From a historical point of view, the deadly drone attack that resulted in the death of three American soldiers in Jordan did not necessarily reflect an escalation in the relationship between Iran and the U.S.

 However, it did reflect the expansion of attacks carried out by pro-Iranian Iraqi militias against the U.S. in recent months in Iraq and Syria.

 Since the 1980s, Iran has been promoting a terrorist campaign against the U.S. as a central anchor in its ambition to achieve regional hegemony and push the U.S. from the region.

 In 1983, through Hezbollah, Iran committed a deadly incendiary attack against the bases of the multinational force in Beirut, where 241 American soldiers and 58 French soldiers were killed. Its leading role in the attack was revealed by the American National Security Agency (NSA), which intercepted a transmission from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence to the Iranian ambassador in Damascus in which the order was passed to encourage the attack carried out by Hezbollah and with the help of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Forces.

 Since Iran activated its strategy of proxy warfare, in a process spanning decades, it has established and nurtured an impressive array of militias and Shiite and Sunni terrorist organizations in the Middle East, all financed, trained, and armed by Tehran. This is how it managed to fight the U.S. (and its main rivals in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia) while not being attacked in return, except for the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.

 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iran used this proxy network to fight Saddam Hussein and to punish Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for their support in Iraq. In the 1990s, the network of proxies expanded to al-Qaeda, which received significant aid from Tehran for the devastating attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 7, 1998), in which 224 civilians were killed and 4,000 were injured.

 After the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Iranian terrorist sponsorship also included the Taliban (albeit to a lesser extent), which received funding, training, and military personnel to fight the Americans.

 In the Iraq War (2003-2011), Iran operated a terrorist array that included four Shiite militias and two Sunni ones; its goal was to prevent the U.S. from establishing a forward base where they could operate militarily against Tehran. According to a 2019 assessment by the Pentagon, through an activation of proxies, Iran was responsible for the killing of 608 American soldiers and contractors during the Iraq War.

 One decade later, during the Syrian civil war, Iran expanded its network of proxies and succeeded in preventing the ouster of Assad. They accomplished this by sending in a variety of Iraqi Shia militias, an Afghani militia, a Pakistani militia, and the Lebanese Hezbollah to Syria.

 In recent months, statements from Tehran and Shia militias in Iraq have asserted that attacks against Americans in Iraq and Syria will stop if the U.S. instructs Israel to stop the war in Gaza. This leaves no room for doubt about Iran’s standing behind these attacks. They are carried out by the group Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which also accepted responsibility for the attack in Jordan. This organizational framework includes several pro-Iranian militias in Iraq; chief among them is Kataib Hezbollah, the spearhead of the Iranian formation in Iraq.

 Since the drone attack, in various briefings to the American media, the Biden administration has signaled its intention not to engage in a conflict with Iran. Indeed, immediately after the attack, senior Iranian officials rushed to emphasize that Tehran was not related to the responsible organization, though it did welcome it.

 Differentiating Iran from its affiliates is an essential part of the Iranian strategy of proxy warfare. Accordingly, the American retaliatory attacks in Syria, Iraq and Yemen focus only on IRGC-backed militias, and aren’t likely to cause an escalation between the U.S. and Iran.

 Basically, the Biden administration is absolving Tehran of responsibility for its terrorist proxies. The administration still seeks to “restore trust” between Tehran and Washington, with the ultimate aim of restoring the JCPOA nuclear deal from President Obama’s time in office.

 Published by i24news 06.02.2024

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The evacuation of communities from the Gaza Envelope settlements, including the city of Sderot, following the events of October 7^th  – and the ruin left in the area in their wake – is a traumatic event for the settlers, a scar in the soul of the Israeli people, evidence to what many perceive as a disgraceful failure of the State’s systems, and no less importantly, a substantial psychological achievement for Hamas, the Palestinians, and our other enemies in the area. Every day that the Western Negev stands devoid of its residents amplifies the enemy’s achievements, provides further tailwind for its continued struggle against Israel, and further incentivizes it to continue on the path of terrorism, and to support its inciters and sponsors.

Settlement in this area, and along the Israeli border as a whole, is part of the Zionist ethos of inhabiting and defending Israel, reclaiming and making agricultural use of the land – both as a value and as a crucial component of the State’s economy and resilience. Any delay in restoring the settlements of the Gaza Envelope to their former glory – and in expanding, developing, and supporting them – further erodes the Zionist ethos.

No less importantly, though – any delay in restoring this region, returning its citizens to their rightful place, and making it thrive again serves to deepen the crisis of faith between these residents and the State and its institutions, as well as the crisis of faith between Israeli society and its leadership – all while making the physical and mental scars of the evacuated residents run even deeper. This, of course, is compounded by the economic aspects of this ongoing situation – partially due to the direct costs of hosting thousands of families in hotels, but mostly due to indirect costs from loss of income, the impaired production capability and continuous supply of agricultural produce, and the future indirect costs of the mental and physical rehabilitation of those thousands of families and of entire communities.

Thus, as the fighting in the Gaza Strip advances and operational achievements accumulate, it would be prudent to bring the residents back to the Gaza Envelope settlements. As published in early January, some of the residents at the Hof Ashkelon and Shaar HaNegev regional councils have already started returning to their homes. Now, however, is a good time to systematically act to restore the settlements in their entirety – something that harbors much significance for a variety of reasons, including reasons of state sovereignty and regional security, community and personal aspects, the psychological and national resilience element – and finally, for economic reasons.

The State of Israel must reassert its sovereignty over the entire country, including the Gaza Envelope. Reasserting sovereignty and security is fundamental to the State’s duties towards its citizens. Thus, we must act quickly to exercise sovereignty and restore our hold over the areas of the nation that were evacuated and abandoned. To this end, two fundamental terms must be met – the first of which is disrupting the capabilities of Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist organizations to attack the settlements. The IDF’s mounting achievements and the building of a security buffer and military defense envelope will make it very difficult for the enemy to launch infiltration or standoff firing attacks in the direction of the settlements – and will eventually, through a prolonged process, negate its capabilities for massive rocket fire towards the settlements as well. The IDF had already begun implementing a broad-scope plan to defend the settlements and respond to their security needs by reinforcing the settlements’ rapid response teams, providing proper equipment and regular training, alongside integration of the IDF’s area defense into the settlements and installation of various deterrents such as indicative fences, smart cameras, Command and Control rooms, etc.

An important tool for restoring sovereignty and security would be growing the population of the Gaza Envelope area through reviving the Nahal program and establishing Nahal settlements in the Gaza Envelope area – after two decades during which not a single Nahal settlement was established and converted into a civilian settlement. Beyond increasing the population, further settlement of the area by Nahal core groups would enable reclaiming this geographical era in a productive and principled manner, serving as a lodestone for a reformed ethos of pioneering, inhabiting and working the land, alongside active defense of the area – the sickle and the sword as a foundation for volunteering and harnessing the national spirit to establish new settlements and restore security to the area.

