Iran concludes this chapter of confrontation with Israel with a mixed cost-benefit balance sheet: On one hand, it crossed the Rubicon, disregarded President Joe Biden’s explicit warning, and use its own territory to carry out the largest missile and UAV attack any country has ever launched against another country. In doing so, according to its view, it will cause Israeli decision-makers to think twice before approving strikes on Iranian elements.

On the other hand, it exposed itself to a direct response, led to the formation of a coalition of countries against it, provided an opportunity to showcase an impressive array of air defense capabilities against Iran, opened the door for Israel to extricate itself from the political travails it found itself in due to the situation in Gaza, led the US to intensify measures against it, and caused internal tension and escalation in American political climate.

In addition to preserving deterrence, Israel’s main goals vis-à-vis Iran are dismantling its nuclear capabilities and neutralizing the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s proxy forces, chief among them Hezbollah. In response to the pressure Washington is exerting on Israel to refrain from retaliation, its willingness to join a practical plan with a binding timeline for achieving these goals should be examined.

In any case, Israel need not rush to respond. It would be wise to keep Iranian nerves in tense anticipation, allowing the Iranian rial to continue plummeting and enabling internal criticism of the regime to intensify.

Iran concluded this chapter of confrontation with Israel in a worse geopolitical position than it began: It invested in building proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, but ultimately became embroiled in a direct clash with Israel. The attack it carried out against Israel was impressive in scale but encountered an effective air defense array and did not cause significant damage. It prompted a cohesion of regional states and provided them with a successful experience of regional cooperation against it – which could encourage such a trend, contrary to its desires.

It provided legitimacy for striking it directly, and unlike Israel, it is less protected. It gave Israel leverage to pressure the US, so that even if it does not attack, it can extract concessions that will make things difficult for Iran. Russia and China, its allies, stood on the sidelines. It exacerbated Iran’s domestic situation, created a sense of tension and anxiety, and impacted the value of the rial.  

What does Iran still have in its arsenal that it has not yet employed against Israel? It mainly boils down to Hezbollah. The terrorist group’s set of considerations is broader and not solely focused on Iranian interests.

The Biden administration, which once again impressively stood by Israel’s side and assisted in forming a coalition of states that participated in thwarting the Iranian attack, fears a widening of the regional war due to the geostrategic and economic implications and the possibility of being dragged into intervening, especially in an election year. 

Therefore, it is trying to amplify the achievement against Iran, settling for that and a few diplomatic steps whose significance regarding neutralizing Iran’s capabilities is unclear. From Washington’s perspective, the developments reinforce its approach to hasten the establishment of a strategic regional alliance, and it will try to push for that to happen.

Israel, for its part, even if the prospects are unclear, must examine the possibility of seizing the opportunity created to advance its over-arching goal: Thwarting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If that is a concession that can be obtained at this time – restraint on its part would be justified.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Israel is simultaneously dealing with several fronts, but it is precisely those that appear to be quieter that are most worrisome, primarily the Jordanian arena. 

Since its foundation, the Kingdom comprised a high percentage of Palestinians, some of whom are citizens of the Jordanian state, while the rest have remained in “refugee” status for decades. 

To this, masses of Syrian refugees who fled from the massacre perpetrated by the Syrian president were added in recent years.

All this, while the Hashemite regime, that controls Jordan is not Palestinian and well understands the dangers inherent in the composition of the population to its survival and stability. 

It is doubtful if what was done against the coup attempt in “Black September” by the Jordanian regime in the 1970s will be feasible to emulate by the current regime, even at the cost of the Kingdom itself, both due to the weakness of the current rulers and to the fact that Queen Rania is Palestinian.

Despite the Jordanian understanding of the potential internal danger lurking at home, it sometimes appears that the regime acts almost against its own interests.

In fact, Jordan insists on continuing to adhere to an outdated syllabus, which encourages hatred and incites the Jordanian crowd against Israel and Jews. 

Anyone who understands anything about the Arab world knows that the blatant antisemitism, which unfortunately has become an integral part of the value system of every Jordanian, does indeed encourage the public to divert tensions and frustrations away from the economic situation and the ills of society and vent anger against the “Zionist enemy.”

 But violent demonstrations against Israel and Jews tend to turn into fierce opposition to the government itself.

This happened, more than once, in Egypt and in Jordan. Furthermore, Israel and the US are essential for the continued survival of the Jordanian regime, on the economic, military, and intelligence levels. 

Incitement against Israel and the US spurs the Jordanian public to attack the Jordanian regime, if and when it adopts a policy that reflects cooperation with one of them, even when this cooperation is necessary for the national security of the Kingdom.

AND THAT brings me to the second point – in preserving this incitement-ridden education system, the Jordanian regime obliges itself to adhere to a harsh anti-Israel rhetoric, which is often contrary to Jordan’s security interests. 

Thus, we have almost become accustomed to hearing, every year during the month of Ramadan, senior Jordanian officials compete with Hamas as to who is more radical in their hatred of the “Zionist entity,” in order to prove to their own public that they are, indeed, deserving of this public support.

According to Muslim tradition, the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan was entrusted with the responsibility of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, an asset that over the years has become one with the potential to enthuse the entire Muslim world. Therefore, the “ownership” or the “protection” thereof is desired by many groups in the Muslim world.

In recent years the Hamas movement – with Iranian encouragement – began to try and “seize ownership” of the Mosque, in order to create instability among the Arabs of Israel, the Arabs of east Jerusalem, and Muslims throughout the world.

During Ramadan in recent years, the Hamas terrorist group has adopted inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, accusing it of trying to damage and/or occupy the Mosque, while the Jordanian regime intensified the tone against Israel, in a manner of competition for the same “ownership” over this holy site.

Parallel to the above, Iran began to advance – methodically and with endless patience, starting in 1979 – its policy of taking over the Arab region first, and the West. 

This, while sowing instability and chaos in every country that it could do that in and that is in order to gain a foothold and influence and to establish some kind of military presence there – at times in the form of Shia militias and at times via a local Arab proxy.

Thus, it leveraged Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, starting in 2006, to establish its position in the southern periphery of Israel. It also strengthened its hold in that region, via support of the Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups.

Furthermore, Tehran also operated over the years in Judea and Samaria by strengthening Hamas and undermining the Palestinian Fatah rule, under the auspices of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), which advocates a secular ideology that is contrary to the religious view of Hamas and other Islamic movements.

In Lebanon, Iran strengthened Hamas above and beyond its unwavering support for Hezbollah as a voice in the region. All this, while undermining Lebanon on the economic and political levels to the core.

In Syria, Iran established an army of Shi’ite militias, and acted in the same manner in Iraq, which over the years and since the withdrawal of the United States, has become an Iranian stronghold on the borders of little Jordan.

BUT TEHRAN is yet unsatisfied and strives to create territorial continuity in the entire area up to the Jordanian border with Israel. Quietly and cunningly, Iran works to strengthen radical elements among the Palestinians in Jordan itself, and to strengthen the presence of Hamas in Jordanian territory.

The destabilization of the Kingdom is intended to further weaken the government in the country, and in due time cause masses of Palestinians to flock to the Jordanian-Israeli border, over 300 km. long – a situation that the IDF will have a hard time stopping.

Only in the last few weeks, the Kingdom seemingly “awakened” when King Abdullah II spoke out harshly against blatant attempts by the Hamas movement to “undermine the stability of the kingdom,” in his words.

When Israel recently hit a distinct Iranian target on Syrian soil, it actually targeted the Iranian Mullah regime’s world view, according to which a world-wide Sharia-based caliphate must control of the entire region and the West, by exploiting local extremist elements and without involving its own people and/or territory in the campaign.

