Last week the world watched as the terrorist army Hezbollah was hit by an attack that was equal parts debilitating and humiliating. On Tuesday, September 17, the special pagers carried by Hezbollah operatives suddenly exploded. Then, on Wednesday, their walkie talkies literally blew up.

Although Israel has not claimed responsibility for the operation, in the event they did carry out this historically unprecedented strike, it was entirely justified and in full accordance with international law.

It is not surprising that it did not take long for the usual chorus of anti-Israel politicians and pundits — those who only remember International Humanitarian Law (IHL) whenever they think it might hurt the Jewish State — to find some obscure provision, divorced from context, that they might deceptively latch onto and accuse Israel of violating, knowing full well that the uneducated armchair ‘experts’ who blindly follow them would thoughtlessly amplify their claims, muddy the waters of good vs. evil, and somehow make Israel the bad guy again. 

This time, the frenzied cries centered around Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which prohibits the use of booby-traps in certain circumstances. Pseudo-academics like Kenneth Roth could not wait to tell their breathless adherents that IHL unequivocally “prohibits the use of booby traps” — even though it is obvious that if booby traps are prohibited in certain circumstances, they must be permitted in others.

For the record, this is one of those permitted times, and here, with citations, is why.

First, it is important to establish that communication devices ordered by terrorists, issued to terrorists, for terrorist purposes, do not count as harmless civilian objects. Under Article 52 of the Additional Protocols to Geneva Convention I, the communication devices that a designated foreign terrorist organization issues to its operatives are legitimate military targets, and this should not be controversial. The fact that civilians may also use cell phones does not mean that you cannot target a terrorist call center.

Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II provides certain restrictions as to the use of booby traps and other similar devices. Paragraph 1 lists certain categories of objects — religious objects, children’s toys, etc. — for which it is prohibited to use booby traps in all circumstances. The devices in question do not fall under any of those categories.

Paragraph 2 of Article 7 prohibits using booby traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are

specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material. As the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual explains:

The prohibition is intended to prevent the production of large quantities of dangerous objects that can be scattered around and are likely to be attractive to civilians, especially children.

It has nothing to do with communications devices procured by terrorists for terrorists, devices that were not specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material, and were instead modified to detonate once they clearly became military objects.

Paragraph 3 of Article 7 reminds us that even when permissible any such weapon must be placed “in the close vicinity of a military objective.” It is hard to imagine a more surgically precise procedure than the destruction of personal devices that were (literally) held by terrorists.

Analyzing the legality of a military operation also requires factoring in the principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality. The principle of necessity permits actions necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. In this instance, in a single operation, an entire enemy army was significantly impacted, and not only physically – the attack also exposed the Hezbollah network, in Lebanon but also throughout the Middle East where Hezbollah agents or affiliates were carrying these specific Hezbollah issued pagers. The devastating psychological impact also cannot be discounted;

Hezbollah can no longer trust their own equipment, cannot communicate (ironically, they are rumored to have switched to pagers out of concerns Israel was monitoring their comms!), and will have to change many elements of their operations with the potential to make further mistakes that can then be exploited.

The principle of distinction requires combatants to distinguish between civilians and military objectives during armed conflict. Here, the attack specifically targeted combatants, members of the Hezbollah army who had received specific Hezbollah equipment that is usually kept on their person. The law does not require perfect accuracy, which is impossible, and that leads to the principle of proportionality: Would such an attack be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated In this case, not a chance. Recall that Hezbollah has been bombing Israel incessantly for almost a year. In a swift and defensive maneuver — fully legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter — Israel (allegedly) immobilized a large segment of a terrorist organization actively hellbent on the genocidal elimination of the country.

Reports say that a few civilians, including two children, were tragically hurt as well. Innocent civilians getting hurt is absolutely tragic, but not in any way unlawful or Israel’s fault.

