The US will have to demonstrate its firm stand on Israel’s side in the upcoming military campaign, as a long list of countries are watching it with a very, very critical eye.

The sense of betrayal and disappointment associated with the United States amidst its allies, following its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan (completed in September 2021) is still freshly imprinted in the minds of some of the region’s main role players, who had already begun to flirt with competing powers for alternative economic and security backing.

The manner in which the United States will demonstrate its strength vis-à-vis Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Hamas, and Hezbollah – and of course Russia and China who are actively maneuvering behind the scenes – will be a watershed moment in terms of determining its positioning and status in the existing world order.

It may sound dramatic, but following October 7, it seems that the dam of radicalism had been broken – the same radical campaign that had been meticulously planned since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Already then, 45 years ago, the Mullah regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran began to plan the public relations campaign that we are witnessing today around the world – a campaign that is not, as we tend to think, against the State of Israel and/or the Jews, but against the West and its values ​​and in favor of the establishment of an extreme worldwide Islamic caliphate.

This campaign comprises small, slow and systematic steps, in the shape of infiltrating all systems in the West, including professional syndicates, student bodies, think tanks, neighborhood councils, LGBT circles, Green Peace circles, and more.

Within this large, macro framework, the events of October 7 were a very marginal part of the bigger picture, which as previously mentioned is the establishment of a large-scale radical Islamic Caliphate, while weakening the current superpower in the international arena, the USA, and simultaneously eliminating the influence of regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, India, and more.

Iran is doing all this while temporarily cooperating with any potential partner who serves its goal – at least for the time being – including Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as large parts of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and more. Recently, it appears that in light of its poor economic condition, Egypt has also been caught in Iran’s dangerous spider web.

Egypt sits on the wrong side of history

This was reflected in a high-level Iranian visit to Cairo, approximately ten months ago, and in the fact that the official Egyptian regime gave the “green light” to the existence of dozens of significant terrorist tunnels running from Egyptian Rafah into Gaza. The latter allowed the smuggling of weapons and offensive equipment from Iran to Hamas, in preparation for the October 7 attack.

Furthermore, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s recent statement that he will not cooperate with a US-led coalition against Iran, which would counter Tehran’s attack on Israel, reinforces the assumption that some kind of a deal may have been forged between Cairo and Tehran, given Egypt’s precarious economic situation. Although Egypt accepts the second largest foreign aid package from the United States, it seems that it no longer trusts its benefactor’s strength in the region and is now prone to choosing the wrong side.

Alongside this choice, its significant armament efforts in recent years in the Sinai Peninsula should be a cause of concern for the West – yet another reason why the US must demonstrate clarity of policy against the Iranian axis in the upcoming campaign, so that Egypt must once again be convinced that there is no other side but the American one.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2024.

October 7 (Hamas’ invasion of Israel) and April 14 (Iran’s missile attack on Israel) demand that Jerusalem free itself from stale strategic paradigms. The targeted killings of Iran-backed terrorist leaders on July 30/31 suggest that Israel is indeed doing so.

They suggest that Israel is getting strategically “unstuck.” Israeli political and military leadership seems to finally realize that Israel has no choice but to confront across-the-board Iran’s 40-years-long and rapidly escalating war against it. Would the rest of the West awaken to this reality – halevai!

The screeching strategic reality is that Iran has catapulted to stratospheric plateaus its hegemonic drive to dominate the Middle East and suffocate Israel. It is doing so through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; through its massive missile attack on Israel directly from Iranian soil; and through its looming breakout to nuclear weapon capacity.

Just by way of example, remember that Hezbollah (Iran) still has 180,000 missiles, rockets and UAVs in Lebanon aimed at Israel, and northern Israel has been depopulated and devastated. This can no longer be waited out or ignored.

Yes, the remarkable intelligence and operational capabilities demonstrated this week in the two pinpoint assassinations of key enemies (note: enemies of the West as well) is an important marker in the effort to restore Israel’s deterrent posture after the collapse of October 7.

But the justified, successful kills do not change the overall strategic picture, nor will the strikes alone sufficiently vitiate the grand Iranian region-wide assault on Israel (and the West). If anything, the assassination in Beirut of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s chief of staff, draws nearer the date of activation of the terrorist group’s arsenal. So be it, along with the necessary Israeli campaign to crush Hezbollah.

Understand: The worst possible thing is that a perception of Israel as “being stuck” takes root in Tehran and/or around the world. The unhealthiest situation involves Israel being “stuck,” not moving forward, in crushing Hamas in Gaza, in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, in suppressing terror cells in Judea and Samaria, in targeting IRGC emplacements in Syria, and in sabotaging nuclear facilities in Iran.

Being stuck is also a situation where Israel is diplomatically or militarily hampered in every direction by well-meaning but weak allies; by allies who fool themselves into thinking that Iran (with its Russian backer) is not already engaged in WWIII against the West; by allies who prioritize temporary quiet over sustainable victory. This is an unacceptable, perilous position for Israel to be in.

Alas, Israel’s strategic goals have become too limited in recent decades, hamstrung by the failed Oslo peace process with Palestinians and the failed Obama peace process with Iranians. These gambits emphasized quiet, co-option, deflation, and survival, at the expense of principle, dominance, and victory. They bought about cowering postures instead of appropriately necessary offensive ones.

As a result, even at this very moment Israel is being pressed by its fainthearted friends to abandon its goal of liquidating Hamas; to instead prioritize humanitarian provisions to the enemy population; and to acquiesce in the release of Palestinian terrorists and butchers (including the “Nukhba” marauders of Hamas).

Israel also is being pressed to absorb Hezbollah’s continued blows and to settle for another worthless, airy-fairy diplomatic “settlement” that will only perpetuate the Iranian threat from southern Lebanon, and to refrain from “escalatory retaliation” to whatever response Iran now dishes out to the July 30/31 assassinations.