All this, while Tehran continues almost uninterrupted, in equipping itself with unconventional weapons and nuclear capabilities for military purposes.

It is interesting to note that there were no overly harsh condemnations of the Israeli action from many Arab countries in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and more – since all of those countries, despite their difficult rhetoric against Israel, well understand the magnitude of the challenge that Iran poses to the entire world. 

Those who fail to understand this are in the West, whose democracies makes them more vulnerable to infiltration by hostile elements, such as Sunni Muslim Brotherhood activists on the one hand and Shi’ite Hezbollah cells and Iranian influence on the other.

MEANWHILE, IRAN does not stop at all from doing everything it possibly can, to destabilize Israel itself from within. 

Recognizing the existing political rifts in Israeli society, just as it recognized similar rifts in all the other countries which Iran had undermined and dismantled from within, Tehran is constantly at work to deepen the chasm inside Israel.

It does this by impersonating Israelis from different camps on social networks, pretending to take extreme positions on the Right and the Left. 

It does this through unceasing attempts to create Shi’ite cells also among Sunni Israeli Arabs in Arab cities in the country – although so far, with little success. It does this through incessant attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to elements of the Arab sector in Israel, belonging to the criminal network.

Therefore, in order to understand the nature and quality of the hostile activity against Israel in each of the aforementioned arenas, one must understand the picture as a whole and stop burying one’s head in the sand. The West in general and Israel in particular – are at least for now at the forefront of the world struggle – do not have the privilege to ignore the scale of the issue. 

If Iran has already succeeded in disintegrating Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, significant parts of Yemen, and Sudan, is on its way to disintegrating Jordan and has literally “bought” the corrupt ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, by erasing the huge debt it had accumulated, then it will try with all its might, and may even succeed, to destabilize the State of Israel from within.

This is The Plan. All we have to do, is not cooperate with the plot and understand that unity is more than just a naive cliché, but a matter of national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2024.

While most of the world’s attention is focused on Israel’s battle against Hamas in Gaza, Israel is simultaneously fighting on a second, lower-profile front against Hizballah in Lebanon. This is a war of attrition, and both sides have so far kept their ground forces out of the other’s territory. Yet, in all other respects, it is a war, and it is more severe than any of Israel’s numerous skirmishes with Hizballah since 2006. This war started the same day the one in Gaza did, when, on October 7, Hizballah expressed its support for Hamas by attacking Israel with missiles, RPGs, and drones. These attacks have continued daily since then. Worse, Hizballah has amassed ground forces along the border, poised to invade Israeli towns and carry out a slaughter that would make October 7th look mild by comparison.

This threat has forced Israel to evacuate the entire civilian population living within a few miles of the Lebanese border, leaving 80,000 Israelis internally displaced. The IDF has struck back at Hizballah targets, seeking to weaken the terror organization’s military capabilities and command structure, but it has not yet sought a large-scale maneuver while it is focused on the Gazan theatre. But to many if not most Israelis, an intensification of the war in the coming months seems inevitable. The scale and severity of that war is one of the subjects of this essay, as are Israel’s options in it, options that are shaped by the decisions—good and bad, wise and ill-conceived—that Israel has made about Lebanon in the past several decades.

The threat to Israel from its northern neighbor did not arise on October 7. It has been building since Israel fought its last war there in 2006, since it pulled its ground troops out at the turn of the new century, indeed since the modern state was founded. In a certain sense the threat from Lebanon has been present for millennia, a function less of politics and strategy than of simple geography.

How did we get to this point? What can be learnt from the previous rounds? What are Israel’s options? And what is at stake in the coming battle?…

1. Israel and Lebanon from the Bible to Begin
2. The Era of the Security Zone
3. Progress for the Party of God
4. Israel’s New Reality
5. The Northern Dilemma Returns
6. War in the North?

For full article see link.

Israeli media revealed recently that the Axis of Resistance led by Iran has made plans to invade Israel via Jordan and carry out a large-scale terror attack against Israeli communities near the border. According to the report, Israel’s defense establishment has identified increased motivation among Iraqi Shiite militia groups supported by Iran to attempt to attack Israel via Jordan using aerial platforms or by other means. Israel is preparing for a scenario in which Iraqi or Afghan Shiite terror cells, supported by Iran, try to invade Israeli territory via Jordan to carry out another massacre similar to October 7.

Since the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime in 2003, and following the Iraq War (2003–2011) and ISIS conflict (from 2014 onwards), Iran has entrenched itself in Iraq, thereby realizing its historical aspiration since the Safavid Empire (1501–1722), when it fought the Ottoman Empire for control of the Shia holy sites in Iraq. Thus, Iran has managed to take over the political and security arenas in post-Baath Iraq and turn them into important elements of the Shiite “crescent” developing in the Middle East. Accordingly, part of Iraqi territory serves as an important link in the land corridor supplying weapons delivered by the Iranian Quds Force to the Axis of Resistance proxies in Syria, as well as to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Jordan’s King Abdullah is increasingly aware of the Iranians breathing down his neck. He first used the term the ‘Shiite Crescent’ in 2004, when he warned against Iran gaining control over Iraq by intervening in the Iraqi parliamentary elections of January 2005. The Shiite Crescent, he cautioned at the time, would cause a shift in the traditional power balance between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East, threatening the interests of the United States and its allies. Jordan’s concern over the severity of the Iranian threat grew when Iran used the Syrian Civil War (2011–2020) to deploy Shiite militia groups to Jordan’s north.

In 2014, after Iran identified Jordan as fertile ground and a key arena for tightening the encirclement of Israel, Khamenei publicized the order he had given to arm the West Bank, declaring that “the West Bank should be armed just like Gaza.” As part of its attempt to lure Jordan to defect to the Axis of Resistance in 2012, Tehran offered the Hashemite Kingdom a free supply of oil and energy-based products for 30 years in exchange for allowing Iran to engage in religious tourism on its soil and providing the goods Tehran requires. King Abdullah, who relies heavily on U.S. support and Israeli intelligence, refused.

Over the following decade, there were several periods during which Iran accelerated its attempt to implement Khamenei’s directive to arm the West Bank via Jordan. As part of these efforts, several weapons deliveries intended for terrorists in the West Bank were seized on the Jordanian border, most of which likely originated in Iran. In response, Jordan increased its oversight of weapon and drug smuggling attempts from Syria, which included attempts to smuggle a wide range of weapons, such as Fajr rockets and Claymore charges produced by Iran and intended for the West Bank.

The Royal Jordanian Air Force even targeted a leader of one of the smuggling networks in December 2023 on Syrian soil as part of an attack against the hideouts used by smugglers supported by Iran and Hezbollah in the Syrian As-Suwayda Governorate, near the Jordanian border. The attack was part of Jordan’s campaign against captagon trafficking, as this illegal form of drug trade finances the spread of pro-Iranian and pro-governmental militia groups in Syria.

In addition to Iran’s subversive activity within Jordan, Tehran’s hope that its normalization agreement with Riyadh would serve as a significant lever for drawing closer to Amman seems to have been unfulfilled thus far. The reason is likely anger and concern among members of Jordan’s government and media elite over Iran’s subversive efforts in the Hashemite Kingdom.

Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre and the continuing attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel has internalized the severity of the threat posed from both the south and north, realizing that it can no longer accept the existence of Iran-supported terror organizations posing a grave threat to its national security. The potential threat posed by the Axis of Resistance on Israel’s eastern border is also severe, requiring Israel to prepare accordingly in cooperation with Jordan. Jordan is well aware of the severity of the threat that Iran poses to it, which reached a peak in Iran’s infringement of Jordan’s sovereignty in late January 2024, when Iranian proxies attacked the U.S. military outpost Tower 22 in northeast Jordan, killing 3 U.S. soldiers.

