Where are we headed? This question seems to preoccupy Israelis more than any other issue these days. The ongoing war of attrition with Hezbollah, with northern residents displaced from their homes, coupled with the emerging security routine in the Gaza Strip and the lack of progress on the hostage issue, create an impression of stagnation and stalemate. The escalation in the West Bank – with Iran’s indirect involvement and Hamas leadership pushing for renewed suicide attacks – raises tension levels and attention to this arena.

The eastern border is not quiet, and the threat of a Shiite invasion of Jordan has not diminished. Spokespersons for the regime in Tehran continue to promise revenge for the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh, while on the other side, the Houthi leader in Yemen repeatedly vows to respond harshly to the Israeli attack on the port of Hodeidah. On the international stage, the prosecutor in The Hague continues to press for arrest warrants for top Israeli officials. If all this weren’t enough, there’s growing concern about the war’s impact on the economy, the radicalization of discourse between sectors of Israeli society, and internal polarization.

Against this backdrop, clarifying the government’s objectives, the “organizing idea” for achieving them, and providing a (general) report on progress in this regard is essential. This is crucial for directing and fine-tuning the activities of governmental systems, each in its domain, to engage the public, or at least reduce confusion and uncertainty in this dynamic reality. This is particularly important given the large number of challenges and arenas of action, and in light of the tensions and interconnections between them.

The reality we should aim for within a year should include the following components:

Gaza Strip: Militarily demilitarized, under Israeli security control, without Hamas’s governmental and organizational capabilities, and after the return of the hostages (as soon as possible). The “Generals’ Plan” is one way, but not the only one, that could address the existing tension between the pursuit of Hamas’s collapse and the desire to return the hostages quickly. It is suggested that the political echelon adopt it or develop an alternative that achieves the same effect.

West Bank: After root treatment to dismantle terrorist strongholds, crushing Hamas’s organizational and economic power, strengthening the defense of the seam zone, and exhausting leverage on the Palestinian Authority regarding the encouragement of terrorism and adversarial activities against Israel.

Northern Front: Removing Hezbollah from the direct threat range to northern settlements and safely returning residents to their homes.

Iran: In the midst of an international diplomatic, security, and economic campaign to deter it from nuclear ambitions and dismantle the ring of fire it has built around Israel.

Expanding normalization agreements between Israel and countries in the region and beyond, and forming a regional coalition from a position of strength and after victory.

Israel: In the process of implementing an unprecedented national plan for empowerment in all areas and dimensions, while harnessing all forces to alleviate internal tensions and increase cohesion and agreement.

The ability to achieve these goals, at least some of them, depends to a considerable extent on the policy of the American administration. Truth be told, some of the things heard last week grate on Israeli ears. In this context, it is right to clarify: Israel will not compromise on achieving its goals in Gaza and the north. Its existence requires a stubborn struggle that it is ready for. It is not in question, for the eternity of Israel will not deceive.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 15, 2024.

While Israeli officials continue to debate the cabinet’s decision to oppose withdrawing IDF forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s deputy chief in Gaza, reiterated that this issue is merely one of several demands his group has put forward as conditions for a deal. “We stress that any agreement must encompass a full cessation of hostilities, complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing, unimpeded return of displaced persons to their homes, aid and relief for Palestinians, Gaza’s reconstruction, and a prisoner exchange,” al-Hayya stated.

This stance isn’t new. What stood out in its presentation was the self-assurance displayed by the senior Hamas official, during a week when he and his associates were expected to be on edge, fearing repercussions for the killing of six hostages. However, the reaction to this in Israel and the United States prompted an opposite response from them. From their perspective, not only did they avoid consequences for the heinous act, but through it, they managed to escalate tensions and internal disagreements in Israel, while also prompting Washington to consider presenting a framework defined as a “final offer, without room for negotiation” (“Take it or leave it”). They swiftly capitalized on the public outrage over the hostages’ deaths through a media campaign warning that this would be the outcome of Israeli military pressure, while taking a firm stance on their negotiation demands.

Hamas assumes that a final American proposal will inevitably come at Israel’s expense. The primary pressure to reach an agreement is already being applied to Israeli leadership. Hamas faces no consequences for prolonging the process, and as long as it holds hostages, it can always resume negotiations from where they left off.

President Joe Biden has promised that Hamas would face consequences for the hostages’ deaths. At the very least, he can be expected not to reward Hamas. Pressuring the Israeli government to yield to Hamas’s demands would be tantamount to rewarding the terror group. Instead, the logical step would be American support for Israel’s justified position. Such backing might even help advance negotiations.

It’s time for the United States to fully leverage its influence over Hamas. One approach is to push for the removal of the group’s leaders from Qatar. Washington should demand this from Doha. This leadership bears equal responsibility as the Gaza-based leadership for the October 7 terror attack and subsequent war crimes. It’s the same leadership that is currently urging its operatives in the West Bank to carry out suicide attacks. Demanding the expulsion of Hamas leadership from Qatar and imposing personal sanctions on its members is the minimum expected from the US. Israel will find ways to hold the ringleaders accountable.

From Israel’s standpoint, its next moves in Gaza should serve three objectives: further degrading Hamas’s remaining military capabilities, undermining its governing capacity, and increasing pressure to facilitate the release of hostages. To achieve these goals, Hamas must be entirely stripped of control over supplies entering Gaza. This is the group’s lifeline and the primary means of maintaining its authority. It’s also worth considering further dividing the Strip beyond the current partitions.

