While discussions in Israel increasingly focus on transitioning to a new phase of the conflict, the situation on the ground remains volatile. Approximately 20 rockets were recently launched from Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip toward communities in southern Israel, and intense fighting continues in the city of Rafah.

The threat extends beyond Gaza’s borders. Near Tulkarm in the West Bank, an explosive device was detonated against Israeli forces operating in the Nur al-Shams refugee camp. Hamas official Husam Badran recently outlined the group’s strategy: “We are currently working to increase and develop resistance in the West Bank.” He called on anyone with weapons to take action.

In a separate interview, senior Hamas figure Khaled Mashal stated that the Oct. 7 attack created an opportunity for Palestinians to revive their longstanding ambition: a single Palestinian state “from the river to the sea.”

The purpose that the discourse on the imminent end of intense fighting is meant to serve is unclear. The risks it poses are evident: it generates hope for our enemies and, conversely, may reduce our forces’ operational readiness and vigilance. While Israel has dealt significant blows to Hamas, the group is far from defeated. Hamas retains a considerable fighting force, substantial weaponry, an extensive tunnel network, and a largely intact leadership structure both within Gaza and abroad.

The organization maintains control over areas of Gaza where Israeli forces are not present. Its unyielding stance in hostage negotiations demonstrates not only an ability to coordinate under difficult circumstances but also a degree of confidence in its position.

As long as Israel’s stated war objectives remain unmet, including the formulation of an acceptable hostage release deal, pressure on Hamas should not be reduced. The opposite is true. Our forces on the ground have proved that they know how to achieve their objectives. They should be given everything necessary to do so, including authorizations to use intense fire as much as needed to reduce risks and maintain their safety. It is appropriate to avoid messages that create hesitation or confusion.

The time has come to target senior Hamas officials living abroad, who currently operate with relative impunity. Israel must maintain several points of leverage against Hamas to impede its recovery: Control over humanitarian aid distribution; preventing residents from returning to northern Gaza; maintaining control of key border crossings; keeping Gaza geographically divided; establishing a wide security perimeter with strict rules of engagement and carefully managing the issue of Palestinian detainees (under no circumstances should we agree to a situation where they are released due to a shortage of detention facilities or for other technical and administrative reasons.)

The many question marks in the current policy should be replaced with exclamation points, both regarding the pressing humanitarian issues and undermining Hamas’ governance efforts. The principle of simplicity also applies in this regard.

Our success in the Gaza Strip is crucial to prevent Hamas from realizing its ambitions in the West Bank as well, and to ensure that when the time comes, and to ensure we can address the northern front from a position of strength when the time comes.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 2, 2024.

In the complex web of dilemmas facing Israeli decision-makers, the war to decisively defeat the Hamas terror organization must remain a cornerstone of policy and action. After Oct. 7, there is no room for maneuver – any other outcome will have far-reaching consequences. A determined effort to achieve all our objectives in the Gaza Strip will also shake Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s confidence in the effectiveness of his attrition strategy against Israel and provide him and Lebanese leaders with a stark illustration of the potential outcomes of a war with Israel.

The dispute at the top political-security echelon on Gaza-related issues reflects not only differences in approaches to the strategic purpose (real, not declared) of the war but also gaps in assessing the effectiveness of efforts and the synchronization of the Gaza fighting with other threats and challenges. Our enemies exploit this disagreement as propaganda material, presenting it as expressions of frustration and despair, and as signs of breakdown within the Israeli system.

Examining the conduct of the Israeli military and society, along with the war’s achievements, provides a mixed balance that leans more toward the positive, optimistic side than the opposing view.

This refers not only to military achievements but even to the war’s impact on public opinion in Gaza, as can be learned from the results of an updated quarterly survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research headed by Khalil Shikaki. This survey indicated a decrease in the percentage of Gaza residents who still support Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, a decrease in satisfaction with Hamas, and a decline in the percentage of Gazans who believe Hamas will win the war. While the data is still far from indicating a complete shift (and in the West Bank, they even reflect a trend of strengthening for Hamas), they should not be ignored.

The differences in approaches within the Israeli system are not always reconcilable, but it is possible to reduce expectation gaps between the political echelon and the security system, and between both of these and the public.

The first gap concerns the required achievement. The goal defined by politicians is the destruction of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities, but there is still a need to define metrics by which its achievement can be assessed. Security officials have often used the term “dismantling,” referring to dismantling the ability of Hamas brigades and battalions to operate as organized frameworks. Indeed, the IDF has dismantled most of them.

In a war against a regular state army, collapsing the combat system, dismantling it, and certain destruction of its forces is sufficient to make its fighting hopeless in a way that will lead to deterrence and surrender. This happened in our wars against Arab armies until 1973.

In the case before us, fighting against a hybrid entity – an army that knows how to switch to operate as guerrilla and terror cells (or against another jihadist army, like the Nazis and Japanese) – is not enough to defeat it. Dismantling the system is necessary to achieve the second decisive factor: eliminating the enemy and/or uprooting it from the area. This can explain the return to places where the IDF has already operated in the past and the lengthy time required.

Another gap exists regarding the destruction of governmental capabilities. While one approach suggests that the way to revoke Hamas’ control is to allow another entity (not the IDF) to take over civilian affairs management in Gaza, the other opinion holds that no entity other than the IDF can succeed under current conditions, and in any case, every Hamas governmental power center must be collapsed, even if there is temporarily no alternative. Either way, there is no known plan to achieve the goal, including severing Hamas’ control of humanitarian aid that provides it with breathing room and positions of power.