It is highly unlikely that the plan to invade Israel from its eastern border is being formulated solely by Shiite militia groups, as such a significant terror attack cannot be carried out unless directed or, at the very least, supported by Iran. IRGC commander Hossen Salami publicly posited the idea in early December that the Palestinians would repeat the “Al Aqsa flood” attack, this time from Israel’s north, south and east to ensure Israel’s annihilation.

Therefore, and in light of senior Israeli defense establishment officials’ warnings prior to the month of Ramadan, it seems that Iran is seeking to take advantage of the crisis with which Israel is grappling to deliver a decisive blow in the form of a murderous terror attack in the West Bank. The Iranian modus operandi, as reported by the Israeli media, is to prefer the use of proxies, due to Tehran’s fear of entering a direct confrontation with Israel.

At this stage it is unclear whether the Axis of Resistance led by Iran is fully prepared to put its invasion plan into practice. The fact that such plans were revealed by the media may decrease the likelihood of their execution. Nevertheless, Israel must relate to this Iranian terror scheme with utmost seriousness.

First, Israel should prepare its intelligence and make operational plans in cooperation with Jordan to curb the attack, should it indeed be launched. Working closely with Jordan to thwart this terror scheme would advance another crucial Israeli interest as well, as it would help mitigate tensions between the two countries, which have increased since the war in Gaza began. At the same time, the Iranian chain of command directing this impending terror attack should be identified and, in accordance with the invasion plan’s progress, one of its senior officials should be targeted in advance. This would make it clear to Tehran that Israel is determined to thwart the Iran-led Axis of Resistance’s terror scheme, and will not allow its citizens to be massacred again.

Recently, the Qatari Foreign Ministry denounced Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call for Doha to increase pressure on Hamas. In a meeting held in January with hostage families, Netanyahu was quoted as saying that Qatar, in a sense, is “more problematic than the UN and the Red Cross.”

Admittedly, in pursuit of quiet in Gaza, Israel turned a blind eye to the risks entailed in the cooperation with Qatar being a major sponsor of Hamas. Now however, after the revelation of this colossal mistake, it would be folly to continue on the same path in the attempt to broker a hostage deal. The same is true with regard to Qatar’s potential involvement in the “day after” scenario.

These days as conditions for another hostage deal materialize, Israel should rally the support of its Western allies and make it clear to Qatar that it must use all the tools at its disposal to secure the release of the hostages and that unwillingness to do so will have serious consequences.

Israel must also act more assertively to show the international community that Qatari support for extremist groups is a threat not only to Israel, as the events of October 7 demonstrated, but also to the United States and Europe. As is commonly known, for many years Qatar has been nurturing extremist Islamist groups, promoting jihadist propaganda on its state-owned news network, Al-Jazeera, and fostering its ties with Iran, the greatest threat in the Middle East.

Less well-known is the detrimental influence that Qatari “soft” power wields in Western societies. Qatar has penetrated deep into American higher educational institutions and its extensive funding has gone hand in hand with the rise of antisemitic rhetoric in US elite universities.

It turns out that even its investments in seemingly humanitarian projects among Muslim communities in Europe are tainted with an agenda to promote a separatist Islamic identity. Evidence also suggests Qatar’s dubious involvement in the legislative processes of the European Parliament, and several bribery scandals have been linked to it.

Considering the above, Western countries must send a clear message to Qatar that it cannot reap the benefits of partnership with the West while simultaneously supporting radical Islamism, whether directly or indirectly. As long as Hamas offices in Doha remain open, there is no justification for praising Qatar’s mediation efforts either. Instead, a more assertive approach towards Doha is needed, demanding that it fully exert its influence on Hamas to provide evidence of the medical condition of the hostages and expedite their release.

To achieve this goal, Israel, the US, and Europe should make a combined effort to illustrate the consequences on Qatar if its behavior doesn’t change.

The United States should condition the upgrading of security cooperation with Qatar, including future arms deals, on Qatar completely cutting ties with terrorist organizations, expelling Hamas leaders, and enforcing American sanctions in full. Qatar should also be warned that its unwillingness to abandon its support for terror and increase pressure on Hamas could result in freezing Qatari assets, limiting its airlines’ airspace, and facilitating lawsuits by American terror victims against it. If Qatar continues its support for terror, the US should consider downgrading its status from an ally to a state sponsor of terrorism.

In addition, European countries should use the recent strengthening of economic ties with Qatar as leverage against it until substantial progress is made on the issue of the hostages.

Qatar needs to understand that it is replaceable.

Israel must be prepared to “lose” Qatar as a central player in negotiating a hostage deal while seeking alternatives.

It is not unthinkable that Egypt could play a more central role in the mediation efforts, alongside assistance from European countries that have served as mediators in the past, such as Germany.

The time has come to replace Western tolerance towards Doha with a more hardline stance. Only then will it be possible to put an end to Qatar’s dangerous double game.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 4, 2024. February

For over four decades, the leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran have been planning the world’s “redemption” by the Islamic Shia. This is the almost unimaginable reality that must be known and acted upon in order to stop it.

Currently, the supreme leader is old and ill, while his less-spoken son, Al-Kshad Al-Shaabi, continues his path with even greater cruelty and fervor.

Tehran has created a magnificent set of proxies through which it works to implement its dark vision.  These include “inferior” soldiers in the form of Palestinians in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Lebanon- Sunni Arabs.

The Palestinians and/or their national aspirations are of little interest to the Mullahs. The reason for training and financing the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and similar extremist movements is the promotion of regional chaos, which simplifies taking over as much territory, influence, and resources as possible by Iran.

The Iranian regime acts quietly, patiently, and methodically in regions reigned by instability and chaos.  A point in the case is Jabal Druze in Syria. The area has been populated by Syrian Druze for many years.  There was a silent understanding between Assad’s regime and the Druze that they would not interfere with his actions and he would not harm them. And so it was for years.

In recent years, however, Shi’ite locals forcefully took over some of the land and properties in that area, spurring intense struggles between local Shi’ites, directed by Iran, and the local Syrian Druze population.

The US removal of Saddam Hussein, the notorious leader of Iraq in the 1990s, created a vacuum into which Iran quickly entered and took control of the Iraqi oil reserves, gaining hundreds of millions of dollars per day. In recent years, when the anti-Shi’ite extremist ISIS emerged, the international arena effectively created a coalition that literally eliminated it, leaving Iran to once more return to being the undisputed force in the region.

In doing so, it unwittingly allowed the Islamic Republic to also continue its production of uranium for the purposes of promoting its nuclear project.

Iran also created a different “line” of proxies, namely the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria. These Shi’ite proxies are seen as considerably more worthy in Iran’s perception, given their loyalty to the Islamic Revolution and its ideology.

In order to create competent Iranian militias imbued with Shi’ite ideology, resources, and soldiers are needed. Iran works to obtain the resources via its revenues from oil sales alongside massive drug smuggling operations throughout the region.

Producing the manpower needed for the militias has been forwarded by a mechanism so insane that it is hard to believe that it is actually real: encouraging Shi’ite girls in various countries in the region to enter into “marriages of pleasure” – a term coined in the Muslim world that grants religious permission to enter into “temporary” marriages, in which it is permissible to have conjugal relations, and after a short time to break up the covenant of “marriage.”

Indeed, Iran had incorporated the subject into the school curriculum for those girls. The children born within the framework of those “marriages of convenience” are then taken by the regime and undergo religious indoctrination to become exactly those aforementioned Shiite militias.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is but a convenient excuse for harnessing Arab-Muslim attention, given that the hatred of Israel and the “Zionists” is relatively undisputed in most public circles in the Muslim world. In this manner and by provoking the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, Iran has thus far succeeded in keeping Saudi Arabia away from normalizing relations with Israel and/or from creating an effective Sunni-Western coalition that will harm its grandiose, imperialistic aspirations.

