The funeral of Nasrallah and his successor Hashem Safieddine – who managed to serve in his position for less than a month before being eliminated – was attended by masses in Lebanon (especially from the Shiite community) as well as delegations from Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and other countries. It was Hezbollah’s show of force, a way to project messages to its rivals and enemies in the shadow of the unprecedented blow it suffered from Israel.

At home in Lebanon, it seeks to convey to its Shi’ite support, which is its source of security and political power, that it is still the beloved organization despite criticism from its social base, due to the hardships of war. The massive funeral also signaled to Hezbollah’s political rivals that, irrespective of its political weakening, as reflected in the appointment of Lebanese Army commander Joseph Aoun to the presidency, the group remains a significant factor in politics.

To its enemies outside Lebanon, mainly Israel and the United States, Hezbollah needs to demonstrate that it is still strong, regardless of its extensive loss of leaders and commanders and serious damage to its missile and rocket systems.

In its media and social network campaign entitled “I remain loyal to my covenant,” Hezbollah highlights the importance of the adherence of its social base. The organization needs masses of recruits from the Shi’ite community to fill the ranks left by thousands of commanders and activists eliminated during the war, whether by beeper attack, targeted assassination, or in the ongoing IDF attacks over 13 months of fighting.

The widespread use of Nasrallah’s figure since his assassination, especially in the funeral, symbolizes a transition from the Nasrallah era to an era of his legacy. In the absence of a figure with his abilities, as Tehran itself admitted, Hezbollah needs Nasrallah’s legacy to advance its aspiration to offset the military, economic, and intelligence blows it suffered. Nasrallah’s figure will now be used by the organization’s leadership to instill motivation in the Shi’ite youth and in the ranks of Hezbollah’s various arrays, to continue the fight despite unprecedented challenges and difficulties.

The fulcrum of Iranian action

One cannot undervalue Nasrallah’s importance in promoting Hezbollah and relations with Iran.

Nasrallah knew Persian and was educated for two years in religious seminaries in Iran’s Qom in the late 1980s, consequently developing intimate working relations with the Iranian regime’s leadership. While Qasem Soleimani commanded the Quds Force (1998-2020), he worked jointly and closely with Nasrallah in planning severe attacks against Israel and the US.

Their respective successors, Naim Qassem in the Hezbollah leadership and Esmail Qaani in the Quds Force do not come close to the abilities of their predecessors. The assassinations of Nasrallah and Soleimani served as a severe blow to the Khamenei resistance axis and accentuated the critical importance of targeted assassinations in the fight against terrorism.

With the weakening of its proxies, Iran’s first line of defense, the Iranian regime recognized that it must immediately strengthen and rebuild Hezbollah. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei emphasized that the participation of the high-ranking Iranian delegation (headed by Islamic Republic Guard Corps deputy commander Ali Fadavi and others) symbolizes Tehran’s commitment to continue its assistance to Hezbollah.

Adding this statement to Khamenei’s declaration that Hezbollah had won the war shows that both Hezbollah and Iran realize that the organization must not be perceived as weak and battered for fear of a slippery slope that could endanger its existence.

Israel’s operational and conscious activities during the funeral were important, [with its Air Force flying over the procession in Beirut]. They conveyed to the terrorist organization that Israel is determined not to allow it to be resurrected.

Having managed to force a ceasefire on Hezbollah, Israel is signaling that it does not intend to allow the organization to rearm, reactivate its money-smuggling operations from Iran, or reestablish itself in the area south of the Litani River.

Of course, alongside activity directed against Hezbollah, Israel must also act against the head of the snake, its Iranian patron.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 26, 2025.

The Gaza drama is putting Egypt’s peace with Israel under new strain. This is not the result of only events in the past weeks but is rather the culmination of much longer-term dynamics that cannot easily be mastered and reversed at this stage. The conflagration that Hamas began on October 7, 2023, may have triggered a chain of events that exposes these long-term trends and failures and brings them to a head — perhaps even including a broader war.

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and material to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability. Egypt tried to bury the legacy of its failure by focusing on Israel’s taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border. The Egyptians claim, inaccurately, that Israel’s presence violated the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The Philadelphi diversion did not solve the basic problem, which was that, for Israel, October 7 had rendered obsolete the reemergence of a Gazan population under the control of either Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. After October 7, for Israel to allow Palestinian agency so close to its heart became too dangerous, a threat to Israel’s existence. Resurrecting the status quo, even dressed in some modification, was no longer feasible. But this meant Cairo could no longer contain the Gazan problem across the border at arm’s length. So it began to reinforce its border — not to stop smuggling, but to stop the potential outflow of Palestinians. This, however, solved nothing, and again dumped the entire Gaza problem — a problem that Egypt had inflated by failing to control the border — on to Israel. Further complicating the situation, Cairo recently began to deploy armor and troops nearby, in violation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The demilitarization of the Sinai is the alpha and omega of the treaty. Its violation is itself a gravely serious affair.

What has unfolded since October 7, and is accelerating now, is no doubt a failure of immediate policy in the Biden presidency, as well as Obama’s. But it is a far greater failure that is indigenous to the region and dates back for most to the last century. Egypt’s policy on Gaza was just one manifestation of the typical regional pattern of dealing with problems emanating from ideological danger: indulge and reconcile with the problem by exporting it to others who will deal with it.

That pattern solves nothing. The problem returns, but having acquired a far more dangerous form. Egypt did that with the Gamaat al-Islami, and it returned. Saudi Arabia did that with bin Ladin, and it exploded back on 9/11. Syria mobilized the Palestinians in the camps in Tripoli, Lebanon in the 2000s to create Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaida Iraq (Musab al-Zarqawi). Both eventually returned to haunt them as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra/Haya at-Tahrir ash-Shams (HTS). The Arab world’s proclivity to export its problems outward for someone else to deal with rather than directly resolve or erase them consistently comes home to roost. Gaza, indeed the Palestinians as a whole, are no exception.