An additional gap is related to the pace and intensity of the fighting. These are influenced by the constraints Israel faces – political, operational, and legal. However, the current approach reduces efficiency, limits pressure points on the enemy, allows its forces to escape to areas outside the combat zone and reorganize there, prolongs the war, and strengthens the sense of stagnation. A strategy of accumulating tactical achievements comes with high prices that can only be demanded from the public when there is no other alternative.

The political and security leadership would do well to clarify these issues within the discussion rooms. Despite its drawbacks, the dispute can be an opportunity to strengthen our confidence not only in the justness of the war but also in the way it is being conducted.

Targeting Hamas leaders will clarify that there is a price for their refusal
Unlike in these areas, there seems to be no dispute about the importance of eliminating Hamas leadership and the expected benefits in relation to all the goals Israel has defined. While the difficulty in doing so regarding commanders in Gaza can be understood, it is not understandable regarding the organization’s leaders abroad, who star in the media and behave as if their immunity is guaranteed.

The central role played by this command, and its efforts to drag Israel into a multi-front war, require Israel to take systematic action against it until all its components are neutralized – especially after the Oct. 7 onslaught and after the clear wording provided by Khaled Mashal regarding Hamas’ commitment to destroy Israel.

Targeting them will clarify that there is a price for their refusal of a release deal and for the passing time. It will help disrupt the ability to control and coordinate and make recovery efforts more difficult.

Without an effective command abroad, Hamas will lose its status as a movement with regional influence, even if it continues to exist as a local persecuted organization. This is a shared interest for Israel and its neighbors, and a goal that serves the American desire to shape a new regional order.

Published in Israel Hayom, June November 23, 2024.

The Palestinian-Arab war against the pre-state Jewish community in the land of Israel, and afterwards in the state of Israel, can be divided into a number of stages. Until May 1948 it was primarily a war of militias in the territory of the British Mandate. In the quarter-century after the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel, it was a total Arab war, in which the Arab world hoped to defeat Israel by conquering the territory. After the failure of the Yom Kippur War, the Palestinian struggle changed its form and transitioned to a combination of terrorism inside and outside Israel, a diplomatic struggle in the international arena and a public relations effort to weaken Israel. In all of these stages, the Arab-Palestinian aspiration remained identical: to foil the establishment of the state of Israel; and after it was established, to oppose its existence within any borders.

This article will deal with one facet of the Palestinian struggle against Israel, and that is the use of the Palestinian refugee problem as a demographic tool to eliminate the Jewish state. It will present the Palestinian position on the refugee question during negotiations that took place between the PLO and the PA and Israel, and will clarify the status of the Palestinian demand for massive return of refugees to within Israel (what is known as “the right of return”). This position, and the use of demography as a tool to fight Israel, will be demonstrated via internal documents of the Palestinian negotiation team.

Together they present a clear picture of the use of millions of Palestinians, some of whom are fourth and fifth generation descendants of Palestinian displaced persons and refugees from the War of Independence in 1948, as a tool for turning Israel from a state with a clear Jewish majority into a state with an Arab majority, thereby rendering it an additional Arab state in the Middle East.

For the full article

Last week’s dramatic rescue of four Israeli hostages from Gaza included a shocking revelation: The hostages, who endued unbearable torture and constant threats of death, were held captive by Palestinian civilians in their home in central Gaza—including a journalist with bylines in Al Jazeera and his physician father. Amazingly, as soon the hostages were returned to Israeli soil, the operation was denounced by the usual suspects for the hundreds of “Palestinian civilians” it had claimed as casualties. The United Nations called the rescue operation a “war crime,” while EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell called it a “bloodbath” and “massacre.” Naturally, the press reflexively parroted Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry figures of purported casualties during the operation.

It’s a perfect opportunity for a long-overdue conversation about the use of the phrase “Palestinian civilian.”

Let’s get something straight from the outset: When you take hostages, you risk death. The moral and legal responsibility for any casualties resulting from the operation to free the hostages rests fully with Hamas and those holding hostages captive.

Under international law, it is a sacrosanct principle that civilians enjoy special protection, and the intentional targeting or harming of them during hostilities, is a grave war crime. But one should not need to be a legal scholar to understand that if you are a journalist or physician holding hostages, you are no longer a “civilian.” In fact, the Geneva Convention makes it unequivocally clear that civilians lose that protection when they take direct part in the hostilities.

In other words, when you hold hostages captive, you become a legitimate military target and should not be surprised when the Israel Defense Forces come knocking on your door.

And it wasn’t just these four hostages. In addition to the four Israeli hostages rescued from Nuseirat in central Gaza, there have been countless reports from hostages returning to Israel describing being held captive by ordinary Gazans, including families, doctors, teachers, and even U.N. employees.

It is also well known that civilians in Gaza willingly joined Hamas en masse on October 7 and took part in the massacre, rapes, and abductions on that day.

How many Gazan “civilians” helped Hamas move and store rockets? How many “civilians” offered up their homes to hold hostages captive or keep guard to make sure they did not escape? How many have been the willing accomplices and collaborators of Hamas in the worst massacre and crimes against the Jewish people since the Holocaust?

These questions are crucial. Yet the international community is failing to ask these questions.

Instead, lawmakers, journalists and diplomats are blindly accepting reported casualty figures from the Gaza Health Ministry, as if it were Moses delivering the Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai. Apparently, eight months into this war, it still has to be repeated that the Gaza “Health Ministry” is no more than a propaganda arm of the Hamas terror group.

A group that murders, massacres, rapes, beheads, and abducts people, and has a relentless history of fabricating stories, inflating casualties, and using their own civilians as human shields, is not exactly the world’s most trustworthy source.