Another strategy worth exploring is the one proposed by former National Security Council head, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Giora Eiland: evacuating northern Gaza’s residents, sealing it off as a military zone, and halting supplies to the area. The drawbacks of this proposal lie in the opposition it’s likely to face from the US and the international community, as well as the significant forces required for implementation. Naturally, it could be executed in other areas to varying degrees. Nonetheless, its numerous advantages warrant serious discussion.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 8, 2024.

It has often been said that the definition of insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” That maxim can aptly describe the international community’s approach to the current ceasefire—hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas.

This past week, we received the devastating news of six hostages being executed in cold blood by Hamas in captivity. One of those murdered was 23-year-old American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, whose family’s plight touched so many around the world.

Yet inexplicably, as some of the hostages were still being buried, instead of unleashing fury at Hamas and their state sponsors, the international community chose to raise the pressure on the Jewish State.

President Joe Biden, for example, chose this moment to claim that Prime Minister Netanyahu was not doing enough to secure a hostage deal, while in an unconscionable act of betrayal, Britain chose to adopt a partial arms embargo against Israel.

Even in his wildest dreams, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, could never have imagined this!

Time and time again, Israel has offered unprecedented strategic and security concessions to free the remaining hostages and achieve a pause in hostilities, yet the one constant has been Hamas intransigence and rejectionism—and the international community’s lack of moral backbone to hold them accountable.

The fact of the matter is, Israel has responded positively to every international proposal since November last year, including the most recent framework that President Biden submitted on May 31, as well as “the final bridging proposal: put forward on Aug. 16. In his visit to Israel and the region on Aug. 19, Secretary of State Blinken even confirmed that Netanyahu accepted the bridging proposal and that “it’s now incumbent on Hamas to do the same.”

Hamas made their response clear—with bullet holes to the heads of the six hostages, including Hersh.

Yet, like clockwork, the international community instead chose to single out Netanyahu and Israel, for opprobrium.

It is hardly surprising therefore, that Hamas continues to reject every proposal put before them, when they know they can sit on their laurels and wait for the international community to up the pressure on Israel. By focusing its attention on Israel, the U.S.is empowering Hamas and removing any incentive for the terror group to compromise or reach a deal.

If the international community, led by the U.S., wants to actually advance a hostage deal, they could do so by demanding that American allies such as Qatar and Turkey use all of the levers at their disposal to pressure Hamas into accepting a deal.

Hamas operates extensive financial and business networks out of Qatar and Turkey, while its leaders live in luxurious accommodations in Doha. Qatar’s Al Jazeera media empire is Hamas’ primary outlet for its propaganda, not only inciting terror, but undermining moderate governments interested in Middle East peace. Turkey has given senior Hamas leaders Turkish passports in order to facilitate their travel around the world.

Perhaps if the international community spent a fraction of the energy they do on pressuring Israel to make further concessions, to instead applying unyielding pressure on Hamas and their state sponsors, primarily Qatar, Turkey, and of course Iran, we could have already reached a deal and saved countless lives.

The U.S. must show Doha and Ankara that there is a costly price to pay for failing to pressure Hamas, which knowingly-executed a U.S. citizen in cold blood. There are numerous steps that the Biden administration and Congress can take. Congress should demand regular reports on any and all entities providing material support to Hamas in Qatar and Turkey (as well as in additional countries such as Malaysia, Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon), in order to examine their eligibility for sanctions. Sanctions should also be placed on Qatar’s Al Jazeera for its terror support.

The U.S. should demand that the Qatari and Turkish governments extradite Hamas leaders involved in the murder of US citizens, especially following the Justice Department’s announcement this week of terrorism charges against senior Hamas leaders. The U.S. could also take steps to make it easier for private victims of terror to bring lawsuits against all countries which have provided support to Hamas. If Qatar fails to take swift action to force Hamas to accept a deal, Doha should lose its status as a major U.S. non-NATO ally, which Biden granted it in 2022.

The international community, and especially the U.S., now faces a choice. It can continue its rhetoric against Hamas while focusing real pressure on Israel. Or it can act to truly increase the chances of a deal, by placing unyielding pressure on Hamas and its state sponsors. Only the latter can save the lives of the hostages being held in Gaza, while ensuring security for Israel and a future of stability in the Middle East.

Published in Newsweek, September 6, 2024.

After 10 months of fighting, many ask why Hamas has not yet been destroyed and Israel’s war objectives have yet to be fully realized.

At the beginning of the war, some in the defense establishment and government sought to avoid a ground maneuver in Gaza. Similar advice was offered by the American officials who frequented Israel. There were several reasons for this hesitation, primary among which were doubts regarding the ability of ground forces to operate effectively in Gaza’s complex environment. While it took time to make the decision to go ahead with the maneuver, once made, Israeli forces acted decisively.

However, over time, the senior command became hesitant in its use of force, imposing numerous limitations on the advance of forces. It was as if they envisioned the campaign as a large special operation and not a series of divisional attacks during which it was necessary to maintain the principles of war, particularly that of continuity. This resulted in frequent halts in operations, especially in Rafah, partly due diplomatic pressures from the United States that the political echelon was unable to withstand. However, lack of professional resolve among the highest military ranks also contributed to the unnecessary prolongation of the conflict.

