The deal laid out by US President Joe Biden in his May 31 address on the war in Gaza is disingenuous and disastrous. His remarks reflect the failed paradigms, illusions, and wishful thinking that led to October 7. The plan he described, if implemented, would create an existential threat to the State of Israel.

President Biden’s deceptive and dangerous claims are numerous. Here are a few of the most egregious: The US president began his remarks by declaring that his goal is an end to the war, “one that… creates a better ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power…” However, the rest of his speech included no concrete steps or road maps for removing Hamas from power. The opposite was true. The proposed outline would ensure that Hamas remained in power and was able to rebuild its military strength.

President Biden assured that “Palestinian civilians would return to their homes… in all areas of Gaza, including the North.” He seemed to be claiming that it would only be civilians that would return to northern Gaza. But the fact is that there would be no way to ensure that Hamas fighters did not return there as well. These fighters aren’t wearing uniforms and their guns are hidden in the hundreds of tunnels that still exist in northern Gaza.

With this plan, Hamas would quickly reassert its control over every inch of the Strip.

Biden then made a statement of unparalleled chutzpah: “The people of Israel should know they can make this offer without any further risk to their own security because they’ve already devastated Hamas forces over the past eight months…” The reality is that Hamas still has many intact fighters and senior leadership – even if it is now operating as smaller terror cells rather than battalions, or laying low until the IDF withdraws.

Once reconstruction began in Gaza, the Islamist terror group would quickly rebuild its capabilities. The idea that leaving Hamas in power does not constitute a severe risk to Israel’s security, especially to those Israelis in the western Negev region, is ludicrous.

President Biden suggested that the United States would “help forge a diplomatic resolution, one that ensures Israel’s security” and that “with a deal, a rebuilding of Gaza will begin… in a manner that does not allow Hamas to re-arm.”

He ignores the inconvenient truth that diplomatic resolutions have failed time and again. They failed to prevent Hezbollah from greatly increasing its arsenal following the Second Lebanon War – and they failed to prevent the massive smuggling of weapons to Hamas from Egypt following the previous rounds of fighting in Gaza.

Likewise, the idea that with Hamas still in power, reconstruction could take place without enabling the terrorist group to rearm, is simply laughable. The current war in Gaza has revealed the far-reaching extent to which supplies that entered Gaza over the years, including for humanitarian purposes, were used first and foremost by Hamas, to build its terror infrastructure.

With regard to those who would oppose such a plan, Biden claimed that “the hostages are not a priority for them.”

This was a false and outrageous statement.

The fact that there are those who recognize that leaving Hamas in power will destroy Israel’s deterrence and encourage countless murderous attacks and kidnappings of Israelis does not mean that they care any less about the hostages. They simply believe that the efforts to free the hostages must take place on the basis of a pragmatic understanding of the Middle East, and of the psychopathic but intelligent enemy that Israel faces.

It is important to realize that while Hamas may be willing to release some of the hostages, it will never release all of them, as they serve as a human shield for its leadership. Under the deal that Biden describes, a ceasefire will continue, and Hamas will remain in power, as long as negotiations over the second stage of the hostage release continue – negotiations that can drag on for years.

Biden then assured that the “United States will always ensure that Israel has what it needs to defend itself.”

Let there be no mistake, however. Biden did not say that he supports Israel’s right to destroy the genocidal terrorist organizations bent on its destruction.

He said that Israel will have the right to shoot down rockets fired at its cities, while its citizens hide in shelters. This is the Biden doctrine with regards to Israel: Defense, yes. Offense, no.

President Biden concluded his remarks with the sentence: “It’s time for this war to end and for the ‘day after’ to begin.” This sentence encapsulated the failed paradigms that led to October 7. The idea that if we just stop fighting, the ‘day after’ can begin, is entirely false.

If the fighting stops with Hamas in power, the ‘day after’ will never begin. We will simply return to October 6. Only this time, with zero deterrence, an emboldened ring of terror along all of Israel’s borders, and large swaths of Israel’s territory in the South and North abandoned due to the ongoing terror threats.

To be fair – the degree to which Biden is accurately describing an outline that Israel proposed, and to what degree he is putting his own spin on the deal, is unclear. If an Israeli leader believes that it is necessary and correct to let Hamas win in order to return some of the hostages, then that leader should stand up and say so clearly.

The dilemma is a heart-wrenching one.

The fact is that the deal, as described by President Biden, would create an existential threat to Israel’s very existence. It would lead to countless terror attacks, kidnappings, instability, and war. Israel’s decisions must be based on a clear-sighted recognition of reality, however harsh.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2024.

On May 15, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav said that if no alternative to Hamas rule is presented for Gaza, only two options would remain: Hamas rule or Israeli military rule. “Both alternatives are bad,” he said.

“I will not agree to Israeli military rule in in Gaza, Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza…I call on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make a decision and declare that Israel will not establish civilian control over the Gaza Strip and that Israel will not establish military governance in Gaza,” he said.

He further noted that “the end of the military campaign must come together with political action” and said that “the day after Hamas will only be achieved with Palestinian entities backed by Arab countries taking control of Gaza. This is in Israel’s interests in order to achieve our goals.”

He did not specify which Palestinian entities should control Gaza, or how to get such elements to control Gaza.

It is true that the military campaign must be accompanied by political action to stabilize Gaza and bring about a situation in which it no longer poses a security threat to Israel. For several reasons however, there is still a long way to go until we reach this goal.

First, the fighting is far from over. The IDF is currently operating throughout the Gaza Strip, including in places it has already occupied and partially mopped up. The scope of the terrorist infrastructure built by Hamas  above and below ground is unprecedented, and the quantity and dispersal of weapons enormous. Cleansing the Gaza Strip of this infrastructure will require time, and so Gaza will continue to be a combat zone for the near future.

Second, despite the extensive damage inflicted on it, Hamas has managed to partially rehabilitate itself in some places. The Israel Defense Forces has succeeded in dismantling most of Hamas’ military apparatus; its command-and-control systems and organized units (brigades, battalions, companies) are no longer functioning, or only partially functioning. At this time, several organized battalions remain in Rafah and the central camps.

Hamas, however, is rehabilitating local networks in order to conduct guerilla attacks on IDF forces and from time to time to launch high-trajectory fire at communities near the Gaza Strip and even locations farther away. In addition, since Hamas is deeply embedded amid the Gazan population, in many cases “civilians” not officially belonging to Hamas’s military organization also operate against the IDF. As a result, the IDF has had to return to many areas in the Gaza Strip to disrupt terrorist networks.

Third, Hamas has managed to retain civilian and governmental capabilities. It has done so by taking control of the humanitarian aid reaching Gaza, using it to deepen its control over the population; it sells this aid at exorbitant prices to the civilian population.