In the personal-community aspect, keeping entire communities out of their natural environment may jeopardize their social cohesion and their ability to recover from the traumatic event. The sooner these communities return to their settlements, rehabilitate them, and establish routines of daily life, the more effective their recovery process will be.

In the national context, the settlements thriving and prospering once again will constitute a victory for the State of Israel – radiating strength both inwards into Israeli society and outwards, demonstrating the resilience of Israeli society and its perseverance in the Zionist endeavor. The residents’ return to the Gaza Envelope settlements will also boost the recovery of the area’s community and education systems – including that of schools, other educational institutions, medical services, public transport, and a variety of needful community services. This process cannot be serial – it must occur concurrently with the residents’ return and brooks no delay. In this manner, community systems could be rehabilitated in a vibrant, healthy way.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the psychological dimension. Restoring and developing settlements will necessarily radiate on the Israeli society’s sense of capability, on trust in the State’s institutions and its capability to recover from severe trauma and devastation whilst harnessing national resources and capabilities for planning and execution – and no less importantly – on the sense of cohesion, solidarity, and mutual responsibility. All these are expressions and aspects of social and national resilience. National resilience is a fundamental and essential component of national strength – and thus, of national security in its broad sense. We cannot ignore the difficulties and the trauma caused by the events of October 7^th, or their impact on our sense of capability, security, trust, and resilience. Since October 7^th, Israeli society has gone a long way in the process of rehabilitation and recovery – but the process cannot be completed without restoring settlement, exercising sovereignty, re-establishing communities, agriculture, and industry in the area – and in particular, continuing its development and expansion as an appropriate Zionist reply to the bloodthirsty destructiveness that Hamas demonstrated during the murderous terrorist attack of October 7^th. Through its communities, Israeli settlement shall set exercising sovereignty and reclamation of the land through agricultural work against Hamas’ destructive efforts. Renewing the settlement efforts, restoring them to their former glory, developing and expanding them will constitute the true Israeli victory in this war – the triumph of the Zionist ethos of building and development, reclaiming and settling the land, over Hamas’ ethos of ruin and devastation.

Finally, the return of the Gaza Envelope’s residents to their homes holds economic significance of the highest order, for several reasons. First, the direct costs of hosting evacuated individuals in alternative residences and in hotels and guest houses.  An analysis of the proposal for increasing the 2023 budget suggests that the scope of addition to the budget required to support the expenditures of assisting evacuated individuals was more than ILS 6 billion. [1] This budget is expected to grow even further in 2024. Diverting funds from direct aid to the evacuated individuals into developing and rehabilitating the Gaza Envelope settlements will yield great returns and generate income for the national economy, made possible by restoring the Gaza Envelope’s economy to a functional state – albeit partially, at first. Second – bringing the residents back would necessitate the provision of economic benefits – both for individual residents and on the community-settlement level. The State is required to invest in developing the area and the settlements, and to provide a variety of economic benefits in the form of tax breaks, grants, and aid in developing settlements, in a manner that would serve all national needs. This investment should be considered a substantial part of the war costs and one of the tools for winning it.

Many residents will wish to return to their homes as soon as possible, given the right conditions. The right time is now, and we must act to return the settlers to the Gaza Envelope. Uprooting these communities from their settlements was a necessary evil at the start of the war, but now we must put our full strength behind making these settlements prosper again. The leadership of the State must take the reins on this national challenge – this national mission –through relevant government ministries and State institutions. It is also the time for local leadership and community leadership – as well as for the communities themselves and their settlers – to shine. Now is the time for pioneers to take the van – the time for the nation to step forward in its journey to rise again and make its way towards the establishment of Israel 2.0. [2]

Settlement in this area, and along the Israeli border as a whole, is part of the Zionist ethos of inhabiting and defending Israel, reclaiming and making agricultural use of the land – both as a value and as a crucial component of the State’s economy and resilience. Any delay in restoring the settlements of the Gaza Envelope to their former glory – and in expanding, developing, and supporting them – further erodes the Zionist ethos.

No less importantly, though – any delay in restoring this region, returning its citizens to their rightful place, and making it thrive again serves to deepen the crisis of faith between these residents and the State and its institutions, as well as the crisis of faith between Israeli society and its leadership – all while making the physical and mental scars of the evacuated residents run even deeper. This, of course, is compounded by the economic aspects of this ongoing situation – partially due to the direct costs of hosting thousands of families in hotels, but mostly due to indirect costs from loss of income, the impaired production capability and continuous supply of agricultural produce, and the future indirect costs of the mental and physical rehabilitation of those thousands of families and of entire communities.

Thus, as the fighting in the Gaza Strip advances and operational achievements accumulate, it would be prudent to bring the residents back to the Gaza Envelope settlements. As published in early January, some of the residents at the Hof Ashkelon and Shaar HaNegev regional councils have already started returning to their homes. Now, however, is a good time to systematically act to restore the settlements in their entirety – something that harbors much significance for a variety of reasons, including reasons of state sovereignty and regional security, community and personal aspects, the psychological and national resilience element – and finally, for economic reasons.

The State of Israel must reassert its sovereignty over the entire country, including the Gaza Envelope. Reasserting sovereignty and security is fundamental to the State’s duties towards its citizens. Thus, we must act quickly to exercise sovereignty and restore our hold over the areas of the nation that were evacuated and abandoned. To this end, two fundamental terms must be met – the first of which is disrupting the capabilities of Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist organizations to attack the settlements. The IDF’s mounting achievements and the building of a security buffer and military defense envelope will make it very difficult for the enemy to launch infiltration or standoff firing attacks in the direction of the settlements – and will eventually, through a prolonged process, negate its capabilities for massive rocket fire towards the settlements as well. The IDF had already begun implementing a broad-scope plan to defend the settlements and respond to their security needs by reinforcing the settlements’ rapid response teams, providing proper equipment and regular training, alongside integration of the IDF’s area defense into the settlements and installation of various deterrents such as indicative fences, smart cameras, Command and Control rooms, etc.

An important tool for restoring sovereignty and security would be growing the population of the Gaza Envelope area through reviving the Nahal program and establishing Nahal settlements in the Gaza Envelope area – after two decades during which not a single Nahal settlement was established and converted into a civilian settlement. Beyond increasing the population, further settlement of the area by Nahal core groups would enable reclaiming this geographical era in a productive and principled manner, serving as a lodestone for a reformed ethos of pioneering, inhabiting and working the land, alongside active defense of the area – the sickle and the sword as a foundation for volunteering and harnessing the national spirit to establish new settlements and restore security to the area.

In the personal-community aspect, keeping entire communities out of their natural environment may jeopardize their social cohesion and their ability to recover from the traumatic event. The sooner these communities return to their settlements, rehabilitate them, and establish routines of daily life, the more effective their recovery process will be.

