Close to a month into the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, the daily rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has stopped, but since the very first day, the IDF has had to act to counter Hezbollah’s attempts to transfer weaponry into southern Lebanon. Given this situation, we must ask: has the government’s stated goal of safely returning northern residents to their homes been achieved? And what are the long-term implications if, within 60 days, the IDF withdraws from southern Lebanon as stipulated in the agreement?

On one hand, significant achievements have been made against Hezbollah. Most of their missile arsenal and production capabilities have been destroyed, and their senior leadership and operational command have been eliminated. Hezbollah is now weaker than it has been in 20 years. Many of the border villages in which Hezbollah was entrenched have been heavily damaged, and there is currently no immediate threat of an invasion by Radwan forces. One could argue that since there is no immediate threat to northern communities, life can begin to return to normal. This time, Israel would be determined to enforce the agreement through the international supervision mechanism and unilaterally from its own territory when necessary.

The problem is that to truly restore life and rehabilitate Israel’s north, which has been abandoned for over a year, achieving short-term quiet is not enough. The real question is whether, under these conditions, Israel can prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament and the resurgence of a direct threat to its border communities. And the answer is that, in this sense, we are far from achieving the war’s objectives for the Lebanese front.

The critical point of failure here is the reported requirement for Israel to withdraw the IDF back within the Blue Line within 60 days. For anyone who has been there to see it with their own eyes, it becomes undeniably clear that the way the Blue Line cuts through the terrain makes this border indefensible for Israel. The topography along most of the line places Lebanese villages in elevated positions overlooking and dominating Israeli communities. If we learned one thing from October 7, it is that we must not accept a situation where hostile villages, serving as bases for a terror army operating under civilian cover, exist in close proximity and topographic dominance of Israeli towns.

Have we learned nothing from the failed attempts to rely on international supervision for our security? And has the Lebanese army done anything to prove it could effectively fulfill the role of enforcer of Hezbollah’s perpetual disarmament south of the Litani River? Anyone who thinks the IDF can prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament through visual intelligence and standoff airstrikes alone is sorely mistaken.

The only way to secure Israel’s north, bring residents back, and rehabilitate the region in the long term is to maintain a buffer zone along the first mountain ridge in southern Lebanon. This area should be defined as a no-man’s-land, prohibiting any movement, with the IDF maintaining control over the high ground overlooking Israel. Only from this forward defensive position can the IDF effectively act against Hezbollah’s rearmament and prevent the threat of invasion or anti-tank fire into northern communities. Such a buffer zone would not even require holding the entire area up to the Litani River and could even be smaller than the previous Security Zone.

From the first day of the agreement, Hezbollah has been violating it with repeated attempts to infiltrate forces and weapons into southern Lebanon and has even fired into Israeli territory on Mount Dov. Israel cannot be expected to fully withdraw its forces under such conditions.

The incoming Trump administration is indeed interested in achieving ceasefires on all fronts, but it will not impose terms of defeat on Israel. Trump primarily seeks to halt the intense fighting that could spread to other arenas. However, maintaining the buffer zone, which in practice already exists, is simply enforcing the ceasefire conditions from a forward position and should remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Hezbollah has been dealt a great blow, but it is by no means defeated. A full Israeli withdrawal at this time means that many residents will not return, placing Israel’s north in an economic tailspin, and will ensure that within a few years, those who do remain in the north will live under severe security threats. Only maintaining a forward Israeli presence to proactively prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament in the area can prevent this and justify the price we have paid thus far.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 24, 2024.

The emerging ceasefire with Hezbollah may include a strategic achievement by decoupling the Lebanon and Gaza theaters, but it also reveals a missed golden opportunity for Israel. Iran is conspicuously absent from the ceasefire agreement; it is neither a party to the deal nor bound by it, and it is highly unlikely that Iran would relinquish Hezbollah – its leading strategic arm in the Middle East – which plays a key role in advancing the Regime’s plans to destroy Israel and for regional hegemony. Iran is expected, immediately after the ceasefire, to initiate a comprehensive plan to rebuild Hezbollah and preserve its dominance in Lebanon.

Hezbollah, for its part, will focus on internal recovery and restoration of its status, especially considering the criticism from its social base in the Shiite community. With its billions of dollars from Iran, it will launch a massive reconstruction effort. Meanwhile, various Quds Force units responsible for arming and strengthening Hezbollah will continue their quiet activities of arms smuggling (Unit 190) and improvement of missile accuracy, range, and destructive capabilities (Unit 340). These units were recently exposed by media coverage of the strategic struggle between Israel and Iran. Additionally, Hezbollah operatives, including the Radwan Force, will resume training in Iran, including preparations to pursue their ambitions of invading Israel as part of their “Galilee Conquest” plan.

The emerging ceasefire agreement brings to light several problems. As evidenced by the experience with UNIFIL, Israel cannot entrust its security to foreign entities tasked with enforcing UN Resolution 1701 in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) – a central pillar of US strategy in Lebanon – is infiltrated by Hezbollah, with some of its officers doubling as operatives. The LAF is outmatched by Hezbollah and lacks the ability or motivation to confront it as the US hopes.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has already declared, including in his most recent speech (Monday), that Hezbollah is the war’s victor. Similarly, Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Mohammad Bagheri, asserted yesterday that Israel’s aspiration to restore security to its northern residents is merely an illusion.

Despite the unprecedented blows to Hezbollah, including the elimination of its senior leadership and the death of its leader, Tehran is looking ahead. It is leveraging Hezbollah’s survival and the continuous missile and UAV attacks to claim victory and advance its learning process to better prepare for the next war.