Hamas thus sends a message to the population that it intends to remain in control and that they would be well advised to cooperate with it. Hamas’s continued civilian control even in areas where the IDF has dealt it heavy blows allows it to rehabilitate its military capabilities as well. The preservation of Hamas’s civilian and governmental capabilities thus perpetuates the continuation of the fighting. The key to destroying Hamas’s military capabilities permanently thus lies in taking away its civil and governmental capabilities in the Gaza Strip.

A governmental alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip requires the destruction of Hamas’s military, as well as civil and governmental capabilities. Only after this will it be possible to achieve a governmental alternative to Hamas. The group will not disappear voluntarily; it can only be removed by force.

In the interim, there is no non-Hamas-affiliated entity willing to accept civilian control of the Gaza Strip. Only the IDF can do it. Therefore, as part of the military effort, the IDF needs to assume civilian control in areas in which it has military control. This will allow the emergence of elements in Gaza not under Hamas’s control. After this interim period, and only after the complete removal of Hamas from the civilian power centers in the Gaza Strip, permanent governmental alternatives can be examined.

Establishment of an alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip will have to lean on several principles. The first is that the only armed element operating in Gaza be the IDF. Civilian entities can operate only with the means to maintain public order and carry out basic policing activity. Israel must strictly enforce this principle to prevent a slow spillover of  “police” mechanisms toward  military capabilities, such as the commando forces (the Dayton Force established with American funding, training, and equipment) of the Palestinian Authority, established in violation of the Oslo agreements.

The second principle is the maintenance of IDF’s operational freedom of action throughout the Gaza Strip.

The third principle is Israeli control of all crossings into the Gaza Strip (including the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor).

After implementing these principles, civil alternatives in the Gaza Strip can be examined.

The first alternative is the emergence of local elements that will operate either in the entire Gaza Strip or parts of it. This alternative can exist under the guidance and mentoring of international and/or regional powers. Another alternative which has been raised is the return of the P.A. to Gaza. Without addressing the conditions that P.A. officials have set for such a return, it should be remembered that the P.A. is corrupt and supports terrorism.

In addition, senior P.A. officials have expressed support for Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre. Indeed, P.A. officials regard Hamas as a legitimate member of the Palestinian political body. The legitimacy of the P.A. among the Palestinian population is extremely low, and there is no reason to bring the problems that the P.A. has created in Judea and Samaria into Gaza. In effect, this is the replacement of an element hostile to Israel with another hostile element. Add to this the fact that all the U.S. demands that the P.A. carry out in-depth reforms have been met with lip service only.

A third option is transferring control to local Fatah elements in the Gaza Strip, or alternatively bringing Mohammed Dahlan back to take control of the Strip. This would be extremely dangerous for Israel. These elements would most likely operate under the control of Hamas, which would build a model similar to the Lebanese one, in which Hezbollah is “not involved” in the state system but controls it in practice. This would be dangerous for Israel as in such a scenario, if it attempted to take action against terror networks in Gaza it would be perceived as interfering with the development  of the alternative governmental structure.

Another alternative is the deployment of international forces (Arab, European, American) in Gaza. This alternative, too, is problematic, because it will be extremely difficult for the IDF to maintain operational freedom of action with such a force on the ground. It would further cause constant friction with the governments of the countries that have deployed troops to Gaza. An international actor can only play a role in mentoring and directing the alternative civil framework in Gaza, but cannot replace it.

The only relevant alternative from Israel’s perspective, it seems, is the emergence of local elements in Gaza. Defense Minister Gallant noted this option, but without addressing the conditions that would be required for such an alternative to be put in place. It is noteworthy here that there is a public administration in Gaza (municipalities, various ministries) that is not entirely affiliated with Hamas, and from whose ranks it will be possible to find elements that can operate in the Strip.

No matter which alternative is ultimately chosen, the prerequisite for all of them is the elimination of Hamas’s military and civil capabilities. Achieving this will require an interim stage of Israeli civilian control of Gaza during which Israel expands civil responsibility in the areas under its military control. The northern Gaza Strip is suitable for this purpose.

The implementation of the proposed framework in the northern Gaza Strip will serve as an operational pilot to deny Hamas governmental capabilities, while at the same time making a concentrated military effort to demilitarize the territory. This will be done through IDF civil control first in the northern Gaza Strip, and later, depending on the circumstances, in other areas.

Some 200,000 Gazans remain in northern Gaza, including hundreds of operatives of Hamas and other organizations who constitute a fighting force and are a threat to Israeli troops. The American pier has begun working in the area and will serve as an anchor for humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in general and the north in particular. The IDF maintains forces in the northern Gaza Strip to control the area and conduct mop-up operations. Therefore, it is possible to devise methods of action that will further destroy Hamas’s military capabilities coupled with establishing  civilian control in the area.

The IDF will assume responsibility for providing humanitarian aid to the civilian population while preventing Hamas from taking control of the aid. The actual distribution will be conducted by international aid organizations, assisted, if necessary, by the IDF. The IDF’s duty, as long as the area is a combat zone, is to provide only basic humanitarian assistance, subject to military necessity. Israeli civilian control of the area will also make it clear to the population that the era of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is over. Israel has the operational and organizational capability to exercise such civilian control and assume responsibility for managing the territory and its population.

Removing Hamas from civilian centers of power will help locate elements in the population that can contribute to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The implementation of this process will first require an understanding among decision makers in Israel, especially the defense minister and defense establishment officials, that there is no other way to find governmental alternatives without an intermediate stage in which Israel holds civil responsibility. This will also require coordination and cooperation with the United States and international organizations to channel relief efforts through the IDF’s temporary civil control.

Published in JNS, June 3, 2024.

The ramming attack near Nablus that claimed the lives of two IDF soldiers, as well as the shooting incidents and drone flights toward Israeli towns near the Seam Zone, momentarily drew public attention to the simmering Judea and Samaria arena. While defined as a secondary front in the multi-arena campaign Israel is waging, the threats emanating from it continue to be a source of concern for the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency.

So far, two factors have somewhat restrained the potential for terror from Judea and Samaria. The first is the shock and dismay that gripped the terrorist elements and the Palestinian public in this area following Oct. 7. The fear that Israel might unleash its wrath over the horrific massacre on anyone who provokes it has caused some terrorist elements to be more hesitant. Even the worsening economic situation due to the ongoing closure has not shattered this psychological barrier. The second factor, which came in parallel, is the intensive activity of the security establishment. This has been characterized to a much greater extent by proactive friction and aggression, leading to thousands of arrests, thwarting numerous attacks, and dismantling parts of the terrorist infrastructure.