In the meantime, it continues its efforts to promote its military nuclear program while the US is busy with its internal affairs in an election year, and Israel is preoccupied with returning its hostages held by Hamas terrorists in Gaza and protecting its Southern, Eastern and Northern borders from Iranian-backed extreme Palestinian and other terror organizations.

Jordan, whose regime is weak, trembles under the Iranian weight on its soil. This is the fruit of years-long efforts by Iran, systematic and quiet, as it always is, to gain influence within the Hashemite Kingdom. As I have emphasized more than once in my speeches, briefings, and writings, this is an urgent situation with a very low profile on international media and global public opinion, yet it is most concerning to all stability-seeking Sunni countries in the region, as well as the West and of course, to the State of Israel, given the very long border which Israel shares with Jordan.

The horrific scenario that Tehran is striving for is that the Jordanian government will no longer be able to stop the millions of Palestinians living there from forcefully entering the State of Israel.

The optimal strategic answer to all of the above is the creation of an effective Saudi-led alliance of Sunni countries, which Israel and the Western countries will join in order to make sure that the Iranian threat is curbed.

Published in the Jerusalem Post,  February 25, 2024.

The Israeli-Egyptian relations met with a fair share of challenges, after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. It is interesting that precisely in the same year, the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran, and the deep and warm friendship forged between Israel and Iran instantly disappeared and was “replaced” by a cold, but strategic, peace with Egypt.

The lack of normalization that characterized the bilateral relations with Egypt from the very start, will continue to accompany the two countries throughout the next four decades, except for a brief respite after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Thus far, the Egyptian and Israeli interests, especially the ones pertaining to security, have prevailed. That is – despite a long series of military operations that Israel conducted against the Palestinians, two intifadas and many other obstacles.

They also managed to overcome the lack of basic affection inherent amidst the Egyptian public towards Israel in general and Jews in particular – a product of long years of indoctrination and the educational system in Egypt. Just this past year, we have witnessed isolated attacks by Egyptian soldiers and police officers against Israelis – one case along the shared border, where an Egyptian soldier attacked and killed two combatants while on guard duty, and another case that occurred immediately after the events of October 7, when an Egyptian security guard shot an Israeli man who was visiting as a tourist. Both countries, however, were quick to try and lower the public profile of the scandals.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, there has indeed been a welcome change in the textbooks in the elementary schools in Egypt. Definitive antisemitic and anti-Israeli messages were removed from the books as part of Egypt’s effort to position itself as a responsible country that respects minorities in the eyes of the West.

This is not a given in a country where things change at an extremely slow pace, sometimes to the point of frustration, but the positive trend has stopped for the time being and has not yet extended to middle schools and high schools. In practice, millions of Egyptians have been consuming antisemitic and anti-Israel information and messages for decades.

Every Ramadan month-long holiday, for example, Egyptians have become accustomed to watching anti-Israeli series dealing with espionage affairs in which the “evil” figure is always embodied by Israeli Mossad agents, while the Egyptian heroes prevail over them. That is, despite that in recent years, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a certain effort to minimize these messages.

Nonetheless, these are just a few of the many examples which demonstrate how the Egyptian public is being nurtured with antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiments, messages and materials. In addition to this, there is the inherent compassion which the Egyptians have towards the Palestinian people and their suffering, as it is portrayed by the social media in the Arab world and in networks such as the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya and the like.

Thus, a rather surreal situation has arisen in which the Egyptian regime, which fosters security interests that are by definition compatible with those of Israel and opposed to those of Hamas, is forced to take into account the very negative public opinion held by the majority of the Egyptian street towards Israel and its very positive attitude towards the Palestinians, and therefore to act almost contrary to its own self-interest. As far as Israel’s current war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is concerned, on the one hand, the Egyptian regime is adamant about preventing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip from entering Egyptian territory.

The Egyptian leadership knows very well why it does not want this and understands that the “temporary” arrival of Palestinians could become absolutely permanent, as can be seen in Jordan and other places where Palestinian refugee camps have existed for decades. Moreover, the Egyptians well understand the ambitions of Hamas – for them the Muslim Brotherhood – which will strive to take advantage of any Palestinians who will “temporarily” settle in the Sinai Peninsula in order to strengthen their own stronghold in that arena.

The Egyptians well understand the ideology that characterizes Hamas. It is not a national ideology, that attaches any importance to gaining independence in the Gaza Strip or Judea and Samaria or even from the entire State of Israel, but rather a religious ideology that strives to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate, including Egypt as well.

On the other hand, the Egyptian public sympathizes with their Palestinian brethren in the Gaza Strip and expects the regime to help them. Hence, Egypt finds itself aiming arrows at Israel, encouraging the transfer of more and more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in the Strip (although it is well aware that a significant part of the supplies is stolen by Hamas) and repeatedly states that the fighting in the Gaza Strip must stop, although in essence and behind closed doors, Cairo would not shed a tear in the face of the destruction of Hamas.

Even more dangerous now is the apparent rapprochement between Iran and Egypt. Although this is almost never discussed in the Israeli media, we must in no way take our eyes off Iran’s tireless pursuit to buy influence in the region. It is perhaps critical to recall that Egypt’s relations with Iran have always been accompanied by more than a tad of suspicion: Cairo remembers Tehran’s efforts to spy on its territory and, over the years, there have been several incidents which included the removal of the Iranian ambassador from Egyptian soil.

While Iran has been working for years inside Jordan, in order to strengthen its positioning there, while taking advantage of the weakness of the Jordanian regime, its attempts so far to do the same in Egypt have come to naught. Therefore, the recent rapprochement between the countries is worrisome and raises questions about the baits offered by Iran to Egypt with regards to the activities of the Houthis against ships passing through the region.

Sisi’s recent statement in this regard – “Attack only ships destined for Israel” – does not leave much room for doubt and is even more worrying since it is possible that it is an Iranian-Egyptian understanding not to damage Egyptian economic assets in exchange for systematic but consistent damage to Egypt’s relations with Israel.

Iran also has great influence on the African continent, which is very important to Egypt, especially in Ethiopia, with which Egypt has a long-standing conflict regarding the Ethiopian dam built on the Nile River and the issue of water distribution – an Egyptian strategic interest. Iran, which has been strengthening its foothold in many countries on the African continent for years, is perhaps the only one that very wisely extends its hand to Egypt on an issue that simply does not concern any other party in the region or outside of it. Iran, of course, will not be satisfied with providing help in this or any other context without adequate compensation…

To add to the above, the relations between Israel and Egypt have indeed been based on excellent and ongoing cooperation in recent years, but mainly on the professional level. The political-strategic discourse is almost nonexistent and the vacuum thereof is astounding, mainly in light of the very high tensions that currently exist around the IDF’s intended activity in the Philadelphi crossing.

Ongoing, high-level political and strategic talks, in which not only security issues will be discussed, but also the issue of decades-long incitement and indoctrination of the Egyptian public against Israel, must serve as an anchor to the relations. The latter is not merely a matter of being a nice-to-have issue resolved, but has far-reaching strategic consequences if not addressed.

Israel has its own leverages which it must exercise within the framework of the aforementioned strategic dialogue. This must be done within the framework of a broad and systematic analysis of the Egyptian and Israeli interests within the regional context of challenges and opportunities and not simply within a tactical framework, as is mostly the case at the moment. What is missing here is a broad and strategic view of the challenges facing Egypt and how Israel can assist it in creative ways. This should be seen first with a view to avoid Cairo from being tempted to rely on Tehran and secondly so that Israel will also benefit from regional inputs over time.

