The five demands that Hamas has put forth in the negotiations for the release of the Israeli hostages are aimed at preserving its status as the dominant power in the Gaza Strip, allowing its members to emerge from hiding and resume their routine activities without fear of Israeli retaliation, enabling the reconstruction of its military capabilities, and capitalizing on the political gains from the war in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority.

Hamas’ insistence on receiving international guarantees that Israel will not violate the terms of the deal is intended to maintain international involvement in the conflict, anticipating that pressure will be primarily directed toward Israel, serving Hamas’ interests at every stage.

The notion that Hamas could agree to a ceasefire for the exchange and then renew hostilities under some pretext to achieve its goals overlooks the dynamics inherent in such processes, which would effectively prevent such a scenario.

The key costs Israel would incur under the proposed deal include ending the war without destroying Hamas, allowing the reconstruction of its military capabilities in Gaza, creating conditions that enhance its standing in the West Bank, heightening risks due to the involvement of hundreds of released militants in terrorist activities, and potentially encouraging increased use of kidnappings by terrorist groups emboldened by the current outcome.

Moreover, on a psychological level, the deal would be perceived as a successful conclusion to the war Hamas imposed on Israel and a failure by the IDF to achieve its military objectives despite the prolonged fighting. Any decision by the government to support or reject the deal is legitimate, provided it is made with a sober assessment of the comprehensive advantages and risks it entails.

In response to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s accusation of obstructing efforts to reach an agreement, Hamas once again outlined its primary demands in exchange for releasing the captives: “A comprehensive agreement based on a permanent ceasefire, complete Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, return of displaced Gaza residents to their homes, reconstruction of the Strip, and a serious prisoner exchange deal.” The five demands outlined reveal Hamas’ strategic objectives for the day after.

Irreversible cessation of hostilities

For Hamas, the cornerstone of any deal is an agreement on ending the war, leading to the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-escalation lines and limiting Israel’s ability to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Gaza. This would allow Hamas members to safely emerge from their hiding places, reorganize, restore their governance, and rebuild their capabilities.

Concurrent with the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, captives would be released in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, displaced Gazans would be allowed to return to the Strip, and an internationally funded reconstruction process would commence.

Israel would not be able to resume hostilities after their cessation. In such a reality, and after the Israeli war machine has been shut down, it would be impossible to simply flip a switch and restart the fighting as if nothing had happened. Even in the face of ceasefire violations by Hamas, the international community would pressure Israel to resort to a “proportionate response.” Domestically, too, it would be challenging to garner support for renewing the war, given the costs and the additional threats and challenges that would arise. The practical implication is that the war would effectively end with Hamas remaining the dominant force in Gaza and having achieved gains that would enhance its standing even in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority.

No disarmament for Hamas

At Hamas’ disposal would not only be a network of tunnels spanning dozens of kilometers but also the means to rapidly restore its local arms production industry. Combined with the substantial resources that would be introduced for civilian reconstruction, it is reasonable to assume that within a short period, Hamas could replenish its arms shortages. As long as Hamas remains the governing authority and the de facto ruler, no external party – neither Arab states nor international organizations – would be able to effectively monitor and prevent these risks.

Regarding the prevention of smuggling from Sinai into Gaza, without effective Israeli control over the Philadelphia Corridor and the Rafah Crossing, Israel would be forced to rely on international arrangements, emphasizing security coordination with Egypt. Past experience does not inspire optimism for the future. Moreover, the inherently gradual nature of military buildup, occurring out of the spotlight, would hinder the application of pressure and allow for incremental adaptation to the evolving reality.

Return of displaced Gazans: Accepting tunnel reality

The extensive network of tunnels beneath residential areas in Gaza City provides Israel with justification for not allowing displaced Gazans to return to their homes and to continue considering these areas as “combat zones.” This could have served as significant leverage for the Gazan population seeking to return to normalcy, pressuring Hamas. Israel’s concession on this issue not only eliminates this source of pressure but may also be interpreted as tacit acceptance of this reality, which contradicts the concept of security demilitarization.

Consolidating power in the West Bank and PA

Hamas’ insistence that militants from the West Bank released as part of the deal be returned to their homes rather than Gaza reflects not only the position of strength from which Hamas leaders are negotiating but also the organization’s intent to leverage their release to enhance its political standing in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority and, of course, to utilize their terrorist capabilities to strengthen its infrastructure in that area.

Continued action against Hamas necessary

At this juncture, Hamas’ elaborate response has spared Israel from the in-depth discussion required regarding the implications of the deal on the table. Decision-makers face an unenviable task. Any decision they make will be a case of “woe to those who fashion me, and woe to those who birth me.”

For now, it is prudent to continue and intensify efforts to dismantle Hamas’ infrastructure, increase efforts to target Sinwar and other field commanders, work to eliminate Hamas leaders abroad who constitute the organization’s political, media, and economic arm – for they are the ones who transform Hamas into a regionally influential entity. If we do not act against them, they will be central players in the reconstruction of Hamas in the Strip.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 16, 2024.

The deal laid out by US President Joe Biden in his May 31 address on the war in Gaza is disingenuous and disastrous. His remarks reflect the failed paradigms, illusions, and wishful thinking that led to October 7. The plan he described, if implemented, would create an existential threat to the State of Israel.

President Biden’s deceptive and dangerous claims are numerous. Here are a few of the most egregious: The US president began his remarks by declaring that his goal is an end to the war, “one that… creates a better ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power…” However, the rest of his speech included no concrete steps or road maps for removing Hamas from power. The opposite was true. The proposed outline would ensure that Hamas remained in power and was able to rebuild its military strength.

