Back in 2013, the IDF chief-of-staff promulgated a multi-year plan for the Israeli military called “Teuzah” (prowess or fearlessness). That plan accepted a significant decrease in overall funding to the IDF and shifted priorities away from the ground forces in favor of air force and cyber capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, and stand-off precision fire. This came atop a cut of 25 percent in the ground forces budget between 2002 and 2006.

The IDF chief of staff at the time was Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz.

According to Amir Rapaport, publisher and editor of the military industry-leading Israel Defense magazine, Gantz accepted the relative weakness of the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces as a given. He did not think that the IDF would need to fight conventional army forces in the foreseeable future, nor have to conduct large-scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

Obviously, Gantz and his predecessors and successors (Mofaz, Halutz, Yaalon, Ashkenazi, Eisencott, and Kochavi) – all of whom were party to this grand conceptual error to one degree or another – were dead wrong. It is today quite clear that Israel will likely fight several wars in enemy-held territory over the coming decade.

Responding to Gantz’s mistaken plan in 2013, Dr. Eitan Shamir and Dr. Eado Hecht of the BESA Center warned that “Neglect of the IDF’s ground forces poses a risk to Israel’s security. There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies.” But back then nobody was listening.

Today it is clear that the IDF needs to knock-back the Iranian-proxy armies and jihadist militias camped on our borders. It needs to go house-by-house and tunnel-by-tunnel to ferret-out and eliminate terrorist cells in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It may need to “decommission” Iran’s nuclear enrichment and bomb-making facilities.

Consider the situation in Lebanon. To rout Hezbollah and destroy its missile stockpiles in the coming war Israel will have to reconquer southern Lebanon. Even with the Israel Air Force working intensively from above (including massive leveling of Lebanese infrastructures), Israel could be facing months weeks of real and unrelenting ground combat in the deep valleys and steep mountains of Lebanon where Hezbollah is well dug in. (The Iranian-built and -funded terror army sits on a tunnel and bunker array that reportedly makes the Hamas military infrastructure in Gaza seem like child’s play).

Given America’s stampeding retreat from overseas commitments, the creeping repeal of an American protective diplomatic umbrella for Israel by presidents Obama and Biden, and the newest restrictions on use of US weaponry – Israel may be fighting truly alone.

UNDERSTANDING THIS is particularly relevant as Israel prepares to replace its military and intelligence leadership.

Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva has just resigned for his role in the gargantuan failure of October 7, appropriately so. Soon, IDF Chief-of-Staff Herzi Halevi, OC Southern Command Chief Yaron Finkelman, Mossad Chief Dedi Barnea, General Security Service Chief Ronen Bar, and dozens of other senior defense establishment leaders are expected to resign or be sacked, appropriately so.

The question is not only who will replace them but what sort of operational prisms their replacements will bring to the task. And what conceptual prisms will Israel’s politicians lay out for them. (A new set of politicians is necessary too!) And what budgets Israel’s prime minister and defense and finance ministers will allocate for the defense establishment.

Here is a brief list of necessary fixes:

* Manpower: Over the past 40 years, the IDF has shrunk from 15 to 10 divisions. It now needs to grow by at least three divisions. That is 50,000 soldiers more, and tons and tons of military equipment.     

  * Training: A gargantuan increase in the training of front-line troops is necessary. It is a well-known secret that many of the infantry and armored forces that went into Gaza over the past half-year were insufficiently trained for combat in built-up areas.

It is actually a miracle how well the IDF has fought in Gaza, with mid-level military commanders in the field (the lieutenant colonels, battalion commanders; and the colonels, brigade commanders) learning on the go and quickly bringing their troops up to speed. They are among the true heroes of the current war.

Alas, training is expensive, especially for combined arms high intensity conflict – which involves multiple branches of the military working together. Training of the reserve forces is even more expensive. And unfortunately, budget lines for training are usually the first thing to be cut when the overall military budget is slashed – as it has been in recent decades.

* Platforms: The army needs to reverse the demobilization of armored formations and buy and deploy many more “Namer” armored personnel carriers equipped with the “Iron Fist” active defense system; “Merkava” main battle tanks with the “Trophy” system; and self-propelled artillery guns with the “Thundermaker” system. This will cost hundreds of millions of shekels.

* Ammunition: The IDF used up much of its ammunition reserves over the past six months, especially its stocks of shells for the ground forces and precision-guided missiles for the air force.

