While most of the world’s attention regarding Israel’s current war is focused on Gaza, Israel is simultaneously fighting an entirely separate front against Hezbollah in Lebanon. It can be described as a war of attrition, as there has yet to be a ground invasion from either side, but in all other respects it is a war, and it is more severe than any of the skirmishes with Hezbollah since 2006. Immediately after Hamas’ attack and through to today, Hezbollah began attacking Israel daily with missiles, RPG’s, attack drones, and has amassed ground forces along the border, who are prepared to invade Israeli towns and enact a slaughter which would make October 7^th look mild. This has forced Israel to evacuate the entire civilian population within a few miles of the border with Lebanon, creating a crisis in which approximately 80,000 residents of Israel’s north have become internally displaced and remain so. Israel has struck back at Hezbollah targets, seeking to weaken the terror organization’s military capabilities and command structure, but has not sought to undertake a large-scale maneuver while it is still focused on the Gazan theatre. But it must be understood, that this is an ongoing warfront and far from stable.

Recent reporting has suggested the Biden administration is heavily invested in negotiating a deal to end the battle between Israel and Hezbollah. In doing so, he is attempting to convince Israel to accept a deal that will slightly lower the immediate threat level, but essentially keep in place the continued strategic threat which Hezbollah poses to the entire country and most acutely to the northern region. The steps under discussion include having Hezbollah forces pull back 8-10 kilometers but they fall short of implementation of UNSC 1701, which requires Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and outlaws its military presence south of the Litani river, close to 30 km from the border with Israel. Even worse, some reports have indicated that Israel is being asked to negotiate on surrendering control of territories along the “Blue-Line,” the border demarcated by the UN in 2000, and reiterated by UNCS 1701. Among the points claimed by Lebanon is Mount Dov, an area of strategic topographic importance, which the UN has clearly declared as not belonging to Lebanon and should not be up for discussion.

Biden is motivated by a desire to prevent further escalation of the war between Israel and the Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, out of concern that this could eventually drag the US into a broader war against Iran. He also fears that a larger war with Hezbollah would undermine any chances for reaching a diplomatic understanding with Iran, which he hopes would stabilize the region and prevent Tehran’s nuclear progress.

However, his current strategy of declaring publicly his commitment not to escalate vis-à-vis Iran, while pressuring Israel to stand down will likely have the precise opposite effect of what he is trying to achieve. In order to prevent further escalation, he must instead send the message that he is willing to escalate and that he will back Israel in its demands to fully enforce UNSC 1701.

Biden may be worried about a ‘full-scale’ war with Iran, but in reality, it is Khamenei who should be most concerned over this prospect. Given the vast disparity in military strength between the two countries, Iran understands that an all-out war with the US could lead to a collapse of the regime. Tehran is only willing to push the boundaries of aggression when it assesses that the US will not react with greater force, something Biden has all but given a written guarantee.

Iran’s regional strategy turns upon the idea that it can attack its enemies through its Arab proxies while avoiding any direct retaliation against Iran itself. But historically speaking, any time the regime felt threatened directly, it has consistently turned to caution and sought to avoid escalation. A number of examples illustrate this pattern of behavior.

Most recently, after the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani by the US in January 2020, Iran responded by launching 16 missiles at 2 US bases in Iraq, resulting in some damage but no American casualties. Supreme Leader, Khamenei, defined the purpose of the attack as “a blow to the dignity of the U.S. as a superpower,” meaning it was a symbolic retaliation.

Not long before this, when the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal, adopted a policy of maximum pressure and began to return sanctions in 2018, Iran did nothing for a full year. When it attacked, ostensibly in response to Trump’s policies, it was in the form of a carefully calibrated strike on oil tankers, a Saudi oil pipeline, cautious progress in the nuclear realm, and an attack on Saudi oil refineries, which was certainly egregious, but ultimately designed to prove a point, not to start a war.

The last time Israel fought Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, in 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon and brought vast destruction to local infrastructure and Hezbollah installations, but Iran merely supported Hezbollah logistically and with strategic advice. It called for a ceasefire and conveyed messages to Hezbollah not to escalate beyond necessity.

In 2003, against the backdrop of the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and President Bush’s threats to continue the march on to Tehran, Iran froze its illegal enrichment of uranium and halted research into the military dimensions of its nuclear program.

