Israel is riding a wave of momentum in the Gaza conflict. On the battlefield, the defense establishment has chalked up a string of victories, starting with the push into Rafah and securing the vital Philadelphi Corridor – Hamas’ lifeline. Other successes include the daring rescue of four hostages in Nuseirat, the reported elimination of Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif and Khan Yunis commander Rafah Salameh, establishing control over the strategic Netzarim Corridor, conducting raids in Gaza City and Khan Yunis, and recovering the bodies of five fallen soldiers abducted into Gaza. Hamas’ inability to mount significant counteroperations during this period underscores the cumulative impact of Israel’s actions.

Moreover, Israel’s swift and bold response against the Houthis in Yemen, coupled with the ongoing precision strikes on Hezbollah field commanders and relentless operations against terrorist cells in the West Bank, demonstrate not only Israel’s operational prowess but also its resolve and the resilience of its defense apparatus. This steadfast stance in the face of prolonged multi-front challenges, despite intense pressure and heavy costs, is beginning to shake some of our adversaries’ core assumptions and raise doubts about the viability of their war of attrition strategy.

Even on the diplomatic front, typically a source of hope for Israel’s enemies, there are signs of a shifting landscape. Global attention has diversified beyond Gaza, criticism of Israel persists but with limited impact on military operations, international courts have not halted Israel’s actions, normalization agreement partners have maintained ties despite street-level anger, and discussions of future peace deals continue to simmer.

From Hamas’ perspective, political developments in the US are casting a long shadow. It’s unclear whether pressure on Israel from the current administration will maintain its intensity, and they’ve heard Donald Trump’s hawkish stance loud and clear, should he return to office. The call for Israel to swiftly conclude the war and “finish the job against Hamas” is interpreted as an expectation of ramped-up military action. Against this backdrop, Hamas likely realizes that time is no longer on its side.

A double-edged sword

For Israel, the passage of time cuts both ways. On one hand, it allows for consolidating gains, further degrading Hamas, and potentially securing more favorable terms for hostage release. On the other, it heightens the risk to captives’ well-being and escalates costs and dangers on the northern front, which is inextricably linked to the situation in Gaza. The political leadership faces a stark dilemma: balancing the imperative of dismantling Hamas against the urgent need to bring the hostages home.

Hamas’ demands in the emerging deal aim to end the war while preserving its status as Gaza’s power broker and securing conditions that would enable it to rebuild its capabilities and leverage political gains, including in the West Bank. Israel’s insistence on resuming combat operations after the deal’s initial phase is meant to address these concerns, but it overlooks the complex dynamics of such processes. Once the war machine winds down, it can’t simply be restarted at will. The international community would likely oppose such a move, and domestic support would be difficult to muster given the mounting costs and new challenges on the horizon. The practical upshot is that the war could effectively end without achieving its stated objectives.

Another sticking point is Hamas’ demand for IDF withdrawal from Gaza, including the critical Philadelphi Corridor and Netzarim Corridor. Control over the Philadelphia Corridor represents one of Israel’s key strategic gains in this conflict. This control is crucial for preventing Hamas’ resurgence. Without it, Israel would struggle to curb weapons smuggling into Gaza and its transformation back into a terrorist stronghold. Past experience cautions against relying on foreign entities for this task, regardless of their identity. An Israeli pullback from this corridor would be nearly irreversible and invite pressure in future Palestinian negotiations.

Caught between a rock and a hard place

Relinquishing the Netzarim Corridor, or entrusting it to other parties, would pave the way for Hamas’ return to northern Gaza. In the current climate, it’s hard to envision any enforcement body (besides the IDF) capable of restricting Hamas’ movements – not Arab states, not international forces, not even Mohammed Dahlan. Even if a solution were found, declaring that “armed individuals will not be allowed to return to northern Gaza” rings hollow when miles of unmapped tunnels honeycomb the area.

Paradoxically, the extensive tunnel network beneath Gaza City neighborhoods provides Israel with justification to delay the return of displaced residents and continue treating these areas as active combat zones. This could serve as leverage, with the displaced population pressuring Hamas. Conceding on this issue would amount to tacit Israeli acceptance of this reality, undermining the goal of demilitarization.

We haven’t even touched on the risks posed by the potential release of terrorists as part of any deal: It could incentivize future kidnappings, see those released return to terrorist activities, and bolster Hamas’ political standing in both Gaza and the West Bank.

There isn’t a soul in Israel who doesn’t yearn for the hostages’ safe return, just as there’s no one who doesn’t want to see Hamas decisively defeated. Navigating between these two imperatives is a true “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario. Whatever course the government chooses will be legitimate, provided we don’t blind ourselves to the costs.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 31, 2024.

The borders of Israel are permeable. The need for a commission of inquiry into the failures of October 7 is crystal clear and the timing for this probe is still to be determined. However, it can already be said quite clearly that technological means – however advanced – must be backed up by the physical presence of soldiers in order to secure the borders.

We must never again allow a situation in which the citizens of Israel live hundreds of meters from potential terrorists, as was the case on October 7. An impassable buffer zone of significant size must be enforced and any factor that enters it – no matter what it may be – must be immediately ranged.

Currently, many villages in the North experience the same reality of having absolutely no buffer zone. The small town of Ghajar, for example, is located on the Israeli-Lebanese border, and its inhabitants, originally Syrian Alawite Muslims, now have Israeli citizenship. Until recently, they lived in a surreal reality in which Hezbollah terrorists were allowed to approach within a few meters of their homes.

Many Jewish communities on the northern border live in similar circumstances. The UN forces, whose sole role is to make sure that the buffer zone is free of terrorists, are not fulfilling their role either because of a lack of will or because of a lack of real ability to stand up to Hezbollah.