The absence of a secure buffer zone guarantees that Hezbollah will return to the border, shielded by southern Lebanese residents, to renew the potential threat even as it rebuilds its infrastructure (with massive Iranian support). Once Israel withdraws from Lebanon and releases its reserve forces, it will face difficulty resuming large-scale combat against Hezbollah. Additionally, the lack of any robust mechanism guaranteeing Israel freedom of action in response to future violations by Hezbollah – likely under Iran’s guidance – justifies the grievance and sense of disappointment felt by Israelis.

Israel’s significant battlefield achievements in Lebanon have not translated into principles that ensure the goals of the war are met; the agreement does not reflect Israel’s freedom from the “October 6 conception.” As long as Iran, which directs the proxy network with Hezbollah as its “crown jewel,” is not addressed, the Regime is likely to continue its subversion into Lebanon, its security in Hezbollah’s dominance, and its grip on the country remains unchallenged and ensured. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, November  27, 2024.

It is hard to think of a United Nations agency with a more glaring failure in its core mission than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, more commonly known as UNIFIL — and there has certainly been no shortage of contenders this year.

Following the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war, which was initiated after Hezbollah terrorists ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping two others, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1701. This mandated the creation of a demilitarized zone south of Lebanon’s Litani River and entrusted UNIFIL to oversee Hezbollah’s disarmament and withdrawal from the area.

That, however, did not happen.

Instead, with the acquiescence of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah entrenched itself, including literally burrowing in tunnels, along the common border with Israel. It amassed an arsenal of 150,000 or more Iranian-made precision guided rockets, in addition to an arsenal of missiles and suicide drones. All of this happened under the watchful eye of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL’s ineffectiveness has been underscored over the last 12 months. A day after Hamas’s rampage in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Hezbollah joined the war as well, with notional plans to recreate a similar massacre in Israel’s north. Since then, the group has fired more than 10,000 rockets at Israel from southern Lebanon, killing dozens and displacing tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes.

One may be forgiven for asking what, if anything, UNIFIL has done to uphold UNSCR 1701. The answer: nothing of substance.

Just this week, Hezbollah terror tunnels and weapons caches meters away from UNIFIL observation posts and bases, literally right under the noses of U.N. peacekeepers. That UNIFIL was unaware of this state of affairs is simply implausible.

Rather, it has either been grossly incompetent, acting as no more than as a passive bystander while Iran’s chief terrorist proxy arms itself for war with Israel. Or, worse yet, it has become a shield allowing Hezbollah to attack Israeli civilian communities while complicating Israel’s subsequent response.

On Sunday, a statement issued on behalf of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres defiantly reiterated that “UNIFIL peacekeepers remain in all positions and the UN flag continues to fly.” That’s a lofty statement, to be sure. But it obscures the real contours of the problem.

By staying in place, UNIFIL is not only obstructing the IDF’s legitimate military operations against Hezbollah, it is also recklessly putting its own peacekeepers at risk.

Just the other day, five UNIFIL peacekeepers were inadvertently injured when Israeli forces fired in the direction of their Lebanon headquarters in Naqoura, while engaged in a fight against Hezbollah terrorists in the vicinity. This tragic consequence was the result of UNIFIL’s rejection of repeated prior requests by Israel for it to withdraw from Hezbollah strongholds and active combat zones.

But UNIFIL isn’t just an obstacle; it has also become an active enabler. Over the last month, at least 25 rockets and missiles have been launched at Israeli communities and troops from Hezbollah terrorist compounds embedded near UNIFIL posts in southern Lebanon, exploiting their proximity to U.N. forces. One of the attacks even resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers.

How, then, can UNIFIL be entrusted to keep the peace and continue its mission?

In the 18 years since the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has been an abject failure, allowing Hezbollah to rearm and entrench itself in southern Lebanon, setting the stage for the current conflict in the process. Moreover, it has done so with international support and American largesse. Last year, the U.S. appropriated $143 million to UNIFIL for 2023, amounting to about one-quarter of the force’s total budget of $507 million. And once the current war ends, history suggests it won’t not take long for Hezbollah to return to southern Lebanon, in spite of UNIFIL’s presence there.

For the time being, however, there are only two feasible options. Either UNIFIL ceases to serve as a willing pawn for Hezbollah and actually enforces UNSCR 1701, or it closes up shop and leaves.

In other words, the U.N. should either do its job or let Israel do it.

The article was written in collaboration with Ilan Berman from the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

Published in The Hill, October 17, 2024.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

When Hamas launched its offensive on October 7, the IDF mobilized many reserve forces. Part of this force was sent to the northern front, recognizing that Hezbollah has the capability and motivation to join the battle, with its Radwan force having been equipped, trained, and prepared to invade the Galilee for years. The deployment of forces to the north was aimed at taking up defensive positions before Hezbollah could attempt to execute its plans. Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict on October 8 began with relatively low-scale fire, mainly targeting military objectives. Later, as the organization gained confidence and identified a policy of containment on the part of Israel, it ramped up fire across the entire front.

At the beginning of the campaign, Israel chose to separate the fronts and focus its primary efforts on the southern front. This situation persisted for nearly ten months. The Israeli intelligence-driven offensive on September 17, 2024 signaled a change in approach, and since then, Israel has been engaged in an expanding and evolving offensive against Hezbollah across all of Lebanon. After eliminating Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and decapitating a significant portion of the organization’s senior command levels, as well as damaging its infrastructure, Israel launched a limited ground operation in southern Lebanon in early October 2024.