This strategic dialogue with Egypt must be institutionalized, with very senior representation on behalf of the Israeli government, accompanied with experts on Arab culture and language. We have already learned that every truth we were convinced of before October 7th requires a fresh look. A failure to do so vis-à-vis our relations with Egypt would be considered nothing less than pure negligence.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 10, 2024.

Eighty days have passed since the horrific events of October 7 and we are now in the second month of the IDF’s ground operation in Gaza which they are carrying out with significant achievements, while simultaneously maintaining a high ethical standard consistent with international law.

Nonetheless, it appears that the Hamas is nowhere near surrendering, nor even willing to negotiate the release of Israeli hostages still held in Gaza. It is hence our duty to closely examine why this is so and whether Israeli policies should be recalculated accordingly.

Recently, a delegation of senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials visited Egypt and met with President Abdel Fattah Sisi and his men, following a long period in which it had seemed that Qatar had the lead in everything concerning the negotiations for the abductees. Following the visit, Cairo announced a new, three phase road map regarding the hostages, the cessation of fighting, and the question of the continuity of Hamas rule.

It appears that for the two terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, as well as for Hamas’s Qatari patron, it was important to honor Egypt. The important question is: Why? Is this an attempt to once again put Egypt center stage while promising that Gazan citizens will not be allowed to cross the border into Egyptian territory, in exchange for a certain degree of freedom of maneuver for the Hamas leaders through the Philadelphi Corridor?

October 7 obliges us to re-examine every aspect of our policies. We must toughen Israel’s position somewhat – first, as far as the supervision of the Philadelphi Corridor is concerned. It is crucial to increase supervision of the Egyptian soldiers posted on the border and to put an end to the bribes they receive from Hamas.

No tunnels – whether for smuggling or for terror – should be allowed to remain, and there should be a clear Israeli military presence on the Gazan side of the border, to make sure that there is no future reconstruction.

The official Israeli position towards Egypt was and remains extremely respectful and cautious, as it should.

However, following more than four decades of peace between the countries, the time has come to demand a fundamental change in Egypt’s educational curriculum and in the messages that are conveyed to the Egyptian public, most of whom still hate Israel. Although elementary schools in Egypt have already made significant changes, with blatantly antisemitic and anti-Israel material having been removed from textbooks, this is not enough. It is important to also speed up the process in middle and high schools, and to start monitoring antisemitism more closely in universities, as well as in the professional syndicates throughout Egypt, such as the lawyers and the teachers unions.

The time has come for the Egyptian regime to become proactive and systematic in this, even as the “street,” which is highly hostile to Israel, exerts pressure to be “anti-Israel,” an attitude which is often contrary to its best interest. Fair practice and mutual tolerance in education must be demanded. Respect begets respect.

Jordan, for its part, is collapsing under the burden of the Syrian refugees who have settled within its borders in recent years. The Iranian militias have been trying, rather successfully, to make a name for themselves in Jordan for several years and are shamelessly encouraging the smuggling of drugs and munitions to and from Lebanon and Syria.

The regime in Jordan is weak, fears for its stability, and relies significantly on Israel and the US. The countries of the region that aspire to regional stability, including Israel, have every interest in supporting the Hashemite Kingdom, despite its frequent blatant accusations against Israel, yet perhaps a slightly different angle needs to be adopted by Jerusalem.

Perhaps it is time to support the leadership in Jordan, as well as its people, by helping to rehabilitate the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in refugee camps on Jordanian territory. These serve as terrorist nests that threaten not only Israel but also the stability of the Jordanian regime itself.

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jordan, have been held in a huge number of refugee camps for years by the United Nations and the international arena. Imagine what could be done with all the funding endlessly invested in maintaining those camps. How many sustainable sources of income could be derived from it? How many employment opportunities created? How many lives rehabilitated? How much terror activity diverted into productive action?

Moreover, in Jordan even more than in Egypt, the incitement and intolerance to Jews, Israel and the West apparent in educational material are appalling, disseminating hatred and vengeance. It is high time that the Israeli and the American continued support for the kingdom be linked to a fundamental change in the curriculum.

Another important anchor is Qatar. Evidently, it must be characterized as a terror-supporting country unless it obliges Hamas – immediately and without conditions – to return all the Israeli abductees. Sounds impossible? Quite the opposite! It requires the mobilization of all Israeli decision-makers, as well as all the Jewish influencers and the help of Israel’s non-Jewish friends in the US, and just a little bit of courage. The US has the leverage.

One last thought: If humanitarian aid stops coming into the Gaza Strip, Hamas will surrender, as it will no longer have the food and the medicine which it steals from its own people nor the fuel with which to power its continue military resistance. As long as supplies continue to pour in, Hamas will continue to fight and will refrain from releasing the abductees until it may be too late.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 29.12.2023

As these lines are being written, the war of attrition on Israel’s northern border continues, with the threat of further escalation growing each passing day. Unprecedented numbers of Israeli forces are stationed along the border and the military rhetoric talks about “striking Hezbollah,” there is a widespread understanding that Israel must deliver a significant blow to Hezbollah in order to restore Israeli deterrence in the region and to enable the residents of the north who have been evacuated from their homes to return and live in security.

Yet when it comes to the practical question of what next steps Israel must take in order to reestablish its security in the north, our national conversation finds itself stuck in an awkward silence. This is because the very question automatically conjures up the scars of Israel’s past experiences in Lebanon and the supposed universally acknowledged lessons learnt from Israel’s many years of military presence leading up to the withdrawal in the year 2000. It is therefore vital that in our current moment, where it seems that the north could erupt into full scale war at any time, we re-examine some of these supposed ‘lessons learned’ from the IDF’s past actions in Lebanon, and be prepared for the rapidly approaching moment of decision that Israel may face again soon.

Myth 1: The South Lebanon Security Zone (1985–2000) was militarily ineffective

Following the First Lebanon War, Israel withdrew from Beirut and its surroundings, and the IDF, along with the South Lebanon Army (or the SLA, a mainly Christian Lebanese militia backed by Israel), repositioned itself along a 3 to 12 km wide zone inside Lebanon along Israel’s northern border, known as the “security zone.” The goal was to create a buffer zone between the Hezbollah terrorists and the residents of Northern Galilee, while continuing to fight them within Lebanon, rather than within Israel’s borders.[1]

The IDF’s presence in the zone was highly successful in preventing terrorist infiltrations into Israeli territory. However, it was less successful in preventing rocket fire from Lebanese territory north of the zone. Over these 15 years, Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets aimed at Israeli towns, killing seven civilians and greatly disrupting the lives of the residents of the north.[2] By the eve of the withdrawal in the year 2000, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian assistance, had accumulated around 7,000 rockets, whose range covered most of Israel’s north.[3]

In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, the IDF conducted numerous small ground raids and aerial bombings, consistently targeting the terrorist group’s forces and capabilities. Two major operations were conducted in 1992 and 1996, during which Israel extensively bombarded both Hezbollah forces and Lebanese civilian infrastructure. During the 15 years of the zone’s existence, 256 IDF soldiers were killed, an average of about 17 per year.[4] However, Hezbollah’s behavior was also influenced by the nature of Israeli actions: when Israel acted decisively against Hezbollah, as in the early years, Israel enjoyed periods of relative calm. But when Israel, starting in 1992 under Rabin’s government, adopted a more accommodating policy with the aim of promoting peace initiatives with Syria and Lebanon, Hezbollah grew in confidence, and its attacks on IDF forces increased.

