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Policy Papers

How to Improve Israel’s Public Diplomacy

Lahav Harkov 19.06.2024

Lahav Harkov

Public diplomacy is an essential element in Israel’s war effort, but is important to Israel’s international standing at all times.
Israel’s Public Diplomacy Directorate was unprepared for a crisis and improvised solutions, which have been insufficient. The IDF’s Spokesperson Unit was better prepared.
A larger Public Diplomacy Directorate with full-time professional staff that goes beyond on-camera spokespeople and includes researchers, public relations professionals, graphic artists, representatives of intelligence bodies and more is necessary.
The various government offices handling public diplomacy, as well as the IDF Spokesman’s Unit should improve their cooperation and coordination.

Introduction:

Public diplomacy has long been a problematic area for Israel. The Hebrew word for “public diplomacy,” hasbara, is a hint at Israel’s longstanding challenges in this area. “Hasbara” means “explanation” – but explaining what happened after the fact is far from sufficient to meet Israel’s international challenges.

Effective public diplomacy is essential for Israel at all times, but that need is even more acute in wartime, when distorted images and interpretations of the Jewish state’s actions can limit its ability to defend itself and attain its war aims. While “good PR” is not a magic wand that will solve all of Israel’s problems – especially when there is a sizable global audience predisposed against the Jewish state for a variety of reasons – it can only help, and “bad PR” is an unforced error that continues to damage Israel’s international standing and war effort.

Israel’s government needs a fully staffed team of professionals in communications, marketing, intelligence and other relevant areas to bring positive results that will support Israel’s war effort and boost its standing in calmer times.

The Misgav Institute hosted a webinar with three experts who played a role in Israel’s public diplomacy in the war with Hamas that began on October 7: former government spokesman Eylon Levy, Lt. Col. (Res.) Jonathan Conricus and Matt Krieger, CEO of strategic communications firm Gova10 and the chief communications officer of the campaign advocating for Israeli-American hostage Hersh Goldberg-Polin’s release from Hamas captivity. This paper is based on the insights reached in that webinar.

The Problems

Civilian public diplomacy efforts:

When Operation Swords of Iron began, Israel’s National Public Diplomacy Directorate, a unit within the Prime Minister’s Office, had a new head and a small staff. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not have a spokesperson for the foreign press. The system that eventually came about, of daily online briefings in English and a system of coordinating television and radio interviews for official government spokespeople, was improvised after October 7. Publisher Rotem Sella, of his own initiative, sought out media contacts (including the author of this paper, who was unable to participate) to try to share details of the October 7 massacre with the world. Levy was one of the first people he called, as well as journalist Tal Heinrich. Within weeks, their volunteer operation was absorbed by the Public Diplomacy Directorate, with some of the staff paid by a contractor to avoid byzantine government hiring practices, but many remaining volunteers.

This system has mostly remained, with a rotating team of spokespeople for daily briefings and TV and radio interviews, but little other staff to research and prepare the spokespeople. Nor did the Public Diplomacy Directorate hold regular briefings in any languages other than English and, for a time, Arabic.

The limitations of the current system are such that the address for handling print and online written media inquiries and requests remains unclear, and the spokespeople in the briefings are given broad talking points, instead of detailed information to answer journalists’ questions. They are also unable to take initiative and pitch the stories that Israel may want to be widely known, both due to time constraints and their narrow remit.

The National Public Diplomacy Directorate has tried to work on Israel’s online presence, and reports launching over 200 advertising campaigns, using physical billboards as well as digital platforms, producing videos and still content emphasizing Israel’s messages. They launched a website titled the “October 7 Hamas Massacre.” They also invited influential figures to their command center. The directorate reports over 2 billion hits for its campaigns, and 43 million for the Hamas massacre website in its first three days.

IDF public diplomacy efforts:

The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit dominates Israel’s international public image. The unit is a veritable empire compared to the Public Diplomacy Directorate, but when men in uniform are conveying Israel’s messages, “it begins to look a little bit like martial law,” as Levy put it in the webinar. And while this has not always been the case, the prominent representatives of the IDF in the media in this war have not represented Israel’s diverse population.

The unit has, to a great extent, resolved some of its past problems in international communications, such as its longtime penchant for prioritizing access for Hebrew-language media outlets even in times of international crisis. In the current war, IDF Spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari has put international media at the center of his strategy, viewing global communications as a tool through which to enable the IDF to operate. Hagari also has sufficiently proficient English to address foreign outlets himself, which he has done in briefings, press conferences, and appearances in foreign news segments.

However, like Israeli government communications, much of this came together in wartime rather than be part of an overarching strategy. Many of the prominent figures in the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit in recent months were reservists who left jobs and families to spend their time helping the army, which in most cases was not sustainable long-term, though some have been hired by the IDF.

There is also a lack of effective coordination between the IDF and the Public Diplomacy Directorate; Levy said he would look to Conricus’s social media accounts for information – as opposed to communication being shared between the offices in which they served in a timely manner. This is true for the Foreign Ministry and Diaspora Affairs Ministry, which engage in related activities, as well.

Recommendations

Israel needs a formal, professional, civilian body responsible for public diplomacy, with a budget and full-time paid personnel enabling it to operate more fully at all times, not only in wartime. Having consistent names and faces that journalists and the public know will allow for more effective communication when a crisis breaks out. That full-time public diplomacy team would prepare a crisis communications plan, to be put in place during wartime.

That plan could include “enlisting” additional spokespeople temporarily, but capable people able to represent the government on camera in key languages – not only English – should be employed full-time. Foreign Ministry employees, many of whom have useful experience in this area, can be loaned out to the Public Diplomacy Directorate for this purpose, in a similar way to how some are loaned out as diplomatic advisers to government ministries and the Knesset speaker.

Visual communications are often as important as what is said by the spokespeople. Therefore, while their abilities are the highest priority, the team of spokespeople should have an appropriate gender balance and reflect Israel’s diverse society.

Permanent spokespeople are not the only employees that a more robust public diplomacy system needs. The IDF Spokesman’s Unit should have an intelligence officer permanently on its staff to examine open-source intelligence for Israel’s advantage, as well as to rapidly respond to accusations of wrongdoing. Public relations experts who would not necessarily be on camera are important as well, to field reporters’ questions and work with non-broadcast media. Graphic and video artists are needed, as well as fact-checkers and researchers to support those who are speaking to the press and the public.

A larger staff for the PMO Public Diplomacy Directorate would also allow for the cultivation of relationships with journalists, facilitating deeper and more frequent background briefings and the pitching of stories that show Israel in a more favorable light.

More foreign media should be allowed to embed with IDF troops in Gaza. When foreign media are allowed to directly accompany the IDF, this often leads to more accurate and nuanced portrayals of IDF operations.

The Public Diplomacy Directorate is meant to coordinate between different bodies communicating the government’s messages at home and abroad – it must make a greater effort in that respect, especially by integrating the IDF into the broader structure, without putting obstacles in front of its efforts that are working well. Cooperation between the Public Diplomacy Directorate, the Foreign Ministry and the Diaspora Affairs Ministry should be deepened as well, to ensure that a consistent message is being sent and that all of Israel’s public diplomacy assets worldwide are being used effectively.

19.06.2024 0 comment

Policy Papers

Strategies for Combatting Antisemitism

Lahav Harkov 05.02.2024

Lahav Harkov

Key points:

The IHRA definition, including its examples, is one of the most useful tools in combatting antisemitism and its wide adoption should be encouraged.
Organizations should consider using legal means to ensure Jews do not face discrimination, while being sensitive to freedom of expression.
Hateful rhetoric against Jews and Israel online is strongly correlated with real-world antisemitic incidents. Social media companies should be encouraged to train moderators to recognize antisemitism and to be transparent about how they implement policies against hate.
A full-time, ambassador-level special envoy would help Israel be more effective in the global war on antisemitism.

Introduction:

Antisemitism has been on the rise in the West for the past decade, and the number of incidents as well as expressions of Jew-hatred on social media have exploded since October 7, 2023. There are several strategies that governments and organizations advocating for Israel can adopt, that are backed up by data or past successes. These include adopting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism, using legal avenues against institutions that discriminate against Jews and pushing social media outlets to effectively implement policies against hate. It would also be beneficial for Israel to have a full-time envoy dedicated to these efforts. Finally, the UK Jewish community’s battle against antisemitic Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn can serve as a useful example for how a community can effectively combat antisemitism.

IHRA:

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism is one of the most useful tools in fighting antisemitism – something that the Foreign Ministry already recognizes. It is impossible to fight something that cannot be defined.

It is important to encourage institutions of all kinds, from governments to universities to NGOs and even to corporations, to adopt the definition and use its parameters in their efforts to combat antisemitic hate crimes and discrimination. It is worth noting that the idea is not necessarily for new laws against hate crimes, hate speech or discrimination to be passed, but for the authorities to actively refer to IHRA when determining whether those crimes are antisemitic or not.

Alternative definitions of antisemitism have been promoted to weaken the understanding of the ties between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. It should be noted that the IHRA definition has been called the “gold standard,” adopted by 45 governments and over 1200 entities around the world. Georgia adopted the IHRA definition in January 2024, making it the 35th US state to do so.

The IHRA working definition is: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

The examples that come with the definition are part and parcel of the definition, in that they demonstrate its real-life application, including the fact that anti-Israel actions and speech are usually thinly-veiled versions of antisemitism. Institutions adopting IHRA should be encouraged to consider the examples, as well, because without the examples, the definition is not particularly substantive or useful. Therefore, all entities need to understand that adopting the definition means adopting the examples.