President Biden assured that “Palestinian civilians would return to their homes… in all areas of Gaza, including the North.” He seemed to be claiming that it would only be civilians that would return to northern Gaza. But the fact is that there would be no way to ensure that Hamas fighters did not return there as well. These fighters aren’t wearing uniforms and their guns are hidden in the hundreds of tunnels that still exist in northern Gaza.

With this plan, Hamas would quickly reassert its control over every inch of the Strip.

Biden then made a statement of unparalleled chutzpah: “The people of Israel should know they can make this offer without any further risk to their own security because they’ve already devastated Hamas forces over the past eight months…” The reality is that Hamas still has many intact fighters and senior leadership – even if it is now operating as smaller terror cells rather than battalions, or laying low until the IDF withdraws.

Once reconstruction began in Gaza, the Islamist terror group would quickly rebuild its capabilities. The idea that leaving Hamas in power does not constitute a severe risk to Israel’s security, especially to those Israelis in the western Negev region, is ludicrous.

President Biden suggested that the United States would “help forge a diplomatic resolution, one that ensures Israel’s security” and that “with a deal, a rebuilding of Gaza will begin… in a manner that does not allow Hamas to re-arm.”

He ignores the inconvenient truth that diplomatic resolutions have failed time and again. They failed to prevent Hezbollah from greatly increasing its arsenal following the Second Lebanon War – and they failed to prevent the massive smuggling of weapons to Hamas from Egypt following the previous rounds of fighting in Gaza.

Likewise, the idea that with Hamas still in power, reconstruction could take place without enabling the terrorist group to rearm, is simply laughable. The current war in Gaza has revealed the far-reaching extent to which supplies that entered Gaza over the years, including for humanitarian purposes, were used first and foremost by Hamas, to build its terror infrastructure.

With regard to those who would oppose such a plan, Biden claimed that “the hostages are not a priority for them.”

This was a false and outrageous statement.

The fact that there are those who recognize that leaving Hamas in power will destroy Israel’s deterrence and encourage countless murderous attacks and kidnappings of Israelis does not mean that they care any less about the hostages. They simply believe that the efforts to free the hostages must take place on the basis of a pragmatic understanding of the Middle East, and of the psychopathic but intelligent enemy that Israel faces.

It is important to realize that while Hamas may be willing to release some of the hostages, it will never release all of them, as they serve as a human shield for its leadership. Under the deal that Biden describes, a ceasefire will continue, and Hamas will remain in power, as long as negotiations over the second stage of the hostage release continue – negotiations that can drag on for years.

Biden then assured that the “United States will always ensure that Israel has what it needs to defend itself.”

Let there be no mistake, however. Biden did not say that he supports Israel’s right to destroy the genocidal terrorist organizations bent on its destruction.

He said that Israel will have the right to shoot down rockets fired at its cities, while its citizens hide in shelters. This is the Biden doctrine with regards to Israel: Defense, yes. Offense, no.

President Biden concluded his remarks with the sentence: “It’s time for this war to end and for the ‘day after’ to begin.” This sentence encapsulated the failed paradigms that led to October 7. The idea that if we just stop fighting, the ‘day after’ can begin, is entirely false.

If the fighting stops with Hamas in power, the ‘day after’ will never begin. We will simply return to October 6. Only this time, with zero deterrence, an emboldened ring of terror along all of Israel’s borders, and large swaths of Israel’s territory in the South and North abandoned due to the ongoing terror threats.

To be fair – the degree to which Biden is accurately describing an outline that Israel proposed, and to what degree he is putting his own spin on the deal, is unclear. If an Israeli leader believes that it is necessary and correct to let Hamas win in order to return some of the hostages, then that leader should stand up and say so clearly.

The dilemma is a heart-wrenching one.

The fact is that the deal, as described by President Biden, would create an existential threat to Israel’s very existence. It would lead to countless terror attacks, kidnappings, instability, and war. Israel’s decisions must be based on a clear-sighted recognition of reality, however harsh.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2024.

On May 15, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav said that if no alternative to Hamas rule is presented for Gaza, only two options would remain: Hamas rule or Israeli military rule. “Both alternatives are bad,” he said.

“I will not agree to Israeli military rule in in Gaza, Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza…I call on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make a decision and declare that Israel will not establish civilian control over the Gaza Strip and that Israel will not establish military governance in Gaza,” he said.

He further noted that “the end of the military campaign must come together with political action” and said that “the day after Hamas will only be achieved with Palestinian entities backed by Arab countries taking control of Gaza. This is in Israel’s interests in order to achieve our goals.”

He did not specify which Palestinian entities should control Gaza, or how to get such elements to control Gaza.

It is true that the military campaign must be accompanied by political action to stabilize Gaza and bring about a situation in which it no longer poses a security threat to Israel. For several reasons however, there is still a long way to go until we reach this goal.

First, the fighting is far from over. The IDF is currently operating throughout the Gaza Strip, including in places it has already occupied and partially mopped up. The scope of the terrorist infrastructure built by Hamas  above and below ground is unprecedented, and the quantity and dispersal of weapons enormous. Cleansing the Gaza Strip of this infrastructure will require time, and so Gaza will continue to be a combat zone for the near future.

Second, despite the extensive damage inflicted on it, Hamas has managed to partially rehabilitate itself in some places. The Israel Defense Forces has succeeded in dismantling most of Hamas’ military apparatus; its command-and-control systems and organized units (brigades, battalions, companies) are no longer functioning, or only partially functioning. At this time, several organized battalions remain in Rafah and the central camps.