In the national context, the settlements thriving and prospering once again will constitute a victory for the State of Israel – radiating strength both inwards into Israeli society and outwards, demonstrating the resilience of Israeli society and its perseverance in the Zionist endeavor. The residents’ return to the Gaza Envelope settlements will also boost the recovery of the area’s community and education systems – including that of schools, other educational institutions, medical services, public transport, and a variety of needful community services. This process cannot be serial – it must occur concurrently with the residents’ return and brooks no delay. In this manner, community systems could be rehabilitated in a vibrant, healthy way.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the psychological dimension. Restoring and developing settlements will necessarily radiate on the Israeli society’s sense of capability, on trust in the State’s institutions and its capability to recover from severe trauma and devastation whilst harnessing national resources and capabilities for planning and execution – and no less importantly – on the sense of cohesion, solidarity, and mutual responsibility. All these are expressions and aspects of social and national resilience. National resilience is a fundamental and essential component of national strength – and thus, of national security in its broad sense. We cannot ignore the difficulties and the trauma caused by the events of October 7^th, or their impact on our sense of capability, security, trust, and resilience. Since October 7^th, Israeli society has gone a long way in the process of rehabilitation and recovery – but the process cannot be completed without restoring settlement, exercising sovereignty, re-establishing communities, agriculture, and industry in the area – and in particular, continuing its development and expansion as an appropriate Zionist reply to the bloodthirsty destructiveness that Hamas demonstrated during the murderous terrorist attack of October 7^th. Through its communities, Israeli settlement shall set exercising sovereignty and reclamation of the land through agricultural work against Hamas’ destructive efforts. Renewing the settlement efforts, restoring them to their former glory, developing and expanding them will constitute the true Israeli victory in this war – the triumph of the Zionist ethos of building and development, reclaiming and settling the land, over Hamas’ ethos of ruin and devastation.

Finally, the return of the Gaza Envelope’s residents to their homes holds economic significance of the highest order, for several reasons. First, the direct costs of hosting evacuated individuals in alternative residences and in hotels and guest houses.  An analysis of the proposal for increasing the 2023 budget suggests that the scope of addition to the budget required to support the expenditures of assisting evacuated individuals was more than ILS 6 billion. [1] This budget is expected to grow even further in 2024. Diverting funds from direct aid to the evacuated individuals into developing and rehabilitating the Gaza Envelope settlements will yield great returns and generate income for the national economy, made possible by restoring the Gaza Envelope’s economy to a functional state – albeit partially, at first. Second – bringing the residents back would necessitate the provision of economic benefits – both for individual residents and on the community-settlement level. The State is required to invest in developing the area and the settlements, and to provide a variety of economic benefits in the form of tax breaks, grants, and aid in developing settlements, in a manner that would serve all national needs. This investment should be considered a substantial part of the war costs and one of the tools for winning it.

Many residents will wish to return to their homes as soon as possible, given the right conditions. The right time is now, and we must act to return the settlers to the Gaza Envelope. Uprooting these communities from their settlements was a necessary evil at the start of the war, but now we must put our full strength behind making these settlements prosper again. The leadership of the State must take the reins on this national challenge – this national mission –through relevant government ministries and State institutions. It is also the time for local leadership and community leadership – as well as for the communities themselves and their settlers – to shine. Now is the time for pioneers to take the van – the time for the nation to step forward in its journey to rise again and make its way towards the establishment of Israel 2.0. [2]

[1] Description and Analysis of the Proposal to Increase the 2023 National Budget and a Macro-Economic Review. Knesset Information and Research Center, December 2023.

[2] https://www.misgavins.org/siboni-michael-israel-2-0-project-launch

Critical voices have surfaced in the Israeli public and in the media concerning the goals of the war, which are presented as presumptuous and impractical, and regarding the tension between destroying Hamas as a military and governing entity and releasing the hostages. Criticism is also heard regarding the political echelon’s vacillation about deciding as to the “day after.”

This criticism, which should properly be heard and discussed even in wartime, recently has morphed into a cascade of gloom and doom on the part of some opinion leaders, culminating in appeals to “concede defeat, accept Hamas’s terms for a hostage release deal, and end the war.

This dispiriting commentary runs up against the sense of achievement felt by Israel’s troops in the field, and by the resolve of the military and political echelon to attain the war’s goals and by their complete confidence in the necessity of the war.

There is a grand incongruity between the dispiriting criticism and widespread public support of the war’s goals and confidence in the ability of Israel to attain those goals – as expressed in every public opinion poll. (See, for example, polls conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies, the Israel Democracy Institute, and others).

Without having been declared or formally organized, a new movement has effectively been founded in Israel: The Downer Movement (“Dichonistim” in Hebrew). The movement boasts members such as media outlets and opinion leaders who wield extensive influence by virtue of their prominence in public discourse. They are agents of demoralization, steadily and doggedly dripping their despondent messages into public discourse.

They do not necessarily do this maliciously; likely motivated by a profound “downer” conviction – pessimism on steroids – resulting from severe crisis of trust in the resilience of Israeli society and in the IDF’s capabilities, as well as from their harsh, even virulent, disapproval of Israel’s current political leadership.

However, regardless of the causes of such despondency and pessimism, their efforts can adversely affect the fighting spirit of the IDF, boost Hamas’s morale and that of the entire resistance axis, and invite the exertion of heavier and more significant external pressures on Israel, including by the US administration.

The pessimistic analyses and evaluations paint a grim picture of reality, which again is quite different from the situation as perceived by the majority of Israelis. This is borne-out in a study conducted by Dr. Gil Samsonov and his colleagues at Publicis, which shows an immense gap between the spirit inculcated by the Downer Movement and the spirit of Israel’s younger generation. (See: Today’s Youth Against the Background of the Iron Swords War – Among Teenagers, Soldiers and Students, A Study of Israelis 16-25; Glikman, Shamir, Samsonov – The Publicis Group; December 2023).

The study’s authors argue that Israel is undergoing nothing less than a generational upheaval, one that shatters paradigms and entrenches new perspectives: from an disconnected, global generation of Israelis to almost pioneer-like optimistic generation.

According to the study, 59% of young Israelis believe that Israel is strong, will win and has a future. 58% have a purely positive outlook, 28% have both a positive and a negative outlook and only 14% have a purely negative outlook. 70% of people aged 16-18 believe in Israel’s strength and future. Young people understand the difficulties faced by the country, with 57% saying that Israel will gradually regain its standing despite substantial difficulties posed by a hostile Middle East, relying on a strong military. 29% think Israel will quickly regain its strength and resume growing, with many immigrants making their way to Israel.

Young Israelis understand the need to party less and work more (through both university studies and military service). Finally, 57% think Israel will emerge victorious from the current crisis thanks to its strong army.

The survey’s findings indicate a strong spirit exhibited by the younger generation, with impressive optimism, a spirit of volunteering, and belief in the justness of Israel’s path as the nation-state of the Jewish People.

In an interview television, Dr. Samsonov summarized his study’s findings by stating that the younger Israeli generation is more like the rugged, realistic, and scrappy generation of Israelis in 1948 – the generation of their grandparents – than its own parents’ generation.