This pattern held even under the founder of revolutionary Iran, Khomeini, when in 1988, in response to an Iranian attack on an American destroyer in the Persian Gulf, the US launched a punitive operation, sinking three Iranian ships and destroying two oil drilling rigs. The US then offered a cease-fire, which Iran swiftly accepted.

Since the beginning of the war, Iran has been testing US resolve, and because Biden has made it clear that his first priority is to limit the war at all costs, Iran’s actions have become increasingly daring. Even as Washington has been forced to react, for example to protect maritime traffic against the Houthi threat in the Red Sea, and to retaliate against Iran’s killing of three Americans, it has done this while declaring its intention to prevent a larger war, and limiting its response to targeting Iran’s Arab proxies only. This only serves to clarify to Iran that it continues to have a free hand to attack the US, and to clarify to Hezbollah that if it threatens escalation, the US will likely pressure Israel to back down.

But it is precisely this dynamic that may drag Washington further into the conflict. If it continues, it will also clarify for Iran that it will not pay a price for progress on the nuclear front, and would therefore be more likely to attempt a break out in the next year, while it can still be certain that the Biden administration will be in power.

Instead, the US must show resolve and project its willingness to exact a higher price than Iran is expecting for its aggressions. Washington must also make clear that it will allow Israel to act as it sees fit to protect itself against Hezbollah’s aggression, even if this means using force. Any pressure on Israel to make territorial concessions, especially on land for which Lebanon has no legal basis to demand, would only strengthen Hezbollah’s resolve. A pullback of 8-10 km from the border would be a minor and reversable concession from Hezbollah. If it were to agree to do this, it would behave just has it did in the past, following the 2006 war. Hezbollah will give the appearance of a pullback, while in practice it would simply go undercover, operate wearing civilian clothes, dig more bunkers under the cover of civilians and return fully to its positions at the first opportunity. It would do nothing to fundamentally change the severe threat that is posed to Israel’s north, and would remain an intolerable security situation for Israel’s civilian population, who rightly refuse to live as sitting ducks for the next slaughter. The only reasonable end-state can be a full implementation of UNSC 1701, and it is an embarrassment to Washington that even its opening position is not to demand the enforcement of the Security Council decision for which it played a crucial role in formulating 18 years ago.

This applies no less to the nuclear realm. The only reason Iran has to date not yet developed a nuclear weapon has been the credible threats of force that it has faced. In the 2000s, it felt this threat from the United States following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Throughout the 2010s it felt this threat mainly from Israel. Now is the time to strengthen this deterrence by clearly indicating that the US will not prevent Israel from acting directly against Iran if necessary. If Washington truly wants to engender the stability that will allow it to focus less on the region, it must stop restraining its allies and start supporting them decisively in their battles against Iran and its proxies.

Published in The national interest,  February 15, 2024.

The United States explained the purpose of Kamala Harris’ trip this week to Dubai. Among the points were that the US will have conversations with Israel to “shape the next phase of the war” in Gaza. While this is clearly further pressure on Israel to avoid greater civilian casualties – a reasonable but unnecessary request since Israel has already gone to impossible lengths to protect Palestinian civilians — it is also suggests how the US expects to leverage the course of this war to affect post-war outcome.

There has been confusion regarding the nature of American support for Israel. It was the consensus in Israel in the first weeks that the United States under the Biden team had two common goals: remove Hamas and help Israel focus on the south and avoid a two-front war immediately. True enough. But Israelis of all stripes projected their hopes further and welcomed the impression that the US now “gets it” the same way as has been seared into Israel’s soul through the horror of October 7. Not only that Washington “switched its diskette” on Hamas, but on Palestinians, Hizballah and Iran. As such, American actions — including moving carrier battle groups and reinforcing US bases region-wide — were assumed first to be support on helping Israel survive initial attack and second to adopt a muscular, if not even threatening policy on Iran.  In essence, Israelis believed that Israel and the US were traveling along the same line, or at least two closely tracking parallel lines.

The problem is they are not.

The United States and Israel travel on intersecting and not parallel lines. The distinction is important. Parallel lines never touch, but they always run together. Intersecting lines on the other hand, converge at one point but eternally diverge afterwards. The point of convergence between the United States and Israel has now yielded to the inevitable divergence, and the strategic implications could not be graver. Moreover, the vast chasm emerging is both on the issue of Palestinians and the larger threat of Iran.

