as “naive.”

Living for several years, as a Jew and an Israeli, in an Arab country, does not leave much room for naivete. Albert Einstein once said that stupidity is defined by repeating the same action over and over while expecting a different result.

Given the complexity of the current situation, its solution calls for great faith in our Creator, along with extraordinary creativity, courage, and original thought.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 03, 2024.

In the age before Hamas’s October 7 massacre, the air defense operation that successfully intercepted Iran’s air assault against Israel would have seemed like a victory. Almost all (99%) of the over 300 missiles and UAVs launched by Tehran and its proxies were shot down by an international coalition led by the United States, and Israel emerged largely unscathed.

However, the failed paradigms that led to Hamas’s October 7 massacre have taught us that Israel and its allies, including the US, must not revert to a merely defensive posture. They must demonstrate clearly to Iran and the entire Middle East that there is a significant price to be paid for launching such attacks, even if they are deflected.

Before October 7, 2023, the dominant security paradigm in Israel was one that relied on defensive capabilities. Israel had become adept at shooting down Hamas rockets from the Gaza Strip with its Iron Dome system. Even as Hamas’s arsenal in Gaza grew more sophisticated, and Iran provided Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border with precise missiles, Jerusalem’s security concept remained grounded in preserving quiet to the extent possible by relying on its multi-layered air defenses. As long as damage to Israel’s home front could be minimized, the Jewish state could make do with limited strikes on the terrorist organizations that surrounded it.

This paradigm was supported not only by Israel’s military and political echelons, but also by the United States, which provided billions in support for Israeli air defense under the US-Israel 2018 Memorandum of Understanding. In 2022, Congress approved an additional $1 billion for Iron Dome. President Joe Biden’s November 2023 request for supplemental aid to Israel includes funding for 100 Iron Dome launchers.

This assistance has saved countless Israeli lives and Israelis are rightfully grateful for it. At the same time, this approach allowed Israel to tell itself that “defense is deterrence.” Jerusalem adopted the belief that the proper response to Tehran’s increasingly-dangerous efforts to build a ring of terror around Israel through its proxies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, was to build a defensive wall.

ON OCTOBER 7, that paradigm came crashing down. Despite all of Israel’s hi-tech systems, Hamas showed that it was not deterred, and launched a horrifically brazen and barbaric attack. One by one, Israel’s defensive systems failed to prevent Hamas terrorists from murdering more than 1,200 mostly Israelis and kidnapping more than 250 others, leading to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Israel’s reliance on its Iron Dome air defense made its security establishment overly-complacent in the face of Hamas, leading to a failure to detect the terrorist group’s plans for attacking Israel along other vectors.

In parallel, in line with its defensive posture, Israel evacuated the towns along its northern border, in order to move civilians out of the way of Hezbollah’s Iranian-funded missiles. It is not clear when the tens of thousands of internally displaced Israeli refugees will be able to return to their homes in the North.

On the night between October 13-14, Iran launched over 300 cruise and ballistic missiles and UAVs at Israel. Some 99% of them were intercepted by the Israeli, American, British and Jordanian militaries, reportedly with the involvement of Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The successful response showed the utility of the nascent Middle East Air Defense architecture, built since the signing of the Abraham Accords.

According to media reports, President Biden told Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu soon after the successful interception that Israel should see the results as a victory, and that the US would not support an Israeli counter-strike.

Steadfast American support for an Israeli operation against Iran and Hezbollah will send a clear message to the Islamic Republic, while improving overall security in the region and laying the groundwork for future stability. A US-Israel show of unity and determination will lead Iran to limit its response. It must be remembered that the Iranian economy is in dire straits, with an increased reliance on energy sales to China and weapons sales to Russia. The ayatollah regime faces substantial opposition at home. Iran is therefore much more vulnerable to a strike targeting strategic assets.

President Biden warned Iran before it launched its attack with one word: “Don’t”. But Iran did. Now is the time to turn words into actions. Israel must demonstrate that it has learned the lessons of October 7, and will no longer make do with mere defense. The United States must show that its repeated assurances of “ironclad” support for Israel include the Jewish state’s ability not just to block blows, but to strike those who threaten its people.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 16, 2024

Iran concludes this chapter of confrontation with Israel with a mixed cost-benefit balance sheet: On one hand, it crossed the Rubicon, disregarded President Joe Biden’s explicit warning, and use its own territory to carry out the largest missile and UAV attack any country has ever launched against another country. In doing so, according to its view, it will cause Israeli decision-makers to think twice before approving strikes on Iranian elements.