Another factor prolonging the conflict—one that is still in play—is the issue of humanitarian aid, which has two aspects. The first is the scope of aid entering Gaza and the second is how this aid is distributed. From the start, Israel faced intense American pressure to transfer humanitarian aid and fuel to Gaza, despite Washington’s knowledge that much of it would reach Hamas and enhance its ability to survive in Gaza’s tunnels. The political echelon’s inability to withstand this pressure undermined one of Israel’s key leverage points to secure the return of the hostages and prolonged Hamas’ military and civilian survivability.

Hamas’s control over humanitarian aid gives it breathing room and maintains its influence and power among the population. Some aid is diverted to the organization’s needs (food and fuel), while the rest is distributed by it; Hamas uses the aid to recruit new operatives (by supplying them with food) and to strengthen its control over the Gaza Strip and its population. Moreover, the aid is not distributed in a manner that aligns with the IDF’s operational objectives, thus complicating efforts to evacuate civilians from areas of conflict, such as northern Gaza, and hindering military operations. The IDF’s hesitation in putting a stop to this by imposing partial and temporary military rule or assuming responsibility for aid distribution prolongs the war and hampers the IDF’s ability to achieve its objectives.

Another factor contributing to the prolonged conflict is the hostage issue. The IDF has acted cautiously throughout the conflict and continues to do so to avoid harming the hostages. Operational planning of the ground maneuver and the use of firepower have been calculated to reduce the risk to them. This caution likely resulted in missed operational opportunities and will likely continue to influence the IDF’s conduct in Gaza.

A delay of some four months was also caused by American and international pressure to avoid operations in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border. This pressure was driven primarily by concerns over harm to civilians and actions that could hinder potential hostage negotiations. However, it now seems clear that these concerns were in fact an excuse for the United States and elements in the international community to impose a ceasefire on Israel. Precious time was lost before the IDF began operations in this area under a format acceptable to Washington.

The IDF’s preparedness for the conflict in Gaza was also inadequate, to say the least. This was manifested in several areas, including force buildup. Over recent years, the IDF has neglected its ground forces, particularly reserve units, due to a belief that wars could be won with intelligence, remote firepower and advanced technology operated by small units.

This perception led to a shift in resources away from the ground forces and toward intelligence and precision firepower. As a result, the IDF’s ground forces were cut, armored brigades disbanded and the procurement of key combat platforms (tanks and APCs) reduced. The artillery and engineering corps (primarily heavy engineering equipment) crucial for ground operations in complex areas like Gaza and Lebanon have also been cut back. Tens of thousands of reservists were released from the IDF, and training for those who remained was also significantly reduced.

The truth must be told: Some senior IDF commanders failed to grasp the multi-front threat and consequently failed to understand the importance of maintaining the readiness of ground forces, particularly in the reserves.

These force buildup issues, coupled with a lack of sufficient ground forces, are among the main reasons for the difficulty in conducting simultaneous operations across multiple combat zones in Gaza. The lack of civilian oversight by the political echelon of the IDF’s force buildup also contributed to the army’s poor preparedness.

Lack of preparedness in operational planning exacerbated the force-buildup situation. This was evident in two main areas: First, the IDF underestimated the threat posed by Hamas, particularly its underground infrastructure and tunnel network. Second (directly derived from the first) was the absence of operational plans for a scenario like the one unfolding in Gaza—the full occupation of the Gaza Strip and the destruction of Hamas.

For years, Gaza was considered a secondary arena, with the General Staff focusing mainly on the northern front and Iran at the expense of intelligence gathering, operational planning and attention to Gaza. As a result, the IDF found itself scrambling to formulate updated operational concepts and implement them during combat. This neglect directly affected the duration of the conflict.

Finally, while the prolongation of the conflict in Gaza is the result of multiple factors, the IDF’s unwillingness to take over the distribution of humanitarian aid, as required by international law, is the main reason currently preventing the complete destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities. The political echelon bears significant responsibility for this, due to its inability or unwillingness to confront the military and force it to take the necessary steps in the civilian sphere. Other factors also contributed, as detailed in the article. Addressing these issues in the civilian sphere is essential to completing the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.

Published in JNS, August 27, 2024.

According to government sources, the deal currently under discussion between Israel and Hamas would see between 500 and 1,000 Palestinian terrorists, 100 of them considered “heavy” terrorists (i.e., bloodthirsty butchers), released from Israeli jails in exchange for 22 live Israeli hostages, mainly women and other civilians, alongside the bodies of another dozen deceased hostages.

The plan also theorizes second and third tranches of terrorist/hostage exchange, but nobody really believes this likely. Too many conditions apply to the supposed next stages, ranging from international supervision of Gaza’s borders (against Hamas wishes) to IDF withdrawals. And nobody in Israel can say for sure that additional hostages are still alive/will still be alive for a second or third stage.

Many Israelis will say that the deal under discussion is sad but necessary; that it is the government’s moral obligation to free as many hostages as possible, as soon as possible, despite the high price. That the suffering of our hostages and their families is intolerable on the personal and national levels. That giving freed hostages one big national hug will be the greatest triumph of all, something so necessary for Israel’s collective spirit and its resilience over the long term.

Many Israelis might feel this to be so even if the deal entails complete withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza. In other words, even if Hamas retains power and essentially wins the war.