The divergence is most evident through the increasing tone of statements coming from Washington about how to “shape” this war.  There is a tension — strategic and moral –between a war narrowly focused on defeating Hamas and extending the Palestinian Authority, and a broader strategic war to change Israeli security on every border let alone advance a regional defeat of Iran and its proxies, which remain the ultimate source of the problem.

Israel’s population has undergone a traumatic paradigm shift. It fights this war informed by a broader and grounded understanding of the region and its dynamics that unfortunately indicts policy on the region that both Jerusalem and Washington had indulged for the last thirty years. Washington, however, proceeds as if nothing has changed. It remains in paradigmatic stasis. It still labors under the delusion that the exit to all this is a combination of some sort of Oslo 2.0 and JCPOA 2.0 (Iran deal).  Hence its engagement with Abu Mazen and its cultivated restraint and lack of meaningful responses to nearly 80 attacks on US bases across the region and regional attacks by Iran’s proxies from Yemen to Iraq.

Because the US now focuses on “the day after” plans for Gaza, and because Secretary Blinken reportedly demanded that Israel not expand the geographic parameters of the war, it has essentially made support for Israel conditional — specifically as long as the goal of the war remains laser-focused on the removal of Hamas to facilitate restoring Palestinian Authority (PA) control over Gaza.

Stripped of all the noise, essentially this is less support for Israel than support for the Palestinian Authority via Israel, while ignoring Hizballah and Iran.  The US is using this war — and all Israel’s sacrifice — to revive Oslo by making Palestine safe for Abu Mazen.

For the US, this is a war to save a paradigm in Washington. For Israel, it is a war for survival against a vast Iranian threat and Palestinian irridentism. As long as the United States fails to appreciate the war in this context, then it bodes ill about the future of Israeli American relations.

Or does it?

In my many years as a senior US official dealing with Israeli officials, it always struck me that they regard State Department corridor messages as the definitive word on US policy for Israel. Yet, Americans strongly support Israel. Congressional support is strong and growing. No President can afford to abandon Israel as long as the American people view it as a close ally fighting darkness. The belief Israel is acting fiercely to defend its independence and freedom — alone if necessary – taps into classic American imagination in popular culture as the epic hero. The irony missed often by Israelis is that the more they act in deference to the State Department, the more they damage their brand in the American public’s psyche, and the more they surrender popular support now and affinity in the long run.

The President does have a problem with progressives’ pressure to confront Israel. As long as Israel defers to American demands, it yields the field to progressives to dominate cost-free. If however, this president is forced to choose, the Democratic leadership understands that the party will lose swing districts in the 2024 Congressional elections as well as possibly the White House. Progressives cannot deliver the floating center of American politics. They have nowhere else to go; centrist liberals do.

As such, Israeli deference is self-defeating. Israel suffers self-deterrence.

The stakes could not be higher. Israel must decisively win this war, secure its citizenry country-wide, strategically devastate Iran’s regional reputation, and establish Israel as a powerful regional actor. The viability of the state depends on it.

Published in The Institute for A Secure America, December 4, 2023.

Even as he turns this weekend 100 years old Dr. Henry Kissinger is relevant and worth listening to. World leaders continue to consult with him, and he pumps out sage book after prescient opinion column. His record regarding Jews and Israel remains controversial, but I think that on balance Kissinger deserves respect.

Arriving in the US in 1938 as a fifteen-year-old Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, Kissinger rose to become the most consequential figure in US foreign policy of the past century, serving as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State to US presidents Nixon and Ford.

He crafted the policy of détente towards the Soviet Union, led diplomatic rapprochement with China, helped bring an end to the Vietnam war (for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize alongside Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam), and broached the beginnings of Arab-Israel peace after the Yom Kippur War.

His erudite books are staples for those who study statecraft, beginning with A World Restored (about the Congress of Vienna that ended the Napoleonic wars), through his three-volume memoir of government service, to the more recent books Diplomacy, World Order, Crisis, On China, and Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy.

All this has kept him at the forefront of international affairs discourse, and global leaders still beat a path to his New York office. In these interactions, Kissinger promotes a realpolitik strategic outlook.

