Alongside the satisfaction at seeing the Iranian “axis of resistance” collapse in what appears to be a domino effect (Gaza-Lebanon-Syria), concerns are now rising about the nature of the future regime taking shape in Damascus. This is especially true regarding the question of the new Syrian regime’s approach toward Israel, particularly in light of Turkey’s establishment as the dominant player in the Syrian arena.

Assad’s fall served Ankara well, paving the way for it to expand its foothold in Syria without having to get its hands too dirty. The victory of the rebels it trained and armed for over a decade helps improve its position regarding its core interests in Syria, which mainly include weakening Kurdish autonomy in the country and returning millions of Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey since the civil war, causing much domestic frustration. Under the pretext of fighting Kurdish terrorism, Turkey has created a de facto security zone on the northern border with Syria, including areas like Afrin and others. The zone functions as an independent Turkish-speaking province with civilian infrastructure like roads and hospitals.

Now, Turkey is doing everything in its power to establish a pro-Turkish governing alternative that aligns with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman aspirations to transform Syria into a Sunni Islamist stronghold under its patronage. Ankara isn’t wasting time, and in an effort to expand its influence, has already declared its commitment to help Syria build a “new structure” and its intentions to strengthen trade, security, and energy ties with Damascus. It even offered to train the military forces that will form under the new government led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Recently, it went further by threatening military invasion in what appeared to be a signal to the Americans to withdraw their support from the YPG – a Syrian-Kurdish militia associated with the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK) which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US and the European Union.

Given Erdogan’s militant approach toward Israel, which reached a low point after the Oct. 7 massacre, and his standing alongside Hamas, both in words and actions, certain circles in Israel advocate that Jerusalem would do well to repay Erdogan in kind by aiding his Kurdish enemies in the Syrian arena. Supporters of this position argue that beyond moral logic, this approach has practical rationale. Strengthening Kurdish autonomies and other forces hostile to pro-Turkish militias will weaken the influence of Turkish-backed forces and prevent their establishment on Syria’s border with Israel. Such a move, they argue, would make it clear to Erdogan that Israel won’t overlook the Turkish president’s attempts to promote anti-Israeli moves in the regional and global arena. More importantly, it would cause him to hesitate in implementing his threat of invasion into Israel through support for jihadist groups operating in the area. In this view, Israel should provide military assistance to Kurdish groups already receiving significant American backing, thus improving their ground presence and even expanding their hold in northern and eastern Syria.

On the other hand, some warn that following this path could escalate the conflict with the Turks and endanger Israeli interests. Support for the Kurds would be interpreted in Ankara as backing the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and as a worrying advance toward fulfilling the national aspirations of the Kurdish region in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey itself. It’s important to understand that the Turks hold a monolithic view of the Kurds, meaning that support for the YPG is equivalent to support for the PKK – both are terrorists in their view.

Ankara’s current hostile approach toward Israel, severe as it is, could worsen further, and it wouldn’t be wise to push Erdogan in this direction. For example, Turkey could choose not to allow the passage of oil coming from Azerbaijan and destined for Israel through its territory – a move that hasn’t been implemented despite the Turkish boycott. Moreover, if Turkey deepens its influence in Syria, not to mention if it launches another military operation to dismantle Kurdish autonomies according to its recent threat, the chances of the Kurds emerging victorious are very low. In such a scenario, what seems like Israel seizing opportunities could prove to be betting on the wrong horse.

According to this approach, one shouldn’t act comprehensively regarding the range of challenges with Ankara, and instead should provide specific and unique responses that align with Israeli interests vis-à-vis Turkey according to each issue. Despite periods of tension between Israel and Turkey surrounding the Palestinian problem, Erdogan typically prioritized economic considerations over Islamist ideology, even while remaining its ardent supporter. In fact, until the deterioration that characterized the past year, Turkey cultivated close trade relations and considered cooperation with Israel in additional areas like energy.

Therefore, given wise conduct that integrates the vital interests of both sides, Israel and Turkey might reach understandings in Syria just as Israel managed to coordinate its actions with Russia over the past decade and maintain relative stability in the region. In an optimistic forecast, together they could even turn Syria into a buffer zone, similar to Jordan serving as a buffer between Israel and Iraq (and incidentally – Iran).

It seems that at this stage it’s still too early to determine the nature of the new regime taking shape in Damascus, the extent of its reliance on Ankara, and its position toward Israel. Israel would do well to refrain for now from taking a public stance and/or providing overt material support to the Kurds in Syria. Despite the benefit inherent in establishing a strong Kurdish presence as a player blocking the spread of extreme Sunni Islamism in the space hostile to Israel, this could open a new, close, and dangerous front with the Turks. Thus, a move intended to strengthen Israel’s security through effective deterrence against Ankara could bring upon it exactly the escalation it fears, in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It should be remembered that in the conflict between Ankara and the Kurds, the balance of power favors the former unless the Kurds are provided with game-changing means – a development that doesn’t seem realistic in the foreseeable future, neither for the Americans nor for Israel. Trump is not expected to deepen the American military presence in Syria, and if anything, is more likely to thin out the forces as he did during his first term as president. As for Israel, most attention and resources are directed to other arenas, particularly Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon, and at this stage it doesn’t seem it can afford to direct more resources than those already invested today in securing the Syrian Golan.

In conclusion, unless it can be done covertly, Israel should be careful about meddling in the Syrian cauldron and suspend support for the Kurds, at least until timing when it becomes clear that betting on them will prove worthwhile, if the balance of power tilts in their favor. This does not apply to other minorities in Syria like Christians and especially the Druze who, unlike the Kurds, are geographically much closer to the border with Israel. They should and can be supported without it being done as a finger in Erdogan’s eye while risking escalation of the situation to Israel’s detriment.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 30, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

To many researchers, journalists, leaders, and citizens in the West, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is perceived as a pragmatic figure. However, this belief, rooted in Western perspectives, reflects the cultural biases of the West more than the realities of the Middle East. To understand why, we must examine how Western culture shapes the perception of leaders in the Middle East and how the role Julani himself plays in this sophisticated diplomatic game.

Westerners are logically constrained by their cultural bias in understanding the Middle East due to fundamental cultural differences between the two regions. Westerners are the cultural product of over a century of devastating wars in Europe – conflicts that reshaped the global order and led to the adoption of values such as peace, prosperity, and cooperation among nations. After two world wars resulting in tens of millions dead and immense suffering, Western culture became centered around aspirations for economic stability, human rights, and international harmony.

In contrast, the Middle East has evolved over millennia as a desert tribal culture shaped by territorial conflicts and religious wars that continue to define the region.

While religious wars in the West ended centuries ago, in the Middle East, the Sunni-Shia conflict and ethnic struggles remain central to ongoing conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Iran’s Shi’ite hegemony dominated the Middle East through coalitions and threats. Today, however, the Sunni coalition, led by Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, is gaining strength, particularly after the removal of Assad and the conquest of Syria.

Cognitive bias in the Western view of Julani

The gap between Western values and Middle Eastern realities creates a significant cognitive dissonance for Western leaders, journalists, and researchers. They struggle to reconcile how a jihadist leader such as Julani seized power in Syria and rebranded himself as pragmatic leader to the world. How does the Western mind bridge this gap? Through a mechanism of cognitive distortion.