This has not stopped the international community from using the Hamas figures as evidence to maliciously accuse Israel of genocide, call for embargoes, or seek arrest warrants for Israeli leaders.

Even if you accept Hamas’s figure of 30,000 reported deaths in Gaza during Israel’s war, the ratio of Palestinian non-combatants to terrorists killed has been estimated to be one to one, a level unprecedented in modern warfare. Meanwhile, the actual number of civilian casualties was recently significantly altered when the U.N. acknowledged that over 10,000 of the reported casualties were missing, not verified deaths; they also halved their demographic estimates of men versus women and children. With these updates, the already questionable figures become much lower. It would be lower still if those who have been reported as “civilians” were in fact combatants or, as we saw this week, holding hostages captive.

For Hamas, civilian death is their strategy; Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has called civilian deaths a “necessary sacrifices.”

As long as the press and world leaders fail to ask these questions, continuing to push false narratives and unsubstantiated casualty figures, they are only enabling and empowering Hamas and perpetuating the violence and suffering they claim to seek to end.

The article was co-authored with John Spencer. John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point and host of the ”Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He is the co-author of ”Understanding Urban Warfare.

Published in Newsweek, June 17, 2024.

The five demands that Hamas has put forth in the negotiations for the release of the Israeli hostages are aimed at preserving its status as the dominant power in the Gaza Strip, allowing its members to emerge from hiding and resume their routine activities without fear of Israeli retaliation, enabling the reconstruction of its military capabilities, and capitalizing on the political gains from the war in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority.

Hamas’ insistence on receiving international guarantees that Israel will not violate the terms of the deal is intended to maintain international involvement in the conflict, anticipating that pressure will be primarily directed toward Israel, serving Hamas’ interests at every stage.

The notion that Hamas could agree to a ceasefire for the exchange and then renew hostilities under some pretext to achieve its goals overlooks the dynamics inherent in such processes, which would effectively prevent such a scenario.

The key costs Israel would incur under the proposed deal include ending the war without destroying Hamas, allowing the reconstruction of its military capabilities in Gaza, creating conditions that enhance its standing in the West Bank, heightening risks due to the involvement of hundreds of released militants in terrorist activities, and potentially encouraging increased use of kidnappings by terrorist groups emboldened by the current outcome.

Moreover, on a psychological level, the deal would be perceived as a successful conclusion to the war Hamas imposed on Israel and a failure by the IDF to achieve its military objectives despite the prolonged fighting. Any decision by the government to support or reject the deal is legitimate, provided it is made with a sober assessment of the comprehensive advantages and risks it entails.

In response to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s accusation of obstructing efforts to reach an agreement, Hamas once again outlined its primary demands in exchange for releasing the captives: “A comprehensive agreement based on a permanent ceasefire, complete Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, return of displaced Gaza residents to their homes, reconstruction of the Strip, and a serious prisoner exchange deal.” The five demands outlined reveal Hamas’ strategic objectives for the day after.

Irreversible cessation of hostilities

For Hamas, the cornerstone of any deal is an agreement on ending the war, leading to the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-escalation lines and limiting Israel’s ability to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Gaza. This would allow Hamas members to safely emerge from their hiding places, reorganize, restore their governance, and rebuild their capabilities.

Concurrent with the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, captives would be released in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, displaced Gazans would be allowed to return to the Strip, and an internationally funded reconstruction process would commence.

Israel would not be able to resume hostilities after their cessation. In such a reality, and after the Israeli war machine has been shut down, it would be impossible to simply flip a switch and restart the fighting as if nothing had happened. Even in the face of ceasefire violations by Hamas, the international community would pressure Israel to resort to a “proportionate response.” Domestically, too, it would be challenging to garner support for renewing the war, given the costs and the additional threats and challenges that would arise. The practical implication is that the war would effectively end with Hamas remaining the dominant force in Gaza and having achieved gains that would enhance its standing even in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority.

No disarmament for Hamas

At Hamas’ disposal would not only be a network of tunnels spanning dozens of kilometers but also the means to rapidly restore its local arms production industry. Combined with the substantial resources that would be introduced for civilian reconstruction, it is reasonable to assume that within a short period, Hamas could replenish its arms shortages. As long as Hamas remains the governing authority and the de facto ruler, no external party – neither Arab states nor international organizations – would be able to effectively monitor and prevent these risks.

Regarding the prevention of smuggling from Sinai into Gaza, without effective Israeli control over the Philadelphia Corridor and the Rafah Crossing, Israel would be forced to rely on international arrangements, emphasizing security coordination with Egypt. Past experience does not inspire optimism for the future. Moreover, the inherently gradual nature of military buildup, occurring out of the spotlight, would hinder the application of pressure and allow for incremental adaptation to the evolving reality.

Return of displaced Gazans: Accepting tunnel reality

The extensive network of tunnels beneath residential areas in Gaza City provides Israel with justification for not allowing displaced Gazans to return to their homes and to continue considering these areas as “combat zones.” This could have served as significant leverage for the Gazan population seeking to return to normalcy, pressuring Hamas. Israel’s concession on this issue not only eliminates this source of pressure but may also be interpreted as tacit acceptance of this reality, which contradicts the concept of security demilitarization.

Consolidating power in the West Bank and PA

Hamas’ insistence that militants from the West Bank released as part of the deal be returned to their homes rather than Gaza reflects not only the position of strength from which Hamas leaders are negotiating but also the organization’s intent to leverage their release to enhance its political standing in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority and, of course, to utilize their terrorist capabilities to strengthen its infrastructure in that area.