On the other hand, it exposed itself to a direct response, led to the formation of a coalition of countries against it, provided an opportunity to showcase an impressive array of air defense capabilities against Iran, opened the door for Israel to extricate itself from the political travails it found itself in due to the situation in Gaza, led the US to intensify measures against it, and caused internal tension and escalation in American political climate.

In addition to preserving deterrence, Israel’s main goals vis-à-vis Iran are dismantling its nuclear capabilities and neutralizing the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s proxy forces, chief among them Hezbollah. In response to the pressure Washington is exerting on Israel to refrain from retaliation, its willingness to join a practical plan with a binding timeline for achieving these goals should be examined.

In any case, Israel need not rush to respond. It would be wise to keep Iranian nerves in tense anticipation, allowing the Iranian rial to continue plummeting and enabling internal criticism of the regime to intensify.

Iran concluded this chapter of confrontation with Israel in a worse geopolitical position than it began: It invested in building proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, but ultimately became embroiled in a direct clash with Israel. The attack it carried out against Israel was impressive in scale but encountered an effective air defense array and did not cause significant damage. It prompted a cohesion of regional states and provided them with a successful experience of regional cooperation against it – which could encourage such a trend, contrary to its desires.

It provided legitimacy for striking it directly, and unlike Israel, it is less protected. It gave Israel leverage to pressure the US, so that even if it does not attack, it can extract concessions that will make things difficult for Iran. Russia and China, its allies, stood on the sidelines. It exacerbated Iran’s domestic situation, created a sense of tension and anxiety, and impacted the value of the rial.  

What does Iran still have in its arsenal that it has not yet employed against Israel? It mainly boils down to Hezbollah. The terrorist group’s set of considerations is broader and not solely focused on Iranian interests.

The Biden administration, which once again impressively stood by Israel’s side and assisted in forming a coalition of states that participated in thwarting the Iranian attack, fears a widening of the regional war due to the geostrategic and economic implications and the possibility of being dragged into intervening, especially in an election year. 

Therefore, it is trying to amplify the achievement against Iran, settling for that and a few diplomatic steps whose significance regarding neutralizing Iran’s capabilities is unclear. From Washington’s perspective, the developments reinforce its approach to hasten the establishment of a strategic regional alliance, and it will try to push for that to happen.

Israel, for its part, even if the prospects are unclear, must examine the possibility of seizing the opportunity created to advance its over-arching goal: Thwarting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If that is a concession that can be obtained at this time – restraint on its part would be justified.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Israel is simultaneously dealing with several fronts, but it is precisely those that appear to be quieter that are most worrisome, primarily the Jordanian arena. 

Since its foundation, the Kingdom comprised a high percentage of Palestinians, some of whom are citizens of the Jordanian state, while the rest have remained in “refugee” status for decades. 

To this, masses of Syrian refugees who fled from the massacre perpetrated by the Syrian president were added in recent years.

All this, while the Hashemite regime, that controls Jordan is not Palestinian and well understands the dangers inherent in the composition of the population to its survival and stability. 

It is doubtful if what was done against the coup attempt in “Black September” by the Jordanian regime in the 1970s will be feasible to emulate by the current regime, even at the cost of the Kingdom itself, both due to the weakness of the current rulers and to the fact that Queen Rania is Palestinian.

Despite the Jordanian understanding of the potential internal danger lurking at home, it sometimes appears that the regime acts almost against its own interests.

In fact, Jordan insists on continuing to adhere to an outdated syllabus, which encourages hatred and incites the Jordanian crowd against Israel and Jews. 

Anyone who understands anything about the Arab world knows that the blatant antisemitism, which unfortunately has become an integral part of the value system of every Jordanian, does indeed encourage the public to divert tensions and frustrations away from the economic situation and the ills of society and vent anger against the “Zionist enemy.”

 But violent demonstrations against Israel and Jews tend to turn into fierce opposition to the government itself.

This happened, more than once, in Egypt and in Jordan. Furthermore, Israel and the US are essential for the continued survival of the Jordanian regime, on the economic, military, and intelligence levels. 

Incitement against Israel and the US spurs the Jordanian public to attack the Jordanian regime, if and when it adopts a policy that reflects cooperation with one of them, even when this cooperation is necessary for the national security of the Kingdom.