Hamas, however, is rehabilitating local networks in order to conduct guerilla attacks on IDF forces and from time to time to launch high-trajectory fire at communities near the Gaza Strip and even locations farther away. In addition, since Hamas is deeply embedded amid the Gazan population, in many cases “civilians” not officially belonging to Hamas’s military organization also operate against the IDF. As a result, the IDF has had to return to many areas in the Gaza Strip to disrupt terrorist networks.

Third, Hamas has managed to retain civilian and governmental capabilities. It has done so by taking control of the humanitarian aid reaching Gaza, using it to deepen its control over the population; it sells this aid at exorbitant prices to the civilian population.

Hamas thus sends a message to the population that it intends to remain in control and that they would be well advised to cooperate with it. Hamas’s continued civilian control even in areas where the IDF has dealt it heavy blows allows it to rehabilitate its military capabilities as well. The preservation of Hamas’s civilian and governmental capabilities thus perpetuates the continuation of the fighting. The key to destroying Hamas’s military capabilities permanently thus lies in taking away its civil and governmental capabilities in the Gaza Strip.

A governmental alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip requires the destruction of Hamas’s military, as well as civil and governmental capabilities. Only after this will it be possible to achieve a governmental alternative to Hamas. The group will not disappear voluntarily; it can only be removed by force.

In the interim, there is no non-Hamas-affiliated entity willing to accept civilian control of the Gaza Strip. Only the IDF can do it. Therefore, as part of the military effort, the IDF needs to assume civilian control in areas in which it has military control. This will allow the emergence of elements in Gaza not under Hamas’s control. After this interim period, and only after the complete removal of Hamas from the civilian power centers in the Gaza Strip, permanent governmental alternatives can be examined.

Establishment of an alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip will have to lean on several principles. The first is that the only armed element operating in Gaza be the IDF. Civilian entities can operate only with the means to maintain public order and carry out basic policing activity. Israel must strictly enforce this principle to prevent a slow spillover of  “police” mechanisms toward  military capabilities, such as the commando forces (the Dayton Force established with American funding, training, and equipment) of the Palestinian Authority, established in violation of the Oslo agreements.

The second principle is the maintenance of IDF’s operational freedom of action throughout the Gaza Strip.

The third principle is Israeli control of all crossings into the Gaza Strip (including the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor).

After implementing these principles, civil alternatives in the Gaza Strip can be examined.

The first alternative is the emergence of local elements that will operate either in the entire Gaza Strip or parts of it. This alternative can exist under the guidance and mentoring of international and/or regional powers. Another alternative which has been raised is the return of the P.A. to Gaza. Without addressing the conditions that P.A. officials have set for such a return, it should be remembered that the P.A. is corrupt and supports terrorism.

In addition, senior P.A. officials have expressed support for Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre. Indeed, P.A. officials regard Hamas as a legitimate member of the Palestinian political body. The legitimacy of the P.A. among the Palestinian population is extremely low, and there is no reason to bring the problems that the P.A. has created in Judea and Samaria into Gaza. In effect, this is the replacement of an element hostile to Israel with another hostile element. Add to this the fact that all the U.S. demands that the P.A. carry out in-depth reforms have been met with lip service only.

A third option is transferring control to local Fatah elements in the Gaza Strip, or alternatively bringing Mohammed Dahlan back to take control of the Strip. This would be extremely dangerous for Israel. These elements would most likely operate under the control of Hamas, which would build a model similar to the Lebanese one, in which Hezbollah is “not involved” in the state system but controls it in practice. This would be dangerous for Israel as in such a scenario, if it attempted to take action against terror networks in Gaza it would be perceived as interfering with the development  of the alternative governmental structure.

Another alternative is the deployment of international forces (Arab, European, American) in Gaza. This alternative, too, is problematic, because it will be extremely difficult for the IDF to maintain operational freedom of action with such a force on the ground. It would further cause constant friction with the governments of the countries that have deployed troops to Gaza. An international actor can only play a role in mentoring and directing the alternative civil framework in Gaza, but cannot replace it.

The only relevant alternative from Israel’s perspective, it seems, is the emergence of local elements in Gaza. Defense Minister Gallant noted this option, but without addressing the conditions that would be required for such an alternative to be put in place. It is noteworthy here that there is a public administration in Gaza (municipalities, various ministries) that is not entirely affiliated with Hamas, and from whose ranks it will be possible to find elements that can operate in the Strip.

No matter which alternative is ultimately chosen, the prerequisite for all of them is the elimination of Hamas’s military and civil capabilities. Achieving this will require an interim stage of Israeli civilian control of Gaza during which Israel expands civil responsibility in the areas under its military control. The northern Gaza Strip is suitable for this purpose.

The implementation of the proposed framework in the northern Gaza Strip will serve as an operational pilot to deny Hamas governmental capabilities, while at the same time making a concentrated military effort to demilitarize the territory. This will be done through IDF civil control first in the northern Gaza Strip, and later, depending on the circumstances, in other areas.

Some 200,000 Gazans remain in northern Gaza, including hundreds of operatives of Hamas and other organizations who constitute a fighting force and are a threat to Israeli troops. The American pier has begun working in the area and will serve as an anchor for humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in general and the north in particular. The IDF maintains forces in the northern Gaza Strip to control the area and conduct mop-up operations. Therefore, it is possible to devise methods of action that will further destroy Hamas’s military capabilities coupled with establishing  civilian control in the area.

The IDF will assume responsibility for providing humanitarian aid to the civilian population while preventing Hamas from taking control of the aid. The actual distribution will be conducted by international aid organizations, assisted, if necessary, by the IDF. The IDF’s duty, as long as the area is a combat zone, is to provide only basic humanitarian assistance, subject to military necessity. Israeli civilian control of the area will also make it clear to the population that the era of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is over. Israel has the operational and organizational capability to exercise such civilian control and assume responsibility for managing the territory and its population.