Throughout this entire period, there was a broad consensus among Israel’s leadership, as well as within the public, that it had no choice but to maintain a presence in Southern Lebanon in order to protect the northern region of the country. Despite the difficulties involved, the zone was perceived as a necessary price for ensuring the security of the Galilee against terrorist invasion.

Accordingly, when the idea of withdrawing from the zone emerged in the late 1990s, it was strongly opposed by the IDF, led by then-Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, as well as by the broader security establishment. They maintained that the zone had proven itself to be operationally effective, and therefore necessary to continue for the foreseeable future.[5] In their view, the risks of withdrawal clearly outweighed the costs of continued presence in the zone. The IDF continued its opposition to any withdrawal even after two fatal incidents in 1997: the infamous “Helicopter Disaster,” in which 73 soldiers were killed in an accidental collision of two helicopters en route to Lebanon, and the “Ansariya Ambush,” which killed 12 soldiers from the Israeli Navy’s special forces operation unit, Shayetet 13.[6]

In 1999, the IDF submitted a report arguing that if it withdrew from Lebanon without first dismantling Hezbollah, the result would be disastrous.[7] The IDF claimed that Hezbollah would take over the entire area right up to Israel’s border, thereby increasing its capability to directly threaten Israel’s north; that withdrawal would be interpreted by Israel’s enemies as a sign of Israeli weakness and would damage Israeli deterrence across the entire region; and that it would be understood as an Israeli submission to terrorism, thus encouraging Palestinian and other terrorist organizations to reign fire on Israel’s civilians.[8]

Myth 2: Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon was Politically Inevitable

In 1998, even Ehud Barak himself was still arguing that a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon “would endanger Israel’s security, endanger the security of the residents of the north, and strengthen Hezbollah. To initiate this would demonstrate public irresponsibility.”[9] When, as Prime Minister in 2000, he eventually decided to push through a unilateral withdrawal, this constituted an abandonment of all the accumulated wisdom of Israeli strategic doctrine up to that point. The drastic decision contradicted the hitherto unchallenged strategic principle of maintaining an offensive posture and seeking to shift battlelines into enemy territory. So, what explains this radical shift in policy?

When Barak assumed the role of Prime Minister in 1999, he brought with him a vision of effecting a profound change in the regional order. Immediately upon starting his term as premier, he declared his intention to secure a peace agreement with Syria, sign a comprehensive and final agreement with the Palestinians, and to withdraw the IDF from Southern Lebanon, all within one year.[10] His original intention was to withdraw from Southern Lebanon as part of the peace agreement with Syria. However, after his attempts to offer far-reaching concessions to Syria to broker a peace deal failed to yield tangible results, he pivoted and ordered the complete and unilateral withdrawal from the security zone.

He was also eager to carry out the withdrawal as soon as possible, with the aim of completing the move before the Camp David Summit in July 2000, where he hoped to reach a permanent agreement with the Palestinians.[11] To the public, he claimed that withdrawal would improve the daily security of residents of the north, and that any attack on Israel from Lebanese territory would be met with massive retaliation.[12]

Another contributing factor to the withdrawal decision emerged in 1997 with the formation of the “Four Mothers” protest movement. This movement, driven by bereaved mothers, initiated a public campaign advocating for a full withdrawal from the security zone, emphasizing the human cost and emotional toll of Israel’s continued presence in Lebanon. While highlighting these significant concerns, the movement did not address the strategic concerns that necessitated the IDF’s control of the area. Their push for withdrawal did not offer solutions for preventing terrorist attacks against border communities or for salvaging Israeli deterrence.[13] However, the campaign did receive substantial and sympathetic coverage from major Israeli media outlets,[14] who were deeply committed to the idea that the Oslo accords would lead to “peace in our time.”

The decision to pursue a unilateral withdrawal was not inevitable, but rather the product of the initiative of Ehud Barak, acting within a worldview according to which comprehensive peace deals with Syria and Yasser Arafat were just a matter of offering the right concessions, following which a new era of peace would be ushered in. The Israeli media aided in legitimizing this questionable move by focusing heavily on the costs associated with remaining, while downplaying the costs of leaving.

Myth 3: The General Public and Even the Likud Supported a Unilateral Withdrawal

By the end of the 1990’s, voices in the Likud, including Netanyahu, supported the idea of withdrawing from Lebanon within the framework of a political agreement that would see Hezbollah disarmed. In 1998, then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai proposed an Israeli withdrawal conditioned upon on the prior disarmament of Hezbollah and ensuring security guarantees for the South Lebanon Army members. However, this proposal did not progress because Syria, which effectively controlled Lebanon at the time and whose consent was essential for any Hezbollah disarmament initiative, rejected it outright.[15]

There is an immense difference between a withdrawal within the framework of an agreement that would lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament and a unilateral withdrawal that would abandon the territory to Hezbollah and lead to its inevitable empowerment. For this reason, even the leader of the far-left Meretz party, Minister Yossi Sarid, opposed the unilateral withdrawal on the eve of its execution.[16] Ahead of the May 1999 elections which brought Ehud Barak to power, a Gallup poll found that 61% of the public opposed a withdrawal without an agreement with Lebanon and Syria, while only 31% supported a unilateral withdrawal.[17]

Another factor that contributed to the decision to withdraw was the assessment among some political leaders that Israeli society was particularly sensitive to the loss of soldiers and would therefore be unwilling to bear the costs of a war of attrition. However, this was a misreading of public sentiment, perhaps even a projection of those leaders’ own feelings onto the public. Israeli society has demonstrated great national resilience and a willingness to endure significant losses, provided that the purpose of the war was clear and the leadership was committed to a decisive victory over the enemy, even if it would take an extensive period of time.[18] This public patience and fortitude was evident in Operation Defensive Shield and the subsequent counter-terrorism activities in Judea and Samaria in the following years. A similar sentiment was also seen at the onset of the Second Lebanon War.[19] Anyone observing the public atmosphere in Israel today, amidst the threat of Hamas,  can clearly see the resilience of Israeli society, and its willingness to accept losses when the goal is the pursuit of decisive victory over its enemies.

Myth 4: The Withdrawal Led to a Period of Quiet for Israel’s North

The first years following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon did indeed see a decrease in rocket attacks on Israel, with the exception of the areas of Mount Dov and the Shebaa Farms.[20] During this period, however, Hezbollah fortified its presence along the entire Israel-Lebanon border, constructing numerous bunkers for the purpose of executing mortar attacks. Hezbollah persisted in assaulting IDF patrols on Israel’s side of the border, to which Israel responded with targeted and restrained actions. The first significant incident occurred in October 2000, when Hezbollah killed and captured three Israeli soldiers, which eventual led Israel to release 400 prisoners in exchange for their bodies in 2004.[21]

After Barak’s assurances, Israel was expected to respond vigorously to any post-withdrawal aggression. However, the withdrawal had, as predicted, emboldened Palestinian terrorist organizations, plunging Israel into a series of deadly terror attacks, known as the Second Intifada. The turmoil of this new wave of terror pre-occupied Israel, leaving it unprepared for a rapid response and unwilling to simultaneously engage in forceful retaliation against Hezbollah.[22] After Hezbollah’s initial attack Israel’s restrained reaction set a new precedent. Its hesitant responses, coupled with its willingness to exchange terrorists for hostages, further strengthened the position of Hezbollah, who went on to attempt additional hostage-taking operations that eventually erupted into the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

Following the withdrawal, Hezbollah additionally focused on expanding its missile arsenal and extending its range. By the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah had amassed approximately 16,000 rockets and Katyushas, with some capable of reaching as far as Hadera.[23] As early as 2003, high-ranking security officials were raising alarms about Hezbollah’s evolution from a tactical concern to a significant strategic threat, with the capability to unleash a barrage of rockets across the entire northern region of Israel and to target strategic Israeli infrastructure.