Were they to be adopted, these policies taken together amount to a grand strategic defeat for Israel. They constitute a straitjacket that puts Israeli survival – yes, Israel’s very survival! – at risk; that brings into question its power to persevere as an independent nation in the Middle East. Were they to be adopted by Jerusalem, these policies inevitably would crash Israel as a resilient, buoyant society and a prosperous, leading economy that contributes so much to the world.

The Biden administration’s ongoing campaign to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further military conquest in Gaza; and to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further confrontation with Iran – accompanied by persistent threats to deny Israeli diplomatic backing and weapons if Jerusalem does not heed Washington’s warnings – are formulas for grand defeat. And as such, they must be resisted.

President Biden’s reported advice to Israel (after April 14) – to “take the win,” as it were; to suck-up its indignation; to rely on Western sanctions against Iran alone as “smart retaliation”; and in general, to “avoid escalation” – is dangerous advice.

And, compounding the American failure to deter Iran from directly attacking Israel, Biden and his Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have now hampered the likelihood of any strategic win against Iran by yet again piously (and foolishly) declaring that America seeks no confrontation with Iran, and that Washington had nothing to do with Israel’s targeted strikes on terrorist leaders. This is strategic insanity of grandiose proportions!

When America fears escalation more than Iran does, the path towards grand Western defeat is clear. If Israel fears escalation more than Iran does, Tehran will march all the way to Jerusalem with even greater and grander attacks.

ALAS, there is a great disconnect between the way Israel sees the current war(s) and the way they are viewed abroad. The gap is enormous, serious, and terrifying.

Around the world, most leaders view the current conflicts as dangerous conflagrations (with a terrible humanitarian cost) that need to be ended quickly, with a swift return to diplomatic agreements (whether regarding the Palestinians, or Iran, or whatever).

However, for almost all Israelis, it has finally dawned on them that the country stands before a long war of attrition; a war for existential survival; a war at the cusp of a “clash of civilizations,” of “Western civilization against barbarism” (as Netanyahu said Congress last week); of a decades-long war that, with ups and downs, pauses and shaky ceasefires – must escalate in order to crush the Iranian juggernaut.

That is the lesson Israelis have learned from mostly turning a blind eye in recent decades to the military buildup on Israel’s southern and northern borders under the auspices of Iran. Turning this back cannot be done in a short time. Security will come through long battles (like the ten-month-long slog through Gaza, still unfinished) and eventual unequivocal defeat of Israel’s enemies, not hollow diplomatic agreements or guarantees.

Therefore, while Israel can and will negotiate here and there for respites and breaks in the conflicts (and hopefully for freedom for the Hamas-held Israeli hostages), the overall vector is one of long warfare against Iran and its proxies. Patience and resilience are needed for a long struggle.

Israel’s enemies certainly understand things this way. Iran’s Khamenei, Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, Hamas’ (now demised) Haniyeh, and the Houthis’ Abdul Malik al-Houthi explicitly have declared the current fighting as the beginning of a long war of attrition which they intend to pursue for as long as it takes until Israel’s elimination.

THE WAKE-UP call for Israelis is multi-level. It begins with discovery of the IDF’s hollowness and weakness (evident by the failures of October 7, and lack of preparation for long, hard war against Hamas and Hezbollah) and the failed diplomatic paradigms held by a broad spectrum of Israel’s political leaders. It continues with the shock of omnipresent antisemitic and anti-Israel protests worldwide.

But most of all, the wake-up call for Israelis lies in their discovery that the Western “liberal” mindset is incapable of recognizing the need for WWII-style crushing military “victories” over enemies who openly declare themselves on jihad with genocidal aims against Israel and the West, with every intention to grind away at it relentlessly “forever.”

For most Westerners (including many Jews and some Israelis), this presentation of the situation (that a “forever war” is underway) is anathema – because it involves the inevitable use of escalating military force rather than constant diplomatic compromise – and because it is, well, scary.

And because prevailing in this struggle requires deep ideological commitment and willingness to sacrifice for principle, which are traits so lacking in today’s Western post-religious, post-ideological, heavily materialistic world. And because nobody likes to be told by Jews that principles and liberties have to be defended.

Israel can no longer be hemmed in by such frailty. Perhaps the strikes of July 30/31 are the beginning of Israel’s emancipation from the impossible military and diplomatic handcuffs that Washington and others have sought to slap on Jerusalem.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 2, 2024 and Israel Hayom, August 7, 2024.

Eliminating key leaders of terror organisations is a practice often used by states such as the US and Israel in their war against terror. Muhammad Deif, Fouad Shukr and Ismail Haniyeh follow many of their predecessors in the Palestinian terror organisations (Abu Jihad, Fathi Shikaki, Ahmad Yassin to mention a few) and in other terror groups (Osama Bin Laden, Qasem Soleimani, Imad Moghnieh; Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi for example).

No one expects that killing those figures will – by itself – bring about the defeat of these organisations, which thrive on strong commitment to an extreme interpretation of religious and/or nationalist ideas. Yet it seems that those who use this method of fighting terror consider this tool to be quite effective and the terror organisations themselves probably think the same, judging by their efforts to prevent it from happening.

Though eliminating the terror leaders does not constitute a decisive and existential blow, it inflicts psychological damage on them and a very painful hit to their morale – and exposes how easily they can be penetrated and how vulnerable they are. It is supposed to sow fear and distrust in their ranks, especially among the remaining leaders. It may degrade the quality of their leadership and weaken their operational competence. True, in some cases the successor maybe as capable or even more dangerous than the outgoing leader, but in most cases the replacement is less impressive. It is also a way of handing these terrorists the punishment they deserve and preventing them from carrying out more terror operations.

One lesson is clear. If the elimination of a terror leader is a stand-alone operation, its impact is usually limited – but if the eliminations repeat themselves within a relatively short period of time, are directed against the entire leadership echelon and are part of a wider effort to weaken and defeat the terror organisation, their impact can be more significant.

This is the context in which we should consider the recent attacks against Hamas and, to a lesser extent, Hezbollah’s military leadership. The killing of Deif and Haniyeh is a major step in the war aimed at defeating Hamas in Gaza (and abroad) and hitting their leaders. Many were already hit (Salah AlArouri, Marwan Issa, Shabana and Salama are some high-ranking Hamas operatives). The same is true for Hezbollah.