Removing Hamas from civilian centers of power will help locate elements in the population that can contribute to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The implementation of this process will first require an understanding among decision makers in Israel, especially the defense minister and defense establishment officials, that there is no other way to find governmental alternatives without an intermediate stage in which Israel holds civil responsibility. This will also require coordination and cooperation with the United States and international organizations to channel relief efforts through the IDF’s temporary civil control.

Published in JNS, June 3, 2024.

The ramming attack near Nablus that claimed the lives of two IDF soldiers, as well as the shooting incidents and drone flights toward Israeli towns near the Seam Zone, momentarily drew public attention to the simmering Judea and Samaria arena. While defined as a secondary front in the multi-arena campaign Israel is waging, the threats emanating from it continue to be a source of concern for the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency.

So far, two factors have somewhat restrained the potential for terror from Judea and Samaria. The first is the shock and dismay that gripped the terrorist elements and the Palestinian public in this area following Oct. 7. The fear that Israel might unleash its wrath over the horrific massacre on anyone who provokes it has caused some terrorist elements to be more hesitant. Even the worsening economic situation due to the ongoing closure has not shattered this psychological barrier. The second factor, which came in parallel, is the intensive activity of the security establishment. This has been characterized to a much greater extent by proactive friction and aggression, leading to thousands of arrests, thwarting numerous attacks, and dismantling parts of the terrorist infrastructure.

However, the audacity displayed by terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria in recent times likely indicates the dissipation of the first factor’s influence and an adaptation to the IDF’s current modus operandi. Against this backdrop, terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria have begun adopting an approach of initiating attacks against communities, apparently inspired by Hamas’ Oct. 7 onslaught.

Even if their performance currently seems far from mimicking that attack, the very intention to emulate this pattern, with necessary adaptations in the Judea and Samaria arena, must be viewed with utmost seriousness.

The security establishment must take steps to make this course appear futile and hopeless in the eyes of the Palestinians. Consideration should be given to defining a special regime, including unique open-fire instructions for the Seam Zone, and to nip in the bud any attempt to act in this direction, even through the use of targeted prevention measures. 

Enforcement must be exhausted, and administrative measures taken against anyone involved in these ideas – perpetrators, accomplices, suppliers of means (such as drones), transporters of wanted individuals, and their employers. In the face of this dangerous pattern, it is appropriate to consider using sweeping measures against areas from which attacks or preparations for them originate. This must be a top priority for IDF forces, the Shin Bet, Border Police, and the police in this sector.

The large accumulation of events unfolding simultaneously across seven geographical arenas (the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and above all, Iran), the international legal arena (the courts in The Hague), and the political arena could create the impression of “the Philistines are upon you, Samson.”

The protracted war, the direct and indirect costs paid thus far, the disputes over its continuation, the dead-end regarding the hostages, and the uncertainty of the evacuated northern residents regarding their future – all contribute to a sense of stagnation. The high cost of living, economic hardships, as well as the resurgence of political issues and internal divisions on the agenda, add to the general concern. It can be assumed that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are closely following developments in Israel, hoping that these trends will erode national resilience and lead to a change in its positions. The concept of a multi-arena war with Israel was also aimed at this. The basic perception in these circles is that the ultimate weapon against the West, including Israel, is steadfastness over time. As  Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah has said, Israel is weary of wars and lacks the resilience and fortitude to withstand a bloody struggle and sustain casualties.

And yet, Israel’s conduct during the eight months of war has slapped them in the face. Despite internal and external challenges, Israel persists in resolutely striving to achieve all its objectives.

At this juncture, given the challenges that still lie ahead, the political leadership should invest in strengthening national resilience alongside the ongoing efforts on the military and diplomatic fronts. It is appropriate to minimize public uncertainty as much as possible, bolster economic continuity, alleviate the economic burden, avoid or postpone addressing divisive issues, and strive for broad consensus.

The Israeli public, accustomed to living in the light of a grand vision, also needs this. At this point, the American proposal for a new regional order meets the authentic yearning for an organizing idea, but Israel cannot afford the accompanying price tag. For the time being, the organizing principle for Israel’s conduct is simpler but faithful to reality: We are acting to ensure our existence so that, when the time comes, we can fulfill the vision that will be agreed upon.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 2, 2024.

The reported deaths of several dozen civilians in an Israeli air strike on Hamas terror targets in Rafah this week was a profound tragedy.

One cannot be human without feeling both empathy and outrage — empathy that innocent people, especially children, died, and outrage that Hamas would cynically and deliberately put them in such a situation.

It is important to remember that we are only in this awful situation because of the heinous acts committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, as well as the organization’s ongoing holding of hostages in Gaza and continued use of civilians as human shields. This has been noted by world leaders including President Biden.

There are those who, without pause or consideration, have immediately sought to ascribe blame and intention upon Israel, alleging that the Israel Defense Forces either knowingly or recklessly targeted civilians. That could not be further from the truth.

For Israel, every civilian death is a tragedy. For Hamas, civilian death is their strategy.

Experts such as John Spencer, who heads up the urban warfare program at the West Point military academy, and Col. Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, note that Israeli forces have gone to lengths not seen in the history of modern warfare to avoid harm to civilians and abide by the laws of war.

It is an inevitable consequence of war that in the fog of battle, especially in a dense and challenging urban battlefield, errors will occur.  But under international law, not every error is necessarily a war crime. To say so only demeans real victims of war crimes.