Myth 5: Israel’s Military Responses after the Withdrawal Received Greater International Legitimacy

Between the withdrawal and the Second Lebanon War, Israel’s security establishment came to believe that the threat of conventional armies invading Israel had all but ceased to exist, particularly after the disbanding of the Iraqi army in 2003. A new doctrine was being formed, which focused on creating a “smaller and smarter army,” focused on advanced technologies, virtual command and control systems, and a strong reliance on the Air Force and its use of precision-guided missiles, while de-emphasizing the need for a large, maneuverable ground force.[24]

As the Second Lebanon War unfolded and the political leadership determined that a substantial response was required, the favored approach was to conduct air strikes targeting civilian infrastructure in Lebanon as well as Hezbollah positions. However, these air strikes proved ineffective against the small, dispersed rocket bunkers in southern Lebanon, primarily because their locations were unknown. The concession of territorial control had also brought a significant loss in essential elements of intelligence gathering.

At the outset of the Second Lebanon War, Israel initially received considerable international support. However, this support waned as it became evident that Israel’s military efforts were mainly causing damage to Lebanese infrastructure, rather than effectively targeting Hezbollah — a goal that necessitated ground operations. In Washington, there were high expectations that Israel would critically weaken Hezbollah, a goal which aligned with the US’ broader objectives in its War on Terror. However, the approach Israel pursued led to great disappointment in Washington. Instead of a decisive ground campaign to dismantle terrorist infrastructure — similar to Operation Defensive Shield in Judea and Samaria — Israel continued to prioritize air strikes. The element of ground invasion that eventually occurred was belated, ineffective and lacked clearly defined objectives.[25]

The Second Lebanon War ended with several strategic shortcomings for Israel. The most notable was its failure to effectively neutralize Hezbollah’s rocket fire, which persisted until the ceasefire and was touted as a victory by Hezbollah. Israel also missed a vital opportunity to substantially dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Southern Lebanon. This oversight not only weakened Israel’s military impact, but also spoiled the opportunity to bolster its reputation as a vital security ally of the United States. As the conflict progressed, international support dwindled, creating a new status quo, in which any future Israeli actions would come at a substantial diplomatic cost. Israel’s withdrawal, rather than granting it greater international legitimacy to respond to attacks, instead resulted in raising the diplomatic price of future military action in that same territory.

Myth 6: International Institutions are Key to Any Effective Solution

According to the UN Charter, decisions made by the Security Council are binding. However, in practice, these decisions are only implemented in circumstances where there are state actors who are willing to enforce them. Already in 1978, the Security Council decided (per Resolution 425) that Israel must make a full withdrawal from Lebanon, and that the UNIFIL force should assume security responsibility in the border area. This meant that for the entire 15 years of the security zone, Israel acted contrary to the Security Council’s decision.[26] Israel’s justification, it argued, was that in the absence of a peace agreement with Lebanon and in light of the threat to its territory, its military presence there was necessary, as UNIFIL was incapable of fulfilling its mission.[27]

In 2004, the Security Council also decided (Resolution 1559) that all militias in Lebanon must be disarmed.[28] This decision has not been implemented to this day, because it requires the Lebanese government to disband Hezbollah, which it does not have the power to do. In 2006, at the end of the Second Lebanon War, Security Council Resolution 1701 called for an immediate ceasefire, reiterating the call to disarm all militias, again planning to ensure peace through the deployment of UNIFIL forces south of the Litani River. This time, Israel decided to rely on the UNIFIL forces, who are supposed to prevent Hezbollah from accumulating weapons. In practice, the UNIFIL force has failed miserably in its mission, being itself under threat by Hezbollah not to act and thereby turning a blind eye to arms smuggling.[29] Foreign soldiers, it turns out, are not willing to risk their lives for the sake of Israel’s security — nor for the sake of the implementation of Security Council resolutions.

Myth 7: Every Threat Has a Diplomatic Solution

Will we forever “live by our sword?” Unfortunately, it seems that the answer is yes. We must abandon the ill-conceived dream that we are on the precipice of a fundamental change in reality, or that concessions will diminish our enemies’ desire to destroy us. It is precisely our willingness to accept the truth of the matter that will bring about improved security, put our enemies on defense, and allow for a thriving and prosperous national existence.

Since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has refrained from actions that would inevitably trigger a full-scale escalation, but this relative calm is misleading. Iran and Hezbollah share the ultimate objective of dismantling the State of Israel, and are gearing up for a direct confrontation. In 2006, Hezbollah possessed 16,000 rockets, with their farthest range reaching Hadera; in 2023, they have a stockpile of 150,000 missiles and rockets, with tens of thousands capable of striking central Israel. Their arsenal has expanded to include attack drones, advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and a commando unit equipped to conquer areas in the Galilee.[30] In the broader context, the past two decades have been utilized by Iran to create a land corridor under its dominance, extending from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean.

Prior to the withdrawal from Lebanon, the public debate surrounding withdrawal centered on the price of maintaining our presence there. Today, it’s crucial to acknowledge the price of our absence from this territory. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, it became clear that our northeastern border remained indefensible as long as the Golan Heights were under Syrian control. Similarly, we must now recognize that our northern border remains fully indefensible so long as whoever controls Southern Lebanon harbors hostility towards Israel. From a geographic standpoint, the Litani River represents the only logical boundary between Israel and Lebanon, not the arbitrary line that was set in the middle of a mountain range by the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916.

Looking back, it’s clear that when Israel was active in Lebanon, Hezbollah posed only a tactical threat, primarily affecting the immediate northern Galilee; whereas following Israel’s withdrawal, Hezbollah has evolved into a strategic threat to the entire State of Israel. This has allowed it to function as a tool of deterrence for Iran, thereby raising the price of any potential Israeli actions against Iran’s nuclear capabilities or its regional military presence.

In 2000 we left the security buffer zone in Lebanon’s territory; in 2023 we have effectively created a security buffer zone within Israeli territory, having evacuated some 60,000 Israelis from their homes along the border because we couldn’t guarantee their safety there. This war must not end without Israel fully dismantling the threat from Hezbollah. A range of strategic options must be considered, beginning with the offer of a diplomatic solution by insisting on the implementation of UNSC 1701 — meaning Hezbollah’s disbandment — through air operations, and potentially a ground occupation of Southern Lebanon. A complete analysis of the long-term alternatives is beyond the scope of this article, but what should be clear is that after dealing with the immediate threat from Hezbollah, decision-makers must not dismiss the possibility that Israel may need to control territory in Southern Lebanon for the foreseeable future in order to prevent its re-emergence as a threat to Israel. From our experiences with withdrawals in Gaza and Lebanon, one lesson stands out: shying away from conflict by pursuing territorial withdrawal inevitably results in the emergence of greater and more severe threats.

Published in Hashiloach Journal, Issue 35, December 2023

[1] The IDF History Department, “The Full Survey of the Operations in the Security Zone,” Retrieved 7.12.2023. https://tinyurl.com/444psysj; Dov Ben-Meir, The Israeli Defense Establishment: History, Structure, Policy, [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2009), p. 227; Charles D. Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas: how Israel makes national security policy. (Cornell University Press, 2017), p. 142. For an informative reassessment on the First Lebanon War itself, see: Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin, “Was the 1982 Lebanon War a Deviation from Israeli Security Doctrine?” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa (2023): 1-26.

[2] Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas, p. 142.

[3] Ibid, p. 201.

[4] Ibid, p. 142.

[5] Dalia Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli decision to withdraw from Southern Lebanon: Political leadership and security policy”, Political Science Quarterly 117: 4 (2002), p. 567

[6] Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas, p. 150.