So, the Palestinian/Gaza problem returns to haunt Egypt. Egypt’s 75-year policy of appeasing and paying the Palestinian piper under the assumption it is Israel’s problem has finally come home for Egypt itself. Israel can no longer tolerate Palestinian agency in Gaza, and the destruction there will leave no real option for Israel other than the removal of the population of Gaza — perhaps temporarily, but more likely permanently. Both Jerusalem and Washington have now come to this conclusion, resulting in the Trump plan for Gaza. Egypt opposes the American plan to resettle Gazans to safer lands because doing so would import the problem it so desperately exported. It would move it inside the house.

Though this is a circumstance of Egypt’s own making, it places Egypt in a difficult position.

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts the Trump plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or “Nakba.” It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first Nakba in 1948. Any leader that fails to stop a second Nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Egyptian President El-Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

Ultimately, this could prove fatal. If Egypt buckles, El-Sisi would be seen as a wounded fish by the region’s sharks. Turkey, Qatar and Iran — Cairo’s true enemies — will gather around the limping Egyptian nation and incite the population against the government in an invigorated attempt to carry to power in Cairo the Islamist sweep that in December seized Damascus. That threat could topple the government.

On the other hand, refusing the Trump plan will drive a wedge in US-Egyptian relations, and likely will terminate the U.S. aid and weapons sales, which have totaled more than $80 billion since 1978. El-Sisi may figure that he can weather the U.S. opposition but cannot weather an upheaval from below fomented by Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. And indeed, if current reports coming out of Qatari news channels are true, El-Sisi already has made his choice and decided to postpone indefinitely the trip to Washington that had been scheduled for next week. In these circumstances, it is possible that Egyptian-U.S. relations may have already entered into a much deeper crisis than is widely appreciated.

How far can this go?

The context includes signs that Iran has made a decision to move toward confrontation. That means the Iranian proxies, Hizballah and the Houthis, will escalate. Within 48 hours of Hamas leaders visiting Tehran for consultations, Hamas announced it is suspending the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, Ayatollah Khamenei slammed the door shut on negotiations with the US over its nuclear program. Then, during anniversary celebrations this week of the Islamic Revolution, billboards with facsimiles of a death notice for President Trump appeared, as well as a passion play of his trial and hanging. Iran has clearly decided to escalate against the United States. That pushes Hamas to return Gaza to war — the last thing Egypt needs right now.

While the current Egyptian threats, training, rhetoric, and deployments are increasingly belligerent to Israel, the assumption of most Western analysts and intelligence agencies is that it is chest-beating. Most in the West assume that an Egyptian-Israeli war is unthinkable. That assumption should be reexamined. Unfortunately, the idea that war is off the table for Egypt is not solid. There are scenarios in which Egypt would see it in its interest to go to war, even though it knows it would be devastating, that it would lose the Sinai, and that it would terminate the U.S. alliance and aid.

Brigadier General (Reserve) Amir Avivi, the founder and chairman of Israel’s Defense and Security Forum, said in a recent briefing that the Israel Defense Forces should be prepared for a war with either Egypt or Turkey in the next 20 years. “Look not at intentions, but capabilities,” he advised.

Why would Egypt see it in its interest to invite the destruction of its army and Air Force, alienate the Americans, and lose the Sinai? Losing assets and territory would damage the Egyptian regime deeply, but perhaps not as deeply as would El-Sisi’s evincing unmanly weakness. Regimes survive in the region on their ability to project ruthless, confident resolve to survive. Any sign of fear, weakness, or faltering confidence can quickly turn fatal almost immediately.

As painful as it would be for El-Sisi to lose a bit of his army and the Sinai, it may yet to him be viewed as preferable to the damage he would sustain in appearing to cower to Israel and accept, even participate in, a second Nakba. China and Russia can replace the materiel. Qatar can replace the funding.

But nobody can restore El-Sisi’s or his regime’s honor, and nobody in Egypt will forgive him for forfeiting it. Especially not Egypt’s real enemies — Turkey, Qatar, and Iran.

Under those circumstances, El-Sisi may decide to assert his manliness and make a stand, knowing that he would lose a good bit of the military as well as the Sinai. He may imagine he would emerge from this looking tough, willing to accept risk and inflict lots of losses, even on his own people, in order to survive and uphold the stature of the Egyptian military government.

Added to this is an unfortunate dynamic that has previously gripped Egyptian-Israeli relations, a pattern of actors whipping themselves into a frenzy over which they lose control and wind up in a war they may not have originally intended.

It would thus be wise for Western intelligence agencies and other interested observers to at least consider that there is a real potential for an Egyptian-Israeli war. If such an unfortunate turn of events is thrust onto Israel, then it is one from which Israel would need to emerge with a victory as decisive as 1967. It was that Israeli victory, after all, that eventually led Sadat, Begin, and Carter to the Camp David Accords and nearly half a century of uneasy peace.

Published in The Editors, February 12, 2025.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statements to a Hamas delegation in Tehran on Saturday regarding the need to rebuild Gaza leave no doubt about Iran’s ambition to restore Hamas’s infrastructure, which was severely damaged during the war. Experience shows that this reconstruction will focus on Hamas rather than Gaza’s civilian population.

With Iranian assistance, the terrorist organization will rebuild its underground network while leaving Gaza’s residents without shelter or protection from the bombings that Israel will be forced to carry out in response to Hamas’s attacks – attacks that, as usual, will be launched from within civilian population centers.

In doing so, the regime led by Khamenei is complicit in Hamas’s war crimes.

The Iranian force responsible for facilitating Hamas is the Quds Force, specifically Unit 190, which handles smuggling operations. This unit relies on a variety of alleged civilian infrastructures, including humanitarian aid organizations and religious associations. It has gained significant expertise, as evidenced by the diverse arsenal Hamas possessed on the eve of its October 7 massacre.

Khamenei’s order to rebuild Hamas highlights Tehran’s role in the war and the importance of restoring the resistance axis for Iran’s security. Iran can no longer be allowed to remain behind the scenes, hiding behind its network of proxies. Tehran has already suffered significant blows during the war, including the loss of senior Quds Force officers on a scale not seen since the Islamic Revolution.

