“The president is curious why they haven’t surrendered. Why under this kind of pressure with the amount of naval power we have there, why haven’t they come to us and said ‘we declare we don’t want weapons, and this is what we’re willing to do.'” Those remarks were made by Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump’s envoy, in an interview with Fox News.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could hardly have hoped for a better acknowledgment of his steadfastness in the face of American pressure. Witkoff’s statement will almost certainly be presented in Iran as clear proof that Washington’s military moves are intended merely to intimidate, threaten and pressure Tehran into accepting the framework the Americans are offering for a diplomatic agreement.

Although President Trump himself has said the military threat is meant to reinforce diplomatic efforts, he has also left room to suspect that such statements are part of a negotiating tactic rather than a reflection of his true intentions. Witkoff’s comments from within the administration leave little space for that possibility.

From the perspective of Iran’s leadership, as long as it believes the option of a deal remains open and preferable in Trump’s eyes, it will view that as an insurance policy for the regime’s survival, which it values above all else.

Any deal would be bad

From Israel’s standpoint, the more appropriate way to confront the Iranian regime’s threats is to work toward its downfall. Even before the current security tensions, developments had strengthened optimism about that prospect. The achievements of Operation Rising Lion and the success of the sanctions policy have placed the regime under existential strain. The widespread killing of protesters, aimed at swiftly crushing unrest, demonstrated how seriously the regime viewed the threat.

Recent reports of renewed protests at universities suggest that the spirit of the regime’s opponents has not been broken, despite harsh repression and despite disappointment over the absence of meaningful external support.

Ultimately, Tehran’s leadership cannot resolve the country’s fundamental problems and will struggle to offer its citizens a better future. On the contrary, conditions are likely to worsen as sanctions expand and intensify, and as Iran’s allies grapple with their own crises. Such a reality ensures continued potential for sustained unrest within the Islamic Republic.

Under these circumstances, any deal with Tehran would serve as a lifeline for the regime. Ending the crisis without one, while tightening sanctions to hasten its collapse, is preferable to an agreement that might temporarily curb its ambitions but ultimately ensure its survival.

Even if President Trump continues to seek only “a better nuclear deal,” he will struggle to achieve it as long as Iran’s leadership believes it holds the switch that can halt the war machine. He should set a declared deadline for the conclusion of talks and make clear that once hostilities erupt, the only relevant agreement with Iran will be a surrender agreement.

Such an approach would also dispel reports that the US might carry out a limited strike and then give Iran another opportunity to return to the negotiating table. There must be no option that conveys the message: There is no need to hurry; there will be a second chance.

Defining the goals of military action

In any case, once operational conditions for military action are met, the likelihood of such action increases. The most important decision Trump would face is defining the objectives of the war. He would need to choose between two primary alternatives.

The first would be a military operation designed to compel the regime to accept a deal that meets US demands. Regime change would remain a desirable outcome that might result from weakening the leadership, but it would not be defined as a direct objective.

The second alternative would be a powerful and prolonged campaign aimed at creating conditions for replacing the regime. Such a campaign would seek to destroy all the regime’s vital centers of gravity, including the political leadership, military command and senior intelligence officials, as well as its strategic capabilities at sea, in the air and on land. It would also target dual-use infrastructure that serves the military arms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 23, 2026.

As speculation swirls over the likelihood of a strike against Iran and regional tensions reach a boiling point, US President Donald Trump continues to keep everyone guessing. Speaking with reporters in Davos on Wednesday, he voiced hope that no further military steps would be taken against Iran. In the same breath, he stressed that the US would act if Tehran resumed advancing its nuclear program.

The implication is that as long as the current situation in Iran holds, military action would be taken only if it renews its nuclear activity. On Thursday, at the launch of what he termed a “Board of Peace,” Trump added: “Iran wants to talk to us, and we’ll talk.”

