After 10 months of fighting, many ask why Hamas has not yet been destroyed and Israel’s war objectives have yet to be fully realized.

At the beginning of the war, some in the defense establishment and government sought to avoid a ground maneuver in Gaza. Similar advice was offered by the American officials who frequented Israel. There were several reasons for this hesitation, primary among which were doubts regarding the ability of ground forces to operate effectively in Gaza’s complex environment. While it took time to make the decision to go ahead with the maneuver, once made, Israeli forces acted decisively.

However, over time, the senior command became hesitant in its use of force, imposing numerous limitations on the advance of forces. It was as if they envisioned the campaign as a large special operation and not a series of divisional attacks during which it was necessary to maintain the principles of war, particularly that of continuity. This resulted in frequent halts in operations, especially in Rafah, partly due diplomatic pressures from the United States that the political echelon was unable to withstand. However, lack of professional resolve among the highest military ranks also contributed to the unnecessary prolongation of the conflict.

Another factor prolonging the conflict—one that is still in play—is the issue of humanitarian aid, which has two aspects. The first is the scope of aid entering Gaza and the second is how this aid is distributed. From the start, Israel faced intense American pressure to transfer humanitarian aid and fuel to Gaza, despite Washington’s knowledge that much of it would reach Hamas and enhance its ability to survive in Gaza’s tunnels. The political echelon’s inability to withstand this pressure undermined one of Israel’s key leverage points to secure the return of the hostages and prolonged Hamas’ military and civilian survivability.

Hamas’s control over humanitarian aid gives it breathing room and maintains its influence and power among the population. Some aid is diverted to the organization’s needs (food and fuel), while the rest is distributed by it; Hamas uses the aid to recruit new operatives (by supplying them with food) and to strengthen its control over the Gaza Strip and its population. Moreover, the aid is not distributed in a manner that aligns with the IDF’s operational objectives, thus complicating efforts to evacuate civilians from areas of conflict, such as northern Gaza, and hindering military operations. The IDF’s hesitation in putting a stop to this by imposing partial and temporary military rule or assuming responsibility for aid distribution prolongs the war and hampers the IDF’s ability to achieve its objectives.

Another factor contributing to the prolonged conflict is the hostage issue. The IDF has acted cautiously throughout the conflict and continues to do so to avoid harming the hostages. Operational planning of the ground maneuver and the use of firepower have been calculated to reduce the risk to them. This caution likely resulted in missed operational opportunities and will likely continue to influence the IDF’s conduct in Gaza.

A delay of some four months was also caused by American and international pressure to avoid operations in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border. This pressure was driven primarily by concerns over harm to civilians and actions that could hinder potential hostage negotiations. However, it now seems clear that these concerns were in fact an excuse for the United States and elements in the international community to impose a ceasefire on Israel. Precious time was lost before the IDF began operations in this area under a format acceptable to Washington.

The IDF’s preparedness for the conflict in Gaza was also inadequate, to say the least. This was manifested in several areas, including force buildup. Over recent years, the IDF has neglected its ground forces, particularly reserve units, due to a belief that wars could be won with intelligence, remote firepower and advanced technology operated by small units.

This perception led to a shift in resources away from the ground forces and toward intelligence and precision firepower. As a result, the IDF’s ground forces were cut, armored brigades disbanded and the procurement of key combat platforms (tanks and APCs) reduced. The artillery and engineering corps (primarily heavy engineering equipment) crucial for ground operations in complex areas like Gaza and Lebanon have also been cut back. Tens of thousands of reservists were released from the IDF, and training for those who remained was also significantly reduced.

The truth must be told: Some senior IDF commanders failed to grasp the multi-front threat and consequently failed to understand the importance of maintaining the readiness of ground forces, particularly in the reserves.

These force buildup issues, coupled with a lack of sufficient ground forces, are among the main reasons for the difficulty in conducting simultaneous operations across multiple combat zones in Gaza. The lack of civilian oversight by the political echelon of the IDF’s force buildup also contributed to the army’s poor preparedness.

Lack of preparedness in operational planning exacerbated the force-buildup situation. This was evident in two main areas: First, the IDF underestimated the threat posed by Hamas, particularly its underground infrastructure and tunnel network. Second (directly derived from the first) was the absence of operational plans for a scenario like the one unfolding in Gaza—the full occupation of the Gaza Strip and the destruction of Hamas.

For years, Gaza was considered a secondary arena, with the General Staff focusing mainly on the northern front and Iran at the expense of intelligence gathering, operational planning and attention to Gaza. As a result, the IDF found itself scrambling to formulate updated operational concepts and implement them during combat. This neglect directly affected the duration of the conflict.

Finally, while the prolongation of the conflict in Gaza is the result of multiple factors, the IDF’s unwillingness to take over the distribution of humanitarian aid, as required by international law, is the main reason currently preventing the complete destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities. The political echelon bears significant responsibility for this, due to its inability or unwillingness to confront the military and force it to take the necessary steps in the civilian sphere. Other factors also contributed, as detailed in the article. Addressing these issues in the civilian sphere is essential to completing the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.

Published in JNS, August 27, 2024.

According to government sources, the deal currently under discussion between Israel and Hamas would see between 500 and 1,000 Palestinian terrorists, 100 of them considered “heavy” terrorists (i.e., bloodthirsty butchers), released from Israeli jails in exchange for 22 live Israeli hostages, mainly women and other civilians, alongside the bodies of another dozen deceased hostages.

The plan also theorizes second and third tranches of terrorist/hostage exchange, but nobody really believes this likely. Too many conditions apply to the supposed next stages, ranging from international supervision of Gaza’s borders (against Hamas wishes) to IDF withdrawals. And nobody in Israel can say for sure that additional hostages are still alive/will still be alive for a second or third stage.

Many Israelis will say that the deal under discussion is sad but necessary; that it is the government’s moral obligation to free as many hostages as possible, as soon as possible, despite the high price. That the suffering of our hostages and their families is intolerable on the personal and national levels. That giving freed hostages one big national hug will be the greatest triumph of all, something so necessary for Israel’s collective spirit and its resilience over the long term.

Many Israelis might feel this to be so even if the deal entails complete withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza. In other words, even if Hamas retains power and essentially wins the war.