Legal:

Most democratic countries have laws against antisemitism in various forms, even if they have robust protections for freedom of expression as the US does. While hate speech is protected by the US Constitution and some antisemitic speech may be protected in other democratic countries, if these incidents take place on a college campus or in the workplace, are pervasive or are part of a pattern of discrimination, or if an institution does not take reasonable measures to prevent or stop them, there could be a basis for legal action.

Two of the leading organizations on this front are the Louis D. Brandeis Center in the US, and UK Lawyers for Israel. The US Department of Education has opened numerous investigations into universities following complaints by the Brandeis Center of discrimination against and harassment of Jews in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The Brandeis Center has also fought campus antisemitism in court. UK Lawyers for Israel has prompted investigations of university administrators and arrests of figures for illegal displays of support for terrorist groups.

Free speech and academic freedom are sensitive issues when it comes to combatting antisemitism. The Brandeis Center, which focuses primarily on campus antisemitism, has useful resources to help understand how to balance these values, including effective anti-discrimination policies and communications against antisemitism by administrators of prominent universities across North America.

Social media:

Antisemitism has been a constant on social media from its inception, allowing those who espouse views that were widely rejected in the West, certainly in the US, to find and amplify one another. Boundless Israel, an organization that uses data to develop better approaches to fighting antisemitism, has done extensive research on social media, specifically. They found a correlation between the proliferation of terms like “apartheid” and “colonialism” about Israel on social media and a rise in real-world incidents of antisemitism.

One of Boundless’s most important findings has been that “pro-Israel messaging is stuck in an echo chamber.” In other words, when messages are posted on social media meant to counter antisemitism, they are not reaching the audience that needs to hear it. Even the best messages will not break through the walls of vitriol on X, TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, etc. against Jews and Israel. Positive messaging should continue, but its impact should not be overestimated.

The research points to a number of actions the Government of Israel can take. The first is to raise awareness of harm to minorities and other vulnerable groups in messages to educators, policymakers, law enforcement, and the business/tech community, and to emphasize that this includes Jews, who, contrary to what some in the West think, are not part of the white majority. Among the points to emphasize in these conversations is how online hate turns into crimes against marginalized communities. In addition, note that the targeting of these communities undermines American\Western\etc. values.

Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are often less aware of antisemitism coming from the Left. In communications between Israelis and their foreign counterparts in such agencies about antisemitism, it is important to note that it is often cloaked in language related to human rights, social justice, or other seemingly legitimate political discourse, and encourage training in this area.

Advocacy that is aimed at encouraging social media companies to combat Jew-hatred on their platforms has been helpful, and the government should continue in its efforts, much of which have been conducted by the Justice Ministry domestically, and can also take place via Israeli missions abroad. That being said, it must be understood that this strategy has its limits because social media companies’ engagement-based business models encourage posts that spark a heightened emotional response – including anger and fear. In addition, TikTok is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party which, despite its strict crackdown on communications, has allowed antisemitism to take root in China and to fester on the video-sharing platform.

The Interparliamentary Task Force to Combat Online Antisemitism, which includes lawmakers from Israel, the US, Canada, the UK and more, has suggested the following proposals for social media giants’ policies, which Israeli representatives can suggest: Tech platforms should have a specific and consistent policy for removing antisemitic content and users, and they should be transparent about how they implement them, including downranking of posts; antisemitism should be a specific category in social media companies’ transparency reports, including reporting the volume of antisemitic content; the companies should facilitate training for platform moderators to identify antisemitism.

CyberWell, an NGO dedicating to fighting online antisemitism recommends legislation requiring platforms to disclose antisemitic content to regulators and make it available to researchers and NGOs, to disclose the rate of engagement with reported hateful content that is not removed, to allow external audits to ensure that the social media sites do not gain ad revenue from hateful content, and to address antisemitism in non-English languages, with an emphasis on Arabic.

Boundless recommends that businesses be discouraged from advertising on platforms that do not take action to remove hate, to incentivize the companies to enforce their own policies on antisemitic and other hateful content. This has had some success in the past.

DEI:

The proliferation of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion departments and the popularity of the ideology behind it on college campuses, in corporations, and beyond have been behind many of the recent manifestations of antisemitism that view Jews as an oppressor class and Israel as a colonial entity. Legacy Jewish organizations have tried to work with DEI over the years with little success. In recent years, and especially since October 7, there is increased awareness of the antisemitism embedded in DEI. While it is too early to say what has been effective in combatting DEI, legal action against discriminatory policies by campuses or actions – say, by US college professors who bully Israelis in their classes – could be possible. In addition, donors have begun pulling funds from universities that have not fought antisemitism on their campuses. That could backfire if the contributions are replaced by anti-Israel funders like Qatar, but exposing foreign actors pouring funds into American and other Western campuses with ulterior motives could serve as an important counterbalance.

Countering DEI has also become a major conservative cause in the US, specifically, as well as in other Western countries, though to a lesser extent. It is important to take care to keep antisemitism nonpartisan, in the sense that there are antisemites on the Right and on the Left, with different messages gaining prominence at different times and sometimes working in tandem. The message should be that decent people of all political stripes should join together to fight antisemitism, and not that antisemitism is part of, for example, the Republican fight against “wokeness.”

Special envoy:

Israel’s approach to antisemitism is somewhat muddled by the fact that there are units in multiple government ministries meant to address the problem. Ideally, the Foreign Ministry could work together with the Diaspora Affairs Ministry to coordinate messaging and pool resources to face this global challenge.

The appropriate conduit through which the Foreign Ministry should implement the government policy recommendations is the special envoy for combating antisemitism, though the Foreign Minister himself could and should put his weight behind the envoy’s efforts.

The position of special envoy should be upgraded, allowing the Foreign Ministry to have someone focused on combatting antisemitism full time, as well as staff to support her. Israel should not lag behind other countries in the seriousness with which it takes this position. The position should hold the rank and status of an ambassador, and be given to someone with a relevant background, such as experience in international law or academia, or to a diplomat who rose through the ranks of the Foreign Ministry and worked on related issues.

This is not a position for a celebrity envoy, as it is not so much about media appearances as it is about making the case for adopting policies against antisemitism to government entities, corporations, and other bodies.

The Corbyn case:

Perhaps one of the greatest successes of a Diaspora community in fighting a clear and present antisemitic danger was the British Jewish community vs. former UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn.

Corbyn, who came from the party’s far-left flank, rode a change in the party’s by-laws to its leadership, campaigning as a populist and socialist leader. But he also was someone who laid a wreath on the graves of the terrorists who murdered Israeli athletes in Munich and made antisemitic comments while making sure to say “Zionists” or “Israel” instead of Jews, and publicly supported antisemites.

The UK Jewish community was united to an extent rarely seen in its opposition to Corbyn. From Jewish lawmakers in the Labour Party to community organizations to prominent media figures, diverse actors came together on a mission to expose and highlight Corbyn’s antisemitism. The politicians resigned, people wrote in the newspapers and spoke on TV programs, and official complaints were filed within the party and submitted to government human rights watchdogs. Some of the aforementioned strategies were used, including legal means, and efforts to push for the inclusion of the IHRA definition’s examples in Labour’s guidelines on antisemitism. The community seemed to throw everything it had at Corbyn, trying all avenues.

The message became clear to the non-Jewish majority in the UK, with celebrities campaigning against Corbyn. Though antisemitism is not the only reason, Labour had a poor showing in the 2019 election and Corbyn did not become prime minister.

Two key lessons can be drawn from the Labour antisemitism scandal and the campaign against Corbyn. The first is that Diaspora Jewish communities are more effective at fighting antisemitism when they unite their top organizations, famous figures and others behind one cause. The second is that there may not be one specific strategy to fight antisemitic phenomena or figures. Rather, the approach of trying every angle and chipping away at the antisemitic challenge or threat may ultimately be most effective.

05.02.2024 0 comment

Internal Security After the Gaza War

Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni & Prof. Kobi Michael 02.01.2024

Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni & Prof. Kobi Michael

Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni and Prof. Kobi Michael are leading development of a national strategy for internal security, and the “Israel 2.0” research project, both at the Misgav Institute.

Following the events of October 7, a comprehensive overhaul and rethinking are required regarding the defense of Israeli settlements, towns, and cities. Internal security arrays cannot be disconnected from other national defense systems.
Analyzing the needs and practically addressing Israel’s internal security requirements requires categorizing the country’s settled areas based on a distinction between rural towns, outlying settlements, and large cities and the center of the country or metropolitan areas. Based on such categorization (as outlined in this paper) the principles for ensuring the security of settlements can be derived.
The following security threats must be addressed: Attack by hostile entities (Israeli citizens and enemies) on cities including mixed towns, ambushes along traffic routes, as well as the blocking of traffic routes.
In-depth consideration must be undertaken of the option of entrusting a National Guard with the overarching responsibility for settlement security arrays.
Emergency or rapid-response squads in rural areas and along the borders (the external buffer zone) must prepare to be able to independently defend all civilian areas for up to six hours. The IDF, the police and rescue entities in these regions must be ready to intervene and provide defense within a time range not exceeding six hours. This means appropriate training, qualification, and equipment of rapid response squads, and command-and-control systems for coordination.

Introduction

The events of October 7, 2023 must lead to rethinking in many areas of security, including internal security as an integral part of national security. The incursion by Hamas terrorists into Gaza Envelope settlements and into IDF camps in that region not only caught IDF forces off-guard, but also demonstrated the extent of the collapse of the settlements’ regional defense concept. This was the result of a prolonged process in which the strength of rapid-response squads was sapped. In many places, local emergency teams had been stripped of their weapons or been forced to deposit weapons in inaccessible bunkers, preventing their real-time use in defense against attack.