For example, over the past year he has expressed concern about too-severe Western sanctions that could lead to the breakup of Russia – which would be a global security nightmare given its nuclear weapons. Kissinger has suggested that even though Russian President Vladimir Putin certainly does not deserve to be placated with ill-gotten territory, the war in Ukraine could best be ended by “a balance of dissatisfaction” whereby Russia retains Sevastopol and Ukraine joins NATO.

In Mideast matters, Kissinger was and remains a critic of President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran. He worries about Tehran’s hegemonic advances and its ballistic missile program. He is supportive of the Abraham Accords and believes that Washington should work harder to bring Saudi Arabia into the circle of peace with Israel. He is mindful, however, of raw Islamic antisemitism in Riyadh. (That antisemitism was well-evident when Kissinger managed ties with the Saudis in the 1970s.)

In an eight-hours of discussion with editors of The Economist this month, Kissinger sounded the alarm about Chinese and Russian forays into Asia, Europe, and the Middle East at the expense of American leadership, due to “a dangerous lack of strategic purpose in US foreign policy.” He also expressed concern that “the shared perception (by all sides in US politics) of American worth has been lost. In order to hold a strategic view, you need faith in your country.” Instead, he insinuated, Democratic/liberal education “dwells on America’s darkest moments.” (It is worth studying the 20,000-word Economist transcript.)

Most lately, Kissinger is seized with the human future in an age of artificial intelligence (generative AI), as advanced machines take over the decision-making processes associated with nuclear deterrence and warfare – ungoverned by ethical or philosophical norms. He is worried that AI is going to supercharge Sino-American rivalry too. “We are on the path to great power confrontation,” he warns.

TO SOME AMERICAN JEWS, mention of Kissinger elicits extreme scorn, mainly because of his opposition to the Jackson-Vanik amendment which was crucial in pressuring the Soviet Union to allow Jewish emigration. Kissinger advised Nixon that “the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy.” He and Nixon did not like Congressional (or Jewish or other) interference in foreign policy, especially not in the administration’s centerpiece détente policy.

I think that Kissinger was wrong in de-emphasizing human rights as it pertained to the Soviet Union. He should have been supportive of the movement to free Soviet Jews, despite détente. Kissinger also erred in remaining silent as Nixon often let loose with notoriously antisemitic tirades. In these matters, alas, Kissinger never has expressed remorse.

To some Israelis, Dr. Kissinger is recalled as a foe because he supposedly held-up American supply to Israel of weapons during the first crucial week of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

This is a false allegation. From my in-depth study of the historical and biographical literature relating to the Yom Kippur War, and from personal conversations with Dr. Kissinger in Israel in 2017 and in New York in 2022, I am convinced that he has been maligned in this regard.

(I will add that in conversation with me, Kissinger has been personally gracious, honest in tackling criticism, and open to hearing new perspectives.)

The delay in weapons supply to Israel on days two through six of the war cannot be attributed to Kissinger but rather then-Defense Secretary Schlesinger, along with unfriendly European leaders who refused stopover landing rights for planes carrying supplies for Israel.

The delay also was a function of the fact that nobody thought, including Israel, that the IDF truly needed a massive airlift of weapons. The assumption was that any heavy weapons sent to Israel would anyway arrive after the war had been quickly won (just like Israel swiftly had won the Six Day War).

When the situation worsened, Jerusalem finally did beseech Washington for significant weapons supply – on the seventh and eighth days of the war, Oct. 12-13. Kissinger then got Nixon to okay an immediate emergency airlift of arms in US military planes. Over the first full day of the airlift, the US shipped to Israel more weaponry (1,800 tons) than the USSR had sent to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq over the four previous days; and 3,000 tons more of equipment were to follow.

Furthermore, any fair assessment of Kissinger’s conduct at that time must consider the fact that he shrewdly counseled Israel against agreeing to a ceasefire on the fifth day of the war, because at that time Israel had lost territory. Kissinger warned an exhausted and dispirited Prime Minister Golda Meir that she should agree to a ceasefire only when the IDF had the upper hand and had pushed back into enemy territory.

Of even greater import is that fact that the following week, on Saturday October 20, Kissinger defied a directive from Nixon to cut a deal with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev at Israel’s expense.

