As part of the trilateral negotiations between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States, talk of an American-Israeli defense treaty is in the air. The Saudis want such a treaty with the United States, and the Saudi-Israel peace treaty is in the interest of both nations. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, it is not in Israel’s interest to sign such a treaty with the United States. The security of both countries will be stronger without it.

An American-Israeli security treaty does not mean that Israel receives a carte blanche to do whatever it feels necessary to defend its security, safe in the conviction that the United States will protect it against the worst. On the contrary, such a guarantee will come with the requirement that Israel do nothing that the United States perceives as reckless or provocative, which would have obligated the United States to save Israel from any mess it gets into.

The United States will expect Israel to conform to its own perception of Israel’s security needs. A security treaty may also lead the United States to question Israel’s desire to obtain certain weapons systems (with American aid, i.e.at American expense,) or to preserve Israel’s qualitative military superiority in the Middle East. After all, an American administration can argue, we’re here to protect you, so what do you need all this stuff for?

U.S. wants Israel to get off the fenceFundamentally, the best guarantee for Israel’s security – for any nation’s security – is the autonomy to decide when its security is at stake and to act accordingly. No treaty with a foreign nation can take the place of a nation’s ability to decide on its own what it needs to do to defend itself. Today, Israel serves America’s current security needs in myriad ways that a defense treaty will not reinforce. What Israel needs from the United States is what it already possesses: An American guarantee that if it sells weapons to potential enemies of Israel, America will provide Israeli access to the weapons Israel needs to ensure its qualitative superiority.As democratic nations in a world challenged by rising authoritarianism, Israel and the United States share fundamental interests. That does not mean that their interests are in every respect equivalent. America’s perception of Israel’s security needs will always be colored by the United States’ perception of its own interests, and America’s perception of what it needs to do to live up to any security guarantee it gives to Israel will not always be congruent with what Israel believes needs to be done. Too often American policy – like many nations’ policies – will be governed by myopia and short-term interests. Contemporary examples abound. The United States wants Israel to get off the fence and provide arms and military technology to Ukraine. No NATO ally in Europe is as directly threatened by what Russia can do to harm its security as Israel is, yet this apparently does nothing to reduce American impatience with Israel. The current American administration pays lip service to the idea that Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons, yet it is as clear as day that the United States will do nothing effective to prevent Iran from obtaining these weapons and wants Israel to refrain from doing anything either. The current administration is a prisoner to the perspective that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Israel’s fault and that it is incumbent upon Israel to do less against the threat of Palestinian terror, even if it has to pay a price in Israeli civilian lives. To be frank, all these American policies threaten vital Israeli security interests, and Israel cannot comply with them. The American-Israeli alliance is an important asset for Israel, but even today it comes at a price, in terms of the constraints it imposes upon Israel’s ability to defend itself. America is large and powerful enough to survive many years of foolish policy, but this is not necessarily true of all America’s allies – as Taiwan is likely to discover to its cost in a few years’ time. America’s long-term security interests are best served when Israel is strong, independent, and can take care of itself, even if America sometimes wishes it had more control over Israel. Israel’s greatest asset in the United States is the respect most Americans have for our democracy and our independence: Our commitment, from the days of Ben-Gurion, to defend ourselves and never to submit to the temptation to let someone else do our fighting for us. An Israel dependent upon American security guarantees will become just that – a dependent state, the object of contempt rather than admiration. An American-Israeli security treaty represents a Faustian bargain for Israel – giving up more control over our own security in return for someone else’s promise to do the job for us. We should think back to 1975, the year the United States walked away from South Vietnam, an American ally, and let it fall. That year Golda Meir warned her people that an American security guarantee was a false promise that Israel should never rely upon. Israel should heed that warning today.

Published in Ynet,  September 28, 2023.

In a recent Foreign Affairs article, former IDF Gen. Amos Yadlin argues that in order to entice Washington into taking a stronger stance against Iran and facilitating a deal between Israeli and Saudi Arabia, Israel must make “goodwill gestures.”

These would include: Ending the process of judicial reform, preventing the construction of Jewish homes in Judea and Samaria, and more actively supporting Ukraine. While the idea that a country must prioritize its national interests and then negotiate with its allies to promote them is sound, Yadlin’s proposals would not bring about the desired results, as they are not in the core interests of either country.

Yadlin’s proposal fails to distinguish between core American interests and mere political preferences. For example, while opposing Iran’s nuclear program and normalizing relations with the Saudis are key Israeli and U.S. interests, judicial reform is a purely domestic issue. It has no effect on American interests.

Likewise, neither preventing Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria nor “solving” the Palestinian issue is a priority for Washington.

Finally, while Ukraine is significant to the Biden administration, a change in Israeli policy would have a negligible impact on the outcome of the war. It would also bring Israel into direct conflict with Russia. This would be highly detrimental to Israel’s national security and thus American interests in the Middle East.

None of these issues are important enough to change Washington’s calculus in regard to a war with Iran or security guarantees to Saudi Arabia.