In the case of the Rafah attack this week, Israel specifically targeted senior Hamas terrorists Yassin Rabia and Khaled Nagar, who are responsible for numerous attacks on Israelis. This was therefore a legitimate military operation. It did not, contrary to Hamas’s lies and media misinformation, target a refugee or tent camp, nor did they hit the Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Area, which was at least a mile away from the intended target.

According to preliminary indications, as well as U.S. officials, it appears that there was a secondary explosion from a Hamas ammunition warehouse near the compound, where Israel targeted the Hamas terrorists, that might have ignited the fire and resulted in the loss of civilian lives.

Immediately following the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted that, “despite [Israel’s] utmost effort not to harm non-combatants, something unfortunately went tragically wrong,” and that “we are investigating the incident.”

Israel has also announced that the incident is being investigated by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, an independent and professional body, including what caused the ignition of the fire beyond the target and the tragic result, despite the precautionary measures, including surveillance, precise munitions and additional intelligence to limit civilian casualties.

This is how a democracy operates — when mistakes are made, however unintended, they are admitted. People take responsibility and appropriate lessons are learnt.

The response by the international community to the incident in Rafah has also been telling, with immediate worldwide condemnations and the United Nations Security Council already scheduling an emergency session. One cannot help but wonder, where was this same international community when a video was released last week of five terrified young Israeli girls, bloodied, beaten and being abducted by Hamas, with horrific threats of being impregnated? Where was the international community when Hamas rained down a barrage of rockets from Rafah on central Israel, including Tel Aviv?

We would not be in this situation at all were it not for Hamas carrying out the October 7 massacre and continuing to hold in Gaza more than 100 hostages, including five U.S. nationals.

This of course does not absolve Israel of its obligation to abide by the rules of war and international humanitarian law — a duty it has fulfilled and in many documented respects exceeded. However, it is Hamas, an internationally designated terrorist group, that continues to willfully violate every imaginable international law, including embedding combatants in civilian areas.

It is therefore Hamas that bears ultimate responsibility for every innocent life lost, Palestinian and Israeli. The West’s failure to make this distinction only emboldens Hamas and perpetuates the violence.

Published in The Hill, May 29, 2024.

While Ireland, Norway, and Spain announced unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state, the IDF conducted large-scale counterterror operations in the Jenin area – part of the never-ending effort to thwart terrorism’s strongholds in the West Bank.

Since Oct. 7, the security forces have conducted over 4,000 arrests in Judea and Samaria, averaging a staggering 18 per day. This fundamental component allows Israel to maintain security stability and curb terrorism in areas under Palestinian Authority control – the same authority now being recognized as a state by some. Without such uncompromising measures, Israel would likely be unable to independently confront the threats it faces.

Hamas swiftly claimed credit, explaining to Norway’s prime minister and other naive leaders that far from bolstering moderates, such recognition following the October massacre is considered an achievement for the terror group.

“Recognition of the Palestinian state came after the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ war and the steadfastness of the ‘resistance,'” boasted senior Hamas official Husam Badran. His words were published while footage of the abduction of the observers from Nahal Oz filled television screens in Israel.

While the hypocrisy of this move is obvious, it lacks an understanding of the potential implications it may have on the balance of power within the Palestinian camp itself: Crowning Hamas as the factor by virtue of which the Palestinians will receive this achievement, together with their high levels of public Palestinian support, and with the background of an already raging struggle over the succession of Mahmoud Abbas’ seat, could pave the way for the terror organization to take over the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank as well.

And not only that. This step, which will be credited to Hamas, is necessarily a tailwind for the entire “axis of resistance” and a strengthening of the path of the Islamic extremists wherever they are. Instead of uniting around the position that the way of terror is flawed and will not yield achievements, the message of this step is the opposite: Terror pays off.

In practical terms, the impact of unilateral recognition is quite limited. The recognition does not address the issue of borders, and in this way, most countries of the world have already recognized a Palestinian state when it was admitted as an observer to the UN.

The impact of these declarations is mainly on the level of awareness and the momentum they could create, especially when they occur in parallel with proceedings at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice in The Hague and at a time when the US administration is pressuring Israel to agree to a deal, one component of which is a commitment to a process that will eventually lead to a Palestinian state.

In this sense, the US’ reservations about the unilateral recognition move are very important, both to prevent a momentum of more countries recognizing a Palestinian state and to prevent this idea from gaining a foothold in Washington itself. After the heavy price Israel has paid and is still paying, the political leadership not only has the right but is obligated to take a sober, cautious, and suspicious stance. Israel needs to rely only on itself and avoid entering processes that would be difficult, if not impossible, to exit.

In the security arena, whatever the definition of the Palestinians may be, Israel will need to continue its presence and do everything it is currently doing for its security, without any compromises.

It will have to continue to maintain absolute and effective control over the borders and the seamline, ensure security and freedom of operation within the territory, and prevent processes such as those that took place in Gaza.

The IDF and the Shin Bet will be required to continue their activity against terrorist infrastructures, thwart smuggling or production of combat means, take a suspicious approach also towards Palestinian mechanisms, and prevent by all means the possibility of Hamas taking over the governing institutions, whether directly, through a partnership with another political factor or through proxy actors. This is the meaning of the statement – we must defend ourselves by ourselves.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 26, 2024.

“The Israelis go on the trajectory, potentially, to inherit an insurgency with many armed Hamas left or, if it leaves, a vacuum filled by chaos, filled by anarchy, and probably refilled by Hamas. We’ve been talking to them about a much better way of getting an enduring result, enduring security,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said just recently, criticizing Israel’s conduct in Gaza. “We haven’t seen an Israeli plan to prevent this situation,” he added. Similar remarks are expected from Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor as he begins his visit in Israel this week.