This mechanism operates as follows: to reconcile their expectations with reality, Western observers interpret Julani’s actions as signaling change. His adoption of Western attire, his avoidance of excessive violence against local populations, and his diplomatic language are seen as proof of pragmatism. However, the truth is that Julani’s actions do not reflect Western values but rather a distinctly Islamic strategy known as taqiyya.

What is taqiyya?

Taqiyya is a doctrine designed to protect Islamic believers from harm or persecution. The Quran permits Muslims to conceal their faith when faced with “disbelievers” (enemies of Islam) if necessary to protect themselves (Quran, Surah 28:3). It even allows Muslims to declare disbelief when under duress, provided that faith remains intact in their hearts. Even the Prophet Muhammad himself employed taqiyya in certain situations.

One famous example of Muhammad’s use of taqiyya was the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah with the Quraysh tribe. Many scholars view this treaty as strategic taqiyya, as Muhammad agreed to a ceasefire with the intention of later conquering Mecca – a goal he eventually achieved.

Julani’s strategic sophistication recalls that of the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat. In a speech in Johannesburg on May 10, 1994, Arafat compared the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah before it was broken. History has shown that Arafat meant what he said – those who doubt it can review the Second Intifada and the Karine A weapons ship incident. In 2002, I had the privilege of interrogating that ship’s crew, an investigation that traced the operation back to Arafat and his finance minister, Fuad Shubaki.

The influence of Turkey’s Erdogan

Julani has a masterful mentor in Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His cooperation with this Turkish director explains much of Julani’s success in deceiving the West. As a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey excels in diplomatic manipulation of Western perceptions. Through Erdogan’s mentorship, Turkey has taught Julani how to adopt a pragmatic facade that serves his ideological and political goals.

The strategy of ‘hudna’

A key tactic in Julani’s playbook is the concept of hudna – a temporary cessation of hostilities – rooted in Islamic history. According to the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, hudna is permitted when Muslims are in a position of weakness, allowing them to regroup and grow stronger before resuming conflict. When asked about relations with Israel or future wars, Julani does not rule out fighting.

Instead, he frames the situation in terms of “the weakness of the believers” and “the good of the ummah” (nation). This approach avoids committing to genuine peace and instead cloaks itself in religiously sanctioned postponement.

The Western illusion vs the simple truth

Political researchers, politicians, and journalists in the West who lack an understanding of the cultural and religious context interpret Julani’s words and actions as progress toward Islamic modernization. The simple truth is that Julani remains an ideological jihadist whose long-term goals exclude peace or prosperity in Western terms. A fundamentalist Muslim willing to make peace with Israel is, in a cultural-religious sense, as unlikely as an ultra-Orthodox Jew willing to eat non-kosher meat.

Conclusion: Realism in perception

Having spent over 30 years in interrogation rooms with some of the most notorious Arab terrorists and spies, my conclusion is clear: The West must view the Middle East and its leaders through a realistic lens. Julani is not pragmatic in the Western sense but a sophisticated strategist who uses diplomacy, religious history, and Western misconceptions to achieve his goals. Only by understanding the cultural and religious context can the West formulate a realistic and informed policy toward leaders such as Julani and his mentor, Erdogan.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 25, 2024.

Israel’s strategic objective, which has become increasingly evident over the past few months, aims to fundamentally reshape the regional landscape by targeting Iran and the axis it leads, thereby weakening its influence. This strategy unfolds across two parallel tracks.

On the military front, Israel has targeted Iran’s key proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Iran itself, exposing its vulnerabilities and undermining its prestige. On the diplomatic front, Israel is working to establish a new regional framework centered on expanding the Abraham Accords through normalization with Saudi Arabia, a plan backed by the United States. This new regional framework is intended to serve as a counterbalance to the Iranian axis, further weakening it and potentially destabilizing the Iranian regime to the point of collapse, thereby reducing regional risks.

Israel’s actions have left Iran strategically cornered, facing distress and embarrassment. The regime in Tehran is overshadowed by threats. It fears the imminent return of President Trump, the strength of Israel’s military, the loss of strategic assets, and its exposed vulnerabilities, all of which compound its domestic challenges. Indeed, the collapse of Assad’s regime, the weakening of Hezbollah, and the removal of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the Shiite axis have left Iran in a state of strategic confusion. While its rhetoric remains aggressive, Iran must now decide its next steps, particularly as Trump’s return to power looms.

Iran faces a strategic dilemma:  Pursue a new agreement with the international community, led by the U.S. and a determined president. Such an agreement could allow Iran to focus on economic and security recovery, and perhaps even rebuild the Shiite axis. Or it could accelerate its nuclear ambitions, securing military nuclear capabilities as a safeguard for the regime and a foundation for revitalizing the Shiite axis under a nuclear umbrella.

Despite this dilemma, Iran continues its efforts to rehabilitate Hezbollah, though this task has become increasingly difficult under the new conditions following Assad’s fall in Syria. Concurrently, Iran seeks to destabilize Jordan, turning it into a front against Israel, while smuggling advanced weaponry into the West Bank via Jordan to maintain a foothold against Israel and compensate for its other losses in the Palestinian arena. Additionally, Iran may attempt to secure agreements with the new Syrian regime in exchange for investments, though the chances of such agreements succeeding are slim.

If Iran opts for a new nuclear deal, it will likely rely on its signature tactic: prolonged and sophisticated negotiations. Such a deal would likely require Iran to halt its nuclear program, abandon its regional hegemonic ambitions through proxies and terrorism, and scale back the Shiite axis. In return, sanctions would be lifted, and the Ayatollah regime would remain in power. However, it must be considered that in spite of any such deal, Iran would almost certainly seek to undermine it and resume its subversive activities behind the scenes.

As for Iran’s allies, the country is increasingly isolated. Russia is likely to focus on negotiating with the U.S. over Ukraine, while China – who prioritizes its economic interests – will support Iran only to the extent that it aligns with its economic and technological dominance strategy. In any case, Iran’s current status is problematic: Rebuilding the Shiite axis, meanwhile, would require massive investments, and Iran remains concerned about any activity of insurgents from Syria in Iraq, that would threaten its sphere of influence.

The underlining assumption is that Iran will continue to pose a severe threat to Israel and regional stability regardless of its chosen path. True regional transformation cannot occur without neutralizing the Iranian threat, weakening its influence, and dismantling its regional infrastructure. Achieving this would require destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, targeting its military and governmental symbols, and crippling its economy to render it weak, vulnerable, and focused on internal recovery.

In light of these conditions, Israel must determine the best way to achieve its goals. These include two main components: Completing the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and pursuing a diplomatic initiative to establish a new regional framework that further weakens the Shiite axis.

It is still unclear how Trump will approach Iran, but Israel cannot accept any deal that leaves Iran’s nuclear infrastructure intact. With Iran currently weakened, Syria’s air defenses neutralized, and Trump seemingly supportive of Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel must act swiftly to target Iran’s nuclear program and all its components – assuming the IDF can achieve this goal, and the Americans will back it with the needed weapons and intelligence aid.