To this end, the Israeli government added an additional war goal, stating that the State of Israel would work to safely return the displaced residents of the North, who had evacuated their homes as Hezbollah ramped up its attacks. Based on what is publicly known, the IDF’s ground operation is advancing cautiously, with forces currently operating only in the area adjacent to the line of engagement with an aim to destroy terrorist infrastructure close to the border (approximately 4 km deep). After four weeks of ground operations, a reality more severe than the Israeli intelligence likely knew has emerged—and far more than what was made clear to the public before the ground operation.

Hezbollah has built an extensive terrorist infrastructure. This was done under the laxity of the Lebanese army, which failed to fulfill its obligations; under the eyes of the UNIFIL forces; and most gravely, due to Israel’s decision not to instruct the IDF to thwart the transfer of massive quantities of weapons into the area. Weapons and equipment stockpiles were stored in extensive tunneling that reached very close to the Israeli border, and in at least one case, even crossed it. Extensive use was made of residential homes and civilian infrastructures such as mosques and schools. In fact, nearly every house and building in the Shiite villages along the front have been turned into a Hezbollah military outpost or prepared for offensive military effort. While it is clear that the overwhelming majority of buildings in these Shiite villages are considered legitimate military targets, and although it is evident that clearing the area cannot be limited to narrow surgical operations in a strip of a few kilometers, the IDF has so far refrained from systematically and thoroughly destroying all of these buildings.

However, even if a security buffer zone of a few kilometers’ width is created, this space will not provide adequate protection to northern communities and will not allow evacuated residents to return to their homes safely. Defending the northern communities requires a broader approach that does not limit itself to addressing only the line of engagement. This defense requires the removal of Hezbollah forces from the entire area, at least up to the Litani River, and in certain areas where the river’s course is closer to the Israeli border, even beyond. Since Hezbollah operatives are integrated into the Shiite villages––some even living there––and given that many of the Shiite villages conceal terrorist infrastructure, it will not be possible to allow residents of these villages to return to southern Lebanon. The map below illustrates a small portion of Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure up to the Litani in the eastern sector (as of 2015).

/*! elementor - v3.21.0 - 30-04-2024 */
.elementor-widget-image{text-align:center}.elementor-widget-image a{display:inline-block}.elementor-widget-image a img[src$=".svg"]{width:48px}.elementor-widget-image img{vertical-align:middle;display:inline-block}

In the initial phase, the IDF must take control of the entire area up to the Litani River (and in certain places beyond it) while fully evacuating the population of the Shiite villages in the area for their protection and to allow for the clearing of the area without endangering the Lebanese population. The IDF has already begun the process of evacuating the population, but there is still work to do as it is necessary to address the presence of terrorist infrastructure in the city of Tyre, which lies south of the Litani.

The operation in southern Lebanon is closely linked to the overall strategy of the State of Israel. The extent of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah creates an opportunity to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and weaken Hezbollah to the point where it is no longer a relevant threat to Israel by continuously and persistently thwarting its efforts to recuperate and reconstitute itself.

In southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River and beyond where necessary, full Israeli control is required, preventing residents from returning to the villages to avoid Hezbollah operatives returning under the guise of the civilian population. The Shiite region must be completely cleared of any military and civilian presence under Hezbollah’s cover. Regarding other villages, a specific assessment will be needed to determine the level of threat posed by their population to Israel’s security, and a policy will need to be established regarding monitoring their exit from and return to the area. As for how the IDF should take southern Lebanon, this article does not provide an operational outline, but it is expected that IDF commanders will carry out this mission in a cunning and creative manner.

A second area of operations would be between the Litani River and the Awali River and the Qaroun Lake line in the east. This area will serve as an immediate depth zone of operation for the IDF to prevent capabilities from drifting towards the Litani. The IDF can operate through aerial actions and special operations. Lastly, operations, mainly aerial, should be carried out throughout Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its military capabilities.

Until an agreement that meets Israel’s security needs is achieved (although under current conditions and for the foreseeable future, it is unclear if such an agreement can be established), there should be a buffer zone (security perimeter) established north of the security zone in southern Lebanon. This area must be cleared of infrastructure and buildings, enabling observation and fire control to prevent any entry into the security zone established in southern Lebanon and to destroy any Hezbollah force attempting to return to this area. This should resemble the buffer zone along the Gaza Strip border. In the case of Lebanon, this zone should be 2–4 km wide depending on the terrain conditions. Therefore, a quick and efficient clearing of the area is required. For this purpose, maneuvering must be expanded and civilian structures destroyed to render the entire area uninhabitable.

Such a move would impose a painful cost on Hezbollah and the Shiite population in southern Lebanon that supports it, serving as a catalyst for Lebanon and the international community to dismantle Hezbollah and reach a security arrangement acceptable to Israel. Above all, it would allow effective military control and presence in the area until such an agreement is achieved. Given that this is likely to require a long-term commitment––perhaps even years until an achievable and enforceable agreement is reached––the IDF must prepare optimal conditions for military control in the area, which must also be better protected.

This improved defense will be achieved by emptying the area of its residents and blocking access to it while considering any entity trying to enter the area as a hostile element to be neutralized. This reality is fundamentally different from what we knew during the 18 years when the IDF was in the security zone. In those years, the zone remained populated, and despite the actions of the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Hezbollah found it relatively easy to penetrate the area with the support of the large Shiite population and launch attacks on IDF and SLA forces.