However, the audacity displayed by terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria in recent times likely indicates the dissipation of the first factor’s influence and an adaptation to the IDF’s current modus operandi. Against this backdrop, terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria have begun adopting an approach of initiating attacks against communities, apparently inspired by Hamas’ Oct. 7 onslaught.

Even if their performance currently seems far from mimicking that attack, the very intention to emulate this pattern, with necessary adaptations in the Judea and Samaria arena, must be viewed with utmost seriousness.

The security establishment must take steps to make this course appear futile and hopeless in the eyes of the Palestinians. Consideration should be given to defining a special regime, including unique open-fire instructions for the Seam Zone, and to nip in the bud any attempt to act in this direction, even through the use of targeted prevention measures. 

Enforcement must be exhausted, and administrative measures taken against anyone involved in these ideas – perpetrators, accomplices, suppliers of means (such as drones), transporters of wanted individuals, and their employers. In the face of this dangerous pattern, it is appropriate to consider using sweeping measures against areas from which attacks or preparations for them originate. This must be a top priority for IDF forces, the Shin Bet, Border Police, and the police in this sector.

The large accumulation of events unfolding simultaneously across seven geographical arenas (the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and above all, Iran), the international legal arena (the courts in The Hague), and the political arena could create the impression of “the Philistines are upon you, Samson.”

The protracted war, the direct and indirect costs paid thus far, the disputes over its continuation, the dead-end regarding the hostages, and the uncertainty of the evacuated northern residents regarding their future – all contribute to a sense of stagnation. The high cost of living, economic hardships, as well as the resurgence of political issues and internal divisions on the agenda, add to the general concern. It can be assumed that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are closely following developments in Israel, hoping that these trends will erode national resilience and lead to a change in its positions. The concept of a multi-arena war with Israel was also aimed at this. The basic perception in these circles is that the ultimate weapon against the West, including Israel, is steadfastness over time. As  Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah has said, Israel is weary of wars and lacks the resilience and fortitude to withstand a bloody struggle and sustain casualties.

And yet, Israel’s conduct during the eight months of war has slapped them in the face. Despite internal and external challenges, Israel persists in resolutely striving to achieve all its objectives.

At this juncture, given the challenges that still lie ahead, the political leadership should invest in strengthening national resilience alongside the ongoing efforts on the military and diplomatic fronts. It is appropriate to minimize public uncertainty as much as possible, bolster economic continuity, alleviate the economic burden, avoid or postpone addressing divisive issues, and strive for broad consensus.

The Israeli public, accustomed to living in the light of a grand vision, also needs this. At this point, the American proposal for a new regional order meets the authentic yearning for an organizing idea, but Israel cannot afford the accompanying price tag. For the time being, the organizing principle for Israel’s conduct is simpler but faithful to reality: We are acting to ensure our existence so that, when the time comes, we can fulfill the vision that will be agreed upon.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 2, 2024.

The reported deaths of several dozen civilians in an Israeli air strike on Hamas terror targets in Rafah this week was a profound tragedy.

One cannot be human without feeling both empathy and outrage — empathy that innocent people, especially children, died, and outrage that Hamas would cynically and deliberately put them in such a situation.

It is important to remember that we are only in this awful situation because of the heinous acts committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, as well as the organization’s ongoing holding of hostages in Gaza and continued use of civilians as human shields. This has been noted by world leaders including President Biden.

There are those who, without pause or consideration, have immediately sought to ascribe blame and intention upon Israel, alleging that the Israel Defense Forces either knowingly or recklessly targeted civilians. That could not be further from the truth.

For Israel, every civilian death is a tragedy. For Hamas, civilian death is their strategy.

Experts such as John Spencer, who heads up the urban warfare program at the West Point military academy, and Col. Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, note that Israeli forces have gone to lengths not seen in the history of modern warfare to avoid harm to civilians and abide by the laws of war.

It is an inevitable consequence of war that in the fog of battle, especially in a dense and challenging urban battlefield, errors will occur.  But under international law, not every error is necessarily a war crime. To say so only demeans real victims of war crimes.

In the case of the Rafah attack this week, Israel specifically targeted senior Hamas terrorists Yassin Rabia and Khaled Nagar, who are responsible for numerous attacks on Israelis. This was therefore a legitimate military operation. It did not, contrary to Hamas’s lies and media misinformation, target a refugee or tent camp, nor did they hit the Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Area, which was at least a mile away from the intended target.

According to preliminary indications, as well as U.S. officials, it appears that there was a secondary explosion from a Hamas ammunition warehouse near the compound, where Israel targeted the Hamas terrorists, that might have ignited the fire and resulted in the loss of civilian lives.

Immediately following the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted that, “despite [Israel’s] utmost effort not to harm non-combatants, something unfortunately went tragically wrong,” and that “we are investigating the incident.”

Israel has also announced that the incident is being investigated by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, an independent and professional body, including what caused the ignition of the fire beyond the target and the tragic result, despite the precautionary measures, including surveillance, precise munitions and additional intelligence to limit civilian casualties.

This is how a democracy operates — when mistakes are made, however unintended, they are admitted. People take responsibility and appropriate lessons are learnt.

The response by the international community to the incident in Rafah has also been telling, with immediate worldwide condemnations and the United Nations Security Council already scheduling an emergency session. One cannot help but wonder, where was this same international community when a video was released last week of five terrified young Israeli girls, bloodied, beaten and being abducted by Hamas, with horrific threats of being impregnated? Where was the international community when Hamas rained down a barrage of rockets from Rafah on central Israel, including Tel Aviv?

We would not be in this situation at all were it not for Hamas carrying out the October 7 massacre and continuing to hold in Gaza more than 100 hostages, including five U.S. nationals.

This of course does not absolve Israel of its obligation to abide by the rules of war and international humanitarian law — a duty it has fulfilled and in many documented respects exceeded. However, it is Hamas, an internationally designated terrorist group, that continues to willfully violate every imaginable international law, including embedding combatants in civilian areas.

It is therefore Hamas that bears ultimate responsibility for every innocent life lost, Palestinian and Israeli. The West’s failure to make this distinction only emboldens Hamas and perpetuates the violence.

Published in The Hill, May 29, 2024.

“The Israelis go on the trajectory, potentially, to inherit an insurgency with many armed Hamas left or, if it leaves, a vacuum filled by chaos, filled by anarchy, and probably refilled by Hamas. We’ve been talking to them about a much better way of getting an enduring result, enduring security,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said just recently, criticizing Israel’s conduct in Gaza. “We haven’t seen an Israeli plan to prevent this situation,” he added. Similar remarks are expected from Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor as he begins his visit in Israel this week.

The same could be said about the reality in northern Samaria. We have long stopped counting the number of operations in Jenin and the Tulkarm area. Our forces go in, arrest or eliminate targets, and withdraw – only to see terror elements rear their heads again, forcing the IDF and Shin Bet to go back and operate there in a continuous cycle. Nevertheless, no one in the political or security establishment has doubted the necessity of such action.