The border crossing in the narrow “waist” of Israel, in the northern Sharon area, was, until October 7, 2023, almost completely permeable and served as a haven for the illegal and unauthorized entry of Palestinians into Israel.

Towns and villages along the wall, in the part of the border where a wall does indeed exist, such as Bat Hefer, Yad Hana, Kibbutz Bahan, and others, are located right alongside it, while living with the knowledge that there are countless loopholes in the fence that was set up in the remainder of the border area.

Following the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, significant military forces secured the area and extensive activity was carried out, and continues to be carried out, by IDF forces in the area, aiming to eradicate Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist operatives who have been supported by Iran for years. However, the border crossing is not at all hermetic and there are too many cases of illegal infiltration of Palestinians into the country, with the help of Israeli citizens, most of whom are Arabs.

Most infiltrate to work in agriculture and construction, but this can certainly not be counted upon. There is the possibility that they could be recruited to perform terrorist attacks similar to the one perpetrated on October 7 in the South. The creation – and enforcement – of a significant buffer zone on the other side of the borderline is undoubtedly an issue of life and death.

Jordanian intervention

THERE IS a very long border of over 300 km. between Israel and Jordan. This is a border that, until recently, was secured almost exclusively by Jordanian security forces that have prevented attempts by terrorist elements to infiltrate from Jordan into Israel.

Iranian activity in Jordan and the subversion against the Hashemite monarchy have been going on for several years, although the issue has received almost no media coverage. A significant obstacle – a draconian buffer zone and an Israeli military presence in that area – are an unquestionable necessity.

Approximately one month ago, the Jordanian king made a first-of-its-kind public announcement against the continued Iranian subversion, and Tehran’s encouragement of Hamas to try to carry out a Palestinian coup in the small and fragile country.

The Iranians’ proposal to send Shi’ite militias from Iraq to Jordan to “help” the king against potential rebels was met with an unequivocal “No!” The Jordanian soft-spoken approach toward Iran and Hamas had become aggressive and uncompromising, understanding that the Iranian modus vivendi is to disintegrate a country from within and then come in with its proxies to practically take it over. It has done so in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, to name but a few countries.

However, will Jordan be able to stand alone against Iran’s repeated attempts to undermine the kingdom and its sovereignty and harness the Palestinian population in Jordan to march into the State of Israel?

Will Jordan be able to eradicate Iranian ambitions to create chaos within the kingdom while subjecting the population to the Hashemite regime? These attempts in Jordan are particularly dangerous since an Iranian takeover of the country would create a territorial continuum of Iran – through Iraq – and potentially through Jordan to Israel’s eastern border.

The lack of enforcement against polygamy among Bedouin in the Negev has led in the past decades to an increase in the number of Palestinian women from the Gaza Strip and the southern Hebron Hills living in Israel’s South and raising their children on the values ​​they had secured in Gaza. While polygamy is prohibited by Israeli law, Sharia courts in the country – which are authorized to rule on matrimonial and family law matters among Muslims – allow it.

The difficulty of creating an actual barrier between the southern Hebron Hills area and the Negev must be addressed immediately. No explanation or rejection can be accepted, given the significant risk inherent in the current situation.

Long before the events of October 7, and even more so following them, there can be no legitimacy for the lack of significant and very stringent border security enforcement. The Israeli public has every right to demand this and decision-makers are obliged to respond to the issue without hesitation.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, July 23, 2024.

Key Points: 

1. Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor is required to achieve two of the war’s objectives: Destroying Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities in Gaza, and preventing Gaza from becoming a terrorist base again in the future. Abandoning control of the corridor will be perceived as a Hamas achievement, enabling the terrorist group to rearm, and increasing its chances of surviving as the dominant power in Gaza after the war. Conversely, Israeli control over Philadelphi will be viewed as a clear indication of Hamas’ defeat following the October 7 massacre. It will also send a clear message to Hezbollah.

2. Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor is crucial to prevent the rearming of terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially after their weapons stockpiles have dwindled during the course of the fighting. The IDF’s control of the route and the Rafah Crossing provides Israel with the opportunity to cut off a primary lifeline through which Hamas and other terrorist groups smuggled weapons, manufacturing materials, terrorist instructors, military experts, and special capabilities, often with Iranian involvement.This is also an opportunity to correct one of the fundamental weaknesses that have influenced the security reality in the Gaza Strip over the past two decades and to implement the principle that Israel will always defend itself by itself.  

3. The terrorist group’s processes of rearming and rebuilding their military capabilities occur far from public eye and at a gradual pace. Past experience demonstrates that over time, the enforcing authority’s determination and ability to prevent such processes decreases, due to the complexity and price of thwarting them. It is therefore critical that Israel adopt today robust solutions to the threat of future rearmament that will remain effective over time.

4. Physical barriers and technological means of detection are not sufficient to prevent smuggling. In addition to such systems and infrastructure, an independent and readily-deployable operational capability is required, one capable of operating in the field at short notice to thwart smuggling attempts. Reliance on international actors and foreign countries as an alternative has failed repeatedly over the years, and there is no reason to assume that this time will be different.

5. Abandoning control of the Philadelphi Route, which was achieved after the terrible price Israel paid, is an almost irreversible step. If Israel withdraws from the Corridor now, it will find it difficult in the future to ensure the legitimacy (domestic and international) needed to return and retake control.

6. Additionally, abandoning control of the Philadelphi Corridor and agreeing to rely on international actors will lead to intense international pressure in the future to adopt a similar approach with regards to Judea and Samaria and to Israel’s border with Jordan. 

7. Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will also involve costs to Israel on the operational, diplomatic and legal levels. Yet while the severity of these costs will vary over time as a result of international conditions and Israeli counter-measures, it is certain that abandoning control of the Corridor will entail very high costs for Israel.Israel’s presence in the Corridor will allow it to advance arrangements in the operational, physical, diplomatic and humanitarian spheres that will enable Israel to protect its core interests and security.