Some Israelis will argue that the IDF can be sent back to continuously crush Hamas in Gaza after the deal is done (although manifestly this will not be possible given inevitable diplomatic restraints). Some will say that the need for further strikes will be obviated by better border technologies, more IDF sentries, and allied foreign forces (although this is patently ridiculous in the near term). Some will add that the deal usefully will collapse the current government (which in their view may be more important than hostage release).

Oh, what a horrible situation! How can the heart not bleed in pain.

HOWEVER one finesses the moral and strategic dilemmas here, there is one additional grand security calculus that seems absent from public discourse. This is the piercingly high price of releasing so many Palestinian terrorists.

The released terrorists assuredly will strike again, with God-only-knows how many Israeli casualties in the future. Their release certainly will incentivize future kidnappings, pour gasoline onto the terrorist fires already raging in Judea and Samaria, and catapult Hamas towards its intended takeover of Judea and Samaria too.

I know this to be a fact because this has been the case with every previous terrorist release. Israel repeatedly has erred by letting terrorists loose to murder more Israelis.

And each time, in advance of every deal, the Israeli “security establishment” arrogantly and falsely has assured Israeli politicians and the public that it “would know how to manage the situation,” i.e., how to track the terrorists and crush any nascent return to terrorist activity without too much harm done.

But this never has proven to be true. Every deal involving the release of terrorists has led to much bloodshed, planned and carried-out by these released terrorists.

There are no exact statistics on this (because unsurprisingly the security establishment refuses to release such statistics), but estimates range from 10 to 50 percent of released terrorists who swiftly return to hard-core terrorist activity, with devastating effect.

The 1,150 Palestinian prisoners released by Israel in the 1985 Jibril deal (in exchange for three Israeli soldiers) proceeded to fuel the First Intifada. According to the Ministry of Defense, about ten percent of the released Palestinian terrorists returned to active terrorist duty.

Then came the Oslo Accords when Israel mistakenly allowed at least 60,000 (!) Palestinians from “abroad” into the territories including 7,000 card-carrying PLO terrorists. Between 1993 and 1999, Israel released many additional Palestinian terrorists as “gestures” to the PLO, which fueled the Second Intifada.

In 2004, Israel released more than 400 Palestinian prisoners and some 30 Lebanese prisoners including leaders of Hezbollah for one civilian captive, Elhanan Tannenbaum, and the bodies of three IDF soldiers. The Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah followed not long after.

The 2011 deal for Gilad Shalit was the worst. Among the more than 1,000 Palestinian security prisoners released in exchange for a single staff sergeant were Yihye Sinwar, Warchi Mushtaha, Ahmed Andor, Abdulah Barghouti, Izzadin Sheikh Khalil, Musa Dudin, Jihad Yamour, and Hassan Salameh – today’s Hamas leaders. In fact, almost the entire Hamas command structure that planned last year’s Simchat Torah assault on Israeli towns and cities, which killed over 1,200 Israelis on one day, was made up of terrorists released in the Shalit deal.

Other Palestinian terrorists released in the Shalit deal proceeded to carry out the most notorious terrorist murders of the past 13 years: Baruch Mizrachi by Ziad Awad, Dr. David Applebaum and his daughter Navah (on the eve of her wedding) by Ramez Sali Abu Salim, Malachi Rosenfeld by Ahmas Najjar, Rabbi Miki Mark (a father of ten kids) by Mohamed Fakih, and more.

Mahmoud Qawasameh, another terrorist released in the Shalit deal, planned the kidnapping and murder of the three teenagers Naftali Fraenkel, Eyal Yifrach, and Gilad Shaer in Gush Etzion in 2014. Jasser Barghouti, also released from Israeli prison in the Shalit deal, directed from Gaza the murders of Yosef Cohen and Yuval Mor-Yosef and a child, Amiad Israel.

After the kidnapping and murder of the three boys, the IDF acted to re-arrest many of the terrorists freed in the Shalit deal. Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch, who was chief prosecutor of the IDF in the territories, says that half of the 130 “heavy” terrorists released into Judea and Samaria in the Shalit deal had returned to terrorist activity, and were re-arrested.

Many others, he says, also reactivated their terrorist ties in the territories and engaged in terrorist support activities outside of Israel – but Israeli authorities could not always get to them for operational or legal reasons.

Dr. Gadi Hitman of Ariel University, who has studied terrorist releases, says that numbers count, not just the identity of “key” terrorists with known terrorist records. The more terrorists released, even “pedestrian” ones, the more likely that some of them will become “key terrorists” themselves and ignite the territories.

There is some debate among experts as to whether Israel has a better chance of interdicting terrorist activity of released terrorists in the territories or abroad, meaning whether it is preferable to keep terrorists under surveillance in Gaza and Judea and Samaria (where they can be eliminated, if necessary), or to “exile” terrorists to Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria (where targeting them is politically and operationally more difficult).

Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yedid, former adviser on Arab affairs to the IDF’s Central Command, and Moshe (“Mofaz”) Fuzaylov, former Israel Security Agency investigations chief, say that the current terrorist free-for-all in Jenin and Tulkarem, for example, proves that released terrorists must be expelled as far away as possible. Otherwise, they will bolster the already-solid, Iranian-backed military machine that terrorists have built in these areas, and will expand them.

EITHER WAY, the danger of mass-releasing Palestinian terrorists is clear. A deal that frees vicious murderers of Israeli Jews (including the Nukhba killers and rapists of October 7) in exchange for Israel’s innocent suffering hostages endangers even more Israeli lives down the road – and that road is not notably long.

Dvora Gonen, whose son Danny was murdered near Dolev in 2015 by a terrorist released in the Shalit deal, told journalist and researcher Nadav Shragai last month that “the difference between the hostages currently held in Gaza and the next generation of Israeli victims who will be murdered by those released in the impending Hamas hostage deal – is that the hostages have faces and names, while future victims remain as yet unknown.”

Gonen: “On the other hand, the previous generation of terrorist victims like my son Danny, murdered by Palestinian terrorists released in previous deals, have both faces and names.”