Despite Khamenei’s denials, Tehran’s security is closely tied to the capabilities of the resistance axis, which serves as its defensive shield. Accordingly, his directive to rebuild Hamas underscores the urgency of restoring Iran’s network of proxies, including Hezbollah.

Israel actively working to thwart Iran

As demonstrated by Israel’s operations during the ceasefire in Lebanon, it is actively working to thwart Iran and Hezbollah’s efforts to reestablish smuggling routes and arms shipments. In response to these challenges, Iran has, in recent months, established an aerial smuggling route from Tehran to Beirut’s airport, necessitating Israeli countermeasures with American backing.

Israel and the US must exert maximum effort to prevent the Quds Force from rebuilding Hamas, as its restoration would erase Israel’s military achievements in the war and enable the terrorist organization to carry out another massacre.

Furthermore, Israel and the US should promote a comprehensive strategic plan for an all-out war against Hamas. A key element of this strategy is cutting it off from Iran, which serves as its primary source of financial and military support – resources that Hamas now needs as desperately as air to breathe.

Egypt, for instance, has proven to be a weak link in this regard, making it essential for the Trump administration to pressure Cairo into taking significant action to cut Hamas off from its sources of support in Iran.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 11, 2025.

The newly re-elected US President, Donald Trump, declared last week that his first trip abroad in office might be to Saudi Arabia, even though US presidents traditionally make their first diplomatic visit to the United Kingdom. The unconventional leader in the Oval Office had already broken this tradition in his previous term when he first visited Riyadh. Trump added that he would once again diverge from convention if he could reach a trade agreement with the Arab kingdom worth $450 to $500 billion.

This statement was preceded by a phone call between the newly inaugurated president and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who pledged to expand trade with the US and invest $600 billion “or perhaps even more” in the American economy over the next four years. This suggests that Trump’s planned visit is likely to materialize.

The extended Trump family has longstanding business interests in Saudi Arabia. The Trump Organization is expected to build hotels in the kingdom, Saudi business partners are promoting extensive projects with the organization in other countries, and the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, has secured investments worth approximately $2 billion from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund.

The rulers in Riyadh, who are well-versed in large-scale economic investments, including leveraging them for political gain, are already jumping on the bandwagon of the new US president and will undoubtedly continue to align with him swiftly. They aim to use this momentum to expand their economic and diplomatic foothold in Washington, thereby elevating their status in the region and worldwide.

For his part, Trump is eager to bolster Saudi Arabia’s regional standing, particularly by reviving the normalization agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem. This deal had been on the table before the war with Hamas, but the Biden administration failed to secure it. The new White House administration sees such an agreement as a potential solution to several pressing Middle Eastern issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Gaza. In recent days, progress seems to have been made on this front, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington this week may focus on this matter.

Meanwhile, the convergence of interests between Riyadh and Washington, driven by their mutual desire to strengthen ties and potentially shape a new regional framework, is occurring alongside another significant trend in the Middle East: the decline of Iran and the Shiite axis it led, along with some of its key proxies.

Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Hamas has lost most of its leadership, its military capabilities have been significantly reduced, its weapon stockpiles have dwindled, and Gaza has been left in ruins with no clear path to reconstruction. Hezbollah has suffered a crushing blow in Lebanon, its leadership has been decimated, and its political power has weakened as a result. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s regime – an Iranian ally – has been ousted, and even in Iraq, efforts are underway to curb the power of Shiite militias backed by Tehran.

These developments have eroded Iran’s power and influence throughout the region. While grappling with deep economic crises and internal social challenges, Iran has watched as its various proxies, cultivated for the fight against Israel, have fallen like dominoes. The Islamic Republic itself has been targeted twice by Israeli Air Force strikes on its own soil and has been unable to effectively respond. At the same time, speculation that Trump may launch a maximum pressure campaign against Iran, though this has not yet materialized, further isolates the Ayatollah regime.

As Iran retreats, several actors are stepping in to shape the region’s future. Israel is, of course, one of them, though it has primarily operated in the military sphere. Other key players include Egypt and Qatar, both vying for influence in post-war Gaza, and Turkey, which is leveraging its influence over the rebel faction that has taken control of Syria to advance its war against the Kurds and strengthen its grip on the country.

Saudi Arabia, too, is seizing this opportunity. It seeks to capitalize on the decline of the Shiite crescent to establish itself as a leading regional force, this time at the head of a Sunni bloc whose interests and goals may be significantly different from those of Tehran.

A new chapter

Syria has broken free from over 50 years of Assad family rule, thanks to the Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham rebel group. Without Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s support, the rebels might not have been able to seize control of the country so swiftly. However, despite the rebels’ ongoing ties to Ankara, the first destination of Syria’s new foreign minister was not the Turkish capital, but Riyadh.

“We seek to open a new and bright chapter in the history of Syria-Saudi relations, one that reflects our shared past,” stated Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, Syria’s new foreign minister. He arrived in the kingdom at Riyadh’s invitation and spent his visit giving interviews advocating for the removal of sanctions on Syria following its regime change.

Al-Shibani’s choice to push this narrative in Riyadh was no coincidence. Shortly after Assad’s ouster, Saudi Arabia began pressuring world powers, especially the European Union, to change their policies toward Syria’s new regime. In mid-January, Riyadh hosted an international conference of European and Middle Eastern diplomats to discuss Syria’s future, publicly calling for the lifting of sanctions on Damascus. The kingdom pledged to help Syria’s new government stand on its feet and quickly began an airlift of humanitarian aid to the country.

Meanwhile, Syria’s new strongman, Ahmed al-Sharaa (or Mohammed al-Julani), who last week officially appointed himself president, dismantled armed factions, and dissolved the Baath Party, knows where his bread is buttered. In an interview with Al Arabiya, the Saudi news channel, Syria’s new president praised Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 initiative and expressed enthusiasm about attracting Saudi investments. He also reassured the Gulf states that Iran no longer poses a threat in Syria. “Saudi Arabia will play a significant role in Syria’s future,” he emphasized, recalling that he spent his early childhood in Riyadh and would be happy to visit again.