The Downer Movement sometimes dominates public discourse because Israeli media highlights its members and messaging. But again, the despondent messaging is not truly reflective of mainstream Israeli thinking and feeling.

Part of the despondency stems from the downers fervent and near-religious beliefs in the so-called two-state solution; from being addicted to the notion that no solution exists other than reliance on the Palestinian Authority. They advocate for propping up the PA even at the cost of compromising on critical demands for reform of that problematic body. Their inability to move beyond the PA, their reliance on failed paradigms of the past, leads them to bleak assessments regarding the IDF’s ability to attain Israel’s war goals. Alas, they don’t understand how resilient and determined Israelis are to do things differently.

Originally published in Maariv 16.01.2024

Israel can no longer remain silent in the face of Turkey’s extensive support of Hamas and its central role in building the organization’s financial empire. 

With the help of its closest ally, Israel must clarify to Turkey that continuing to sponsor Hamas will have severe consequences for their relationship.

Three weeks after Hamas’s massacre in southern Israel, during a pro-Palestinian mass rally held in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and accused Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza.

In another speech in Ankara in December 2023, Erdogan went so far as to compare Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Hitler in reference to the IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip.

Such rhetoric is not uncommon when it comes to the president of Turkey and aligns with previous antisemitic statements by Erdogan or his affiliates. 

However, Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel is not confined to mere rhetoric. For over a decade, Turkey has been assisting Hamas in various ways: politically, economically, and militarily, enabling it to grow exponentially and afflict catastrophic suffering on innocent Israelis. 

Turkey a safe haven for Hamas

It is no secret that Turkey provides a safe haven for Hamas leadership. Ankara regularly hosts top Hamas figures, and Erdogan himself has openly met with the movement’s senior officials, including the chairman of the political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and the former head, Khaled Mashaal.

Ankara is also the driving force behind Hamas’s global financing apparatus. An investigation by The Wall Street Journal reveals Turkey’s primary role in constructing the financial network of Hamas, led by the organization’s financial chief, Zaher Jabarin. 

According to the WSJ report, from his office in Istanbul, Jabarin oversees Hamas’ comprehensive fundraising system, which involves transferring funds from Iran to the Gaza Strip, managing a portfolio of companies that provide Hamas with annual income, among which are several Turkish firms, and managing a network of private donors.

Strong evidence supports the claim

DESPITE ITS denial, there is strong evidence to support the claim that Turkey assists Hamas militarily as well. In 2018, Israel arrested Kamil Takli, a Turkish law professor who was revealed to be a Hamas financier. 

In his interrogation, Takli confirmed that Hamas operated in Turkey and that it received military aid from Ankara through a private military contractor close to Erdogan. Furthermore, in July 2023, Israel intercepted 16 tons of explosive material on its way from Turkey to Gaza to be used for rocket production.

The damage caused to Israel by containing Turkey’s extreme Islamist approach seems to outweigh the benefits of cooperation with Ankara. Thus, despite the desire to maintain close trade relations, it is time for Israel to make it clear that if Turkey continues to support Hamas, it will pay a heavy price.

The Israeli government should reject any future initiatives to normalize relations with Turkey until Hamas is defined by the Turkish government as a terror organization and Turkey fully complies with American sanctions on its funding. Israel should also freeze any potential cooperation with Turkey in the gas and energy sectors until Turkey responds to these demands.

In accordance with this hardline approach, Israel must engage the United States in its efforts, imploring Washington to exert pressure on Turkey. This pressure should include an American demand that Turkey take legal action against entities on Turkish territory that fund US-designated terror organizations. 

The US should also condition any future arms deal with Turkey on the latter, cutting off all ties with Hamas and enforcing American sanctions in full.

If Turkey continues to back Hamas, the US should amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to facilitate the filing of lawsuits by victims of terrorism. This has been proposed in relation to Qatar and can be applied to any other state that provides material or other forms of assistance to terrorist organizations, Turkey included. 

These measures would send a clear message to Turkey that it must cease backing Hamas or suffer the consequences. 

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2024.

Our war for the safekeeping of Israel is being waged on several levels. The military level is undoubtedly the most important and basic one, as it is undoubtedly the physical battle which shall clear the Gaza Strip of terrorists and weapons. Yet the battle over our narrative is not less important.

Even without the support of the world, we will continue to stand firmly against the evil we face. Even without the international legitimacy we so deserve, we will continue to strive and work for the return of our abducted men, women, children, and the elderly.

Even without the tears of the citizens of the world, we shall continue in our righteous path, simply because it is so undoubtedly just.

Nonetheless, and despite all that, it is important to note that the battle for the acceptance or at least acknowledgment of our narrative in the Muslim world is not lost. The Muslim and Arab world is not exposed to almost any information that puts it at odds with the anti-Israeli messaging to which it is accustomed. Arab governments, which have signed peace agreements with the State of Israel, filter the messages to which their publics are exposed, in a manner which does not expose Israel’s story.

The time has come to change this situation. This is not naïveté and it is not mere wishful thinking. It is doable.

How can Israel change the narrative in the Arab and Muslim worlds?

Why is it important? The Arabs and Muslims make up a significant portion of the world’s population, that has a significant impact on global discourse, whether in international organizations or whether in its ability to harness mass public opinion on various campuses and on the streets of Europe, the US, Australia, and Canada.

Moreover, this is the neighborhood in which Israel is situated and although it is important to acknowledge that it is, indeed, a tough one and prepare accordingly, there is no reason in adopting a defeatist state of mind when it comes to trying to touch the hearts of the masses in this neighborhood.

Some basic principles reinforce the argument that with the right effort, the goal is attainable. First, Arab culture is significantly based on emotion and less so on rationalism. This is not an absolute statement, of course, but the emotional component carries a very significant weight for many in the Arab and Muslim world.

Any Israeli, Jewish or other effort to share the Israeli narrative with the Arab and Muslim world must be based largely – if not entirely – on emotion. And are the atrocities committed on October 7th not heart-wrenching? Are those actions not enough to shake the human soul? Are the testimonies of the abductees and especially the women abductees who were returned from hell not enough to take away one’s breath?

IF WE put our inevitable cynicism aside for a moment, we will realize that these horrors and truths, almost entirely simply do not reach the Arab and Muslim public. It is important to internalize this – and to stop declaring defeat in advance, because “even if they knew, they would disqualify or ignore them, or even be happy that they had happened”… Some will, indeed, be happy. Some of them – in Gaza – even took part in the October 7th “Carnival of Horrors.”

But a very large part of the Arab world simply does not know and is not exposed to what had happened and to what continues to be the lot of our abductees in the Gaza Strip. It is our duty to put this truth in front of their eyes, in cooperation with the Arab governments, and with the help of the US.

And that brings me to the second point that must be taken into account when it comes to the Arab and Muslim world. There are topics that are considered “haram” – absolutely forbidden according to Islam and the Arab tradition. One of these topics, and perhaps the most sensitive, is sexual abuse.