Quite the opposite – it has been refined into an almost official policy called “mowing the grass,” underscoring the belief that the fight against terror is an ongoing process, not a one-time thing This applies to the West Bank theater of operations as well, where the IDF has thoroughly combed, and even more so to the Gaza Strip, where our activity so far has focused on achieving operational control and dismantling Hamas’ military frameworks, but not on a thorough clearing of the area.

The blow Hamas sustained from the IDF is indeed painful but far from fatal. Its order of battle still includes thousands of fighters, ammunition and weaponry, and many kilometers of tunnels. The dead commanders and battalion leaders have deputies, and in any case, Hamas knows how to easily transition from a semi-military system to a flexible and mobile mode enabling terror and guerrilla warfare.

It fires rockets almost daily, demonstrating control and governance, and displaying a high level of coordination among its senior command components; this can also be gleaned from how the negotiations over the captives are being conducted. In such a situation, the debate over the “day after” is akin to arguing over the skin of a bear that has yet to be hunted.

As early as February, in a document issued by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office outlining the principles for the day after the war, it was stated that “a necessary condition for reaching the day after is for the IDF to continue the war until its objectives are achieved: the destruction of Hamas’ and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military capabilities and governing networks.” The same document also provided guidance on managing civilian affairs in the strip after Hamas’ rule collapses: “As much as possible, civilian administration and responsibility for public order will be based on local elements with managerial experience, who will not be identified with states or bodies supporting terror and will not receive salaries from them.” At present, there is no entity that could rule without submitting to Hamas’ dictates.

From the Americans’ perspective, the discussion about the “day after” is meant to lead Israel to recognize the futility of the war and push it toward a solution that will be presented as the lesser evil but will serve President Joe Biden’s vision of establishing a new regional order, including a Palestinian state.

The truth must be told: There are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have been implemented during one of the many opportunities over the years of conflict. Nevertheless, Israel did not enter this war to find a replacement for Hamas but to destroy it. That is the goal, not the means. Moreover, it is not at all clear that imposing the “Palestinian Authority,” which aside from its many flaws would also allow Hamas’ survival and recovery, is preferable to the alternatives.

One need not be an intelligence expert to understand that given the current balance of power in Gaza, no entity can replace Hamas in the civilian administration of the Strip without its consent. This applies to the “Palestinian Authority,” the “Dahlan camp,” “technocratic ministers,” or local “clan” leaders. Hamas, for its part, will have to accept such an arrangement only if it has no choice or if it shapes it as a “puppet government” that provides cover for its behind-the-scenes rule and protection for its military buildup.

This is the context in which to view a senior Hamas official’s statement that “we will be ready to support a national (Palestinian) consensus government in Gaza and the West Bank, and we do not necessarily have to be part of it.” In such a case, Israel would pay twice: Not only would Hamas strengthen under the new administration’s cover, but Israel would also find it difficult to act against this administration, lest it be accused by the international community of undermining efforts to establish a “governing alternative to Hamas.”

Israel must also draw lessons from its three decades of relations with the Palestinian Authority. Israel has already transferred control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority in the past. The notion that it will now succeed where it previously failed rests more on the wishful thinking of its proponents than on a factual basis. The authority would owe its return to Gaza to Hamas, not Israel. That is how the Palestinian public would perceive it, and their attitude toward the Authority would stem from that. It is the same Authority that cannot control Jenin and northern Samaria and would likely be unable to address security challenges even against itself were it not for the IDF and Shin Bet.

And from Israel’s perspective, it is the same Authority that did not condemn the October 7 massacre, that leads efforts to accuse Israel of war crimes, that perpetuates the struggle against Israel among its people, that provides incentives for terror, and that continues to instill hatred of Jews through its shools. Given this reality, talk of expanding its sphere of control to Gaza is disconnected from reality.

Some circles are toying with the idea of entrusting the strip to Mohammed Dahlan, with the support of the United Arab Emirates and other countries. Even without delving into Dahlan’s political doctrine and the challenges it poses for Israel, it is clear that he too would be dependent on Hamas, and the considerations regarding having him in charge are similar to those concerning the Palestinian Authority. The “clans” idea, intended to circumvent Hamas through local elements, has failed and demonstrated the terror group’s absolute control over the area.

Given this situation, it must be stated that even after seven months, the conditions for establishing an alternative to Hamas’ rule have not yet matured. From Israel’s perspective, the question of the “day after” in Gaza is secondary to the more important goal: destroying Hamas’ military and governing capabilities and restoring Israeli deterrence. Israel must not be tempted by proposals that provide the appearance of a solution while leaving the problem intact.

To reach the “day after,” the pace of fighting must be accelerated and the intensity increased: in Rafah, the central camps, and areas where Hamas’ activity has resumed. It is crucial to act against its governing mechanisms, which have suffered only minor damage so far, and no less important, to crush its overseas headquarters.

Above all, it is essential to mitigate internal disputes at all levels and ranks. The war is in full swing, and no one knows how it might evolve on each front. To succeed, preserving cohesion is crucial.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 19, 2024.

“Not 75 years later, but just seven and a half months later, and people are already forgetting, they’re already forgetting that Hamas unleashed this terror, that it was Hamas that brutalized Israelis, that it was Hamas that took and continues to hold hostages…I have not forgotten, nor have you. And we will not forget,” President Joe Biden declared just two days before issuing his dramatic threat to halt the supply of offensive weapons to Israel should the IDF invade Rafah.

Unlike two months ago when they rushed to welcome America’s abstention in the UN Security Council resolution on Gaza, this time Hamas spokespeople refrained from publicly responding to this move by the Biden administration. However, one can assume they are rubbing their hands in glee and thanking Allah for providing them with salvation.

In this monstrous organization, they understand that Washington is striving to end the war at almost any cost. On the one hand, they are pressuring Israel to reach a prisoner exchange deal that would allow Hamas not only to survive but to militarily rehabilitate and enhance its status beyond the Gaza Strip, including in the West Bank and the broader region. On the other hand, they are preventing the IDF from operating in Rafah, forcing Israel to open the Kerem Shalom crossing just one day after a barrage of rockets hit the area, killing four IDF soldiers. They are compelling Israel to increase humanitarian aid, despite most of it falling under Hamas’ control, pushing for the opening of the Erez crossing, which was the target of a vicious attack on October 7, and promoting ideas like the maritime corridor that Hamas could only dream of. In doing so, the Biden administration is giving the international community the framework within which to maneuver Israel into different channels, hinting that the set of pressure levers at its disposal has not yet been exhausted.