The truth is that the entire booby trap framework of analysis is wrong. IF Israel did commit these actions, then it was perhaps the finest and cleanest act of lawful sabotage in military history. As the ICRC explains:

Sabotage is generally the work of individuals or small formations operating in enemy-controlled territory and taking advantage of clandestinity, surprise, and ruses of war. It is generally carried out with great precision and therefore does not usually harm the civilian population. The targets of sabotage must form part of the enemy’s material infrastructure, that is, they must be military objectives. To sum up, sabotage against the enemy is a lawful operation provided the legal rules for the choice of targets and the methods and means employed are respected.

To quote one actual international humanitarian law expert, Eugene Kontorovitch:

Those protesting the attack on Hezbollah cell phones would have been crying over bombs placed on Nazi Germany’s train tracks.

The sad conclusion is this: if you are among those who were silent while Hezbollah committed thousands of undeniable, uncontested, and unprovoked

war crimes against innocent Israeli civilians — killing men, women,

and children in the process — and yet now find yourself horrified that Israel finally responded in a lawful, targeted manner by neutering (in some cases literally) hundreds of the terrorists who had been indiscriminately attacking them for months — your problem is not with Israel’s actions under international law; it is with Israel’s very existence.

Arsen Ostrovsky wrote the article together with John Spencer from West Point and Attorney Mark Goldfeder. 

Published in the Daily Wire, September 24, 2024.

For years, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly claimed that “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web.” This message was woven throughout his speeches and echoed in Hamas propaganda. The entire Iran-backed alliance believed it. The goal wasn’t just psychological; it had an operational purpose. It was meant to motivate the organization’s operatives, especially the Radwan Force, to train even more vigorously for the conquest of the Galilee, seen as the first step in Israel’s total destruction.

To be honest, albeit regrettably, some Israeli actions reinforced this message in the narrative of the “resistance axis” and Hezbollah itself, rather than undermining it. The refusal to eliminate armed Hezbollah operatives approaching the border, instead chasing them away; the months-long reluctance to destroy two tents Hezbollah erected on Mount Dov beyond the international border line as a challenge to Israeli sovereignty and a sign of its weakness; along with Israel’s internal weakness displayed in the year before the war – all these strengthened Nasrallah’s belief that Israel was indeed a paper tiger that would immediately collapse once the Radwan Force invaded northern settlements and conquered the Galilee.

The 500 casualties Hezbollah has suffered since deciding to attack Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, and the enormous losses Hamas endured in the Gaza Strip following its terror attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, began to change the picture, both within Hezbollah and among the Lebanese public.

Many in Lebanon, even if not among Hezbollah supporters, who witnessed the increasing power of Israeli Air Force strikes in Lebanon and the massive destruction in Gaza, began to express public opposition to the war. This is an unprecedented phenomenon in Lebanon.

The situation took another dramatic turn last week following the pager and radio communication device attack on Hezbollah operatives and senior officials, which took thousands of them out of the fight within seconds. It intensified further with the surprising and, from Nasrallah’s perspective, shocking elimination of the Radwan Force leadership in the heart of Dahieh.

Although Nasrallah claimed in his speech responding to these events that they didn’t affect the organization’s operational capabilities, no one in Lebanon believes him anymore. Hezbollah is perceived as weak, and there’s a prevailing understanding that in this conflict, Israel undoubtedly has the upper hand – technologically, militarily, and in terms of intelligence.

The Israeli Air Force bombings in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley over the past two days, which hit hundreds of important Hezbollah assets built over many years, and Israeli awareness efforts directed at Lebanese public opinion, aimed at evacuating civilian populations from villages turned by Hezbollah into weapons depots and launch sites for cruise missiles, rockets, and drones, make it clear to every Lebanese and every member of the Iran-backed alliance that Israel is a real tiger. Everyone now understands that underestimating it was a very costly mistake.

Even in interviews with Lebanese commentators on the country’s TV networks, it’s explicitly stated: “We thought we could destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. We were gravely mistaken.”

