The joint US-Israeli operation against Iran has produced a development few could have imagined on the eve of the attack: the Islamic Republic of Iran has launched about 3,000 missiles and drones at Arab countries. No fewer than 1,668 launches were directed at the United Arab Emirates, a number far higher than the total fired at Israel.

Abu Dhabi has firmly denied Israeli reports that it struck an Iranian desalination facility in retaliation. Yet the questions now echoing across the Middle East remain unchanged: Why is Iran attacking its neighbors with such intensity? And are those countries about to respond militarily?

Iran’s assault on the Gulf is not irrational. Rather, it is part of a calculated strategy aimed at coping with the combined power of the US and Israel and surviving the conflict. Leaders in Tehran understand that the country’s defense systems are incapable of fully stopping the blows being dealt to them. Their hope, therefore, is to pressure US President Donald Trump into halting the war before the regime weakens to the point that domestic opponents might topple it.

To create that pressure, Iran is trying to undermine the foundations of what could be called the “Gulf model”: the image of Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates, as islands of stability, prosperity and energy wealth. By disrupting oil flows and targeting major business hubs, the ayatollahs are betting that Gulf governments will pressure Washington to end the war prematurely.

This strategy of pressing Trump to halt the operation is also evident in other fronts. For example, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has begun echoing rhetoric that sounds as though it were lifted from the monologues of Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens, claiming that Trump is being “misled” by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and that this is a war of “Israel first” rather than “America first.” The aim is clear: to stir opposition to the war among Trump’s Republican base.

For now, however, Iran appears to be failing on both fronts. Polls in the US show that between 77% and 84% of Republicans support the operation. In the Gulf, despite the economic damage, air defense systems have recorded impressive successes. The United Arab Emirates has reported an extraordinary interception rate of 99% for missiles and 94% for drones.

That success has fueled national pride in the Emirates and strengthened confidence in the country’s military capabilities and national resilience. Public opinion across Gulf states has also hardened significantly against Iran.

The major question now is under what circumstances, if any, the United Arab Emirates will respond directly with military force. Abu Dhabi has remained cautious, wary of being dragged into a broader confrontation and uncertain whether the ayatollah regime might ultimately survive.

As Anwar Gargash, senior adviser to President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, put it: “The Emirates is in a state of self-defense. Any defensive step taken will be public and clear. Our goal is to stop this ongoing aggression, not to be drawn into escalation.”

Still, there are signs that Emirati patience is running out. President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed sent a pointed message yesterday: “The United Arab Emirates has thick skin and bitter flesh. We are not easy prey.”

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess advanced and well-trained air forces. If it becomes clear that the US and Israel are indeed determined to go all the way and bring down the rule of the ayatollahs, and if that determination is backed by sustained strikes against Iran’s governing, military and internal security targets, the Emirates may decide to actively join the campaign.

The likelihood of such a move increases for one reason: even if the US and Israel destroy most of Iran’s missile launch infrastructure, it will be far more difficult to eliminate Tehran’s drone-launch capabilities entirely. That threat will continue to provoke the anger of Gulf states. In such a scenario, the United Arab Emirates would likely strike clearly defined military targets while seeking to minimize civilian casualties.

Such a step would cement Abu Dhabi’s standing not only as a global economic and energy power but also as a regional military force capable of defending its sovereignty with offensive tools.

For Israel, this represents a historic opportunity to deepen security cooperation and advance the vision of a Middle Eastern strategic alliance that could reshape the region for generations to come.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 08, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The joint Israeli-American strike on Iran has thrown Tehran into turmoil. The extensive scale of launches and strikes across the Gulf states underscored its willingness to exact a regional price. By expanding its attacks beyond military infrastructure to include civilian targets and oil facilities, Tehran overstepped and crossed yet another threshold in the conflict. Yet, the desperate move to restore its lost honor and to exert regional and global pressure on Washington to retreat only worsened its position.

After years of restraint, the region’s states are now being compelled to recognize that standing aside is no longer tenable and that Tehran must be made to pay a price. Following Iran’s escalating attacks, the time for a forceful response has arrived: Doha shot down two Iranian fighter jets and, according to reports, carried out strikes on Iranian soil. In Riyadh, preparations are underway for a possible entry into the conflict, and a similar option is reportedly under consideration in Abu Dhabi.