While the US has rushed tons of weaponry to Israel, Washington also has held up resupply of some of these munitions at certain times, and there is anyway a global shortage of some firepower like 155mm artillery shells (with the war in Ukraine soaking-up much of the available weaponry). As mentioned above, Israel also now faces increasing restrictions on its use of US-supplied weaponry.

The takeaway is that Israel needs to self-manufacture and the IDF needs to stockpile much larger reserves of weaponry for the lengthy wars of the future with Hezbollah and Hamas. Again, this requires more money with guaranteed funding over a multi-year plan.

Reportedly, Prime Minister Netanyahu has ordered a massive build-up, eight times over the current manufacturing capacity of the Israeli defense industries. Let’s see whether this order is implemented and budgeted appropriately by the next Israeli governments.

* Navy: Elements of radical Islam are gaining control across the eastern Mediterranean basin, from Libya to Syria and Turkey. Israel and Greece are the only Western-oriented countries in the region.

Former Israeli Naval Chief, Admiral (res.) Eliezer “Chiney” Marom, argues that Israel needs a much more powerful navy, with a long reach, to counter the strategic realignments underway, and to protect from terrorist attack the substantial natural gas fields we have discovered at sea.

The Israel Navy wants more than $5 billion in new ships, submarines, weapons systems. and personnel over the next decade for this.

* West Bank: Given that security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority essentially has collapsed, and Mahmoud Abbas’ forces are no match for Hamas and other terrorist mini-armies that have entrenched themselves across Judea and Samaria – Israel needs to pour more troops into policing the territory. This is a big drain on the military system, but without it nobody in greater Tel Aviv or Jerusalem will be safe.

The fact is that Palestinian terrorism is off the charts with organized battalions of terrorist commandoes operating openly in dozens of cities and refugee camps. Take, for example, Nur Shams, a tinpot refugee camp adjacent to Tulkarem in central Israel just over the security barrier. The IDF operated there for four days last week and was unexpectedly met by insane quantities of Palestinian firepower.

(So much for dreams of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority that would not only truly combat terrorism in the West Bank but also assume responsibility for administering, demilitarizing, and deradicalizing Gaza. Hah!)

* Jordan Valley: Many voices in the defense establishment are calling for the building of a well-fortified security fence along Israel’s long border with Jordan, as has been done along the Sinai, Lebanese, and Golan borders; alongside the permanent stationing of more troops along this strategic seam line.

Iran is actively seeking to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and take advantage of the porous border between Israel and Jordan to ship weaponry into the West Bank. The fluidity of the political and security situation to our east requires a military buildup in the Jordan Valley, and this needs to be budgeted for expeditiously.

* Iran: If worse comes to worse (and every day indeed it seems that worse news comes from Iran about its nuclear advances and from Washington about its strategic capitulation to Iran), the IDF and IAF may have to act against Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities. Then Israel will have to deal with the fallout from Iran’s retaliation – and the country had better be ready both militarily and on the home front.

This month’s unprecedented Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel proves that Israel needs quite a few more Arrow 2 and 3 anti-missile defense arrays. A small fortune.

Israel’s independence depends on robust defense readiness. And on new military-intelligence leaders with clear-eyed understanding of the situation.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 26, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.

As signs of an imminent IDF operation in Rafah intensify, there is growing concern that Israel will unnecessarily exercise self-imposed restraint by acting with insufficient force, so as not to upset the Biden administration, the Egyptians, or the ICC prosecutor at The Hague.

Meanwhile, Hamas is presumably exploiting the prolonged waiting period and preparing well for the ground operation in this sector, which will undoubtedly pose complex operational challenges for the IDF. Despite the political pressures, Israel’s decision-makers must make it a top priority to attain the objectives with minimal risk to the security of our forces.

The deadlock in negotiations for the release of Israeli captives held by Hamas, coupled with American accusations against the group, has paved the way for Israel to launch the Rafah offensive. The recent de-escalation with Iran allows Israel to shift its focus, without forfeiting political gains made, while continuing the fight against Hezbollah and dismantling terrorist networks in the West Bank.

In this operation, the security establishment will be required to achieve five objectives: Dismantling Hamas’ regional brigade, with its four battalions: eliminating or arresting its commanders and most of its personnel, seizing or destroying its command centers, strategic assets, weapons, and production facilities – both above or below ground. Eliminating or arresting senior members of Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad who fled from other areas to Rafah and found refuge there.
Ending Hamas’ civilian control in this area: striking Hamas’ governing mechanisms, including police and internal security forces, prisons, and courts, as well as “civilian” committees for managing emergency affairs.