The sequence of events which began on October 7 requires swift action to enhance settlement security both in frontier areas and in the center of the country. There is a real danger of broader conflict led by Hezbollah, Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, and – in the event of a serious deterioration in the security situation – also potentially violence on the part of Israeli Arabs in the center of the country.

The Significance of October 7 for Internal Security

Despite feats of heroism by rapid-response squads in the towns and farms of the Gaza Envelope, and even some local successes in stopping the tides of assault – in most places the emergency squads were unable to provide an adequate response to the threat. Though they clearly could not entirely thwart the massive assault, obviously more could have done given appropriate preparations.

The events revealed a systemic failure concerning the coordination and cooperation arrays between the military and police and the settlements. In most Gaza Envelope settlements, defense was haphazard at best. It was only the initiative and bravery displayed by combat soldiers of the IDF, the police and the Border Police who arrived in the area independently (rather than as properly organized and outfitted units) that partially saved lives.

A comprehensive overhaul and rethinking are required regarding the formation of settlements’ defensive arrays and of appropriate defensive arrays in cities. Such arrays cannot conduct themselves only independently and separately from the other security systems: the military, the police, the rescue entities and soon the National Guard as well. At this time, a broad and comprehensive systemic and nationwide perspective is required to enable the conceptual foundation for creating the arrays, bolstering the coordination and collaboration between them, outfitting, training and professionally qualifying them on a regular basis and, primarily, institutionalizing their patterns of operation and action.

The Threat

In the context of the internal security concept in light of the war, the threat can be broken down into two components. The first concerns a (security) threat arising from action taken by hostile entities (though a clear distinction is required between hostile Israeli citizens and enemies of the state). The second is a (criminal) threat arising from the risk of weaponry falling into the hands of criminal and hostile entities, as well as misuse of such weaponry for purposes other than the one for which it was distributed.

A security assessment also must address the following possibilities: An attack by hostile entities (Israeli citizens and enemies) on settlements and populated areas, including mixed cities, ambushes along traffic routes, and the blocking of such traffic routes. This does not necessarily refer only to primary traffic routes but also to secondary routes and even to settlements’ access and escape routes, and to incidents of mass disorderly conduct which could evolve into such an attack. The attacks may be limited to a single settlement or to a region where hostile activity is taking place in several settlements and along several routes.

Categorizing Israeli Cities and Settlements

To analyze and practically address the issue, Israeli cities/towns must be categorized based on a distinction between rural or outlying settlements and large cities and the center of the country or metropolitan areas. It is from this categorization that the principles for ensuring the security of the Settlement Project and of the rest of the country’s settlements must be derived. For this purpose, we have developed the following initial categorization:

Border-Adjacent Towns

The threat to this group comprises the following components:

An enemy incursion across the border in a scenario similar to that of October 7, with the key attribute being activity on an organized and planned “military” level including forces and assignments, taking place across the entire region and accompanied by a bombardment of mortar, rocket and missile fire.
The enemy is armed with standard means, including light and heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, explosives and incendiaries and multiple vehicles outfitted for combat and mobility.
This threat also includes the blocking both of primary and secondary traffic routes and junctions across the area, alongside a concurrent attack on IDF camps and outposts in the area.
All these can take place in conjunction with an aerial threat in the form of drones/UAVs.
This threat can occur without advance warning and with only a short time passing from the moment it breaks out until the enemy enters the settlements.

Second-Line Border Cities

Such settlements include, for example: Ashkelon, Ofakim and Netivot in the south, Kiryat Shmona in the north, etc.

A threat similar to the one posed to border-adjacent settlements, but with longer time and space constants.
Such settlements could also suffer from the development or outbreak of mass disorderly conduct, which, as stated above, could evolve into an assault.

Seam Line Towns

The threat to this group comprises the following components:

An attack by organized, partially organized, or sporadic and disorganized groups on settlements. Such an attack will presumably not be accompanied by a massive bombardment (there may be local use of makeshift explosives). The attackers will presumably use standard, makeshift weaponry, as well as vehicles not outfitted for combat.
An attack waged by the Palestinian Authority’s armed forces. (We assess this to be a low likelihood, but in view of the escalating security situation in Judea and Samaria and the accelerating trend of the PA’s weakening, this threat should be given due consideration.)
Ambushes along traffic routes, as well as blocking them.
The attacks may be limited to a single settlement or to a region where hostile activity is taking place in several settlements and along several routes, as well as incidents of mass disorderly conduct which, as stated above, could evolve into an assault.

Judea and Samaria Settlements

Here there is a threat similar to the one posed to Seam Line settlements, but much more serious. The escalating security situation in Judea and Samaria and the ongoing weakening of the PA increases security risks. The settlements are at risk of terrorist attack, even an attack like October 7, with Palestinian security forces participating in attacks and inflamed mob breaching the fences, while the PA’s security apparatus being either unable or unwilling to prevent the mob from breaking into the settlements.

Other Cities

The threat to this group comprises the following components:

A large number of terrorist squads infiltrating Israel on foot (in conjunction with, or separately from, the motorized incursion).
Continuous massive and indiscriminate gunfire, including the use of grenades and other weapons, and including in conjunction with an aerial threat of drones/UAVs firing at the settlement’s residents on several sectors, while carrying out actions of murder, pillaging and burning.
Entering residents’ homes to murder and abduct residents and burn their houses down.
Firing at bus stops / public institutions or at crowds, cars, and public transportation.
Vehicular attacks – running over people standing at bus stops and hitchhiker stops, including open-air stops.
A ‘bargaining’ (hostage-taking) attack.

Further Steps

A series of questions must be considered including: What must be addressed; what were the key points of failure; what role does settlement play in, or how does it contribute to, domestic and general security; where does the line pass between the police and the military and the interactions between the emergency squads and the military and police; and why did emergency squads fail? Formulating organizing principles to address all this requires an in-depth understanding of the importance of settlement and the security rationale of buffer zones and borders.

From buffer zone inwards, settlements serve as a defensive belt for settlements located deeper in the heart of the country, hence the link to domestic security – a National Guard. From buffer zones outward, they defend Israel’s borders and sovereignty, hence the link to military security – regional defense and the IDF.

This dual security rationale requires rethinking and translation into developing a mechanism for achieving connection / synchronization / synergy and integration between defense and security organizations and between them settlement rapid-response squads.

Discussion of the principles for coordination and collaboration must begin from the core –settlement emergency squads. From there, we must proceed to the regional buffer zone, breaking it down to the military and the police and to the connection and synchronization between them and the rescue entities and the National Guard. Within this framework, we must formulate an organizational structure, principles for coordination and collaboration, as well as command and control. An in-depth review of these subjects will be presented in the comprehensive document.

We estimate that serious consideration should be given to the option of entrusting a National Guard with the overarching responsibility for the settlement security arrays. All this is contingent on the assumption that a National Guard indeed will be created and will act in a manner which grants it the abilities and powers to be entrusted with such responsibility and to implement it. This also hinges on the size of said National Guard. As we understand it, a standing force must be created, alongside a large scale of forces consisting of about 20 brigades, organized by region.

Recommendations

The events of October 7, which are yet to be investigated and studied, suggest three immediate and paramount takeaways:

Emergency squads in the rural sphere and along the borders (the external buffer zone) must be ready to capably and independently defend a settlement for up to six hours. This determination carries implications pertaining to the emergency squads’ size, training, the type of equipment they will possess, the rationales of action and the principles of command and control, as well as the coordination with the military, police and rescue entities.
In light of the above, the IDF, the police and the rescue entities in those regions must be ready to intervene and provide a defense and aid response within a time range not exceeding six hours. The immediate implication of this directive is in organizing, preparation, training and qualification, equipment, a command-and-control system and principles for coordination and cooperation between the entities. In this context, mention should be made of the place and role of a National Guard; a subject worthy of in-depth consideration. In this context, defense entities are required also to build up capability of opening traffic routes forcibly blocked by enemy forces.
A consideration of the response requires the categorization of the various settlements according to their character, location, and the threat level they face, with a mantle of relevant action capabilities and rationales being formulated and tailored for each cluster or category.

Conclusions

The failures of October 7 regarding security for towns along the border with the Gaza Strip and on Israel’s northern border, as well as in second-line cities such as Netivot and Ofakim, require a reconceptualization of the nature and purpose of the Israeli settlement project – in terms of national security and regarding the relationships between internal security and military and national security. This challenge calls for expansive and profound thought and work processes, which will include an in-depth discussion of the current security snapshot, analyzing the failures of October 7 and presenting rationales for potential responses and recommendations for operating principles and a relevant organizational structure.

In this brief document, we have sought to inspire that thought process and introduce to public discourse several substantial points as foundation for the broader, more comprehensive process necessary in repairing this critical area of national security.