The fact that religious permits were given to the Hamas terrorists to commit acts of rape and even gang rape is not only unacceptable to Israelis and to those in the Western world. To many in the Muslim world, this is a shocking act that tarnishes the very image of their religion. It is our duty to raise what had happened, with all its complexities, with all its gory and horrific details (and God only knows that there are many and there are simply beyond belief), again and again and to fight in order for these shocking, inhumane, despicable acts to be put before the eyes of millions of Muslims around the world.

The United States has much leverage vis-à-vis Arab countries, and therefore has the power to demand that their media broadcast the whole truth. It is not possible for us to accept as a fait accompli the reality that Arab governments prevent the knowledge of the suffering of our people from their public.

No more. Enough is enough. There is an element of Respect. And respect begets respect.

THE ISSUE must be made a condition for cooperation. There are quite a few issues where Israel is also required to be forthcoming, whether it is allowing Egypt to increase its military forces in the Sinai Peninsula beyond what is permitted in the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement or whether it is the humanitarian aid which Israel is required to allow into the Gaza Strip.

This is a condition that is of utmost importance since such exposure will create a real and lasting change in the consciousness of large publics towards Israel’s plight.

As someone who has been involved, for many years, in “hasbara,” or public diplomacy for the State of Israel, I am calling for the first time for a significant and massive fundraising campaign for the purpose of creating a global information campaign intended for the young generation worldwide, and specifically the young generation of Arabs and Muslims. This is a strategic investment which shall have an impact on Israel’s resilience.

Such a campaign must include the best technology that will overcome the numerical weakness that is Israel’s lot. Israel simply does not have the privilege of ignoring or turning a blind eye to the insane incitement against Israelis and the Jewish people, which is the foundation of much of the messaging which is being fed to many in the Arab and Muslim publics by some of their governments.

We must not turn a blind eye to the terrible educational programs that perpetuate the hatred towards us in the Gaza Strip, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jordan, not to mention in other Arab countries. Though, these places have already begun to improve the messages sent out in exchange for incentives from the international arena, especially from the US.

This is a step that will also well serve the moderate Arab governments themselves, since incitement against Israel has always been a double-edged sword wielded by the regimes themselves. Standing by Israel and against terrorism and radical Islam is clearly in their best interest.

October 7 presented the State of Israel and the Jewish people with a difficult, painful, and shocking reality.

The events of that Black Shabbat shook us from our divisions and rifts that many in Israel had been busy with until that very moment. The events oblige us to reexamine old models, reconsider patterns of action that may have seemed impossible until now, to think entirely differently, openly, and creatively. Those who are ready to join this tremendous effort to carry out what I call a Revolution of Consciousness – this is the time to do so.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 15, 2024.

Over the past two months, the Houthis have disrupted navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, attacking Israeli-owned ships and other commercial vessels heading to Israel.

In response, on December 10 the United States announced the formation of an international naval coalition of 10 countries to counter the Houthis’ ongoing aggression and restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Unfortunately, the announcement not only failed to deter the Yemeni armed group but was met with a daring ultimatum: If action was taken against them, the Houthis would go as far as to attack American warships in retaliation.

Tensions escalated quickly and Iran, which has so far assisted the planning and directing of the Houthis’ attacks, primarily through its spy ship, is now deeply involved in the turmoil. On December 23, Iran launched a suicide drone at a vessel affiliated with Israel in the Indian Ocean. Tehran has even threatened to block additional sea routes, including the Mediterranean.

These worrying developments call for a decisive Western response that would mark a shift from the overly cautious attitude currently held by Washington. Judging by various news reports, the recently formed naval coalition’s activities are limited to patrols across the Red Sea and intelligence gathering. Assignments of this kind indicate a defensive stance, contrary to the more assertive posture necessary to suppress the unbridled militia.

Along the same lines, it is difficult to justify the feckless US containment policy that persisted even in the face of yet another Red Sea incident carried out by the Houthis as recently as December 26. According to US Central Command, the 12 drones and five missiles aimed at Israel were intercepted by the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group with no reported injuries. Still, it remains a puzzle why President Joe Biden has not consequently ordered a harsh offensive.

While it appears that the Biden administration has been trying to avoid a direct confrontation for fear of sparking a greater conflict, failure to push back against the continuous Houthi provocations and increasing Iranian involvement signals that such acts of aggression can go unpunished. If Iran and the Houthis don’t pay a heavy price for their attempt to impose a naval blockade, not only will international trade be severely jeopardized, but so will the security of the entire region. Thus, to effectively deter both Iran and its Yemeni strategic partner, Washington must take more robust military action.

It is important to remember that Iran has been backing the Houthi rebels consistently for over a decade, exploiting the weakness of the Yemeni government and the country’s crisis. By arming and training the rebel group, Tehran aims to create a pro-Iranian stronghold in northern Yemen – the area controlled by the Houthis – that would dominate the strategically critical Bab Al-Mandab straits.

Indeed, the US has long targeted Iranian operatives responsible for coordinating and facilitating assistance to the Houthis, such as Abdul Reza Shahla’i, whose assassination attempt in 2020 failed. Another such senior operative named Abu Fathima was recently reported in a research by The Washington Institute to have attended strategic meetings organized by the rebels.

In accordance with these measures, the US must redesignate the Houthis as a terrorist organization – after their prior removal from the list by President Biden in a somewhat baffling move. The sanctioning of Iranian and Yemeni individuals involved in financial aid transfers to the Houthi insurgents would be another step in the right direction.

As for Israel, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has rightly stated that Israel would be closely observing the American response to the Houthi attacks. If the US-led naval coalition proves futile, Israel will have to act on its own using targeted attacks, economic sanctions, and cyber warfare.

Israel should also designate the rebel group as terrorists and enhance its intelligence efforts regarding the Yemeni arena.

Lastly, Jerusalem will have to exact a direct price from the Iranian regime. The December 26 attack further emphasized the urgent need to destroy ballistic missile and drone facilities on Iranian territory.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2024

We are pleased to announce the publication of our research fellow, Dr. Raphael BenLevi’s new book: Cultures of Counterproliferation: The Making of US and Israeli Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Program with academic press, Routledge.

About the book:

The United States and Israel have been the two states most active in opposing Iran’s nuclear ambitions; however, the respective strategies of each of these states have changed repeatedly. This book explores how competing cultural schools of thought on grand strategy within each state inform and shape the key policy decisions in their attempts to prevent a nuclear Iran. Drawing on numerous interviews conducted with former high-level officials in each country as well as published memoirs, this book first describes in detail the belief systems of the competing schools and then analyses the internal debates and key decisions on policy toward the Iranian Nuclear Program, while critically assessing the extent to which these beliefs influenced policy in the face of material-structural pressures. This in-depth analysis of the internal debates and dilemmas within the national leadership of the two states most prominent in the effort to prevent a nuclear Iran constitutes an indispensable guide for scholars and policymakers who will inevitably face similar dilemmas in dealing with this ongoing challenge and additional cases of nuclear proliferation around the world.