Yadlin correctly states that Israel wants the United States to put unrelenting pressure on Iran. But such a policy carries risks of escalation that U.S. President Joe Biden is simply not willing to take. No Israeli goodwill gesture will convince him otherwise.

Yadlin asserts that “Biden is the only world leader who is capable of taking steps that will stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon.” This is incorrect. America indeed has the power to strike a devastating blow to Iran’s nuclear facilities, but it has not convinced anyone that it would actually follow through on its threats.

While Israel may not have the same overwhelming firepower, Iran sees Israeli threats as credible. Indeed, the only reason Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons is the military threat posed by Israel.

Thus, it is in the interest of both Jerusalem and Washington for Israel to continue its threats to strike. In this context, Biden can negotiate with Iran if he so desires, while Israel maintains its credible threat.

Yadlin suggests that Israel and the U.S. could “establish the foundations of a new Middle East security architecture in which participants share intelligence, air defenses, logistics and other resources to protect freedom of navigation and coordinate additional steps against Tehran.”

This is an excellent idea because it would be in the interests of all involved. But the key to its success is Israeli assertiveness, not a public display of Israeli subordination to Washington.

As for Saudi-Israel normalization, it cannot succeed unless Biden abandons some of his previous policies vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. However, this would be in America’s interests, not a result of Israeli goodwill gestures. As long as the U.S. turns a cold shoulder to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will seek to deepen its cooperation with China and Russia. Therefore, in the context of great power competition, pursuing Saudi-Israel normalization is a core U.S. interest. Moreover, the only reason Saudi Arabia is interested in normalization with Israel in the first place is because of Israeli power and assertiveness in the region, which have made Israel an asset to the Saudis against their primary threat—Iran.

To more closely align itself with the U.S., Yadlin suggests that Israel take steps to reduce its technological exposure to China. It’s a good suggestion, but it is already Israeli policy. Yadlin criticizes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for strengthening economic cooperation with China a decade ago, but at the time it was uncontroversial.

Yadlin also suggests strengthening Israel’s connections with U.S. allies India, Japan and South Korea. This is a great idea, but he fails to note that it was Netanyahu who spearheaded Israel’s growing connections with India over the past decade.

Yadlin’s proposals on Ukraine are more problematic. Israel’s cautious position on Ukraine has been maintained by all three of its most recent governments, which spanned the political spectrum. Israel faces serious security threats that could be exacerbated by a direct conflict with Russia. At the same time, the amount of direct assistance it could provide to Ukraine is negligible relative to the larger economies of Europe and the U.S.

Yadlin claims that Moscow is “too busy” to hinder Israel’s freedom of action in Syria, but Russian planes are still active in Syria’s skies. Moreover, because Iran is actively supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, when Israel takes direct action against Iran—such as the strike on an Iranian drone facility in Jan. 2023—it directly benefits Ukraine.

A policy based on mutual U.S.-Israeli interests would be for the United States to encourage such Israeli operations, as they indirectly serve U.S. interests in Ukraine.

Moreover, Yadlin’s claim that Israeli policy is distancing Israel from the West is incorrect. Given their newfound realization that security threats still exist, Western European countries have become more eager to cooperate with Israel and purchase its military equipment. For example, Germany recently decided to purchase Israel’s Arrow 3 missile defense system.

Yadlin’s proposals for the Palestinian arena are even more misguided. He is correct that Palestinian terror attacks have been on the rise. But he reverses the order of cause and effect by asserting that Israeli policies on Jewish construction and Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount are the source of the Palestinian “inflammation.”

In fact, it is the Palestinians who are undertaking illegal land grabs across Area C of Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the idea that more Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria are somehow an obstacle to peace implies that, for some reason, any Palestinian political entity must be Judenrein—empty of Jews. A fifth of Israel’s population is Arab; the Palestinians should be capable of the same degree of tolerance. Moreover, what U.S. interest is served by the demand that a future Palestinian state be “cleansed” of Jews?

Biden sees no alternative to maintaining the façade of “working toward the two-state solution,” but he has no intention of making the Palestinian issue the linchpin of U.S. regional policy. Furthermore, strengthening the Palestinian Authority and its hopes of replacing Israel does not serve U.S. interests. A Palestinian state would be a failed and hostile state aligned with Beijing and Moscow, not Washington.

Yadlin promotes the view that Israel’s value to the United States is a result of its willingness to subordinate its national security policy to U.S. preferences. In fact, Israel has become a strategic asset to the U.S. because it has insisted on taking responsibility for its own security.

On occasion, Israeli policy does not align perfectly with that of the U.S. The two allies must try to have honest conversations when this is the case. By doing so, it will become clear what each other’s core national security interests are and which are merely preferences. In their strategic dialogue, Jerusalem and Washington should check their sentimental disagreements at the door.

Published in Jns, August 17, 2023.

Believe it or not, the Biden administration apparently is once again offering the mullahs of Tehran a sweetheart deal: the release of $10 billion or more in frozen Iranian assets and clemency for Iran’s near-breakout nuclear advances of recent years, in exchange for Iranian release of American hostages and warmed-over pious Iranian pledges to freeze the Shiite atomic bomb program.