Is he planning to send US forces on a punitive mission against the regime? That seems doubtful. His softened rhetoric does not point in that direction. Had that been his intention, one would expect him to amplify reports about the scale of the casualties and atrocities involved in the regime’s crackdown, using them to bolster the legitimacy of an attack.

Has Trump returned to the path of accommodation and abandoned the idea of regime change? That too is unclear. Trump understands well that as long as the clerical regime in Tehran remains in power, it will not relinquish its ambitions. Any achievement against such a regime would therefore be temporary and limited. Still, public and diplomatic discourse in recent days has cast doubt on the feasibility of achieving regime change quickly, as Trump would prefer. Instead, assessments point to a prolonged interim period of chaos. These assessments, together with the relative lull in protests inside Iran, may have curbed ambitions in the White House, at least for now.

What, then, is the purpose of the US military buildup and deployment in the region? First and foremost, readiness for a range of possible scenarios. The situation is fragile, and it is difficult to predict how events will unfold. Force availability signals deterrence, shortens response times, and projects reassurance to US partners.

Second, the buildup enables preparedness for the next opportunity. Given Iran’s persistent structural problems, the assumption is that a renewal of protests is only a matter of time. Moreover, the deployment itself could help encourage such unrest. Trump wants to be in a position to make good on his promise that “help is on the way” when that moment arrives.

Third, the forces are meant to deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program. Fourth, they provide readiness for the possibility that Iran will seek to retaliate for any military action taken against it in response to its armament efforts. As a reminder, this was one of the key issues discussed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump at their meeting in Mar-a-Lago in Florida less than two months ago, before the wave of protests in Iran came to dominate the agenda.

From Israel’s perspective, developments regarding Iran largely reflect a positive trend. Tehran is mired in diplomatic, military and economic distress. Its allies and proxies are unable to come to its rescue. The “maximum pressure” campaign and secondary sanctions are taking their toll. There is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Still, Israel cannot afford to stand aside and let events run their course. It must do everything in its power to ensure that the US is not tempted to enter negotiations with the Iranian regime. The mere existence of political dialogue would provide the regime with a lifeline vis-à-vis its protesting citizens, signaling the possibility of agreements that could ease conditions.

Political negotiations would seriously undermine the prospects for regime change precisely at a moment when that possibility is becoming tangible, even before considering the additional gains the regime could extract from such talks. Past experience offers little basis for optimism regarding what negotiations with the Iranian regime can deliver.

A second issue that Israel’s political leadership must advance with Washington concerns Iran’s rehabilitation and rearmament. Amid warnings about nuclear activity and the killing of protesters, the threat posed by ballistic missiles has been conspicuously absent. Despite some discussion of the issue, it appears this threat has yet to receive appropriate attention in Washington. One can assume that Israel’s leadership continues its diplomatic and security efforts on this front, mindful as well of the window of opportunity at its disposal.

Presence and freedom of action matter more than an agreement

Events this week in the Kurdish region of northeastern Syria illustrate the depth of change in the region and its moral implications. The Kurds, who played a significant role in the fight against jihadist terrorism emanating from the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and other extremist groups, have now become a target of the regime in Damascus, led by the jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as the hardline al-Julani, and his partner, the “good friend” Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Accounts from Kurdish sources depict ethnic cleansing and a genuine attempt to eradicate the Kurdish people. They also convey undisguised disappointment with the US stance, alongside an expectation that Israel will extend a helping hand.

Given Israel’s renewed standing as a regional power and against the backdrop of Turkish ambitions in the area, Israel’s leadership in Jerusalem cannot remain silent in the face of shifting balances of power in regions of strategic importance to it. Nor can it ignore such cries for help from those who see themselves as aligned with Israel. Conduct in these tests will shape Israel’s standing, particularly in the old-new Middle East in which we live.