Endorsements:

Head of the Misgav Institute, Meir Ben-Shabbat: “Dr. BenLevi has provided a well-researched and in-depth analysis of the interests and considerations that informed the key debates within Israel and the United States regarding one of their greatest mutual national security threats. A must-read for policymakers and scholars alike!”

Prof. Emeritus at Georgetown University, Robert J. Lieber: “BenLevi’s book provides a valuable addition to the literature on decision-making, strategic culture, the impact of ideas on foreign policy, and to our understanding of divergent responses to the Iranian nuclear program. It is an important and original work, especially in explaining policy choices made by U.S. and Israeli leaders.”

Excerpt from final chapter:

“Current circumstances raise the question of whether a state that is determined to attain nuclear weapons can ever be stopped. Indeed, the case of North Korea is an example of a failure to prevent such an outcome. On the other hand, the case of Iraq, Syria and Libya provide examples of successful counterproliferation, by military strikes in the first two, and by the implicit threat of military intervention in the third. This suggests that the only policy that can prevent a determined proliferator from going nuclear is a willingness to use force. However, a coercive sanctions regime, coupled with a credible threat of force and a clear red line can have the effect of weakening a proliferator’s determination and willingness to attempt to cross the threshold. This is in fact the difference between North Korea and Iran. For North Korea, for the reasons outlined above, neither the United States nor South Korea was willing to issue a credible threat of a counterproliferation strike and North Korea understood this. For Iran, on the other hand, it faced such a threat first in the 2000s from the United States, after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the 2010s from Israel. I would argue that the reason Iran has not yet crossed the threshold despite decades of developing its enrichment capabilities is because of Israel’s covert delay actions, the unprecedent macro-economic sanctions regime its, most importantly, its continued credible threat of military action.”

Link to book page at Routledge website.

Since the dawn of the Oslo peace process, Israel has insisted on Palestinian demilitarization. This meant that any degree of Palestinian independence from Israel in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza was predicated upon the prevention of symmetrical and asymmetrical military threats against Israel – including conventional warfare, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare – from and via the territory of an autonomous Palestinian Authority or a prospective Palestinian state.

It was explicit in every Israeli-Palestinian deal signed since 1993 that the Israeli public would not countenance living alongside a Palestinian entity that houses a terrorist infrastructure or active, hostile military forces. The definite Israeli assumption was that the IDF could deny or block the massive military armament of a Palestinian government. The unequivocal Israeli expectation was that massive military armament would not be sought by a peaceful Palestinian government.

Alas, three decades of Palestinian terror and missile attacks from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the Hamas attack on southern Israel two months ago, and the gargantuan caches of weaponry since discovered in Gaza have blown these assumptions and expectations out of the water.

My conclusion is that demilitarization is a myth. In any territory evacuated by Israel, it is neither possible to enforce nor reasonable to expect that.

The attendant conclusion is clear too: only full Israeli military control of the territories adjacent to Israel has any chance of preventing enemy military buildup, and even then, it would remain an ongoing and difficult challenge.

THE IDF has confiscated more than 30,000 rifles, rockets, RPGs, IEDs, and attack drones from Hamas terrorists and hideouts in Gaza over the past two months and destroyed at least 250,000 other such items, along with hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition. It has also captured millions of shekels of cash used for weapons purchases and documents that expose tens of millions more expended on weapons purchases. This does not include the billions apparently spent on building and equipping Hamas’s terror attack tunnel network, an underground network that seems to be 500% more extensive than IDF intelligence knew or presumed to know before the war began.

According to an IDF Special Forces briefing this week, “the scope of the captured munitions is unprecedented. The volume of weaponry, especially anti-tank missiles, is on a scale reminiscent of and even beyond that of the warfare of global jihadist organizations in Syria and Iraq.”

A lot of this weaponry was smuggled into Gaza through tunnels beneath the Philadelphi corridor or through Egyptian-controlled border crossings in Rafah. Additional weaponry was manufactured in Gaza, using machinery and civilian supplies repurposed for weapon manufacture that were imported into Gaza with Israeli approval and even support.

(The same applies to the millions of tons of cement Israel allowed into Gaza for construction and rehabilitation after previous rounds of conflict, much of which was poured into the terror attack tunnels.)

And today, weapons can be produced with 3-D laser printers in any basement hideout; no large and identifiable manufacturing facility is necessary.

Again, all this means that the demilitarization of zones where Palestinians assume governance over themselves is a myth. It is neither possible to enforce from afar nor reasonable to expect it in any territory evacuated by Israel. Only the Israeli military can and will permanently demilitarize Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

And again, even then, demilitarization will remain a challenge. Consider Jenin, for example. The Palestinian Authority has long lost effective control of the Jenin refugee camp and similar terrorist headquarters in Samaria, forcing the IDF to operate deep inside these areas in full battle array with heavy equipment, almost like Gaza.

Hundreds of professional-grade weapons (not just homemade, ragtag weaponry) were discovered and confiscated this month in Jenin, including the beginnings of a West Bank missile manufacturing capability. Much of this was smuggled in via the porous Israeli border with Jordan. (No, the “moderate” Jordanians are not doing nearly enough to interdict such massive smuggling, and neither is the IDF.)

But the only reason that Katyushas and Kassams are not raining down every day from Kalkilya and Jenin on Gush Dan (Greater Tel Aviv) is that the IDF maintains overall security control of the West Bank envelope; direct military control over Areas B and C, which is 80% of the West Bank; and acts aggressively (“full freedom of operation,” in formal terms) to keep the terrorists off base in Area A, which is the remaining 20% where the PA was accorded “full security control” to supposedly prevent militarization and terror.

IT IS IMPORTANT to recognize that this grim situation is very far from the idealized, empty theoretical framework of demilitarization and peace imagined by the Oslo Accords. Was it obvious from the start and inevitable that the PA would become a failed state and serve as a base for terrorist infrastructure? I don’t know. But was the notion of full demilitarization of the territories by Palestinians a fallacy from the very beginning? Apparently so.

Remember that from day one, Yasser Arafat financed, directed, and equipped 16 competing Palestinian Authority militias, providing nearly 60,000 “security forces” with weapons – through local manufacturing and smuggling – that were prohibited in the Oslo agreements. He gave these forces all the trappings of an army (i.e., organizational structure, operational functions, unit names, ranks, etc.), expanding them well beyond what had been agreed upon. Since then, many Palestinian Authority military men and policemen have turned their guns against IDF troops and Israeli civilians, and some reports have them now organizing for Hamas-style raids into Israeli towns too.

According to an analysis written back in 2014 for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, an Israeli think tank, by Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash, former chief of IDF military intelligence, the Oslo Accords unambiguously stipulated that no Palestinian army or military capabilities that could constitute a threat would be established. Moreover, the “strong police force” allowed by Oslo was to “ensure demilitarization” by preventing terrorism, dismantling terrorist infrastructures and armed militias, preventing arms smuggling and terrorist infiltration, preventing armed or ideological interference in the proper workings of the Palestinian state by radical extremists and opponents of peace, preventing incitement to terrorism, and building a “culture of peace.”