AND THAT brings me to the second point – in preserving this incitement-ridden education system, the Jordanian regime obliges itself to adhere to a harsh anti-Israel rhetoric, which is often contrary to Jordan’s security interests. 

Thus, we have almost become accustomed to hearing, every year during the month of Ramadan, senior Jordanian officials compete with Hamas as to who is more radical in their hatred of the “Zionist entity,” in order to prove to their own public that they are, indeed, deserving of this public support.

According to Muslim tradition, the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan was entrusted with the responsibility of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, an asset that over the years has become one with the potential to enthuse the entire Muslim world. Therefore, the “ownership” or the “protection” thereof is desired by many groups in the Muslim world.

In recent years the Hamas movement – with Iranian encouragement – began to try and “seize ownership” of the Mosque, in order to create instability among the Arabs of Israel, the Arabs of east Jerusalem, and Muslims throughout the world.

During Ramadan in recent years, the Hamas terrorist group has adopted inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, accusing it of trying to damage and/or occupy the Mosque, while the Jordanian regime intensified the tone against Israel, in a manner of competition for the same “ownership” over this holy site.

Parallel to the above, Iran began to advance – methodically and with endless patience, starting in 1979 – its policy of taking over the Arab region first, and the West. 

This, while sowing instability and chaos in every country that it could do that in and that is in order to gain a foothold and influence and to establish some kind of military presence there – at times in the form of Shia militias and at times via a local Arab proxy.

Thus, it leveraged Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, starting in 2006, to establish its position in the southern periphery of Israel. It also strengthened its hold in that region, via support of the Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups.

Furthermore, Tehran also operated over the years in Judea and Samaria by strengthening Hamas and undermining the Palestinian Fatah rule, under the auspices of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), which advocates a secular ideology that is contrary to the religious view of Hamas and other Islamic movements.

In Lebanon, Iran strengthened Hamas above and beyond its unwavering support for Hezbollah as a voice in the region. All this, while undermining Lebanon on the economic and political levels to the core.

In Syria, Iran established an army of Shi’ite militias, and acted in the same manner in Iraq, which over the years and since the withdrawal of the United States, has become an Iranian stronghold on the borders of little Jordan.

BUT TEHRAN is yet unsatisfied and strives to create territorial continuity in the entire area up to the Jordanian border with Israel. Quietly and cunningly, Iran works to strengthen radical elements among the Palestinians in Jordan itself, and to strengthen the presence of Hamas in Jordanian territory.

The destabilization of the Kingdom is intended to further weaken the government in the country, and in due time cause masses of Palestinians to flock to the Jordanian-Israeli border, over 300 km. long – a situation that the IDF will have a hard time stopping.

Only in the last few weeks, the Kingdom seemingly “awakened” when King Abdullah II spoke out harshly against blatant attempts by the Hamas movement to “undermine the stability of the kingdom,” in his words.

When Israel recently hit a distinct Iranian target on Syrian soil, it actually targeted the Iranian Mullah regime’s world view, according to which a world-wide Sharia-based caliphate must control of the entire region and the West, by exploiting local extremist elements and without involving its own people and/or territory in the campaign.

All this, while Tehran continues almost uninterrupted, in equipping itself with unconventional weapons and nuclear capabilities for military purposes.

It is interesting to note that there were no overly harsh condemnations of the Israeli action from many Arab countries in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and more – since all of those countries, despite their difficult rhetoric against Israel, well understand the magnitude of the challenge that Iran poses to the entire world. 

Those who fail to understand this are in the West, whose democracies makes them more vulnerable to infiltration by hostile elements, such as Sunni Muslim Brotherhood activists on the one hand and Shi’ite Hezbollah cells and Iranian influence on the other.

MEANWHILE, IRAN does not stop at all from doing everything it possibly can, to destabilize Israel itself from within. 

Recognizing the existing political rifts in Israeli society, just as it recognized similar rifts in all the other countries which Iran had undermined and dismantled from within, Tehran is constantly at work to deepen the chasm inside Israel.

It does this by impersonating Israelis from different camps on social networks, pretending to take extreme positions on the Right and the Left. 

It does this through unceasing attempts to create Shi’ite cells also among Sunni Israeli Arabs in Arab cities in the country – although so far, with little success. It does this through incessant attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to elements of the Arab sector in Israel, belonging to the criminal network.