What Dvora Gonen is saying, I think, is beware and be aware. Dealing for the hostages held in Gaza now might be the most humanitarian and morally necessary thing in the world to do, but it also may be the most dangerous and potentially disastrous thing Israel can do. The cost will pay out over a prolonged period, and it will be steep. An agonizing dilemma for Israel, indeed.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 16.08.2024 and Israel Hayom 18.08.2024

As preparations for a military confrontation between Iran and its proxies and Israel reach their peak, and in parallel with the bolstering of its military capabilities in the region, the United States is also intensifying its diplomatic efforts. These efforts aim to formulate an agreed-upon formula that will help promote a general ceasefire and, at the very least, prevent deterioration into a regional war.

It appears that Washington is seeking to leverage the tensions with Iran to accelerate the promotion of a regional arrangement that would also include Gaza. It can be assumed that administration officials are trying to secure Israeli agreement to end the war in the Gaza Strip in a way that would allow the Iranians to market it as an achievement following their involvement, and in exchange for their agreement to freeze or moderate their revenge operation for the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh. From the American perspective, such a formula, combined with the authentic concerns of the Tehran regime about getting entangled in a wider war (and perhaps with additional promises from the US), could provide the Iranians with a respectable ladder to climb down from the high tree they’ve climbed.

Such a formula could pave the way for easing regional tensions and would include: a roadmap for ending the war in Gaza, the release of hostages, an agreed solution on the northern front, and calm with the Houthis as well. Reinforcement for this line of thinking can be found in the words of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, who, in his statement this week, spoke in one breath about efforts to ease tensions with Iran and progress in negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza.

Slim chance for a de-escalation formula

However, the chances of reaching such an arrangement are slim. First, from Iran’s side – it is highly doubtful whether the compensation in Gaza will satisfy the Iranians’ thirst for revenge after the severe blow to their national pride and after the belligerent declarations made by regime officials, one after another. Moreover, from their perspective, such a formula does not address the need to renew the “deterrence equation” against Israel.

Second, regarding Hezbollah, if Iran does not respond to Haniyeh’s elimination, it will then expect part of the price for this to be exacted through Hezbollah’s revenge attack for the elimination of Fuad Shukr. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah settling for a moderate response to the two assassinations and then being willing to discuss withdrawing his forces from the border with Israel.

Third, the question of whether concessions in Gaza are appropriate on Israel’s part and whether it is right to use them as “compensation.” Assuming that the political echelon in Israel adheres to its positions, then the ceasefire in Gaza should be limited in time and without giving up Israeli control over the Philadelphia Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor. At this point in time, concessions beyond this on Israel’s part will provide a lifeline to Hamas and allow it to recover, consolidate its governance, and renew military capabilities as well. Assuming that the justified insistence on these positions will still allow reaching a deal, it is not certain that, in the eyes of the Iranians, such a deal is sufficient compensation.

Ismail Haniyeh is just the straw that broke the camel’s back

Fourth and above all, the current clash between Israel and the Islamic Republic, although occurring in the wake of accusations about Haniyeh’s assassination, has deeper roots, and its causes lie in the aggressive moves the regime is taking to realize its vision of achieving regional hegemony and destroying Israel. The ring of fire that this regime has built around Israel through its many proxy forces is one component. Its significance was well demonstrated in the current war. The additional component is the regime’s advanced efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Solutions that do not address these root problems will not hold up, and from Israel’s perspective, it is not certain that achieving quiet at such a price is worthwhile.

Faced with the current threats from Iran and Hezbollah, the Israeli system has so far acted responsibly, seriously, and confidently. Iran’s moves pose an existential threat to Israel, and after emphasizing this in every possible forum, Israel is behaving as required in the face of such a threat, demonstrating determination, self-confidence, high intelligence, and operational capabilities. In Iran and Lebanon, they are well aware of the damage Israel can inflict on their critical infrastructures. Presumably, they take this into account when planning their steps.

There is also the possibility of an escalation that will force the US to increase its involvement in the fighting. The Iranian threat is a central challenge for Israel, but not only for Israel. Iran is a key player in shaping the axis of countries opposing the US and the West. Its influence and actions do not stop at the borders of the Middle East. They can be seen in the war in Ukraine and in dealings with countries in Africa, Asia, and South America. And this is even without it possessing nuclear weapons. The US has a key role not only in restraining Iran but also in dealing with the root problem – the ayatollah regime.

Washington’s desire to prevent a regional war and their expectation from Israel to avoid moves that will drag the US into such a war requires a fundamental and rapid response to the threats posed by Iran. An effective effort led by the US against the Iranian octopus – this is also Israel’s strategic preference, although there are red lines whose crossing will compel Israel to act. This is well understood in Tehran, Beirut, and Washington.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 9, 2024.

Hamas officially announced Tuesday night that Yahya Sinwar has been appointed head of the organization’s political bureau, replacing Ismail Haniyeh. This makes him Hamas’s de facto new sole leader.

This comes as a surprise. Sinwar’s name was not mentioned as a possible candidate in the speculation and predictions regarding Haniyeh’s successor. At first glance, this is a puzzling choice, as it is unclear how Sinwar will manage to lead and run the organization while he is hidden in a tunnel or another hideout in the Gaza Strip as he is being pursued and trying to save his life.

The leadership of Hamas have known tensions and rivalries for years, even during Khaled Mashaal’s tenure as head of the political bureau, and especially towards the end of his term.

The rivalry only intensified after Sinwar’s release in 2011 as part of the Shalit deal, particularly with the establishment of his status as Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip and his official election in 2017. The rivalry was fundamentally between the external leadership, even when Ismail Haniyeh from the Shati refugee camp in Gaza headed it, and the organization’s leadership in Gaza.

Gaza is seen as the organization’s center of gravity, and its leadership, certainly when it comes to Yahya Sinwar, considered itself more significant and important in the decision-making processes, especially regarding the events in the Gaza Strip.

Tensions have only worsened since October 7 and the beginning of hostage negotiations. The Gaza leadership, led by Sinwar, set the tone and made the decisions, not the external leadership. Sinwar, who focuses on Egypt as the main mediator, has not hidden his disdain for Haniyeh, who, in turn, placed his hopes on Qatar.

Therefore, Egypt has a significantly greater influence on the person who, until yesterday, was just the organization’s leader in Gaza, while Qatar’s influence on him is much smaller.