Some Israelis will argue that the IDF can be sent back to continuously crush Hamas in Gaza after the deal is done (although manifestly this will not be possible given inevitable diplomatic restraints). Some will say that the need for further strikes will be obviated by better border technologies, more IDF sentries, and allied foreign forces (although this is patently ridiculous in the near term). Some will add that the deal usefully will collapse the current government (which in their view may be more important than hostage release).

Oh, what a horrible situation! How can the heart not bleed in pain.

HOWEVER one finesses the moral and strategic dilemmas here, there is one additional grand security calculus that seems absent from public discourse. This is the piercingly high price of releasing so many Palestinian terrorists.

The released terrorists assuredly will strike again, with God-only-knows how many Israeli casualties in the future. Their release certainly will incentivize future kidnappings, pour gasoline onto the terrorist fires already raging in Judea and Samaria, and catapult Hamas towards its intended takeover of Judea and Samaria too.

I know this to be a fact because this has been the case with every previous terrorist release. Israel repeatedly has erred by letting terrorists loose to murder more Israelis.

And each time, in advance of every deal, the Israeli “security establishment” arrogantly and falsely has assured Israeli politicians and the public that it “would know how to manage the situation,” i.e., how to track the terrorists and crush any nascent return to terrorist activity without too much harm done.

But this never has proven to be true. Every deal involving the release of terrorists has led to much bloodshed, planned and carried-out by these released terrorists.

There are no exact statistics on this (because unsurprisingly the security establishment refuses to release such statistics), but estimates range from 10 to 50 percent of released terrorists who swiftly return to hard-core terrorist activity, with devastating effect.

The 1,150 Palestinian prisoners released by Israel in the 1985 Jibril deal (in exchange for three Israeli soldiers) proceeded to fuel the First Intifada. According to the Ministry of Defense, about ten percent of the released Palestinian terrorists returned to active terrorist duty.

Then came the Oslo Accords when Israel mistakenly allowed at least 60,000 (!) Palestinians from “abroad” into the territories including 7,000 card-carrying PLO terrorists. Between 1993 and 1999, Israel released many additional Palestinian terrorists as “gestures” to the PLO, which fueled the Second Intifada.

In 2004, Israel released more than 400 Palestinian prisoners and some 30 Lebanese prisoners including leaders of Hezbollah for one civilian captive, Elhanan Tannenbaum, and the bodies of three IDF soldiers. The Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah followed not long after.

The 2011 deal for Gilad Shalit was the worst. Among the more than 1,000 Palestinian security prisoners released in exchange for a single staff sergeant were Yihye Sinwar, Warchi Mushtaha, Ahmed Andor, Abdulah Barghouti, Izzadin Sheikh Khalil, Musa Dudin, Jihad Yamour, and Hassan Salameh – today’s Hamas leaders. In fact, almost the entire Hamas command structure that planned last year’s Simchat Torah assault on Israeli towns and cities, which killed over 1,200 Israelis on one day, was made up of terrorists released in the Shalit deal.

Other Palestinian terrorists released in the Shalit deal proceeded to carry out the most notorious terrorist murders of the past 13 years: Baruch Mizrachi by Ziad Awad, Dr. David Applebaum and his daughter Navah (on the eve of her wedding) by Ramez Sali Abu Salim, Malachi Rosenfeld by Ahmas Najjar, Rabbi Miki Mark (a father of ten kids) by Mohamed Fakih, and more.

Mahmoud Qawasameh, another terrorist released in the Shalit deal, planned the kidnapping and murder of the three teenagers Naftali Fraenkel, Eyal Yifrach, and Gilad Shaer in Gush Etzion in 2014. Jasser Barghouti, also released from Israeli prison in the Shalit deal, directed from Gaza the murders of Yosef Cohen and Yuval Mor-Yosef and a child, Amiad Israel.

After the kidnapping and murder of the three boys, the IDF acted to re-arrest many of the terrorists freed in the Shalit deal. Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch, who was chief prosecutor of the IDF in the territories, says that half of the 130 “heavy” terrorists released into Judea and Samaria in the Shalit deal had returned to terrorist activity, and were re-arrested.

Many others, he says, also reactivated their terrorist ties in the territories and engaged in terrorist support activities outside of Israel – but Israeli authorities could not always get to them for operational or legal reasons.

Dr. Gadi Hitman of Ariel University, who has studied terrorist releases, says that numbers count, not just the identity of “key” terrorists with known terrorist records. The more terrorists released, even “pedestrian” ones, the more likely that some of them will become “key terrorists” themselves and ignite the territories.

There is some debate among experts as to whether Israel has a better chance of interdicting terrorist activity of released terrorists in the territories or abroad, meaning whether it is preferable to keep terrorists under surveillance in Gaza and Judea and Samaria (where they can be eliminated, if necessary), or to “exile” terrorists to Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria (where targeting them is politically and operationally more difficult).

Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yedid, former adviser on Arab affairs to the IDF’s Central Command, and Moshe (“Mofaz”) Fuzaylov, former Israel Security Agency investigations chief, say that the current terrorist free-for-all in Jenin and Tulkarem, for example, proves that released terrorists must be expelled as far away as possible. Otherwise, they will bolster the already-solid, Iranian-backed military machine that terrorists have built in these areas, and will expand them.

EITHER WAY, the danger of mass-releasing Palestinian terrorists is clear. A deal that frees vicious murderers of Israeli Jews (including the Nukhba killers and rapists of October 7) in exchange for Israel’s innocent suffering hostages endangers even more Israeli lives down the road – and that road is not notably long.