Continued action against Hamas necessary

At this juncture, Hamas’ elaborate response has spared Israel from the in-depth discussion required regarding the implications of the deal on the table. Decision-makers face an unenviable task. Any decision they make will be a case of “woe to those who fashion me, and woe to those who birth me.”

For now, it is prudent to continue and intensify efforts to dismantle Hamas’ infrastructure, increase efforts to target Sinwar and other field commanders, work to eliminate Hamas leaders abroad who constitute the organization’s political, media, and economic arm – for they are the ones who transform Hamas into a regionally influential entity. If we do not act against them, they will be central players in the reconstruction of Hamas in the Strip.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 16, 2024.

The deal laid out by US President Joe Biden in his May 31 address on the war in Gaza is disingenuous and disastrous. His remarks reflect the failed paradigms, illusions, and wishful thinking that led to October 7. The plan he described, if implemented, would create an existential threat to the State of Israel.

President Biden’s deceptive and dangerous claims are numerous. Here are a few of the most egregious: The US president began his remarks by declaring that his goal is an end to the war, “one that… creates a better ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power…” However, the rest of his speech included no concrete steps or road maps for removing Hamas from power. The opposite was true. The proposed outline would ensure that Hamas remained in power and was able to rebuild its military strength.

President Biden assured that “Palestinian civilians would return to their homes… in all areas of Gaza, including the North.” He seemed to be claiming that it would only be civilians that would return to northern Gaza. But the fact is that there would be no way to ensure that Hamas fighters did not return there as well. These fighters aren’t wearing uniforms and their guns are hidden in the hundreds of tunnels that still exist in northern Gaza.

With this plan, Hamas would quickly reassert its control over every inch of the Strip.

Biden then made a statement of unparalleled chutzpah: “The people of Israel should know they can make this offer without any further risk to their own security because they’ve already devastated Hamas forces over the past eight months…” The reality is that Hamas still has many intact fighters and senior leadership – even if it is now operating as smaller terror cells rather than battalions, or laying low until the IDF withdraws.

Once reconstruction began in Gaza, the Islamist terror group would quickly rebuild its capabilities. The idea that leaving Hamas in power does not constitute a severe risk to Israel’s security, especially to those Israelis in the western Negev region, is ludicrous.

President Biden suggested that the United States would “help forge a diplomatic resolution, one that ensures Israel’s security” and that “with a deal, a rebuilding of Gaza will begin… in a manner that does not allow Hamas to re-arm.”

He ignores the inconvenient truth that diplomatic resolutions have failed time and again. They failed to prevent Hezbollah from greatly increasing its arsenal following the Second Lebanon War – and they failed to prevent the massive smuggling of weapons to Hamas from Egypt following the previous rounds of fighting in Gaza.

Likewise, the idea that with Hamas still in power, reconstruction could take place without enabling the terrorist group to rearm, is simply laughable. The current war in Gaza has revealed the far-reaching extent to which supplies that entered Gaza over the years, including for humanitarian purposes, were used first and foremost by Hamas, to build its terror infrastructure.

With regard to those who would oppose such a plan, Biden claimed that “the hostages are not a priority for them.”

This was a false and outrageous statement.

The fact that there are those who recognize that leaving Hamas in power will destroy Israel’s deterrence and encourage countless murderous attacks and kidnappings of Israelis does not mean that they care any less about the hostages. They simply believe that the efforts to free the hostages must take place on the basis of a pragmatic understanding of the Middle East, and of the psychopathic but intelligent enemy that Israel faces.

It is important to realize that while Hamas may be willing to release some of the hostages, it will never release all of them, as they serve as a human shield for its leadership. Under the deal that Biden describes, a ceasefire will continue, and Hamas will remain in power, as long as negotiations over the second stage of the hostage release continue – negotiations that can drag on for years.

Biden then assured that the “United States will always ensure that Israel has what it needs to defend itself.”

Let there be no mistake, however. Biden did not say that he supports Israel’s right to destroy the genocidal terrorist organizations bent on its destruction.

He said that Israel will have the right to shoot down rockets fired at its cities, while its citizens hide in shelters. This is the Biden doctrine with regards to Israel: Defense, yes. Offense, no.

President Biden concluded his remarks with the sentence: “It’s time for this war to end and for the ‘day after’ to begin.” This sentence encapsulated the failed paradigms that led to October 7. The idea that if we just stop fighting, the ‘day after’ can begin, is entirely false.

If the fighting stops with Hamas in power, the ‘day after’ will never begin. We will simply return to October 6. Only this time, with zero deterrence, an emboldened ring of terror along all of Israel’s borders, and large swaths of Israel’s territory in the South and North abandoned due to the ongoing terror threats.

To be fair – the degree to which Biden is accurately describing an outline that Israel proposed, and to what degree he is putting his own spin on the deal, is unclear. If an Israeli leader believes that it is necessary and correct to let Hamas win in order to return some of the hostages, then that leader should stand up and say so clearly.

The dilemma is a heart-wrenching one.

The fact is that the deal, as described by President Biden, would create an existential threat to Israel’s very existence. It would lead to countless terror attacks, kidnappings, instability, and war. Israel’s decisions must be based on a clear-sighted recognition of reality, however harsh.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2024.

On May 15, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav said that if no alternative to Hamas rule is presented for Gaza, only two options would remain: Hamas rule or Israeli military rule. “Both alternatives are bad,” he said.

“I will not agree to Israeli military rule in in Gaza, Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza…I call on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make a decision and declare that Israel will not establish civilian control over the Gaza Strip and that Israel will not establish military governance in Gaza,” he said.