From the specific case of the Kurds to the broader picture, Syria itself: the sequence of events since Julani rose to power underscores the instability of this arena and the rapid swings between extremes. In some ways, this mirrors the challenge present in other open fronts. The dramatic achievements of the war have created a new reality, but one that is still taking shape. The old order has been dismantled; a new order has yet to solidify.

The challenge in such a reality is to secure achievements and thwart the enemy’s efforts to rebuild strength and erode them. This stretches the attention and capabilities of the defense establishment and political leadership to the limit, demands flexibility and rapid response, and runs counter to the natural desire for stable routine. Yet this stage is unavoidable. Attempts to shorten the path through dubious arrangements or premature agreements could prove far too costly. This applies as well to pressures to establish an Israeli-Syrian security arrangement.

In Washington, this is viewed as another layer of the Abraham Accords and an opportunity to shape a new regional order. But Israel, having been burned before, must adopt a cautious and skeptical approach. It is entitled, and indeed obliged, to assume that the ruler’s friendliness toward the West is merely a survival tactic. Even if he himself were to change, he remains bound by commitments to a base whose behavior can be seen in clashes with Druze, Alawites and now also Kurds.

Israel must preserve freedom of action, both aerial and ground, in Syria. This will allow it to continue proactive operations against hostile elements entrenching themselves in the area, prevent weapons smuggling and terrorist intentions, and safeguard additional interests. Under no circumstances should Israel relinquish security control of the buffer zone or its hold on the Mount Hermon crest, a vital observation point for blocking linkages between Syria, Hezbollah and Iran.

A situation in which Israeli forces are forced into friction with the Turkish military in southern Syria cannot be acceptable to Israel, even if formal diplomatic relations exist between the two countries. The Golan Heights constitute Israel’s strategic defensive line on its eastern border, and their status is not open for discussion.

It is hard to believe that Julani would be willing to reach arrangements with Israel under these conditions. That does not mean Israel should compromise. Tangible assets and freedom of security action are preferable to dubious arrangements, even if they are formalized.

The gates of hell

Ali Shaat, head of the “Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip,” announced from Davos that the Rafah crossing would reopen next week. It remains unclear whether this will happen on the stated date and whether the crossing will be used for goods as well as for people. In any case, once the statement has been made, the direction is clear.

As if the existing openings and crossings through which dual-use items flow to the benefit of the Hamas terrorist organization were not enough, this route is now set to open as well, with oversight that evokes tales of Chelm. Confronting our enemies’ rearmament efforts on all fronts, and in the Gaza Strip in particular, requires an unconventional organizational response: a joint effort by the Israel Defense Forces, the Shin Bet security agency, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the police, the Tax Authority, the crossings authority, the State Attorney’s Office and others.

For this to happen, political direction is required, as are resources and, above all, an understanding of the processes involved. Because of their complexity, these processes demand a level of sustained attention that is not always present among decision-makers and senior officials. That is what our enemies are counting on. It is time to bring about change here as well.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 25, 2025.

Let’s start with a fact many likely missed: Ankara announced that it is recruiting 2,000 Turkish soldiers and training them as a Turkish brigade that will join the International Stabilization Force, slated to deploy in the Gaza Strip as part of US President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan. This step dovetails with another Turkish move revealed a few days ago, the issuance of 37 arrest warrants against senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on allegations of war crimes and genocide.

These developments come as Ankara invests heavily in increasing Turkish visibility in Gaza via Turkish and Palestinian aid organizations. Turkish posters and flags are flying across the Strip, including on bulldozers clearing debris and searching for deceased hostages.

Trump has enlisted Turkey, alongside Qatar, as a lead partner in his initiative and views Ankara as the most effective lever over the Hamas terrorist organization. Erdogan has thrown himself into the task. He credits Turkey with persuading Hamas to accept, and begin implementing, the plan’s first phase, and he wants what he considers proper payment for that achievement: a deeper Turkish presence, involvement and influence in Gaza.