Taking control of smuggling routes and shaping a new security reality along the border strip, preventing smuggling from Sinai to the Gaza Strip.
Advancing the release of the captives– either by seizing opportunities during the fighting or through negotiations following increased pressure on Hamas.
The IDF and Hamas: Starting Conditions

The IDF’s starting position for this operation is better than those at the beginning of the campaign in the northern Gaza Strip or the Khan Younis area. The enemy will now be entering combat with a command echelon that has been depleted, with many fighters dead, injured, or arrested. Second, its stockpile of weapons and ammunition has dwindled. Third, the ability to strike the Israeli home front with rocket fire is rather limited. And fourth, the IDF will have already replenished its forces, updated its intelligence, and improved its fighters’ operational combatworthiness through lessons learned from previous stages of the fighting.

However, from the enemy’s perspective, the overall picture also has some bright spots. Their force deployment in the combat zone has not only remained intact but has also been reinforced with operatives from other areas. Their logistical preparedness has improved thanks to humanitarian aid entering the Strip, and they are equipped with fuel and food that allow prolonged survival in tunnels.

Additionally, they draw encouragement from the pressures exerted on Israel to minimize casualties and benefit from the involvement of Iran and its proxies, as well as the political support of Turkey and other countries. Above all, they are emboldened by their demonstrated ability to survive the IDF onslaught so far and the fact that even after 200 days of fighting, Hamas continues to be the central power in the Gaza Strip.

Alongside its offensive capabilities, the IDF will also need to strengthen its defense against various forms of attacks on its forces or on the home front that exploit proximity to borders or the use of tunnels. The same applies to the possibility that Hamas may carry out provocations in the border fence area and towards Sinai, aiming to create tensions between Israel and Egypt. Hints of this could be found in a statement issued this week by the “Palestinian factions.” The IDF’s well-oiled war machine has proved itself, and there is no doubt as to its ability to successfully handle this challenge as well. On the political level, maximum support and freedom of action are required to allow the IDF to employ intense firepower that will reduce the risk to our soldiers and bring about the swiftest possible defeat of the enemy.

Meanwhile, the IDF will need to continuously examine how the combat situation can be leveraged to advance the release of the captured individuals.
The Rafah operation will not complete the task of decisively defeating Hamas. Even after it is over, much more work, and a deeper impact, will be needed inside the territory before Hamas’ remaining capabilities are destroyed and a new reality emerges. This was also the case following Operation Defensive Shield, which began exactly 22 years ago. It will not be quick and easy, but it is necessary and possible.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.

Reading the Israeli and global media, one would think that this week Israel achieved its greatest victory since the Six Day War, successfully stymieing a massive Iranian missile attack. With dozens of videos and hagiographic pilot profiles, the IDF is busy pumping out its technological prowess. In religious circles, there are a thousand memes and essays circulating asserting a divine miracle, no less.

This is poppycock. At best, Israel can record a defensive tactical achievement, perhaps indeed blessed, but not a strategic win. On a strategic level, Israel suffered a whopping loss as Iran pierced, with apparent impunity, American and Israeli deterrence frameworks.

The US president in Washington barked “don’t,” and Jerusalem didn’t believe that Iran would dare to attack Israel directly, but Iran nevertheless dared to do so. The ayatollahs brazenly launched a colossal Russian-style strike package intended to cause considerable damage – the largest one-night drone and missile barrage ever launched in history by one nation against another.

The fact that the attack failed – with 50% of the missiles failing to launch or crashing before reaching their target and 49% more impressively being intercepted by Israel and its allies – is irrelevant from a strategic perspective.

The screeching strategic reality is that Iran has catapulted its 40-year-long war against Israel – a war that has been underway via proxies ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 – to a new, stratospheric plateau (literally so, with ballistic missiles flying from Iranian soil through space to hit Israel).

When one realizes what a dramatic watershed moment this is, the fact that the strike did amazingly little damage fades into the background. It is not a pertinent consideration in determining how and with what ferocity Israel should respond.

That is why President Biden’s reported advice to Israel – to “take the win,” as it were, to suck up its indignation, to rely on Western sanctions against Iran alone as “smart retaliation,” and in general to “avoid escalation” – is outrageous and dangerous nonsense.