With others doing the work for them, all that remains for Hamas is to continue insisting on their exaggerated demands in the negotiations, buy time, exploit the supplies to equip their fighters and re-establish their governance and prepare their forces for the continuation of the campaign – not just for defense but also for attack. One cannot rule out the possibility that under the prevailing circumstances in Rafah, they may even manage to smuggle or manufacture means of combat during this period.

This stance is detrimental to Israel, primarily in the effort to secure the release of the hostages and defeat Hamas in Gaza. Israel’s enemies, even in other theaters, draw encouragement from this. In fact, from the US perspective, this administration’s approach does not even aid its own efforts to persuade Israel to acquiesce to its initiatives. It would want Israel to have faith in its support amid the risks inherent in these ideas, but its conduct could lead to the opposite conclusion. Moreover, this approach toward Israel could undermine America’s efforts to strengthen the pro-American axis, as even Saudi Arabia and other countries, they can now see how Washington treats its crucial ally during wartime. The current conduct will likely temper the enthusiasm from the impressive display against the Iranian kamikaze drone attack.

The ongoing dispute over the issue of combat in Rafah provides an opportunity to contemplate the absurdity of the American stance. Hamas’ division in that area, with its four brigades, is placed along the border strip between Gaza and the outside world, through which all evil passes: smuggling of weapons and technical equipment, and the movement of operatives and commanders. Rafah may also be a place of shelter for commanders and terrorists from other parts of the Strip who have fled there to escape the fighting. Given these facts, does anyone truly believe it is possible to topple Hamas’ rule and dismantle its military capabilities without operating in Rafah? Does anyone think limited and targeted raids can substitute for that? As far as is known, despite its statements, the American administration has yet to provide a realistic alternative plan that could achieve these goals. Indeed, one cannot expect the global superpower to grasp Rafah with the same detail that Israel requires. But precisely for that reason, one must wonder whether it is appropriate for the White House to engage in discussions about operational methods in that area.

The allegations against Israel regarding the extent of harm to the uninvolved population are presumably based on data from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, whose reliability is unclear. Even if we assume these are accurate figures, there is no parallel in the world to the low ratio between the number of terrorists and uninvolved individuals among the casualties. These results were achieved, among other things, thanks to the evacuation of the population and stringent precautionary measures by the IDF, some would say overly stringent. Israel is doing everything required under international law. If more is desired, the burden of protecting the population should not rest solely on Israel’s shoulders. For instance, has Washington considered the possibility of persuading Egypt to allow temporary humanitarian refuge in Egyptian Rafah to minimize the risks of harming the population? In these days when the US, the European Union, and other countries are coming to Egypt’s aid with billions of dollars for its economy, one might have expected a serious discussion of this option as well. In any case, the pressure on Israel on this issue only proves to Hamas and other terror organizations that their strategy of using the population as a human shield is proving effective.

As for the border strip with Sinai, it can be assumed that the parties in Washington are trying to establish an Israeli-Egyptian coordination mechanism, with American involvement, to prevent arms smuggling. Well, we’ve been down that road before. In January 2009, at the end of Operation Cast Lead, Tzipi Livni, then Israel’s foreign minister, signed such an agreement that prevented Israel from continuing that war until Hamas was defeated. Yet it did not prevent the smuggling of even a single ounce of gunpowder.

Similar assurances were given by American officials even earlier, in October 2005, when Israel was asked to sign the agreement regulating the opening of border crossings from the Gaza Strip. Presumably, this was also aimed at strengthening Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ahead of the 2006 Palestinian elections. Nothing came of it. Abbas and his people were expelled from Gaza. The promises to Israel were annulled. Hamas celebrated the folly.

Another contentious issue concerns Washington’s desire to hand over the civilian administration in Gaza to an “improved Palestinian Authority” or other entity that they deem a substitute for Hamas. This stance ignores the extent of support for Hamas among the Gazan public. Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the Strip, casting doubt on the prospects of effecting a profound change in the Gaza Strip through entities that would take the reins and enjoy Arab or international patronage without Hamas’ consent.

The truth must be told, even if it is frustrating and complicates finding solutions: The population in Gaza was not hijacked by Hamas. The majority of the public chose Hamas to govern, and according to the latest polls, they would do so again if elections were held. This explains the descriptions by our soldiers of finding weapons, tunnel shafts, and the like in almost every home in Gaza. Whoever believes, therefore, that a few nice figures can be installed in power and succeed in changing the mindset and uprooting Hamas fails to understand how deeply rooted Hamas is. As long as a strong, organized, and armed core of the terror organization remains in Gaza, it will be the central force of power in the strip, regardless of who is officially crowned.

Overshadowing all these disputes is the disagreement over the American vision for the Middle East: the desire to establish regional integration that would include peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the establishment of a Palestinian state, which would also serve as a response to the Iranian issue. The war is perceived as an opportunity to bring about a new regional order, and that is what Washington is pushing for. The White House would be happy to announce a move that averted a regional war, allowed the resumption of global trade through the Red Sea, assisted in wresting control of Gaza from Hamas and transferring it to the Palestinian Authority, revived discussions about a Palestinian state, and led to a new regional partnership centered on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Such an announcement would undoubtedly emphasize the significance of this achievement in the competition for the new world order: the return to the American fold of countries that had turned toward the Chinese-Russian axis and the strengthening of America’s position in the Middle East without getting embroiled in war.

From an external perspective, this might seem like a perfect move that solves the Rubik’s Cube all at once. But the closer you get, the more you realize the cube is stuck, and its sides cannot be turned at all because something inside is jammed, disorderly, and unsynchronized. Can one abandon the defeat of Hamas? Is there an entity that could truly govern Gaza? Would it not be a prize for terror to speak of a “Palestinian state” after October 7? Do they not understand that merely discussing it gives Hamas more credit than it has, even in Judea and Samaria? Can one expect Israel to again take on risks similar to those that led it to its current predicament? Is the Palestinian Authority – which received Gaza under its control and failed, and is unable to contend with Hamas alone in Jenin and Tulkarm, encourages terror through payments and glorification of terrorists – suitable to be the partner for the Gaza mission? Or for a Palestinian state? These are just some of the questions and not the most challenging ones. With all the importance and desire for it, the celebratory carpet of normalization with Saudi Arabia cannot be rolled out before straightening, cleaning, and leveling the floor beneath it.

Washington must understand that for Israel, after October 7, defeating Hamas in Gaza has become an existential matter. It is not akin to America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – wars waged thousands of miles from its soil, which some tend to draw comparisons to. The players in our region and the international arena, including enemies, friends, and those undecided, are watching what is happening in Gaza. Their stances and conduct toward Israel will be influenced by the outcomes. The deterrence that shattered on October 7 will not be restored unless all of Israel’s stated objectives for this war are achieved.