8. In our assessment, a determined stance by Israel on this issue may also assist in increasing internal pressure within Hamas to adopt positions that will contribute to a comprehensive solution to the issue of hostage release.

Signed by: Meir Ben Shabbat, Ronen Levi, Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, Moshe Fuzaylov, Ruth Pines Feldman, Asher Fredman, Elie Klutstein.

• Key Points

  • The proposed hostage deal for Israel is a strategic risk and a moral and ethical error. The IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor would allow Hamas to renew its military buildup.
  • The return of hundreds of thousands of Gazans to the northern part of the Gaza Strip will bring thousands of terrorists with them. They do not need to bring weapons with them, as there are vast stockpiles of weapons in northern Gaza that the IDF has not yet located and destroyed.
  • Statements by senior military officials regarding the IDF’s ability to operate again in these areas as needed are presumptuous and disconnected from reality. To resume fighting, Israel would have to sacrifice the lives of its best soldiers and risk crisis with the US and the international community.
  • Only continued military pressure by Israel can increase the chances that Hamas will bend and might release the remaining hostages.

  Comprehensive Discussion Needed

  The proposed hostage deal requires a thoughtful and thorough discussion, analyzing all the relevant implications. One must not entertain the thought that those who oppose the emerging deal do so out of irrelevant considerations, lack of interest, or insensitivity to the release of the hostages and their fate. The authors of this article addressed this issue in December 2023, discussing the tension between national security and personal safety in the context of the current war’s goals. This logic remains valid today.

  Prioritizing Collective National Security

  Without addressing collective national security through achieving war goals, primarily the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities, Israeli society is doomed to face many more painful tragedies of this kind. These will not be limited to the Palestinian arena and will exact a high and painful toll on both national and personal security levels. Israel must prioritize its national security while expressing absolute commitment to freeing all hostages. The political echelon must clarify to the public, and especially to the hostages’ families, the necessity of adhering to war goals and at the same time work to create the military and political conditions that are crucial for fulfilling the mission and achieving military and political victory, which will ultimately lead to the release of all hostages.

  Issues with the Emerging Deal

  The proposed deal’s problematic points include Hamas’s demand that the IDF withdraw from Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, an area filled with underground tunneling infrastructure used for smuggling weapons and strengthening terrorist organizations in Gaza. (On August 4, Israel exposed a Hamas tunnel large enough for trucks to drive through.) IDF operations in this area are crucial in cutting off smuggling routes from Egypt and preventing the entry of weapons, thus thwarting the renewed buildup of Hamas and other organizations in Gaza. Attempts to monitor this through technology and cameras have failed, resulting in massive amounts of weapons passing through the Rafah crossing.

  International Monitoring Failures

  The attempt to incorporate an international entity into the monitoring and supervision system also failed, as the EU-BAM monitoring team abandoned the crossing following Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip. The operational pattern of BAM-EU resembles that of UNDOF on the Golan Heights after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and that of the UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula in 1967 after the Egyptian army entered the peninsula. Similarly, the UNIFIL force deployed in southern Lebanon following the adoption of Resolution 1701 and tasked with its enforcement failed miserably. Experience demonstrates that international forces are unable to perform such tasks effectively and persistently, especially in the Israeli context.

  Necessity for a Physical IDF Presence

  Complete disarmament of Gaza is impossible without thwarting any attempt at weapon smuggling through Philadelphi as well as other crossings into the strip. To ensure no weapons can be smuggled into Gaza, it is imperative that IDF forces are present in the surrounding Gaza area. This is true in general, and it most certainly applies to the entire period of constructing a barrier along the Philadelphi Corridor, until its completion.

  Summary

  The proposed deal is a strategic threat, as well as a moral and ethical mistake, by all indicators.

  The deal includes several phases and demands the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, the Netzarim Route, and northern Gaza, and eventually also from the security buffer zone. Moreover, the phased hostage release plan is intended, from Hamas’s perspective, to prolong the cessation of fighting indefinitely. Agreeing to this demand would mean that Israel forfeits all the remaining leverage it has to ensure the release of hostages and the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.

  Such withdrawal would enable Hamas to resume smuggling from Egypt, accelerate the process of military buildup, and maintain a real military threat to Israel. The return of hundreds of thousands of Gazan civilians to the northern part of the Gaza Strip would also allow the return of thousands of terrorists. The claim that armed militants will not be allowed back is deceptive, and statements about the IDF’s ability to operate again in these areas are disconnected from reality.

  Ending the war in the Gaza Strip is a cornerstone of the US regional strategic vision, which, in Washington’s view, could also lead to a ceasefire in the north and a reconciliation with Iran and its proxies, thereby advancing the normalization process with Saudi Arabia. Thus, the US is adamant about this, and will attempt to prevent Israel from resuming combat once IDF forces exit the Gaza Strip. In addition, the presence of regional and international forces, along with Palestinian Authority forces, will complicate the operational reality in Gaza and hinder the IDF’s ability to resume fighting against Hamas.

  If Israel had accepted such a deal, Muhamad Deif, Aref Saleme, Rauhi Mushtawa and others would not have been eliminated and Hamas would have had more capacity to reconstitute itself rapidly. The fact that central figures have been eliminated increases the pressure on Sinwar and facilitate conditions for a better deal and an improved security reality in the Gaza Strip.

  Alternative Proposal

  A more logical and moral alternative is an Israeli proposal or ultimatum for the release of all hostages in one phase, in exchange for the lives of Hamas leaders and remaining organization members in Gaza, who will be allowed to leave Gaza unharmed. Hamas will likely reject such a deal, in which case the IDF should conquer all of Gaza, establish military governance, and prevent Hamas from regaining control.