Even if Nasrallah publicly maintains that the Lebanese front is linked to the Gaza front and that his organization will continue to fire at Israel as long as there’s no ceasefire in the Strip, it seems that, watching the refugee convoys traveling from southern Lebanon to Beirut and the significant casualties his organization suffers daily at Israel’s hands, Nasrallah surely regrets now believing his own false propaganda.

The consequences of this mistake are now manifesting in Hezbollah’s unprecedented and long-term weakening. Every day that the Israel Defense Forces powerfully strikes Hezbollah’s infrastructure and denies it capabilities built over decades to harm Israel brings closer the day when northern residents will return to their homes and enjoy long-term peace.

Alongside the military effort, successful influence and psychological warfare efforts on the Lebanese public, whose trust in Hezbollah has been severely shaken and whose fear of Israel has intensified sevenfold, must continue. This axis – which sears the enemy’s consciousness – will also ensure long-term quiet on the northern border.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 24, 2024.

This week, in a scene one would expect from a Hollywood thriller, thousands of pagers and walkie talkies exploded across Lebanon and the Middle East, killing, maiming, or severely injuring thousands of Hezbollah terrorists.

Although the attacks were immediately attributed to Israel, the Jewish state has so far not claimed responsibility. In the event that Israel did carry out the operation, it could only be understood as the most audacious and unprecedented counter-terrorism precision attack in military history, and one that was entirely justified and in full accordance with international law.

The attack not only disrupted Hezbollah’s terrorist capabilities and infrastructure; it re-established Israeli deterrence and leveled psychological trauma on the entire terror organization, from its leader Hassan Nasrallah, to the most junior of Hezbollah foot soldiers, who now know that no-one is safe, and every terrorist can be reached at any time.

Lest you be swayed by the false and malicious narratives of those trying to defend Hezbollah or blame the Jewish state, some necessary context is in order.

First, Hezbollah is a Lebanese-based jihadist terrorist organization and a standing army that is funded, supplied by, and serves entirely at the behest of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Like Hamas, Hezbollah also has genocidal intentions to annihilate Israel and kill all the Jews, intentions which they have made repeatedly clear and have continuously sought to act on. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has said that that the entire Middle East will not rest until the “cancerous gland” that is Israel is removed, and on October 8 last year, a day after the Hamas massacre, Hezbollah formally joined the war in the wistful hope that they might help eradicate the Jewish state.

Since then, Hezbollah has fired more than 8,500 rockets at Israel, each an unquestionable war crime, murdering 47 people, including 12 children who were struck while playing football in the Majdal Shams massacre in July. In the meantime, over 80,000 Israelis have also been displaced from their homes in the north of the country, as a result of the ongoing attacks.

By any stretch of the imagination, Israel is fully entitled under international law, including but not limited to Article 51 of the UN Charter, to exercise its right to self-defense.

Some so-called “experts,” like Ken Roth, former head of Human Rights Watch, and New York Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, have immediately and reflexively rushed to condemn Israel for violating international humanitarian law, including by unlawfully using booby traps. But what does the law actually state?

Generally speaking, under Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the use of booby traps in communication devices are indeed prohibited in certain situations. There is, of course, an overriding caveat, which is that pursuant to Article 52 of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention I, such acts are permissible in circumstances where the objects in question are no longer used for civilian purposes.

In this case, the pagers and hand-held devices, which were distributed specifically to Hezbollah operatives, were being used for the purposes of communicating, planning and conducting operations. As such, they immediately ceased to be considered “civilian objects” and became legitimate military targets.

Accordingly, their destruction constitutes a clear military objective under customary international law (per Art. 52 of the Additional Protocols), and they are a lawful target of attack.

Under the Principle of Distinction, one of the cornerstone principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), parties to an armed conflict must also at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.

In this case, the operation was also aimed solely at Hezbollah terrorists. Indeed, only Hezbollah operatives were known to be in possession of these devices, which were not widely or generally available, and were in fact ordered by Hezbollah and distributed by Hezbollah leadership specifically to circumvent Israeli intelligence.