The rapprochement between the two countries is particularly significant given their relations during Assad’s rule, which experienced far more downturns than upswings. Even before the Arab Spring, tensions were evident between Assad’s regime and the Saudi kingdom, due in part to Damascus’ support for Iran, particularly in connection with the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon. A brief reconciliation attempt in 2009 did not last, and relations between the two countries quickly deteriorated again.

The uprisings that erupted across much of the Middle East in 2011 were not welcomed by Riyadh’s rulers, but in Syria, they supported the rebels, again, largely due to their strained relations with Assad and their desire to curb Iran’s influence in the country, which was seen as a regional rival. Thus, despite Saudi Arabia’s general reluctance to encourage elements that destabilized the regional order, it found itself aligning with several Syrian opposition groups. However, it was careful to distance itself from factions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, preferring to support more secular or nationalist groups.

The disconnect between the two sides remained largely unchanged until about two years ago. The fact that Assad remained in power despite more than a decade of rebellion, the desire to use reconciliation with him to get closer to Iran, and the necessity of cooperating with Damascus to combat drug smuggling into the kingdom, all these factors contributed to a gradual thaw in relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria. Meanwhile, Russia, which had previously been the dominant and most powerful player in Syria, became preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, leaving the Syrian arena primarily in Iran’s hands. Determined to prevent Tehran from becoming Assad’s sole and primary backer, the Saudis sought rapprochement with his regime.

The fall of the Alawite dictator’s regime suddenly presented the Saudi leadership with an entirely new opportunity. Within a short time, they gained access to a new government eager for their support, one that explicitly sought to expel Iran from Syria entirely. The threat of Captagon drug smuggling significantly declined, as did concerns about a new wave of refugees. On the surface, everything seemed set for Saudi Arabia to make a full-scale entry into Syria.

However, for now, the Saudis appear to be exercising patience and caution. One possible reason is their concern over the Islamist background of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and the possibility that it might promote a jihadist ideology within Syria and beyond. The way the new regime stabilizes itself, the policies it adopts, and the laws it implements will all play a crucial role in shaping Riyadh’s future relationship with Damascus. The disbanding of armed factions last week was a step in the right direction.

Still, Saudi Arabia has much to gain from Syria in the current period. Therefore, despite its cautious approach, Riyadh is likely to become involved in numerous initiatives in the country. Among other objectives, the kingdom aims to prevent Turkey from dominating the Syrian arena, much like Iran did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The Saudis also want a significant stake in Syria’s reconstruction and redevelopment projects and seek to position themselves as a key supplier of oil, fuel, and potentially even natural gas to Damascus, which, until now, has relied on Iranian imports.

Reforms and aid

This situation is particularly interesting in light of a similar development in neighboring Lebanon, where Saudi Arabia has also found itself facing a new scenario filled with opportunities – something that just a few months ago seemed impossible. Riyadh has long harbored concerns over Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, and the two countries plunged into a major crisis in 2021. When a Lebanese minister criticized Saudi Arabia’s war against the Houthis in Yemen that year, the Saudis responded with severe punitive measures: they expelled Lebanon’s ambassador from Riyadh and halted all imports from Lebanon. For an impoverished country like Lebanon, this was a devastating blow, and all attempts since then to reverse the decision proved futile.

However, Hezbollah suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the IDF in the war, its top leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, was eliminated, and during the ceasefire with Israel, Lebanon reached an agreement to elect a president, a move that reshaped the balance of power in the country and significantly weakened the Shiite axis. Into this power vacuum stepped Saudi Arabia, which, together with Western nations, pushed for the election of Joseph Aoun, the Lebanese Army commander, to the presidency. This position, the most powerful and significant in Lebanon, had remained vacant for two years due to domestic political deadlock over who should hold the office.

Aoun, a member of the Christian community, was indeed elected with support from Shiite political forces in Lebanon, but it was clear that he was not their preferred candidate. Moreover, the Shiites suffered an even greater setback when Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam, the President of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, as prime minister. Salam’s appointment passed in the Lebanese parliament without the support of Hezbollah and Amal, which together form the Shiite bloc, and he was widely regarded as Saudi Arabia’s preferred candidate.

With Aoun as president and Salam as prime minister, Riyadh feels it finally has partners it can work with, leaders who prioritize the interests of Lebanon itself over narrow factional or external interests, particularly those of Hezbollah and Iran.

It is no surprise, then, that shortly after Salam was appointed prime minister, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister visited Lebanon, marking the first visit by a Saudi minister to the country in 15 years. From there, Prince Faisal continued on to neighboring Syria. In Lebanon, he met with President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, and afterward, he expressed his hope that “we will soon see real reform in Lebanon, a commitment to the future rather than the past, so that we can increase our involvement in the country.”

Prince Faisal’s emphasis on reforms was no coincidence. For years, Riyadh has conditioned all economic aid to Lebanon on economic, legal, and political reforms. Analysts explain that the foreign minister’s visit signals Saudi confidence that the appointments of Aoun and Salam have put Lebanon on the right track toward these reforms, paving the way for real and meaningful cooperation.

Another key focus was the diminishing influence of Iran. Analysts noted that without Hezbollah and Iran weakening in Lebanon, neither Aoun nor Salam could have been appointed, nor would Saudi involvement have been possible.

A further sign of Riyadh’s growing influence at Tehran’s expense in Lebanon came from an announcement by President Joseph Aoun. He declared that his first official diplomatic visit as Lebanon’s new leader would be to Saudi Arabia, where he is expected to sign dozens of economic and security agreements.

“Saudi Arabia is emerging as the great winner in the Middle East,” explained Lina Khatib, a Chatham House expert, to the Financial Times. “The major changes in Lebanon and Syria highlight Riyadh’s central role in the region. Neither country could have made these shifts without Saudi support.”

In the coming period, Saudi Arabia will need to assess the stability of both Lebanon and Syria and accordingly adjust its level of involvement and investment in these countries. If Syria’s new government stabilizes and develops the country, and if the Lebanon ceasefire holds without renewed clashes between the IDF and Hezbollah, it will be of utmost importance to Riyadh.