And compounding his failure to deter Iran from directly attacking Israel, Biden has now added to the potential further collapse of any deterrence against Iran by declaring that he seeks no confrontation with Iran and will not participate in any Israeli retaliatory strike at Iran. This is strategic insanity of grandiose proportions!

When America fears escalation more than Iran does, the path towards grand Western defeat is clear. If Israel fears escalation more than Iran does, Tehran will march all the way to Jerusalem with even greater and grander attacks.

One can be certain that Tehran can and will build more successful strike packages in the future designed to overwhelm Israel’s defenses. It will try again and again, just as Hamas has launched repeated rocket wars against Israel over the past 20 years, each time with a larger number of longer-range and more accurate rockets.

Imagine if only one of the eight ballistic missiles (out of 120) that managed to penetrate Israeli defenses last Saturday night had fallen not in and around a well-protected airbase in the barren Negev but on a high-rise building in Tel Aviv? What if that one ballistic missile had hit the nuclear reactor in Dimona, which is near that airbase? What if that one ballistic missile had been nuclear tipped? What if Israel had no advance notice of another such Iranian attack (which it did have this time) in order to mount a robust air-defense plan?

Remember that every single warplane in the Israeli arsenal was in the air for eight straight hours this past Saturday night, along with warplanes and flying intelligence platforms from four Western air forces and reportedly several allied Arab air forces, plus all reserve components of Israel’s air defense array (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2 and 3, and the like). This is certainly not something that will necessarily be in place every time Iran decides to take a direct, unannounced poke at Israel in the future.

DETERRENCE is a tricky task, a defense and diplomatic act that is hard to achieve. It is a construct that requires constant maintenance or else it dissipates. Psychologically, deterrence is measured by “subsequent behavior,” meaning that the Iranian attack will be considered successful if it dissuades Israel from future attacks against Iranian leaders and assets.

Conversely, the Iranian attack will be considered unsuccessful – not because the damage it intended was prevented – if Israel continues to target Iranian leaders and assets inside Iran and around the region. Such offensives are necessary to prevent Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions and nuclear military effort.

The worst possible thing for Israel’s deterrent posture is for a perception of Israel “being stuck” to take root in Tehran and/or around the world. The unhealthiest situation involves Israel being “stuck,” not moving forward, in crushing Hamas in Gaza (Rafah), in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, in suppressing terror cells in Judea and Samaria, in targeting IRGC emplacements in Syria, and in sabotaging nuclear facilities in Iran.

Being stuck in a situation in which Israel is diplomatically or militarily hampered in every direction by well-meaning but weak allies or by supremely confident Shiite mullahs and their Russian ally is an unacceptable and perilous position for Israel. Instead, Israel needs to become “unstuck” to free itself from stale strategic paradigms and insufferable diplomatic handcuffs that dominated before October 7 and April 14 – two dates that constitute watershed moments for Israel.

IN GENERAL, I sense that Israel’s strategic goals have become too limited in recent decades, hamstrung by the failed Oslo peace process with Palestinians and the failed Obama peace process with Iranians. These gambits emphasized quiet, co-option, deflation, and survival at the expense of principle, dominance, and victory. They brought about cowering postures instead of the appropriately necessary offensive postures.

As a result, at this very moment, Israel is being pressed by its fainthearted friends to abandon its goal of liquidating Hamas, to instead prioritize humanitarian provisions for the enemy population, to downgrade its rage over the invasion, murder, abuse, and humiliation of its citizens, including kidnapped Israelis held hostage for more than six months, and to acquiesce in the release of Palestinian terrorists and butchers (including the “Nukhba” marauders of Hamas.

Israel is also being pressed to absorb Hezbollah’s continued blows, including the depopulation of northern Israel, to settle for another worthless, airy-fairy diplomatic “settlement” that will only perpetuate the Iranian threat from southern Lebanon, and to refrain from “escalatory retaliation” for the April 14 earthquake-level Iranian assault on Israel.

Were they to be adopted, these policies, taken together, would amount to a grand strategic defeat for Israel. They would constitute a straitjacket that puts Israeli survival – yes, Israel’s very survival! – at risk, which brings into question Israel’s power to persevere as an independent nation in the Middle East. Were they to be adopted by Israel, these policies, taken together, would inevitably crash Israel as a resilient, buoyant society and a prosperous, leading economy that contributes so much to the world.

The Biden administration’s current campaign to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further military conquest in Gaza and to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further confrontation with Iran, accompanied by persistent threats to deny Israel diplomatic backing and weapons if Jerusalem does not heed Washington’s warnings, are formulas for grand defeat. As such, they must be resisted.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 20, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 21, 2024.