Simultaneously with targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Israel should aim to destabilize the Iranian regime by striking symbolic targets, disrupting its internal energy economy, and reducing its ability to provide basic resources like fuel and electricity. These measures would harm Iran’s economy without significantly affecting the global economy, potentially empowering domestic opposition movements.

Of course, the risks of an Israeli operation must be considered. A single strike is unlikely to suffice, requiring multiple rounds of deep strikes in Iran. There is also the possibility of a significant Iranian response, including large-scale missile attacks on Israel. Even with regional and international coalition support led by the U.S., Israel may not always intercept such attacks as successfully as it has in the past year. However, the opportunity to decisively weaken Iran and dismantle its nuclear program is rare and crucial. This window of opportunity would also serve to establish a new regional framework and solidify Israel’s position as a key regional power.

Timing is critical. Delaying until Trump takes office may complicate an Israeli strike. Israel should seize this moment to launch its first strike on Iran before Trump’s inauguration, even in the face of opposition from the Biden administration. Such action would demonstrate Israel’s resolve to prevent Iran’s nuclear advancement. As subsequent strikes would take place under Trump’s administration, Israel would likely benefit from greater American support, advancing its strategic goals for regional transformation and ensuring its security.

In light of the rebels’ success and the fall of Assad’s regime, is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan poised to make good on his threat to invade Israel?

Since October 7, Turkey has hardened its stance toward Israel, including severing trade relations with Israel in solidarity with Hamas. In July, Erdogan escalated further, threatening, “Just as we entered Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya, we will do the same to Israel.”

What initially seemed like an empty threat is now becoming a more plausible scenario following the rebels’ astonishing victory in Syria, where many factions supported by Ankara toppled the Assad regime in just 11 days.

Turkey’s role in these developments is significant, though attributing the coup solely to Ankara would be premature. While Turkey trains and arms some rebel groups, it remains unclear if it directly commands Tahrir al-Sham, the organization spearheading the surprise attack. It is also doubtful that Erdogan himself anticipated such swift and decisive rebel gains.

Surely, Erdogan stands to benefit greatly from dismantling a Shiite regime supported by Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah and replacing it with a Sunni-led government. His key interests in Syria include weakening Kurdish autonomy and facilitating the return of millions of Syrian refugees who have fled to Turkey since the civil war.

The rebels’ victory can help Ankara achieve its goals on both fronts.

Erdogan to exacerbate the situation?

However, this achievement does not shield Turkey from the potential spillover of war into its own territory. The rebel factions are a fragmented mixture of militias, often in conflict with one another. Erdogan likely understands that the path to a pro-Turkish government in Syria is fraught with challenges and could take years, if it materializes at all.

Meanwhile, the extensive operational freedom granted to rebel groups could backfire, entangling Turkey in Syria’s internal strife. It may also reignite tensions at home should the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) launch retaliatory attacks against Turkish forces targeting Kurds in Syria.

And what of Israel? Could Erdogan leverage a friendly regime in Syria to position troops and weaponry on Israel’s border? Turkey’s growing influence in Syria aligns with Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision for the Middle East, as part of which Syria could transform into a Sunni Islamist stronghold under Ankara’s auspices. 

This would intensify Turkey’s adversarial stance toward Israel, particularly as there is no end to the “Swords of Iron” war in sight.

Thus, it is plausible that Erdogan either directly orders jihadist groups operating on the Israeli border to attack Israel or, at the very least, supports them in doing so. 

That said, Turkey must weigh the consequences of opening such a front against Israel. Any escalation would risk straining its relationships with the United States and NATO, especially under a new US administration unlikely to tolerate such aggression. 

Considering these dynamics, Erdogan would be well advised to play his cards cautiously and avoid exacerbating the Syrian conflict, particularly with regard to Israel.

Regardless of Erdogan’s calculations, Israel was wise to mobilize tanks and infantry across the border for the first time in 50 years. Israel must continue leveraging this momentum to strike targets in Syria to diminish Iran’s and Hezbollah’s capabilities. 

Moreover, it is crucial for Israel to insist on a robust and expanded American military presence in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan triangle. 

This strategy will not only curb the influence of pro-Turkish Islamists but also preempt other hostile forces from gaining a foothold in neighboring Jordan—a country already under threat from Iran’s ambitions to destabilize its regime and launch attacks on Israel from the east.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Since Oct. 7, Israel has faced numerous internal and external challenges, yet appears to have succeeded in creating a new regional reality. However, security forces and political leadership had to advance these changes amid significant difficulties and at a heavy cost, operating across multiple fronts after failing to foresee and prepare for various developments.

The recent rapid developments in Syria should serve as another reminder of the importance of maintaining a healthy dose of pessimism. Such an approach helps prepare for worse scenarios – and allows for relief when they don’t materialize.

According to reports, even Israeli intelligence was caught off guard by Bashar Assad’s fall in Syria within days. Their overly optimistic assessment led political leadership to implement what hindsight reveals as flawed policy. Israel believed Damascus’ ruler’s position was stable, and based on this, diplomatic moves were made with Russia, including regarding the end of the Lebanon war. In practice, the Syrian lion proved to be nothing more than a paper tiger.

Excessive optimism was also evident regarding Iran during the war. Before the April missile attack, experts claimed Iran wouldn’t dare launch a direct attack on Israel from its territory, an assessment reportedly shared by US intelligence. The outcome, as we all know, was entirely different: Iran attacked Israel directly not once but twice – launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and UAVs.

This adds to the misconception held by Israeli security forces before Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack: many worked under the assumption that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in confrontation with Israel. Senior IDF officials displayed complacency and dismissiveness, leading to the Gaza war that remains ongoing.

Conversely, regarding the war with Hezbollah, Israel heard exaggerated assessments of the Shiite terror organization’s capabilities. Doomsday scenarios of thousands of daily missiles and rockets striking Israel, hundreds of casualties, and prolonged power grid failures circulated – but ultimately proved baseless. Israel fought Hezbollah with considerable success, and these nightmare scenarios proved false and misleading. The prices paid, heavy as they were, weren’t close to the numbers cited by many commentators and professionals.

So which approach should national assessors take – those tasked with predicting reality based on available information – optimistic or pessimistic? Seemingly, an optimistic approach or operational concept that relies somewhat on intelligence about enemy intentions becomes necessary when dealing with budget constraints. The numerous missions facing Israel’s security forces require prioritization and preparation accordingly.

Yet this was also part of the Oct. 7 error. Had commanders in the field based their military deployment along the Gaza Strip on the enemy’s capabilities rather than their analysis of Hamas’ intentions, we might be in a different place today. While budget and manpower certainly play a role, it’s worth remembering that optimistic scenarios sometimes lead to faulty preparation – and the price we ultimately pay proves exponentially higher.

Is this merely hindsight wisdom? Can we draw future lessons from such thinking? In my view, two conclusions emerge: First, the way to manage budget constraints against mission allocation is simply to increase the budget. Clearly, a jump in defense spending will come at the expense of other matters and affect our quality of life and welfare. However, in recent years, we’ve grown accustomed to living in great comfort, each under their own vine and fig tree. A clear-eyed look at reality reveals that Israel likely needs a larger defense budget. In the long run, maintaining stability and security here is worth significant investment across other areas of life.