For example, Lebanese military cooperation with hostile elements in southern Lebanon last week was a troubling sign for Saudi Arabia. While Riyadh supported the IDF’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Aoun, as a former army commander, is expected to restrain Lebanese troops and ensure they do not get involved, even indirectly, in hostilities against Israel.

In this regard, Saudi Arabia’s interests align closely with Washington’s: to prevent Syria and Lebanon from being drawn into regional conflicts, particularly any potential continuation of the war in Gaza. Meanwhile, both countries are also highly motivated to prevent a renewed Iranian foothold and the resurgence of Tehran’s proxies.

Israel, for its part, should feel encouraged by Saudi Arabia’s involvement in both Lebanon and Syria. This window of opportunity, in which Riyadh is interested in advancing normalization with Israel and a strategic agreement with the US, could potentially lead to the formation of a new regional framework and new norms.

The Saudis, for their part, continue to declare their desire for progress on the Palestinian issue – whether this is a statement aimed at appeasing public opinion in the kingdom or a genuine interest of the Saudi leadership – but in Jerusalem, many believe that a mutually acceptable formula can be reached.

In any case, Saudi Arabia’s regional strengthening is far preferable to the alternative, namely, the entry of other nations, particularly Iran or other representatives of the Shiite axis. The same applies to so-called “moderate” Sunni players in the region, such as Qatar or Turkey, especially given that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared last week his support for the “spirit of resistance” demonstrated by Hamas in its war against Israel.

From Israel’s perspective, as long as Saudi Arabia’s growing influence does not conflict with its security interests, it is important to encourage Saudi involvement in Lebanon and Syria. In any case, dialogue and negotiations with actors like Saudi Arabia should be prioritized over continuing engagement with regional players like Qatar, which has so far supported Hamas and the terrorism it generates.

Since this interest aligns with President Trump’s vision, Israel stands only to benefit from such a scenario.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 02, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

A Failed Trial Run in Gaza

Facing refusal of the Palestinians to accept generous offers for independence, in 2005, Israel decided to unilaterally withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, essentially creating a trial run for a Palestinian state. Israel wanted nothing more than to see the Strip prosper and become the ‘Singapore of the Middle East’ and Gaza had every opportunity to become one if its people so desired. But alas, you can unilaterally withdrawal, but you cannot then dictate what kind of state the Gazan Palestinians will choose to build. It turns out that the best this society could come up with was a genocidal Islamist terror state.

If the Palestinian Arabs genuinely desired a state to coexist peacefully alongside the Jewish State, the hundred-year-long conflict would never have arisen, and various creative arrangements would have been made in order to live as neighbors and prosper. Israelis were so ecstatic at this prospect in the 1990s that they were willing to import their own terrorist arch-enemy, Yasser Arafat, and grant him everything possible to make the project succeed. But Palestinian Arabs have proven by their words and actions that they do not desire a state coexisting peacefully alongside the Jewish State, and no amount of hoping otherwise will make it so. The Palestinians have agency and must bear responsibility for their poor decisions.

An Existential Threat to Israel

A Palestinian state would not only be a gross distortion of justice but would also constitute an intolerable and existential threat to Israel’s existence. It would swiftly become a Hamas controlled terror state and it is for this reason the PA has not held elections since 2006, as it knows that Hamas has more support among the Arab population of Judea and Samaria than the supposedly moderate Fatah. Such that if elections were held in the PA, Hamas would likely come to control its institutions and we would witness a repeat of the Gaza experiment…

To read the full article, click on the link.

For Part 1 of this essay please see “The Case Against a Palestinian State – Part 1: An Unjust Cause” here.

Published in Times of Israel, January 30, 2025. 

For decades now, common wisdom has been that the only solution to the hundred-year conflict between Israel and its neighbors is to establish an independent Arab-Palestinian state alongside Israel. So engrained has this thinking become that many have been unable to fathom an alternative response to the Palestinian Hamas massacre of October 7^th than to double down on promoting such a state.

However, even those who strongly oppose the idea that the result of such horrendous behavior should be an award of independence, have mainly couched their opposition in terms of the timing and not necessarily the essence of the matter. Though the ‘a state now would be a prize for terror’ argument is correct and in a saner world perhaps suffice to put the issue to rest for the foreseeable future, it does not address the real issue at hand. In fact, the October 7^th massacre is only the most recent and grave symptom of the abject failure of the Palestinian national movement to demonstrate that it is capable and deserving of an independent state.

With the re-inauguration of President Donald Trump, there is a historic opportunity to move beyond the tried and failed policies of previous administrations, Republican and Democrat alike. We must recognize the truth, that the idea of a State of Palestine is one of the most unjust initiatives of the latter half of the 20^th century and if ever established would constitute a geopolitical disaster of the highest order; for Israel, for moderate Arab States in the region, and for the United States. Any moral and straight-thinking person should abandon it and start considering alternative arrangements for self-rule for Palestinians, conditioned on civilized behavior and demand an end to the idea of perpetual Palestinian refugeedom. Here’s why.

Published in Times of Israel, January 19, 2025. 

There is a spurt of great optimism on both sides of the political spectrum in the United States, and even Israel, that the Lebanese government, now that it has installed Joseph Aoun as its president, will finally leverage Israel’s devastating victory over Hizballah to assert Lebanon’s sovereignty.

In this optimistic view, the Lebanese government will uphold the November ceasefire between Hizballah and Israel. It will do so by executing both U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, a 2006 measure under which Hizballah was to be removed from south of the Litani River, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, a 2005 measure under which all armed factions are to be disarmed and the monopoly of power be returned to the Lebanese government. Moreover, for the first time in five decades, powerful regional forces seem held at bay; the PLO is weakened and Iran and Hizballah are laid waste. Lebanon is back in Lebanese hands. And indeed, the optimists assert, the speech Aoun gave upon assuming office contained language that lends substance to this promise: “The era of Hizballah is over; We will disarm all of them.”