It must be acknowledged that Gulf states have long been aware of the Iranian threat but most of them chose to rely on Israel and the United States to address it on their behalf, while maintaining distance from Israel and at times even hostility toward it. Fearing Iranian retaliation and the consequences of regional escalation for their oil reserves, these states took care to appease Tehran and preserve normal—even close—relations with it, even as they quietly hoped for Iran’s weakening, particularly the halting of its nuclear and missile programs.

While the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain opted for overt ties and cooperation with Israel, others—foremost among them Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—condemned Israel even as it acted against the Iranian axis that threatens them as well. They tended to favor accommodation and the preservation of dialogue with Tehran over escalation, even though the diplomatic track proved ineffective in curbing the threats emanating from it. This choice carried practical consequences: it weakened the deterrent effect and signaled to Tehran that its policies would not entail a tangible cost.

As for Saudi Arabia, the picture appears somewhat more complex. According to a report in The Washington Post, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman held several conversations with President Trump in recent months to advance an attack against the Islamic Republic, in stark contrast to the public stance he projected, including refusal to allow American strikes from Saudi territory. If accurate, this disclosure somewhat mitigates the criticism directed at Riyadh, alongside indications that the Saudis likely provided assistance in the defensive envelope, even if not in the offensive campaign, both in this and previous rounds. At the same time, this does not absolve the kingdom of having permitted—or turned a blind eye to—the recent anti-Israel campaign that spread through Saudi media, nor of regional moves suggesting rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood axis led by Turkey, rather than strengthening the camp of moderation led by Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Ultimately, the risk-management policy that relied on maintaining an open channel with Tehran, coupled with public criticism of Israel and the assumption that Washington and Jerusalem would shoulder the burden of containing the threat, did not deliver the level of strategic immunity it was intended to secure. In the end, Iran did not distinguish between those who actively acted against it and those who avoided direct confrontation and confined themselves to balanced statements.

It is possible that had some regional states aligned themselves at an earlier stage with Israel, and advanced a coordinated regional framework to curb Iran’s growing power, they might have been able to establish joint deterrence and defense mechanisms and promote security measures capable of arresting the threat at an earlier phase — before the conflict reached the gates of their own capitals.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, March  03, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

So far, the Houthis have not directly joined the confrontation between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other. The central question is whether this restraint will endure, or whether it is likely to shift in the near future, depending on the duration of the combined campaign and the depth of its impact on the Iranian regime and the broader regional environment.

Several indicators suggest that escalation remains a possibility. According to reports, Iran has instructed the Houthis to operate in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea—an especially sensitive maritime corridor of global strategic importance. From Tehran’s perspective, this constitutes a significant pressure tool which could bear consequences for the entire region. For their part, the Houthis could resume attacks on commercial vessels en route to or associated with Israel, without necessarily being drawn into a direct clash with the United States, in line with the May 2025 ceasefire agreement, under which they clarified that the arrangement did not include Israel.

In a recent speech, the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, declared that his movement stands in full solidarity with Iran and is “fully prepared for any developments”, calling on supporters to stage mass rallies in Sanaa and other provinces. Given the longstanding strategic partnership between Tehran and Sanaa—through which the Houthis have benefited from Iranian expertise and the supply of advanced weaponry—the organization’s leadership may find it difficult to refrain from demonstrating tangible support. Even if it avoids large-scale engagement, it may opt for a symbolic or limited move designed to signal commitment.

Some argue that the Houthis may seek to leverage the current confrontation to return to center stage and will not settle for symbolic backing alone. The Yemeni militia has demonstrated boldness in the past and views itself as a leading actor within Iran’s “axis of resistance”—a status it may seek to reinforce in light of Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign last night and the immediate, albeit relatively limited scope of engagement, by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq alongside Tehran.

Against this backdrop, security experts caution that since the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis have used the lull to significantly bolster their capabilities and conduct military preparations, including ground exercises. Although their intermittent rocket fire in previous rounds with Israel largely failed—most missiles were successfully intercepted—there are signs of growing sophistication in their weaponry, including the unprecedented use of surface-to-surface missiles equipped with a dispersal warhead.

At the same time, the Houthis face restraining considerations. Launching attacks against Israel or disrupting international shipping in the Red Sea could provoke a particularly forceful Israeli—and potentially American—response, especially if Houthi aggression targets U.S. assets and bases in the region. The organization’s leadership is well aware of American capabilities, as demonstrated in the large-scale U.S. air and naval operation (“Rough Rider”) conducted against Houthi targets in Yemen in March 2025 in response to Red Sea attacks, and is unlikely to seek a repeat experience.