[7] Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli decision”, p. 568.

[8] Ibid, 569.

[9] Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas, p. 141 .

[10] Ehud Barak, My Country, My Life: Fighting for Israel, Searching for Peace, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018), p. 328; Raphael BenLevi, Cultures of Counterproliferation: The Making of US and Israeli Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Program, (London, UK: Routledge, 2023), p. 118.

[11] Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas, p. 146.

[12] Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli decision”, p. 581.

[13] Ibid, 571.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas, p. 149; Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli decision”, p.  578.

[16] Barak, My Country, p. 345.

[17] Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli decision”, p.  571.

[18] Pnina Shuker, “The Sensitivity of Israeli Society to Losses and its Influence on Military Decision Making,” [Hebrew] The Jerusalem Institute to Strategy and Security, 4.2.2.2022. https://tinyurl.com/bddv8dsx.

[19] Efraim Inbar, Israel’s national security: issues and challenges since the Yom Kippur War, (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), p. 228; Shuker, “Sensitivity of Israeli Society.”

[20] Ben-Meir, “The Defense Establishment,” p. 232.

[21] Ibid, p. 233.

[22] Freilich, Zion’s dilemmas, p. 200.

[23] Ben-Meir, “The Defense Establishment,” p. 241.

[24] Inbar, Israel’s national security, p. 225, 227.

[25] Ibid, 227; Ben-Meir, “The Defense Establishment,” p. 231.

[26] Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli decision”,  p. 564.

[27] Ibid.

[28] UNSCR, “Resolution 1559: The Situation in the Middle East,” 2.9.2004  http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1559

[29] Noa Landau, AP, Reuters, “Under Israeli and American Pressure, the UN reduces UNIFIL Forces and Raises Oversight,” [Hebrew], Haaretz, 29.08.2020. https://tinyurl.com/yc5vzfsy

[30] Oded Yaron, “150 Thousand Missiles and Rockets: Until Where Does Hezbollah Deadly Arsenal Reach” [Hebrew], Haaretz, 20.10.2023. https://tinyurl.com/ycx5xsxb

A US plan, spearheaded by the diplomatic efforts of the US, and led by Amos Hochstein (who negotiated the Lebanon Maritime Agreement) and the French government, is emerging to diffuse tension along Israel’s northern border.  The US and France appear to propose a plan with three elements. Hizballah withdraws its forces northward.  Israel concedes all the disputed areas along the border. And finally, the area between Israel and Hizballah will be filled by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Hizballah has been in violation of UNSCR 1701 — the resolution that terminated the 2006 Second Lebanon War — since its signing. Resolution 1701 called for the “full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.”  Moreover, the resolution said all foreign forces are prohibited, such as IRGC, Hamas or other Palestinian factions, or Iraqi militias. Israel left in 2006, so it has been in compliance ever since. Also, the area south of the Litani River will be policed by the LAF and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In many ways, the US proposal only asks of Hizballah to implement one part of UNSCRs 1701 and completely ignores 1559 and 1680. This itself constitutes a major victory for Hizballah since it validates the annulment of the critical obligations of all three resolutions that render Hizballah an illegal militia altogether — all in order to ask of Hizballah to abide by one part of 1701 which it violated as Israel withdrew from the area under 1701.

Second, the three UNSCRs — to ensure that Israel had indeed withdrawn from all Lebanese territory and thus deny Hizballah’s anticipated claim of being a Lebanese nationalist resistance to continued Israeli occupation — established a mechanism to demarcate the border and validate the “blue line” which had been set in 2000. Such a demarcation was completed shortly thereafter and the border runs along that line.  Moreover, careful examination of UN demarcation maps since World War I established that the village of Ghajar had been part of Syrian Golan, and thus, part now of the Israeli Golan Heights, not Lebanon. In short, there actually is no real disputed territory because of either un-demarcated or unclear borders. They are disputed only because Hizballah raised spurious claims.

And yet, under the plan proposed by the US and France, Hizballah is rewarded — and its resistance validated and continued existence as an armed militia legitimized — by a full Israeli withdrawal in all of the areas (Kfar Shouba, Sheba Farms and Ghajar) in addition to other disputed parcels. Essentially by conceding these lands as Lebanese retroactively sanctioned Hizballah’s existence because ostensibly the US and France (and Israel, if it agrees) will now have admitted that Israel continued to occupy Lebanese territory. In other words, Israel becomes the party responsible for Hizballah’s failure to disarm as required by UNSCRs 1559, 1680 and 1701, because Hizballah was a Lebanese faction conducting resistance against occupation of Lebanese land.

The US and France have also proposed under this agreement that the LAF secures the border and the buffer zone south of the Litani River.  Indeed, UNSCR 1701 had called for that, but it has long been proven to be an entirely dysfunctional fiction as a sovereign force. It cannot in any way cross Hizballah, and to believe it can going forward is simply delusional. The historical record only shows it has functioned until now as cover and human shield for Hizballah presence despite the vast sums of money, equipment and training that have been given to LAF by the US (an aid activity which is coming under increased scrutiny in the US Congress). The LAF has simply  for decades been controlled fully by or cowered into subservience to Hizballah.

So why is the US doing this?

The US is in fact determined not only to avoid escalation on the Lebanese border, but also to avoid any Israel escalation against Iranian proxies anywhere.  For example, the US has warned Israel to stop attacking Yemen since “it could provoke Iran,” wherein a very odd situation now exists whereby American warships and international sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are attacked, and only Israel appears to be responding  to the attacks on the US warship and SLOCs.

This is part of a broader attempt by the US to burrow more deeply into the paradigm it nurtured prior to October 7 regarding Iran. At its core, it is an attempt to appease Iran by handing it major strategic victories. The paradigm itself allows the US to still seek through some combination of pressure and incentives to harness Iran, validate its “moderates,” and reach a regional understanding that can stabilize the Middle East. Essentially, it highlights that the US continues to operate toward Tehran under the Robert Malley doctrine, under which the United States still believes that there are moderates in structures of power in Iran who, with proper modulation of US policy — specifically that showing understanding and restraint rather than backing Iran against the wall, which is what “hardliners” would want — will have their fortunes so vastly improved that their common interest with the United States can be cultivated and a common understanding reached to stabilize not only Iran’s nuclear program, but its policies to such an extent that Iran becomes a partner for regional stability.

Israeli indulgence of these diplomatic discussions might be an attempt to set the stage for a war rather than reflect a genuine belief that this would lead to anything — especially were Israel to stand firm in rejecting the strategically devastating concessions demanded of it to secure Hizballah partial compliance with UNSCRs to which it already is obliged to comply.

Moreover, Hizballah likely will not accept it either. While it would be an Israeli humiliation for it to be accepted, that Hizballah withdraws voluntarily under Israeli threat would be yet another point of humiliation for Hizballah too. Neither Iran nor Hizballah care about these little pieces of land nor do they build too much on the idea that Israel’s humiliation by yielding them outweighs their humiliation of the last seven weeks of restrained intervention, two meager speeches of Nasrallah, and withdrawal operationally from territories south of the Litani without a fight. They are already ridiculed regionally.

Iran right now needs the area south of the Litani more than ever to shift the remains of Hamas over there to continue the war.  In short, they can in no way accept a buffer zone that will take a year or two to infiltrate and establish a Hamas presence and Hizballah reasserted presence. And they need to end this war right up against Israeli lines to get in the last shots to signal that they continue fighting the resistance.

The US and France are pushing for an agreement to avoid escalation on Israel’s northern border which must be understood in effect as part of a larger effort to appease Iran on substance and strategy while giving Israel hollow tactical scraps. It is a deal Israel must refuse.

Published by the Institute for a Secure America 15.12.2023.