Mark me down as highly skeptical of that view. And not only because of the jadedness and curmudgeonly essence that can come with an analyst’s age and experience, but because of the underlying reality. Lebanon likely is far from out of the woods, far from adequately executing its obligations under the ceasefire plan, and certainly far from emerging as a calm state at peace with Israel.

The problem is because Lebanon’s instability arises not from the external array of forces, but from the foundations of the Lebanese state, which are then leveraged by external forces.

The quote that never was

Let’s start, first, with the most obvious. President Aoun was reported to have said that line about how “The era of Hizballah is over; We will disarm all of them.” He was even praised for it by President Trump’s incoming national security adviser. The problem is he did not say that, not in the text of the speech or as it was delivered in Arabic. He actually said:

“My mandate begins today, and I pledge to serve all Lebanese, wherever they are, as the first servant of the country, upholding the national pact and practicing the full powers of the presidency as an impartial mediator between institutions … Interference in the judiciary is forbidden, and there will be no immunity for criminals or corrupt individuals. There is no place for mafias, drug trafficking, or money laundering in Lebanon.”

He raised this in the context of the judiciary, not the military. Regarding the disbanding of the Hizballah militia as a military force, he was careful in his words and suggested it would be subsumed into the state rather than outright eliminated. Such an integration of Hizballah into the Lebanese Armed Forces is one of Israel’s greatest fears, because it could put Israel into a war not with a militia but with a sovereign country on its own border. Aoun said:

“The Lebanese state – I repeat the Lebanese state – will get rid of the Israeli occupation … My era will include the discussion of our defensive strategy to enable the Lebanese state to get rid of the Israeli occupation and to retaliate against its aggression.”

The structure that cannot reform

Words in the Middle East mean only so much. Some might therefore dismiss as inconsequential this episode of “the quote that never was.” Yet it reflects something significant and far deeper. The Lebanese state — the “National Pact” to which Aoun refers — cannot develop into what the optimists hope it will, because its structure is not aligned with the only form of Lebanon that potentially justifies its existence as an independent state, let alone one at peace with Israel.

Understanding why requires dipping into the history of Lebanon. There’s a popular misconception that Lebanon exists only as a result of a colonial gift to a Christian community by the French at the end of World War I. Actually, Lebanon has an older and more defined reason to exist than almost any other state in the region but Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. The colonial definition of Lebanon established at the end of World War I unwittingly and out of the best intentions to the Lebanese Christians undermined that essence.

Lebanon embodies the result of a major event: the Battle of Ayn Dera in 1711, where the powerful Chehab clan converted to Christianity from Sunni Islam, aligned with the powerful Khazen Maronite clan, and unified the remaining non-Greek Orthodox Christians into a powerful force, all aligned with half of the Druze under the Jumblatt, Talhuq, Imad and Abd al-Malik clans. This Maronite-Druze coalition won against their premier enemy — the Ottoman empire and its governors of Sidon and Damascus — and expelled the Ottoman proxies, the Arslan, Alam al-Din, and Sawaf Druze clans from Mount Lebanon to the east in what today is the area of Jebel Druze/Suweida in Syria. The key enemy around which the Lebanese state was formed in 1711 was the Ottoman threat from Damascus and the area of Sidon. Ousting the Turks was a Christian and Druze project. The Shiites were not even a factor, although they too held as their nemesis the Ottoman specter, of which the Sunni Arabs was a mere instrument.

Aoun’s remarks are a reminder of the problem with the present Lebanese structure. The military and its government are fundamentally anchored to the National Pact. That National Pact is a concept of a multi-confessional equilibrium among four communities, rather than the idea of Lebanon as established as a result of the battle of Ayn Dara in 1711 around a Maronite-Druze core. This multi-confessional concept divorced Lebanon from its only reason for existence: to be a homeland for a Christian state aligned with the Druze ally. Lebanon as constructed embodies the multi-confessionalism, rather than the alliance of the 1711 Battle of Ayn Dera and its results.

At first, this was a moot point: the Maronites and the Druze were a strong majority, and thus dominated the state. But the Greek Orthodox were never fully on board with the idea, and over the 20^th century, the Sunni populations grew, largely through immigration, as did the Shiite, to the point at which the Christians were no longer the majority. The multi-confessional equilibrium thus shifted from being a cover for Maronite dominance to being a genuinely rickety, artificial coalition of forces that could not manage to overpower each other. Any attempt by any faction to overpower the other resulted in a breakdown of the equilibrium, a collapse of civic order, and violent conflict.

The current structure of the Lebanese government and its premier manifestation, the armed forces, are manifestations of this equilibrium of forces. A more coherent, peaceful, and successful Lebanon would reject the National Pact and return to its original and only raison d’être as a regional Christian nation that gathers the various nearby Christian communities into a homeland offering hope for regional survival.

Strategic forces at work

The looming threats from the outside push the fragile artificial institution of the Lebanese state and army to hedge yet further rather than move decisively to extirpate the remains of Hizballah. The inherent instability and misalignment with the 1711 purpose invite those external interventions.

Lebanon has a neighbor next door — Syria — that essentially has never recognized Lebanon‘s existence as a valid state. Syria was also established as an Arab state with large minorities — a multi-ethnic, confessional quilt, and as such is not easily distinguished from a multi-confessional Lebanon. The mix is different; Syria has a much larger Sunni Arab community, with large Alawite minorities. And the Christians in Syria were largely Greek Orthodox who had made their peace with Arab nationalism because it allowed them to transform the irreconcilable and potentially mortal Turkish nemesis into a digestible Arab one. If Lebanon remains a multi-confessional state rather than narrowly a Maronite state with a Druze entity, then its digestion by Syria is conceivable.

Most concerning for Lebanon is that what is emerging in Syria is not a multi-confessional nation with enough of its own problems to leave Lebanon alone, but rather a Sunni-Arab state under Turkish influence and possible suzerainty. Turks are flooding the new Syria as well. The Ottoman nemesis that was defeated in Ayn Dara in 1711 is on the move to reverse that verdict — this time without their Druze allies but with the natural affinity of the sizeable Sunni Arab populations of northern Lebanon.