Therefore, in order to understand the nature and quality of the hostile activity against Israel in each of the aforementioned arenas, one must understand the picture as a whole and stop burying one’s head in the sand. The West in general and Israel in particular – are at least for now at the forefront of the world struggle – do not have the privilege to ignore the scale of the issue. 

If Iran has already succeeded in disintegrating Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, significant parts of Yemen, and Sudan, is on its way to disintegrating Jordan and has literally “bought” the corrupt ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, by erasing the huge debt it had accumulated, then it will try with all its might, and may even succeed, to destabilize the State of Israel from within.

This is The Plan. All we have to do, is not cooperate with the plot and understand that unity is more than just a naive cliché, but a matter of national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2024.

While most of the world’s attention is focused on Israel’s battle against Hamas in Gaza, Israel is simultaneously fighting on a second, lower-profile front against Hizballah in Lebanon. This is a war of attrition, and both sides have so far kept their ground forces out of the other’s territory. Yet, in all other respects, it is a war, and it is more severe than any of Israel’s numerous skirmishes with Hizballah since 2006. This war started the same day the one in Gaza did, when, on October 7, Hizballah expressed its support for Hamas by attacking Israel with missiles, RPGs, and drones. These attacks have continued daily since then. Worse, Hizballah has amassed ground forces along the border, poised to invade Israeli towns and carry out a slaughter that would make October 7th look mild by comparison.

This threat has forced Israel to evacuate the entire civilian population living within a few miles of the Lebanese border, leaving 80,000 Israelis internally displaced. The IDF has struck back at Hizballah targets, seeking to weaken the terror organization’s military capabilities and command structure, but it has not yet sought a large-scale maneuver while it is focused on the Gazan theatre. But to many if not most Israelis, an intensification of the war in the coming months seems inevitable. The scale and severity of that war is one of the subjects of this essay, as are Israel’s options in it, options that are shaped by the decisions—good and bad, wise and ill-conceived—that Israel has made about Lebanon in the past several decades.

The threat to Israel from its northern neighbor did not arise on October 7. It has been building since Israel fought its last war there in 2006, since it pulled its ground troops out at the turn of the new century, indeed since the modern state was founded. In a certain sense the threat from Lebanon has been present for millennia, a function less of politics and strategy than of simple geography.

How did we get to this point? What can be learnt from the previous rounds? What are Israel’s options? And what is at stake in the coming battle?…

1. Israel and Lebanon from the Bible to Begin
2. The Era of the Security Zone
3. Progress for the Party of God
4. Israel’s New Reality
5. The Northern Dilemma Returns
6. War in the North?

For full article see link.

Key Points:

• Sudanese Transitional Sovereignty Council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken major steps to demonstrate his commitment to peace with Israel. Israel must welcome and embrace this serious commitment, rather than taking it for granted.

• Iran’s destabilizing activities in Sudan can be countered by stronger security cooperation between Israel and Sudan. Such cooperation would help prevent Sudanese territory from being used to smuggle Iranian weapons to Hamas in Gaza.

• Sudan, as the third-largest country in Africa, has the potential to become a major exporter of wheat and agricultural products. This potential can be realized through cooperation with Israeli agri-tech companies, which can provide the necessary technology to develop the fertile Sudanese land.

• Just as peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia is still possible despite Saudi Arabia re-establishing ties with Iran, peace between Israel and Sudan is still possible despite Sudan re-establishing ties with Iran.

  Four years ago, on February 3^rd, 2020, a dramatic meeting took place against all odds and expectations in the Middle East. While on a working visit in Uganda, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a meeting with the leader of Sudan, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The meeting was a breakthrough for numerous reasons. First and foremost, until that point, Sudan was most notable in Israeli history for hosting the Arab League Khartoum Summit of 1967. This summit, which followed Israel’s decisive victory in the Six Day War, established the Arab League’s “Three Nos” – “No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.”

The meeting between Netanyahu and Burhan in 2020 helped shift the mindset of Arabs and Israelis, leading them to realize that the region was changing for the better. It became obvious that Netanyahu’s successful campaign of expanding Israel’s engagement with Africa (“Israel is returning to Africa and Africa is returning to Israel”) was producing positive results in the Arab world as well. The immediate publication of the meeting in a statement to the press – as agreed by both Netanyahu and Burhan – showed that Sudan wanted this relationship to be public.