Under the Laws of War, parties must also abide by the Doctrine of Proportionality, which requires that any anticipated loss of civilian life must not be excessive in comparison to the potential military advantage to be gained from such an attack and or action, as well as taking feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack.

In this case, the clear military advantage would be to stop the ongoing Hezbollah rocket fire, allow for the 80,000 displaced Israeli residents to safely and permanently return to their homes, and render a large part of an enemy army unable to fight.

Of the 4,000 reported Hezbollah operatives injured, only a handful of civilians were reportedly harmed. That is an extraordinary feat in modern warfare and the textbook definition of a precision and proportionate attack.

Lots of people like to claim Israel has the right to self-defense, and yet the moment the Jewish state lawfully exercises that right in an almost unimaginably targeted way, they are outraged, looking to cast Israel as an aggressor. For the record, 8,500 unprovoked and indiscriminate rocket attacks is what might be called an escalation, not the pinpoint accurate response to stop those rockets.

The article was written in collaboration with John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point and host of the ”Urban Warfare Project Podcast”  and Dr. Mark Goldfeder is Director of the National Jewish Advocacy Center, and teaches at the Touro Law Center.

Published in Newsweek, September 20, 2024.

From supermarket lines in Beirut’s Dahieh district to various locations in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and even Syria, chaos erupted as at least 2,800 Hezbollah operatives were struck by explosions in their organization-supplied communication devices. The group now faces the daunting task of initiating three simultaneous processes.

First, Hezbollah must investigate the incident and assess its scope, focusing on casualties among both its members and civilians in the vicinity. Second, an intelligence inquiry will attempt to uncover how the perpetrator managed to infiltrate these devices into the organization’s ranks and why Hezbollah failed to detect the impending threat. Third, the group will need to consider a retaliatory operation to restore Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s standing and mitigate the severe blow to the organization’s image, while evaluating the extent of casualties and injuries that will become clearer in the coming days.

Hezbollah has blamed Israel for the attack. In the current conflict, one of the longest in its history (alongside the War of Attrition), Israel finds itself engaged in a type of warfare it has not previously experienced against Hezbollah. The group strikes Israel daily with various missile and drone attacks and has managed to establish a buffer zone within Israeli territory. However, if Israel is indeed behind this attack on Hezbollah, Nasrallah and the group’s leadership will need to reassess their war strategy.

Nasrallah and senior Hezbollah officials have repeatedly stated that they will only cease fire when Israel agrees to end the war in Gaza. Their sole objective is to assist Hamas by engaging in activities designed to wear down Israel and force it to keep a significant portion of the IDF’s military power on the northern front, maintaining the possibility of escalation into a full-scale war against Hezbollah.

It is highly doubtful that this bold operation will deter Nasrallah and his lieutenants from continuing their current strategy. Apart from the elimination of Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff, Wissam Tawil, Nasrallah has not paid a high enough price to reconsider his course in the war. In his view, criticism from Lebanese state actors regarding Lebanon’s involvement in the conflict is insignificant, and he can continue the current war pattern for years to come, thanks to Iran’s strategic backing and his strong hold on Lebanon’s Shiite community, which forms Hezbollah’s social base. Israel’s avoidance of attacking Lebanese state infrastructure also allows Nasrallah to continue the war effort without much difficulty.

However, once the full extent of the damage suffered by Hezbollah becomes clear in the near future, the group’s leadership will need to recalculate its approach to the war. The primary factor influencing the organization’s conduct will likely be the number of casualties, both among Hezbollah operatives and civilians. It appears that the US forces deployed in the area due to tensions between Iran and Israel will not affect Nasrallah’s considerations, given the absence of a tangible American threat against Hezbollah.