  From day one, it was sustained Israeli military pressure that forced Hamas to be flexible, and it seems that only continued military pressure can increase the chances of recovering Israeli hostages and forcing a change in Hamas’ position.

Israel’s grip on the Philadelphi Corridor stands out as one of its key strategic gains in the Gaza war. This control serves a dual purpose: it provides leverage in hostage release negotiations and, more critically, acts as a bulwark against Hamas’ potential resurgence. The move reflects a hard-learned lesson from Israel’s two-decade struggle to contain military buildup in Gaza. Past reliance on international arrangements as a security substitute has proven ineffective, with little reason to believe such measures would fare better in the future. Moreover, acquiescing to these arrangements could embolden Hamas, fostering hope that post-conflict Gaza might revert to its pre-Oct. 7 status quo.

The flurry of updates on hostage deal negotiations and ongoing Gaza operations has overshadowed recent reports suggesting Israel’s potential withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. However, the question of who controls this strategic strip could prove decisive in determining the lasting impact of Israel’s war efforts. The extent of control over this route will not only influence how quickly adversaries could pose renewed threats to Israel but also shape the nature and intensity of future security challenges. One need look no further than Hezbollah’s daily provocations for a glimpse of potential scenarios absent effective control.

Drawing from its Gaza experience, Israel has emphasized that any future political settlement must include Israeli control over the external border areas. This stance, initially articulated regarding arrangements with the Palestinian Authority, holds even truer for Gaza in the absence of a formal agreement. The devastating toll of Oct. 7 has lent legitimacy to this position, while the war has created the operational conditions to make it feasible. However, relinquishing this control now would be irreversible. Israel would be hard-pressed to reclaim the area after making commitments to Egypt and the US, especially within the context of broader international understandings.

Could an Israeli-Egyptian mechanism, with US involvement, effectively replace direct Israeli control? Historical precedent offers little room for optimism. In Jan. 2009, as Operation Cast Lead wound down, then-Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni signed an agreement establishing such a mechanism. While this accord halted Israel’s military campaign short of decisively defeating Hamas, it failed to prevent even a single instance of smuggling.

This wasn’t without precedent. In Oct. 2005, at the urging of US officials, Israel agreed to regulate the opening of Gaza border crossings. Promises of assistance in countering resulting security threats proved hollow. The PA lost its foothold in Gaza, Israeli security assurances evaporated, and Hamas reveled in the perceived folly of the arrangement.

Any reasonable person understands that detection and monitoring systems alone can’t stop smuggling. An effective operational force is crucial – capable of swift, timely responses to incidents. Without Israeli control, we would be dependent on the goodwill of the Egyptians. Their priorities and considerations may not align perfectly with Israeli security imperatives. The likelihood of such a mechanism meeting Israel’s expectations is far lower than the probability of smuggling along this route becoming a flashpoint in Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Undoubtedly, Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor presents complex operational, diplomatic, and logistical challenges. However, these must be weighed against the costs of relinquishing control. The current climate provides unprecedented justification for implementing necessary engineering measures to enhance the security of Israeli forces in the area.

While Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor may not be ideal from all perspectives, it represents a vital course correction. It embodies the principle of self-reliance in defense, deprives a significant strategic asset of those responsible for the Oct. 7 atrocities, and marks a substantial step toward reshaping Gaza’s future security landscape.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 14,  2024.

Israel is grappling with three main alternative strategies for continuation of the Gaza war, aiming to achieve its declared goals: the military and governmental collapse of Hamas, the release of all hostages, and the creation of a new reality that will prevent Gaza from again becoming a base for attacks on Israel.

The supporters of each alternative strategy express absolute confidence in the righteousness of their position, alongside low attentiveness to criticism and arguments pointing to difficulties and drawbacks. It is important to examine each approach with a clear mind, with integrity, and with as few preconceptions as possible.

Strategy A: Hostage Deal and an End to the War

The first strategy calls upon the Israeli government to accept Hamas’s terms for release of the hostages, including an end to the war and immediate withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza. Among the proponents of this strategy are hostage families, senior commentators, figures on the Israeli left, many in the international community, and (according to The New York Times) several senior IDF officers. They believe that the hostages, especially those still alive, cannot be freed by any other means, and that their fate outweighs any other consideration. They also claim that since Israel has already severely harmed Hamas and its supporters among Gaza residents, Hamas will find it difficult to rebuild its power in the near future and will not be able to repeat the October 7th attack.

Additionally, they argue, Israel will not be able to bear the burden of continued fighting for much longer and therefore should end it now. According to its proponents, this strategy will also lead to an end of the conflict on the northern border, as promised by Hezbollah, halt the erosion of international support for Israel, ease tensions with the United States, and may even advance the desired normalization with Saudi Arabia.

The practical implication of this strategy is leaving Hamas as the ruling power in Gaza, abandoning the effort to prevent it from regaining its strength as well as the vision of de-radicalization of the Gazan population – costs that the supporters of this strategy are willing to bear. They believe that Hamas as an idea cannot be defeated and that any form of (Palestinian? local?) governing body in Gaza is preferable to Israeli rule or the chaos that will prevail in the aftermath of the war. However, the implementation of this strategy would mean that Israel is, unwillingly, declaring Hamas as the victor in the war and admitting that the decision to initiate the October 7 attack was wise and based on sound strategic thinking.

Hamas anticipated a harsh Israeli response but assumed that nevertheless it would emerge the ruling power in Gaza because Israel could not bear the cost of removing it from power. From Hamas’s perspective, as seen by Iran and its proxies, the primary goal at this point is to keep Hamas in power at any cost. Hamas’ victory will be seen as a huge achievement and will be translated into continued strengthening of the organization with the aim of forcing further concessions from Israel, undermining the confidence of the Zionist enterprise in its ability to exist in the heart of a hostile region, and expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East, including into Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. Within the Palestinian system, it will mean further strengthening of Hamas and the Islamist version of the Palestinian narrative of struggle.