Israel, too, represents a significant deterrent factor, based on past operations that included severe strikes on ports and infrastructure and the targeted killing of senior figures. The elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the combined campaign against Iran may also likely to resonate. Such a message would not be lost on al-Houthi, who is unlikely to wish to have a similar fate.

The Houthis therefore face a clear dilemma: strategic loyalty to Iran and the projection of regional power versus a fundamental interest in survival. If they choose to join the campaign, their move will likely be measured and limited—designed to signal solidarity and project strength without being drawn into a prolonged confrontation that could exact a heavy price. At the same time, Israel must prepare for the more severe scenario in which the Houthis decide to assume significant risk and enter the conflict as a leading actor within the axis of resistance.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 06, 2026.  

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

“The president is curious why they haven’t surrendered. Why under this kind of pressure with the amount of naval power we have there, why haven’t they come to us and said ‘we declare we don’t want weapons, and this is what we’re willing to do.'” Those remarks were made by Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump’s envoy, in an interview with Fox News.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could hardly have hoped for a better acknowledgment of his steadfastness in the face of American pressure. Witkoff’s statement will almost certainly be presented in Iran as clear proof that Washington’s military moves are intended merely to intimidate, threaten and pressure Tehran into accepting the framework the Americans are offering for a diplomatic agreement.

Although President Trump himself has said the military threat is meant to reinforce diplomatic efforts, he has also left room to suspect that such statements are part of a negotiating tactic rather than a reflection of his true intentions. Witkoff’s comments from within the administration leave little space for that possibility.

From the perspective of Iran’s leadership, as long as it believes the option of a deal remains open and preferable in Trump’s eyes, it will view that as an insurance policy for the regime’s survival, which it values above all else.

Any deal would be bad

From Israel’s standpoint, the more appropriate way to confront the Iranian regime’s threats is to work toward its downfall. Even before the current security tensions, developments had strengthened optimism about that prospect. The achievements of Operation Rising Lion and the success of the sanctions policy have placed the regime under existential strain. The widespread killing of protesters, aimed at swiftly crushing unrest, demonstrated how seriously the regime viewed the threat.

Recent reports of renewed protests at universities suggest that the spirit of the regime’s opponents has not been broken, despite harsh repression and despite disappointment over the absence of meaningful external support.

Ultimately, Tehran’s leadership cannot resolve the country’s fundamental problems and will struggle to offer its citizens a better future. On the contrary, conditions are likely to worsen as sanctions expand and intensify, and as Iran’s allies grapple with their own crises. Such a reality ensures continued potential for sustained unrest within the Islamic Republic.

Under these circumstances, any deal with Tehran would serve as a lifeline for the regime. Ending the crisis without one, while tightening sanctions to hasten its collapse, is preferable to an agreement that might temporarily curb its ambitions but ultimately ensure its survival.

Even if President Trump continues to seek only “a better nuclear deal,” he will struggle to achieve it as long as Iran’s leadership believes it holds the switch that can halt the war machine. He should set a declared deadline for the conclusion of talks and make clear that once hostilities erupt, the only relevant agreement with Iran will be a surrender agreement.

Such an approach would also dispel reports that the US might carry out a limited strike and then give Iran another opportunity to return to the negotiating table. There must be no option that conveys the message: There is no need to hurry; there will be a second chance.

Defining the goals of military action

In any case, once operational conditions for military action are met, the likelihood of such action increases. The most important decision Trump would face is defining the objectives of the war. He would need to choose between two primary alternatives.

The first would be a military operation designed to compel the regime to accept a deal that meets US demands. Regime change would remain a desirable outcome that might result from weakening the leadership, but it would not be defined as a direct objective.

The second alternative would be a powerful and prolonged campaign aimed at creating conditions for replacing the regime. Such a campaign would seek to destroy all the regime’s vital centers of gravity, including the political leadership, military command and senior intelligence officials, as well as its strategic capabilities at sea, in the air and on land. It would also target dual-use infrastructure that serves the military arms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 23, 2026.

As speculation swirls over the likelihood of a strike against Iran and regional tensions reach a boiling point, US President Donald Trump continues to keep everyone guessing. Speaking with reporters in Davos on Wednesday, he voiced hope that no further military steps would be taken against Iran. In the same breath, he stressed that the US would act if Tehran resumed advancing its nuclear program.

The implication is that as long as the current situation in Iran holds, military action would be taken only if it renews its nuclear activity. On Thursday, at the launch of what he termed a “Board of Peace,” Trump added: “Iran wants to talk to us, and we’ll talk.”