Dvora Gonen, whose son Danny was murdered near Dolev in 2015 by a terrorist released in the Shalit deal, told journalist and researcher Nadav Shragai last month that “the difference between the hostages currently held in Gaza and the next generation of Israeli victims who will be murdered by those released in the impending Hamas hostage deal – is that the hostages have faces and names, while future victims remain as yet unknown.”

Gonen: “On the other hand, the previous generation of terrorist victims like my son Danny, murdered by Palestinian terrorists released in previous deals, have both faces and names.”

What Dvora Gonen is saying, I think, is beware and be aware. Dealing for the hostages held in Gaza now might be the most humanitarian and morally necessary thing in the world to do, but it also may be the most dangerous and potentially disastrous thing Israel can do. The cost will pay out over a prolonged period, and it will be steep. An agonizing dilemma for Israel, indeed.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 16.08.2024 and Israel Hayom 18.08.2024

As preparations for a military confrontation between Iran and its proxies and Israel reach their peak, and in parallel with the bolstering of its military capabilities in the region, the United States is also intensifying its diplomatic efforts. These efforts aim to formulate an agreed-upon formula that will help promote a general ceasefire and, at the very least, prevent deterioration into a regional war.

It appears that Washington is seeking to leverage the tensions with Iran to accelerate the promotion of a regional arrangement that would also include Gaza. It can be assumed that administration officials are trying to secure Israeli agreement to end the war in the Gaza Strip in a way that would allow the Iranians to market it as an achievement following their involvement, and in exchange for their agreement to freeze or moderate their revenge operation for the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh. From the American perspective, such a formula, combined with the authentic concerns of the Tehran regime about getting entangled in a wider war (and perhaps with additional promises from the US), could provide the Iranians with a respectable ladder to climb down from the high tree they’ve climbed.

Such a formula could pave the way for easing regional tensions and would include: a roadmap for ending the war in Gaza, the release of hostages, an agreed solution on the northern front, and calm with the Houthis as well. Reinforcement for this line of thinking can be found in the words of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, who, in his statement this week, spoke in one breath about efforts to ease tensions with Iran and progress in negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza.

Slim chance for a de-escalation formula

However, the chances of reaching such an arrangement are slim. First, from Iran’s side – it is highly doubtful whether the compensation in Gaza will satisfy the Iranians’ thirst for revenge after the severe blow to their national pride and after the belligerent declarations made by regime officials, one after another. Moreover, from their perspective, such a formula does not address the need to renew the “deterrence equation” against Israel.

Second, regarding Hezbollah, if Iran does not respond to Haniyeh’s elimination, it will then expect part of the price for this to be exacted through Hezbollah’s revenge attack for the elimination of Fuad Shukr. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah settling for a moderate response to the two assassinations and then being willing to discuss withdrawing his forces from the border with Israel.

Third, the question of whether concessions in Gaza are appropriate on Israel’s part and whether it is right to use them as “compensation.” Assuming that the political echelon in Israel adheres to its positions, then the ceasefire in Gaza should be limited in time and without giving up Israeli control over the Philadelphia Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor. At this point in time, concessions beyond this on Israel’s part will provide a lifeline to Hamas and allow it to recover, consolidate its governance, and renew military capabilities as well. Assuming that the justified insistence on these positions will still allow reaching a deal, it is not certain that, in the eyes of the Iranians, such a deal is sufficient compensation.

Ismail Haniyeh is just the straw that broke the camel’s back

Fourth and above all, the current clash between Israel and the Islamic Republic, although occurring in the wake of accusations about Haniyeh’s assassination, has deeper roots, and its causes lie in the aggressive moves the regime is taking to realize its vision of achieving regional hegemony and destroying Israel. The ring of fire that this regime has built around Israel through its many proxy forces is one component. Its significance was well demonstrated in the current war. The additional component is the regime’s advanced efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Solutions that do not address these root problems will not hold up, and from Israel’s perspective, it is not certain that achieving quiet at such a price is worthwhile.

Faced with the current threats from Iran and Hezbollah, the Israeli system has so far acted responsibly, seriously, and confidently. Iran’s moves pose an existential threat to Israel, and after emphasizing this in every possible forum, Israel is behaving as required in the face of such a threat, demonstrating determination, self-confidence, high intelligence, and operational capabilities. In Iran and Lebanon, they are well aware of the damage Israel can inflict on their critical infrastructures. Presumably, they take this into account when planning their steps.

There is also the possibility of an escalation that will force the US to increase its involvement in the fighting. The Iranian threat is a central challenge for Israel, but not only for Israel. Iran is a key player in shaping the axis of countries opposing the US and the West. Its influence and actions do not stop at the borders of the Middle East. They can be seen in the war in Ukraine and in dealings with countries in Africa, Asia, and South America. And this is even without it possessing nuclear weapons. The US has a key role not only in restraining Iran but also in dealing with the root problem – the ayatollah regime.

Washington’s desire to prevent a regional war and their expectation from Israel to avoid moves that will drag the US into such a war requires a fundamental and rapid response to the threats posed by Iran. An effective effort led by the US against the Iranian octopus – this is also Israel’s strategic preference, although there are red lines whose crossing will compel Israel to act. This is well understood in Tehran, Beirut, and Washington.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 9, 2024.

Hamas officially announced Tuesday night that Yahya Sinwar has been appointed head of the organization’s political bureau, replacing Ismail Haniyeh. This makes him Hamas’s de facto new sole leader.