While Nasrallah is not interested in entering a full-scale war against Israel, he will certainly seek severe retaliation. The Shin Bet revealed today that it thwarted a Hezbollah plot aimed at targeting a former senior Israeli security figure in the coming days using a remotely detonated Claymore mine. This is similar to the method Hezbollah employed in Tel Aviv’s Yarkon Park in September 2023, which, according to the Shin Bet, was aimed at a senior Israeli official but ended without casualties. This information points to dangerous terrorist capabilities that Hezbollah has acquired, which Nasrallah can use in planning his response.

Israel has already demonstrated its ability to thwart Hezbollah’s revenge plans in the August 25 attack. Now, it must further hone its intelligence capabilities against Hezbollah and act to preemptively foil Nasrallah’s retaliatory response. It seems that both sides are still not ready to be dragged into a full-scale war due to mutual deterrence, but Israel is willing to take risks in an attempt to throw Hezbollah off balance and make it pay a heavy price for its participation in the conflict.

Published in  Israel Hayom, Seprember 17, 2024.

After waiting several days since the severe massacre in Majdal Shams, it appears that Israel chose the most aggressive option among the possibilities presented by the IDF to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who were authorized by the cabinet to decide on the matter.

The assassination, targeted a shadowy figure who managed Hezbollah’s military operations and served as the terrorist organization’s chief of staff.

Fuad Shukur, known by the alias Hajj Mohsen, has been wanted by the U.S. for many years due to his long-standing involvement in deadly terrorist attacks against Americans. In 2017, Washington offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture. According to information from the U.S., Mohsen was very close to Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Imad Mughniyeh, who, as is well known, was assassinated by Israel in February 2008 in Damascus. Together, they played a senior role in the attack on the Marine barracks in October 1983, where 241 American soldiers were killed. Little is known about Mohsen, other than his birthplace, Nabi Sheet, in 1962, and that he was part of Nasrallah’s inner circle and the senior commanders Nasrallah relied upon.

Since joining Hezbollah in the early 1980s, Hajj Mohsen climbed the ranks and gained a senior position within the organization’s operational hierarchy. Following Mughniyeh’s assassination, his status rose, and he gradually became the de facto second in command. This was partly due to the controversial assassination of Mustafa Badreddine, who was responsible for Hezbollah’s forces in Syria. This internal assassination within the terrorist organization occurred in 2016, due to a conflict between the leadership and Badreddine.

What Will Be the Response?

The Israeli strike is a dramatic and reality-altering move. While the primary focus of the war had been in Gaza, Hezbollah may now intensify the conflict. In consultations likely to be held with its patrons in Iran, the organization will decide how to respond.

At this stage, we must wait and see if Hajj Mohsen was indeed killed, which will directly impact the scope and nature of the response. If he was not killed, Hezbollah’s response is expected to be less intense, and the risk of entering an all-out war is not high. In such a scenario, the Lebanese terrorist organization may extend the range of its attacks, aim to inflict casualties, and not limit itself to targeting IDF assets. In other words, in this scenario, Hezbollah is expected to do “a bit more” than it has done so far.

If Hajj Mohsen was indeed killed, there are three main scenarios:

1. A one-time missile attack on Tel-Aviv: According to Nasrallah’s logic in war and in general, Hezbollah seeks to retaliate against Israel in an “eye for an eye” fashion. Due to Israel’s technological and intelligence superiority, Hezbollah cannot eliminate a senior Israeli figure in a missile attack. Therefore, it may choose to respond with a missile strike aimed at Israel’s heart, Tel Aviv, in an attack equivalent to the Israeli strike in Dahiya, Beirut.
2. All-Out War: So far, Hezbollah’s guiding logic in the war has been to wear down Israel to assist Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. If Nasrallah and the leadership in Iran feel the time is ripe to enter an all-out war that will incur significant costs to Israel, Hezbollah will launch a heavy missile strike under which it may attempt to initiate the “Galilee Conquest” plan. Under this plan, Hezbollah would try to infiltrate Israel with thousands of its elite Radwan Force fighters to seize a strip of Israeli territory, as Nasrallah has promised since 2014.
3. An Intense Strike: Hezbollah may choose to execute an intense strike that includes expanding the range of its fire and using precision missiles to inflict as much damage on Israel as possible in response to the historic assassination.