Otherwise, it will face an existential threat, the temptation to attack it will grow stronger, and its political standing will be severely damaged. The room for maneuver that Israel can allow itself under these circumstances is limited. The only way to end the fighting in Gaza is to let Israel win and not stop it. The opposite of what the administration is currently doing.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 12, 2024.

The barrage of rockets and mortars towards Kerem Shalom on Sunday is Hamas’ response to those who questioned the necessity of an Israeli military operation in the Rafah area. It reflects the self-confidence of Hamas’ commanders, who did not hesitate to initiate such an attack from a humanitarian area – even in the midst of critical negotiations for the organization and despite the cost of damaging a vital supply line for the Gazan population.

The attack aims to rekindle the zeal and vigor of Hamas’ ground forces while sending a clear message to the public that the group’s call for a cessation of hostilities stems from a position of power – not capitulation or weariness. The results of the attack also illustrate the danger of prolonged waiting and hesitation on the Israeli side.

One does not need to be an intelligence officer to understand that Hamas draws great encouragement from the positions of the US and the attitude it displays towards Israel regarding the war in Gaza. In this monstrous organization, they understand that the Biden administration is striving to end the war through a deal involving the release of the Israeli hostages, without achieving any of Israel’s objectives; a deal that would allow Hamas to recover militarily and upgrade its status not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and the region as a whole.

In the meantime, this administration is tying Israel’s hands from taking action in Rafah, forcing it to increase humanitarian aid despite it reaching Hamas’ control, pressing it to open the Erez Crossing that was attacked by Hamas’ savages on Oct. 7 and implement ideas like the maritime corridor the terrorist organization could only dream of.

In addition, it allows the international community to make decisions that undermine Israel’s status and hints that the stockpile of pressure tactics at its disposal has not yet been exhausted.

When its work is done by others, all that remains for Hamas is to continue insisting on its exaggerated demands in the negotiations, buy time, exploit the supply to equip its fighters, re-establish its rule, and prepare its forces for the continuation of the campaign – not only for defense but also for attack. It must be taken into account that under the cover of the reality that has developed in Rafah, it also manages to smuggle or produce means of combat even during this period.

Israel must completely close the Kerem Shalom Crossing and act forcefully, without unnecessary risks, to crush Hamas in Rafah and shape a new reality in the area between Gaza and Egypt, without relying on international arrangements that have never proved themselves.

Israel will remember and appreciate President Joe Biden’s support for it at the onset of the war, but it cannot back down from the just goals it has defined and which have also received his backing.

Published in Israel Hayom, May 6, 2024.

Back in 2013, the IDF chief-of-staff promulgated a multi-year plan for the Israeli military called “Teuzah” (prowess or fearlessness). That plan accepted a significant decrease in overall funding to the IDF and shifted priorities away from the ground forces in favor of air force and cyber capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, and stand-off precision fire. This came atop a cut of 25 percent in the ground forces budget between 2002 and 2006.

The IDF chief of staff at the time was Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz.

According to Amir Rapaport, publisher and editor of the military industry-leading Israel Defense magazine, Gantz accepted the relative weakness of the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces as a given. He did not think that the IDF would need to fight conventional army forces in the foreseeable future, nor have to conduct large-scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

Obviously, Gantz and his predecessors and successors (Mofaz, Halutz, Yaalon, Ashkenazi, Eisencott, and Kochavi) – all of whom were party to this grand conceptual error to one degree or another – were dead wrong. It is today quite clear that Israel will likely fight several wars in enemy-held territory over the coming decade.

Responding to Gantz’s mistaken plan in 2013, Dr. Eitan Shamir and Dr. Eado Hecht of the BESA Center warned that “Neglect of the IDF’s ground forces poses a risk to Israel’s security. There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies.” But back then nobody was listening.

Today it is clear that the IDF needs to knock-back the Iranian-proxy armies and jihadist militias camped on our borders. It needs to go house-by-house and tunnel-by-tunnel to ferret-out and eliminate terrorist cells in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It may need to “decommission” Iran’s nuclear enrichment and bomb-making facilities.

Consider the situation in Lebanon. To rout Hezbollah and destroy its missile stockpiles in the coming war Israel will have to reconquer southern Lebanon. Even with the Israel Air Force working intensively from above (including massive leveling of Lebanese infrastructures), Israel could be facing months weeks of real and unrelenting ground combat in the deep valleys and steep mountains of Lebanon where Hezbollah is well dug in. (The Iranian-built and -funded terror army sits on a tunnel and bunker array that reportedly makes the Hamas military infrastructure in Gaza seem like child’s play).

Given America’s stampeding retreat from overseas commitments, the creeping repeal of an American protective diplomatic umbrella for Israel by presidents Obama and Biden, and the newest restrictions on use of US weaponry – Israel may be fighting truly alone.

UNDERSTANDING THIS is particularly relevant as Israel prepares to replace its military and intelligence leadership.

Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva has just resigned for his role in the gargantuan failure of October 7, appropriately so. Soon, IDF Chief-of-Staff Herzi Halevi, OC Southern Command Chief Yaron Finkelman, Mossad Chief Dedi Barnea, General Security Service Chief Ronen Bar, and dozens of other senior defense establishment leaders are expected to resign or be sacked, appropriately so.

The question is not only who will replace them but what sort of operational prisms their replacements will bring to the task. And what conceptual prisms will Israel’s politicians lay out for them. (A new set of politicians is necessary too!) And what budgets Israel’s prime minister and defense and finance ministers will allocate for the defense establishment.

Here is a brief list of necessary fixes:

* Manpower: Over the past 40 years, the IDF has shrunk from 15 to 10 divisions. It now needs to grow by at least three divisions. That is 50,000 soldiers more, and tons and tons of military equipment.     

  * Training: A gargantuan increase in the training of front-line troops is necessary. It is a well-known secret that many of the infantry and armored forces that went into Gaza over the past half-year were insufficiently trained for combat in built-up areas.

It is actually a miracle how well the IDF has fought in Gaza, with mid-level military commanders in the field (the lieutenant colonels, battalion commanders; and the colonels, brigade commanders) learning on the go and quickly bringing their troops up to speed. They are among the true heroes of the current war.

Alas, training is expensive, especially for combined arms high intensity conflict – which involves multiple branches of the military working together. Training of the reserve forces is even more expensive. And unfortunately, budget lines for training are usually the first thing to be cut when the overall military budget is slashed – as it has been in recent decades.

* Platforms: The army needs to reverse the demobilization of armored formations and buy and deploy many more “Namer” armored personnel carriers equipped with the “Iron Fist” active defense system; “Merkava” main battle tanks with the “Trophy” system; and self-propelled artillery guns with the “Thundermaker” system. This will cost hundreds of millions of shekels.