This comes as a surprise. Sinwar’s name was not mentioned as a possible candidate in the speculation and predictions regarding Haniyeh’s successor. At first glance, this is a puzzling choice, as it is unclear how Sinwar will manage to lead and run the organization while he is hidden in a tunnel or another hideout in the Gaza Strip as he is being pursued and trying to save his life.

The leadership of Hamas have known tensions and rivalries for years, even during Khaled Mashaal’s tenure as head of the political bureau, and especially towards the end of his term.

The rivalry only intensified after Sinwar’s release in 2011 as part of the Shalit deal, particularly with the establishment of his status as Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip and his official election in 2017. The rivalry was fundamentally between the external leadership, even when Ismail Haniyeh from the Shati refugee camp in Gaza headed it, and the organization’s leadership in Gaza.

Gaza is seen as the organization’s center of gravity, and its leadership, certainly when it comes to Yahya Sinwar, considered itself more significant and important in the decision-making processes, especially regarding the events in the Gaza Strip.

Tensions have only worsened since October 7 and the beginning of hostage negotiations. The Gaza leadership, led by Sinwar, set the tone and made the decisions, not the external leadership. Sinwar, who focuses on Egypt as the main mediator, has not hidden his disdain for Haniyeh, who, in turn, placed his hopes on Qatar.

Therefore, Egypt has a significantly greater influence on the person who, until yesterday, was just the organization’s leader in Gaza, while Qatar’s influence on him is much smaller.

The internal rivalry in Hamas also manifests in the relations between the leadership in the West Bank and the leadership in Gaza.

The struggle between the approaches is also evident regarding the organization’s cooperation with Iran, which Haniyeh encouraged. Conversely, Sinwar merely viewed it pragmatically and instrumentally (similar to Iran’s attitude towards Hamas).

Khaled Mashaal became a persona non grata for Iran and Syria due to what they perceived as his ultimate betrayal during the Syrian civil war. This also led to his expulsion from the country in 2012. Therefore, at this time, Mashaal could not again lead the political bureau.

Nevertheless, Sinwar’s appointment to the position surprised many. He indeed intended to run in the 2025 elections for the head of the political bureau, but his election during the war, while he is pursued and hidden, raises many questions.

Under such conditions, it is difficult to assess how he will manage to function as the organization’s leader, represent it externally, and fulfill the required tasks.

There is a possibility that Sinwar’s selection was intended to advance the hostage deal negotiations and lead to ending the war in Gaza.

It is possible that the Egyptians, the only ones in contact with Sinwar, helped promote the move through dialogue with the Hamas leadership.

If Ismail Haniyeh indeed represented a tougher stance in the deal negotiations compared to Sinwar’s more pragmatic line, an obstacle has been removed.

Now, with Sinwar’s election to the position, he may want to fulfill his role as the organization’s leader and ensure his election in the 2025 elections, which he can only do once the hostage deal is completed – leading to the end of the war and the guarantees he demands that Hamas leaders will not be assassinated.

Now, serving simultaneously as the head of the political bureau and the leader in Gaza, Sinwar’s ability to advance a deal may even increase.

If this is indeed the plan, Sinwar could strengthen his position as the organization’s leader and Hamas’s position as an alternative to Fatah, aiming to take over the Palestinian Authority and the PLO.

This would be due to the steadfastness and what will surely be presented as the ultimate victory, as Israel fails to eliminate the organization’s rule in the Strip, and he returns to his sovereign role in Gaza.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 7, 2024.

In the week of Oct. 8, 2023, the Israeli War Cabinet deliberated over a proposal to take the initiative against Hezbollah by responding to its attacks with a surprise full-scale invasion. The argument raised against this was that it would be strategic folly to attempt a full-scale war on two fronts and that decimating Hamas must be the priority. The latter view won out and it was decided to respond to Hezbollah’s attacks tit for tat, in what would become a war of attrition now entering its tenth month.

This decision may have been correct given the limited resources at our disposal and the scale of the task which lay before us in Gaza, but it entailed the heavy price of allowing the north to burn and its residents to be displaced, risking a longer-term loss of sovereignty in what has become a security buffer zone within Israel’s own territory. Since then, every time the specter of escalation in the north has arisen, Israel has chosen restraint, all in the name of completing the first phase of the reconquest of Gaza from Hamas.

But that phase was essentially completed over a month ago. Israel has attained the ability to maneuver throughout the entire Strip, including in Rafah and critically along the border with Egypt. It has now shifted to a less intense level of fighting, focusing on the slower and arduous task of fully eliminating Hamas presence through targeted raids, clearing the maze of underground terror tunnels, and gradually dismantling Hamas’s command structure. This new phase is expected to take many months, perhaps years, and so Israel can no longer justify waiting for its completion to turn its attention to the north.

As soon as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned from his vital visit to the United States, the time had come to shift the center of gravity of Israel’s efforts northwards. Therefore, it would be a mistake to view the events of the past week as merely another round of tit for tat following the terrible attack on Majdal Shams. That attack is not the reason Israel must increase the intensity of the fighting against Hezbollah, but rather a symptom which serves to demonstrate just how necessary is a shift of focus.