Strategy B: A Deal Followed by Continuous Military Pressure

Strategy B, supported by the security establishment, argues that the main effort in Gaza should be to continue military pressure on Hamas until it is completely dismantled. This involves the third phase of the war, i.e., raids and pinpoint strikes that will exact a painful price from the terrorist organization and force it to accept the hostage deal proposed by Israel and backed by the United States, the mediators, and the international community.

Supporters of this strategy see the slight flexibility in Hamas’s position as proof of the validity of this argument. For Israel, they argue, the costs of continued fighting will gradually decrease while Hamas, which has already suffered a severe blow, will continue to pay heavily, including the potential targeting of its senior leadership.

Concurrently, to restore legitimacy, Israel will continue humanitarian efforts and try to gradually promote governance structures that are not affiliated with Hamas or other terror organizations, preferably ones not tied to Fatah but without excluding them either. According to this strategy, the IDF will retain full responsibility for fighting terrorism in Gaza and will continue to maintain its presence in the Philadelphi corridor (until an arrangement is reached with Egypt to ensure no smuggling occurs) and the Netzarim corridor, as well as in the perimeter surrounding Gaza.

This strategy would leave Hamas in control of most of Gaza and its population but would allow Israel to address security risks without restrictions while not tasked with the burden of managing the civilian life in Gaza (like the situation in Palestinian Authority areas in Judea and Samaria). The IDF will then be able to allocate more resources to addressing the threat from Lebanon (if attempts to achieve an agreement through diplomatic means fail). Although this does not fully meet the expectations of the US, it may significantly mitigate disagreements with Washington.

However, there are several problems with pursuing this course of action. Firstly, it deviates from the declared goals of defeating Hamas and allows Hamas to remain in power for an extended period, inspiring hope among the Iranians and their allies that this would become the new permanent reality. The proponents of this strategy do not use the terms victory or defeat and replace them with the term “dismantle” that means making the military formations of Hamas dysfunctional.

Secondly, this approach offers only partial solution to the issue of hostages, as Hamas would have no interest in releasing all hostages without an Israeli commitment to a complete cessation of fighting and full withdrawal from Gaza (i.e., shifting to Strategy A). As such, this strategy, too, may play into the hands of Hamas and Iran, albeit to a lesser extent, and would worsen Israel’s strategic situation, with all the risks that entails.

The claim that the IDF will be capable of dealing with any emerging threat from Gaza after evacuating it, including the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors may easily turn into empty promises. It also completely ignores a fundamental issue – the need to change the Palestinian narrative, i.e., de-radicalization (although its supporters hope that the initial criticism of Hamas in Gaza will increase as the harsh reality weighs on the residents).

Supporters of this strategy argue that Hamas is an “idea” and therefore it cannot be defeated, and in doing so they justify the limited goals set forth.

Strategy C: Defeat, Control, and De-radicalize

Strategy C, promoted by the Israeli government (and which I tend to favor), holds that once the hostage deal option has been exhausted (and either culminates with a deal that is acceptable by Israel or fails), Israel should pursue the total military and governmental defeat of Hamas, deploying significant forces to fully dismantle Hamas’s infrastructure, and replacing it temporarily with Israeli military governance, as a first stage. Once it is clear that Hamas is not returning to power, efforts will be made to transfer many of its responsibilities to Palestinian entities that are not linked to terror, and/or to an international and inter-Arab administration that will manage Gaza’s rehabilitation.

In the process, supporters of this approach hope that it will be possible to secure the release of the hostages through military pressure; and in exchange for an Israeli commitment not to harm Hamas’ leadership and remaining militants, allow them to leave Gaza safely. This strategy would improve Israel’s strategic position, severely damage the Iranian axis both among Palestinians and across the region, place Israel in a favorable position against Hezbollah, and prepare the ground for de-radicalization steps towards a long-term change in Gaza.

The problematic aspects of this strategy are its low feasibility and the high potential of damaging relations with the US and Israel’s legitimacy in the international arena. The main argument against it is that while Israel can destroy Hamas brigades, it cannot eliminate its ideology, which is deeply embedded in the hearts and minds of Gazans. It is also argued that the cost of Israeli control of Gaza to remove Hamas from power is too high, both in terms of the military force required and the casualties resulting from prolonged presence in an area full of terrorists. This would also impose heavy economic burden on the Israeli society and damage relations with the US, which has explicitly declared its opposition to Israel’s control of Gaza. Most of these claims are exaggerated in order to convince the government avoid implementing this strategy.

Conclusions

All three strategies should be taken with the utmost seriousness and deliberated respectfully and objectively by both proponents and opponents, with the understanding that all parties seek the best result for the State of Israel. It is essential that discussion be substantive and involve as many politicians and experts as possible on military, security, home front security, economics, and foreign relations. Additionally, to ensure that the chosen strategy considers diverse perspectives and receives broad support, a national emergency government should be formed, which is clearly necessary in Israel’s current predicament. The brave IDF soldiers who will implement the adopted strategy deserve no less.

While discussions in Israel increasingly focus on transitioning to a new phase of the conflict, the situation on the ground remains volatile. Approximately 20 rockets were recently launched from Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip toward communities in southern Israel, and intense fighting continues in the city of Rafah.

The threat extends beyond Gaza’s borders. Near Tulkarm in the West Bank, an explosive device was detonated against Israeli forces operating in the Nur al-Shams refugee camp. Hamas official Husam Badran recently outlined the group’s strategy: “We are currently working to increase and develop resistance in the West Bank.” He called on anyone with weapons to take action.

In a separate interview, senior Hamas figure Khaled Mashal stated that the Oct. 7 attack created an opportunity for Palestinians to revive their longstanding ambition: a single Palestinian state “from the river to the sea.”