02.01.2024 0 comment

Policy Papers

UNRWA has No Place in Gaza on the Day After Hamas

Dr. Adi Schwartz 05.12.2023

Dr. Adi Schwartz

Key Messages:

No other international organization in the past 75 years has enabled, supported, fostered and empowered the Palestinian rejectionist and anti-Israel ideology (the “from the River to the Sea” concept) as UNRWA has done.
Alternatives exist for providing humanitarian aid, welfare, health and education services to the Palestinians, other than through UNRWA.
The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip should not have been treated as refugees in the first place, and the provision of aid to the Strip’s residents should not have been tied to refugee status.The promises of a reform in UNRWA should not be relied upon; numerous such attempts have been made in the past – and all have failed.
Introduction
One of the Israeli hostages abducted to Gaza on October 7 revealed, on returning to Israel, that he had been held at the home of an UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) teacher[1]. In the past two weeks, IDF forces have presented evidence of weaponry and ammunition having been found under UNRWA crates[2]. However, the true problem with UNRWA is not one specific incident or another. The true problem with UNRWA is its very existence.
No other entity in the past 75 years has enabled, actualized, supported, fostered and empowered the Palestinian rejectionist ideology as UNRWA has done. This ideology denies the basic legitimacy of the existence of a State of Israel, nurtures a perpetual refugee status of the majority of Palestinians, and demands a massive return of those “refugees” into the State of Israel (referred to as the “Right of Return”). This ideology played a key role in the horrors of October 7.
Background
UNRWA was founded in December 1949[3] as a temporary agency for 18 months, to rehabilitate the Arab refugees from Israel’s War of Independence. Ever since, the agency has been operating as a temporary entity whose mandate is extended every three years, without having stricken off even a single person’s name from the lists of refugees. Instead of an agency for aiding or rehabilitating the Palestinian refugees, UNRWA has become an agency for perpetuating the Palestinian refugees’ existence until they can ‘return’ en masse to Israel.
According to the agency’s records, there are 1.6 million “registered Palestinian refugees” in the Gaza Strip today (as of 2022)[4], out of a total of 2.1 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip[5]; i.e., over 75%. The Palestinians and the Arab countries have always refused to include the Palestinian refugees under the auspices of the UN’s global refugee agency (UNHCR). As a result, the definition of a “Palestinian refugee” differs from that of any other refugee in the world.
In the context of the Gaza Strip, there are several key differences between the definitions. The first is that a refugee anywhere in the world must be located outside their country in order to be considered a refugee, whereas a Palestinian refugee need not be. “Palestinian refugees” currently living in the Gaza Strip view the Strip as part of Palestine; meaning, they are in “Palestine”, yet are nevertheless treated as “refugees from Palestine”. Such a state of affairs does not exist anywhere else in the world. Refugees all over the world are people who have left their country and crossed an internationally-recognized border. The Palestinians who relocated from Jaffa or Ashkelon to Gaza during Israel’s War of Independence did not cross such a border, and accordingly should never have been treated as refugees in the first place.
Another difference between UNRWA and UNHCR concerns their treatment of offspring. In the case of the Palestinians, any child born to a “registered refugee” is automatically registered as a refugee. UNHCR has a more complex process, with registration not being automatic and being considered on a case-by-case basis[6]. It is only in the case of the Palestinians that a state of affairs has come about where the number of the refugees’ descendants registered as ‘refugees’ far exceeds the number of the original refugees. The result is that hundreds of thousands of the people living in Gaza have never left their homes, are living in what they themselves consider to be Palestine, yet are nevertheless treated as refugees from Palestine. This is completely absurd.
The Problem
UNRWA grants a fictitious refugee status to over 75% of Gaza’s population, thereby providing them with international endorsement of their belief that their true home is not in Gaza, but rather in the Israeli cities of Ashkelon, Ashdod, Jaffa or Beersheba. This is a political refugee status, intended to perpetuate the conflict. This refugee status provides the Palestinians with a pretext to continue their war against the Jews.
Demanding their ‘return’ into Israel is the principal mechanism through which they hope to transform Israel from a Jewish state into an Arab one.
UNRWA, which is funded by the international community at a cost of about one billion dollars every year, sends the Palestinians the exact opposite message from the one they should receive. Instead of conveying to them an unequivocal message that the world has no intention of supporting the Palestinian delusions to supplant Israel, the world is doing the opposite. The messages conveyed by the mere fact of UNRWA’s existence, and naturally also through the education system and the diplomatic and public mantle provided to the Palestinians by the agency, are that the demand for Israel’s destruction is a legitimate one. UNRWA is the international expression of the antisemitic calls of “from the River to the Sea”, since both mean the same thing: a demand for the elimination of the Jewish state and its replacement with an Arab state.
For the Palestinians, UNRWA primary importance lies not in its role as a technical agency providing education and health services. For the Palestinians, UNRWA serves as an insurance policy issued to them by the international community, and an endorsement both of their own self-concept as having experienced the greatest calamity in the history of humanity (the “Nakba”) and as being entitled to one day return to the territory of the State of Israel. When, in 2018, the U.S. government decided to cut off the agency’s funding, Palestinians’ reactions did not focus on the possible impairment of the quality of education and health services; rather, they expressed indignation and outrage that their “Right of Return” was being tampered with.
The Solution
As long as Gazans believe themselves to be refugees and harbor hopes of one day returning into Israel’s territory, funds and aid delivered to the Strip for purposes of constructing housing will actually be used for constructing terror infrastructure aimed at advancing the vision of ‘Return’.
For this reason, UNRWA must be dismantled, and any aid of any kind that the international community wishes to provide to Gaza must be provided through other avenues. The best option is to provide such aid through the national aid agencies operated by various countries, some of which are already active in Gaza (and in many other places around the world.) Thus, for example, the U.S. provides aid all over the world, and in Gaza as well, through USAID. Similar government agencies exist in the EU, UK, Norway, Sweden and many other European countries. Apolitical U.N. agencies, such as the World Food Programme, can also play a role. In any case, the aid must be completely unassociated with any political aspect of the conflict, and from the fictitious refugee status. Just as the international community has provided aid in numerous countries around the world, such as Haiti or Turkey, in recent years, without tying that aid to refugee status, such should be the case in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority as well.
Conclusion
UNRWA fuels the mindset of a Palestinian ‘Return’ and serves as an important pillar of the rejectionist Nakba ethos. Since Israel’s cooperation with UNRWA has been voluntary from the outset, Israel can terminate its cooperation with UNRWA.
Any international aid to the Gaza Strip, whether in welfare, health and education services or in any other field, must be provided through other channels, and in no case through UNRWA.
Attempts to “fix” or “improve” UNRWA should in no case be relied upon. This is an agency whose primary purpose is to perpetuate the Palestinian ideology of return. All past attempts to carry out reforms of UNRWA have failed – and for good reason. Such is the organization’s very DNA, and it cannot be changed. Therefore, UNRWA should have no role in a post-Hamas Gaza.
[1] https://x.com/bokeralmog/status/1729929618742755477?s=20
[2] https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/6361323ddea5a810/Article-b3b05439b5a2c81027.htm
[3] UN General Assembly Resolution 302, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, A/RES/302(IV) (December 8, 1949). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/051/21/PDF/NR005121.pdf?OpenElement
[4] “UNRWA in Action” Factsheet. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/unrwa_in_numbers_eng_1.pdf
[5] CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/gaza-strip/
[6] “Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate,” https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/577e17944.pdf.

05.12.2023 0 comment

Policy Papers War against Hamas

The Day After in Gaza

Dr. Raphael BenLevi 27.11.2023

Dr. Raphael BenLevi

Israel has declared its war aims as the destruction of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities, but what should its plan be for the day after? Since the beginning of the war, some prominent figures in the United States and the Israeli media and former establishment have raised the idea of installing the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governing body for civilian affairs. However, such a course of action would inevitably result within a few years in the emergence of a new terrorist state hostile to Israel, possibly even under the control of a re-emerged Hamas. If the IDF fights to eradicate Hamas rule and a similar entity rises in its place, this will constitute a historic failure, a fatal blow to Israel’s national resilience, and an existential threat to the future of the country.

The most feasible alternative is an autonomous Arab civilian entity in Gaza, with Israel maintaining overall security responsibility for as long as required by the security situation and threat assessment. However, to ensure that such an autonomous entity remains viable, does not revert to serving as a base for murderous terror attacks, and would be willing to live in peace with the State of Israel, several conditions must be met.

In Gaza today lives an entire generation that has been indoctrinated into Hamas’ genocidal ideology, and there exists no organized opposition movement to speak of. As a result, if a new leadership would be established tomorrow based upon local or familial allegiances, it would almost certainly be comprised of Hamas sympathizers, if not supporters, opposed to coexistence with Israel.

The only way to create a political entity in Gaza that is not hostile to Israel will be for the public to undergo a deradicalization process, similar to the de-Nazification process carried out in postwar Germany, during which civil society underwent a profound transformation leading it to reject Nazi ideology. This transformation was made possible through numerous steps, including public trials against Nazi criminals, severe bans on expressions and symbols of support for Nazism, and the re-writing of educational material for an entire new generation. In Gaza, such a deradicalization process should be based upon a collective narrative that recognizes the utter failure and moral repulsiveness of the Hamas ideology. It should be recalled that de-Nazification was made possible by the Allied occupation of Germany, followed by the establishment of a local government based primarily on individuals who had opposed the Nazis.

Without such a process of “de-Hamasification,” any Arab-led political entity that arises in postwar Gaza will be hostile to Israel and eventually lead to the re-emergence of the terrorist state. Transferring power to the PA would guarantee this outcome. The PA is itself already a political entity hostile to Israel’s existence. The current model in Judea and Samaria—overall Israeli security responsibility alongside PA civilian rule—is highly unstable, and its future is uncertain even in the near term. The PA is perceived by the public over which it rules as a deeply corrupt institution and holds dismal levels of support. According to a June 2023 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh would defeat PA Chair Mahmoud Abbas by a large margin if Palestinian elections were held today. In the 2006 elections for both Gaza and Judea and Samaria, Hamas won a decisive majority. It is widely recognized that the reason Abbas has not agreed to hold new elections since 2006 is because Hamas would almost certainly win again.