This was to include neutralizing all channels of support for terrorist organizations (such as the transfer of funds to and activities conducted by extremist associations disguised as organizations established to help the needy) as well as eliminating school curricula as well as sermons in mosques and other religious and cultural institutions that encourage violence, martyrdom, and suicide.

Alas, almost none of this has happened. Arafat and his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, never ripened into partners for peace. Abbas has not uttered one dash of distaste, never mind a clear condemnation, of the October 7 Hamas attack, and he continues to “pay for slay” (to pay rewards to the families of terrorists).

So, the suggestions to give the Palestinian Authority more authority to expand territory in the West Bank or to bring it back as ruler of Gaza are both outrageous and dangerous. Abbas and his Fatah party never have and never will ensure demilitarization of the territories, not to mention real peace with Israel. And the suggestions to pose a broader pan-Arab security force in Gaza to ensure the demilitarization of Gaza going forward are similarly unrealistic.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 29.12.2023 and Israel Hayom 01.01.2024.

On Simchat Torah October 7, the “Black Sabbath,” some 3,000 Palestinian terrorists broke through the Gaza border fence in 29 places, swarming into nearby Israeli communities to commit mass murder. The frontline Hamas fighters were heavily armed and penetrated as far as Ofakim. The military and civilian Israeli defenders on hand, sparse and skeletal as they were, fought desperately and heroically until reinforcements arrived, in most cases much too late.

There are hundreds of Israel cities, towns, villages, and neighborhoods along Israel’s northern, eastern, and southern borders, straddling the Green Line in the center of the country, in Judea and Samaria, and in the Jerusalem environs that are similarly threatened. Exposed, insufficiently defended, and unprepared.

Therefore, the training and equipping of civilian rapid-response security squads on a massive scale everywhere in this country is more necessary and urgent than ever. This requires both government investment and volunteer civilian mobilization.

The threat is real. Hamas only beat Hezbollah to the punch, with the latter known to have long planned a broadscale invasion of northern Israel. The Jordanian army has been practicing offensive maneuvers right-up on the Jordan River border for months. Israeli Arabs previously have rioted and blocked major arteries in the Negev and Galilee – locking-down Israeli-Jewish townships.

Most stark of all is the threat of Palestinian swarm attacks on settlement communities in Judea and Samaria and on cities straddling the Green Line in the center of the country like those in the Emek Hefer region. This is not an imaginary scenario. It is a clear and present danger.

Just this week, the IDF conducted a drill simulating an October 7-style attack in Judea and Samaria. The drill was dictated by the escalation of Palestinian terrorist attacks over the past two months.

In the nine weeks since Hamas launched its cross-border attack from the Gaza Strip, there have been 1,388 Palestinian terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria, including 569 stoning assaults, 287 attacks with explosives, 143 fire-bombings, and 70 drive-by shooting attacks. Three Israelis (a civilian, a soldier, and a Border Police officer) have been murdered in Judea and Samaria since October 7 and at least 52 Israelis sustained injuries.

On Monday, 27-year-old Mevaseret Cohen was wounded when terrorists fired on the car in which she, her husband, and their six-week-old baby were traveling near the Jewish town of Ateret in Samaria. Her baby and husband were unharmed. The terrorist, who fired at least six bullets at the car, escaped, despite being fired back at by the bold husband/driver.

(But of course, the international media covers none of this. Like biased UN agencies and hostile so-called “human rights” NGOs, the media is instead obsessed with practically and comparatively non-existent “settler violence” against Palestinians.)

According to investigative journalist Nadav Shragai of Israel Hayom, the Palestinian Authority itself is preparing for battle against Israel, right under our noses. A scenario whereby Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) turn their guns against IDF troops and Israeli civilians is rapidly developing into actuality.

Dozens of terrorist attacks on IDF forces and the civilian population in Judea and Samaria have been propelled since the beginning of 2023 by Palestinian policemen, by members of the Preventive Security Forces, and members of other PA units.

A similar picture arises in relation to counter-terrorist activity too. Alongside the considerable number of successful targeting operations carried out by the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members over the course of the last year, dozens of Fatah “fighters” have also been killed. This has involved Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which since 2021 has taken up arms once again, and prior to the October 7 massacre in the Gaza envelope communities made an express appeal for mass killing of Israeli Jews.

Shragai points out that since the outbreak of the current war some 2,200 Palestinians have been arrested in Judea and Samaria, with 1,100 of them being Hamas-affiliated activists or terrorists. No information is available regarding the organizational affiliation of the other 50 percent.

One must dive deep into reports on the Palestinian side to understand that alongside members of the PIJ and “unidentified individuals,” many of them belong to organizations affiliated with Fatah, the beating heart of the PA, or its security forces.

Israel blurs or covers-up this information because it seeks to preserve what minimally remains of security cooperation with the PASF and to discourage attacks by additional members of the PASF.

But as Palestinian Media Watch has showed, the PA itself makes no attempt to conceal the escalated involvement of its institutional “martyrs” in attacks on Israelis. In fact, it is rewarding them with “pay for slay” stipends and formal PA military funerals. Declarations in support of the October 7 massacre and the express desire for a similar slaughter assault in Judea and Samaria have become standard discourse in the PA-controlled media over the last two months, with top PA officials joining the melee. Palestinian social media are inundated with AI-generated videos of terrorist swarm attacks into Samarian settlements, mimicking the Gaza envelope attacks.

And one cannot just ignore the unmistakable offensive military exercises conducted in recent weeks by PASF battalions, which now number 45,000 men: exercises to conquer installations and infiltrate settlements, commando incursions into urban territory, etc. This is a far cry from the “strong police force” imagined by the Oslo Accords tasked with merely guaranteeing “public order and internal security.”

A not-yet-published analysis by Professors Kobi Michael and Gabi Siboni of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy assesses that Israeli cities and settlements need professionally trained and well-equipped rapid response platoons with the ability to fend-off invaders for up to six hours (before arrival of military troops and helicopter gunships). They attempt an initial mapping and categorization of Israeli cities by level of immediate threat and make a rough estimation of the concomitant force structure required.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, a former deputy IDF chief-of-staff and OC Central Command, similarly has written about the need to develop “active defensive capabilities” for settlements and even for “pre-1967” Israeli cities like Kfar Saba and Rosh HaAyin to initially defend themselves, with serious training and tight incorporation into IDF defense planning.

Again, this will require significant government investment. But also volunteer civilian mobilization. Where will all the volunteers come from? Well, part of the answer ought to be, needs to be, hopefully can be – from the haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) community, which until now has refused any national security service.

But as Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer of The Tikvah Fund haredi division and haredi journalist Yakov Plevinsky have shown, there is an awakening at least on the fringes of haredi society regarding the obligation to contribute to the national security burden, regarding the need to protect their own communities and those beyond haredi community walls too.