Turkey’s interest, and Hamas’s

For Erdogan, that payoff serves two strategic aims. First, to elevate Turkey’s status as a leading regional power that is actively shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics. Second, to hem in Israel, erode its regional standing and blunt its ability to advance Israeli priorities over Turkish ones. A clear example is the Israel–Greece–Cyprus strategic alliance, which Turkey see as threatening key Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara regards Israel as its most challenging regional competitor, chiefly in military terms but also in technology, and economically through the potential opened by expanding the Abraham Accords, including IMEC, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor linking India and East Asia through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel and on to Europe. Diplomatically, Israel’s widening ties in the region and its special relationship with the US also come into play.

Backing Hamas and political Islam is one of Turkey’s levers for asserting leadership of Sunni Islam in the Middle East. That logic drives Ankara’s Hamas policy and its insistence that Hamas retain its standing as a relevant and influential political actor, not only in Gaza but in Palestinian politics more broadly. A significant Turkish presence in Gaza would allow Ankara to safeguard Hamas’s vital interests, which by definition are also vital Turkish interests.

A winning combination

Influence in Gaza, coupled with Erdogan’s closeness to Trump and the favor the US president shows the Turkish leader, creates what Ankara sees as a winning combination. Erdogan believes, and hopes, that this mix will enable Turkey to force a broad military presence in Gaza as a central pillar of the ISF. A Turkish military footprint in the Strip, reinforced by the growing dominance of Turkish civilian aid groups, could, in Erdogan’s view, narrow Israel’s room to maneuver and its operational freedom in Gaza, and thus its ability to act consistently, deeply and effectively against Hamas’s reconstruction efforts.

Israel’s understandable caution about harming Turks, together with Erdogan’s sway over Trump to restrain Israel, gives the Turkish Armed Forces a chance to clamp Israel in a pincer, via Gaza in the south and Syria in the north. That is how the Turkish president could carve out and stabilize a strategic comfort zone that works to Israel’s detriment.

Given these moves, and in light of Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel and his open antisemitism, Israel would do well to keep firmly opposing any Turkish military presence in Gaza. It should act creatively and in close coordination with Washington, working with the Egypt–Saudi Arabia–UAE axis to minimize Turkey’s role in the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, Israel should push to prioritize deeper involvement, military presence and influence by that counter-axis, which also sees Turkey and its maneuvers as a threat and a challenge. Above all, Israel needs to internalize the implications: if Erdogan succeeds in executing his broader strategy, Israel could find itself in a Turkish stranglehold, where Ankara sets the rules.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 11, 2025.