He further noted that “the end of the military campaign must come together with political action” and said that “the day after Hamas will only be achieved with Palestinian entities backed by Arab countries taking control of Gaza. This is in Israel’s interests in order to achieve our goals.”

He did not specify which Palestinian entities should control Gaza, or how to get such elements to control Gaza.

It is true that the military campaign must be accompanied by political action to stabilize Gaza and bring about a situation in which it no longer poses a security threat to Israel. For several reasons however, there is still a long way to go until we reach this goal.

First, the fighting is far from over. The IDF is currently operating throughout the Gaza Strip, including in places it has already occupied and partially mopped up. The scope of the terrorist infrastructure built by Hamas  above and below ground is unprecedented, and the quantity and dispersal of weapons enormous. Cleansing the Gaza Strip of this infrastructure will require time, and so Gaza will continue to be a combat zone for the near future.

Second, despite the extensive damage inflicted on it, Hamas has managed to partially rehabilitate itself in some places. The Israel Defense Forces has succeeded in dismantling most of Hamas’ military apparatus; its command-and-control systems and organized units (brigades, battalions, companies) are no longer functioning, or only partially functioning. At this time, several organized battalions remain in Rafah and the central camps.

Hamas, however, is rehabilitating local networks in order to conduct guerilla attacks on IDF forces and from time to time to launch high-trajectory fire at communities near the Gaza Strip and even locations farther away. In addition, since Hamas is deeply embedded amid the Gazan population, in many cases “civilians” not officially belonging to Hamas’s military organization also operate against the IDF. As a result, the IDF has had to return to many areas in the Gaza Strip to disrupt terrorist networks.

Third, Hamas has managed to retain civilian and governmental capabilities. It has done so by taking control of the humanitarian aid reaching Gaza, using it to deepen its control over the population; it sells this aid at exorbitant prices to the civilian population.

Hamas thus sends a message to the population that it intends to remain in control and that they would be well advised to cooperate with it. Hamas’s continued civilian control even in areas where the IDF has dealt it heavy blows allows it to rehabilitate its military capabilities as well. The preservation of Hamas’s civilian and governmental capabilities thus perpetuates the continuation of the fighting. The key to destroying Hamas’s military capabilities permanently thus lies in taking away its civil and governmental capabilities in the Gaza Strip.

A governmental alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip requires the destruction of Hamas’s military, as well as civil and governmental capabilities. Only after this will it be possible to achieve a governmental alternative to Hamas. The group will not disappear voluntarily; it can only be removed by force.

In the interim, there is no non-Hamas-affiliated entity willing to accept civilian control of the Gaza Strip. Only the IDF can do it. Therefore, as part of the military effort, the IDF needs to assume civilian control in areas in which it has military control. This will allow the emergence of elements in Gaza not under Hamas’s control. After this interim period, and only after the complete removal of Hamas from the civilian power centers in the Gaza Strip, permanent governmental alternatives can be examined.

Establishment of an alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip will have to lean on several principles. The first is that the only armed element operating in Gaza be the IDF. Civilian entities can operate only with the means to maintain public order and carry out basic policing activity. Israel must strictly enforce this principle to prevent a slow spillover of  “police” mechanisms toward  military capabilities, such as the commando forces (the Dayton Force established with American funding, training, and equipment) of the Palestinian Authority, established in violation of the Oslo agreements.

The second principle is the maintenance of IDF’s operational freedom of action throughout the Gaza Strip.

The third principle is Israeli control of all crossings into the Gaza Strip (including the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor).

After implementing these principles, civil alternatives in the Gaza Strip can be examined.

The first alternative is the emergence of local elements that will operate either in the entire Gaza Strip or parts of it. This alternative can exist under the guidance and mentoring of international and/or regional powers. Another alternative which has been raised is the return of the P.A. to Gaza. Without addressing the conditions that P.A. officials have set for such a return, it should be remembered that the P.A. is corrupt and supports terrorism.

In addition, senior P.A. officials have expressed support for Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre. Indeed, P.A. officials regard Hamas as a legitimate member of the Palestinian political body. The legitimacy of the P.A. among the Palestinian population is extremely low, and there is no reason to bring the problems that the P.A. has created in Judea and Samaria into Gaza. In effect, this is the replacement of an element hostile to Israel with another hostile element. Add to this the fact that all the U.S. demands that the P.A. carry out in-depth reforms have been met with lip service only.

A third option is transferring control to local Fatah elements in the Gaza Strip, or alternatively bringing Mohammed Dahlan back to take control of the Strip. This would be extremely dangerous for Israel. These elements would most likely operate under the control of Hamas, which would build a model similar to the Lebanese one, in which Hezbollah is “not involved” in the state system but controls it in practice. This would be dangerous for Israel as in such a scenario, if it attempted to take action against terror networks in Gaza it would be perceived as interfering with the development  of the alternative governmental structure.

Another alternative is the deployment of international forces (Arab, European, American) in Gaza. This alternative, too, is problematic, because it will be extremely difficult for the IDF to maintain operational freedom of action with such a force on the ground. It would further cause constant friction with the governments of the countries that have deployed troops to Gaza. An international actor can only play a role in mentoring and directing the alternative civil framework in Gaza, but cannot replace it.

The only relevant alternative from Israel’s perspective, it seems, is the emergence of local elements in Gaza. Defense Minister Gallant noted this option, but without addressing the conditions that would be required for such an alternative to be put in place. It is noteworthy here that there is a public administration in Gaza (municipalities, various ministries) that is not entirely affiliated with Hamas, and from whose ranks it will be possible to find elements that can operate in the Strip.