Even if some Palestinians also feel disillusionment towards Hamas as an organization, a vast majority (71 percent) support the formation of new terrorist groups such as “Lion’s Den” and the “Jenin Battalion.” This demonstrates that the goal of murdering Jews and destroying Israel enjoys broad support in much of Palestinian society. The political debate centers around choosing which organization is best suited to attain these goals.

The only reason that Hamas’ attack was launched from Gaza and not from Judea and Samaria is because of the extensive presence of the IDF and Israel’s security services across Judea and Samaria, who are constantly preventing terror attacks and pursuing terror organizations. Creating a similar situation in Gaza under PA control will be just as unstable as it currently is in Judea and Samaria. There is no reason to believe that a PA-led government in Gaza will educate for peace and promote coexistence with Israel. Even today, the PA’s educational materials educate for hatred and hostility towards “the Zionist entity.” As a result of the PA’s institutionalized incitement against Israel, it will constantly face the threat of being taken over by even more extreme entities such as Hamas.

Furthermore, removing Hamas just to install the PA will not achieve the required deterrence vis a vis Hezbollah. On the contrary, it will project Israeli weakness and signal to Hezbollah that there is no tangible price to be paid for a confrontation with Israel, as the latter would likely make a similar move in Lebanon: a limited-duration takeover followed by a swift withdrawal.

If the IDF fights to conquer the Gaza Strip and remove Hamas, but within a few years, a hostile entity once again takes control of the territory, this will have a very significant demoralizing effect on both current soldiers and future draftees. Such a move would be a historic failure, a fatal blow to Israel’s national resilience, and an existential threat to the country’s future.

In order to ensure long-term stability and security in Israel, Gaza, and the broader Middle East, it is necessary to ensure that any future autonomous Arab entity in Gaza meets certain conditions that will ensure its commitment to peace and coexistence. Many relevant conditions can also be found in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan released by the Trump administration in January 2020.

Although the PA rejected the plan due to the Palestinian leadership’s lack of interest in a lasting and viable peace with Israel, many of the conditions outlined in the document can help shape the path forward towards creating an autonomous Arab governing body in Gaza. It is important to emphasize that the PA does not even come close to meeting these conditions, and its involvement would be highly counter-productive.

The following is a list of relevant conditions drawn directly from the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Where the plan’s original language is applicable, it has been retained and presented in quotations. Otherwise, the substance has been retained, but the language and content have been edited or adapted to fit the current context.

Any Gazan autonomous governing body must recognize the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, and make clear that it rejects the ideologies of destruction, terror, and conflict.

“The Palestinians shall have ended all programs, including school curricula and textbooks, that serve to incite or promote hatred or antagonism towards its neighbors, or which compensate or incentivize criminal or violent activity… It is very important that education focuses on peace to ensure that future generations are committed to peace… Promoting a culture of peace… with the goal of creating an environment that embraces the values of coexistence and mutual respect throughout the region.”

“The creation of a culture of peace should include an end to incitement, including in government-controlled media, as well as an end to the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom.”

“It should also prohibit hostile propaganda, as well as textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of [an agreement], including the denial of one another’s right to exist.”

“The Palestinians shall have implemented a governing system with a constitution or another system for establishing the rule of law that provides for freedom of press, free and fair elections, respect for human rights for its citizens, protections for religious freedom and for religious minorities to observe their faith, uniform and fair enforcement of law and contractual rights, due process under law, and an independent judiciary with appropriate legal consequences and punishment established for violations of the law.”

“The Palestinians shall have achieved civilian and law enforcement control over all of its territory and demilitarized its population.”

A Palestinian government should cease to support “Boycott, Divest, and Sanction” (BDS) campaigns, anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and multilateral bodies, and any other efforts intended to delegitimize the State of Israel. Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease.

“All Israeli captives and remains must be returned.”

“It is unrealistic to ask the State of Israel to make security compromises that could endanger the lives of its citizens.”

Gaza must be fully demilitarized, and Israel will maintain full security responsibility and control of the airspace, electromagnetic spectrum, and territorial waters.

All persons and goods will cross the borders into Gaza through regulated border crossings, which Israel will monitor. Israeli border crossing officials, using state-of-the-art scanning and imaging technology, shall have the right to confirm that no weapons, dual-use, or other security-risk-related items will be allowed to enter Gaza.

“Security challenges make the building of a port in Gaza problematic for the foreseeable future.”

“The State of Israel has experienced the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s first doctrine of security – that it must be able to defend itself by itself – is as salient as ever. It is a critical strategic interest of the United States that the State of Israel remain strong and secure, protected by the IDF, and continue to remain an anchor of stability in the region.”

An international fund should be established for infrastructure development, the cost of which is not expected to be absorbed by the State of Israel.

Capital raised through this international effort will be placed into a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank. Accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, and conditionality safeguards will protect investments and ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and effectively.

Significant investments will require a governance structure that allows the international community to safely and comfortably put new money into investments that future conflicts will not destroy.

“The Palestinians shall have established transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies with appropriate governance to prevent corruption and ensure the proper use of such funds, and a legal system to protect investments and to address market-based commercial expectations.”

In the initial stage, to defeat and uproot Hamas, Israel will have no choice but to assume control of the entire Gaza Strip and set up a civilian administration, similar to how it administered Gaza from 1967 to 1994, until the Oslo Accords and transfer of power to the PA. During this period, the IDF maintained control of military affairs and oversight of civilian affairs, which were managed in conjunction with local representatives of the Arab population at the municipal level. It is important to note that during this period, there were far fewer attacks against Jewish soldiers and residents, increased economic prosperity for all of Gaza’s residents, and many examples of mutually beneficial coexistence. Following the installation of the PA in 1994, Hamas’ power grew, terror attacks increased, and institutionalized incitement undermined much of this coexistence.

Israel is, of course, not interested in undertaking a long-term military administration of Gaza. It is, however, necessary that any future autonomous entity in Gaza meet the conditions that will ensure it lives in peace and coexistence alongside Israel. Anything less will ultimately devolve again into an unacceptable and existential threat to the State of Israel.

Published in The National Interest 27.11.2023

27.11.2023 0 comment

Policy Papers War against Hamas

Israel Should Reevaluate Relations with Russia

Joseph Rozen 12.11.2023

Joseph Rozen

A caricature from a pro-Russian Telegram channel with antisemitic images:

“Genocide of any people is a holocaust.”

Russia has maintained close ties with Hamas for many years, supporting the terror organization both directly and indirectly. The Kremlin sees Hamas as a valuable agent of chaos due to its affiliation with Hezbollah and Iran.
The war between Israel and Hamas benefits Russia, as it diverts US attention from Ukraine to the Middle East, and potentially weakens support for additional assistance to Ukraine. It also leads to the rise of oil and gas prices, benefiting Russia’s energy sector.[1]
Since the beginning of the Hamas-Israel war, the level of antisemitism in Russia has risen. Antisemitic expressions are now common in Russia, whether in traditional media, social media, or official statements by the Kremlin.
Russia’s position on the war against Hamas must lead to a change in Israel’s policy towards Russia. It is questionable whether Russia can any longer play a constructive role in the region.
Israel should be clearer in its support of Ukraine, not only as a moral stance but as a signal to Russia about the consequences of its actions. Supplying weapons to Ukraine is not a relevant option for Israel during this time of war, but Israel can increase its assistance to Ukraine in other ways.

Over the years, the Hamas terror organization was a welcomed guest in Moscow, with several visits in recent years.[2][3] Senior Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh, Saleh al-Arouri, and Moussa Abu Marzouq met regularly with senior Russian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov and his deputy Mikhail Bogdanov.[4] Russia has also hosted a delegation and leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In its meetings with Hamas, Russia expressed its strong support for the terrorist group.

On October 27, 2023, less than three weeks after Hamas’ ISIS-like massacre of 1,400 Israelis and kidnapping of more than 240, a Hamas delegation visited Moscow and met with Bogdanov. During the visit, Hamas praised Putin for his long-time support, and called to stop the “Zionist crimes supported by the United States and the West.” Hamas also promised to look for eight hostages with dual Russian-Israeli citizenship and free them, since Hamas “considers Russia to be a closest friend.”[4]

These ongoing ties with Hamas are taking place despite Russia having experienced acts of Sunni terrorism in the past. Some notable incidents include the Beslan school massacre in 2004, which resulted in 330 casualties, the bombing of a Russian airplane by ISIS in Egypt in 2015, leading to the deaths of all 224 passengers, and the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002, among others.

While Russia has listed Al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Sunni terror groups in its official list of terror organizations, Hamas, which is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is not on the list.[5] There are several reasons for this: Firstly, Hamas is a proxy of Russia’s close partner, Iran. As relations between Russia and Iran have deepened following their broad cooperation in Syria and Ukraine, Russia is willing to do more for Iran than ever before, including supporting Iran’s proxies. Secondly, Russia tries to disparage the US and its involvement in the Middle East peace process that has failed miserably in the eyes of Russia. Moreover, Russia has traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, and in the past claimed to host Hamas delegations in order to advance intra-Palestinian reconciliation and broker a peace solution as an alternative to US-led efforts.[6]

Hamas has acknowledged its close alliance with Russia and thanked Russia for its unwavering support. While Russia’s backing of Hamas primarily takes a political form, there are indications of broader assistance to the terror organization.

Israeli PM Netanyahu: “I don’t see a thing”.