* Ammunition: The IDF used up much of its ammunition reserves over the past six months, especially its stocks of shells for the ground forces and precision-guided missiles for the air force.

While the US has rushed tons of weaponry to Israel, Washington also has held up resupply of some of these munitions at certain times, and there is anyway a global shortage of some firepower like 155mm artillery shells (with the war in Ukraine soaking-up much of the available weaponry). As mentioned above, Israel also now faces increasing restrictions on its use of US-supplied weaponry.

The takeaway is that Israel needs to self-manufacture and the IDF needs to stockpile much larger reserves of weaponry for the lengthy wars of the future with Hezbollah and Hamas. Again, this requires more money with guaranteed funding over a multi-year plan.

Reportedly, Prime Minister Netanyahu has ordered a massive build-up, eight times over the current manufacturing capacity of the Israeli defense industries. Let’s see whether this order is implemented and budgeted appropriately by the next Israeli governments.

* Navy: Elements of radical Islam are gaining control across the eastern Mediterranean basin, from Libya to Syria and Turkey. Israel and Greece are the only Western-oriented countries in the region.

Former Israeli Naval Chief, Admiral (res.) Eliezer “Chiney” Marom, argues that Israel needs a much more powerful navy, with a long reach, to counter the strategic realignments underway, and to protect from terrorist attack the substantial natural gas fields we have discovered at sea.

The Israel Navy wants more than $5 billion in new ships, submarines, weapons systems. and personnel over the next decade for this.

* West Bank: Given that security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority essentially has collapsed, and Mahmoud Abbas’ forces are no match for Hamas and other terrorist mini-armies that have entrenched themselves across Judea and Samaria – Israel needs to pour more troops into policing the territory. This is a big drain on the military system, but without it nobody in greater Tel Aviv or Jerusalem will be safe.

The fact is that Palestinian terrorism is off the charts with organized battalions of terrorist commandoes operating openly in dozens of cities and refugee camps. Take, for example, Nur Shams, a tinpot refugee camp adjacent to Tulkarem in central Israel just over the security barrier. The IDF operated there for four days last week and was unexpectedly met by insane quantities of Palestinian firepower.

(So much for dreams of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority that would not only truly combat terrorism in the West Bank but also assume responsibility for administering, demilitarizing, and deradicalizing Gaza. Hah!)

* Jordan Valley: Many voices in the defense establishment are calling for the building of a well-fortified security fence along Israel’s long border with Jordan, as has been done along the Sinai, Lebanese, and Golan borders; alongside the permanent stationing of more troops along this strategic seam line.

Iran is actively seeking to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and take advantage of the porous border between Israel and Jordan to ship weaponry into the West Bank. The fluidity of the political and security situation to our east requires a military buildup in the Jordan Valley, and this needs to be budgeted for expeditiously.

* Iran: If worse comes to worse (and every day indeed it seems that worse news comes from Iran about its nuclear advances and from Washington about its strategic capitulation to Iran), the IDF and IAF may have to act against Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities. Then Israel will have to deal with the fallout from Iran’s retaliation – and the country had better be ready both militarily and on the home front.

This month’s unprecedented Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel proves that Israel needs quite a few more Arrow 2 and 3 anti-missile defense arrays. A small fortune.

Israel’s independence depends on robust defense readiness. And on new military-intelligence leaders with clear-eyed understanding of the situation.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 26, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.

As signs of an imminent IDF operation in Rafah intensify, there is growing concern that Israel will unnecessarily exercise self-imposed restraint by acting with insufficient force, so as not to upset the Biden administration, the Egyptians, or the ICC prosecutor at The Hague.

Meanwhile, Hamas is presumably exploiting the prolonged waiting period and preparing well for the ground operation in this sector, which will undoubtedly pose complex operational challenges for the IDF. Despite the political pressures, Israel’s decision-makers must make it a top priority to attain the objectives with minimal risk to the security of our forces.

The deadlock in negotiations for the release of Israeli captives held by Hamas, coupled with American accusations against the group, has paved the way for Israel to launch the Rafah offensive. The recent de-escalation with Iran allows Israel to shift its focus, without forfeiting political gains made, while continuing the fight against Hezbollah and dismantling terrorist networks in the West Bank.

In this operation, the security establishment will be required to achieve five objectives: Dismantling Hamas’ regional brigade, with its four battalions: eliminating or arresting its commanders and most of its personnel, seizing or destroying its command centers, strategic assets, weapons, and production facilities – both above or below ground. Eliminating or arresting senior members of Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad who fled from other areas to Rafah and found refuge there.
Ending Hamas’ civilian control in this area: striking Hamas’ governing mechanisms, including police and internal security forces, prisons, and courts, as well as “civilian” committees for managing emergency affairs.

Taking control of smuggling routes and shaping a new security reality along the border strip, preventing smuggling from Sinai to the Gaza Strip.
Advancing the release of the captives– either by seizing opportunities during the fighting or through negotiations following increased pressure on Hamas.
The IDF and Hamas: Starting Conditions

The IDF’s starting position for this operation is better than those at the beginning of the campaign in the northern Gaza Strip or the Khan Younis area. The enemy will now be entering combat with a command echelon that has been depleted, with many fighters dead, injured, or arrested. Second, its stockpile of weapons and ammunition has dwindled. Third, the ability to strike the Israeli home front with rocket fire is rather limited. And fourth, the IDF will have already replenished its forces, updated its intelligence, and improved its fighters’ operational combatworthiness through lessons learned from previous stages of the fighting.

However, from the enemy’s perspective, the overall picture also has some bright spots. Their force deployment in the combat zone has not only remained intact but has also been reinforced with operatives from other areas. Their logistical preparedness has improved thanks to humanitarian aid entering the Strip, and they are equipped with fuel and food that allow prolonged survival in tunnels.

Additionally, they draw encouragement from the pressures exerted on Israel to minimize casualties and benefit from the involvement of Iran and its proxies, as well as the political support of Turkey and other countries. Above all, they are emboldened by their demonstrated ability to survive the IDF onslaught so far and the fact that even after 200 days of fighting, Hamas continues to be the central power in the Gaza Strip.

Alongside its offensive capabilities, the IDF will also need to strengthen its defense against various forms of attacks on its forces or on the home front that exploit proximity to borders or the use of tunnels. The same applies to the possibility that Hamas may carry out provocations in the border fence area and towards Sinai, aiming to create tensions between Israel and Egypt. Hints of this could be found in a statement issued this week by the “Palestinian factions.” The IDF’s well-oiled war machine has proved itself, and there is no doubt as to its ability to successfully handle this challenge as well. On the political level, maximum support and freedom of action are required to allow the IDF to employ intense firepower that will reduce the risk to our soldiers and bring about the swiftest possible defeat of the enemy.