No matter which alternative is ultimately chosen, the prerequisite for all of them is the elimination of Hamas’s military and civil capabilities. Achieving this will require an interim stage of Israeli civilian control of Gaza during which Israel expands civil responsibility in the areas under its military control. The northern Gaza Strip is suitable for this purpose.

The implementation of the proposed framework in the northern Gaza Strip will serve as an operational pilot to deny Hamas governmental capabilities, while at the same time making a concentrated military effort to demilitarize the territory. This will be done through IDF civil control first in the northern Gaza Strip, and later, depending on the circumstances, in other areas.

Some 200,000 Gazans remain in northern Gaza, including hundreds of operatives of Hamas and other organizations who constitute a fighting force and are a threat to Israeli troops. The American pier has begun working in the area and will serve as an anchor for humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in general and the north in particular. The IDF maintains forces in the northern Gaza Strip to control the area and conduct mop-up operations. Therefore, it is possible to devise methods of action that will further destroy Hamas’s military capabilities coupled with establishing  civilian control in the area.

The IDF will assume responsibility for providing humanitarian aid to the civilian population while preventing Hamas from taking control of the aid. The actual distribution will be conducted by international aid organizations, assisted, if necessary, by the IDF. The IDF’s duty, as long as the area is a combat zone, is to provide only basic humanitarian assistance, subject to military necessity. Israeli civilian control of the area will also make it clear to the population that the era of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is over. Israel has the operational and organizational capability to exercise such civilian control and assume responsibility for managing the territory and its population.

Removing Hamas from civilian centers of power will help locate elements in the population that can contribute to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The implementation of this process will first require an understanding among decision makers in Israel, especially the defense minister and defense establishment officials, that there is no other way to find governmental alternatives without an intermediate stage in which Israel holds civil responsibility. This will also require coordination and cooperation with the United States and international organizations to channel relief efforts through the IDF’s temporary civil control.

Published in JNS, June 3, 2024.

The ramming attack near Nablus that claimed the lives of two IDF soldiers, as well as the shooting incidents and drone flights toward Israeli towns near the Seam Zone, momentarily drew public attention to the simmering Judea and Samaria arena. While defined as a secondary front in the multi-arena campaign Israel is waging, the threats emanating from it continue to be a source of concern for the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency.

So far, two factors have somewhat restrained the potential for terror from Judea and Samaria. The first is the shock and dismay that gripped the terrorist elements and the Palestinian public in this area following Oct. 7. The fear that Israel might unleash its wrath over the horrific massacre on anyone who provokes it has caused some terrorist elements to be more hesitant. Even the worsening economic situation due to the ongoing closure has not shattered this psychological barrier. The second factor, which came in parallel, is the intensive activity of the security establishment. This has been characterized to a much greater extent by proactive friction and aggression, leading to thousands of arrests, thwarting numerous attacks, and dismantling parts of the terrorist infrastructure.

However, the audacity displayed by terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria in recent times likely indicates the dissipation of the first factor’s influence and an adaptation to the IDF’s current modus operandi. Against this backdrop, terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria have begun adopting an approach of initiating attacks against communities, apparently inspired by Hamas’ Oct. 7 onslaught.

Even if their performance currently seems far from mimicking that attack, the very intention to emulate this pattern, with necessary adaptations in the Judea and Samaria arena, must be viewed with utmost seriousness.

The security establishment must take steps to make this course appear futile and hopeless in the eyes of the Palestinians. Consideration should be given to defining a special regime, including unique open-fire instructions for the Seam Zone, and to nip in the bud any attempt to act in this direction, even through the use of targeted prevention measures.

Enforcement must be exhausted, and administrative measures taken against anyone involved in these ideas – perpetrators, accomplices, suppliers of means (such as drones), transporters of wanted individuals, and their employers. In the face of this dangerous pattern, it is appropriate to consider using sweeping measures against areas from which attacks or preparations for them originate. This must be a top priority for IDF forces, the Shin Bet, Border Police, and the police in this sector.

The large accumulation of events unfolding simultaneously across seven geographical arenas (the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and above all, Iran), the international legal arena (the courts in The Hague), and the political arena could create the impression of “the Philistines are upon you, Samson.”

The protracted war, the direct and indirect costs paid thus far, the disputes over its continuation, the dead-end regarding the hostages, and the uncertainty of the evacuated northern residents regarding their future – all contribute to a sense of stagnation. The high cost of living, economic hardships, as well as the resurgence of political issues and internal divisions on the agenda, add to the general concern. It can be assumed that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are closely following developments in Israel, hoping that these trends will erode national resilience and lead to a change in its positions. The concept of a multi-arena war with Israel was also aimed at this. The basic perception in these circles is that the ultimate weapon against the West, including Israel, is steadfastness over time. As  Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah has said, Israel is weary of wars and lacks the resilience and fortitude to withstand a bloody struggle and sustain casualties.

And yet, Israel’s conduct during the eight months of war has slapped them in the face. Despite internal and external challenges, Israel persists in resolutely striving to achieve all its objectives.

At this juncture, given the challenges that still lie ahead, the political leadership should invest in strengthening national resilience alongside the ongoing efforts on the military and diplomatic fronts. It is appropriate to minimize public uncertainty as much as possible, bolster economic continuity, alleviate the economic burden, avoid or postpone addressing divisive issues, and strive for broad consensus.