Nixon had written to Brezhnev that he was ready to “get his client in line” (i.e., Israel), as Brezhnev should do with his Arab client states, and the two superpowers then should “determine” an Arab-Israeli settlement, on their own. Nixon then cabled Kissinger, who had just arrived in Moscow, instructing him to disregard “the intransigence of the Israelis,” and find a way to impose a permanent Middle East settlement.

Nixon: “I want you to know that I am prepared to pressure the Israelis to the extent required, regardless of the domestic political consequences” (meaning, the anger of American Jews). From Moscow Kissinger issued an unprecedented retort to President Nixon, refusing to do Nixon’s “unacceptable” bidding in this regard.

After the war, Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin called Kissinger a true friend, even though Kissinger played hardball with Israel during the arduous “shuttle diplomacy” he undertook to reach armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria.

THE MAIN THING to understand about Kissinger’s actions in the 1970s are that he acted from an American superpower prism. He sensed a historic opportunity to peel Egypt away from the Soviet Union and push Moscow out of the Middle East, and then begin a process of moving Egypt towards a more normal relationship with Israel and the West.

Kissinger conceptualized this as a strategic goal enormously important to Israel’s security, which he cared about; as well as to America’s global position, which was his primary responsibility.

Kissinger thus discouraged Israel from obliterating the Third Egyptian Army in the Sinai and he sought Israeli territorial concessions that would pry the door open to the first-ever direct Arab-Israel negotiations. And while he was very tough with Israeli leaders, Kissinger never ran roughshod over Israel’s core interests. Nixon might have preferred to do so, but Kissinger was respectful of Israel.

Most importantly of all, Kissinger was prescient. Anwar Sadat’s bold visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the ensuing Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 never would have materialized if not for Kissinger’s triangulating diplomacy of 1973-75. In grand historical perspective, this determines that Kissinger acted wisely.

In sum, there is no denying that Kissinger is one of the great practitioners and theoreticians of foreign affairs in the modern age. For the enormous contributions he has made to American diplomacy and Mideast security he merits best wishes on his 100th birthday. And I would be happy to see him visit Israel again this year.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 24, 2023; and Israel Hayom, May 28, 2023

As part of the trilateral negotiations between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States, talk of an American-Israeli defense treaty is in the air. The Saudis want such a treaty with the United States, and the Saudi-Israel peace treaty is in the interest of both nations. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, it is not in Israel’s interest to sign such a treaty with the United States. The security of both countries will be stronger without it.

An American-Israeli security treaty does not mean that Israel receives a carte blanche to do whatever it feels necessary to defend its security, safe in the conviction that the United States will protect it against the worst. On the contrary, such a guarantee will come with the requirement that Israel do nothing that the United States perceives as reckless or provocative, which would have obligated the United States to save Israel from any mess it gets into.

The United States will expect Israel to conform to its own perception of Israel’s security needs. A security treaty may also lead the United States to question Israel’s desire to obtain certain weapons systems (with American aid, i.e.at American expense,) or to preserve Israel’s qualitative military superiority in the Middle East. After all, an American administration can argue, we’re here to protect you, so what do you need all this stuff for?