Quietly there are many initiatives underway to incorporate haredi men in a range of defense and relief capacities, ranging from rapid-response squads to fire and rescue services, and from the Homefront Command to medical first-responders like Zaka, Hatzala, and Mada – where some haredi men already are involved.

The challenge is to make such service mainstream and “honorable” in haredi society. Plevinsky and others argue that the way to do so is by soft peddling the demand for formal enlistment and “uniforming” of haredi men, instead settling for their volunteer absorption, by osmosis and out of uniform, in the “soft” security frameworks described above.

(Nobody argues that this is fair or equitable in comparison to the national security service burden on non-haredi Israeli society, only that it now might be realistic.)

Success in this endeavor, supremely important in my eyes, requires wise and far-sighted leadership from both government and haredi community leaders alike.

In any case, the necessity of forming hefty rapid-response squads in all parts of the country should be clear, long before Israel’s other enemies seek to copycat Hamas attacks.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 22.12.2023 and Israel Hayom 24.12.2023

Since the outbreak of “Swords of Iron,” top officials in Teheran, most notably Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have denied Iran’s involvement in planning the October 7 massacre as well as Houthi aggressions in the Red Sea. These proclamations are meant to distance Iran from the attacks made by its strategic partners. At the same time, they reveal Iran’s fear of open, full-scale war and Tehran’s preference to keep its regional meddling and muckraking behind the scenes.

This Iranian fear, and preference for proxy war only, stem from a combination of considerations relating to Tehran’s domestic and international standing.

First, as a matter of principal, Iran’s tends to avoid direct engagement in regional or global conflicts. Iran instead flexes its power by supporting a wide range of proxy forces that launch terror attacks against its enemies, mainly the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has conducted numerous extraterritorial operations without having to mobilize its own troops. Instead, it employs terror clients in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. This strategy has driven Iran to several strategic achievements such as US withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s and the retribution exacted on Saudi Arabia in 2019 for its prime role in promoting the American oil sanctions imposed on Iran (following President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal).

Second, deeply ingrained in the Iranian consciousness is the Iran-Iraq War. This war is viewed by leadership as a momentous event that demonstrated significant national sacrifice. The war cost Iran heavily in casualties (at least 220,000 dead) and trillions of dollars worth of damage to critical infrastructure. Considering this high toll on human life and strategically vital assets, Iran has since refrained from engaging in additional frontal wars. Its leaders repeatedly boast that, despite the various upheavals afflicting the region, the country has remained an “island of stability.”

Third, the Iranian regime has been dealing with a prolonged crisis of legitimacy, as evidenced by the historic low voter turnout in the 2020 parliamentary elections (42%) and by the Amini protests (September 2022-March 2023). With declining levels of public support, the Iranian regime cannot afford to embark on a military adventure which would risk its very survival.

Fourth, Iran is restricted by its military and technological capabilities, which undeniably are inferior to those of its American rival. This is most probably why Tehran had settled for a limited offensive against Washington in retaliation for the January 2020 assassination of former Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani.

This stance was expressed by the IRGC’s aerospace commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, one of the most hawkish figures in the Iranian security apparatus, who admitted that Tehran didn’t want to engage in a direct war with the US. Another testimony reflecting this sentiment can be found in the words of Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, Ayatollah Khamenei’s advisor and son-in-law. In a recent interview, Adel explained that Iran’s initiating a military offense against Israel would serve an Israeli plot to cause a clash between Iran and the US.

The combination of these factors help explain Iran’s decision not to directly enter a full-scale war fray. After all, Iran’s proxy warfare strategy has proved effective enough. In the Iraq War (2003-2011), Iran fought against American and British forces indirectly through the Shi’ite terrorist apparatus it had nurtured (Jaysh al-Mahdi, Liwa’ al-Yawm al-Maw’oud, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq), alongside Sunni Islamist groups (Al-Qaeda Iraq and Ansar al-Islam) that received its backing. This also was the case during the Second Lebanon War, in which Iran played an important role in supporting Hezbollah’s warfare against Israel.

Iran also credits itself with the achievements obtained by the resistance terror organizations in their rounds of fighting against Israel. In February 2012, Khamenei proudly stated that Iran “was involved in the resistance campaign against Israel, and the result was manifested in the victory (Hezbollah’s) in the 33-Day War (the 2006 war), as well as in the (Hamas’) victory in the 22-Day War (Operation Cast Lead, December 2008-January 2009). Ever since, we have stood behind every nation and every organization fighting against the Zionist regime, everywhere, and we have no fear of saying so. That is the simple truth.”

Khamenei is known for his ideological teachings calling for the destruction of Israel by force. However, in stark contrast to this position, he recently stated that Iran does not wish to “throw either the Jews or the Zionists into the sea,” blatantly lying about such past statements. (For example, in February 2020 IRGC Commander Salami urged Israelis to “take a good look at the Mediterranean, because that will be your [their] final dwelling.”)

During “Swords of Iron,” Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials have denied any role in the attacks against Israel in Gaza or from Yemen. It also denies responsibility for Iraqi Shi’ite militia attacks on American targets in Iraq and Syria.

In any case, it is plainly obvious that Tehran supports the elimination of Israel trough proxy warfare. The massacres perpetrated by Hamas on October 7 are a direct result of Iran’s significant, decade-long support of the terror organization. Hamas’ murderous ideology is also compatible with Khamenei’s antisemitic teachings and anti-Jewish hatred, which seems to have permeated all branches of the Iranian regime. Religious rulings issued by Khomeini and Khamenei permit the killing, including by suicide attacks, of all Jewish citizens of Israel on the pretext that they are the “Occupiers of Palestine.”

Not only does Iran not hide its desire to destroy Israel, but it also says so openly on every possible platform. On Khamenei’s order, Iranian athletes boycott Israel at international competitions, making sure not to grant Israel even a shred of legitimacy.

Despite violating the UN treaty that prohibits any state from actively seeking the destruction of another, Iran has paid no price for expressing such views. On the contrary, it continues to be courted by European nations which, in their attempt to appease Iran, are disturbingly indifferent to the threat posed to their national security by the Iranian subversion efforts across the continent.

Perhaps even more puzzling is the fact that while Tehran strengthens ties with Russia and China, the US persists in its efforts to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, never once entertaining the military option as a practical course of action.

Against this background, it appears that Khamenei is under no pressure to cease his anti-Israel activity. At the same time, he continues, at least formally, to distance Iran from the comprehensive terror campaign aimed at Jerusalem from various staging grounds. He is well aware of the dangers to Teheran’s nuclear program and to regime stability were Iran to enter full-scale warfare.

In this regard, the announced Iranian campaign to recruit volunteers for the battlefield in Gaza is not genuine. Although Teheran boasts that the effort has reached 10 million people, among them 142 members of the Parliament, this is only a symbolic effort.

Israel ought to leverage this situation for its own advantage. Israel has space to hit the IRGC Qods Force in Iran and across the region without undue risk of escalation. Again, Iran will shy away from full-scale regional war.