The logic behind this effort is not only to weaken Hamas and Hezbollah and charge them a heavy price for their terror attacks, but to reestablish Israeli deterrence by showing its intelligence and military capabilities and making the terror groups and their supporters realise that launching the terror war on October 2023 was a very costly move, so they will not even think about it in the future.

Hitting terror leaders is also leveraged domestically to promote confidence in and support for the country’s leadership and security system, though this effect is usually short lived.

Eliminating terror leaders often has some disadvantages. First, in some cases it requires operating in problematic locations from the point of view of political and human collateral damage – and if the attempt fails, it builds the image of the targeted leader as a hero. Furthermore it may lead to escalation, since the terror groups and their patrons feel obliged to take revenge and retaliate as they feel humiliated, shocked and frustrated. This reaction may be relevant especially in the short term, but in certain circumstances it may lead to an unintended and unwanted widescale escalation – as may be the case now.

In the Israeli specific case, a major question is how the killing of Deif and Haniyeh may affect the prospects of concluding a deal for releasing the hostages. My assessment is that in the short term Hamas may delay the negotiations, fearing it may seem to be affected by the blow it suffered, but after a while it is going to resume the process. The fear that Israel may hit more leaders, including Sinwar, and the growing military pressure may convince Hamas to show more flexibility, though not necessarily enough to meet Israeli security demands.

To sum up, in the current situation eliminating Hamas leaders and Hezbollah key military figures makes sense and may help Israel in the medium term accomplish its goals in the war – defeating Hamas, releasing the hostages and creating a new situation vis-à-vis Gaza and Lebanon, so that the population can come back to their communities safely. But in the short term there might be a considerable escalation.

Published in The Jewish Chrinical, August 2, 2024.

Last week, Syrian citizens went to the polls for a genuine democratic celebration. For the fourth time since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, they were asked to elect their representatives to the parliament in Damascus. But don’t worry: these are not really free and fair elections, and no one expects any major surprises.

Firstly, residents under rebel or Kurdish control are not allowed to vote. They likely do not have access to polling stations set up by the regime anyway. Additionally, Syrians in the diaspora – like refugees who fled the country during the civil war – cannot cast their votes.

More importantly, the regime is suspected of having complete control over the results. For example, in the previous elections in 2020, the final results were delayed due to “technical failures,” and in the end, the regime won 166 out of 250 seats in the parliament. Just one seat short of two-thirds of the seats. Although the Syrian regime is popular in the country, this still seems excessive.

The absolute control over the elections allows the long-time president, Bashar al-Assad, to promote his personal interests. While the residents are mainly concerned about the crumbling Syrian economy, Assad wants to secure a majority in the parliament that will allow him to change the constitution and extend his rule, which is currently limited until 2028 “only.” He has been in office since 2000, as a reminder.

Assad, who is under US sanctions and has an arrest warrant against him in France due to the chemical attacks his army carried out during the civil war, is holding the elections in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. In 2015, the council issued Resolution 2254, which stipulated that elections would be held in Syria only as part of a comprehensive solution to the internal conflict. It also added other criteria for holding the elections – which the regime has ignored until today – including UN supervision, allowing Syrians abroad to vote, and the “significant” participation of women in the electoral process.

What enables Assad to act so calmly towards a Security Council decision? Perhaps he draws confidence from the fact that in the past year, and especially recently, he is increasingly solidifying his place as a member of the Arab nations’ family.

In November, Assad participated in an Arab League summit in Riyadh that dealt with the war in Gaza, and even gave a speech there. After many years, more than a decade, of regional diplomatic isolation, Syria was invited back to the Arab League two years ago, and Assad seized the opportunity. Even before that, in May 2023, he attended the league’s summit in Jeddah and said he hoped his invitation to the event, for the first time since 2011, “marks the beginning of a new phase in Arab action for solidarity among us.”

Not only has the league as a whole approached Assad, but individual countries have as well. Jordan was one of the countries that pushed for Syria’s reintegration into the Arab world, and even promoted a joint plan – despite American opposition – to minimize the effects of the decade-long conflict. Jordan presented the plan to another Arab country, Saudi Arabia, which agreed to take part in it.

Indeed, the plan gained momentum: last week, Saudi Arabia renewed regular commercial flights from Damascus to its territory, after the first flight took off in May from the Syrian capital to bring pilgrims from the country to the Hajj in Mecca. Last year, Iraq’s prime minister visited Damascus for the first time since 2010, and relations between the two countries are constantly improving.

Iraq, along with Egypt, was also one of the mediators between Syria and another non-Arab country, Turkey. After long negotiations and discussions, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced two weeks ago that he wanted to restore relations with Damascus and “return them to their previous state.” The leaders of Turkey and Syria – two countries that have been bitter rivals over the past decade against the backdrop of the civil war and the war against the Kurds – once enjoyed a friendship and even vacationed together with their families.

Erdogan’s rapprochement attempt may also be the background for his announcement, a few days later, of the imminent end of the military operation he launched in April 2022 against Kurdish rebel organizations in Turkey and Syria. The Turkish president, of course, justified this by saying he had managed to neutralize the Kurdish threat, but the timing remains somewhat suspicious.

Assad, for his part – used to being the bad boy of the neighborhood – does not respond so easily to Erdogan. He may hold a grudge against him for years of occupying territories in Syria, supporting rebels against his rule, and more. He said in response to Erdogan’s offer that he would agree to meet, but “only if core issues are discussed.” What does that mean? Probably the end of Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria, among other things.

Another non-Arab country has been at the center of Syrian affairs recently: Iran. After Masoud Pezhkian’s victory in the presidential elections in Tehran, Assad was one of the first leaders to call and congratulate him. A few days later, Pezhkian called him back to discuss advancing bilateral relations, implementing their agreements, and other issues on the agenda.