The internal rivalry in Hamas also manifests in the relations between the leadership in the West Bank and the leadership in Gaza.

The struggle between the approaches is also evident regarding the organization’s cooperation with Iran, which Haniyeh encouraged. Conversely, Sinwar merely viewed it pragmatically and instrumentally (similar to Iran’s attitude towards Hamas).

Khaled Mashaal became a persona non grata for Iran and Syria due to what they perceived as his ultimate betrayal during the Syrian civil war. This also led to his expulsion from the country in 2012. Therefore, at this time, Mashaal could not again lead the political bureau.

Nevertheless, Sinwar’s appointment to the position surprised many. He indeed intended to run in the 2025 elections for the head of the political bureau, but his election during the war, while he is pursued and hidden, raises many questions.

Under such conditions, it is difficult to assess how he will manage to function as the organization’s leader, represent it externally, and fulfill the required tasks.

There is a possibility that Sinwar’s selection was intended to advance the hostage deal negotiations and lead to ending the war in Gaza.

It is possible that the Egyptians, the only ones in contact with Sinwar, helped promote the move through dialogue with the Hamas leadership.

If Ismail Haniyeh indeed represented a tougher stance in the deal negotiations compared to Sinwar’s more pragmatic line, an obstacle has been removed.

Now, with Sinwar’s election to the position, he may want to fulfill his role as the organization’s leader and ensure his election in the 2025 elections, which he can only do once the hostage deal is completed – leading to the end of the war and the guarantees he demands that Hamas leaders will not be assassinated.

Now, serving simultaneously as the head of the political bureau and the leader in Gaza, Sinwar’s ability to advance a deal may even increase.

If this is indeed the plan, Sinwar could strengthen his position as the organization’s leader and Hamas’s position as an alternative to Fatah, aiming to take over the Palestinian Authority and the PLO.

This would be due to the steadfastness and what will surely be presented as the ultimate victory, as Israel fails to eliminate the organization’s rule in the Strip, and he returns to his sovereign role in Gaza.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 7, 2024.

In the week of Oct. 8, 2023, the Israeli War Cabinet deliberated over a proposal to take the initiative against Hezbollah by responding to its attacks with a surprise full-scale invasion. The argument raised against this was that it would be strategic folly to attempt a full-scale war on two fronts and that decimating Hamas must be the priority. The latter view won out and it was decided to respond to Hezbollah’s attacks tit for tat, in what would become a war of attrition now entering its tenth month.

This decision may have been correct given the limited resources at our disposal and the scale of the task which lay before us in Gaza, but it entailed the heavy price of allowing the north to burn and its residents to be displaced, risking a longer-term loss of sovereignty in what has become a security buffer zone within Israel’s own territory. Since then, every time the specter of escalation in the north has arisen, Israel has chosen restraint, all in the name of completing the first phase of the reconquest of Gaza from Hamas.

But that phase was essentially completed over a month ago. Israel has attained the ability to maneuver throughout the entire Strip, including in Rafah and critically along the border with Egypt. It has now shifted to a less intense level of fighting, focusing on the slower and arduous task of fully eliminating Hamas presence through targeted raids, clearing the maze of underground terror tunnels, and gradually dismantling Hamas’s command structure. This new phase is expected to take many months, perhaps years, and so Israel can no longer justify waiting for its completion to turn its attention to the north.

As soon as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned from his vital visit to the United States, the time had come to shift the center of gravity of Israel’s efforts northwards. Therefore, it would be a mistake to view the events of the past week as merely another round of tit for tat following the terrible attack on Majdal Shams. That attack is not the reason Israel must increase the intensity of the fighting against Hezbollah, but rather a symptom which serves to demonstrate just how necessary is a shift of focus.

It would be preferable for Israel to now launch a surprise all-out war against Hezbollah with the goals of destroying its missile stockpiles and disbanding it as an organization, as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 requires. It is never a convenient time to start a war, and the current case is certainly no exception, but it highly unlikely that there will be a better opportunity for this inevitable war in the foreseeable future, and an opening surprise salvo against Hezbollah’s precision missiles would be of great advantage. Nonetheless, in view of the various constraints, it seems Israel is not likely to take such a drastic step.

In the absence of initiating a war to eradicate Hezbollah, the least Israel must do is address the two most immediate threats: a cross-border ground invasion and the short-range rocket fire on border towns. Addressing the first will require some form of ground maneuver to establish a buffer zone in Lebanese territory. Addressing the second requires extensively damaging Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stockpiles. If both of these minimal goals can be achieved, then Israel could consider settling it there and postponing the inevitable larger conflict to sometime in the coming few years, and use the intervening time to re-arm and prepare itself.

Given this situation, high-profile assassinations are only useful as an opening blow. On their own, they do not provide any solution for the situation in the north or address the continued threat from Hezbollah. They throw the organization off balance for a while, and this is a valuable first step before more significant action that will bring lasting change to the situation, but if we stop there Hezbollah will replace its losses and we’ll be back where we started.

There is political benefit to the assassinations, as Israel’s allies view them as surgical strikes against legitimate targets, whereas for Hezbollah and Iran they constitute a severe affront to their honor which precludes anything but an escalatory response. Thus when the Iranian-led axis inevitably attacks Israel, Jerusalem will receive begrudging international acceptance to expand the campaign, as it will be clear that Hezbollah is the one dragging us into a broader war.

Israel is now on standby for an Iranian-led attack and is busy preparing to defend its population. Hopefully it will succeed in preventing any significant damage to life and property, but it would be a grave mistake to treat the attack according to the actual damage caused, rather than the damage intended. Israel does not need more corpses to justify broader action against Hezbollah or even against Iran directly. Any self-respecting country must take with grave seriousness the severity of the attack itself, and not hide behind its sophisticated defensive capabilities to justify avoiding conflict.

We are at a historic moment of truth. The time for the “Gaza first, Lebanon later” strategy has run out. Israel must face the fact that it is at war with Iran and all its proxies. Now is the time to turn this terrible war that was forced upon us into an opportunity to change the balance of power and shape the reality around us.

Published in JNS, August 5, 2024.