Is he planning to send US forces on a punitive mission against the regime? That seems doubtful. His softened rhetoric does not point in that direction. Had that been his intention, one would expect him to amplify reports about the scale of the casualties and atrocities involved in the regime’s crackdown, using them to bolster the legitimacy of an attack.

Has Trump returned to the path of accommodation and abandoned the idea of regime change? That too is unclear. Trump understands well that as long as the clerical regime in Tehran remains in power, it will not relinquish its ambitions. Any achievement against such a regime would therefore be temporary and limited. Still, public and diplomatic discourse in recent days has cast doubt on the feasibility of achieving regime change quickly, as Trump would prefer. Instead, assessments point to a prolonged interim period of chaos. These assessments, together with the relative lull in protests inside Iran, may have curbed ambitions in the White House, at least for now.

What, then, is the purpose of the US military buildup and deployment in the region? First and foremost, readiness for a range of possible scenarios. The situation is fragile, and it is difficult to predict how events will unfold. Force availability signals deterrence, shortens response times, and projects reassurance to US partners.

Second, the buildup enables preparedness for the next opportunity. Given Iran’s persistent structural problems, the assumption is that a renewal of protests is only a matter of time. Moreover, the deployment itself could help encourage such unrest. Trump wants to be in a position to make good on his promise that “help is on the way” when that moment arrives.

Third, the forces are meant to deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program. Fourth, they provide readiness for the possibility that Iran will seek to retaliate for any military action taken against it in response to its armament efforts. As a reminder, this was one of the key issues discussed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump at their meeting in Mar-a-Lago in Florida less than two months ago, before the wave of protests in Iran came to dominate the agenda.

From Israel’s perspective, developments regarding Iran largely reflect a positive trend. Tehran is mired in diplomatic, military and economic distress. Its allies and proxies are unable to come to its rescue. The “maximum pressure” campaign and secondary sanctions are taking their toll. There is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Still, Israel cannot afford to stand aside and let events run their course. It must do everything in its power to ensure that the US is not tempted to enter negotiations with the Iranian regime. The mere existence of political dialogue would provide the regime with a lifeline vis-à-vis its protesting citizens, signaling the possibility of agreements that could ease conditions.

Political negotiations would seriously undermine the prospects for regime change precisely at a moment when that possibility is becoming tangible, even before considering the additional gains the regime could extract from such talks. Past experience offers little basis for optimism regarding what negotiations with the Iranian regime can deliver.

A second issue that Israel’s political leadership must advance with Washington concerns Iran’s rehabilitation and rearmament. Amid warnings about nuclear activity and the killing of protesters, the threat posed by ballistic missiles has been conspicuously absent. Despite some discussion of the issue, it appears this threat has yet to receive appropriate attention in Washington. One can assume that Israel’s leadership continues its diplomatic and security efforts on this front, mindful as well of the window of opportunity at its disposal.

Presence and freedom of action matter more than an agreement

Events this week in the Kurdish region of northeastern Syria illustrate the depth of change in the region and its moral implications. The Kurds, who played a significant role in the fight against jihadist terrorism emanating from the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and other extremist groups, have now become a target of the regime in Damascus, led by the jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as the hardline al-Julani, and his partner, the “good friend” Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Accounts from Kurdish sources depict ethnic cleansing and a genuine attempt to eradicate the Kurdish people. They also convey undisguised disappointment with the US stance, alongside an expectation that Israel will extend a helping hand.

Given Israel’s renewed standing as a regional power and against the backdrop of Turkish ambitions in the area, Israel’s leadership in Jerusalem cannot remain silent in the face of shifting balances of power in regions of strategic importance to it. Nor can it ignore such cries for help from those who see themselves as aligned with Israel. Conduct in these tests will shape Israel’s standing, particularly in the old-new Middle East in which we live.

From the specific case of the Kurds to the broader picture, Syria itself: the sequence of events since Julani rose to power underscores the instability of this arena and the rapid swings between extremes. In some ways, this mirrors the challenge present in other open fronts. The dramatic achievements of the war have created a new reality, but one that is still taking shape. The old order has been dismantled; a new order has yet to solidify.

The challenge in such a reality is to secure achievements and thwart the enemy’s efforts to rebuild strength and erode them. This stretches the attention and capabilities of the defense establishment and political leadership to the limit, demands flexibility and rapid response, and runs counter to the natural desire for stable routine. Yet this stage is unavoidable. Attempts to shorten the path through dubious arrangements or premature agreements could prove far too costly. This applies as well to pressures to establish an Israeli-Syrian security arrangement.