A Family Business

What has led to the thawing of relations between Assad and the region’s leaders? How is it possible that after more than a decade of being ostracized, isolated, and being the neighborhood bully that no one approaches – suddenly he is warmly welcomed?

The English proverb says, “If you can’t beat them, join them.” That’s roughly what happened here too. After Arab countries tried to isolate Syria but the bad boy only caused more trouble, they are trying a different approach: instead of the stick, they are now going for the carrot.

The Assad regime causes two main problems in the region: the first is the refugees, hundreds of thousands of Syrians who fled their country following the civil war since 2011 and flooded neighboring countries, and from there also moved to European and North African countries. This flow has not stopped, and some still think that perhaps they can be returned to their country through various initiatives, and that the regime in Damascus can help with that.

The second problem, no less significant, is the extensive drug trade that the Damascus regime has been engaged in in recent years, causing havoc throughout the Middle East. Yes, the butcher from Damascus, the compassionate ophthalmologist who slaughtered hundreds of thousands of his people, is also not deterred by widespread drug distribution and profiting from it. Surprising, isn’t it?

The main drug the regime distributes is Captagon, also sold under the name Fenethylline. It is a synthetic stimulant initially created to treat attention deficit disorders, narcolepsy, and more, and is considered highly addictive. It is so addictive that its use was discontinued, and it was classified as a dangerous drug. Throughout the Arab world, religious decrees have been issued against its use due to the danger involved.

During its years of isolation, the Assad regime, desperate for cash flow, began producing and exporting the substance. Indeed, the drug trade has yielded billions of dollars for the Syrians. In 2021, the regime reportedly earned nearly $6 billion (!) from this trade – a third of Israel’s defense budget last year, not including American aid money. The Syrians have become so “addicted” to this field that it is believed they are responsible for about 80 percent of the global supply of Captagon. According to official data, the value of this amount is three times the total trade of all the Mexican cartels combined. All this goodness Dr. Assad freely supplies to the world.

These drugs are transferred to terrorist organizations, including Palestinian ones, which sell them and generate significant revenue. It is claimed that Hezbollah is also involved in the production and distribution of the drug, although Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Shiite organization, previously denied his group’s involvement in drug distribution. “If we were earning billions, I would probably notice,” he said. He probably forgot about his group’s involvement in the drug trade in South America. People forget sometimes, it happens.

Captagon is often associated, especially in the Middle East, with use by terrorist operatives. It is claimed that they use it as a stimulant before carrying out attacks. After the horrors of the October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel, it was claimed that some Hamas terrorists were found with Captagon, but this claim was not substantiated.

One of the countries most severely affected by these smuggling activities is Jordan, which constantly fights groups of smugglers trying to bring the dangerous drug into its territory. Earlier this year, the Jordanians even began directly attacking smugglers across the border in an attempt to disrupt their activities. But Amman is not alone in the battle: the Emirates have also thwarted large-scale smuggling operations worth hundreds of millions of dollars in Captagon, and Iraq has also seized shipments of the addictive substance. Just last month, Jordan foiled a smuggling attempt of 9.5 million Captagon pills destined for Saudi Arabia.

This, then, may be the background for the recent rapprochement between Syria and some of the region’s countries. The issue is still sensitive, and Damascus is required to answer questions about drug distribution. When it failed to do so, there was even a retreat in its rapprochement with Arab countries, and its participation in an Arab summit last year was canceled.

Incidentally, one country still vehemently opposed to Syria’s reintegration into the Arab family, is Qatar. Some believe the reason is the Qatari regime’s desire to maintain its ties with the US and the fear that supporting Assad could alienate the Americans from Doha. On the other hand, it may be related to Qatar’s connections with various rebel groups in northern Syria and their desire to continue nurturing them and establishing a foothold in the country.

However, a significant question that remains open is whether Assad is even willing and able to fight drug smuggling and the spread of refugees from his country. Regarding drugs, it is important to note that it is not just a profit for the regime as a whole, but for the Assad family itself. The tyrant’s hands in Damascus are deeply involved in the drug trade: the president’s younger brother, Maher, who commands a division in the Syrian army, is a key figure in drug distribution. The European Union has imposed sanctions on two of Assad’s cousins due to suspicion that they are also involved in the distribution of Captagon. A family business.

A Final Word on Israel

As far as is known, Captagon is not widely distributed in Israel, although suspects have been caught en route to the country with the drug, and there have also been shipments intercepted by authorities on their way to Gaza. However, besides the addiction risk, as mentioned, this drug can also be used by terrorist organizations to strengthen themselves, including Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. Yet, experts estimate that the fight against drug distribution could serve Israel as another channel through which it can integrate into the regional landscape. Israel might contribute its security capabilities, even intelligence, in its relations with Jordan, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, to try to thwart smuggling and make the entire Middle East a slightly cleaner place. Who knows, maybe salvation for Israel will come from Assad in the end.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 24,  2024.

The two illegal weapons warehouses attributed to Iran and its proxies uncovered recently in the suburbs of Amman, the capital of Jordan, and revealed in the media, express the culmination of Iran-led Axis of Resistance activities in Jordan. Iran’s subversive activity in Jordan aims to make it a fertile ground for the implementation of Khamenei’s 2014 order to arm the West Bank. To this end, Iran consistently increases its violation of Jordanian sovereignty and exploits weaknesses in the Hashemite kingdom. Reports in recent months have shown that there has been a significant increase in attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank.

The current affair further sharpens the urgent need for Israel and Jordan to tighten security cooperation to curtail Iran’s activities and subversion in the Jordanian region. Jordan relies heavily on intelligence assistance from Israel and the US, and tightening cooperation between Jerusalem and Amman will help ease tensions between them against the background of the war in Gaza. Israel is urgently required to complete its renewed preparations on the border with Jordan, to close the loopholes, and to strengthen the fence in weakened areas.