As part of its alignment with Trump’s plan for Gaza, and thanks to its close ties with the United States, Qatar has received another security-related concession from Washington.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently met with his Qatari counterpart, thanked him for Doha’s involvement in the ongoing talks, and announced that the United States would establish a fighter jet training facility at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho for Qatari pilots and fighter jets. This announcement comes shortly after the signing of a presidential order granting Qatar, possibly subject to congressional approval, a US commitment to defend it in the event of an attack by a foreign entity.
The significance of this step should be understood in light of Doha’s considerable investments in recent years in modernizing its air force as part of a broader policy aimed at strengthening its military capabilities. The small emirate is known less for its military might and more for its immense wealth, given its status as a key player in the global gas market, its vast investments in infrastructure and assets abroad, and its deep penetration into Western academia and economies.
At the same time, Qatar is acutely aware of the volatile security environment in the Middle East and the growing need for both defensive and offensive capabilities – a need that intensified following Israel’s attempted assassination of senior Hamas officials in Doha.
Accordingly, Qatar has focused its efforts on upgrading its air force, which has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
A monitoring report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute shows that in 2014, Doha’s air fleet included only 12 fighter jets (nine of them operational) – a modest force compared to its regional competitors. Today, following an accelerated armament strategy, the fleet numbers roughly 100 combat aircraft, including US-made F-15QA jets, French Rafales, and Eurofighter Typhoons produced by a European consortium (a joint venture of the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France).
Israel views these developments with concern, and justifiably so. While the Qataris are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to use their fighter jets for a direct attack on Israel, the trend of acquiring advanced offensive air capabilities could undermine Israeli interests in other forms.
Given that the United States and European countries remain Qatar’s principal suppliers of defense technology and equipment, experts warn that Doha could serve as a conduit for the transfer of advanced Western technologies and tactics to actors hostile to Israel. This concern is heightened by the Qatari air force’s occasional participation in joint exercises with countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, as well as by its proximity to Iran.
Moreover, the West appears increasingly willing to normalize Qatar’s presence in the international security arena, including through its participation in joint exercises with Western nations. This trend risks obscuring the potential harm inherent in Qatar’s emerging military relationships.
In May of this year, the Qatari air force took part in Anatolian Phoenix, a combined air exercise held twice annually since 2012 under Turkish auspices, attended by the United States, Germany, Italy, and others. A month earlier, Doha participated in the international Iniochos 2025 exercise in Greece, focused on air combat training, strike missions, and operational coordination –  an exercise in which an Israel Air Force delegation also participated.
While enhanced defense cooperation with Qatar through arms deals and international forums has already become a fait accompli in both Europe and the United States, Israel would be wise to carefully examine the ways in which it may, directly or indirectly, be contributing to this process – whether through tacit acceptance and willingness to take part in such forums attended by Doha or by refraining from defining Qatar as a hostile state and the strategic implications such a designation entails.
Finally, Israel must consider the potential erosion of its qualitative military edge in the region. Thus far, Qatar’s requests to acquire F-35 aircraft from the United States have been denied. However, if the current trend of deepening US-Qatari relations continues, driven by economic interests, among others, such a scenario cannot be ruled out in the future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, Octiber 20, 2025.

Arguments pointing to the incoherence and lack of logic in Emmanuel Macron’s move and those of his partners to recognize a Palestinian state could fill many pages, and still not be exhaustive. As President Donald Trump said in his UN speech, this is a reward to Hamas and the greatest achievement the terrorist organization can claim for the atrocities it carried out on October 7. Hamas spokesmen were quick to boast about it in media interviews, but they need not try hard. Even without them, the Palestinian public will not see it any other way.

Moreover, the recognition move gives backing not only to Hamas and not only within the Palestinian issue, but to Islamist terrorism in all its forms, precisely at a moment when Israel, in its war against parts of those forces, is managing to dent their capabilities through this approach.

Furthermore, the declaration that Macron and his partners intend to improve the standing of the Palestinian Authority and what remains of Fatah will politically strengthen Hamas and its allies. The move will paint the Palestinian streets in Judea and Samaria green, Hamas’ color, an area where support for the terrorist organization is already trending upward.

And another point: the recognition initiative, which Macron and his partners say is meant to help establish calm and stability, not only fails to achieve that, it is already increasing tensions that will probably escalate further as a result of the countermeasures Israel will be forced to take. The next wave of terror and violence, heaven forbid it comes, already has a name: “Macron escalation”.

Anyone impressed by the conditions some leaders attached to their declaration has probably not closely examined the real condition of the Palestinian Authority and how it operates. This applies not only to its involvement in financial support for terrorists and their families, the glorification of attackers and turning them into role models for Palestinian youth, but also to the corruption that has spread within it and the way it is perceived by parts of its own people. The sheikhs of Hebron proposing to detach from the Authority and join the Abraham Accords as an autonomous area is evidence of how it is perceived, at least by some of the public. The fine words about conditions to be imposed on the Palestinian Authority are nothing more than lip service, pretence or at best naïveté.

And we have not yet addressed feasibility: in his speech this week at the UN “Two-State Solution” conference, Mahmoud Abbas said that “Hamas will not have a part in the government. Hamas and its partners must hand over their weapons to the Authority.” As the old saying goes, words do not pay the customs duties.