In Washington, this is viewed as another layer of the Abraham Accords and an opportunity to shape a new regional order. But Israel, having been burned before, must adopt a cautious and skeptical approach. It is entitled, and indeed obliged, to assume that the ruler’s friendliness toward the West is merely a survival tactic. Even if he himself were to change, he remains bound by commitments to a base whose behavior can be seen in clashes with Druze, Alawites and now also Kurds.

Israel must preserve freedom of action, both aerial and ground, in Syria. This will allow it to continue proactive operations against hostile elements entrenching themselves in the area, prevent weapons smuggling and terrorist intentions, and safeguard additional interests. Under no circumstances should Israel relinquish security control of the buffer zone or its hold on the Mount Hermon crest, a vital observation point for blocking linkages between Syria, Hezbollah and Iran.

A situation in which Israeli forces are forced into friction with the Turkish military in southern Syria cannot be acceptable to Israel, even if formal diplomatic relations exist between the two countries. The Golan Heights constitute Israel’s strategic defensive line on its eastern border, and their status is not open for discussion.

It is hard to believe that Julani would be willing to reach arrangements with Israel under these conditions. That does not mean Israel should compromise. Tangible assets and freedom of security action are preferable to dubious arrangements, even if they are formalized.

The gates of hell

Ali Shaat, head of the “Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip,” announced from Davos that the Rafah crossing would reopen next week. It remains unclear whether this will happen on the stated date and whether the crossing will be used for goods as well as for people. In any case, once the statement has been made, the direction is clear.

As if the existing openings and crossings through which dual-use items flow to the benefit of the Hamas terrorist organization were not enough, this route is now set to open as well, with oversight that evokes tales of Chelm. Confronting our enemies’ rearmament efforts on all fronts, and in the Gaza Strip in particular, requires an unconventional organizational response: a joint effort by the Israel Defense Forces, the Shin Bet security agency, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the police, the Tax Authority, the crossings authority, the State Attorney’s Office and others.

For this to happen, political direction is required, as are resources and, above all, an understanding of the processes involved. Because of their complexity, these processes demand a level of sustained attention that is not always present among decision-makers and senior officials. That is what our enemies are counting on. It is time to bring about change here as well.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 25, 2025.

Let’s start with a fact many likely missed: Ankara announced that it is recruiting 2,000 Turkish soldiers and training them as a Turkish brigade that will join the International Stabilization Force, slated to deploy in the Gaza Strip as part of US President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan. This step dovetails with another Turkish move revealed a few days ago, the issuance of 37 arrest warrants against senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on allegations of war crimes and genocide.

These developments come as Ankara invests heavily in increasing Turkish visibility in Gaza via Turkish and Palestinian aid organizations. Turkish posters and flags are flying across the Strip, including on bulldozers clearing debris and searching for deceased hostages.

Trump has enlisted Turkey, alongside Qatar, as a lead partner in his initiative and views Ankara as the most effective lever over the Hamas terrorist organization. Erdogan has thrown himself into the task. He credits Turkey with persuading Hamas to accept, and begin implementing, the plan’s first phase, and he wants what he considers proper payment for that achievement: a deeper Turkish presence, involvement and influence in Gaza.

Turkey’s interest, and Hamas’s

For Erdogan, that payoff serves two strategic aims. First, to elevate Turkey’s status as a leading regional power that is actively shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics. Second, to hem in Israel, erode its regional standing and blunt its ability to advance Israeli priorities over Turkish ones. A clear example is the Israel–Greece–Cyprus strategic alliance, which Turkey see as threatening key Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara regards Israel as its most challenging regional competitor, chiefly in military terms but also in technology, and economically through the potential opened by expanding the Abraham Accords, including IMEC, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor linking India and East Asia through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel and on to Europe. Diplomatically, Israel’s widening ties in the region and its special relationship with the US also come into play.

Backing Hamas and political Islam is one of Turkey’s levers for asserting leadership of Sunni Islam in the Middle East. That logic drives Ankara’s Hamas policy and its insistence that Hamas retain its standing as a relevant and influential political actor, not only in Gaza but in Palestinian politics more broadly. A significant Turkish presence in Gaza would allow Ankara to safeguard Hamas’s vital interests, which by definition are also vital Turkish interests.