The December 2023 call by Revolutionary Guards chief Hossein Salami for the Palestinians to carry out another Al-Aqsa flood attack from the south, north, and east of Israel should serve as a sharp warning sign for the Israeli security establishment. One must also remember the plan by elements of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, revealed in the Israeli media last March, to infiltrate Israel from Jordan and carry out a large-scale attack on localities in its territory. The plan was dropped from the agenda because the plot was exposed, but it still serves as a wake-up call given the seriousness of the threat from the east.

At the beginning of April, a New York Times investigation revealed that Shiite militias supported by the Quds Force, as well as Iranian operatives in Tehran’s terrorist organization, are carrying weapons from Syria to Jordan. From there, the armaments are transferred at the border to Bedouin smugglers, who then transport the weapon to the Israeli border, where it is transferred to criminal organizations who take it to the West Bank. From a Shin Bet countermeasure operation last March, we see the types of advanced armaments that Iran seeks to distribute in the West Bank, including cluster munitions, Iranian anti-aircraft mines, thunderbolts, anti-aircraft shoulder-fired missiles, RPGs, hand grenades, pistols, and assault rifles.

Israel does not have the privilege of waiting for the end of the war in Gaza – which will last for years. They need to design a new security doctrine that will immediately fit the reality of the aftermath of October 7. The tangible threat to Iran’s leadership is not limited only to its nuclear program but rather to the tightening stranglehold set by Iran and its proxies. This has already created an unprecedented security zone in northern Israel. Israel, after October 7th, cannot stand by but must retaliate against Iran to ensure its national security. Some recommended courses of action would be to restrain Iran by various means, such as arrest operations on Iranian territory of Iranian terrorist operatives; this has been done before.

In April 2022, it was reported that the Mossad arrested – in Iran – Mansour Rasouli, an operative in Unit 840 of the Quds Force (a secret operational unit which is responsible for planning and establishing terrorist infrastructures outside of Iran, against Western and Israeli targets). Rasouli admitted that he planned to assassinate one of the employees of the Israeli consulate in Istanbul and even planned to assassinate a senior American general in Germany and a journalist in France.

The multi-arena challenge from Iran is now fully activated for the first time in what is known as the convergence of the arenas. Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and, to a certain extent, Syria are attacking Israel in the current war. In doing so, they bring to fruition the Iranian ambition to choke Israel with a stranglehold and place it under an existential threat.

The situation in the north is still limited and has not turned into an all-out war; the multi-aspect challenge is not yet operating in full force. Israeli activity against Iran, as well as a joint struggle with Jordan against Iranian subversion in Jordanian territory, would make it clear to Tehran that it will bear the consequences and pay a price for promoting terrorism against Israel.

At the same time, the activity would help Israel restore its deterrence against the Iran-led axis of resistance and its image before the regional Sunni countries, to whom the Iranian subversion in Jordan reminds them that behind the smiles that Tehran spreads are hidden dark intentions.

Published in I24, July 4, 2024.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seizes every opportunity to criticize the IDF’s moral fighting in Gaza, echoing the false Palestinian “resistance” narrative and depicting murderous Hamas operatives as “freedom fighters.”

It’s time for Israel to respond in kind.

Since the Swords of Iron War began, Erdoğan has insisted on portraying Hamas as a liberation movement and presenting himself as the flag bearer of the Palestinian struggle. Recently, he proudly announced that over 1,000 Hamas operatives were being treated in hospitals across Turkey and lamented that the Greeks view Hamas as a terrorist organization rather than a resistance movement.

Erdoğan’s blatant alignment with Hamas is in line with other hostile actions by Ankara against Israel in recent years, especially since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, including the unprecedented decision to sever trade relations with Israel.

However, this also provides Israel with an opportunity it has not yet utilized: to shift from the defensive posture that has characterized its public diplomacy for years and to actively counter the hypocrisy entrenched in the false Palestinian narrative of occupation and dispossession that Erdoğan promotes on every possible platform.

In fact, there is no better example than Turkey to illustrate the depth of Erdoğan’s hypocrisy regarding the “Israeli occupation.” For decades, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has functioned as a de facto state despite lacking international recognition. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek coup attempt against the legitimate Cypriot government, using the pretext of protecting the Turkish population on the island.

In violation of a U.N. ceasefire, Turkey then launched another operation, revealing its true aim: the partition of Cyprus. During this operation, Turkey forcibly expelled over 200,000 Greek Cypriots who were replaced by new settlers from Turkey, successfully establishing control over more than a third of Cyprus’s territory.

Turkish aggression continues today with the presence of over 40,000 Turkish troops in the north of the island, illegal construction on Greek Cypriot-owned property, ethnic segregation and the destruction of Christian cultural heritage.

Similarly, while Erdoğan boasts of standing alongside the “oppressed” Palestinian people, he denies political and cultural rights to Turkey’s Kurdish minority.

After the failed coup attempt in July 2016 by a military faction loyal to Erdoğan’s hated rival Fethullah Gulen, Erdoğan embarked on a major purge that extended far beyond Gulen’s supporters. Leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), members of parliament and thousands of party members across Turkey, including senior officials of various municipalities, were arrested.

A year earlier, during clashes between Turkish security forces and Kurdish insurgents, Erdoğan’s harsh measures to suppress the violence in the southeastern part of the country reached unprecedented levels. Turkey imposed curfews in many Kurdish areas and suspended essential services for the residents, leading to a massive humanitarian crisis and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens from their homes.

To be sure, Erdoğan gives “equal” treatment to Kurdish autonomies beyond the border. Since 2016, Turkey has launched a series of attacks against PKK bases in the Kurdish region of Iraq and its associated organizations in Syria. Under the guise of fighting terror, Turkey’s president carried out a de facto annexation, significantly violating the human rights of the area’s residents.

Since 2018, Turkey has transferred around 400,000 Arabs and Turkmen into the Kurdish enclave in Syrian Afrin, reducing the Kurdish population, which previously constituted 80% of the local population, to less than a quarter.

Even the war against ISIS did not alter Erdoğan’s priorities. When Turkey finally joined the coalition forces’ campaign against the murderous organization, it was used by Turkey as a cover story to land a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria, investing far fewer resources in destroying ISIS strongholds.