The same could be said about the reality in northern Samaria. We have long stopped counting the number of operations in Jenin and the Tulkarm area. Our forces go in, arrest or eliminate targets, and withdraw – only to see terror elements rear their heads again, forcing the IDF and Shin Bet to go back and operate there in a continuous cycle. Nevertheless, no one in the political or security establishment has doubted the necessity of such action.

Quite the opposite – it has been refined into an almost official policy called “mowing the grass,” underscoring the belief that the fight against terror is an ongoing process, not a one-time thing This applies to the West Bank theater of operations as well, where the IDF has thoroughly combed, and even more so to the Gaza Strip, where our activity so far has focused on achieving operational control and dismantling Hamas’ military frameworks, but not on a thorough clearing of the area.

The blow Hamas sustained from the IDF is indeed painful but far from fatal. Its order of battle still includes thousands of fighters, ammunition and weaponry, and many kilometers of tunnels. The dead commanders and battalion leaders have deputies, and in any case, Hamas knows how to easily transition from a semi-military system to a flexible and mobile mode enabling terror and guerrilla warfare.

It fires rockets almost daily, demonstrating control and governance, and displaying a high level of coordination among its senior command components; this can also be gleaned from how the negotiations over the captives are being conducted. In such a situation, the debate over the “day after” is akin to arguing over the skin of a bear that has yet to be hunted.

As early as February, in a document issued by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office outlining the principles for the day after the war, it was stated that “a necessary condition for reaching the day after is for the IDF to continue the war until its objectives are achieved: the destruction of Hamas’ and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military capabilities and governing networks.” The same document also provided guidance on managing civilian affairs in the strip after Hamas’ rule collapses: “As much as possible, civilian administration and responsibility for public order will be based on local elements with managerial experience, who will not be identified with states or bodies supporting terror and will not receive salaries from them.” At present, there is no entity that could rule without submitting to Hamas’ dictates.

From the Americans’ perspective, the discussion about the “day after” is meant to lead Israel to recognize the futility of the war and push it toward a solution that will be presented as the lesser evil but will serve President Joe Biden’s vision of establishing a new regional order, including a Palestinian state.

The truth must be told: There are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have been implemented during one of the many opportunities over the years of conflict. Nevertheless, Israel did not enter this war to find a replacement for Hamas but to destroy it. That is the goal, not the means. Moreover, it is not at all clear that imposing the “Palestinian Authority,” which aside from its many flaws would also allow Hamas’ survival and recovery, is preferable to the alternatives.

One need not be an intelligence expert to understand that given the current balance of power in Gaza, no entity can replace Hamas in the civilian administration of the Strip without its consent. This applies to the “Palestinian Authority,” the “Dahlan camp,” “technocratic ministers,” or local “clan” leaders. Hamas, for its part, will have to accept such an arrangement only if it has no choice or if it shapes it as a “puppet government” that provides cover for its behind-the-scenes rule and protection for its military buildup.

This is the context in which to view a senior Hamas official’s statement that “we will be ready to support a national (Palestinian) consensus government in Gaza and the West Bank, and we do not necessarily have to be part of it.” In such a case, Israel would pay twice: Not only would Hamas strengthen under the new administration’s cover, but Israel would also find it difficult to act against this administration, lest it be accused by the international community of undermining efforts to establish a “governing alternative to Hamas.”

Israel must also draw lessons from its three decades of relations with the Palestinian Authority. Israel has already transferred control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority in the past. The notion that it will now succeed where it previously failed rests more on the wishful thinking of its proponents than on a factual basis. The authority would owe its return to Gaza to Hamas, not Israel. That is how the Palestinian public would perceive it, and their attitude toward the Authority would stem from that. It is the same Authority that cannot control Jenin and northern Samaria and would likely be unable to address security challenges even against itself were it not for the IDF and Shin Bet.

And from Israel’s perspective, it is the same Authority that did not condemn the October 7 massacre, that leads efforts to accuse Israel of war crimes, that perpetuates the struggle against Israel among its people, that provides incentives for terror, and that continues to instill hatred of Jews through its shools. Given this reality, talk of expanding its sphere of control to Gaza is disconnected from reality.

Some circles are toying with the idea of entrusting the strip to Mohammed Dahlan, with the support of the United Arab Emirates and other countries. Even without delving into Dahlan’s political doctrine and the challenges it poses for Israel, it is clear that he too would be dependent on Hamas, and the considerations regarding having him in charge are similar to those concerning the Palestinian Authority. The “clans” idea, intended to circumvent Hamas through local elements, has failed and demonstrated the terror group’s absolute control over the area.

Given this situation, it must be stated that even after seven months, the conditions for establishing an alternative to Hamas’ rule have not yet matured. From Israel’s perspective, the question of the “day after” in Gaza is secondary to the more important goal: destroying Hamas’ military and governing capabilities and restoring Israeli deterrence. Israel must not be tempted by proposals that provide the appearance of a solution while leaving the problem intact.

To reach the “day after,” the pace of fighting must be accelerated and the intensity increased: in Rafah, the central camps, and areas where Hamas’ activity has resumed. It is crucial to act against its governing mechanisms, which have suffered only minor damage so far, and no less important, to crush its overseas headquarters.

Above all, it is essential to mitigate internal disputes at all levels and ranks. The war is in full swing, and no one knows how it might evolve on each front. To succeed, preserving cohesion is crucial.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 19, 2024.