How Should Israel Prepare?

At this stage, Israel must activate all its intelligence tools to anticipate Hezbollah’s response in advance. If it becomes apparent that the Lebanese terrorist organization is about to initiate an all-out war, Israel should consider a preemptive strike aimed at depleting as many of Hezbollah’s assets as possible (senior commanders, tunnels and strategic headquarters, weapon depots, etc.), so that Hezbollah enters the war less prepared.

Additionally, Israel should significantly reinforce its defensive belt along the Lebanese border (carefully, to prevent sniper attacks) to counter a possible invasion by the Radwan Force. Moreover, Israel should utilize its main spokespersons, including the Prime Minister and Defense Minister, to warn the Lebanese government and people that war will lead to the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure and widespread devastation across the country—unlike the 2006 Lebanon War.

Simultaneously, Israel should mobilize the IDF to be as prepared as possible for war in Lebanon, including a ground maneuver aimed at pushing Hezbollah away from the border, ideally up to the Litani River, as a primary objective of the all-out war if it erupts.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 31, 2024.

In Israeli society, there appears to be an almost unanimous consensus that a war with Hezbollah is an inevitable necessity, with opinions differing only on the question of its timing. Israel has a long score to settle with the organization, and a personal one with its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah.

The current war in the northern front is an important reminder that Israel, within the framework of its updated security doctrine, cannot accept the existence of an Iranian-backed terror conglomerate operating on its border.

It must therefore carry out a thoughtful offensive against Hezbollah, including effective psychological warfare aimed at undermining the organization’s firm standing within the Shiite community in Lebanon. This can give Israel a significant advantage in the strategic struggle against Hezbollah. Doing so will better prepare Israel for a full-scale war and enable it to strike the organization more effectively.

The deadly attack in Majdal Shams has stirred public expectation in Israel for a more decisive response, one significantly stronger than what the IDF has employed so far. The rules of engagement adopted by Israel and Hezbollah in the current conflict have limited the intensity of military operations, even if not their depth, with neither side (Iran included) seemingly interested in escalating to a full-scale war.

However, Hezbollah’s unbridled use of the various weaponry at its disposal as evidenced in the indiscriminate attack in Majdal Shams may lead to such an outcome. Contrary to the interpretation proposed by some commentators, Hezbollah’s deadly strike cannot be understood as “operational accident.” A more plausible explanation is that the bloody attack was intentional and should be viewed as part of Hezbollah’s effort to wear Israel down and prevent it from crushing Hamas in Gaza.

It seems that an appropriate response to the massacre in Majdal Shams should include a broad attack on Hezbollah’s strategic infrastructure in southern Lebanon and the targeting of senior commanders. Hezbollah is expected to tolerate this within the informal rules of the current conflict.

At the same time, Israel must act with greater sophistication in its fight against Hezbollah by emphasizing to the Lebanese public the cost Lebanon will pay if the war continues in its current form. Israel’s pressure should focus on the Shiite community, Hezbollah’s social base, making the community realize that the cumulative damage of a prolonged war would set Lebanon back decades.

Hezbollah is aware of this vulnerability and accordingly allocates substantial resources to influence campaigns targeting the Lebanese in general and the Shiite community in particular, using social media. The goal is clear: to persuade the Lebanese that Hezbollah’s (and Lebanon’s) participation in the current war is beneficial, despite the fact that this war does not concern Lebanon at all, having been dragged into it solely due to Nasrallah’s desire to assist Hamas.