Simultaneously with the necessary military organization in southern Lebanon, the IDF must continue its offensive actions against Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. In this regard, there cannot be and should not be a ceasefire until the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Resolution 1701, meanwhile, should be discarded in the annals of history, as it is demonstrably unenforceable, nor can one rely on international actors for its implementation. Israel, after October 7, cannot afford to revert to a doctrine of containment regarding Hezbollah’s growing strength. What is more, the ongoing pursuit of Hezbollah operatives, leaders, and military assets in turn weakens Iran and its entire axis. Hezbollah is the crown jewel of Iran, the spearhead, and the center of gravity in Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy against Israel. Harming this key Iranian asset necessarily harms Iran, the central factor undermining regional security.

The effort in the northern arena must continue alongside the effort in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is dismantled and the conditions are set for a civilian governance alternative with Israeli security responsibility and full military freedom of action in order to prevent any attempt by Hamas to recuperate and rebuild its military and governmental capabilities.

All these efforts are intended to pave the way for the third effort. This effort should focus on weakening Iran itself through strikes on military and governmental assets, and subsequently on its nuclear infrastructure. Following Iran’s 181-ballistic missile barrage launched at Israel which targeted military and civilian infrastructure alike (1 October 2024) and Israel’s precise and targeted retaliatory strike against Iranian military infrastructure (26 October 2024), Iran seems poised to respond. Should it choose to, Israel’s ambition should be to utilize such an Iranian response to persuade the United States to prepare to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Should Israel fail in this crucial effort, it must prepare to carry out this operation independently.

The fourth effort should focus on painful responses in Yemen, western Iraq, and southern Syria in response to missile and drone launches from these areas. As part of this effort, Israel should make it clear to Syria’s president that it would be in his best interest to restrict the steps of Iran and the Shiite militias operating within Syria’s sovereign territory or else his regime would be in danger.

It may seem that the multitude of required efforts stretches Israel’s capabilities to the limit. Indeed, this series of efforts demands significant resource investment and is not without risks. However, in the reality that has emerged, Israel wields strategic momentum that it cannot afford to lose. Israel has no choice but to maintain and enhance its momentum as it can lead to the weakening of the entire Iranian axis and the laying of the foundations for establishing a new regional architecture, which–– beyond its contribution to regional security, stability, and prosperity–– would further weaken and restrain the Iranian axis and open new opportunities for addressing the Palestinian issue.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to the political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

1. This map, which includes only the eastern sector, was released by the IDF in 2015. Since then, Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure has expanded significantly and is likely much broader today.

There is a famous saying in the Talmud, the Jewish scriptures, that roughly translates to “if someone rises up to kill you, kill him first.” This past weekend, the tiny Jewish state of Israel rose like a phoenix and eliminated Hassan Nasrallah, the arch-terrorist and leader of Hezbollah.

His death, the epitome of a just and legal cause, should be applauded by all who seek peace and stand against terror.

Nasrallah will go down in history as one of the most evil people to have ever lived. He should be mourned no less so than Osama Bin-Laden or Adolf Hitler.

A ruthless murderer, he had blood on his hands spanning the world over, not only of Israelis, but hundreds of foreign nationals — including Canadians — and importantly, many Muslims in the region as well.

Like Hamas, Hezbollah also has genocidal intentions to annihilate the Jewish state, with Nasrallah himself having said that that the entire Middle East will not rest until the “cancerous gland” Israel is removed, and on Oct. 8 last year, a day after the Hamas massacre, Hezbollah formally joined the war in the hope that they might repeat an October 7 style attack in the north.

Since then, Hezbollah has fired almost 10,000 rockets at Israel, murdering or killing 48 people, including 12 Druze children who were struck while playing football in the Majdal Shams massacre in July. Meanwhile, almost 100,000 Israelis have been forcibly displaced from their homes in the north as a result of the ongoing attacks.

This week alone, at least 2 million Israelis had to rush to bomb shelter – that’s more than the entire population of Montreal.

Faced with this intolerable situation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have now also entered Lebanon, in a precise and limited operation, to remove the Hezbollah terror targets and infrastructure from southern Lebanon to allow for the safe return of Israeli citizens back to their homes.

Yet before Nasrallah has even been buried and IDF forces set foot in Lebanon, there has been no shortage of self-proclaimed experts and apologists for terror erroneously charging Israel with violating international law.

But the law here is clear.

The Law of Armed Conflict, also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), is based on three foundational principles which also conform with the guiding U.S. Department of Defense Laws of War Manual and include: military necessity, distinction, and proportionality.

The principle of necessity requires that a party to an armed conflict may only resort to those measures that are necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose of a conflict, and specifically, to weaken the military capacity of the other parties.

In this case, Israel’s attack on Hezbollah’s headquarters where Nasrallah was hiding, and entry of IDF troops into southern Lebanon, was designed to specifically weaken and disrupt the terror group’s ability to continue firing rockets at Israel, thereby clearly meeting the necessary threshold.

The principle of distinction requires that parties to a conflict must “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.”

Yet, whereas Hezbollah has indiscriminately rained rockets down on civilian areas in Israel for the past year, Israeli actions, such as those taken this past weekend, have been aimed solely at Hezbollah targets including their senior leadership, command centre, and rocket launching infrastructure, which clearly fall within the legitimate scope of ‘military objectives’.And lastly, there is perhaps no principle in international law that has been as repeatedly abused as that of “proportionality,” to reflexively castigate Israel and charge it with war crimes every time the pesky Jewish state refuses to surrender and allow its citizens to be slaughtered.

First, we need to throw away the notion that proportionality is measured by some kind of perverse equivalence in civilian deaths. It is not. Under IHL, the doctrine of proportionality requires that any expected loss of civilian life must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from such an attack.