Israel is riding a wave of momentum in the Gaza conflict. On the battlefield, the defense establishment has chalked up a string of victories, starting with the push into Rafah and securing the vital Philadelphi Corridor – Hamas’ lifeline. Other successes include the daring rescue of four hostages in Nuseirat, the reported elimination of Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif and Khan Yunis commander Rafah Salameh, establishing control over the strategic Netzarim Corridor, conducting raids in Gaza City and Khan Yunis, and recovering the bodies of five fallen soldiers abducted into Gaza. Hamas’ inability to mount significant counteroperations during this period underscores the cumulative impact of Israel’s actions.

Moreover, Israel’s swift and bold response against the Houthis in Yemen, coupled with the ongoing precision strikes on Hezbollah field commanders and relentless operations against terrorist cells in the West Bank, demonstrate not only Israel’s operational prowess but also its resolve and the resilience of its defense apparatus. This steadfast stance in the face of prolonged multi-front challenges, despite intense pressure and heavy costs, is beginning to shake some of our adversaries’ core assumptions and raise doubts about the viability of their war of attrition strategy.

Even on the diplomatic front, typically a source of hope for Israel’s enemies, there are signs of a shifting landscape. Global attention has diversified beyond Gaza, criticism of Israel persists but with limited impact on military operations, international courts have not halted Israel’s actions, normalization agreement partners have maintained ties despite street-level anger, and discussions of future peace deals continue to simmer.

From Hamas’ perspective, political developments in the US are casting a long shadow. It’s unclear whether pressure on Israel from the current administration will maintain its intensity, and they’ve heard Donald Trump’s hawkish stance loud and clear, should he return to office. The call for Israel to swiftly conclude the war and “finish the job against Hamas” is interpreted as an expectation of ramped-up military action. Against this backdrop, Hamas likely realizes that time is no longer on its side.

A double-edged sword

For Israel, the passage of time cuts both ways. On one hand, it allows for consolidating gains, further degrading Hamas, and potentially securing more favorable terms for hostage release. On the other, it heightens the risk to captives’ well-being and escalates costs and dangers on the northern front, which is inextricably linked to the situation in Gaza. The political leadership faces a stark dilemma: balancing the imperative of dismantling Hamas against the urgent need to bring the hostages home.

Hamas’ demands in the emerging deal aim to end the war while preserving its status as Gaza’s power broker and securing conditions that would enable it to rebuild its capabilities and leverage political gains, including in the West Bank. Israel’s insistence on resuming combat operations after the deal’s initial phase is meant to address these concerns, but it overlooks the complex dynamics of such processes. Once the war machine winds down, it can’t simply be restarted at will. The international community would likely oppose such a move, and domestic support would be difficult to muster given the mounting costs and new challenges on the horizon. The practical upshot is that the war could effectively end without achieving its stated objectives.

Another sticking point is Hamas’ demand for IDF withdrawal from Gaza, including the critical Philadelphi Corridor and Netzarim Corridor. Control over the Philadelphia Corridor represents one of Israel’s key strategic gains in this conflict. This control is crucial for preventing Hamas’ resurgence. Without it, Israel would struggle to curb weapons smuggling into Gaza and its transformation back into a terrorist stronghold. Past experience cautions against relying on foreign entities for this task, regardless of their identity. An Israeli pullback from this corridor would be nearly irreversible and invite pressure in future Palestinian negotiations.

Caught between a rock and a hard place

Relinquishing the Netzarim Corridor, or entrusting it to other parties, would pave the way for Hamas’ return to northern Gaza. In the current climate, it’s hard to envision any enforcement body (besides the IDF) capable of restricting Hamas’ movements – not Arab states, not international forces, not even Mohammed Dahlan. Even if a solution were found, declaring that “armed individuals will not be allowed to return to northern Gaza” rings hollow when miles of unmapped tunnels honeycomb the area.

Paradoxically, the extensive tunnel network beneath Gaza City neighborhoods provides Israel with justification to delay the return of displaced residents and continue treating these areas as active combat zones. This could serve as leverage, with the displaced population pressuring Hamas. Conceding on this issue would amount to tacit Israeli acceptance of this reality, undermining the goal of demilitarization.

We haven’t even touched on the risks posed by the potential release of terrorists as part of any deal: It could incentivize future kidnappings, see those released return to terrorist activities, and bolster Hamas’ political standing in both Gaza and the West Bank.

There isn’t a soul in Israel who doesn’t yearn for the hostages’ safe return, just as there’s no one who doesn’t want to see Hamas decisively defeated. Navigating between these two imperatives is a true “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario. Whatever course the government chooses will be legitimate, provided we don’t blind ourselves to the costs.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 31, 2024.

The borders of Israel are permeable. The need for a commission of inquiry into the failures of October 7 is crystal clear and the timing for this probe is still to be determined. However, it can already be said quite clearly that technological means – however advanced – must be backed up by the physical presence of soldiers in order to secure the borders.

We must never again allow a situation in which the citizens of Israel live hundreds of meters from potential terrorists, as was the case on October 7. An impassable buffer zone of significant size must be enforced and any factor that enters it – no matter what it may be – must be immediately ranged.

Currently, many villages in the North experience the same reality of having absolutely no buffer zone. The small town of Ghajar, for example, is located on the Israeli-Lebanese border, and its inhabitants, originally Syrian Alawite Muslims, now have Israeli citizenship. Until recently, they lived in a surreal reality in which Hezbollah terrorists were allowed to approach within a few meters of their homes.

Many Jewish communities on the northern border live in similar circumstances. The UN forces, whose sole role is to make sure that the buffer zone is free of terrorists, are not fulfilling their role either because of a lack of will or because of a lack of real ability to stand up to Hezbollah.

The border crossing in the narrow “waist” of Israel, in the northern Sharon area, was, until October 7, 2023, almost completely permeable and served as a haven for the illegal and unauthorized entry of Palestinians into Israel.

Towns and villages along the wall, in the part of the border where a wall does indeed exist, such as Bat Hefer, Yad Hana, Kibbutz Bahan, and others, are located right alongside it, while living with the knowledge that there are countless loopholes in the fence that was set up in the remainder of the border area.

Following the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, significant military forces secured the area and extensive activity was carried out, and continues to be carried out, by IDF forces in the area, aiming to eradicate Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist operatives who have been supported by Iran for years. However, the border crossing is not at all hermetic and there are too many cases of illegal infiltration of Palestinians into the country, with the help of Israeli citizens, most of whom are Arabs.