One effective tool Israel holds in this regard is IDF’s spokesperson for the Arabic media, Avichay Adraee. Israel can and should use him to counter Hezbollah’s awareness efforts directed at the Israeli and Lebanese populations. Adraee can expose Nasrallah’s lies in his various war speeches, reveal sensitive intelligence that would embarrass Hezbollah, and present to the Lebanese public the enormous danger they face when they serve as a human shield for the organization’s infrastructure and personnel.

An important message Adraee can broadcast for the residents of Beirut is the heavy toll taken on the residents of southern Lebanon. The destruction of villages there can serve as a warning to those sitting in cafes and clubs in Beirut. Indeed, Adraee is taken quite seriously in Lebanon. He has been blocked on social media by Nasrallah’s son, Jawad, himself a senior Hezbollah figure. Not only is this a mark of honor for Adraee, but evidence that his messages resonate with the Lebanese people and touch a sensitive nerve in the terrorist organization.

Despite its great potential, psychological warfare has not yet been sufficiently utilized by the IDF. In addition to targeting senior figures and infrastructure, it is time for Israel to more broadly use this tool in its fight against Hezbollah.

The assassination of senior Hezbollah figure Muhammad Neamah Naser, the commander of Hezbollah’s Aziz Unit, responsible for launching attacks from southwestern Lebanon into Israel, is a significant tactical achievement for Israel with various implications.

However, it does not alter the overall conflict against Hezbollah.

Firstly, Israel is demonstrating determination against Hezbollah, continuing to eliminate senior field commanders in Hezbollah’s ranks despite leader Hassan Nasrallah’s threats.

This assassination also sends a message to Hezbollah about Israel’s operational and intelligence capabilities, which persist despite Hezbollah’s efforts to improve its readiness and minimize damage and losses.

This is part of an ongoing effort by the IDF aimed at signaling to Hezbollah the cost of its participation in the conflict. The elimination of senior commanders, along with the reduction of capabilities and assets, are the primary tools the IDF currently uses against Hezbollah.

This assassination also reflects the technological and operational advantage of the IDF over Hezbollah, which, despite its technological advancements, is still unable to carry out such eliminations and significantly lags in its casualty numbers compared to the losses it has inflicted on Israel.

Nonetheless, the assassination will not deter Hezbollah from continuing its current pattern of attacks, as part of its strategy to assist Hamas by exhausting Israel.

It is important to remember that Israel is fighting Hezbollah under various constraints, mainly the desire to focus on the Gaza conflict and the Biden administration’s veto on expanding the war to the northern front.

Hezbollah also does not seem eager to expand the scope of the war and is ready to cease fire once the Gaza conflict ends.

It will quickly find a replacement for the commander of the Aziz unit but the assassination will be remembered as one of the significant eliminations carried out in the war, alongside the assassination of Radwan Force commander Wissam Tawil, and Abu Taleb, the commander of the Ansar unit on the organization’s southern front, responsible for Hezbollah’s activities from the eastern sector, from Bint Jbeil to Mount Dov.

In light of reports about increased weapons shipments from Iran to Hezbollah in recent months, Israel needs to strike these weapon transfers to limit Hezbollah’s ability to benefit from the strategic backing provided by Tehran as much as possible.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, July 06, 2024.

Eight months into the war, a paramount challenge confronts the nation’s leadership – galvanizing public resolve for the grueling campaign’s continuance. The adversaries’ conduct in Gaza and Lebanon could facilitate this endeavor. Hamas persists in obstructing the prisoner issue while launching rockets and attempting infiltrations, underscoring the imperative to sustain operations against it. Concurrently, Hezbollah’s escalating assaults on the IDF and northern localities compel Israel to reevaluate its approach.

A considerable segment of the populace appears to identify with the Gaza objectives, deeming them achievable, while seeking transformative change in the north. There is an understanding that this will demand sacrifice, fortitude, and patience. To re-enlist public backing and fortify trust, the political echelon must minimize ambiguity, elucidate Israel’s stance on pivotal matters like the Biden framework and exchange deal, forge broad consensus, dispel doubts surrounding the conflict’s prospects, and present a unified front alongside political allies and security establishments.