In relation to Israel’s current military operation, the goal vis-à-vis Hezbollah was clear: to stop their rocket fire, force Hezbollah to withdraw from southern Lebanon and allow Israeli citizens in the north to safely return home, essentially in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

And whilst Israel has, yet again, gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid harm to civilians in Lebanon, while abiding by the principles of distinction and necessity, it is Hezbollah, which just like Hamas, is also committing the double war crime or embedding in civilian areas, cynically using the Lebanese people as human shields, while indiscriminately firing at civilians in Israel. Indeed, Hassan Nasrallah’s bunker and Hezbollah central command was embedded underneath residential buildings in Beirut.

But what is a “proportionate” response to 10,000 rockets being rained down on you? Should Israel have indiscriminately fired 10,000 rockets on central Beirut? Of course not.

In short, Israel’s operation to eliminate Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and enter into southern Lebanon has been a textbook display of military precision and self-defensive action, in accordance with international humanitarian law.

However, for some critics, it will just never be enough. There are many who claim Israel has the right to self-defense, but yet the moment the Jewish state lawfully exercises that right against someone like Hassan Nasrallah, a man who is the very embodiment of evil, they immediately object to it. Perhaps their issue is not Israel’s right to self-defense, but its very existence.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky in collaboration with Dr. Brian L. Cox is an adjunct professor of law at Cornell Law School and a retired U.S. Army judge advocate.

Published in Nationa Post, October 1, 2024.

Last week the world watched as the terrorist army Hezbollah was hit by an attack that was equal parts debilitating and humiliating. On Tuesday, September 17, the special pagers carried by Hezbollah operatives suddenly exploded. Then, on Wednesday, their walkie talkies literally blew up.

Although Israel has not claimed responsibility for the operation, in the event they did carry out this historically unprecedented strike, it was entirely justified and in full accordance with international law.

It is not surprising that it did not take long for the usual chorus of anti-Israel politicians and pundits — those who only remember International Humanitarian Law (IHL) whenever they think it might hurt the Jewish State — to find some obscure provision, divorced from context, that they might deceptively latch onto and accuse Israel of violating, knowing full well that the uneducated armchair ‘experts’ who blindly follow them would thoughtlessly amplify their claims, muddy the waters of good vs. evil, and somehow make Israel the bad guy again. 

This time, the frenzied cries centered around Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which prohibits the use of booby-traps in certain circumstances. Pseudo-academics like Kenneth Roth could not wait to tell their breathless adherents that IHL unequivocally “prohibits the use of booby traps” — even though it is obvious that if booby traps are prohibited in certain circumstances, they must be permitted in others.

For the record, this is one of those permitted times, and here, with citations, is why.

First, it is important to establish that communication devices ordered by terrorists, issued to terrorists, for terrorist purposes, do not count as harmless civilian objects. Under Article 52 of the Additional Protocols to Geneva Convention I, the communication devices that a designated foreign terrorist organization issues to its operatives are legitimate military targets, and this should not be controversial. The fact that civilians may also use cell phones does not mean that you cannot target a terrorist call center.

Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II provides certain restrictions as to the use of booby traps and other similar devices. Paragraph 1 lists certain categories of objects — religious objects, children’s toys, etc. — for which it is prohibited to use booby traps in all circumstances. The devices in question do not fall under any of those categories.

Paragraph 2 of Article 7 prohibits using booby traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are

specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material. As the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual explains:

The prohibition is intended to prevent the production of large quantities of dangerous objects that can be scattered around and are likely to be attractive to civilians, especially children.

It has nothing to do with communications devices procured by terrorists for terrorists, devices that were not specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material, and were instead modified to detonate once they clearly became military objects.

Paragraph 3 of Article 7 reminds us that even when permissible any such weapon must be placed “in the close vicinity of a military objective.” It is hard to imagine a more surgically precise procedure than the destruction of personal devices that were (literally) held by terrorists.

Analyzing the legality of a military operation also requires factoring in the principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality. The principle of necessity permits actions necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. In this instance, in a single operation, an entire enemy army was significantly impacted, and not only physically – the attack also exposed the Hezbollah network, in Lebanon but also throughout the Middle East where Hezbollah agents or affiliates were carrying these specific Hezbollah issued pagers. The devastating psychological impact also cannot be discounted;

Hezbollah can no longer trust their own equipment, cannot communicate (ironically, they are rumored to have switched to pagers out of concerns Israel was monitoring their comms!), and will have to change many elements of their operations with the potential to make further mistakes that can then be exploited.

The principle of distinction requires combatants to distinguish between civilians and military objectives during armed conflict. Here, the attack specifically targeted combatants, members of the Hezbollah army who had received specific Hezbollah equipment that is usually kept on their person. The law does not require perfect accuracy, which is impossible, and that leads to the principle of proportionality: Would such an attack be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated In this case, not a chance. Recall that Hezbollah has been bombing Israel incessantly for almost a year. In a swift and defensive maneuver — fully legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter — Israel (allegedly) immobilized a large segment of a terrorist organization actively hellbent on the genocidal elimination of the country.

Reports say that a few civilians, including two children, were tragically hurt as well. Innocent civilians getting hurt is absolutely tragic, but not in any way unlawful or Israel’s fault.