U.S. wants Israel to get off the fenceFundamentally, the best guarantee for Israel’s security – for any nation’s security – is the autonomy to decide when its security is at stake and to act accordingly. No treaty with a foreign nation can take the place of a nation’s ability to decide on its own what it needs to do to defend itself. Today, Israel serves America’s current security needs in myriad ways that a defense treaty will not reinforce. What Israel needs from the United States is what it already possesses: An American guarantee that if it sells weapons to potential enemies of Israel, America will provide Israeli access to the weapons Israel needs to ensure its qualitative superiority.As democratic nations in a world challenged by rising authoritarianism, Israel and the United States share fundamental interests. That does not mean that their interests are in every respect equivalent. America’s perception of Israel’s security needs will always be colored by the United States’ perception of its own interests, and America’s perception of what it needs to do to live up to any security guarantee it gives to Israel will not always be congruent with what Israel believes needs to be done. Too often American policy – like many nations’ policies – will be governed by myopia and short-term interests. Contemporary examples abound. The United States wants Israel to get off the fence and provide arms and military technology to Ukraine. No NATO ally in Europe is as directly threatened by what Russia can do to harm its security as Israel is, yet this apparently does nothing to reduce American impatience with Israel. The current American administration pays lip service to the idea that Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons, yet it is as clear as day that the United States will do nothing effective to prevent Iran from obtaining these weapons and wants Israel to refrain from doing anything either. The current administration is a prisoner to the perspective that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Israel’s fault and that it is incumbent upon Israel to do less against the threat of Palestinian terror, even if it has to pay a price in Israeli civilian lives. To be frank, all these American policies threaten vital Israeli security interests, and Israel cannot comply with them. The American-Israeli alliance is an important asset for Israel, but even today it comes at a price, in terms of the constraints it imposes upon Israel’s ability to defend itself. America is large and powerful enough to survive many years of foolish policy, but this is not necessarily true of all America’s allies – as Taiwan is likely to discover to its cost in a few years’ time. America’s long-term security interests are best served when Israel is strong, independent, and can take care of itself, even if America sometimes wishes it had more control over Israel. Israel’s greatest asset in the United States is the respect most Americans have for our democracy and our independence: Our commitment, from the days of Ben-Gurion, to defend ourselves and never to submit to the temptation to let someone else do our fighting for us. An Israel dependent upon American security guarantees will become just that – a dependent state, the object of contempt rather than admiration. An American-Israeli security treaty represents a Faustian bargain for Israel – giving up more control over our own security in return for someone else’s promise to do the job for us. We should think back to 1975, the year the United States walked away from South Vietnam, an American ally, and let it fall. That year Golda Meir warned her people that an American security guarantee was a false promise that Israel should never rely upon. Israel should heed that warning today.

Published in Ynet,  September 28, 2023.

In a recent Foreign Affairs article, former IDF Gen. Amos Yadlin argues that in order to entice Washington into taking a stronger stance against Iran and facilitating a deal between Israeli and Saudi Arabia, Israel must make “goodwill gestures.”

These would include: Ending the process of judicial reform, preventing the construction of Jewish homes in Judea and Samaria, and more actively supporting Ukraine. While the idea that a country must prioritize its national interests and then negotiate with its allies to promote them is sound, Yadlin’s proposals would not bring about the desired results, as they are not in the core interests of either country.

Yadlin’s proposal fails to distinguish between core American interests and mere political preferences. For example, while opposing Iran’s nuclear program and normalizing relations with the Saudis are key Israeli and U.S. interests, judicial reform is a purely domestic issue. It has no effect on American interests.

Likewise, neither preventing Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria nor “solving” the Palestinian issue is a priority for Washington.

Finally, while Ukraine is significant to the Biden administration, a change in Israeli policy would have a negligible impact on the outcome of the war. It would also bring Israel into direct conflict with Russia. This would be highly detrimental to Israel’s national security and thus American interests in the Middle East.

None of these issues are important enough to change Washington’s calculus in regard to a war with Iran or security guarantees to Saudi Arabia.

Yadlin correctly states that Israel wants the United States to put unrelenting pressure on Iran. But such a policy carries risks of escalation that U.S. President Joe Biden is simply not willing to take. No Israeli goodwill gesture will convince him otherwise.

Yadlin asserts that “Biden is the only world leader who is capable of taking steps that will stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon.” This is incorrect. America indeed has the power to strike a devastating blow to Iran’s nuclear facilities, but it has not convinced anyone that it would actually follow through on its threats.

While Israel may not have the same overwhelming firepower, Iran sees Israeli threats as credible. Indeed, the only reason Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons is the military threat posed by Israel.

Thus, it is in the interest of both Jerusalem and Washington for Israel to continue its threats to strike. In this context, Biden can negotiate with Iran if he so desires, while Israel maintains its credible threat.

Yadlin suggests that Israel and the U.S. could “establish the foundations of a new Middle East security architecture in which participants share intelligence, air defenses, logistics and other resources to protect freedom of navigation and coordinate additional steps against Tehran.”

This is an excellent idea because it would be in the interests of all involved. But the key to its success is Israeli assertiveness, not a public display of Israeli subordination to Washington.

As for Saudi-Israel normalization, it cannot succeed unless Biden abandons some of his previous policies vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. However, this would be in America’s interests, not a result of Israeli goodwill gestures. As long as the U.S. turns a cold shoulder to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will seek to deepen its cooperation with China and Russia. Therefore, in the context of great power competition, pursuing Saudi-Israel normalization is a core U.S. interest. Moreover, the only reason Saudi Arabia is interested in normalization with Israel in the first place is because of Israeli power and assertiveness in the region, which have made Israel an asset to the Saudis against their primary threat—Iran.