The purpose that the discourse on the imminent end of intense fighting is meant to serve is unclear. The risks it poses are evident: it generates hope for our enemies and, conversely, may reduce our forces’ operational readiness and vigilance. While Israel has dealt significant blows to Hamas, the group is far from defeated. Hamas retains a considerable fighting force, substantial weaponry, an extensive tunnel network, and a largely intact leadership structure both within Gaza and abroad.

The organization maintains control over areas of Gaza where Israeli forces are not present. Its unyielding stance in hostage negotiations demonstrates not only an ability to coordinate under difficult circumstances but also a degree of confidence in its position.

As long as Israel’s stated war objectives remain unmet, including the formulation of an acceptable hostage release deal, pressure on Hamas should not be reduced. The opposite is true. Our forces on the ground have proved that they know how to achieve their objectives. They should be given everything necessary to do so, including authorizations to use intense fire as much as needed to reduce risks and maintain their safety. It is appropriate to avoid messages that create hesitation or confusion.

The time has come to target senior Hamas officials living abroad, who currently operate with relative impunity. Israel must maintain several points of leverage against Hamas to impede its recovery: Control over humanitarian aid distribution; preventing residents from returning to northern Gaza; maintaining control of key border crossings; keeping Gaza geographically divided; establishing a wide security perimeter with strict rules of engagement and carefully managing the issue of Palestinian detainees (under no circumstances should we agree to a situation where they are released due to a shortage of detention facilities or for other technical and administrative reasons.)

The many question marks in the current policy should be replaced with exclamation points, both regarding the pressing humanitarian issues and undermining Hamas’ governance efforts. The principle of simplicity also applies in this regard.

Our success in the Gaza Strip is crucial to prevent Hamas from realizing its ambitions in the West Bank as well, and to ensure that when the time comes, and to ensure we can address the northern front from a position of strength when the time comes.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 2, 2024.

In the complex web of dilemmas facing Israeli decision-makers, the war to decisively defeat the Hamas terror organization must remain a cornerstone of policy and action. After Oct. 7, there is no room for maneuver – any other outcome will have far-reaching consequences. A determined effort to achieve all our objectives in the Gaza Strip will also shake Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s confidence in the effectiveness of his attrition strategy against Israel and provide him and Lebanese leaders with a stark illustration of the potential outcomes of a war with Israel.

The dispute at the top political-security echelon on Gaza-related issues reflects not only differences in approaches to the strategic purpose (real, not declared) of the war but also gaps in assessing the effectiveness of efforts and the synchronization of the Gaza fighting with other threats and challenges. Our enemies exploit this disagreement as propaganda material, presenting it as expressions of frustration and despair, and as signs of breakdown within the Israeli system.

Examining the conduct of the Israeli military and society, along with the war’s achievements, provides a mixed balance that leans more toward the positive, optimistic side than the opposing view.

This refers not only to military achievements but even to the war’s impact on public opinion in Gaza, as can be learned from the results of an updated quarterly survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research headed by Khalil Shikaki. This survey indicated a decrease in the percentage of Gaza residents who still support Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, a decrease in satisfaction with Hamas, and a decline in the percentage of Gazans who believe Hamas will win the war. While the data is still far from indicating a complete shift (and in the West Bank, they even reflect a trend of strengthening for Hamas), they should not be ignored.

The differences in approaches within the Israeli system are not always reconcilable, but it is possible to reduce expectation gaps between the political echelon and the security system, and between both of these and the public.

The first gap concerns the required achievement. The goal defined by politicians is the destruction of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities, but there is still a need to define metrics by which its achievement can be assessed. Security officials have often used the term “dismantling,” referring to dismantling the ability of Hamas brigades and battalions to operate as organized frameworks. Indeed, the IDF has dismantled most of them.

In a war against a regular state army, collapsing the combat system, dismantling it, and certain destruction of its forces is sufficient to make its fighting hopeless in a way that will lead to deterrence and surrender. This happened in our wars against Arab armies until 1973.

In the case before us, fighting against a hybrid entity – an army that knows how to switch to operate as guerrilla and terror cells (or against another jihadist army, like the Nazis and Japanese) – is not enough to defeat it. Dismantling the system is necessary to achieve the second decisive factor: eliminating the enemy and/or uprooting it from the area. This can explain the return to places where the IDF has already operated in the past and the lengthy time required.

Another gap exists regarding the destruction of governmental capabilities. While one approach suggests that the way to revoke Hamas’ control is to allow another entity (not the IDF) to take over civilian affairs management in Gaza, the other opinion holds that no entity other than the IDF can succeed under current conditions, and in any case, every Hamas governmental power center must be collapsed, even if there is temporarily no alternative. Either way, there is no known plan to achieve the goal, including severing Hamas’ control of humanitarian aid that provides it with breathing room and positions of power.

An additional gap is related to the pace and intensity of the fighting. These are influenced by the constraints Israel faces – political, operational, and legal. However, the current approach reduces efficiency, limits pressure points on the enemy, allows its forces to escape to areas outside the combat zone and reorganize there, prolongs the war, and strengthens the sense of stagnation. A strategy of accumulating tactical achievements comes with high prices that can only be demanded from the public when there is no other alternative.

The political and security leadership would do well to clarify these issues within the discussion rooms. Despite its drawbacks, the dispute can be an opportunity to strengthen our confidence not only in the justness of the war but also in the way it is being conducted.

Targeting Hamas leaders will clarify that there is a price for their refusal
Unlike in these areas, there seems to be no dispute about the importance of eliminating Hamas leadership and the expected benefits in relation to all the goals Israel has defined. While the difficulty in doing so regarding commanders in Gaza can be understood, it is not understandable regarding the organization’s leaders abroad, who star in the media and behave as if their immunity is guaranteed.