And what can be more ironic than Erdoğan pretending to show concern for the welfare of Gazans in early October 2023, while at the same time striking about 140 civilian targets in northern Syria, including bombing hospitals?

Turkey also behaves as an occupying force in places where there is no direct threat to its security. To ensure the survival of the Libyan regime and reap economic as well as other benefits, in January 2020 Ankara sent drones and soldiers—including jihadist mercenaries from Syria—to support the Islamist “Government of National Accord” against the opposing forces led by Khalifa Haftar.

Turkey’s military entrenchment in Libya has worsened the human rights situation in Libya and its overall stability, and continues to raise concerns for Egypt, which fears the spillover of terrorism into its territory.

The next time Erdoğan waves terms like “occupation,” “resistance” and “freedom fighters,” Israel must not remain silent. It must remind the international community who the real occupier is.

Published in JNS, June 9, 2024.

Since the 1979 signing of their peace agreement, Israel-Egypt relations have mainly been characterized by fruitful cooperation in everything related to military, security, and regional issues.

At the same time, there has been an almost total disconnect between the two nations.

In Egypt’s view, since the establishment of a Palestinian entity was significant pillar of the peace agreement, its lack allowed the Mubarak-led Egyptian regime to refrain from promoting bilateral cooperation with Israel in the fields of trade, culture, tourism and more.

Hence, most of the other pillars upon which the peace agreement was based, were not realized.

Egypt adopts anti-Israel rhetoric

Over the years, Egyptian leadership has permitted, and at times even encouraged, the adoption of distinctly anti-Israel rhetoric, as, among other things, a mechanism to distract public attention from internal hardships.

This trend has been reflected in all the newspapers and magazines published in Egypt, whether identified with the opposition or official government mouthpieces.

Beyond anti-Zionist rhetoric, the media often includes clear antisemitic messages, such as the use of cartoons and illustrations.

Israelis are not allowed to appear in the Egyptian media, resulting in all discussions on the subject of Israel taking place without any Israeli representation.

The Qatari-owned-and-controlled Al-Jazeera channel has been outlawed in Egypt more than once – due to its harsh criticism of former president Hosni Mubarak and more recently of President Mohammed Al-Sisi. However, the general Egypt public continues to be exposed to other Arab social media sources providing a significant dose of antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment.

Israel has never insisted that Egypt change its syllabus and alter its negative messaging concerning Israel and the Jews.

Egypt’s duality vis-à-vis Hamas 

There is little doubt that official Egypt understands very well what Hamas is and the nature of its affiliation and kinship with the Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamist movement established in 1920s Egypt, that has been outlawed in the country for years.

The Egyptian constitution prohibits any organized political activity based on religion. Egyptian intelligence carefully monitors any hint of activity on behalf of Islamist organizations inside Egypt, its law enforcement agencies adopting an iron fist policy to contain it.

Egypt is doubtless worried about an influx of Palestinian refugees from Gaza due to the certain infiltration of Hamas operatives among them. In addition, it does not wish for the “temporary” sojourn of Palestinians to become a permanent settlement, as has happened with many Palestinian populations in Arab countries.

This weakened population is ripe for poverty, crime, extremism, and the potential for terrorist infiltration by radical Islamist elements, such as ISIS, Al Qaida, The Muslim Brotherhood.

What, then, caused official Egypt to turn a blind eye to the dozens of tunnels crossing from Gaza into Egypt that the IDF uncovered upon entering Rafah? Their existence must have sounded every single alarm.

Musa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, stated in a 2013 interview that the previous head of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, had assisted Hamas by preventing any attempt to dismantle the tunnels.

His words, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact remains that the discovered tunnels exist. Their very existence has aided Hamas to arm itself in a way that, after October 7, is hard to dispute.

Furthermore, and since 2017, there appears to have been an improvement in Egypt’s relations with Hamas in Gaza, after its leaders published an updated version of the its charter, dissociating themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The considerable extent of the tunnels that were discovered is indicative of a strategic decision at a senior level, or at the very least, a deliberate “blind eye” at the highest level.

One can assume that Egypt sought to preserve its key position as a mediator between Hamas and Israel – thus ensuring its supremacy over Qatar, Turkey and other countries – by allowing Hamas this smuggling outlet as leverage. Cairo’s pursuit of regional hegemony remains an important national interest.

Yet, can that explain Egypt’s willingness to risk playing with fire, after, the 2008 Hamas intrusion into its territory and the murder of Egyptian officers? The characteristic duality of Egyptian policies serves to decipher this particular decision.

On one hand, Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel and strives to create trade routes and cooperation with the US, on the other, it feeds the Egyptian public anti-West and especially anti-Israel messages.

It nurtures an abysmal hatred for Turkey and Qatar, whose rulers have humiliated and criticized Egyptian rulers over the years and supported the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement, which threatened the Egyptian regime; and at the same time it promotes paths of reconciliation and understanding with those countries.

[Egypt had demanded that Turkey and Qatar end their support of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a precondition to normalizing ties.]

This Egyptian duality has cultivated a long-standing rivalry with and suspicion of Shi’ite Iran, where, for many years, one of its capital’s main streets was named after the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s murderer – while Egypt buried the exiled Persian shah with great splendor in one of the most beautiful and impressive places in the center of Cairo.

Egypt recently hosted a senior Iranian delegation, producing a certain questionable rapprochement between the two countries.

Its sharp reaction in view of Israel’s determination to operate in Rafah evidenced that it was not happy about exposing the tunnels crossing from Gaza to its territory. This discovery raises further questions about other potential revelations, such as the infiltration of senior Hamas officials into Egyptian territory; smuggling of hostages into Egypt; or even beyond.

In this context, Cairo’s joining the South African effort at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague stands out.

Is this also an attempt to intensify pressure on Israel to prevent it from advancing into Rafah, while leveraging Egypt’s power in the international arena?