From a pro-Russian telegram channel

On the political level, the messages coming from Moscow are clear. Following the horrendous terror attacks by Hamas, Russian Foreign Ministry Director of Information and Press, Maria Zakharova Spokesperson, was quick to announce:[8] “We call on the Palestinian and Israeli sides to implement an immediate ceasefire, renounce violence, exercise the necessary restraint and establish, with the assistance of the international community, a negotiation process aimed at establishing a comprehensive, lasting and long-awaited peace in the Middle East”. This message reflected the Russian disconnect from reality, with an effort to prevent Israeli retaliation and its right to defend itself, and no mention of Hamas. In addition, Putin compared Israel’s siege of Gaza to the siege of Leningrad by Nazi Germany.[9]

Other affiliates of the Kremlin released anti-Israel and antisemitic statements and propaganda, fueling a massive antisemitic campaign in Russian traditional and social media, exposing the usually under-the-surface antisemitism in Russia.

Here are several examples:

Solovyov, a known Kremlin mouthpiece, accused Israel on his show of waging a brutal war against Gaza, unlike Russia in Ukraine. He added that Russia never cuts off its enemy’s electricity.[10]
Russian media twisted Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s words about destroying Hamas, arguing that he called for a genocide of the Palestinians.[11]
Another Russian channel repeated the narrative about a genocide and added fake information about Israel bombing dozens of hospitals and schools.[12]
In a different article, RIA Novosti cited Ramzan Kadyrov who said: “the Israeli fascism, in its cruelty towards the Palestinians is probably worse than Hitler’s.[13)
In this toxic environment, thousands of incited blood-thirsty people in the Republic of Dagestan gathered in a lynch mob and stormed the local airport and hotels, searching for Israelis and Jews that were allegedly arriving in Dagestan on an October 29 flight from Israel.[14]

New antisemitic, anti-American, and anti-Ukrainian content appears every day on Russian media. Part of it is pure antisemitism and another part reflects what Russia sees as an opportunity to attack the US and its involvement in the Middle East, while drawing a line connecting the Middle East to Ukraine, with narratives aimed at weakening international support of Ukraine.

In addition, Moscow called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council, calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. The Russian draft resolution did not pass as it fell short of achieving a majority.[15] Again, the Russians failed to condemn Hamas and ignored its barbaric atrocities against civilians.

In addition, there are indications that Russia’s support went beyond the political level. Hamas used weapons manufactured in Russia, such as the AK-47, RPG, and Kornet anti-tank missiles,[16] DPRK-made weapons such as the F-7 RPG and 122mm artillery shells, and Iran-made weapons such as AZ111-A2 60mm mortar fuses, M112 demolition charges and newer versions.[17 Lastly, Russian online crypto platforms have been used by Hamas to transfer millions of dollars for their terror activity, in addition to funds in Qatar, violating sanctions.[18]

Russia’s Interests in the Middle East and Ties with Israel

Russia’s primary regional partner is Iran, with extensive cooperation across economic, security, and intelligence domains. Their relationship deepened during the prolonged conflict in Syria, where they collaborated to support the Assad regime.[19] While operating in Syria under the Russian umbrella, Iran was able to provide arms to various groups, including pro-Iranian terrorists in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Recently, it was reported that after airports in Aleppo and Damascus were put out of action, Iranian and IRGC cargo planes began using the Russian airbase “Khmeimim” in Syria.[20]

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the revelation of Russian vulnerabilities, Iran rushed to assist by supplying drones and weapons.[21] As a result, Iran is no longer a minor party in these relations and is considered at least an equal partner, particularly in the Middle East. This limits Russia’s ability to play a constructive role on Israel’s northern border, and associates Russia with what some describe as an “axis of evil.”

A caricature portraying a false Russian claim that NATO’s security assistance to Ukraine reaches Hamas in Gaza. Published by fake Facebook accounts.

Geopolitically, Russia could benefit from the conflict in Gaza by diverting international attention from Ukraine to Israel, thereby occupying American attention on two fronts. In this context, Hamas is a tool to destabilize the region. Furthermore, the resulting instability in the Middle East could lead to rising energy prices, which would benefit Russia, particularly as the winter season approaches. Additionally, the potential shift in the Middle East’s political landscape following a possible normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia could pose risks to Russia’s interests in the region and diminish its influence vis-à-vis the Arab world.

Since Russia’s involvement in Syria in 2015 and even earlier, Israel has considered Russia a responsible power that could use its influence to prevent Iran and the Assad regime from posing a significant threat to Israel. This policy occasionally achieved minor successes, with a hotline between the Russian command in Syria and the IDF instrumental in de-escalation efforts. Russia-Israel bilateral relations also deepened, facilitated by the large Russian-speaking community in Israel and the Jewish community in Russia, forming a cultural bridge between the two nations. Israel embraced the Russian narrative regarding the Red Army’s role in defeating the Nazis, refrained from joining international sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea, and largely maintained a neutral stance on Ukraine, positioning itself as a potential mediator. Prime Minister Netanyahu had frequent engagements with President Putin, with the latter even being an honored guest at events in Israel commemorating International Holocaust Remembrance Day.[22] Lately, the two countries even signed a cinema cooperation agreement, a decision that serves Russia’s propaganda machine.[23]

Russia’s current stance highlights a divergence of interests between Russia and Israel, revealing what some perceive as antisemitic tendencies. Even in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israeli policymakers clung to the notion that Israel should maintain a low profile due to national security concerns on its northern border, as if Russia could still be relied upon to curtail Iran’s activities. Just as Israel had misconceptions about Hamas, it failed to recognize the shifting dynamics of Russia’s power and its potential influence over Iran. If the conflict in Ukraine was not enough to prompt a policy shift in Israel, Russia’s current position regarding Hamas should serve as a wake-up call for the government.

What Should Israel Do Now?

Israel should reevaluate its fundamental assumptions regarding Russia’s role in the region, and its capacity to influence Iran and its proxies. This reassessment should lead to a range of responses, from symbolic gestures to more assertive actions that the Israeli government can take in response to Russian actions.

As a starting point, without completely severing ties with Russia, Israel should consider:

More forcefully condemning and highlighting Russia’s support for Hamas. To date, Israel has summoned the Russian ambassador and expressed its discontent with Russia’s support of Hamas, and released one statement following Hamas’ visit in Moscow, which condemned “the invitation, which is an act of support of terrorism and legitimizes the atrocities of Hamas terrorists.” Israel also called on the Russian government to expel Hamas immediately.[24) This statement did not directly condemn Russia, nor address its long-standing assistance to Hamas.

Sending an official invitation to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, to visit Israel, allowing him to demonstrate solidarity with Israel. (It has been reported that Zelensky expressed interest in vising Israel right after the attack but was turned down

by Israel; later it was leaked that Zelensky was planning to visit Israel, but had to put the trip on hold following the leak).
Opposing a Russian role in the unfolding events related to the war, the hostages, the region, or the international community. Any Russian involvement will be later used to further destabilize the region and interfere with existing efforts.
Shifting its recognition of Victory Day over Nazi Germany from May 9 to May 8. May 8 is the day celebrated by most of the Western world, while May 9 is the day commemorated by Russia, and to date, by Israel.[25] (This would be particularly symbolic given Russia’s attempts to claim that its war against Ukraine is similar to the Red Army’s fight against the Nazi’s.)
Reconsidering or at least refraining from implementing the agreement on cinema cooperation between the two countries, as it is seen as a tool of Russian propaganda with limited cultural value.
Exploring avenues to enhance security support for Ukraine, excluding the provision of lethal systems, for now. While Israel may not be at the forefront of supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine, it can offer other defense technologies.
Reviewing the visa-free policy between Russia and Israel countries. Given the significant decrease in Russian tourists visiting Israel since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it may be appropriate to reconsider this policy.

These steps will not only serve Israel’s national security interests more effectively, but also send a clear message regarding Israel’s alignment with the West. They may also lead to Israel regaining respect from Russia, which often responds to displays of strength, rather than perceived weakness. Moreover, such steps may also enable Israel to free itself from security conceptions that limit its actions on its northern front due to fear of collateral damage to Russian interests.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/oil-set-first-weekly-drop-three-mideast-situation-holds-2023-10-27/

[2] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/hamas-says-leadership-visited-russia-met-sergey-lavrov

[3] https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1512358/

[4] https://mid.ru/ar/1428688/?lang=en

[5] https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-said-to-tell-moscow-its-looking-for-8-russians-among-hostages-will-free-them/

[6] http://en.nac.gov.ru/unified-federal-list-organizations-including-foreign-and-international-designated-terrorist-courts.html

[7] https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-said-to-make-push-for-intra-palestinian-reconciliation/

[8] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/07/russia-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza-a82694

[9] https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-768119

[10] https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1712017935563215228

[11] https://tsargrad.tv/news/politolog-vskryl-samyj-bolshoj-pozor-izrailja-prosto-sravnite-skazannoe-palachami_885057

[12] https://ria.ru/20231013/izrail-1902376854.html

[13] https://ria.ru/amp/20231029/kadyrov-1905907634.html

[14] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/29/mob-storms-dagestan-airport-in-search-of-jewish-passengers-from-israel

[15] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142817

[16] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/hamass-use-of-anti-tank-kornet-missiles-supplied-by-iran-and-hezbollah/

[17] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/10/hamas-used-iranian-produced-weapons-in-october-7-terror-attack-in-israel.php#:~:text=Hamas’%20use%20of%20Iranian%2Dproduced,Iranian%20weapons%20to%20attack%20Israelis.