As a former member of the Knesset, a Jewish citizen of Israel, and a mother who was moved to see you in Israel following the events of October 7 and to hear you declare that one does not have to be Jewish to be a Zionist, I would like to share with you, Mr. President, my belief that you carry within you a deep emotional and spiritual commitment to the Jewish people and the State of Israel.

I feel that you, personally, understand the righteousness of my people’s path, despite the fact that it is, of course, not devoid of errors.

Nonetheless, Mr. President, I would like to share with you my deep concern in light of your call on Israel not to respond to the recent unprecedented Iranian attack on our soil. That is, in your words, to prevent the situation from escalating into a regional war. Mr. President, we are already in a regional war!

For whatever reason, the West chooses to continue to turn a blind eye to the terror cultivated by the Ayatollah regime. I cannot imagine that this regime’s ideology and ambitions remain hidden from you, a leader who has the best intelligence capabilities at his disposal.

This is a regime that began its relentless, systematic, and meticulously planned assault on Western values in 1979, immediately following the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

It is a regime that teaches tens of thousands of Shi’ite girls in Syria and Iraq to engage in temporary “marriages of convenience,” which are annulled shortly after consummation.

After annulment, the “fruits” of these temporary marriages are then taken to be cultivated as future soldiers in the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria. The long arms of this terror take the form of the Houthis in Yemen; Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and Lebanon; as well as Hezbollah.

Iran sponsors terror in Sudan and many other countries on the African continent and quietly nurtures “terror cells” in the West, including in Europe, Canada, Australia, and, of course, the US. All this, Mr. President, is well beyond a regional war.

In the wake of the current Iranian regime’s show of terror in the form of over 300 missiles aimed and fired at Israeli cities, it is hard to imagine that its declaration of intent regarding the destruction of the State of Israel is empty of content and that it will not do everything in its power to realize its threats. That is, particularly if Iran continues to see, hear, and feel the hesitation of Western countries to stop it.

Your clear stand on Israel’s side – intercepting and stopping this unprecedented attack – did not go unnoticed by me or by my fellow citizens. It moved me and re-instilled in me the hope that good will yet prevail.

You were also able to produce an impressive and unprecedented international and regional coalition that even included Arab countries whose interests align with the national security of the State of Israel.

But at the same time, you hastened to publicly warn Israel not to respond to Iran’s horrifying act of aggression.

The reason behind this aggression is undoubtedly our enemies’ perception that Israel’s deterrence is not what it once was – a perception that is strengthened by statements that clearly indicate that Israel’s hands are asked to be tied by none other than our greatest friends in the international arena.

Can you imagine, Mr. President, that if the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, or any other country in the West were attacked in this way, it could be expected not to respond? When the United States was attacked in 2001 by despicable terrorists, was it at all conceivable that it would not retaliate?

Indeed, the dangers inherent in each step must be weighed with the utmost care. The potential consequences of each step are fateful. Yet, not responding, in and within itself, is a choice that has far-reaching consequences.

This strife that we are currently facing on several fronts is one that we did not initiate nor wish for. Mr. President, you have witnessed the pain of my people, the trauma of the families of those among us who are still held captive in Gaza, and the constant threat to our civilians from the east, the south, and the north. All of this can be traced back to none other than the same murderous, hateful regime.

Destiny has placed you, at this particular time, in a position of power and at the helm. You currently hold the reins on the stability of our region and the protection of Western values.

As such, Mr. President, I believe that you simply no longer have the privilege to unsee the clear situation and that you must act in good conscience.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 19, 2024

As Passover 2024 approaches, Israel confronts a daunting array of security and political challenges that will shape its standing and threat landscape for years to come. Overcoming these trials will be an immense test due to several compounding factors – the sheer number of threats, their geographic spread, the intricate connections between them, the grave consequences of missteps, and the lack of consensus on prioritization amidst urgent timelines.

Adding complexity, for the first time Israel must navigate this perilous environment while grappling with the plight of 133 captives held in Gaza and thousands displaced from the north. Withstanding this pivotal moment requires societal resilience mirroring the national unity after the October 7 attacks, coupled with robust military capabilities and deft statecraft.