Last week’s events signified a further intensification of Hezbollah’s war of attrition against Israel, with an unprecedented scale of attacks. Beyond the casualties and damage inflicted on communities and assets, the psychological toll has been substantial. While the IDF exacts costs on Hezbollah, this does not counterbalance the deleterious domestic impact.

Hezbollah will persist in hostilities as long as Gaza operations continue – Nasrallah’s postulated formula since the war’s onset. This conceptually relegates the northern arena to secondary status, preempting Israeli designations. This formula affords Nasrallah command over escalation while providing an exit strategy: upon Israel’s cessation of Gaza operations, per his assessment, he could unilaterally halt hostilities, denying Israel legitimacy for a broader confrontation.

On May 19, Nasrallah expounded to his audience that in the “resistance axis” versus Israel, the side exhibiting tenacity, patience, and resilience would prevail. Victory, he contended, would manifest gradually through attrition rather than a decisive blow. Naturally, Israel’s leadership need not acquiesce to Nasrallah’s paradigm.

His formulations are not binding. Nasrallah must recognize that Israel will dictate the decisive juncture, irrespective of Gaza’s status. Moreover, Israel need not mirror Hezbollah’s attritional strategy, instead completing military preparedness for a strategic decision while imposing substantial costs on Lebanon. Nasrallah, having previously acknowledged misjudging Israeli intentions, must account for potential miscalculations – if indeed broader conflagration is undesired, he risks being inadvertently ensnared.

While the northern front dominated headlines this week, myriad challenges persist: Gaza, the West Bank, Iran’s proxies, diplomatic and legal arenas, and domestic societal fissures.

Given the grave ramifications, the political leadership must bolster national resilience alongside operational endeavors. Minimizing public uncertainty, clarifying positions when not advantaging the enemy, assuaging doubts over the campaign’s trajectory stemming from feared concessions enabling Hamas’s recovery, shoring up home front support, deferring divisive issues, and projecting a cohesive united stance – these prerequisites are imperative.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 8, 2024.

While most of the world’s attention is focused on Israel’s battle against Hamas in Gaza, Israel is simultaneously fighting on a second, lower-profile front against Hizballah in Lebanon. This is a war of attrition, and both sides have so far kept their ground forces out of the other’s territory. Yet, in all other respects, it is a war, and it is more severe than any of Israel’s numerous skirmishes with Hizballah since 2006. This war started the same day the one in Gaza did, when, on October 7, Hizballah expressed its support for Hamas by attacking Israel with missiles, RPGs, and drones. These attacks have continued daily since then. Worse, Hizballah has amassed ground forces along the border, poised to invade Israeli towns and carry out a slaughter that would make October 7th look mild by comparison.

This threat has forced Israel to evacuate the entire civilian population living within a few miles of the Lebanese border, leaving 80,000 Israelis internally displaced. The IDF has struck back at Hizballah targets, seeking to weaken the terror organization’s military capabilities and command structure, but it has not yet sought a large-scale maneuver while it is focused on the Gazan theatre. But to many if not most Israelis, an intensification of the war in the coming months seems inevitable. The scale and severity of that war is one of the subjects of this essay, as are Israel’s options in it, options that are shaped by the decisions—good and bad, wise and ill-conceived—that Israel has made about Lebanon in the past several decades.

The threat to Israel from its northern neighbor did not arise on October 7. It has been building since Israel fought its last war there in 2006, since it pulled its ground troops out at the turn of the new century, indeed since the modern state was founded. In a certain sense the threat from Lebanon has been present for millennia, a function less of politics and strategy than of simple geography.

How did we get to this point? What can be learnt from the previous rounds? What are Israel’s options? And what is at stake in the coming battle?…

1. Israel and Lebanon from the Bible to Begin
2. The Era of the Security Zone
3. Progress for the Party of God
4. Israel’s New Reality
5. The Northern Dilemma Returns
6. War in the North?

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