[18] https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/garantex-russian-crypto-hamas-crime-sanctions-a3648357

[19] https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria

[20] https://www.syriahr.com/en/314450/

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-iran-agrees-ship-missiles-more-drones-russia-defying-west-sources-2022-10-18/

[22] https://www.timesofisrael.com/among-dozens-of-world-leaders-in-jerusalem-putin-proves-the-dominant-presence/

[23] https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-signs-cinema-cooperation-deal-with-russia/

[24] https://twitter.com/LiorHaiat/status/1717592919220056382

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-does-russia-celebrate-victory-day-may-9-what-does-it-mean-putin-2023-05-09/#:~:text=WHEN%20WAS%20THE%20FIRST%20VICTORY,Soviet%20Union’s%20%22Victory%20Day%22.

12.11.2023 0 comment

Policy Papers War against Hamas

Hamas enjoys widespread support in Gaza

Yishay Armoni 27.10.2023

Yishay Armoni

Despite claims now being made that the majority of Gaza’s population desires peace and is being held captive by Hamas, data and evidence collected over the past two decades consistently demonstrates the opposite. Hamas enjoys widespread support among Gaza’s civilian population, which voted Hamas into power and would likely do so again. This support finds expression not only in public opinion polls, but in active participation in Hamas attacks.

In the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, the last to be held in the Gaza Strip as well, Hamas won 76 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Of the 24 seats assigned to the Gaza Strip, Hamas won 15 (62%). Following Fatah’s refusal to recognize the results of these elections, Hamas violently took control of the Strip in 2007, and no general elections have been held in Gaza since. However, public opinion polls conducted in recent years indicate the Gazan public’s continued support of Hamas.

According to an average of polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) during 2022, approximately 60% of the Strip’s residents on average supported the “armed struggle” (i.e. terrorist attacks) against Israel, compared to approximately 40%-50% of West Bank residents. In March 2023, support for armed struggle among Gaza residents rose to 68%.

According to the same poll, in a hypothetical election between Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, 61% of Gazans would back Haniyeh while only 35% would vote for Abbas. In a hypothetical parliamentary election, 45% said they would vote for Hamas, compared to 32% who would vote for Abbas’s Fatah, while the rest would vote for other parties.

In a June 2023 PCPSR poll, support for Haniyeh rose to 65%, compared to 30% for Abbas, whereas support for armed struggle was at 64%. In this poll, 38% of the Strip’s residents felt that the rise of armed Islamic movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and their armed struggle against Israel, were the best thing to have happened to the Palestinian people in the last 75 years (compared to 16% in the West Bank, over twice as many).

Following the Oct. 7 massacre, waves of Gazan civilians entered Israel and took part in the pogrom. Footage from a security camera at Kibbutz Be’eri shows a mob of Gazan civilians invading the kibbutz to pillage it. Gazan civilians also participated in the second wave of kidnappings of Israeli civilians to Gaza. Hamas senior leader Saleh al-Arouri, in an Oct. 12 interview on Al Jazeera, claimed that the people who abducted women and children to Gaza were not Hamas operatives but rather “ordinary Gazan civilians.”

Local journalists in Gaza have described widespread public support for the massacres committed by Hamas. Gazan journalist Hind Khoudary told the Christian Science Monitor, “It may not be aligned with international law, but, for the first time, Palestinians here in Gaza do not feel helpless.” Journalist Ahmed Dremly also described a “feeling of euphoria” following the events.

All available evidence indicates that approximately 60% of the Gaza Strip’s population supports Hamas and its armed struggle against Israel. This support is expressed both in polls and in their active participation in the organization’s terrorist acts. This leads to the conclusion that claims regarding the existence of a clear ideological or political demarcation between the majority of Gaza’s residents and Hamas are entirely unfounded.

None of the above is intended to conflate uninvolved Gazan civilians with Hamas terrorists, whether or not those civilians support Hamas, in the context of Israel’s ongoing war against the terror group. International law makes a clear distinction between uninvolved civilians and those taking part in military activities. However, both with regard to decisions related to the military campaign, and to post-war arrangements in the Gaza Strip, it is important to present an accurate picture regarding the widespread support in Gaza for Hamas.

Published in JNS on October 26, 2023

27.10.2023 0 comment

Iran Policy Papers War against Hamas

How Iran Intends to Assist Hamas in the War

Dr. Yossi Mansharof 26.10.2023

Dr. Yossi Mansharof

Since the war in Gaza broke out, Iran has been considering how to contribute to the great upheaval the region, and how it can assist Hamas. Iran’s support for the goal of destroying Israel is a central pillar of its policy. Indeed, in speeches made since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has given the barbaric massacre a religious and moral seal of approval. According to Khamenei, this was a legitimate reciprocal offensive against Israel’s actions toward the Palestinians. Khamenei also has rejected criticism voiced around the world against Hamas’ slaughter and kidnapping of women, children, and the elderly, stating that every Israeli citizen is to be treated as an armed combatant.

It appears Iran’s leadership currently wishes to keep Tehran outside the circle of war, and does not wish to slide into a direct conflict with Israel or the U.S., which would put at risk its nuclear facilities and the stability of its regime. Reuters has reported, based on three Western security sources, that Iran’s upper echelons have decided that Hezbollah will continue to strike Israel from the north, while Iraqi Shi’ite militias, which are supported by Iran, will carry out low-profile attacks on U.S. targets in the region. These moves are all one step below direct Iranian involvement in the war. On October 15, the Iranian delegation to the U.N. announced that Tehran would stay out of the war as long as Israel does not try to attack Iran.

It appears that Iran intends to directly assist Hamas in two ways. It will try to supply Hamas in Gaza with more weaponry, and it may try to target Israeli institutions in Western countries.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force specializes in arms smuggling, but Iran has an extensive parallel, and ostensibly civilian, infrastructure assisting the country’s smuggling apparatus. The Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS), which has been serving this apparatus since the 1980s, appears to be the instrument through which Iran now aims to send weapons, and potentially even Quds Force members, into the Gaza Strip. Alternatively, the IRCS will seek to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza, with the aim of increasing Iran’s influence in the Strip, particularly in view of the intense pressure placed on Palestinian society in Gaza during this war.

The IRCS has been operating in Gaza for years by virtue of the “Law for Support of the Palestinian People’s Islamic Revolution,” approved by the Iranian parliament in 1990. The law authorizes the society to provide financial support to families of Palestinian prisoners and “martyrs”, in coordination with representatives of the IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence.

In January 2020, Ali Akbar Salehi, formerly Iran’s Foreign Minister, admitted that the Quds Force had previously engaged in smuggling to ‘revolutionaries’ during the Libyan civil war (2014-2020), under the cover of the IRCS. In addition, as revealed on WikiLeaks, the IRCS has an extensive record of arms smuggling operations under the guise of medical equipment to Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War (2006), and of sending IRGC troops and Ministry of Intelligence personnel to Lebanon disguised as IRCS officials. Iran also has used the IRCS to smuggle weapons to the Shi’ite opposition in Bahrain and Yemen.

Saeed Qassemi, a former high-ranking IRGC commander, admitted in 2019 that, under the cover of the IRCS, the IRGC had smuggled weapons to the Muslims fighting in the Bosnian War in the 1990s, and had trained terrorist operatives, including Al Qaeda personnel. The IRCS’s publications reveal its intent of transporting the equipment to Gaza with help from Iranian airline Qeshm Air, known for delivering weapons shipments on behalf of the Quds Force to Syria. The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry, in an October 22 conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Ami-Abdollahian, welcomed the latter’s request to allow the society to deliver aid to Gaza.

It further appears that Tehran is pushing for a terrorist attack on an Israeli target in a Western country. Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmaeil Khatib has declared that “the freedom-seeking peoples across the world” will avenge themselves on the U.S. and on governments supporting Israel in the Gaza War. This implied threat on the part of the Intelligence Minster is consistent with Iran’s motivation to promote terrorist attacks against Israel abroad.

This motivation was affirmed by Mossad Chief Dedi Barnea in September, when he stated that over past year, the Mossad had been involved in thwarting 27 attempted attacks committed on Iran’s behalf against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe, Africa and South America. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence is substantially involved in planning attacks on foreign soil, having orchestrated Hezbollah’s 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) bombing in Argentina.

Faced with this situation, Israel must take action alongside Egypt to prevent the delivery of Iranian aid to the Gaza Strip. Israel and its allies must increase their efforts to thwart any attempt by Iran to attack Israeli interests in Europe and the U.S.

Dr. Yossi Mansharof, an expert on Iran and Shiite political Islam, is a Fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy.

26.10.2023 0 comment

Policy Papers Terrorism War against Hamas

The Red Cross Must Be Given Immediate Access to the Israeli Hostages Held By Hamas

Dr. Adi Schwartz 22.10.2023

Dr. Adi Schwartz

Key Messages:

Hamas carried out a heinous war crime under international law when it took numerous Israeli children, women and men captive during its October 7, 2023 terrorist assault on Israel. The international community must demand that they be released immediately.

At the very least, the International Committee of the Red Cross must be given immediate access to the Israeli captives for humanitarian purposes.

Hamas must provide Israel with precise information regarding the identities of all the Israeli citizens it is holding hostage. It must also promptly release or facilitate the transfer to a neutral country, for individuals who are seriously wounded or afflicted by specified medical conditions.

All countries, international organizations and institutions, must demand that Hamas uphold these basic humanitarian obligations.

Introduction

A large number of Israelis, including many unarmed civilians, were taken hostage during Hamas’ unprovoked barbaric attack on Israel on October 7^th, 2023. Media reports suggest that more than a hundred Israelis, including children, women and the elderly, were forcibly taken from their homes at gunpoint and are presently held captive by Hamas[1].