The truth is that the entire booby trap framework of analysis is wrong. IF Israel did commit these actions, then it was perhaps the finest and cleanest act of lawful sabotage in military history. As the ICRC explains:

Sabotage is generally the work of individuals or small formations operating in enemy-controlled territory and taking advantage of clandestinity, surprise, and ruses of war. It is generally carried out with great precision and therefore does not usually harm the civilian population. The targets of sabotage must form part of the enemy’s material infrastructure, that is, they must be military objectives. To sum up, sabotage against the enemy is a lawful operation provided the legal rules for the choice of targets and the methods and means employed are respected.

To quote one actual international humanitarian law expert, Eugene Kontorovitch:

Those protesting the attack on Hezbollah cell phones would have been crying over bombs placed on Nazi Germany’s train tracks.

The sad conclusion is this: if you are among those who were silent while Hezbollah committed thousands of undeniable, uncontested, and unprovoked

war crimes against innocent Israeli civilians — killing men, women,

and children in the process — and yet now find yourself horrified that Israel finally responded in a lawful, targeted manner by neutering (in some cases literally) hundreds of the terrorists who had been indiscriminately attacking them for months — your problem is not with Israel’s actions under international law; it is with Israel’s very existence.

Arsen Ostrovsky wrote the article together with John Spencer from West Point and Attorney Mark Goldfeder. 

Published in the Daily Wire, September 24, 2024.

For years, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly claimed that “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web.” This message was woven throughout his speeches and echoed in Hamas propaganda. The entire Iran-backed alliance believed it. The goal wasn’t just psychological; it had an operational purpose. It was meant to motivate the organization’s operatives, especially the Radwan Force, to train even more vigorously for the conquest of the Galilee, seen as the first step in Israel’s total destruction.

To be honest, albeit regrettably, some Israeli actions reinforced this message in the narrative of the “resistance axis” and Hezbollah itself, rather than undermining it. The refusal to eliminate armed Hezbollah operatives approaching the border, instead chasing them away; the months-long reluctance to destroy two tents Hezbollah erected on Mount Dov beyond the international border line as a challenge to Israeli sovereignty and a sign of its weakness; along with Israel’s internal weakness displayed in the year before the war – all these strengthened Nasrallah’s belief that Israel was indeed a paper tiger that would immediately collapse once the Radwan Force invaded northern settlements and conquered the Galilee.

The 500 casualties Hezbollah has suffered since deciding to attack Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, and the enormous losses Hamas endured in the Gaza Strip following its terror attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, began to change the picture, both within Hezbollah and among the Lebanese public.

Many in Lebanon, even if not among Hezbollah supporters, who witnessed the increasing power of Israeli Air Force strikes in Lebanon and the massive destruction in Gaza, began to express public opposition to the war. This is an unprecedented phenomenon in Lebanon.

The situation took another dramatic turn last week following the pager and radio communication device attack on Hezbollah operatives and senior officials, which took thousands of them out of the fight within seconds. It intensified further with the surprising and, from Nasrallah’s perspective, shocking elimination of the Radwan Force leadership in the heart of Dahieh.

Although Nasrallah claimed in his speech responding to these events that they didn’t affect the organization’s operational capabilities, no one in Lebanon believes him anymore. Hezbollah is perceived as weak, and there’s a prevailing understanding that in this conflict, Israel undoubtedly has the upper hand – technologically, militarily, and in terms of intelligence.

The Israeli Air Force bombings in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley over the past two days, which hit hundreds of important Hezbollah assets built over many years, and Israeli awareness efforts directed at Lebanese public opinion, aimed at evacuating civilian populations from villages turned by Hezbollah into weapons depots and launch sites for cruise missiles, rockets, and drones, make it clear to every Lebanese and every member of the Iran-backed alliance that Israel is a real tiger. Everyone now understands that underestimating it was a very costly mistake.

Even in interviews with Lebanese commentators on the country’s TV networks, it’s explicitly stated: “We thought we could destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. We were gravely mistaken.”

Even if Nasrallah publicly maintains that the Lebanese front is linked to the Gaza front and that his organization will continue to fire at Israel as long as there’s no ceasefire in the Strip, it seems that, watching the refugee convoys traveling from southern Lebanon to Beirut and the significant casualties his organization suffers daily at Israel’s hands, Nasrallah surely regrets now believing his own false propaganda.

The consequences of this mistake are now manifesting in Hezbollah’s unprecedented and long-term weakening. Every day that the Israel Defense Forces powerfully strikes Hezbollah’s infrastructure and denies it capabilities built over decades to harm Israel brings closer the day when northern residents will return to their homes and enjoy long-term peace.

Alongside the military effort, successful influence and psychological warfare efforts on the Lebanese public, whose trust in Hezbollah has been severely shaken and whose fear of Israel has intensified sevenfold, must continue. This axis – which sears the enemy’s consciousness – will also ensure long-term quiet on the northern border.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 24, 2024.

This week, in a scene one would expect from a Hollywood thriller, thousands of pagers and walkie talkies exploded across Lebanon and the Middle East, killing, maiming, or severely injuring thousands of Hezbollah terrorists.

Although the attacks were immediately attributed to Israel, the Jewish state has so far not claimed responsibility. In the event that Israel did carry out the operation, it could only be understood as the most audacious and unprecedented counter-terrorism precision attack in military history, and one that was entirely justified and in full accordance with international law.

The attack not only disrupted Hezbollah’s terrorist capabilities and infrastructure; it re-established Israeli deterrence and leveled psychological trauma on the entire terror organization, from its leader Hassan Nasrallah, to the most junior of Hezbollah foot soldiers, who now know that no-one is safe, and every terrorist can be reached at any time.

Lest you be swayed by the false and malicious narratives of those trying to defend Hezbollah or blame the Jewish state, some necessary context is in order.