Three days later, on February 6^th, 2020, Burhan announced that Sudan would allow Israeli planes to use its airspace. This move significantly reduced the flight time between Tel Aviv and Johannesburg, as well as to other destinations. Indeed, on February 16^th, 2020, the first-ever commercial Israeli flight entered Sudanese airspace, a historic moment that proved Burhan’s commitment to normalizing ties with Israel.

Eventually, on October 23^rd, 2020, a three-way telephone call was held between Burhan, Netanyahu, and then-US President Donald Trump. In that phone call, it was agreed that Sudan would sign the Abraham Accords and normalize ties with Israel. In exchange, the United States would remove Sudan from its list of state-sponsors of terror. On January 6^th, 2021, Sudan formally signed the Abraham Accords and on April 20^th, 2021, Burhan canceled the official Sudanese boycott of Israel.

Since then, however, there has been little progress made on reaching a full normalization agreement. The Biden Administration, as well as the Bennett-Lapid government, both chose to maintain distance from Burhan. Sadly, potential avenues for collaboration were overlooked. But Burhan was patient and remained optimistic that Israel would eventually advance its normalization with Sudan. This is evidenced by the fact that in September 2022, Burhan said in an interview that he would visit Israel if and when invited – as well as in November 2022, when he was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Netanyahu on his return to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.

Unfortunately, the rebellion launched by rival forces in April 2023 pushed Sudan into a devastating civil war, which has made the situation even more difficult. Burhan has managed to retain control of much of Sudan, while the rebel forces were repeatedly sanctioned and condemned by US and Western officials.

Burhan also made significant trips to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which remain supportive of him. Additionally, Burhan represented Sudan at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2023 and also met with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine.

Eventually, given the lack of robust support from the US, Israel and other Western nations in the context of the Sudanese civil war, Burhan reluctantly accepted Iranian offers to re-establish diplomatic relations and sign arms deals. This unfortunate development highlights an important reality which Israel must recognize: When Israel neglects its relations, anywhere in the world, our enemies quickly expand their influence. Wherever Israel is not actively pursuing peace, prosperity and security – Iran is actively pursuing terrorism, war, and genocide.

Like the Saudis, Burhan would have preferred not to do a deal with the devil in Iran. This can be seen from his recent decision to prohibit the construction of an Iranian Naval Base in Port Sudan. But just as the decision by Western leaders to distance themselves from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led Saudi Arabia to draw closer to China and Iran, the West’s similar approach to Burhan has led to the rekindling of Sudan-Iran ties. Just as peace with Saudi Arabia is still possible despite the Saudis re-establishing ties with Iran, finalizing Israel’s peace agreement with Sudan is still possible despite Burhan’s deal with Iran.

Israel should consider offering Burhan options for security cooperation that would allow Sudan to cancel its agreement with Iran, or at the very least, to reduce its need for Iranian military assistance. This could include presenting Burhan with possibilities for cooperation with Israeli defense companies, including those that have expanded their relationships with other Abraham Accords countries since the signing of the Accords. It is imperative that Israel – not Iran – have a strong relationship with the Sudanese military and security forces. Particularly as Israel’s war against Hamas continues, Israel and Sudan should work together to prevent Sudanese territory from being used to smuggle Iranian weapons to the Gaza Strip. This security coordination would strongly bolster Israel’s regional deterrence.

Sudan also has potential to help bring prosperity to the region, including through enhanced agricultural cooperation with Israel. Sudan is the third-largest country in Africa and home to expansive stretches of fertile farmland. In the past, Sudan served as a major exporter of wheat and cotton. As a result of the Russia-Ukraine War, Sudan has the potential to once again become a major supplier of wheat to Europe and Africa. It can partner with Israeli agri-tech companies to do so. This would be a major achievement for both the Israeli and Sudanese economies. It would cause the people of the region to benefit from the fruits of this peace in the most literal sense.

Some continue to question Burhan’s commitment to normalize relations with Israel. As noted, Burhan has openly demonstrated his seriousness on peace with Israel by meeting publicly with Israel’s Prime Minister, annulling Sudan’s boycott of Israel, opening Sudanese airspace to Israeli flights, and joining the Abraham Accords. The various rebel groups in Sudan have taken no such steps towards normalization with Israel – certainly not in public.

Initiatives for security and economic cooperation with Burhan and his government, despite the civil war in Sudan, and the Israel-Hamas conflict, would help ensure that Sudan remains inside the Abraham Accords. As a result of this crucial cooperation at such a critical time, Israel and Sudan could finally sign the long-awaited normalization agreement and realize the potential of peace.