Most infiltrate to work in agriculture and construction, but this can certainly not be counted upon. There is the possibility that they could be recruited to perform terrorist attacks similar to the one perpetrated on October 7 in the South. The creation – and enforcement – of a significant buffer zone on the other side of the borderline is undoubtedly an issue of life and death.

Jordanian intervention

THERE IS a very long border of over 300 km. between Israel and Jordan. This is a border that, until recently, was secured almost exclusively by Jordanian security forces that have prevented attempts by terrorist elements to infiltrate from Jordan into Israel.

Iranian activity in Jordan and the subversion against the Hashemite monarchy have been going on for several years, although the issue has received almost no media coverage. A significant obstacle – a draconian buffer zone and an Israeli military presence in that area – are an unquestionable necessity.

Approximately one month ago, the Jordanian king made a first-of-its-kind public announcement against the continued Iranian subversion, and Tehran’s encouragement of Hamas to try to carry out a Palestinian coup in the small and fragile country.

The Iranians’ proposal to send Shi’ite militias from Iraq to Jordan to “help” the king against potential rebels was met with an unequivocal “No!” The Jordanian soft-spoken approach toward Iran and Hamas had become aggressive and uncompromising, understanding that the Iranian modus vivendi is to disintegrate a country from within and then come in with its proxies to practically take it over. It has done so in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, to name but a few countries.

However, will Jordan be able to stand alone against Iran’s repeated attempts to undermine the kingdom and its sovereignty and harness the Palestinian population in Jordan to march into the State of Israel?

Will Jordan be able to eradicate Iranian ambitions to create chaos within the kingdom while subjecting the population to the Hashemite regime? These attempts in Jordan are particularly dangerous since an Iranian takeover of the country would create a territorial continuum of Iran – through Iraq – and potentially through Jordan to Israel’s eastern border.

The lack of enforcement against polygamy among Bedouin in the Negev has led in the past decades to an increase in the number of Palestinian women from the Gaza Strip and the southern Hebron Hills living in Israel’s South and raising their children on the values ​​they had secured in Gaza. While polygamy is prohibited by Israeli law, Sharia courts in the country – which are authorized to rule on matrimonial and family law matters among Muslims – allow it.

The difficulty of creating an actual barrier between the southern Hebron Hills area and the Negev must be addressed immediately. No explanation or rejection can be accepted, given the significant risk inherent in the current situation.

Long before the events of October 7, and even more so following them, there can be no legitimacy for the lack of significant and very stringent border security enforcement. The Israeli public has every right to demand this and decision-makers are obliged to respond to the issue without hesitation.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, July 23, 2024.

Key Points: 

1. Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor is required to achieve two of the war’s objectives: Destroying Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities in Gaza, and preventing Gaza from becoming a terrorist base again in the future. Abandoning control of the corridor will be perceived as a Hamas achievement, enabling the terrorist group to rearm, and increasing its chances of surviving as the dominant power in Gaza after the war. Conversely, Israeli control over Philadelphi will be viewed as a clear indication of Hamas’ defeat following the October 7 massacre. It will also send a clear message to Hezbollah.

2. Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor is crucial to prevent the rearming of terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially after their weapons stockpiles have dwindled during the course of the fighting. The IDF’s control of the route and the Rafah Crossing provides Israel with the opportunity to cut off a primary lifeline through which Hamas and other terrorist groups smuggled weapons, manufacturing materials, terrorist instructors, military experts, and special capabilities, often with Iranian involvement.This is also an opportunity to correct one of the fundamental weaknesses that have influenced the security reality in the Gaza Strip over the past two decades and to implement the principle that Israel will always defend itself by itself.  

3. The terrorist group’s processes of rearming and rebuilding their military capabilities occur far from public eye and at a gradual pace. Past experience demonstrates that over time, the enforcing authority’s determination and ability to prevent such processes decreases, due to the complexity and price of thwarting them. It is therefore critical that Israel adopt today robust solutions to the threat of future rearmament that will remain effective over time.

4. Physical barriers and technological means of detection are not sufficient to prevent smuggling. In addition to such systems and infrastructure, an independent and readily-deployable operational capability is required, one capable of operating in the field at short notice to thwart smuggling attempts. Reliance on international actors and foreign countries as an alternative has failed repeatedly over the years, and there is no reason to assume that this time will be different.

5. Abandoning control of the Philadelphi Route, which was achieved after the terrible price Israel paid, is an almost irreversible step. If Israel withdraws from the Corridor now, it will find it difficult in the future to ensure the legitimacy (domestic and international) needed to return and retake control.

6. Additionally, abandoning control of the Philadelphi Corridor and agreeing to rely on international actors will lead to intense international pressure in the future to adopt a similar approach with regards to Judea and Samaria and to Israel’s border with Jordan. 

7. Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will also involve costs to Israel on the operational, diplomatic and legal levels. Yet while the severity of these costs will vary over time as a result of international conditions and Israeli counter-measures, it is certain that abandoning control of the Corridor will entail very high costs for Israel.Israel’s presence in the Corridor will allow it to advance arrangements in the operational, physical, diplomatic and humanitarian spheres that will enable Israel to protect its core interests and security.

8. In our assessment, a determined stance by Israel on this issue may also assist in increasing internal pressure within Hamas to adopt positions that will contribute to a comprehensive solution to the issue of hostage release.

Signed by: Meir Ben Shabbat, Ronen Levi, Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, Moshe Fuzaylov, Ruth Pines Feldman, Asher Fredman, Elie Klutstein.

• Key Points

  • The proposed hostage deal for Israel is a strategic risk and a moral and ethical error. The IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor would allow Hamas to renew its military buildup.
  • The return of hundreds of thousands of Gazans to the northern part of the Gaza Strip will bring thousands of terrorists with them. They do not need to bring weapons with them, as there are vast stockpiles of weapons in northern Gaza that the IDF has not yet located and destroyed.
  • Statements by senior military officials regarding the IDF’s ability to operate again in these areas as needed are presumptuous and disconnected from reality. To resume fighting, Israel would have to sacrifice the lives of its best soldiers and risk crisis with the US and the international community.
  • Only continued military pressure by Israel can increase the chances that Hamas will bend and might release the remaining hostages.