It would be preferable for Israel to now launch a surprise all-out war against Hezbollah with the goals of destroying its missile stockpiles and disbanding it as an organization, as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 requires. It is never a convenient time to start a war, and the current case is certainly no exception, but it highly unlikely that there will be a better opportunity for this inevitable war in the foreseeable future, and an opening surprise salvo against Hezbollah’s precision missiles would be of great advantage. Nonetheless, in view of the various constraints, it seems Israel is not likely to take such a drastic step.

In the absence of initiating a war to eradicate Hezbollah, the least Israel must do is address the two most immediate threats: a cross-border ground invasion and the short-range rocket fire on border towns. Addressing the first will require some form of ground maneuver to establish a buffer zone in Lebanese territory. Addressing the second requires extensively damaging Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stockpiles. If both of these minimal goals can be achieved, then Israel could consider settling it there and postponing the inevitable larger conflict to sometime in the coming few years, and use the intervening time to re-arm and prepare itself.

Given this situation, high-profile assassinations are only useful as an opening blow. On their own, they do not provide any solution for the situation in the north or address the continued threat from Hezbollah. They throw the organization off balance for a while, and this is a valuable first step before more significant action that will bring lasting change to the situation, but if we stop there Hezbollah will replace its losses and we’ll be back where we started.

There is political benefit to the assassinations, as Israel’s allies view them as surgical strikes against legitimate targets, whereas for Hezbollah and Iran they constitute a severe affront to their honor which precludes anything but an escalatory response. Thus when the Iranian-led axis inevitably attacks Israel, Jerusalem will receive begrudging international acceptance to expand the campaign, as it will be clear that Hezbollah is the one dragging us into a broader war.

Israel is now on standby for an Iranian-led attack and is busy preparing to defend its population. Hopefully it will succeed in preventing any significant damage to life and property, but it would be a grave mistake to treat the attack according to the actual damage caused, rather than the damage intended. Israel does not need more corpses to justify broader action against Hezbollah or even against Iran directly. Any self-respecting country must take with grave seriousness the severity of the attack itself, and not hide behind its sophisticated defensive capabilities to justify avoiding conflict.

We are at a historic moment of truth. The time for the “Gaza first, Lebanon later” strategy has run out. Israel must face the fact that it is at war with Iran and all its proxies. Now is the time to turn this terrible war that was forced upon us into an opportunity to change the balance of power and shape the reality around us.

Published in JNS, August 5, 2024.

In the last 48 hours, confirmation of Israel’s stunning elimination of arch-terrorists Mohammed Deif of Hamas and Fuad Shukr of Hezbollah, as well as the presumed elimination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran, will redefine Israeli deterrence and create a paradigm change in the Middle East, likely bringing the war with Hamas closer to an end.

Each of the three terrorists eliminated were the embodiment of evil, dripping with the blood of thousands of innocent civilians, both Israeli and foreign nationals, including Americans.

As leaders of Hamas, Haniyeh and Deif, were the masterminds of the October 7 massacre and decades of terror attacks in Israel. Shukr, the deputy leader of Hezbollah, was responsible for the Majdal Shams rocket attack last weekend in northern Israel, in which 12 children were murdered while playing football. He had also been directing Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel since October 8 and responsible for procuring the terror group’s advanced weaponry.

In case it needs to be reiterated, the elimination of these arch-terrorists and murderers was entirely legal, just, and moral. The world today is a safer place without them and Israel ought to congratulated for their elimination.

But what is the military and geo-strategic impact of these operations?

There is no denying that the brazen October 7 attacks and abductions by Hamas, as well as the ongoing rocket fire by Hezbollah, struck a massive arrow through the heart of Israel’s much-vaunted defense and intelligence apparatus. In the last 72 hours, Israel not only regained its deterrence, but has taken it to a new level, with the potential to permanently alter the landscape of the Middle East.

The pin-point operations against Shukr in Beirut and Haniyeh, while asleep in an apartment building in Tehran on Day 1 of the new President’s tenure, were daring, audacious, and brilliantly executed, with minimum to no civilian casualties and no harm to Israeli soldiers and assets.

That they were carried out great distance away from Israel under the noses of the Hezbollah and Iranian leaderships, and relying on such precise intelligence, will also cause enormous embarrassment to Hezbollah and especially Tehran, because Haniyeh’s security was under their responsibility, underscoring that Israel can strike any target, at any time, effectively turning their leaders and military sites into sitting ducks.

This in turn ought to give them pause for consideration for any future military actions they might seek to undertake, knowing the possible response they might face.

There are those who now insist that the elimination of Haniyeh and Shukr will only escalate regional tensions. To them we ask: Where have you been the last 10 months?

Hamas initiated the massacre of October 7 and were joined by Hezbollah the day after, having since fired over 7,250 rockets at northern Israel from Lebanon.

Iran has meantime been pulling the strings from Tehran as the grandmaster of both Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the Houthis, who joined long ago from Yemen.

If anyone has been escalating regional tensions, it has been the international community, which has been largely trying to pressure Israel into showing restraint or compromise, instead of demanding Hezbollah and Hamas, cease the attacks, disarm and release all the hostages, or that Iran reign in their proxies.

In doing so, the international community has only emboldened these terror groups and encouraged their regional patrons to escalate tensions further.

If anything, the world should thank Israel now, as the elimination of Haniyeh and Shukr ought to send a clear message to all the terror groups and their enablers that their actions come at a heavy price, and they should reconsider their involvement.

Israel’s renewed deterrence can also have a positive impact on the hostage negotiations. Although there will be some uncertainty with respect to the negotiations in the short-term, in the medium term, it should place greater pressure on Hamas to accept a deal.