The central role played by this command, and its efforts to drag Israel into a multi-front war, require Israel to take systematic action against it until all its components are neutralized – especially after the Oct. 7 onslaught and after the clear wording provided by Khaled Mashal regarding Hamas’ commitment to destroy Israel.

Targeting them will clarify that there is a price for their refusal of a release deal and for the passing time. It will help disrupt the ability to control and coordinate and make recovery efforts more difficult.

Without an effective command abroad, Hamas will lose its status as a movement with regional influence, even if it continues to exist as a local persecuted organization. This is a shared interest for Israel and its neighbors, and a goal that serves the American desire to shape a new regional order.

Published in Israel Hayom, June November 23, 2024.

• Public diplomacy is an essential element in Israel’s war effort, but is important to Israel’s international standing at all times.
• Israel’s Public Diplomacy Directorate was unprepared for a crisis and improvised solutions, which have been insufficient. The IDF’s Spokesperson Unit was better prepared.
• A larger Public Diplomacy Directorate with full-time professional staff that goes beyond on-camera spokespeople and includes researchers, public relations professionals, graphic artists, representatives of intelligence bodies and more is necessary.
• The various government offices handling public diplomacy, as well as the IDF Spokesman’s Unit should improve their cooperation and coordination.

Introduction:

Public diplomacy has long been a problematic area for Israel. The Hebrew word for “public diplomacy,” hasbara, is a hint at Israel’s longstanding challenges in this area. “Hasbara” means “explanation” – but explaining what happened after the fact is far from sufficient to meet Israel’s international challenges.

Effective public diplomacy is essential for Israel at all times, but that need is even more acute in wartime, when distorted images and interpretations of the Jewish state’s actions can limit its ability to defend itself and attain its war aims. While “good PR” is not a magic wand that will solve all of Israel’s problems – especially when there is a sizable global audience predisposed against the Jewish state for a variety of reasons – it can only help, and “bad PR” is an unforced error that continues to damage Israel’s international standing and war effort.

Israel’s government needs a fully staffed team of professionals in communications, marketing, intelligence and other relevant areas to bring positive results that will support Israel’s war effort and boost its standing in calmer times.

The Misgav Institute hosted a webinar with three experts who played a role in Israel’s public diplomacy in the war with Hamas that began on October 7: former government spokesman Eylon Levy, Lt. Col. (Res.) Jonathan Conricus  and  Matt Krieger, CEO of strategic communications firm Gova10 and the chief communications officer of the campaign advocating for Israeli-American hostage Hersh Goldberg-Polin’s release from Hamas captivity. This paper is based on the insights reached in that webinar.

The Problems

 Civilian public diplomacy efforts: 

When Operation Swords of Iron began, Israel’s National Public Diplomacy Directorate, a unit within the Prime Minister’s Office, had a new head and a small staff. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not have a spokesperson for the foreign press. The system that eventually came about, of daily online briefings in English and a system of coordinating television and radio interviews for official government spokespeople, was improvised after October 7. Publisher Rotem Sella, of his own initiative, sought out media contacts (including the author of this paper, who was unable to participate) to try to share details of the October 7 massacre with the world. Levy was one of the first people he called, as well as journalist Tal Heinrich. Within weeks, their volunteer operation was absorbed by the Public Diplomacy Directorate, with some of the staff paid by a contractor to avoid byzantine government hiring practices, but many remaining volunteers.

This system has mostly remained, with a rotating team of spokespeople for daily briefings and TV and radio interviews, but little other staff to research and prepare the spokespeople. Nor did the Public Diplomacy Directorate hold regular briefings in any languages other than English and, for a time, Arabic.

The limitations of the current system are such that the address for handling print and online written media inquiries and requests remains unclear, and the spokespeople in the briefings are given broad talking points, instead of detailed information to answer journalists’ questions. They are also unable to take initiative and pitch the stories that Israel may want to be widely known, both due to time constraints and their narrow remit.

The National Public Diplomacy Directorate has tried to work on Israel’s online presence, and reports launching over 200 advertising campaigns, using physical billboards as well as digital platforms, producing videos and still content emphasizing Israel’s messages. They launched a website titled the “October 7 Hamas Massacre.” They also invited influential figures to their command center. The directorate reports over 2 billion hits for its campaigns, and 43 million for the Hamas massacre website in its first three days.

IDF public diplomacy efforts: 

The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit dominates Israel’s international public image. The unit is a veritable empire compared to the Public Diplomacy Directorate, but when men in uniform are conveying Israel’s messages, “it begins to look a little bit like martial law,” as Levy put it in the webinar. And while this has not always been the case, the prominent representatives of the IDF in the media in this war have not represented Israel’s diverse population.

The unit has, to a great extent, resolved some of its past problems in international communications, such as its longtime penchant for prioritizing access for Hebrew-language media outlets even in times of international crisis. In the current war, IDF Spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari has put international media at the center of his strategy, viewing global communications as a tool through which to enable the IDF to operate. Hagari also has sufficiently proficient English to address foreign outlets himself, which he has done in briefings, press conferences, and appearances in foreign news segments.

However, like Israeli government communications, much of this came together in wartime rather than be part of an overarching strategy. Many of the prominent figures in the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit in recent months were reservists who left jobs and families to spend their time helping the army, which in most cases was not sustainable long-term, though some have been hired by the IDF.

There is also a lack of effective coordination between the IDF and the Public Diplomacy Directorate; Levy said he would look to Conricus’s social media accounts for information – as opposed to communication being shared between the offices in which they served in a timely manner. This is true for the Foreign Ministry and Diaspora Affairs Ministry, which engage in related activities, as well. 