The second lesson concerns future assessments of our regional situation, particularly regarding Jordan and Egypt. While the Syrian government’s fall doesn’t mean other neighboring regimes will collapse tomorrow, we must seriously consider and prepare for this possibility. If the regime in Egypt, which maintains war readiness against Israel even in peacetime, collapses, we could find ourselves surprised again on the southern front, potentially at an especially heavy cost. Similarly, if Iran succeeds in gaining control over Jordan, it would somewhat compensate for its loss in Syria while gaining easier direct access to act against Israel and promote terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

One derivative of such thinking emerged in discussions about keeping IDF forces along the Philadelphi Corridor after our troops captured it during the war. Although senior military officials, including the Chief of Staff, indicated that Israel could handle Hamas terrorism without controlling this route – many noted that the military had expressed similar optimistic positions before, yet failed to fulfill the mission.

The economic cost of pessimistic thinking is substantial and burdensome, sometimes proving unnecessary in hindsight. However, the price paid for overly optimistic and incorrect forecasts too often comes in blood, ultimately proving far costlier than any price we would have paid for acting according to pessimistic assessments.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 09, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

The desolation wrought on Hezbollah by Israel, and the humiliation inflicted on Iran, has not only left the Iranian axis exposed to Israeli power and further withering. It has altered the strategic tectonics of the Middle East. The story is not just Iran anymore. The region is showing the first signs of tremendous geopolitical change. And the plates are beginning to move.

First things first. The removal of the religious-totalitarian tyranny of the Iranian regime remains the greatest strategic imperative in the region for the United States and its allies, foremost among whom stands Israel. The Iranian regime, in its last days, is lurching toward a nuclear breakout to save itself. Such a breakout would not only leave one of the most destructive weapons in one of the most dangerous regimes in the world —as President Bush had warned against in 2002 — but in the hands of one of the most desperate ones. This is a prescription for catastrophe. Because of that, and because one should never turn one’s back on a cobra, even a wounded one, it is a sine qua non that Iran and its castrati allies in Lebanon be defeated.

However, as Iran’s regime descends into the graveyard of history, it is important not to neglect the emergence of other, new threats. Indeed, not only are those threats surfacing and becoming visible, but the United States and its allies need already now, urgently in fact, to start assessing and navigating the new reality taking shape.

These new threats are slowly reaching not only a visible, but acute phase. They only increase the urgency of dispensing with the Iranian threat expeditiously. Neither the United States nor our allies in the region have any longer the luxury of a slow containment and delaying strategy in Iran. Instead, a rapid move toward decisive victory in the twilight struggle with the Ayatollahs is required.

The retreat of the Syrian Assad regime from Aleppo in the face of Turkish-backed, partly Islamist rebels made from remnants of ISIS is an early skirmish in this new strategic reality. Aleppo is falling to the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham, or HTS — a descendant of the Nusra force led by Abu Muhammed al-Julani, himself a graduate of the al-Qaeda system and cobbled together of ISIS elements. Behind this force is the power of nearby Turkey. Ankara used the U.S. withdrawal from northern Iraq a few years ago to release Islamists captured by the U.S. and the Kurds. It sent some to Libya to fight the pro-Egyptian Libyan National Army under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar based in Tobruk. It reorganized the rest in Islamist militias oriented toward Ankara. The rise of a Muslim-Brotherhood dominated Turkey, rehabilitating and tapping ISIS residue to ride Iran’s decline/demise to Ankara’s strategic advantage, will plague American and Israeli interests going forward.

Added to this is the power vacuum created by the destruction of Hamas. The defeat of that terrorist group has been, for good reason, a critical goal for Israel and the United States, but it is one that also involves consequences that must be navigated and hopefully countered. The world of Hamas is a schizophrenic one. It has two heads, aligned with different internal fractions — one more anchored to the world of Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood politics led by Turkey and the other to the Iranian axis. In 2012 Israel killed Ahmad al-Jabri, a scion of the powerful al-Jabari clan lording over Hebron but who had transplanted westward to become the leader of the Murabitun forces (part of the Izz ad-Din al-Qasem Brigades) within Hamas in Gaza. He had transported those forces to train under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Mashhad, Iran, in the years before and became the driving force of Hamas by the time Israel felt it had to deal with him. Despite his demise, the structures he led anchored to Iran continued to grow and assume ever more dominance over the Hamas structure, in part because of the release, in the 2011 Gilad Shalit hostage-release deal, of several key figures, including Yahya Sinwar. But Iran did not cleanly control all of Hamas. Turkey maintained a powerful presence in the organization and had some senior Hamas leaders likely more loyal to Turkey than to Iran. In many ways, Hamas reflected the schizophrenia of its patron, Qatar, which served a critical ally to both Iran and Turkey in the last two decades.

In the past two decades, however, Iran proved more ascendent strategically in the region than Turkey. In fits and starts, Ankara had tried quietly to compete with Iran in the last two decades, but more often than not it was left only to nibble at the scraps left by Iran along the edges, whether in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon (after the August 2021 port explosion, for example) or among the two structures of geopolitical discourse, the “Lingua Franca” embodiments of regional competition — the Palestinians and the Islamists. Hamas, therefore, as well as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (an organization whose fealty was far more homogeneously held toward Iran), became increasingly far more defined by Tehran than by Ankara. Iran had become the region’s new Nasser, and its minions accordingly flourished as did its factions in Palestinian and Islamist politics.

However, suddenly the ground shifted. Israel has, since summer 2024, starting with Operation Grim Beeper and the demolition of Hezbollah, triggered an earthquake in the normally slow pace of regional strategic change. If Israel presses onward with priority, as it should, to devastate and destabilize the Iranian regime, and if the Iranian axis meets its demise, then Hamas—indeed all Palestinian and Islamist politics—drifts to a Turkish direction and they slowly emerge as Ankara’s strategic assets. This reorientation does not represent an increase in the Palestinian threat to Israel, but it would be the triumph of hope over experience to think it would reduce it. Indeed, it is likely no more than an exchange of a rabid donkey for a crazed mule.

The emergence of the Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood bloc, which includes Turkey’s slow drift to a dangerous position, as a strategic problem accelerated under President Obama. Turkish leader Tayyip Erdogan always was an Islamist politician. Yet until Obama, Erdogan’s attempts to recreate some sort of neo-Ottoman Caliphate and reignite its imperialist ambitions had been disconcerting but largely symbolic and rhetorical. It was, however, latently concerning, because the reference point on which Erdogan focused—resurrecting the terminated Ottoman Caliphate in 1921—also serves as common ground with the most dangerous Sunni Islamist movements, such as al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group (which was renamed Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), and Fatah al Islam, ISIS and the assortment of al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliate groups across the Maghreb in Africa. There was always the danger of convergence of the Turkish and the most radical Islamist worlds into one strategic threat.

In 2011, President Obama made at least two critical mistakes.

First, instead of supporting indigenous Syrian opposition such as the Free Syrian Army, which sought closer ties to the West, President Obama subcontracted to Turkey and Qatar the task of defining and supporting the opposition to President Assad of Syria as the Syrian regime descended into civil war. The threat of ISIS has thus remained ever since, and with Iran receding, Turkey surfs the crest of the ISIS-remnant wave.