Such actions go against the principles of International Humanitarian Law, which explicitly and consistently prohibits the act of taking hostages, categorizing it as a heinous war crime[1]. Additionally, this body of law governs the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). In accordance with universally accepted international norms, civilian hostages must be released immediately. At the very least, they should be accorded the rights granted to POWs, as elaborated in this paper.

Rights of Prisoners of Wars

[1] International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 34/146, 17 December 1979, Article 1; Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(a)(viii) and (c)(iii).

The Third Geneva Convention laid out the legal framework for the protection of POWs[1]. Every country in the world is a party to the Third Geneva Convention, which also confers a special mandate on the International Committee of the Red Cross, entrusting it with a central role in the protection of the dignity and well-being of POWs.

In accordance with universally recognized international standards, notably the Geneva Conventions, POWs are entitled to fundamental and immediate rights, which include

[1] Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949:

The detaining power must notify the authorities on which the prisoners depend of the capture.

The International Red Cross must be granted regular access to visit prisoners of war in order to verify the conditions of their detention and to restore contacts between them and their families.

Prisoners of war who are seriously wounded or suffer from specified diseases must be repatriated directly back to their own country or to a hospital in a neutral State.

Those whose diseases or wounds warrant a direct repatriation are:

the incurably wounded or sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
the wounded or sick who have recovered but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and permanently diminished.
the wounded or sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one year.

2.Those who may be accommodated in a neutral State are:

the wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year, or sooner if treated in a neutral country;
prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove such a threat.

Any form of torture or cruelty are forbidden. The following acts are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.

Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their person. Women must be treated with due regard to their specific needs.

Prisoners of war must be evacuated, as soon as possible, away from the combat zones.

Prisoners of war must be given sufficient food and water. They shall receive medical attention.

Prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.

Conclusion

International Humanitarian Law mandates that Hamas must promptly provide Israel with precise information regarding the number and identities of all Israeli citizens held within Palestinian custody. Moreover, it obliges Hamas to grant unrestricted access to the Red Cross for humanitarian purposes.

Additionally, the organization is expected to either promptly release or facilitate the transfer to a neutral country, such as Egypt, for individuals who are seriously wounded or afflicted by specified medical conditions, such as elderly individuals with mental disabilities, among others.

All countries, international organizations and institutions, must demand that Hamas uphold its obligations under international law. The International Committee of the Red Cross must demand immediate access to each and every one of the Israeli hostages.

[1] The Times pf Israel. (2023). Israel confirms civilians and soldiers abducted by Hamas into Gaza. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-claims-to-capture-soldiers-civilians-in-deadly-assault-on-gaza-border-towns/

[2] International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 34/146, 17 December 1979, Article 1; Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(a)(viii) and (c)(iii).

[3] Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949.

[4] Medecins Sans Frontieres. (2023). Prisoners of War. https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/prisoners-of-war/

22.10.2023 0 comment

opinion Policy Papers Terrorism

Lessons for Israel’s Fight Against Hamas from the West’s Fight Against ISIS

Dr. Adi Schwartz 22.10.2023

Dr. Adi Schwartz

Key Messages:

World leaders, including US President Joe Biden, have compared Hamas to ISIS.
A Western-led coalition has been fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq since 2014. American Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, characterized the fight against ISIS in their stronghold of Mosul as “a war of annihilation.”
The fight against ISIS for Mosul, Iraq in 2016-2017 was the heaviest urban combat since World War II; the destruction resembled that wrought by the Allied Forces in World War II on the German city of Dresden. The UN calculated that more than 80% of Mosul was estimated to be uninhabitable as a result of the destruction.
The city of Raqqa in Syria, another stronghold of ISIS attacked by the US military, was considered “unfit for human habitation,” following the attacks.
While Israel will continue to take steps to avoid civilian casualties, it is likely that in its fight against ‘ISIS in Gaza’ – e.g. Hamas – it will need to adopt similar strategies and standards as those actually used in some cases by Western governments in their fight against ISIS.

Background

In the wake of the barbaric atrocities perpetrated by Hamas against Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023, numerous world leaders have unequivocally denounced the actions of this radical Islamist extremist group. Some have drawn explicit parallels between these actions and the gravest atrocities committed by the Islamic State (ISIS). For example, on October 10, United States President Joe Biden declared: “The brutality of Hamas — this bloodthirstiness — brings to mind the worst — the worst rampages of ISIS.”[1]

The War against ISIS

In reaction to ISIS’s swift territorial expansion in Iraq and Syria, several Western nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, initiated interventions to counter the threat from the radical Jihadist group. Among the most significant military operations were those conducted in Mosul, located in Iraq, and Raqqa, situated in Syria, which both served as key strongholds of ISIS in the region.

According to Time magazine, senior American military commanders reached back into history for parallels and precedents as to the scope and ferocity of these battles[1]. PBS’ Frontline program cited military commanders describing the fight for Mosul as the largest military operation in the world since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the heaviest urban combat since World War II[2]. Michael Butt, Emergency Response Coordinator for International Medical Corps Iraq, said that the destruction resembled that of the Germany city of Dresden in WWII[3]. Then US Secretary of Defense James Mattis characterized the fight as “a war of annihilation.”[4]

In an interview with CBS’ Face the Nation program on May 28, 2017, Mattis said that ISIS was “a threat to all civilized nations. And the bottom line is we are going to move in an accelerated and reinforced manner, throw them on their back foot. Our intention is that the foreign fighters do not survive the fight to return home to North Africa, to Europe, to America, to Asia, to Africa. We’re not going to allow them to do so. We’re going to stop them there and take apart the caliphate.”[5]

The destruction in both Mosul and Raqqa was near total. The United Nations calculated that more than 80% of Mosul was estimated to be uninhabitable as a result of the destruction.[6] The fighting left behind eight million tons of debris.[7] Raqqa was considered “unfit for human habitation,” with around 80 percent of the city damaged or destroyed[8]. Army Command Sergeant Major, John Wayne Troxell, the senior enlisted advisor to the U.S. military’s top officer, said in November 2017 that Americans “fired more rounds in Raqqa in five months than any other Marine artillery battalion since the Vietnam War”.[9]

Collateral Damage

Since 9/11, the United States has been involved in the war against radical Islamic terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, with many of the battles taking place in densely populated urban areas. Under the law of armed conflict, military forces are required to apply a principle of discrimination — using deadly force against hostile forces, but not against civilian noncombatants. As applied with respect to civilian population centers, the requirement has two elements: there must be a legitimate military target, and the damage to civilians must be “proportionate.” The question of course is how many innocent civilian deaths make a strike against a legitimate military target “disproportionate”.

In an article in July 2007, Salon’s Mark Benjamin learned that “the magic number was 30,” according to Marc Garlasco, who was the US Pentagon’s chief of high-value targeting at the start of the War on Terror. “That means that if you hit 30 as the anticipated number of civilians killed, the airstrike had to go to [then Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld or [then President] Bush personally to sign off.”[1] If it was anticipated that a lower number of civilian casualties would be caused by a strike on a high-value military target, the strike could be approved at less senior levels.

Conclusion

Following the heinous acts committed by Hamas on October 7, both Israel and its Western allies have declared that Hamas shares similarities with ISIS, and consequently, they advocate for a comparable approach: the complete dismantling of the organization.

To implement this strategy, Israel may consider drawing lessons from the practices of its Western counterparts in combating ISIS, particularly in urban regions akin to those in the Gaza Strip. While Israel will continue to take steps to avoid civilian casualties, it is likely that in its fight against ‘ISIS in Gaza’ – i.e., Hamas – it will need to adopt similar strategies and standards as those actually used in some cases by Western governments in their fight against ISIS.

[1] The White House. (2023, October 10). Remarks by President Biden on the Terrorist Attacks in Israel. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/

[2] Benjamin, M. (2007). When is an accidental civilian death not an accident? Salon. https://www.salon.com/2007/07/30/collateral_damage/

[2] Blue, V. J. (2019). After the ‘War of Annihilation’ against ISIS. Time. https://time.com/longform/mosul-raqqa-ruins-after-the-war-of-annihilation/

[3] PBS. (2017). Frontline Mosul. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/mosul/

[4] International Medical Corps. (2017). The battle may be over, but immense needs remain in Mosul. https://internationalmedicalcorps.org/updates/the-battle-may-be-over-but-immense-needs-remain-in-mosul/

[5] Blue, V. J. (2019). After the ‘War of Annihilation’ against ISIS. Time. https://time.com/longform/mosul-raqqa-ruins-after-the-war-of-annihilation/

[6] Garamone, J. (2017). Defeat-ISIS ‘Annihilation’ campaign accelerating, Mattis says. DOD News. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1196114/defeat-isis-annihilation-campaign-accelerating-mattis-says/

[7] OCHA. (2017). Syria crisis: Northeast Syria situation report no. 16 (1-30 September 2017). https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-crisis-northeast-syria-situation-report-no-16-1-30-september-2017

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Amnesty International. (2019). War in Raqqa: Briefing. https://raqqa.amnesty.org/briefing.html

22.10.2023 0 comment

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Introduction:

The Problems

Recommendations

Strategies for Combatting Antisemitism

Internal Security After the Gaza War

UNRWA has No Place in Gaza on the Day After Hamas

The Day After in Gaza

Israel Should Reevaluate Relations with Russia

Hamas enjoys widespread support in Gaza

How Iran Intends to Assist Hamas in the War

The Red Cross Must Be Given Immediate Access to the Israeli Hostages Held By Hamas

Lessons for Israel’s Fight Against Hamas from the West’s Fight Against ISIS

The Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy

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