To more closely align itself with the U.S., Yadlin suggests that Israel take steps to reduce its technological exposure to China. It’s a good suggestion, but it is already Israeli policy. Yadlin criticizes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for strengthening economic cooperation with China a decade ago, but at the time it was uncontroversial.

Yadlin also suggests strengthening Israel’s connections with U.S. allies India, Japan and South Korea. This is a great idea, but he fails to note that it was Netanyahu who spearheaded Israel’s growing connections with India over the past decade.

Yadlin’s proposals on Ukraine are more problematic. Israel’s cautious position on Ukraine has been maintained by all three of its most recent governments, which spanned the political spectrum. Israel faces serious security threats that could be exacerbated by a direct conflict with Russia. At the same time, the amount of direct assistance it could provide to Ukraine is negligible relative to the larger economies of Europe and the U.S.

Yadlin claims that Moscow is “too busy” to hinder Israel’s freedom of action in Syria, but Russian planes are still active in Syria’s skies. Moreover, because Iran is actively supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, when Israel takes direct action against Iran—such as the strike on an Iranian drone facility in Jan. 2023—it directly benefits Ukraine.

A policy based on mutual U.S.-Israeli interests would be for the United States to encourage such Israeli operations, as they indirectly serve U.S. interests in Ukraine.

Moreover, Yadlin’s claim that Israeli policy is distancing Israel from the West is incorrect. Given their newfound realization that security threats still exist, Western European countries have become more eager to cooperate with Israel and purchase its military equipment. For example, Germany recently decided to purchase Israel’s Arrow 3 missile defense system.

Yadlin’s proposals for the Palestinian arena are even more misguided. He is correct that Palestinian terror attacks have been on the rise. But he reverses the order of cause and effect by asserting that Israeli policies on Jewish construction and Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount are the source of the Palestinian “inflammation.”

In fact, it is the Palestinians who are undertaking illegal land grabs across Area C of Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the idea that more Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria are somehow an obstacle to peace implies that, for some reason, any Palestinian political entity must be Judenrein—empty of Jews. A fifth of Israel’s population is Arab; the Palestinians should be capable of the same degree of tolerance. Moreover, what U.S. interest is served by the demand that a future Palestinian state be “cleansed” of Jews?

Biden sees no alternative to maintaining the façade of “working toward the two-state solution,” but he has no intention of making the Palestinian issue the linchpin of U.S. regional policy. Furthermore, strengthening the Palestinian Authority and its hopes of replacing Israel does not serve U.S. interests. A Palestinian state would be a failed and hostile state aligned with Beijing and Moscow, not Washington.

Yadlin promotes the view that Israel’s value to the United States is a result of its willingness to subordinate its national security policy to U.S. preferences. In fact, Israel has become a strategic asset to the U.S. because it has insisted on taking responsibility for its own security.

On occasion, Israeli policy does not align perfectly with that of the U.S. The two allies must try to have honest conversations when this is the case. By doing so, it will become clear what each other’s core national security interests are and which are merely preferences. In their strategic dialogue, Jerusalem and Washington should check their sentimental disagreements at the door.

Published in Jns, August 17, 2023.

Believe it or not, the Biden administration apparently is once again offering the mullahs of Tehran a sweetheart deal: the release of $10 billion or more in frozen Iranian assets and clemency for Iran’s near-breakout nuclear advances of recent years, in exchange for Iranian release of American hostages and warmed-over pious Iranian pledges to freeze the Shiite atomic bomb program.

This, even though Washington would be freezing the Iranian nuclear program with 16 cascades spinning to enrich uranium to 60% purity, which is just shy of weapons-grade. In February, Iran was caught with some uranium enriched to 84% purity and was called-out for manufacturing uranium metal, a material used in nuclear weapon cores.

This month, intelligence photos showed Iran again digging tunnels at its Natanz nuclear site – supposedly deep enough to withstand an American or Israeli military strike. This tells us that Iran has what to hide, a clear sign that it has not given up on its quest for a nuclear bomb.

Nevertheless, US President Joe Biden may grant Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi an end to all past and current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigations into Iran’s nuclear violations alongside the suck-up deal above.