Second, the U.S. tried to sustain Syria as a unified fiction of a state, fearing its partition. The same mistake was replicated in Libya, which had strategic consequences for Egypt. As a result, Egypt is also now drifting in a dangerous direction. The insistence on retaining a unified state meant that to survive in conditions of communal, sectarian, tribal, ethnic civil war, each faction within that state had to fight to the death for control over the other rather than disengage into partitioned pieces. Control meant survival while being controlled meant being slaughtered. This fueled the Syrian refugee crisis.

Given the calamity that befell Syria and the chaos that lies underneath, as well as these hovering strategic forces positioning already to scavenge the Syrian nation’s cadaver, it is important for both Israel and the United States, along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to contemplate as soon as possible many scenarios that hitherto were outlandish in the western end of the fertile crescent. It is too early to identify and digest fully, let alone definitively plan for the reality that will emerge. Now is the time, though, for some initial thoughts that might undergird a longer-term strategic planning process.

First, to be clear; Iran remains the central threat. And nothing can be done until it is defeated. But the urgency of ensuring and achieving its defeat is increasing rapidly.

With Iran’s defeat, Syria will begin unraveling. Russians will try to protect essential interests there — Assad’s Alawite regime and the Christian communities, especially the Greek Orthodox. It is not only the last remnant outside Cuba of the Soviet global bloc, but also a more civilizational sense of commitment to the remains of the world of Byzantium. As several current Russian political commentators, intellectuals and religious leaders have posited, Russia considers itself to some extent the “Third Rome” — Rome and Constantinople being the first two. The remnant Christian communities — especially the Greek Orthodox since the Maronites are Catholic and orient more to France — are envisioned as Moscow’s charge.

A Russo-Turkish confrontation might threaten Israel and America but it could also present opportunities. Russia may consider turning to Israel as a key offset to Turkish power once Iran is removed from the picture.

Moreover, China is likely to realign with Turkey and drop Iran when it realizes the Ayatollah regime is falling. China has hedged for the past few years, having signed a strategic agreement with Iran in 2021, but it has just as aggressively sought to tighten its relations with Turkey. Part of what drives Beijing and Ankara together is the strategic competition between China and India. China has ties to Pakistan through the Hindu Kush range and sees India as one of its premier enemies. Turkey as well has close strategic relations with Pakistan, uses that relationship to compete with India in Afghanistan, and has attempted in the last half decade to destabilize India both through using Pakistani help to rile up unrest in the Jammu and Kashmir, but also among India’s 200 million Muslims. As Iran falters, we see China shifting more toward Turkey.

And we see Egypt also recalibrating. This was in part because of Libya, but also the unrelenting pressure of the Biden administration on human rights and Washington’s tolerance of Qatar and the Muslim brotherhood regionally against the Saudis and Egypt. At first, Egypt retrenched into close alliance with the Saudis and positioned itself as Erdogan’s nemesis — even to the extent of supporting the Syrian regime in its efforts to withstand pressure from Turkey and its Islamist allies. But the pressure of Washington (paused during the first Trump presidency) mounted, and Egypt increasingly moved from confrontation to cooption of the internal Islamist threat. This process began under the Obama era — which led to a strategic shift away from peace, away from Israel, and away from viewing Hamas as a profound strategic and domestic threat, and instead toward slow accommodation of Hamas and Turkey.

The post-October 7 closure of the Red Sea and by extension Suez – and the unwillingness of the United States to reverse that, which Cairo viewed as an inconceivable abdication of American power — shook Cairo. It made it more attractive to align with the Muslim Brotherhood, Erdogan and China. The evidence of this shift has been exposed in recent months. As the war progressed, and especially after Israel captured Rafah and the “Philadelphi” border region between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the level of Egyptian tolerance that was exposed of a far-more expansive Hamas smuggling network through the Sinai surprised even the Israelis. That smuggling could not have been done without the knowledge of all levels of Egypt’s security structures, and indeed various examinations of the network indicate that Egyptian officials profited off this trade in the hundreds of millions of dollars, or even billions. The tight cooperation between Israel and Egypt to check Hamas and curb Erdogan’s intrusion into Gazan and Egyptian affairs still evident in 2014 had somehow shifted toward Egyptian indulgence of Hamas and Iran and Turkey’s support for it. Another sign that this shift is accelerating recently was the sudden release of 800 Muslim Brotherhood operatives by Egypt last week. Such a blanket release indicates a material strategic shift — the Muslim Brotherhood is the vanguard of Erdogan’s threat to the Egyptian regime — not a minor gesture. For the moment, Egypt is not forced to choose whether to side with the emerging Turkish-Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-Chinese bloc or the Russo-Iran bloc. While clearly abandoning the West, it has yet to leap wholeheartedly into the Turkish camp. The power of Russia and the residues of history still have their grip to some extent on Cairo.

In other words, we already see a mass realignment underway to digest the fall of Iran and the rise of an imperial Turkey. If Syria approaches a final failure and collapse, what pieces might emerge?

A proper Lebanese state anchored to its Maronite foundation is one desirable outcome.

Beyond that are some less conventional prospects. The U.S. and Israel should start planning for an Alawite state further up the Mediterranean coast. Syria is unlikely to remain a single country. Russia may find that it will be able only to hold a rump Alawite state and Christian communities (Greek Orthodox — not Maronite) and retreat to protect an enclave state. It will also rapidly come to see Iran as useless in this regard and split from Iran on Syria — or what’s left of it.

How might the United States and Israel relate to the desperate Russian-oriented enclave entity?

Russia had envisioned a new foreign policy approach, launched a year ago at the Valdai Conference in Sochi and unveiled in Putin’s speech there on October 5, 2023. He proposed cobbling together the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations into one geopolitical strategic bloc to challenge the West. But that vision and the underlying unity upon which the Valdai vision is anchored now is being torn to shreds. Russia likely will reach out to India and a post-Ayatollah Iran, but less as a hostile challenge to Israel and the West and more as a desperate move to prepare itself and preserve its dwindling assets in the emerging Russo-Turkish confrontation.

It is strategically wise to consider now how one handles the disintegration of Syria.

It is likely that Russia will be forced to retreat into an effort to protect the Alawite and Christian (especially Greek Orthodox) communities, which it will likely only be able to do by creating a rump Syria state in traditional Alawite and Christian areas. Given that Russia relies on access to the area via Syria’s ports in Latakia, Tartus, and Banias (especially Tartus) along the Mediterranean coast, it will most likely anchor that rump entity along the eastern Mediterranean with strategic partners in Lebanon, and then a rump Alawite state to the north of that in Tartus and the surrounding mountains.

Putin has proven thus far that he is able to adjust or evolve his strategic vision, but only slowly. He suffers some rigidity. It is possible that Russia will remain so focused on imperial European ambitions that it falters and falls — along with its Iranian ally — in its survival in the region.

Yet it’s also conceivable that Russia may reach out to cooperate with the U.S. and Israel to save its position. If so, the U.S. and Israel will be faced with a decision about how much to cooperate with Russia against Turkey and China or how much to try instead to anchor the post-Syria structures to U.S. and Israeli power independent of Russia. It’s complicated, too, by the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO and home, simultaneously, to some of the remaining Hamas leadership and to the U.S. Air Force’s Incerlik Air Base.