The Israeli public, accustomed to living in the light of a grand vision, also needs this. At this point, the American proposal for a new regional order meets the authentic yearning for an organizing idea, but Israel cannot afford the accompanying price tag. For the time being, the organizing principle for Israel’s conduct is simpler but faithful to reality: We are acting to ensure our existence so that, when the time comes, we can fulfill the vision that will be agreed upon.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 2, 2024.

The reported deaths of several dozen civilians in an Israeli air strike on Hamas terror targets in Rafah this week was a profound tragedy.

One cannot be human without feeling both empathy and outrage — empathy that innocent people, especially children, died, and outrage that Hamas would cynically and deliberately put them in such a situation.

It is important to remember that we are only in this awful situation because of the heinous acts committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, as well as the organization’s ongoing holding of hostages in Gaza and continued use of civilians as human shields. This has been noted by world leaders including President Biden.

There are those who, without pause or consideration, have immediately sought to ascribe blame and intention upon Israel, alleging that the Israel Defense Forces either knowingly or recklessly targeted civilians. That could not be further from the truth.

For Israel, every civilian death is a tragedy. For Hamas, civilian death is their strategy.

Experts such as John Spencer, who heads up the urban warfare program at the West Point military academy, and Col. Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, note that Israeli forces have gone to lengths not seen in the history of modern warfare to avoid harm to civilians and abide by the laws of war.

It is an inevitable consequence of war that in the fog of battle, especially in a dense and challenging urban battlefield, errors will occur.  But under international law, not every error is necessarily a war crime. To say so only demeans real victims of war crimes.

In the case of the Rafah attack this week, Israel specifically targeted senior Hamas terrorists Yassin Rabia and Khaled Nagar, who are responsible for numerous attacks on Israelis. This was therefore a legitimate military operation. It did not, contrary to Hamas’s lies and media misinformation, target a refugee or tent camp, nor did they hit the Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Area, which was at least a mile away from the intended target.

According to preliminary indications, as well as U.S. officials, it appears that there was a secondary explosion from a Hamas ammunition warehouse near the compound, where Israel targeted the Hamas terrorists, that might have ignited the fire and resulted in the loss of civilian lives.

Immediately following the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted that, “despite [Israel’s] utmost effort not to harm non-combatants, something unfortunately went tragically wrong,” and that “we are investigating the incident.”

Israel has also announced that the incident is being investigated by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, an independent and professional body, including what caused the ignition of the fire beyond the target and the tragic result, despite the precautionary measures, including surveillance, precise munitions and additional intelligence to limit civilian casualties.

This is how a democracy operates — when mistakes are made, however unintended, they are admitted. People take responsibility and appropriate lessons are learnt.

The response by the international community to the incident in Rafah has also been telling, with immediate worldwide condemnations and the United Nations Security Council already scheduling an emergency session. One cannot help but wonder, where was this same international community when a video was released last week of five terrified young Israeli girls, bloodied, beaten and being abducted by Hamas, with horrific threats of being impregnated? Where was the international community when Hamas rained down a barrage of rockets from Rafah on central Israel, including Tel Aviv?

We would not be in this situation at all were it not for Hamas carrying out the October 7 massacre and continuing to hold in Gaza more than 100 hostages, including five U.S. nationals.

This of course does not absolve Israel of its obligation to abide by the rules of war and international humanitarian law — a duty it has fulfilled and in many documented respects exceeded. However, it is Hamas, an internationally designated terrorist group, that continues to willfully violate every imaginable international law, including embedding combatants in civilian areas.

It is therefore Hamas that bears ultimate responsibility for every innocent life lost, Palestinian and Israeli. The West’s failure to make this distinction only emboldens Hamas and perpetuates the violence.

Published in The Hill, May 29, 2024.

Back in 2013, the IDF chief-of-staff promulgated a multi-year plan for the Israeli military called “Teuzah” (prowess or fearlessness). That plan accepted a significant decrease in overall funding to the IDF and shifted priorities away from the ground forces in favor of air force and cyber capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, and stand-off precision fire. This came atop a cut of 25 percent in the ground forces budget between 2002 and 2006.

The IDF chief of staff at the time was Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz.

According to Amir Rapaport, publisher and editor of the military industry-leading Israel Defense magazine, Gantz accepted the relative weakness of the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces as a given. He did not think that the IDF would need to fight conventional army forces in the foreseeable future, nor have to conduct large-scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

Obviously, Gantz and his predecessors and successors (Mofaz, Halutz, Yaalon, Ashkenazi, Eisencott, and Kochavi) – all of whom were party to this grand conceptual error to one degree or another – were dead wrong. It is today quite clear that Israel will likely fight several wars in enemy-held territory over the coming decade.

Responding to Gantz’s mistaken plan in 2013, Dr. Eitan Shamir and Dr. Eado Hecht of the BESA Center warned that “Neglect of the IDF’s ground forces poses a risk to Israel’s security. There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies.” But back then nobody was listening.

Today it is clear that the IDF needs to knock-back the Iranian-proxy armies and jihadist militias camped on our borders. It needs to go house-by-house and tunnel-by-tunnel to ferret-out and eliminate terrorist cells in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It may need to “decommission” Iran’s nuclear enrichment and bomb-making facilities.

Consider the situation in Lebanon. To rout Hezbollah and destroy its missile stockpiles in the coming war Israel will have to reconquer southern Lebanon. Even with the Israel Air Force working intensively from above (including massive leveling of Lebanese infrastructures), Israel could be facing months weeks of real and unrelenting ground combat in the deep valleys and steep mountains of Lebanon where Hezbollah is well dug in. (The Iranian-built and -funded terror army sits on a tunnel and bunker array that reportedly makes the Hamas military infrastructure in Gaza seem like child’s play).