Recommendations 

Israel needs a formal, professional, civilian body responsible for public diplomacy, with a budget and full-time paid personnel enabling it to operate more fully at all times, not only in wartime. Having consistent names and faces that journalists and the public know will allow for more effective communication when a crisis breaks out. That full-time public diplomacy team would prepare a crisis communications plan, to be put in place during wartime.

That plan could include “enlisting” additional spokespeople temporarily, but capable people able to represent the government on camera in key languages – not only English – should be employed full-time. Foreign Ministry employees, many of whom have useful experience in this area, can be loaned out to the Public Diplomacy Directorate for this purpose, in a similar way to how some are loaned out as diplomatic advisers to government ministries and the Knesset speaker.

Visual communications are often as important as what is said by the spokespeople. Therefore, while their abilities are the highest priority, the team of spokespeople should have an appropriate gender balance and reflect Israel’s diverse society.

Permanent spokespeople are not the only employees that a more robust public diplomacy system needs. The IDF Spokesman’s Unit should have an intelligence officer permanently on its staff to examine open-source intelligence for Israel’s advantage, as well as to rapidly respond to accusations of wrongdoing. Public relations experts who would not necessarily be on camera are important as well, to field reporters’ questions and work with non-broadcast media. Graphic and video artists are needed, as well as fact-checkers and researchers to support those who are speaking to the press and the public.

A larger staff for the PMO Public Diplomacy Directorate would also allow for the cultivation of relationships with journalists, facilitating deeper and more frequent background briefings and the pitching of stories that show Israel in a more favorable light.

More foreign media should be allowed to embed with IDF troops in Gaza. When foreign media are allowed to directly accompany the IDF, this often leads to more accurate and nuanced portrayals of IDF operations.

The Public Diplomacy Directorate is meant to coordinate between different bodies communicating the government’s messages at home and abroad – it must make a greater effort in that respect, especially by integrating the IDF into the broader structure, without putting obstacles in front of its efforts that are working well. Cooperation between the Public Diplomacy Directorate, the Foreign Ministry and the Diaspora Affairs Ministry should be deepened as well, to ensure that a consistent message is being sent and that all of Israel’s public diplomacy assets worldwide are being used effectively.

Last week’s dramatic rescue of four Israeli hostages from Gaza included a shocking revelation: The hostages, who endued unbearable torture and constant threats of death, were held captive by Palestinian civilians in their home in central Gaza—including a journalist with bylines in Al Jazeera and his physician father. Amazingly, as soon the hostages were returned to Israeli soil, the operation was denounced by the usual suspects for the hundreds of “Palestinian civilians” it had claimed as casualties. The United Nations called the rescue operation a “war crime,” while EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell called it a “bloodbath” and “massacre.” Naturally, the press reflexively parroted Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry figures of purported casualties during the operation.

It’s a perfect opportunity for a long-overdue conversation about the use of the phrase “Palestinian civilian.”

Let’s get something straight from the outset: When you take hostages, you risk death. The moral and legal responsibility for any casualties resulting from the operation to free the hostages rests fully with Hamas and those holding hostages captive.

Under international law, it is a sacrosanct principle that civilians enjoy special protection, and the intentional targeting or harming of them during hostilities, is a grave war crime. But one should not need to be a legal scholar to understand that if you are a journalist or physician holding hostages, you are no longer a “civilian.” In fact, the Geneva Convention makes it unequivocally clear that civilians lose that protection when they take direct part in the hostilities.

In other words, when you hold hostages captive, you become a legitimate military target and should not be surprised when the Israel Defense Forces come knocking on your door.

And it wasn’t just these four hostages. In addition to the four Israeli hostages rescued from Nuseirat in central Gaza, there have been countless reports from hostages returning to Israel describing being held captive by ordinary Gazans, including families, doctors, teachers, and even U.N. employees.

It is also well known that civilians in Gaza willingly joined Hamas en masse on October 7 and took part in the massacre, rapes, and abductions on that day.

How many Gazan “civilians” helped Hamas move and store rockets? How many “civilians” offered up their homes to hold hostages captive or keep guard to make sure they did not escape? How many have been the willing accomplices and collaborators of Hamas in the worst massacre and crimes against the Jewish people since the Holocaust?

These questions are crucial. Yet the international community is failing to ask these questions.

Instead, lawmakers, journalists and diplomats are blindly accepting reported casualty figures from the Gaza Health Ministry, as if it were Moses delivering the Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai. Apparently, eight months into this war, it still has to be repeated that the Gaza “Health Ministry” is no more than a propaganda arm of the Hamas terror group.

A group that murders, massacres, rapes, beheads, and abducts people, and has a relentless history of fabricating stories, inflating casualties, and using their own civilians as human shields, is not exactly the world’s most trustworthy source.

This has not stopped the international community from using the Hamas figures as evidence to maliciously accuse Israel of genocide, call for embargoes, or seek arrest warrants for Israeli leaders.

Even if you accept Hamas’s figure of 30,000 reported deaths in Gaza during Israel’s war, the ratio of Palestinian non-combatants to terrorists killed has been estimated to be one to one, a level unprecedented in modern warfare. Meanwhile, the actual number of civilian casualties was recently significantly altered when the U.N. acknowledged that over 10,000 of the reported casualties were missing, not verified deaths; they also halved their demographic estimates of men versus women and children. With these updates, the already questionable figures become much lower. It would be lower still if those who have been reported as “civilians” were in fact combatants or, as we saw this week, holding hostages captive.

For Hamas, civilian death is their strategy; Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has called civilian deaths a “necessary sacrifices.”

As long as the press and world leaders fail to ask these questions, continuing to push false narratives and unsubstantiated casualty figures, they are only enabling and empowering Hamas and perpetuating the violence and suffering they claim to seek to end.

The article was co-authored with John Spencer. John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point and host of the ”Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He is the co-author of ”Understanding Urban Warfare.

Published in Newsweek, June 17, 2024.