This, even though Washington would be freezing the Iranian nuclear program with 16 cascades spinning to enrich uranium to 60% purity, which is just shy of weapons-grade. In February, Iran was caught with some uranium enriched to 84% purity and was called-out for manufacturing uranium metal, a material used in nuclear weapon cores.

This month, intelligence photos showed Iran again digging tunnels at its Natanz nuclear site – supposedly deep enough to withstand an American or Israeli military strike. This tells us that Iran has what to hide, a clear sign that it has not given up on its quest for a nuclear bomb.

Nevertheless, US President Joe Biden may grant Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi an end to all past and current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigations into Iran’s nuclear violations alongside the suck-up deal above.

Biden also seems happy to ignore Iran’s other regional muckraking and hegemonic advances, including its harassment of internationally flagged merchant ships in the Straits of Hormuz, and its placement of “floating terror bases” (civilian ships converted into mini-aircraft and commando carriers) in the strategic waterway. The situation there is so bad that in protest the UAE last month pulled-out of a US naval alliance group meant to protect shipping in the Arabian Gulf.

John Hannah and Richard Goldberg of the Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies warned this week in a special alert publication that the above contours would be “a bad, even a desperate, deal made from a position of American weakness.”

“It looks like the administration is reviving an idea out of the old Obama playbook because it’s not willing to do what’s necessary to stop Iran’s program by restoring deterrence through coercive diplomacy. Biden is scared to death that if Iran keeps advancing its nuclear program, either the United States or Israel will be forced to make good on their promise to stop Iran militarily.”

“From the administration’s perspective, paying Iran off is the easiest way to hold at bay the worst-case outcomes of a nuclear Iran, on the one hand, or another major military conflict, on the other. And suspending sanctions to get there is a lot easier and less risky in their minds than doing the hard work and committing the resources needed to establish a credible US military option to destroy the Iranian program.”

“But the price for America will be stabilizing and strengthening a terror-supporting Iranian regime now under pressure not only from sanctions but from profound domestic discontent and turmoil among its own population,” they added.

Equally distressing, they warned, is that “Biden risks undermining American support for the war in Ukraine by asking Congress to approve billions of taxpayer dollars to support Kyiv while offering Iran billions of dollars to help resupply Moscow.” (It has been well documented that Iran is supplying Russia with military attack drones and other critical technologies with which to clobber Ukraine.)

Given that Washington appears unwilling, even now, to place hard limits on the crucial elements of Iran’s illicit nuclear weapons program (fissile material production, weaponization, and means of delivery/missile development), and is unwilling to apply maximum economic pressure (as President Trump did) or to present a credible military threat to Iran – it is no surprise that Israel is ramping-up its preparations for confrontation.

At the Herzliya Conference last week, IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi said plainly, in a rare speech focused directly on Iran, that Israel may “take action” against Iran’s nuclear facilities because of “possible negative developments on the horizon. We have the ability to hit Iran, and we are not indifferent to what Iran is trying to build around us.” National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi added that “there is no place that can’t be reached” (referring to the new Natanz tunnels).

THIS IS WHERE broader regional diplomacy comes into the picture and complicates Israel’s calculations.

Washington expects Israeli acquiescence in the emerging US surrender to Iran in exchange for a series of other things important to Israel. These include US backing for Israel against escalated Palestinian assaults expected this fall in UN forums, toning down US criticism regarding settlement and security matters (at a time when the IDF is going to have to intensify its anti-terrorist operations in Judea and Samaria), an easing of US pressures on Israel in connection with domestic matters (like judicial reform), a warm Washington visit for Prime Minister Netanyahu (which is not just a political concession but rather is critical to Israel’s overall deterrent posture), and most of all, significant American moves towards reconciliation with Saudi Arabia (which is critical to driving a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi ties).

It is worth dwelling on the latter point because renewed close cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is central to the stability of the region and is the cornerstone of what should and can be Saudi entry to the Abraham Accords. In other words, the road to Israel-Saudi normalization runs through Washington.

It will take serious intent and deft maneuvering from America to get there, and there is good reason to doubt that Biden is prepared or capable of paying the mostly justified Saudi price for renewed close Saudi-US partnership. (This may include a defense treaty, high-quality arms supply, a comprehensive economic agreement, and most controversially, US agreement to a Saudi civilian nuclear program. Israel may have a problem with parts of this package too.)

The further problem is that even an expensive package of US “concessions” to Saudi Arabia will not truly compensate for US capitulation to Iran (something we know from experience will only embolden the hegemonic ambitions of the mullahs). And this capitulation will make it more difficult for the Saudis to publicly embrace Israel (although the quiet security coordination between the two countries assuredly will continue to grow).

In the end, Israel must prioritize its most naked, existential security interests – which clearly are stopping Iran’s nuclear bomb effort and scuttling Iran’s attempts to encircle Israel with well-armed proxy armies. Accepting another ruinous US nuclear deal with Iran is not in accordance with these interests.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, 02.06.2023 and Israel Hayom, 04.06.2023.