At the moment, the Lebanese government is more worried about what will threaten them from Damascus. A Sunni Lebanese alliance with the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham entity emerging in Damascus and led by Ahmad ash-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) could subvert Lebanese independence and subjugate it to the neo-Ottoman project led by Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan. Compared to that risk, Hizballah — which Israel has diminished — seems like a distant concern rather than an acute problem that needs immediate and urgent attention from the central Lebanese government and its multi-confessional military. Indeed, the Lebanese government may even entertain husbanding the remaining forces of Hizballah as an asset to mobilize against the Sunni threat emerging from Ankara and Damascus.

Any current Lebanese government is likely to view an energetic push to confront what remains of Hizballah as a prescription for civil war and an invasion by the new Syrians and their Turkish overlords. This would be tantamount to willfully inviting the apocalypse.

As a result, it is unlikely that the Lebanese government —an artificial institution anchored to a false equilibrium—will risk its existence by trying to rearrange the power structures. It is far more worried about maintaining sufficient stability to prevent Syria from interfering and entering, effectively ending Lebanon as a country.

Lebanon’s path to long-term survival lies not with this equilibrium, but through returning to the essence of what Lebanon was meant to be, the spirit of Ayn Dara and 1711. It could establish a protective strategic umbrella with other regional forces, such as Israel and the West. For Israel, an alliance with Lebanon may be the most effective way to secure its northern border. And for the West, Lebanon offers an opportunity to preserve the oldest churches in the cradle of Christianity.

But that would involve an upheaval that the Lebanese people now appear unwilling to entertain. After decades of civil war, even a bad equilibrium may appear better than intercommunal strife. It is in this conflict-averse context that President Aoun’s call for integration of all militias — essentially a re-manifestation of the national pact and integration of Hizballah into it — needs to be understood. It is something other than a clean call to disarm and erase Hizballah as expected and demanded by the EU, U.S., and Israel.

As a result, peace with Israel and a strategic reorganization of the coastal Levant will have to wait until the Syrian cauldron again comes to visit, Lebanon’s Sunnis align with it, and the neo-Ottoman empire threatens. That is likely to happen, and in a turbulent enough way that it would force Lebanon’s leadership to resort, for survival, to rediscovering the approach of 1711. Only in that framework will there be a realignment of Lebanon and likely strategic cooperation and even peace with Israel. A new era is coming to Lebanon eventually, but things may get worse before they get better.

Published in The Editors, January 13, 2025.

First, the strongest arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, has been significantly weakened, having lost almost its entire leadership and the vast majority of its massive arsenal in Lebanon. Worse still, Iran’s most convenient smuggling route to Hezbollah in Lebanon, across Syria, is now closed.

Following the victory of Abu Mohammed al-Julani’s jihadist army, Syria has turned from Iran’s playground into Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s backyard. The latter is reluctant to allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the region.

The magnificent tunnel network discovered along the Syrian-Lebanese border, which Iran used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, has become inaccessible, and the airspace over Syria has also been closed to Iran. This has heightened the ayatollah’s panic, due to the lack of alternative routes to continue arming Hezbollah.

Shi’ite militias in Iraq have declared their refusal to continue fighting for the axis, and Hamas is now at an unprecedented low in terms of its power in the Gaza Strip.

Despite this, Tehran still maintains convoluted ways to negatively influence the region.

Two significant arenas of influence remain for the ayatollah’s regime: the Jordanian kingdom and the West Bank. In both these arenas, there is a significant population of frustrated Palestinians who have, over the years, been convinced that the existing leadership – regardless of who it is – is not right for them and should be overthrown to gain what they currently lack: land, wealth, and national pride.

In the Jordanian arena, Tehran has long exploited the kingdom’s weakness, poor economic conditions, and inherent divisions among Jordan’s Bedouin tribes. It encouraged the Palestinian masses to support Islamist groups, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, to undermine King Abdullah and prepare for an invasion and attack against Israel from Jordanian territory.

Simultaneously, Iran uses Jordanian land as a convenient transit for smuggling Captagon drugs, which until recently funded Assad’s regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, Iran has treated Jordanian territory as its own and smuggled a huge number of weapons through it to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank.

Now, with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the presence of rebel forces along the Syrian-Jordanian border, Iran faces new competitors for influence in Jordan. Still, as a wounded beast with its back to the wall, it might act in a far less calculated manner than before.

In the West Bank, Iran maintains its influence through Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which it has armed for years to undermine the rule of  Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

The current skirmishes between his Fatah fighters and Hamas are not about sporadic outbreaks of local rivalry but the calculated results of Iran’s long-standing cultivation efforts, aimed at replacing Abbas’s corrupt regime and the Palestinian Authority with governance effectively controlled by Tehran. This would grant Iran almost direct access to Israel’s border.

The Houthis are also not idle, reminding the world that they exist and are a force to be reckoned with. However, the connection between them and Iran seems less tight than Tehran might wish for. The arming of the Houthis so far, coupled with the leniency shown by the Biden administration when it removed them from the blacklist of terrorist organizations, has artificially inflated the group’s self-confidence. It is crucial to bring them back to their natural proportions.

Iran’s long-standing involvement in the African arena, for example, in Sudan, is also significant and should not be forgotten. By acting there, Tehran has effectively prepared the ground for using this devastated and battered state as a transit point for smuggling weapons to its desired targets.

IN ADDITION to these three arenas, Tehran is racing to achieve its ultimate goal: nuclear capability. Such capability would immensely enhance its bargaining power with regional competitors like Turkey and global powers such as the US. Hence, it is of utmost importance to curb these capabilities now before Iran reaches the point of no return.

An arms race

A nuclear Iran would likely drag the region into an arms race, with other countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia aspiring – and in some cases already working toward, the same goal.

Moreover, the Iranians, who view Sunni rebels in Syria as bitter enemies and have recently even begun publicly declaring so, are reluctant to label Turkey and its Turkish “sultan,” Erdogan, as an adversary, even though the rivalry between them is evident and ominous.