Or is there more to it and like South Africa, whose ruling party, the ANC has “sold its soul to the Iranian devil” in exchange for clearing its accumulated debts, is Egypt also expected to reap some sort of reward from Tehran for its efforts? Assumptions should be examined more closely and one should not rely on speculations.

What is clear, however, is that official Egypt could not help but know about and/or allow what took place in the large-scale tunnels discovered in Rafah.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 4, 2024.

Since October 7, Türkiye has been hardening its stance towards Israel in a manner uncharacteristic of the behavior exhibited by the Turkish administration in previous crises with Israel. More specifically, Türkiye’s decision to sever trade relations with Israel as an act of solidarity with Hamas reflects a troubling shift from its typical hostile rhetoric to inflicting actual economic damage. Although Türkiye later retracted from its sweeping boycott, this move marks a significant escalation in Erdoğan’s anti-Israel stance.

In the wider context, Türkiye’s growing presence in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean poses significant challenges for Israel and its Western allies. Erdoğan’s Türkiye leads a radical Islamist line and undertakes actions that undermine the existing regional order while harming crucial Israeli interests.

First and foremost, Türkiye’s support of Hamas, its attempts to force Israel to comply with its demands on the humanitarian aid issue, as well as other initiatives aimed at gaining a foothold in post-war Gaza, act as a considerable obstacle to achieving one of Israel’s main war objectives: the defeat of Hamas.

Moreover, despite the heavy consequences suffered by Ankara after sending the Turkish aid flotilla to Gaza in 2010, Türkiye has been preparing to launch a second Marmara under the supervision of the IHH, which was designated as a terrorist organization by Israel in 2008. This initiative is currently delayed after the Republic of Guinea-Bissau requested the removal of its flag from two of the ships, however, the organizers vow to overcome the obstacles and end the siege on Gaza.

These steps, along with the unprecedented announcement of cutting all economic ties with Jerusalem, position Türkiye as a hostile nation willing to deteriorate its relationship with Israel, with whom it previously maintained reasonable relations despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, even at the cost of severe damage to its already struggling economy.

Israel should also be concerned about Türkiye’s involvement in East Jerusalem, manifesting in the agitation of the local Muslim population against Israel while weakening Jordan’s role in administering the Muslim holy sites. Under the guise of tourism and religious activity, Türkiye strives to gain a foothold in the mosques on the Temple Mount and plays an active role in incitement and provocation against non-Muslim visitors. It is not unreasonable to assume that the stabbing incident of an Israeli Border Police officer by a Turkish tourist in Jerusalem about a month ago is a result of this incitement.

Ankara’s efforts in recent years to thwart cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the gas sector, alongside demonstrating military presence in Libya and other places, further illustrate that Ankara has become a factor that undermines regional stability while infringing on the sovereignty of its neighbors.

The escalation in Türkiye’s attitude towards Israel is particularly concerning given that, unlike in the past, Türkiye is now willing to abandon pragmatism and realpolitik in favor of ideological considerations and domestic public opinion, a trend that, if continues, could turn Ankara from a mere rival into an active enemy. If the Biden administration doesn’t exert significant pressure to curb Türkiye’s dangerous foreign policy, this threat is only likely to grow in the foreseeable future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 2, 2024.

The current geostrategic situation in the Middle East appears at times impossible and even hopeless. Contrary to popular opinion, however, I am not taken with this fatalistic line of thought. Cleaning up the current regional “mess” requires courage and vision, yet it is, indeed, possible.

Beyond the significant threat to our citizens in the form of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, in recent years, the Judea and Samaria region has also become the Wild West, given the Iranian-backed growth of radical movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Currently, only a significant IDF presence prevents disaster for the residents of nearby Jewish towns and villages in the northern Sharon area, well within undisputed Israel, as Israel’s enemies make no secret of their wish to eradicate all of Israel’s citizens and destroy the entire state.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), officially ruling the Palestinians in that area, has proven over the years that it is, indeed, more moderate than Hamas, yet it is still very far from being a terror-free bed of roses.

Recently, along with the gradual and obvious weakening of PA President Mahmoud Abbas (a phenomenon clearly encouraged by the Israeli government over the last decade), the military arm of his political faction, Fatah, has begun competing with Hamas to see who kills more Israeli civilians. Clearly, the situation certainly does not look very promising. So, where is the light at the end of this dark tunnel?

Owing to the fact that in the current state of affairs, the State of Israel depends on the United States to a significant degree in terms of its security and its assistance in the international arena, Israel must creatively recruit Washington and other countries to help when it comes to dealing with the aforementioned threat in question.

A sustainable quiet

THE BIDEN administration is interested in creating “a sustainable quiet” between Israel and Hamas. Washington has a clear interest in calming the current strife between Israelis and Palestinians, especially in the months prior to the November elections in the US. In other words, Israel has inherent leverage with the US due to the Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip and the fact that it can produce a temporary “calm” if it so wishes.

Furthermore, dealing a decisive blow to all hostile terrorist activity in Gaza will be difficult to achieve in a short period of time, as the IDF has already publicly announced in recent days. This will entail a long-standing confrontation against a bitter and stubborn enemy. On the other hand, Jerusalem cannot and should not allow the continued existence of an enemy that declares its readiness to kill, rape, burn, and eliminate its people – and hence, has little choice but to continue to strike. There is little point in doing so, however, without three basic conditions being fulfilled at the same time.

The hostages must be returned, either via a deal or by force, given that Israel cannot violate the unwritten contract between itself and its citizens, who were brutally kidnapped from their homes and held in terrible conditions by a bitter enemy. However, I am not optimistic about Hamas’s intention to release all of them. In fact, to do so would be an antithesis to their worldview and the martial theory they adopted in the first place. There is much room for massive pressure from the US on Qatar with regard to the presence of the Hamas leadership in its territory and until now, such American leverage has not been fully applied.

A clear plan for the temporary civilian management of the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria must be adopted, along with the continued military presence of the IDF. As long as such an Israeli plan is not proposed, any and all in the international arena will view themselves as authorized to come up with a “road map” of one kind or another, without it being viewed and/or sanctified by Israel and regardless of whether it would suit the preservation of Israel’s security interests.