A winning combination

Influence in Gaza, coupled with Erdogan’s closeness to Trump and the favor the US president shows the Turkish leader, creates what Ankara sees as a winning combination. Erdogan believes, and hopes, that this mix will enable Turkey to force a broad military presence in Gaza as a central pillar of the ISF. A Turkish military footprint in the Strip, reinforced by the growing dominance of Turkish civilian aid groups, could, in Erdogan’s view, narrow Israel’s room to maneuver and its operational freedom in Gaza, and thus its ability to act consistently, deeply and effectively against Hamas’s reconstruction efforts.

Israel’s understandable caution about harming Turks, together with Erdogan’s sway over Trump to restrain Israel, gives the Turkish Armed Forces a chance to clamp Israel in a pincer, via Gaza in the south and Syria in the north. That is how the Turkish president could carve out and stabilize a strategic comfort zone that works to Israel’s detriment.

Given these moves, and in light of Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel and his open antisemitism, Israel would do well to keep firmly opposing any Turkish military presence in Gaza. It should act creatively and in close coordination with Washington, working with the Egypt–Saudi Arabia–UAE axis to minimize Turkey’s role in the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, Israel should push to prioritize deeper involvement, military presence and influence by that counter-axis, which also sees Turkey and its maneuvers as a threat and a challenge. Above all, Israel needs to internalize the implications: if Erdogan succeeds in executing his broader strategy, Israel could find itself in a Turkish stranglehold, where Ankara sets the rules.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 11, 2025.

As part of its alignment with Trump’s plan for Gaza, and thanks to its close ties with the United States, Qatar has received another security-related concession from Washington.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently met with his Qatari counterpart, thanked him for Doha’s involvement in the ongoing talks, and announced that the United States would establish a fighter jet training facility at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho for Qatari pilots and fighter jets. This announcement comes shortly after the signing of a presidential order granting Qatar, possibly subject to congressional approval, a US commitment to defend it in the event of an attack by a foreign entity.
The significance of this step should be understood in light of Doha’s considerable investments in recent years in modernizing its air force as part of a broader policy aimed at strengthening its military capabilities. The small emirate is known less for its military might and more for its immense wealth, given its status as a key player in the global gas market, its vast investments in infrastructure and assets abroad, and its deep penetration into Western academia and economies.
At the same time, Qatar is acutely aware of the volatile security environment in the Middle East and the growing need for both defensive and offensive capabilities – a need that intensified following Israel’s attempted assassination of senior Hamas officials in Doha.
Accordingly, Qatar has focused its efforts on upgrading its air force, which has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
A monitoring report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute shows that in 2014, Doha’s air fleet included only 12 fighter jets (nine of them operational) – a modest force compared to its regional competitors. Today, following an accelerated armament strategy, the fleet numbers roughly 100 combat aircraft, including US-made F-15QA jets, French Rafales, and Eurofighter Typhoons produced by a European consortium (a joint venture of the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France).
Israel views these developments with concern, and justifiably so. While the Qataris are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to use their fighter jets for a direct attack on Israel, the trend of acquiring advanced offensive air capabilities could undermine Israeli interests in other forms.
Given that the United States and European countries remain Qatar’s principal suppliers of defense technology and equipment, experts warn that Doha could serve as a conduit for the transfer of advanced Western technologies and tactics to actors hostile to Israel. This concern is heightened by the Qatari air force’s occasional participation in joint exercises with countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, as well as by its proximity to Iran.
Moreover, the West appears increasingly willing to normalize Qatar’s presence in the international security arena, including through its participation in joint exercises with Western nations. This trend risks obscuring the potential harm inherent in Qatar’s emerging military relationships.
In May of this year, the Qatari air force took part in Anatolian Phoenix, a combined air exercise held twice annually since 2012 under Turkish auspices, attended by the United States, Germany, Italy, and others. A month earlier, Doha participated in the international Iniochos 2025 exercise in Greece, focused on air combat training, strike missions, and operational coordination –  an exercise in which an Israel Air Force delegation also participated.
While enhanced defense cooperation with Qatar through arms deals and international forums has already become a fait accompli in both Europe and the United States, Israel would be wise to carefully examine the ways in which it may, directly or indirectly, be contributing to this process – whether through tacit acceptance and willingness to take part in such forums attended by Doha or by refraining from defining Qatar as a hostile state and the strategic implications such a designation entails.
Finally, Israel must consider the potential erosion of its qualitative military edge in the region. Thus far, Qatar’s requests to acquire F-35 aircraft from the United States have been denied. However, if the current trend of deepening US-Qatari relations continues, driven by economic interests, among others, such a scenario cannot be ruled out in the future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, Octiber 20, 2025.