“Not 75 years later, but just seven and a half months later, and people are already forgetting, they’re already forgetting that Hamas unleashed this terror, that it was Hamas that brutalized Israelis, that it was Hamas that took and continues to hold hostages…I have not forgotten, nor have you. And we will not forget,” President Joe Biden declared just two days before issuing his dramatic threat to halt the supply of offensive weapons to Israel should the IDF invade Rafah.

Unlike two months ago when they rushed to welcome America’s abstention in the UN Security Council resolution on Gaza, this time Hamas spokespeople refrained from publicly responding to this move by the Biden administration. However, one can assume they are rubbing their hands in glee and thanking Allah for providing them with salvation.

In this monstrous organization, they understand that Washington is striving to end the war at almost any cost. On the one hand, they are pressuring Israel to reach a prisoner exchange deal that would allow Hamas not only to survive but to militarily rehabilitate and enhance its status beyond the Gaza Strip, including in the West Bank and the broader region. On the other hand, they are preventing the IDF from operating in Rafah, forcing Israel to open the Kerem Shalom crossing just one day after a barrage of rockets hit the area, killing four IDF soldiers. They are compelling Israel to increase humanitarian aid, despite most of it falling under Hamas’ control, pushing for the opening of the Erez crossing, which was the target of a vicious attack on October 7, and promoting ideas like the maritime corridor that Hamas could only dream of. In doing so, the Biden administration is giving the international community the framework within which to maneuver Israel into different channels, hinting that the set of pressure levers at its disposal has not yet been exhausted.

With others doing the work for them, all that remains for Hamas is to continue insisting on their exaggerated demands in the negotiations, buy time, exploit the supplies to equip their fighters and re-establish their governance and prepare their forces for the continuation of the campaign – not just for defense but also for attack. One cannot rule out the possibility that under the prevailing circumstances in Rafah, they may even manage to smuggle or manufacture means of combat during this period.

This stance is detrimental to Israel, primarily in the effort to secure the release of the hostages and defeat Hamas in Gaza. Israel’s enemies, even in other theaters, draw encouragement from this. In fact, from the US perspective, this administration’s approach does not even aid its own efforts to persuade Israel to acquiesce to its initiatives. It would want Israel to have faith in its support amid the risks inherent in these ideas, but its conduct could lead to the opposite conclusion. Moreover, this approach toward Israel could undermine America’s efforts to strengthen the pro-American axis, as even Saudi Arabia and other countries, they can now see how Washington treats its crucial ally during wartime. The current conduct will likely temper the enthusiasm from the impressive display against the Iranian kamikaze drone attack.

The ongoing dispute over the issue of combat in Rafah provides an opportunity to contemplate the absurdity of the American stance. Hamas’ division in that area, with its four brigades, is placed along the border strip between Gaza and the outside world, through which all evil passes: smuggling of weapons and technical equipment, and the movement of operatives and commanders. Rafah may also be a place of shelter for commanders and terrorists from other parts of the Strip who have fled there to escape the fighting. Given these facts, does anyone truly believe it is possible to topple Hamas’ rule and dismantle its military capabilities without operating in Rafah? Does anyone think limited and targeted raids can substitute for that? As far as is known, despite its statements, the American administration has yet to provide a realistic alternative plan that could achieve these goals. Indeed, one cannot expect the global superpower to grasp Rafah with the same detail that Israel requires. But precisely for that reason, one must wonder whether it is appropriate for the White House to engage in discussions about operational methods in that area.

The allegations against Israel regarding the extent of harm to the uninvolved population are presumably based on data from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, whose reliability is unclear. Even if we assume these are accurate figures, there is no parallel in the world to the low ratio between the number of terrorists and uninvolved individuals among the casualties. These results were achieved, among other things, thanks to the evacuation of the population and stringent precautionary measures by the IDF, some would say overly stringent. Israel is doing everything required under international law. If more is desired, the burden of protecting the population should not rest solely on Israel’s shoulders. For instance, has Washington considered the possibility of persuading Egypt to allow temporary humanitarian refuge in Egyptian Rafah to minimize the risks of harming the population? In these days when the US, the European Union, and other countries are coming to Egypt’s aid with billions of dollars for its economy, one might have expected a serious discussion of this option as well. In any case, the pressure on Israel on this issue only proves to Hamas and other terror organizations that their strategy of using the population as a human shield is proving effective.

As for the border strip with Sinai, it can be assumed that the parties in Washington are trying to establish an Israeli-Egyptian coordination mechanism, with American involvement, to prevent arms smuggling. Well, we’ve been down that road before. In January 2009, at the end of Operation Cast Lead, Tzipi Livni, then Israel’s foreign minister, signed such an agreement that prevented Israel from continuing that war until Hamas was defeated. Yet it did not prevent the smuggling of even a single ounce of gunpowder.

Similar assurances were given by American officials even earlier, in October 2005, when Israel was asked to sign the agreement regulating the opening of border crossings from the Gaza Strip. Presumably, this was also aimed at strengthening Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ahead of the 2006 Palestinian elections. Nothing came of it. Abbas and his people were expelled from Gaza. The promises to Israel were annulled. Hamas celebrated the folly.

Another contentious issue concerns Washington’s desire to hand over the civilian administration in Gaza to an “improved Palestinian Authority” or other entity that they deem a substitute for Hamas. This stance ignores the extent of support for Hamas among the Gazan public. Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the Strip, casting doubt on the prospects of effecting a profound change in the Gaza Strip through entities that would take the reins and enjoy Arab or international patronage without Hamas’ consent.