First, Hezbollah is a Lebanese-based jihadist terrorist organization and a standing army that is funded, supplied by, and serves entirely at the behest of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Like Hamas, Hezbollah also has genocidal intentions to annihilate Israel and kill all the Jews, intentions which they have made repeatedly clear and have continuously sought to act on. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has said that that the entire Middle East will not rest until the “cancerous gland” that is Israel is removed, and on October 8 last year, a day after the Hamas massacre, Hezbollah formally joined the war in the wistful hope that they might help eradicate the Jewish state.

Since then, Hezbollah has fired more than 8,500 rockets at Israel, each an unquestionable war crime, murdering 47 people, including 12 children who were struck while playing football in the Majdal Shams massacre in July. In the meantime, over 80,000 Israelis have also been displaced from their homes in the north of the country, as a result of the ongoing attacks.

By any stretch of the imagination, Israel is fully entitled under international law, including but not limited to Article 51 of the UN Charter, to exercise its right to self-defense.

Some so-called “experts,” like Ken Roth, former head of Human Rights Watch, and New York Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, have immediately and reflexively rushed to condemn Israel for violating international humanitarian law, including by unlawfully using booby traps. But what does the law actually state?

Generally speaking, under Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the use of booby traps in communication devices are indeed prohibited in certain situations. There is, of course, an overriding caveat, which is that pursuant to Article 52 of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention I, such acts are permissible in circumstances where the objects in question are no longer used for civilian purposes.

In this case, the pagers and hand-held devices, which were distributed specifically to Hezbollah operatives, were being used for the purposes of communicating, planning and conducting operations. As such, they immediately ceased to be considered “civilian objects” and became legitimate military targets.

Accordingly, their destruction constitutes a clear military objective under customary international law (per Art. 52 of the Additional Protocols), and they are a lawful target of attack.

Under the Principle of Distinction, one of the cornerstone principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), parties to an armed conflict must also at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.

In this case, the operation was also aimed solely at Hezbollah terrorists. Indeed, only Hezbollah operatives were known to be in possession of these devices, which were not widely or generally available, and were in fact ordered by Hezbollah and distributed by Hezbollah leadership specifically to circumvent Israeli intelligence.

Under the Laws of War, parties must also abide by the Doctrine of Proportionality, which requires that any anticipated loss of civilian life must not be excessive in comparison to the potential military advantage to be gained from such an attack and or action, as well as taking feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack.

In this case, the clear military advantage would be to stop the ongoing Hezbollah rocket fire, allow for the 80,000 displaced Israeli residents to safely and permanently return to their homes, and render a large part of an enemy army unable to fight.

Of the 4,000 reported Hezbollah operatives injured, only a handful of civilians were reportedly harmed. That is an extraordinary feat in modern warfare and the textbook definition of a precision and proportionate attack.

Lots of people like to claim Israel has the right to self-defense, and yet the moment the Jewish state lawfully exercises that right in an almost unimaginably targeted way, they are outraged, looking to cast Israel as an aggressor. For the record, 8,500 unprovoked and indiscriminate rocket attacks is what might be called an escalation, not the pinpoint accurate response to stop those rockets.

The article was written in collaboration with John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point and host of the ”Urban Warfare Project Podcast”  and Dr. Mark Goldfeder is Director of the National Jewish Advocacy Center, and teaches at the Touro Law Center.

Published in Newsweek, September 20, 2024.

From supermarket lines in Beirut’s Dahieh district to various locations in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and even Syria, chaos erupted as at least 2,800 Hezbollah operatives were struck by explosions in their organization-supplied communication devices. The group now faces the daunting task of initiating three simultaneous processes.

First, Hezbollah must investigate the incident and assess its scope, focusing on casualties among both its members and civilians in the vicinity. Second, an intelligence inquiry will attempt to uncover how the perpetrator managed to infiltrate these devices into the organization’s ranks and why Hezbollah failed to detect the impending threat. Third, the group will need to consider a retaliatory operation to restore Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s standing and mitigate the severe blow to the organization’s image, while evaluating the extent of casualties and injuries that will become clearer in the coming days.

Hezbollah has blamed Israel for the attack. In the current conflict, one of the longest in its history (alongside the War of Attrition), Israel finds itself engaged in a type of warfare it has not previously experienced against Hezbollah. The group strikes Israel daily with various missile and drone attacks and has managed to establish a buffer zone within Israeli territory. However, if Israel is indeed behind this attack on Hezbollah, Nasrallah and the group’s leadership will need to reassess their war strategy.

Nasrallah and senior Hezbollah officials have repeatedly stated that they will only cease fire when Israel agrees to end the war in Gaza. Their sole objective is to assist Hamas by engaging in activities designed to wear down Israel and force it to keep a significant portion of the IDF’s military power on the northern front, maintaining the possibility of escalation into a full-scale war against Hezbollah.

It is highly doubtful that this bold operation will deter Nasrallah and his lieutenants from continuing their current strategy. Apart from the elimination of Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff, Wissam Tawil, Nasrallah has not paid a high enough price to reconsider his course in the war. In his view, criticism from Lebanese state actors regarding Lebanon’s involvement in the conflict is insignificant, and he can continue the current war pattern for years to come, thanks to Iran’s strategic backing and his strong hold on Lebanon’s Shiite community, which forms Hezbollah’s social base. Israel’s avoidance of attacking Lebanese state infrastructure also allows Nasrallah to continue the war effort without much difficulty.