Can that same Palestinian Authority, which cannot cope on its own with phenomena of terror, the proliferation of weapons, anarchy and lack of governance in whole areas that are already under its responsibility, sustain itself at all? Countless IDF operations in the field and the thousands of arrests the Shin Bet carries out each year to rein in trends of terror are a sign of the magnitude of the security challenge it faces, and of course that is not the only challenge before it.

In fact, do Macron and his partners in the initiative recall that the Palestinian Authority they speak of in their speeches is the same “Authority” that in 2007 lost control of the Gaza Strip to Hamas? Mahmoud Abbas is the same Mahmoud Abbas, only older, and he will turn 90 in a month.

In Gaza’s previous iteration of the Authority, heavy pressure was exerted on Israel to grant measures to Abbas and expand his powers to improve his electoral chances against Hamas. Those gestures were given, Hamas won, and we all remember the aftermath. Of course, that does not prevent Macron and his colleagues from reviving the same ideas.

While leaders continue to wax lyrical about the importance of their initiative, security reports bring us back down to earth: another rocket was located, this time in Tulkarm, days after a terror cell from the Ramallah area was exposed producing rockets intended for launch from Judea and Samaria. This comes about two weeks after the attack at the Ramat Junction in Jerusalem that claimed six civilian lives, which was also carried out by perpetrators from the Ramallah area.

The Macron, Keir Starmer and partners initiative to recognize a Palestinian state is initiative for the sake of initiative. Once, when an idea like this came up, Hamas leaders might have suspected some hidden trick and tried to decipher the sophistication. Today such a possibility does not even cross their minds. Hamas understands that this is a step meant to signal “we are here too,” and that domestic politics and international competition were important motives in its crafting, and that its consequences were not seriously examined. All they have to do is stand aside and enjoy the gains. Evildoers, their work is done by the naïve.

Anyone who links this step to the start of an IDF operation to conquer the city of Gaza is invited to listen to the interview Macron gave back in April of this year, in which he spoke about the recognition initiative he is promoting, long before Israel’s cabinet decided on the conquest of Gaza. Save the self-flagellation for other occasions.

How should Israel respond?

On the diplomatic level, although the immediate significance of recognition is mainly declaratory, it must not be taken lightly, because it gives substantial reinforcement to the standing of the Palestinian Authority in international legal proceedings against Israel. It also creates a foundation for decisions and measures against moves that Israel will carry out in Judea and Samaria.

There is no need to confront Macron head-on now, but under no circumstances should Israel turn the other cheek. There is also no reason to continue treating him with deference. Those who initiated and led this move cannot be accepted as mediators, partners or observers in any process in which Israel is involved.

Despite sympathy with the call to apply sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria, one should question the advisability of such a step. First, because taking it as a reactive or provocative measure weakens the claim of its justice. Second, because it is a divisive act during wartime that requires as broad a consensus as possible, and even without it internal tension is high. It seems that a balanced step that enjoys broad internal agreement and has a good chance of securing backing from the Trump administration would be a decision to apply sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

Regarding security, Israel’s general approach should convey the message that its activity for its security will continue as usual and will not take any political recognition of the Palestinians into account. Furthermore, against the backdrop of terror trends, it is correct to make clear that an area that chooses to behave like Gaza will end up like Gaza.

The security establishment must prepare on the assumption that we are facing another rise in tension in Judea and Samaria. The offensive approach adopted at the beginning of the war should continue, including the use of focused preventive measures, and monitoring and security along the seam line must be tightened. Given the independent manufacturing capabilities for weapons and explosives in that area, it is right to stop entirely the entry into Palestinian Authority areas of dual-use items that terrorist elements use in production processes.