  Comprehensive Discussion Needed

  The proposed hostage deal requires a thoughtful and thorough discussion, analyzing all the relevant implications. One must not entertain the thought that those who oppose the emerging deal do so out of irrelevant considerations, lack of interest, or insensitivity to the release of the hostages and their fate. The authors of this article addressed this issue in December 2023, discussing the tension between national security and personal safety in the context of the current war’s goals. This logic remains valid today.

  Prioritizing Collective National Security

  Without addressing collective national security through achieving war goals, primarily the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities, Israeli society is doomed to face many more painful tragedies of this kind. These will not be limited to the Palestinian arena and will exact a high and painful toll on both national and personal security levels. Israel must prioritize its national security while expressing absolute commitment to freeing all hostages. The political echelon must clarify to the public, and especially to the hostages’ families, the necessity of adhering to war goals and at the same time work to create the military and political conditions that are crucial for fulfilling the mission and achieving military and political victory, which will ultimately lead to the release of all hostages.

  Issues with the Emerging Deal

  The proposed deal’s problematic points include Hamas’s demand that the IDF withdraw from Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, an area filled with underground tunneling infrastructure used for smuggling weapons and strengthening terrorist organizations in Gaza. (On August 4, Israel exposed a Hamas tunnel large enough for trucks to drive through.) IDF operations in this area are crucial in cutting off smuggling routes from Egypt and preventing the entry of weapons, thus thwarting the renewed buildup of Hamas and other organizations in Gaza. Attempts to monitor this through technology and cameras have failed, resulting in massive amounts of weapons passing through the Rafah crossing.

  International Monitoring Failures

  The attempt to incorporate an international entity into the monitoring and supervision system also failed, as the EU-BAM monitoring team abandoned the crossing following Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip. The operational pattern of BAM-EU resembles that of UNDOF on the Golan Heights after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and that of the UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula in 1967 after the Egyptian army entered the peninsula. Similarly, the UNIFIL force deployed in southern Lebanon following the adoption of Resolution 1701 and tasked with its enforcement failed miserably. Experience demonstrates that international forces are unable to perform such tasks effectively and persistently, especially in the Israeli context.

  Necessity for a Physical IDF Presence

  Complete disarmament of Gaza is impossible without thwarting any attempt at weapon smuggling through Philadelphi as well as other crossings into the strip. To ensure no weapons can be smuggled into Gaza, it is imperative that IDF forces are present in the surrounding Gaza area. This is true in general, and it most certainly applies to the entire period of constructing a barrier along the Philadelphi Corridor, until its completion.

  Summary

  The proposed deal is a strategic threat, as well as a moral and ethical mistake, by all indicators.

  The deal includes several phases and demands the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, the Netzarim Route, and northern Gaza, and eventually also from the security buffer zone. Moreover, the phased hostage release plan is intended, from Hamas’s perspective, to prolong the cessation of fighting indefinitely. Agreeing to this demand would mean that Israel forfeits all the remaining leverage it has to ensure the release of hostages and the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.

  Such withdrawal would enable Hamas to resume smuggling from Egypt, accelerate the process of military buildup, and maintain a real military threat to Israel. The return of hundreds of thousands of Gazan civilians to the northern part of the Gaza Strip would also allow the return of thousands of terrorists. The claim that armed militants will not be allowed back is deceptive, and statements about the IDF’s ability to operate again in these areas are disconnected from reality.

  Ending the war in the Gaza Strip is a cornerstone of the US regional strategic vision, which, in Washington’s view, could also lead to a ceasefire in the north and a reconciliation with Iran and its proxies, thereby advancing the normalization process with Saudi Arabia. Thus, the US is adamant about this, and will attempt to prevent Israel from resuming combat once IDF forces exit the Gaza Strip. In addition, the presence of regional and international forces, along with Palestinian Authority forces, will complicate the operational reality in Gaza and hinder the IDF’s ability to resume fighting against Hamas.

  If Israel had accepted such a deal, Muhamad Deif, Aref Saleme, Rauhi Mushtawa and others would not have been eliminated and Hamas would have had more capacity to reconstitute itself rapidly. The fact that central figures have been eliminated increases the pressure on Sinwar and facilitate conditions for a better deal and an improved security reality in the Gaza Strip.

  Alternative Proposal

  A more logical and moral alternative is an Israeli proposal or ultimatum for the release of all hostages in one phase, in exchange for the lives of Hamas leaders and remaining organization members in Gaza, who will be allowed to leave Gaza unharmed. Hamas will likely reject such a deal, in which case the IDF should conquer all of Gaza, establish military governance, and prevent Hamas from regaining control.

  From day one, it was sustained Israeli military pressure that forced Hamas to be flexible, and it seems that only continued military pressure can increase the chances of recovering Israeli hostages and forcing a change in Hamas’ position.

Israel is grappling with three main alternative strategies for continuation of the Gaza war, aiming to achieve its declared goals: the military and governmental collapse of Hamas, the release of all hostages, and the creation of a new reality that will prevent Gaza from again becoming a base for attacks on Israel.

The supporters of each alternative strategy express absolute confidence in the righteousness of their position, alongside low attentiveness to criticism and arguments pointing to difficulties and drawbacks. It is important to examine each approach with a clear mind, with integrity, and with as few preconceptions as possible.

Strategy A: Hostage Deal and an End to the War

The first strategy calls upon the Israeli government to accept Hamas’s terms for release of the hostages, including an end to the war and immediate withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza. Among the proponents of this strategy are hostage families, senior commentators, figures on the Israeli left, many in the international community, and (according to The New York Times) several senior IDF officers. They believe that the hostages, especially those still alive, cannot be freed by any other means, and that their fate outweighs any other consideration. They also claim that since Israel has already severely harmed Hamas and its supporters among Gaza residents, Hamas will find it difficult to rebuild its power in the near future and will not be able to repeat the October 7th attack.

Additionally, they argue, Israel will not be able to bear the burden of continued fighting for much longer and therefore should end it now. According to its proponents, this strategy will also lead to an end of the conflict on the northern border, as promised by Hezbollah, halt the erosion of international support for Israel, ease tensions with the United States, and may even advance the desired normalization with Saudi Arabia.