The international arena, with the US and the United Kingdom at its helm, must take responsibility for the temporary civil management of the Palestinians, while the IDF maintains a temporary military presence to prevent terror against its own civilians, Palestinians living in the Strip, and US and UK nationals who would be present. I do not accept the voices according to which certain political parties would not agree to this. What is true is that neither they nor any others would wish to be dragged into the Gazan and Palestinian mud. But this must be the temporary price for taking care of the Palestinian civilian population – until the establishment of a demilitarized political entity of one kind or another, after a decade or another time frame to be determined by the parties.

Throughout that interim period, constructive” regional parties (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.) would lend a hand to civilian aid, but above all, there would be one specific party – the United Arab Emirates – that would take care of the re-education of the population in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria, but also- and not less important (and in full coordination with the Hashemite Kingdom) in Jordan. Without this significant, long-term reeducation plan, consistent with Western values and devoid of incitement and hateful and murderous messaging – with which Palestinian and Jordanian youth are currently being brainwashed – the mentality will not change and the brainwashing will continue to create more and more terrorists.

The United Arab Emirates has already proved that it is willing and able to change the entire education system in its own territory, to the point of replacing teachers who did not adapt themselves to the renewed content. Also, the UAE has great interest in taking extremely harsh steps against the Muslim Brotherhood and its subsidiary organization, Hamas. It has been doing this tirelessly for years within its own borders, where it is strictly forbidden to act, identify with, or support the Muslim Brotherhood or anyone on their behalf, and anyone who does so feels the iron arm of the local law.

As someone who has lived for several years in an Arab country and learned Arabic, as well as to understand the mentality and even the core and vital elements of Islam, I do not recognize attempts to weaken the aforementioned proposals by epithets such as “naive.”

Living for several years, as a Jew and an Israeli, in an Arab country, does not leave much room for naivete. Albert Einstein once said that stupidity is defined by repeating the same action over and over while expecting a different result.

Given the complexity of the current situation, its solution calls for great faith in our Creator, along with extraordinary creativity, courage, and original thought.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 03, 2024.

In the age before Hamas’s October 7 massacre, the air defense operation that successfully intercepted Iran’s air assault against Israel would have seemed like a victory. Almost all (99%) of the over 300 missiles and UAVs launched by Tehran and its proxies were shot down by an international coalition led by the United States, and Israel emerged largely unscathed.

However, the failed paradigms that led to Hamas’s October 7 massacre have taught us that Israel and its allies, including the US, must not revert to a merely defensive posture. They must demonstrate clearly to Iran and the entire Middle East that there is a significant price to be paid for launching such attacks, even if they are deflected.

Before October 7, 2023, the dominant security paradigm in Israel was one that relied on defensive capabilities. Israel had become adept at shooting down Hamas rockets from the Gaza Strip with its Iron Dome system. Even as Hamas’s arsenal in Gaza grew more sophisticated, and Iran provided Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border with precise missiles, Jerusalem’s security concept remained grounded in preserving quiet to the extent possible by relying on its multi-layered air defenses. As long as damage to Israel’s home front could be minimized, the Jewish state could make do with limited strikes on the terrorist organizations that surrounded it.

This paradigm was supported not only by Israel’s military and political echelons, but also by the United States, which provided billions in support for Israeli air defense under the US-Israel 2018 Memorandum of Understanding. In 2022, Congress approved an additional $1 billion for Iron Dome. President Joe Biden’s November 2023 request for supplemental aid to Israel includes funding for 100 Iron Dome launchers.

This assistance has saved countless Israeli lives and Israelis are rightfully grateful for it. At the same time, this approach allowed Israel to tell itself that “defense is deterrence.” Jerusalem adopted the belief that the proper response to Tehran’s increasingly-dangerous efforts to build a ring of terror around Israel through its proxies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, was to build a defensive wall.

ON OCTOBER 7, that paradigm came crashing down. Despite all of Israel’s hi-tech systems, Hamas showed that it was not deterred, and launched a horrifically brazen and barbaric attack. One by one, Israel’s defensive systems failed to prevent Hamas terrorists from murdering more than 1,200 mostly Israelis and kidnapping more than 250 others, leading to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Israel’s reliance on its Iron Dome air defense made its security establishment overly-complacent in the face of Hamas, leading to a failure to detect the terrorist group’s plans for attacking Israel along other vectors.

In parallel, in line with its defensive posture, Israel evacuated the towns along its northern border, in order to move civilians out of the way of Hezbollah’s Iranian-funded missiles. It is not clear when the tens of thousands of internally displaced Israeli refugees will be able to return to their homes in the North.

On the night between October 13-14, Iran launched over 300 cruise and ballistic missiles and UAVs at Israel. Some 99% of them were intercepted by the Israeli, American, British and Jordanian militaries, reportedly with the involvement of Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The successful response showed the utility of the nascent Middle East Air Defense architecture, built since the signing of the Abraham Accords.

According to media reports, President Biden told Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu soon after the successful interception that Israel should see the results as a victory, and that the US would not support an Israeli counter-strike.

Steadfast American support for an Israeli operation against Iran and Hezbollah will send a clear message to the Islamic Republic, while improving overall security in the region and laying the groundwork for future stability. A US-Israel show of unity and determination will lead Iran to limit its response. It must be remembered that the Iranian economy is in dire straits, with an increased reliance on energy sales to China and weapons sales to Russia. The ayatollah regime faces substantial opposition at home. Iran is therefore much more vulnerable to a strike targeting strategic assets.

President Biden warned Iran before it launched its attack with one word: “Don’t”. But Iran did. Now is the time to turn words into actions. Israel must demonstrate that it has learned the lessons of October 7, and will no longer make do with mere defense. The United States must show that its repeated assurances of “ironclad” support for Israel include the Jewish state’s ability not just to block blows, but to strike those who threaten its people.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 16, 2024