It’s time to start noodling these questions — even the outlandish ones. Trump didn’t spend much time during the presidential campaign talking about the threat of Turkey. He did, though, often warn that we are closer than ever to World War III.

Published in The Editor, December 02, 2024.

The visit by Secretary of State Antony Blinken appears to be a final effort by the US to secure a full ceasefire before the upcoming elections. However, the chances for this are not high. Israel has not yet settled its score with Iran over the ballistic missile attack on October 1. Furthermore, Israel’s accusations toward Iran for the drone strike on the Prime Minister’s residence in Caesarea have increased the stakes.

In Lebanon, although Hezbollah has taken significant blows, it is showing signs of recovery, and its confidence is growing. It is difficult to imagine Hezbollah forgoing further retaliation for its losses or accepting Israel’s terms for a ceasefire. In Gaza, while Israel has scored a significant achievement with the elimination of Yahya Sinwar, the effects are not immediate, and much work remains to be done—particularly in securing the release of hostages and achieving all of Israel’s war objectives.

Given the signals Iran has been sending about its reluctance to be drawn into a regional war, and following its negotiations via Qatari mediation to renew nuclear talks with the U.S., it is possible that Blinken will attempt to craft an agreement that would limit Israel’s operations in a way Tehran can tolerate without military retaliation. In exchange for this and for humanitarian arrangements in Gaza, Blinken is likely to assure continued U.S. military aid to Israel and support for its stance regarding Lebanon.

It can be assumed that Blinken has not given up on the idea of pushing for a comprehensive ceasefire through a deal in Gaza, using a “Biden Plan” format. This would frame the elimination of Sinwar and the implementation of humanitarian measures in northern Gaza as a victory image. However, at this stage, Hamas remains committed to the positions set by Sinwar, making such a ceasefire unlikely.

Given this situation, significant political shifts are not expected soon. Military activity will continue to shape the reality on the ground. Israel will persist in dismantling the threat that Iran has built around it, weakening Iran and its regime in the process, and seizing opportunities to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Simultaneously, Israel will continue to target the remaining military capabilities of Hamas and its efforts to reestablish governance in Gaza.

Against Iran

The Iranian attack on Israel demands a response, but Israel need not rush. The current delay is fraying Iranian nerves, and the growing internal criticism of the regime is a positive byproduct of Israel’s restraint.

Israel should maintain maximum ambiguity (even after reported leaks), prepare for preventive and reactive scenarios, and allow its actions to speak for themselves.

Against Hezbollah

Israel’s declared goal is to ensure the safe return of northern residents to their homes. The ongoing fighting is pushing Hezbollah out of threatening range, but a long-term solution is needed to maintain this new reality. The achievements of the Israeli military, which have placed Israel in a strong position for the post-war period, allow Israel to aim for Hezbollah’s disarmament and the establishment of measures to prevent its rearmament.

Israel should continue striking Beirut to damage Hezbollah’s assets and increase pressure on the organization from other Lebanese factions, who are alarmed by the destruction of the capital. Israel should stick to the stance that any agreement regarding Lebanon must be made under fire, taking advantage of Lebanon’s severe crisis.

Against Hamas

Increased military pressure in northern Gaza is necessary to prevent Hamas’s recovery, deepen the damage to its remaining capabilities, disrupt its efforts to govern, and eliminate key figures who may be appointed as successors. This pressure will also provide justification for factions willing to compromise on the issue of hostages.

It is difficult to assess the chances of success for the proposal to create “humanitarian bubbles” secured by an American company, though it clearly carries significant risks. Nonetheless, Israel’s agreement to this proposal may be a reasonable price to pay to maintain a positive relationship with the Biden administration, especially as it is a temporary and reversible measure.

Additionally, there is a need to increase pressure on the decision-makers in Hamas’s overseas leadership and on Qatar, which hosts them. Qatar can no longer attribute delays to Sinwar and his partners. Israel should also intensify efforts to strike Hamas’s military and organizational infrastructure in the West Bank, preventing coordination channels between those on the ground and the overseas command and targeting key figures involved in driving terrorist activity.

As the Simchat Torah holiday of 5785 approaches, one Hebrew year after the horrific massacre, Israel continues to demonstrate to the Western world how to confront Iran’s proxies, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, or the West Bank. The task is far from over, with many challenges ahead. These include the complete removal of threats, preventing their resurgence, and confronting the head of the Iranian snake.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October  23, 2024.

As Israel’s military campaign against the proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran succeeds, and the scope of potential attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran against Israel in the South and the North becomes narrower, there is a growing probability that the latter will activate additional fronts that have not yet been exhausted.

I have written previously about the threat that looms from the east, yet now it no longer “looms.” It is here. We are, almost unwittingly, already in the midst of yet another campaign, only one which is not yet making headlines in the media.

From a broad observation of the interests of the Islamic Republic, the intention to expand over as wide an area as possible is evident. First, it intends to take over the Middle East, then the Gulf countries, and then the entire world. Despite the fact that it sounds more than a little like science fiction, this is indeed the aspiration of the Shi’ite extremist Islamic rule in Iran.

Iran’s modus operandi is to overthrow regimes and countries from within and to then take control of them, amid the chaos and lack of stability. This is what was done in Iraq, following the withdrawal of the Americans from the country and also the international coalition led by the US against the Sunni terrorist organization ISIS. Today, Iraq is no longer an independent country but an extension of Iran, which has significantly expanded its own territory.

This is how the Islamic Republic of Iran also behaved in Lebanon, through the designated terrorist organization Hezbollah, and in Syria, via its Shi’ite militias. This is how it operated and continues to do so in Yemen, via the Houthis, and this is how it operates through sl

Jordan and Israel interrupt Iranian expansion

What prevents the territorial continuity of the Iranian regime in the region is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel. The relatively weak Jordanian regime, whose national security is being upheld by the US and in more ways than one also by Israel, has had difficulty in recent years preventing the Ayatollah regime from trying to erode its strength from within. This is a point that is not at the center of attention of the world and/or the public in Israel.

The current Iranian regime has begun to justify its infiltration into Jordan several years ago, by having to send emissaries to maintain the graves of righteous Shi’ites in the kingdom, some of which, quite coincidentally of course, are close to the Israel-Jordan border. At the same time, the Iranian regime works day and night to strengthen Hamas among the Palestinian majority in the kingdom.

The Islamic Republic also made and continues to make cynical use of the territory of Jordan as a transit country for smuggling weapons to the Judea and Samaria region to arm Hamas, as well as for smuggling weapons and drugs to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Another unexpected country in Latin America joins this profitable industry – Venezuela – which supports the drug industry and sees it as an important source of income.

All this has been going on for years, while between Israel and Jordan there is a significant border of over 300 km., without any substantial obstacle between the two countries for most of those kilometers, and with a laughable obstacle along a very small part of the border.

The meager military presence along the border is that of the Jordanian army, which is financed and equipped for the most part by the Americans, and relies on the US for its very existence, but is largely fed by an educational system that is no different from the one used in Judea and Samaria – that is, full of incitement against Israel, the US, and the West.