The practical implication of this strategy is leaving Hamas as the ruling power in Gaza, abandoning the effort to prevent it from regaining its strength as well as the vision of de-radicalization of the Gazan population – costs that the supporters of this strategy are willing to bear. They believe that Hamas as an idea cannot be defeated and that any form of (Palestinian? local?) governing body in Gaza is preferable to Israeli rule or the chaos that will prevail in the aftermath of the war. However, the implementation of this strategy would mean that Israel is, unwillingly, declaring Hamas as the victor in the war and admitting that the decision to initiate the October 7 attack was wise and based on sound strategic thinking.

Hamas anticipated a harsh Israeli response but assumed that nevertheless it would emerge the ruling power in Gaza because Israel could not bear the cost of removing it from power. From Hamas’s perspective, as seen by Iran and its proxies, the primary goal at this point is to keep Hamas in power at any cost. Hamas’ victory will be seen as a huge achievement and will be translated into continued strengthening of the organization with the aim of forcing further concessions from Israel, undermining the confidence of the Zionist enterprise in its ability to exist in the heart of a hostile region, and expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East, including into Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. Within the Palestinian system, it will mean further strengthening of Hamas and the Islamist version of the Palestinian narrative of struggle.

Strategy B: A Deal Followed by Continuous Military Pressure

Strategy B, supported by the security establishment, argues that the main effort in Gaza should be to continue military pressure on Hamas until it is completely dismantled. This involves the third phase of the war, i.e., raids and pinpoint strikes that will exact a painful price from the terrorist organization and force it to accept the hostage deal proposed by Israel and backed by the United States, the mediators, and the international community.

Supporters of this strategy see the slight flexibility in Hamas’s position as proof of the validity of this argument. For Israel, they argue, the costs of continued fighting will gradually decrease while Hamas, which has already suffered a severe blow, will continue to pay heavily, including the potential targeting of its senior leadership.

Concurrently, to restore legitimacy, Israel will continue humanitarian efforts and try to gradually promote governance structures that are not affiliated with Hamas or other terror organizations, preferably ones not tied to Fatah but without excluding them either. According to this strategy, the IDF will retain full responsibility for fighting terrorism in Gaza and will continue to maintain its presence in the Philadelphi corridor (until an arrangement is reached with Egypt to ensure no smuggling occurs) and the Netzarim corridor, as well as in the perimeter surrounding Gaza.

This strategy would leave Hamas in control of most of Gaza and its population but would allow Israel to address security risks without restrictions while not tasked with the burden of managing the civilian life in Gaza (like the situation in Palestinian Authority areas in Judea and Samaria). The IDF will then be able to allocate more resources to addressing the threat from Lebanon (if attempts to achieve an agreement through diplomatic means fail). Although this does not fully meet the expectations of the US, it may significantly mitigate disagreements with Washington.

However, there are several problems with pursuing this course of action. Firstly, it deviates from the declared goals of defeating Hamas and allows Hamas to remain in power for an extended period, inspiring hope among the Iranians and their allies that this would become the new permanent reality. The proponents of this strategy do not use the terms victory or defeat and replace them with the term “dismantle” that means making the military formations of Hamas dysfunctional.

Secondly, this approach offers only partial solution to the issue of hostages, as Hamas would have no interest in releasing all hostages without an Israeli commitment to a complete cessation of fighting and full withdrawal from Gaza (i.e., shifting to Strategy A). As such, this strategy, too, may play into the hands of Hamas and Iran, albeit to a lesser extent, and would worsen Israel’s strategic situation, with all the risks that entails.

The claim that the IDF will be capable of dealing with any emerging threat from Gaza after evacuating it, including the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors may easily turn into empty promises. It also completely ignores a fundamental issue – the need to change the Palestinian narrative, i.e., de-radicalization (although its supporters hope that the initial criticism of Hamas in Gaza will increase as the harsh reality weighs on the residents).

Supporters of this strategy argue that Hamas is an “idea” and therefore it cannot be defeated, and in doing so they justify the limited goals set forth.

Strategy C: Defeat, Control, and De-radicalize

Strategy C, promoted by the Israeli government (and which I tend to favor), holds that once the hostage deal option has been exhausted (and either culminates with a deal that is acceptable by Israel or fails), Israel should pursue the total military and governmental defeat of Hamas, deploying significant forces to fully dismantle Hamas’s infrastructure, and replacing it temporarily with Israeli military governance, as a first stage. Once it is clear that Hamas is not returning to power, efforts will be made to transfer many of its responsibilities to Palestinian entities that are not linked to terror, and/or to an international and inter-Arab administration that will manage Gaza’s rehabilitation.

In the process, supporters of this approach hope that it will be possible to secure the release of the hostages through military pressure; and in exchange for an Israeli commitment not to harm Hamas’ leadership and remaining militants, allow them to leave Gaza safely. This strategy would improve Israel’s strategic position, severely damage the Iranian axis both among Palestinians and across the region, place Israel in a favorable position against Hezbollah, and prepare the ground for de-radicalization steps towards a long-term change in Gaza.

The problematic aspects of this strategy are its low feasibility and the high potential of damaging relations with the US and Israel’s legitimacy in the international arena. The main argument against it is that while Israel can destroy Hamas brigades, it cannot eliminate its ideology, which is deeply embedded in the hearts and minds of Gazans. It is also argued that the cost of Israeli control of Gaza to remove Hamas from power is too high, both in terms of the military force required and the casualties resulting from prolonged presence in an area full of terrorists. This would also impose heavy economic burden on the Israeli society and damage relations with the US, which has explicitly declared its opposition to Israel’s control of Gaza. Most of these claims are exaggerated in order to convince the government avoid implementing this strategy.

Conclusions

All three strategies should be taken with the utmost seriousness and deliberated respectfully and objectively by both proponents and opponents, with the understanding that all parties seek the best result for the State of Israel. It is essential that discussion be substantive and involve as many politicians and experts as possible on military, security, home front security, economics, and foreign relations. Additionally, to ensure that the chosen strategy considers diverse perspectives and receives broad support, a national emergency government should be formed, which is clearly necessary in Israel’s current predicament. The brave IDF soldiers who will implement the adopted strategy deserve no less.