There is no denying that Hamas has been utterly decimated and embarrassed. Their leadership is destroyed, its military dismantled into a fraction of its former self, and Sinwar has never been so isolated. Although Hamas is unlikely to re-engage in negotiations so soon for fear of losing face and being seen as succumbing to Israel’s overpowering, they will need to reach some kind of agreement, so as to have at least something to show and avoid the fate of Haniyeh and Deif.

Israel’s audacious targeted operations this past week only underscore that the path to stability in the region and return of the hostages, will come from renewed Israeli deterrence and strength.

The article was written together with John Spencer. 

Published in Newsweek, August 2, 2024.

Israel is riding a wave of momentum in the Gaza conflict. On the battlefield, the defense establishment has chalked up a string of victories, starting with the push into Rafah and securing the vital Philadelphi Corridor – Hamas’ lifeline. Other successes include the daring rescue of four hostages in Nuseirat, the reported elimination of Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif and Khan Yunis commander Rafah Salameh, establishing control over the strategic Netzarim Corridor, conducting raids in Gaza City and Khan Yunis, and recovering the bodies of five fallen soldiers abducted into Gaza. Hamas’ inability to mount significant counteroperations during this period underscores the cumulative impact of Israel’s actions.

Moreover, Israel’s swift and bold response against the Houthis in Yemen, coupled with the ongoing precision strikes on Hezbollah field commanders and relentless operations against terrorist cells in the West Bank, demonstrate not only Israel’s operational prowess but also its resolve and the resilience of its defense apparatus. This steadfast stance in the face of prolonged multi-front challenges, despite intense pressure and heavy costs, is beginning to shake some of our adversaries’ core assumptions and raise doubts about the viability of their war of attrition strategy.

Even on the diplomatic front, typically a source of hope for Israel’s enemies, there are signs of a shifting landscape. Global attention has diversified beyond Gaza, criticism of Israel persists but with limited impact on military operations, international courts have not halted Israel’s actions, normalization agreement partners have maintained ties despite street-level anger, and discussions of future peace deals continue to simmer.

From Hamas’ perspective, political developments in the US are casting a long shadow. It’s unclear whether pressure on Israel from the current administration will maintain its intensity, and they’ve heard Donald Trump’s hawkish stance loud and clear, should he return to office. The call for Israel to swiftly conclude the war and “finish the job against Hamas” is interpreted as an expectation of ramped-up military action. Against this backdrop, Hamas likely realizes that time is no longer on its side.

A double-edged sword

For Israel, the passage of time cuts both ways. On one hand, it allows for consolidating gains, further degrading Hamas, and potentially securing more favorable terms for hostage release. On the other, it heightens the risk to captives’ well-being and escalates costs and dangers on the northern front, which is inextricably linked to the situation in Gaza. The political leadership faces a stark dilemma: balancing the imperative of dismantling Hamas against the urgent need to bring the hostages home.

Hamas’ demands in the emerging deal aim to end the war while preserving its status as Gaza’s power broker and securing conditions that would enable it to rebuild its capabilities and leverage political gains, including in the West Bank. Israel’s insistence on resuming combat operations after the deal’s initial phase is meant to address these concerns, but it overlooks the complex dynamics of such processes. Once the war machine winds down, it can’t simply be restarted at will. The international community would likely oppose such a move, and domestic support would be difficult to muster given the mounting costs and new challenges on the horizon. The practical upshot is that the war could effectively end without achieving its stated objectives.

Another sticking point is Hamas’ demand for IDF withdrawal from Gaza, including the critical Philadelphi Corridor and Netzarim Corridor. Control over the Philadelphia Corridor represents one of Israel’s key strategic gains in this conflict. This control is crucial for preventing Hamas’ resurgence. Without it, Israel would struggle to curb weapons smuggling into Gaza and its transformation back into a terrorist stronghold. Past experience cautions against relying on foreign entities for this task, regardless of their identity. An Israeli pullback from this corridor would be nearly irreversible and invite pressure in future Palestinian negotiations.

Caught between a rock and a hard place

Relinquishing the Netzarim Corridor, or entrusting it to other parties, would pave the way for Hamas’ return to northern Gaza. In the current climate, it’s hard to envision any enforcement body (besides the IDF) capable of restricting Hamas’ movements – not Arab states, not international forces, not even Mohammed Dahlan. Even if a solution were found, declaring that “armed individuals will not be allowed to return to northern Gaza” rings hollow when miles of unmapped tunnels honeycomb the area.

Paradoxically, the extensive tunnel network beneath Gaza City neighborhoods provides Israel with justification to delay the return of displaced residents and continue treating these areas as active combat zones. This could serve as leverage, with the displaced population pressuring Hamas. Conceding on this issue would amount to tacit Israeli acceptance of this reality, undermining the goal of demilitarization.

We haven’t even touched on the risks posed by the potential release of terrorists as part of any deal: It could incentivize future kidnappings, see those released return to terrorist activities, and bolster Hamas’ political standing in both Gaza and the West Bank.

There isn’t a soul in Israel who doesn’t yearn for the hostages’ safe return, just as there’s no one who doesn’t want to see Hamas decisively defeated. Navigating between these two imperatives is a true “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario. Whatever course the government chooses will be legitimate, provided we don’t blind ourselves to the costs.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 31, 2024.