An umbrella that will allow Hamas to preserve its power and capabilities

Several media outlets have reported an American plan formulated for the Gaza Strip that is supposed to include, among other things, the release of all the hostages, a permanent ceasefire, the end of the war and the establishment of a civilian governing mechanism with the involvement of moderate Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

This idea is not new. In the Arab world and within Hamas there has for some time been discussion of formulas that would allow ending the war and reaching the “day after,” without IDF rule in the Strip and without implementing Trump’s transfer plan.

Hamas spokesmen have repeatedly declared their readiness to vacate their role in managing Gaza’s civilian affairs and hand them over to other actors. In previous statements they emphasized that Hamas’s position on the Strip’s future rests on two principles: first, that managing the Strip is an internal Palestinian affair that requires a “national consensus” — a code name that brings the Palestinian Authority into the equation and allows Hamas to set conditions and demands. The second principle is that “armed resistance to the Israeli occupation is the right of the entire Palestinian people over all Palestinian land, and not only the right of Hamas.” This implies opposition to the disarmament of military capabilities.

The civilian mechanism and rehabilitation efforts in Gaza are the main channel for building Hamas’s military capabilities. Everything that enters Gaza for civilian purposes will be used by Hamas to build its military power, from engineering equipment brought in to clear rubble that will be used to prepare tunnels, to cement and rebar brought in for construction that will be used for tunneling, to glues, resins and fertilizers that, although entering for civilian uses, will be diverted to the manufacture of explosives. As long as Hamas is the dominant force in the Strip, it will effectively control everything brought into its territory, even if it is not formally a partner in the civilian governing mechanism.

Moreover, a plan that transfers civilian management away from Hamas but leaves it as the significant power broker could lead to the Hezbollahization of Gaza. Under the cover of a “management committee,” or whatever name is chosen for that governing body, Hamas would rebuild its military strength and pull the strings behind the scenes in the management of all its affairs. The organization could funnel the energies it regains into increasing terror efforts both in Judea and Samaria and in other regions. Arab and international involvement in implementing such a scheme would only complicate matters for Israel and hinder its ability to confront Hamas’s maneuvers.

Therefore, Israel must make clear that it will not compromise on its demand for the demilitarization of the Strip from military capabilities, in addition to the collapse of Hamas’s rule — and not in its place. Israel cannot allow civilian control to be placed in a framework that in practice serves as an umbrella for preserving Hamas’s power and rebuilding it.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said a few months ago: “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” He was referring to Israel’s strike against Iran as part of Operation With the Lion, but his words are also true regarding Israel’s war in Gaza. Alongside continued fighting to destroy Hamas’s capabilities, the real answer to Gaza’s problems is implementing Trump’s initiative. This is a rare opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in the situation, purchased at a terrible human cost. It must not be missed.

Published in Israel Hayom, on September 28, 2025.

Executive Summary
• The Palestinians, divided and chronically rejectionist, have neither built viable institutions nor embraced peace. They must bear responsibility for their actions and poor decisions over the past century, prioritizing violent opposition to Israel over numerous offers for statehood.
• The PA is corrupt, unpopular, and financially dysfunctional, and continues to promote incitement and terror incentives and to educate the next generation in hatred and opposition toward Israel.
• The October 7 atrocities underscored that Palestinian statehood poses an existential danger to Israel. Given Judea and Samaria’s strategic terrain, ceding security control would invite an even more extreme replay of October 7 and a severe rocket threat.
• A Palestinian state would constitute a first-order geopolitical disaster for moderate Arab states in the region, and for free nations around the world. It would align itself with America’s greatest adversaries worldwide, would be an easy target for takeover by Islamist movements, and would destabilize U.S.-aligned Arab states in the region, including Jordan and Egypt.
• The most prudent alternative is localized self-governance for Palestinians as a permanent arrangement. Not an independent state with centralized authority, but a decentralization of control and self-administration at the municipal level. Local self-governance is the alternative to the failed model of the Oslo era, would increase accountability, and offer the best chance for Israeli security alongside a freer, more prosperous Palestinian society.

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