Biden also seems happy to ignore Iran’s other regional muckraking and hegemonic advances, including its harassment of internationally flagged merchant ships in the Straits of Hormuz, and its placement of “floating terror bases” (civilian ships converted into mini-aircraft and commando carriers) in the strategic waterway. The situation there is so bad that in protest the UAE last month pulled-out of a US naval alliance group meant to protect shipping in the Arabian Gulf.

John Hannah and Richard Goldberg of the Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies warned this week in a special alert publication that the above contours would be “a bad, even a desperate, deal made from a position of American weakness.”

“It looks like the administration is reviving an idea out of the old Obama playbook because it’s not willing to do what’s necessary to stop Iran’s program by restoring deterrence through coercive diplomacy. Biden is scared to death that if Iran keeps advancing its nuclear program, either the United States or Israel will be forced to make good on their promise to stop Iran militarily.”

“From the administration’s perspective, paying Iran off is the easiest way to hold at bay the worst-case outcomes of a nuclear Iran, on the one hand, or another major military conflict, on the other. And suspending sanctions to get there is a lot easier and less risky in their minds than doing the hard work and committing the resources needed to establish a credible US military option to destroy the Iranian program.”

“But the price for America will be stabilizing and strengthening a terror-supporting Iranian regime now under pressure not only from sanctions but from profound domestic discontent and turmoil among its own population,” they added.

Equally distressing, they warned, is that “Biden risks undermining American support for the war in Ukraine by asking Congress to approve billions of taxpayer dollars to support Kyiv while offering Iran billions of dollars to help resupply Moscow.” (It has been well documented that Iran is supplying Russia with military attack drones and other critical technologies with which to clobber Ukraine.)

Given that Washington appears unwilling, even now, to place hard limits on the crucial elements of Iran’s illicit nuclear weapons program (fissile material production, weaponization, and means of delivery/missile development), and is unwilling to apply maximum economic pressure (as President Trump did) or to present a credible military threat to Iran – it is no surprise that Israel is ramping-up its preparations for confrontation.

At the Herzliya Conference last week, IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi said plainly, in a rare speech focused directly on Iran, that Israel may “take action” against Iran’s nuclear facilities because of “possible negative developments on the horizon. We have the ability to hit Iran, and we are not indifferent to what Iran is trying to build around us.” National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi added that “there is no place that can’t be reached” (referring to the new Natanz tunnels).

THIS IS WHERE broader regional diplomacy comes into the picture and complicates Israel’s calculations.

Washington expects Israeli acquiescence in the emerging US surrender to Iran in exchange for a series of other things important to Israel. These include US backing for Israel against escalated Palestinian assaults expected this fall in UN forums, toning down US criticism regarding settlement and security matters (at a time when the IDF is going to have to intensify its anti-terrorist operations in Judea and Samaria), an easing of US pressures on Israel in connection with domestic matters (like judicial reform), a warm Washington visit for Prime Minister Netanyahu (which is not just a political concession but rather is critical to Israel’s overall deterrent posture), and most of all, significant American moves towards reconciliation with Saudi Arabia (which is critical to driving a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi ties).

It is worth dwelling on the latter point because renewed close cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is central to the stability of the region and is the cornerstone of what should and can be Saudi entry to the Abraham Accords. In other words, the road to Israel-Saudi normalization runs through Washington.

It will take serious intent and deft maneuvering from America to get there, and there is good reason to doubt that Biden is prepared or capable of paying the mostly justified Saudi price for renewed close Saudi-US partnership. (This may include a defense treaty, high-quality arms supply, a comprehensive economic agreement, and most controversially, US agreement to a Saudi civilian nuclear program. Israel may have a problem with parts of this package too.)

The further problem is that even an expensive package of US “concessions” to Saudi Arabia will not truly compensate for US capitulation to Iran (something we know from experience will only embolden the hegemonic ambitions of the mullahs). And this capitulation will make it more difficult for the Saudis to publicly embrace Israel (although the quiet security coordination between the two countries assuredly will continue to grow).

In the end, Israel must prioritize its most naked, existential security interests – which clearly are stopping Iran’s nuclear bomb effort and scuttling Iran’s attempts to encircle Israel with well-armed proxy armies. Accepting another ruinous US nuclear deal with Iran is not in accordance with these interests.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, 02.06.2023 and Israel Hayom, 04.06.2023.