However, once the full extent of the damage suffered by Hezbollah becomes clear in the near future, the group’s leadership will need to recalculate its approach to the war. The primary factor influencing the organization’s conduct will likely be the number of casualties, both among Hezbollah operatives and civilians. It appears that the US forces deployed in the area due to tensions between Iran and Israel will not affect Nasrallah’s considerations, given the absence of a tangible American threat against Hezbollah.

While Nasrallah is not interested in entering a full-scale war against Israel, he will certainly seek severe retaliation. The Shin Bet revealed today that it thwarted a Hezbollah plot aimed at targeting a former senior Israeli security figure in the coming days using a remotely detonated Claymore mine. This is similar to the method Hezbollah employed in Tel Aviv’s Yarkon Park in September 2023, which, according to the Shin Bet, was aimed at a senior Israeli official but ended without casualties. This information points to dangerous terrorist capabilities that Hezbollah has acquired, which Nasrallah can use in planning his response.

Israel has already demonstrated its ability to thwart Hezbollah’s revenge plans in the August 25 attack. Now, it must further hone its intelligence capabilities against Hezbollah and act to preemptively foil Nasrallah’s retaliatory response. It seems that both sides are still not ready to be dragged into a full-scale war due to mutual deterrence, but Israel is willing to take risks in an attempt to throw Hezbollah off balance and make it pay a heavy price for its participation in the conflict.

Published in  Israel Hayom, Seprember 17, 2024.

After waiting several days since the severe massacre in Majdal Shams, it appears that Israel chose the most aggressive option among the possibilities presented by the IDF to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who were authorized by the cabinet to decide on the matter.

The assassination, targeted a shadowy figure who managed Hezbollah’s military operations and served as the terrorist organization’s chief of staff.

Fuad Shukur, known by the alias Hajj Mohsen, has been wanted by the U.S. for many years due to his long-standing involvement in deadly terrorist attacks against Americans. In 2017, Washington offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture. According to information from the U.S., Mohsen was very close to Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Imad Mughniyeh, who, as is well known, was assassinated by Israel in February 2008 in Damascus. Together, they played a senior role in the attack on the Marine barracks in October 1983, where 241 American soldiers were killed. Little is known about Mohsen, other than his birthplace, Nabi Sheet, in 1962, and that he was part of Nasrallah’s inner circle and the senior commanders Nasrallah relied upon.

Since joining Hezbollah in the early 1980s, Hajj Mohsen climbed the ranks and gained a senior position within the organization’s operational hierarchy. Following Mughniyeh’s assassination, his status rose, and he gradually became the de facto second in command. This was partly due to the controversial assassination of Mustafa Badreddine, who was responsible for Hezbollah’s forces in Syria. This internal assassination within the terrorist organization occurred in 2016, due to a conflict between the leadership and Badreddine.

What Will Be the Response?

The Israeli strike is a dramatic and reality-altering move. While the primary focus of the war had been in Gaza, Hezbollah may now intensify the conflict. In consultations likely to be held with its patrons in Iran, the organization will decide how to respond.

At this stage, we must wait and see if Hajj Mohsen was indeed killed, which will directly impact the scope and nature of the response. If he was not killed, Hezbollah’s response is expected to be less intense, and the risk of entering an all-out war is not high. In such a scenario, the Lebanese terrorist organization may extend the range of its attacks, aim to inflict casualties, and not limit itself to targeting IDF assets. In other words, in this scenario, Hezbollah is expected to do “a bit more” than it has done so far.

If Hajj Mohsen was indeed killed, there are three main scenarios:

1. A one-time missile attack on Tel-Aviv: According to Nasrallah’s logic in war and in general, Hezbollah seeks to retaliate against Israel in an “eye for an eye” fashion. Due to Israel’s technological and intelligence superiority, Hezbollah cannot eliminate a senior Israeli figure in a missile attack. Therefore, it may choose to respond with a missile strike aimed at Israel’s heart, Tel Aviv, in an attack equivalent to the Israeli strike in Dahiya, Beirut.
2. All-Out War: So far, Hezbollah’s guiding logic in the war has been to wear down Israel to assist Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. If Nasrallah and the leadership in Iran feel the time is ripe to enter an all-out war that will incur significant costs to Israel, Hezbollah will launch a heavy missile strike under which it may attempt to initiate the “Galilee Conquest” plan. Under this plan, Hezbollah would try to infiltrate Israel with thousands of its elite Radwan Force fighters to seize a strip of Israeli territory, as Nasrallah has promised since 2014.
3. An Intense Strike: Hezbollah may choose to execute an intense strike that includes expanding the range of its fire and using precision missiles to inflict as much damage on Israel as possible in response to the historic assassination.

How Should Israel Prepare?

At this stage, Israel must activate all its intelligence tools to anticipate Hezbollah’s response in advance. If it becomes apparent that the Lebanese terrorist organization is about to initiate an all-out war, Israel should consider a preemptive strike aimed at depleting as many of Hezbollah’s assets as possible (senior commanders, tunnels and strategic headquarters, weapon depots, etc.), so that Hezbollah enters the war less prepared.

Additionally, Israel should significantly reinforce its defensive belt along the Lebanese border (carefully, to prevent sniper attacks) to counter a possible invasion by the Radwan Force. Moreover, Israel should utilize its main spokespersons, including the Prime Minister and Defense Minister, to warn the Lebanese government and people that war will lead to the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure and widespread devastation across the country—unlike the 2006 Lebanon War.

Simultaneously, Israel should mobilize the IDF to be as prepared as possible for war in Lebanon, including a ground maneuver aimed at pushing Hezbollah away from the border, ideally up to the Litani River, as a primary objective of the all-out war if it erupts.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 31, 2024.