Indeed, until now, once every few years, a Jordanian soldier carried out an attack against Israelis, before things were swept under the carpet in order not to disrupt the delicate nature of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement signed in 1994.

It is perhaps also important to highlight what has been happening in the past several years in Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan. Hamas, an extremist Sunni movement, which is known to be funded and supported by the Ayatollah regime in Iran, cried out against the “cruel Zionist regime that is attacking the holy al-Aqsa Mosque.”

This outcry was cleverly engineered by the Islamic Republic, as an attempt to “steal” the ownership of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque from its traditional guardians – the Hashemite dynasty in Jordan.

The elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, coupled with the damage to Hezbollah’s leadership structure and operational capabilities, marks a potential turning point in the Middle East. The IDF’s ground operation in southern Lebanon, the second attack in Yemen, and Israel’s success in withstanding two massive Iranian missile attacks demonstrate Israel’s brilliant intelligence and operational achievements. These events shake the entire Middle East and create potential for fundamental change. The nature and intensity of this change will depend significantly on Israel’s actions, as well as on United States and Iranian policies.

Hezbollah finds itself confused and battered, the price it paid for Nasrallah’s insistence on maintaining support for Hamas. Despite the blows it has suffered since the beeper attack, the organization does not intend to learn its lesson at this stage. It is unlikely to agree to disconnect the Lebanese front from the Gaza front, enter a ceasefire, or allow northern residents to return safely to their homes. Instead, Hezbollah will likely attempt to avenge the blow it suffered, in the spirit of its charismatic leader’s legacy and testament.

Hezbollah’s lack of preparation for the new reality will make it difficult for the organization to function effectively. It did not conceive of this situation until two weeks ago and has since repressed the significance of the change in Israel’s policy. The organization has failed to draw lessons from Israel’s successive strikes against it. This will increase Hezbollah’s dependence on Iran, which will be forced to focus on its rehabilitation.

At the strategic level, Nasrallah’s elimination and the series of other actions represent the ultimate expression of the change in the war’s trend. After October 7, the trend favored achievements for Hamas and the Iranian axis. They embarrassed Israel, undermined its confidence in its ability to protect its citizens, and worked to create an Islamist order under Iranian leadership in the Middle East. Gradually and patiently, Israel has reversed this trend. With limited consideration for American advice, Israel dismantled Hamas’s military capabilities. It took control of the strategically important Philadelphia Corridor and demonstrated its strength and creativity in a series of impressive operations. These culminated in Nasrallah’s elimination and the attack in Yemen—in short, Israel is winning.

This trend strengthens Israel’s regional standing and self-confidence while significantly weakening Iran and its sponsored entities, which are suffering heavy losses. It is still too early to determine to what extent this change will lead to a reversal. The peak of such a reversal should be Israel’s response to the Iranian attack and full normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The chances for integration between the countries—namely economic and security cooperation without a direct political dimension—have increased due to the blow to Hezbollah, the sworn enemy of the Riyadh regime.

The impact on Hezbollah’s strength and leadership will likely have implications for its status in Lebanon, the region, and in the eyes of its Iranian patron. Israel’s view of the organization will also be affected. Hezbollah’s rivals in Lebanon and the region will try to capitalize on its weakness, pushing it out of its position of power. They will demand that it act to solve Lebanon’s ongoing crises and prevent further destruction from expanded fighting.

Israel has been careful not to damage Lebanese infrastructure. However, Lebanese residents, especially Shiites, are already paying an increasing price due to Hezbollah’s decisions. The role Hezbollah took upon itself as Lebanon’s protector seems ridiculous when it cannot protect itself. Pressure to bring about its disarmament may intensify. Without charismatic leadership, the organization will face difficulties implementing policies that categorically reject this idea, although it is likely to insist on it.

Continued fire towards Israel as revenge for the elimination of its revered leader leads Hezbollah into a dangerous trap. Nasrallah had identified this risk and was careful to avoid it. It gives Israel justification to launch a ground operation and encourages the U.S. to give Israel the green light to do so.

Despite the opportunities created by the shock to the “axis of evil,” the Biden administration adheres to its original priorities as the presidential election approaches. These include preventing escalation into a regional war, concern for the Gaza population and hostage return, and seeing political deals as the best way to achieve a ceasefire. However, given the escalating response of Iran and its proxies, the United States may change its position: it might back Israel’s forceful moves and, in extreme cases, even assist with force.

This narrows the gap between the Israeli and American strategies. Israel aims for victory through decisive action, weakening the axis of evil to force agreement to its terms or impose a new reality. The American strategy aims for compromise, promising illusory stability. Both strategies face enormous challenges. The American strategy lacks regional cooperation, while the Israeli strategy requires long-term de-radicalization and significant policy changes among regional powers. The chance for such change in the foreseeable future is low, leaving mainly the option of forcibly imposing a new reality.

The ball is now largely in Iran’s court. The Ayatollah regime is undergoing an unprecedented experience. Its investments in building a ring of fire around Israel seemed successful, but this has proven to be an illusion. Israel can almost single-handedly undermine the array Iran built. The main danger continues to be the threat of removing Hamas from power in Gaza. Now Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Yemen are also proving unreliable for deterrence against potential strikes on Iran, particularly its nuclear program.

The regime showed concern about events demonstrating its vulnerability, such as Haniyeh’s elimination and the implications of its failed April attempt to avenge Mahdavi’s elimination in Damascus. This proved how dangerous the regime is, but simultaneously exposed how much less effective and more vulnerable it is than it had estimated. Now, it must improve protection of its assets, especially the Supreme Leader, and restore deterrence. It is promoting revenge moves against Israel, aiming for success and pain, but without provoking Israel—perhaps with American assistance—to further exploit Iran’s vulnerability, particularly through assassinations of senior Israeli officials. After realizing its efforts were failing, the regime decided to respond forcefully, as it did in April. This creates an opportunity for Israel to respond forcefully with American backing. The regime may also consider the possibility of a breakthrough in nuclear weapons production, based on everything it has prepared so far, as an alternative to the deterrence that Hezbollah was supposed to provide.

Israel’s success in changing the trend encourages it to take initiative in various arenas, focusing on the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah. This is necessary to achieve war objectives in Gaza and the north. However, the path to these goals may be prolonged. Hamas continues to hold 101 hostages. Hezbollah and Hamas struggle to admit failure and continue fighting. Regime change in Iran remains difficult. Israel must also preserve cooperation and coordination with the United States, vital for the campaign’s continuation, especially given possible Iranian moves.

Published in the Middle East Forum, October 7, 2024.

When Hamas launched its deadly attack on October 7, its primary objective was to mobilize all elements of the Iranian-led resistance axis to join the campaign, attack and weaken Israel, and create the conditions for Israel’s collapse. By integrating itself into the Iranian strategic framework, Hamas became an important part of the “ring of fire” surrounding Israel – a network of proxies that Iran has meticulously developed over the past decades through an enormous investment of resources and human capital. In particular, Iran identified the Palestinian arena as a crucial component of this “ring of fire” – supporting and nurturing Hamas and Islamic Jihad and enhancing their military capabilities through the provision of weaponry, military knowledge, and financial support.