Erdogan, the big winner in Syria’s current situation, has become the central figure attracting regional actors to negotiate for their slice of the regional pie. That is, owing to the fact that he has gained control over an energy transport route bypassing the China-Iran-Europe route.

Erdogan is now able to transport energy through the bloc of Turkic nations (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, etc.), Syria (now effectively under Ankara’s control), and Saudi Arabia to Europe. This route is shorter and cheaper than the former, thereby granting Erdogan substantial power and influence in the region.

Consequently, we might see Tehran swallow its pride and approach Erdogan to negotiate its share. It is also likely that Iran will attempt to “buy” or bribe its way back into the Syrian-Lebanese smuggling tunnels to continue arming Hezbollah. All of this, of course, will undoubtedly come at the expense of Iranian citizens, who have been suffering for years due to the lack of resources diverted by the regime to achieve its imperial ambitions.

As the world examines the consequences of the jihadist uprising in Syria and how to deal with it, it is crucial to understand that a defeated enemy is often a most dangerous one. The Iranian threat remains alive and present in the region and must not be ignored.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 11, 2025

In the last week, there has been intense discussion focused on Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza, reportedly one of the last functioning hospitals in the area. This has been part of a broader ongoing debate in the war between Hamas and Israel, on the status of hospitals in wartime and under what circumstances they might become objects of legitimate military operations.

Under International Humanitarian Law, it is a foundational principle that hospitals receive special protected status. For example, Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute prohibits “intentionally directing attacks against” hospitals provided “they are not military objectives.” Article 11 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions provides that medical units shall be “protected at all times.”

However, this protection ceases if they are “used to commit hostile acts.”

These rules of international law are recognized by Israel and implemented during its conflict with Hamas in Gaza.

Hamas, a ruthless terrorist organization, operates without any regard to the norms of international law or value of human life, with a longstanding practice of systematically embedding their operations in hospitals, using civilians as human shields and building military tunnels underneath hospitals.

Fifteen months into the war initiated by Hamas, there is hardly a hospital or medical facility in Gaza the terror group has not turned into a military command center, including the Kamal Adwan Hospital. There, Israel has detained over 240 Hamas terrorists, including some disguised as patients, and found caches of weapons, including guns and explosives. Each of these acts is an undisputed violation of the law of armed conflict.

The sustained rocket launches from Gaza into Israel, the elimination of the Nukhba unit commander who orchestrated the Oct. 7, 2023 assault on kibbutz Nir Oz and continued operating against us from within the humanitarian zone in Khan Yunis, alongside hundreds of Hamas fighters who engaged in combat, were captured, or eliminated in the Jabaliya sector last week – these directly counter assertions that “we have nothing left to accomplish in the Gaza Strip.”

The blow Hamas sustained from Israel during the war is severe and painful, yet neither fatal nor irreversible. The murderous terror organization maintains its position as the central power force in the Gaza Strip. It commands thousands of fighters and operatives who, while not currently operating within organized military frameworks, maintain their potential to do so, awaiting “the day after” while inflicting damage and casualties on our forces through localized guerrilla operations.

Following the impressive achievements in IDF operations, estimates suggest Hamas still possesses many miles of unaddressed tunnels, substantial weaponry, and potentially some capacity for manufacturing bombs and ammunition. Its operatives control all areas lacking Israeli military presence, as well as a significant portion of humanitarian aid entering Gaza.

The organization’s command structure maintains coordination, at least at a basic level, across all components. Their approach to hostage deal negotiations demonstrates effective leadership coordination between external and internal elements.

 Israel’s dilemma

The terror organization’s remaining capabilities, combined with its deep-rooted control over Gaza’s governing mechanisms and life systems, plus substantial Palestinian public support, reinforces its leadership’s conviction that Hamas’ era in Gaza persists. They pin their greatest hopes on concessions they aim to secure through the hostage agreement: war termination, IDF force withdrawal from Gaza, the population’s return to evacuated areas, commitment to civilian reconstruction, and release of hundreds of terrorists from Israeli prisons. Hamas leadership views these conditions as a launching point for restoring the organization’s position. Without internal competition threatening Hamas’ monopoly, and with support from Qatar and Turkey – key players in the emerging regional Sunni axis – this process might unfold more rapidly than anticipated.

This encapsulates Israel’s dilemma: the hostage situation strengthens Hamas’ aspirations to maintain central power in Gaza post-conflict. This hope aids their survival and hardens their negotiating stance. To advance both hostage return and Hamas’ collapse, Israel needs to apply maximum pressure simultaneously through three parallel tracks: military operations, civilian infrastructure control, and diplomatic negotiations. Donald Trump’s influence already looms in the region, promising support for this approach.

The five-point strategy

What’s the correct course of action? First, intensify IDF operations within Gaza. This is essential, primarily to reduce future security threats to Israel. Beyond eliminating Nukhba operatives, we must target their commanders, facilitators, and trainees – along with weapons stockpiles and military equipment. The operation to clear Beit Hanoun of terrorists is crucial for protecting nearby Israeli residents.

Second, eliminate commanders and senior officials, both in Gaza and abroad. While the senior command structure has thinned, several effective brigade commanders, replacements, deputies, and numerous political bureau officials continue managing operations unimpeded.

Third, wrest humanitarian aid control from Hamas. This represents a critical governance resource. Alternative approaches exist and warrant decisive implementation rather than endless deliberation.

Fourth, target Hamas-controlled governmental mechanisms and capabilities. The “Sahm” (“Arrow”) unit within Hamas’ Interior Ministry and their Government Communications Bureau exemplify how the terror organization shapes Gaza’s civilian landscape. Disrupting these elements is essential for achieving the war’s stated objective of dismantling Hamas’ governmental infrastructure.

Fifth, maximize American influence over negotiation mediators. While Egypt and Qatar’s influence over Hamas has limits, it remains significant. Given Donald Trump’s statements regarding hostages, these mediators should be expected to leverage all available resources to achieve results with Hamas.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 02, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**