Given America’s stampeding retreat from overseas commitments, the creeping repeal of an American protective diplomatic umbrella for Israel by presidents Obama and Biden, and the newest restrictions on use of US weaponry – Israel may be fighting truly alone.

UNDERSTANDING THIS is particularly relevant as Israel prepares to replace its military and intelligence leadership.

Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva has just resigned for his role in the gargantuan failure of October 7, appropriately so. Soon, IDF Chief-of-Staff Herzi Halevi, OC Southern Command Chief Yaron Finkelman, Mossad Chief Dedi Barnea, General Security Service Chief Ronen Bar, and dozens of other senior defense establishment leaders are expected to resign or be sacked, appropriately so.

The question is not only who will replace them but what sort of operational prisms their replacements will bring to the task. And what conceptual prisms will Israel’s politicians lay out for them. (A new set of politicians is necessary too!) And what budgets Israel’s prime minister and defense and finance ministers will allocate for the defense establishment.

Here is a brief list of necessary fixes:

* Manpower: Over the past 40 years, the IDF has shrunk from 15 to 10 divisions. It now needs to grow by at least three divisions. That is 50,000 soldiers more, and tons and tons of military equipment.

* Training: A gargantuan increase in the training of front-line troops is necessary. It is a well-known secret that many of the infantry and armored forces that went into Gaza over the past half-year were insufficiently trained for combat in built-up areas.

It is actually a miracle how well the IDF has fought in Gaza, with mid-level military commanders in the field (the lieutenant colonels, battalion commanders; and the colonels, brigade commanders) learning on the go and quickly bringing their troops up to speed. They are among the true heroes of the current war.

Alas, training is expensive, especially for combined arms high intensity conflict – which involves multiple branches of the military working together. Training of the reserve forces is even more expensive. And unfortunately, budget lines for training are usually the first thing to be cut when the overall military budget is slashed – as it has been in recent decades.

* Platforms: The army needs to reverse the demobilization of armored formations and buy and deploy many more “Namer” armored personnel carriers equipped with the “Iron Fist” active defense system; “Merkava” main battle tanks with the “Trophy” system; and self-propelled artillery guns with the “Thundermaker” system. This will cost hundreds of millions of shekels.

* Ammunition: The IDF used up much of its ammunition reserves over the past six months, especially its stocks of shells for the ground forces and precision-guided missiles for the air force.

While the US has rushed tons of weaponry to Israel, Washington also has held up resupply of some of these munitions at certain times, and there is anyway a global shortage of some firepower like 155mm artillery shells (with the war in Ukraine soaking-up much of the available weaponry). As mentioned above, Israel also now faces increasing restrictions on its use of US-supplied weaponry.

The takeaway is that Israel needs to self-manufacture and the IDF needs to stockpile much larger reserves of weaponry for the lengthy wars of the future with Hezbollah and Hamas. Again, this requires more money with guaranteed funding over a multi-year plan.

Reportedly, Prime Minister Netanyahu has ordered a massive build-up, eight times over the current manufacturing capacity of the Israeli defense industries. Let’s see whether this order is implemented and budgeted appropriately by the next Israeli governments.

* Navy: Elements of radical Islam are gaining control across the eastern Mediterranean basin, from Libya to Syria and Turkey. Israel and Greece are the only Western-oriented countries in the region.

Former Israeli Naval Chief, Admiral (res.) Eliezer “Chiney” Marom, argues that Israel needs a much more powerful navy, with a long reach, to counter the strategic realignments underway, and to protect from terrorist attack the substantial natural gas fields we have discovered at sea.

The Israel Navy wants more than $5 billion in new ships, submarines, weapons systems. and personnel over the next decade for this.

* West Bank: Given that security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority essentially has collapsed, and Mahmoud Abbas’ forces are no match for Hamas and other terrorist mini-armies that have entrenched themselves across Judea and Samaria – Israel needs to pour more troops into policing the territory. This is a big drain on the military system, but without it nobody in greater Tel Aviv or Jerusalem will be safe.

The fact is that Palestinian terrorism is off the charts with organized battalions of terrorist commandoes operating openly in dozens of cities and refugee camps. Take, for example, Nur Shams, a tinpot refugee camp adjacent to Tulkarem in central Israel just over the security barrier. The IDF operated there for four days last week and was unexpectedly met by insane quantities of Palestinian firepower.

(So much for dreams of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority that would not only truly combat terrorism in the West Bank but also assume responsibility for administering, demilitarizing, and deradicalizing Gaza. Hah!)

* Jordan Valley: Many voices in the defense establishment are calling for the building of a well-fortified security fence along Israel’s long border with Jordan, as has been done along the Sinai, Lebanese, and Golan borders; alongside the permanent stationing of more troops along this strategic seam line.

Iran is actively seeking to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and take advantage of the porous border between Israel and Jordan to ship weaponry into the West Bank. The fluidity of the political and security situation to our east requires a military buildup in the Jordan Valley, and this needs to be budgeted for expeditiously.

* Iran: If worse comes to worse (and every day indeed it seems that worse news comes from Iran about its nuclear advances and from Washington about its strategic capitulation to Iran), the IDF and IAF may have to act against Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities. Then Israel will have to deal with the fallout from Iran’s retaliation – and the country had better be ready both militarily and on the home front.

This month’s unprecedented Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel proves that Israel needs quite a few more Arrow 2 and 3 anti-missile defense arrays. A small fortune.

Israel’s independence depends on robust defense readiness. And on new military-intelligence leaders with clear-eyed understanding of the situation.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 26, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.