The truth must be told, even if it is frustrating and complicates finding solutions: The population in Gaza was not hijacked by Hamas. The majority of the public chose Hamas to govern, and according to the latest polls, they would do so again if elections were held. This explains the descriptions by our soldiers of finding weapons, tunnel shafts, and the like in almost every home in Gaza. Whoever believes, therefore, that a few nice figures can be installed in power and succeed in changing the mindset and uprooting Hamas fails to understand how deeply rooted Hamas is. As long as a strong, organized, and armed core of the terror organization remains in Gaza, it will be the central force of power in the strip, regardless of who is officially crowned.

Overshadowing all these disputes is the disagreement over the American vision for the Middle East: the desire to establish regional integration that would include peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the establishment of a Palestinian state, which would also serve as a response to the Iranian issue. The war is perceived as an opportunity to bring about a new regional order, and that is what Washington is pushing for. The White House would be happy to announce a move that averted a regional war, allowed the resumption of global trade through the Red Sea, assisted in wresting control of Gaza from Hamas and transferring it to the Palestinian Authority, revived discussions about a Palestinian state, and led to a new regional partnership centered on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Such an announcement would undoubtedly emphasize the significance of this achievement in the competition for the new world order: the return to the American fold of countries that had turned toward the Chinese-Russian axis and the strengthening of America’s position in the Middle East without getting embroiled in war.

From an external perspective, this might seem like a perfect move that solves the Rubik’s Cube all at once. But the closer you get, the more you realize the cube is stuck, and its sides cannot be turned at all because something inside is jammed, disorderly, and unsynchronized. Can one abandon the defeat of Hamas? Is there an entity that could truly govern Gaza? Would it not be a prize for terror to speak of a “Palestinian state” after October 7? Do they not understand that merely discussing it gives Hamas more credit than it has, even in Judea and Samaria? Can one expect Israel to again take on risks similar to those that led it to its current predicament? Is the Palestinian Authority – which received Gaza under its control and failed, and is unable to contend with Hamas alone in Jenin and Tulkarm, encourages terror through payments and glorification of terrorists – suitable to be the partner for the Gaza mission? Or for a Palestinian state? These are just some of the questions and not the most challenging ones. With all the importance and desire for it, the celebratory carpet of normalization with Saudi Arabia cannot be rolled out before straightening, cleaning, and leveling the floor beneath it.

Washington must understand that for Israel, after October 7, defeating Hamas in Gaza has become an existential matter. It is not akin to America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – wars waged thousands of miles from its soil, which some tend to draw comparisons to. The players in our region and the international arena, including enemies, friends, and those undecided, are watching what is happening in Gaza. Their stances and conduct toward Israel will be influenced by the outcomes. The deterrence that shattered on October 7 will not be restored unless all of Israel’s stated objectives for this war are achieved.

Otherwise, it will face an existential threat, the temptation to attack it will grow stronger, and its political standing will be severely damaged. The room for maneuver that Israel can allow itself under these circumstances is limited. The only way to end the fighting in Gaza is to let Israel win and not stop it. The opposite of what the administration is currently doing.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 12, 2024.

Israel shut down Al Jazeera’s operations in the country and seized some of its communication equipment Sunday, prompting condemnation from the United Nations and rights groups over alleged moves by the government to restrict press freedoms.

Dr. Adi Schwartz told KAN’s Mark Weiss that the closure of Al Jazeera was justified. 5.5.2024.

https://youtu.be/Rnrr149377g

The barrage of rockets and mortars towards Kerem Shalom on Sunday is Hamas’ response to those who questioned the necessity of an Israeli military operation in the Rafah area. It reflects the self-confidence of Hamas’ commanders, who did not hesitate to initiate such an attack from a humanitarian area – even in the midst of critical negotiations for the organization and despite the cost of damaging a vital supply line for the Gazan population.

The attack aims to rekindle the zeal and vigor of Hamas’ ground forces while sending a clear message to the public that the group’s call for a cessation of hostilities stems from a position of power – not capitulation or weariness. The results of the attack also illustrate the danger of prolonged waiting and hesitation on the Israeli side.

One does not need to be an intelligence officer to understand that Hamas draws great encouragement from the positions of the US and the attitude it displays towards Israel regarding the war in Gaza. In this monstrous organization, they understand that the Biden administration is striving to end the war through a deal involving the release of the Israeli hostages, without achieving any of Israel’s objectives; a deal that would allow Hamas to recover militarily and upgrade its status not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and the region as a whole.

In the meantime, this administration is tying Israel’s hands from taking action in Rafah, forcing it to increase humanitarian aid despite it reaching Hamas’ control, pressing it to open the Erez Crossing that was attacked by Hamas’ savages on Oct. 7 and implement ideas like the maritime corridor the terrorist organization could only dream of.

In addition, it allows the international community to make decisions that undermine Israel’s status and hints that the stockpile of pressure tactics at its disposal has not yet been exhausted.

When its work is done by others, all that remains for Hamas is to continue insisting on its exaggerated demands in the negotiations, buy time, exploit the supply to equip its fighters, re-establish its rule, and prepare its forces for the continuation of the campaign – not only for defense but also for attack. It must be taken into account that under the cover of the reality that has developed in Rafah, it also manages to smuggle or produce means of combat even during this period.

Israel must completely close the Kerem Shalom Crossing and act forcefully, without unnecessary risks, to crush Hamas in Rafah and shape a new reality in the area between Gaza and Egypt, without relying on international arrangements that have never proved themselves.

Israel will remember and appreciate President Joe Biden’s support for it at the onset of the war, but it cannot back down from the just goals it has defined and which have also received his backing.

Published in Israel Hayom, May 6, 2024.