Meanwhile, the IDF will need to continuously examine how the combat situation can be leveraged to advance the release of the captured individuals.
The Rafah operation will not complete the task of decisively defeating Hamas. Even after it is over, much more work, and a deeper impact, will be needed inside the territory before Hamas’ remaining capabilities are destroyed and a new reality emerges. This was also the case following Operation Defensive Shield, which began exactly 22 years ago. It will not be quick and easy, but it is necessary and possible.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.

Reading the Israeli and global media, one would think that this week Israel achieved its greatest victory since the Six Day War, successfully stymieing a massive Iranian missile attack. With dozens of videos and hagiographic pilot profiles, the IDF is busy pumping out its technological prowess. In religious circles, there are a thousand memes and essays circulating asserting a divine miracle, no less.

This is poppycock. At best, Israel can record a defensive tactical achievement, perhaps indeed blessed, but not a strategic win. On a strategic level, Israel suffered a whopping loss as Iran pierced, with apparent impunity, American and Israeli deterrence frameworks.

The US president in Washington barked “don’t,” and Jerusalem didn’t believe that Iran would dare to attack Israel directly, but Iran nevertheless dared to do so. The ayatollahs brazenly launched a colossal Russian-style strike package intended to cause considerable damage – the largest one-night drone and missile barrage ever launched in history by one nation against another.

The fact that the attack failed – with 50% of the missiles failing to launch or crashing before reaching their target and 49% more impressively being intercepted by Israel and its allies – is irrelevant from a strategic perspective.

The screeching strategic reality is that Iran has catapulted its 40-year-long war against Israel – a war that has been underway via proxies ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 – to a new, stratospheric plateau (literally so, with ballistic missiles flying from Iranian soil through space to hit Israel).

When one realizes what a dramatic watershed moment this is, the fact that the strike did amazingly little damage fades into the background. It is not a pertinent consideration in determining how and with what ferocity Israel should respond.

That is why President Biden’s reported advice to Israel – to “take the win,” as it were, to suck up its indignation, to rely on Western sanctions against Iran alone as “smart retaliation,” and in general to “avoid escalation” – is outrageous and dangerous nonsense.

And compounding his failure to deter Iran from directly attacking Israel, Biden has now added to the potential further collapse of any deterrence against Iran by declaring that he seeks no confrontation with Iran and will not participate in any Israeli retaliatory strike at Iran. This is strategic insanity of grandiose proportions!

When America fears escalation more than Iran does, the path towards grand Western defeat is clear. If Israel fears escalation more than Iran does, Tehran will march all the way to Jerusalem with even greater and grander attacks.

One can be certain that Tehran can and will build more successful strike packages in the future designed to overwhelm Israel’s defenses. It will try again and again, just as Hamas has launched repeated rocket wars against Israel over the past 20 years, each time with a larger number of longer-range and more accurate rockets.

Imagine if only one of the eight ballistic missiles (out of 120) that managed to penetrate Israeli defenses last Saturday night had fallen not in and around a well-protected airbase in the barren Negev but on a high-rise building in Tel Aviv? What if that one ballistic missile had hit the nuclear reactor in Dimona, which is near that airbase? What if that one ballistic missile had been nuclear tipped? What if Israel had no advance notice of another such Iranian attack (which it did have this time) in order to mount a robust air-defense plan?

Remember that every single warplane in the Israeli arsenal was in the air for eight straight hours this past Saturday night, along with warplanes and flying intelligence platforms from four Western air forces and reportedly several allied Arab air forces, plus all reserve components of Israel’s air defense array (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2 and 3, and the like). This is certainly not something that will necessarily be in place every time Iran decides to take a direct, unannounced poke at Israel in the future.

DETERRENCE is a tricky task, a defense and diplomatic act that is hard to achieve. It is a construct that requires constant maintenance or else it dissipates. Psychologically, deterrence is measured by “subsequent behavior,” meaning that the Iranian attack will be considered successful if it dissuades Israel from future attacks against Iranian leaders and assets.

Conversely, the Iranian attack will be considered unsuccessful – not because the damage it intended was prevented – if Israel continues to target Iranian leaders and assets inside Iran and around the region. Such offensives are necessary to prevent Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions and nuclear military effort.

The worst possible thing for Israel’s deterrent posture is for a perception of Israel “being stuck” to take root in Tehran and/or around the world. The unhealthiest situation involves Israel being “stuck,” not moving forward, in crushing Hamas in Gaza (Rafah), in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, in suppressing terror cells in Judea and Samaria, in targeting IRGC emplacements in Syria, and in sabotaging nuclear facilities in Iran.

Being stuck in a situation in which Israel is diplomatically or militarily hampered in every direction by well-meaning but weak allies or by supremely confident Shiite mullahs and their Russian ally is an unacceptable and perilous position for Israel. Instead, Israel needs to become “unstuck” to free itself from stale strategic paradigms and insufferable diplomatic handcuffs that dominated before October 7 and April 14 – two dates that constitute watershed moments for Israel.

IN GENERAL, I sense that Israel’s strategic goals have become too limited in recent decades, hamstrung by the failed Oslo peace process with Palestinians and the failed Obama peace process with Iranians. These gambits emphasized quiet, co-option, deflation, and survival at the expense of principle, dominance, and victory. They brought about cowering postures instead of the appropriately necessary offensive postures.

As a result, at this very moment, Israel is being pressed by its fainthearted friends to abandon its goal of liquidating Hamas, to instead prioritize humanitarian provisions for the enemy population, to downgrade its rage over the invasion, murder, abuse, and humiliation of its citizens, including kidnapped Israelis held hostage for more than six months, and to acquiesce in the release of Palestinian terrorists and butchers (including the “Nukhba” marauders of Hamas.

Israel is also being pressed to absorb Hezbollah’s continued blows, including the depopulation of northern Israel, to settle for another worthless, airy-fairy diplomatic “settlement” that will only perpetuate the Iranian threat from southern Lebanon, and to refrain from “escalatory retaliation” for the April 14 earthquake-level Iranian assault on Israel.

Were they to be adopted, these policies, taken together, would amount to a grand strategic defeat for Israel. They would constitute a straitjacket that puts Israeli survival – yes, Israel’s very survival! – at risk, which brings into question Israel’s power to persevere as an independent nation in the Middle East. Were they to be adopted by Israel, these policies, taken together, would inevitably crash Israel as a resilient, buoyant society and a prosperous, leading economy that contributes so much to the world.

The Biden administration’s current campaign to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further military conquest in Gaza and to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further confrontation with Iran, accompanied by persistent threats to deny Israel diplomatic backing and weapons if Jerusalem does not heed Washington’s warnings, are formulas for grand defeat. As such, they must be resisted.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 20, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 21, 2024.