On October 8, Hezbollah, Iran’s flagship proxy, also joined the war. Hezbollah, which operates mostly in Lebanon along Israel’s northern frontier, is an enormous Iranian enterprise in which vast resources have been invested. Hezbollah joined the war against Israel in an attempt to stretch Israel’s military capabilities and divert its strategic attention away from the war against Hamas in Gaza. The early days of the war were difficult for Israel; it was humiliated, bleeding, and unprepared, all while the Iranian axis, in its various components, experienced a surge in self-confidence.

Iran’s proxies were built to serve a dual-purpose. The first was defensive: the proxy network would act as a loaded gun aimed at Israel to deter it from attacking Iran’s nuclear program. The animating logic here is that Israel would think twice before attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, because such an attack would immediately expose Israel to an assault from Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas where Iran’s proxies operate, including well-armed terror elements in Judea and Samaria. The second purpose was offensive: to serve as launch sites for a coordinated offensive against Israel, wherein Iran would simultaneously “activate” the entire proxy network once its nuclear weapons reached viability (or approached the threshold of viability). Such an assault, Iran reasoned, would then lead to the collapse of the State of Israel and, ultimately, its destruction.

The war in Gaza and the northern front cannot be viewed as isolated events; rather, the ongoing war in these two theaters illuminates Iran’s strategy––coordinate multiple theaters of combat to trigger a regional war against Israel. Yet, this ostensibly “regional” war entails consequences for the entire world. Russia and China, both opposed to the current American-led world order, have lent their support to the Iranian “resistance axis.” In their view, any entity that undermines U.S. interests (such as a strong and secure Israel) and status deserves their backing. By their logic, any blow to American assets, interests, or reputation weakens the U.S. and damages its global standing, thereby advancing efforts to reshape the world order.

On October 16, 2023, Israel’s political leadership defined the war’s goals: the dismantling of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities in the Gaza Strip, the elimination of the terror threat emanating from Gaza, and the creation of the conditions for the return of the hostages. The political leadership also decided that by the conclusion of the war, the IDF would enjoy full freedom of action regarding Gaza, without restrictions on the use of force. This freedom of action would enable the IDF to eliminate terrorist infrastructures, neutralize terror threats, and prevent terrorist infrastructures from being rebuilt. Notably, these war goals outlined at the beginning stage of the war contained no explicit provision regarding the northern front or the return of evacuated residents of the North. Only in September 2024 was this objective formally added as an official war goal.

For many months, Israel responded cautiously to Hezbollah’s aggression, effectively subjecting itself to the “equations” set by Nasrallah. Occasionally, Israel’s response was particularly forceful, which in turn escalated Hezbollah’s attacks. During this period, Israel opted to concentrate its efforts on the southern front, with the IDF dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities in Gaza through extensive ground maneuvers and airstrikes. The capture of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was delayed by approximately four months, largely due to a direct confrontation with the U.S. administration which involved the withholding of critical arms shipments by the U.S.

With the formal shift of Israel’s military focus to the northern front (from mid-September 2024), Israel has succeeded in “decapitating” Hezbollah by eliminating most of its senior leadership, as well as damaging its command and control capabilities and causing enormous damage to the group’s weapons stockpiles and infrastructure across Lebanon. Israel also began ground operations in southern Lebanon (starting on October 1, 2024) with the goal of “cleaning” southern Lebanon of Hezbollah’s threatening military presence and enabling the safe return of the residents of Northern Israel to their homes. Israel’s actions managed to sow chaos, confusion, fear, and distrust within the organization, impairing its operational capability and its ability to harm Israel.

From the above, one can discern the main elements of Israel’s strategy. The underlying idea of this strategy involves three phases. The first phase includes the destruction of Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s capabilities in the southern front such that they no longer pose a threat to Israel. The second phase entails weakening Hezbollah enough to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and enable the safe return of the evacuated northern residents. Finally, the third phase, following the neutralization of the two most significant components of the Iranian axis (Gaza and Lebanon), Iran itself will be exposed to Israel’s might, as demonstrated on October 26 attack and potential future attacks, bereft of the protection provided by its important proxies.

In this broader context, one can understand the Israeli Prime Minister’s use of the term “total victory.” This term was mocked by political rivals who claimed that the statement was empty and that achieving “total victory” was impossible. However, Israel’s actions illuminate its strategic logic, which aims to weaken the entire resistance axis––including Iran itself. This strategy also serves as the foundation for shaping a new regional order that will see, at the very least, a significantly weakened Iranian threat with its ability to harm Israel and destabilize the region at large hindered.

Israel will no longer tolerate recurring cycles of conflict; it will no longer attempt to “buy calm” or mistakenly apply the logic of “quiet will be met with quiet.” Rather, Israel has decided to fundamentally change the rules of the game and adopt a strategy of decisive victory. In this sense, “total victory” refers to the adoption of an offensive and resolute approach aimed at dismantling the existing system. In strategic terms, this is termed a second-order change, which involves changing the system itself, as opposed to a first-order change, which involves changes and adjustments within the existing system. The intended outcome certainly deserves to be interpreted as “total victory.”

Therefore, the completion of this effort, with a sequence of Israeli successes, will be nothing short of “total victory,” a game-changer and a decisive shift. This success will open the door for Israel, the region, as well as the U.S. and its allies in the free world, to design a new regional architecture. This architecture would promote stability, security, and prosperity, while weakening Iran and its proxies as actors that destabilize security and spearhead radical Islamic terrorism. Such radicalism, fueled by Iran, Hamas and other radical Islamic entities like Qatar, has also permeated the streets of the free world, infiltrated university campuses, and served as fuel for progressive intellectual and media elites, who consistently identify Israel as the source of evil and the rotten fruit of colonialism, imperialism, and oppressive apartheid.

In less than a year, Israel has succeeded in dismantling Hamas and leaving it with only residual capabilities. These capabilities will continue to fade as the military campaign in Gaza concludes and the last major stronghold of Hamas in northern Gaza is dismantled through control of the civilian infrastructure (humanitarian aid distribution), rather than only through military action.

Israel’s and the IDF’s achievements are impressive by any standard, especially from a historical and comparative perspective, considering the success of other armies and international coalitions in wars against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others. The most remarkable and significant achievement is in undermining Iran’s confidence and pushing it into a realm of severe strategic confusion and disorientation, and in dealing a major blow to Iran’s strategic assets in which it has invested years of effort and enormous quantities of resources.

Iran has lost the two most important components of the axis it built over the years. In practical terms, Israel has succeeded in significantly weakening the Iranian system, which has in turn influenced the entire regional system. The weakening of the Iranian system and the dismantling of its potential threat to Israel and the region will inevitably lead to a shift in the entire regional system and will also have repercussions for the international system.

If the test of strategy lies in the nature of the change it brings about and its service of vital interests––goals which are reached through the savvy identification and leveraging of opportunities, continuous optimization and learning, and, ultimately, improvement at a fundamental level–– then from a one-year perspective, one can recognize the clear success of Israel’s strategy. The work is not yet complete, and more time and effort will be required to finish it. However, once completed, the statesman’s hour will arrive, and it will be their duty to translate these impressive achievements into diplomatic gains. Only then will we be able to see a grand strategy in all its glory.