The sweeping objectives Israel must secure across multiple fronts underscore the magnitude of the challenge:

Iran

Iran’s nuclear ambitions, long the paramount security imperative, take on heightened urgency after its brazen strike against Israel. Neutralizing Iran’s missiles, proliferation networks, and proxy forces is equally vital. With the nightmarish scenario of an atomic Iran inching toward reality, Israel aims to capitalize on this window to spur decisive American leadership against the Iranian regime’s nefarious pursuits, while preparing contingencies should that falter.

Syria

Syria: Israel must continue its operations to thwart Iran’s entrenchment in this arena, and not allow any change to the rules of the game that it has dictated until now.

Lebanon and Hezbollah

It is proper to set a target date for the return of residents of the northern communities to their homes, while physically distancing Hezbollah’s Radwan forces outside of the threat range, and until then – to continue the active defense strategy, strike at commanders and capabilities, and maintain freedom of operation in this arena.

The Gaza Strip

Israel needs to achieve the three ultimate objectives it defined for the war, which have not yet been accomplished: the release of the captives, the toppling of Hamas’ governance, and the dismantling of its military capabilities. A significant increase in pressure will serve all three. Beyond action in Rafah, which should also include the border crossing area and the Philadelphi Route, Israel must crush the committees and mechanisms that Hamas utilizes within the territory, and systematically eliminate Hamas’ leaders abroad.

Regarding the “day after” issue – as long as Hamas remains the central power in the Strip, any attempt to establish an alternative in its place, without its consent, is bound to fail. This reality will only change if Hamas is defeated, which is what should be focused on at this stage.

The West Bank and Palestinian Authority

Israel’s first objective is to prevent attacks and demolish terrorist networks, of any kind and from any element. It is proper to maintain the offensive approach displayed by the security establishment in this arena since October 7 and improve readiness for scenarios that could develop inspired by Hamas’ attacks. In a long-term view, the lessons of the reality that developed in Gaza should inform us as we counter any pressure or temptation to upgrade the Palestinian Authority’s status or limit Israel’s freedom of operation in this arena.

Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom understood the potential Iranian threat against it even before the attack from Tehran. The possible threat from the “Axis of Resistance” on the border between Israel and Jordan requires both sides to adopt an appropriate response while capitalizing on the advantages of security coordination.

The regional arena 

The success of the coalition of states in halting the Iranian attack presents an opportunity to consolidate and expand the partnership. The fact that the peace agreements continue to stand firm despite the war fosters optimism regarding the ability to broaden and deepen cooperation.

Saudi Arabia

Establishing relations with the kingdom will continue to be an important goal for Israel, but it is doubtful whether this can be achieved in the time remaining until the US elections. It is proper to continue down this path but not at the expense of pursuing the defeat of Hamas.

Sudan

Its rapprochement with Iran should worry Israel – especially given its past when it served as a transit point for arms smuggling to the Gaza Strip at the behest of Iran. Israel and the US can also curb this trend now.

Above all else, topping the list of Israel’s foreign policy objectives is cementing and strengthening relations with the US. President Joe Biden has again proved his commitment to Israel’s security, despite the disagreements and tensions. Beyond the appreciation he deserves for this, it is proper to confine the disputes to substantive issues and lower their public profile.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 20, 2024.

According to unassailable and well-reported Israeli and American intelligence estimates, the monarchy of Qatar has provided at least $2 billion to its Moslem Brotherhood affiliate Hamas in recent years. The vast majority of this funding has been invested in building terror attack tunnels and manufacturing rockets and missiles for war against Israel.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post of Friday, April 5. Instead, 7,000 words of reporting from the capital of Qatar by the newspaper’s editor-in-chief (see here and here) would have you believe that “the humanitarian aid” and financial support Qatar has provided to the Gazans is “commonly misinterpreted.”

Qatar’s billions for Gaza, according to the Post, “often labeled as aid to Hamas,” has in fact “been actions taken at the request of the Israeli and US governments, targeted specifically at the poorest families in Gaza” and “meticulously coordinated” with the IDF Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories to reach them. All this is designed, so Qatar says, to “foster dialogue rather than support Hamas ideologies and actions.”

The Post even offers its readers a lengthy primer in Qatari mathematical chicanery, to wit $10 million a month flows from Doha to poor families in Gaza, $20 million a month is dedicating to purchasing fuel for Gaza, and $35 is transferred monthly to pay the salaries of supposedly more acceptable Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in Gaza (none of whom actually work in government in Gaza). The Post does not bother to do the elementary math which would expose the millions more lavished on Hamas’ military.

In the massive array of Hamas subterranean terror attack tunnels in Gaza that the IDF has entered over the past six months, Israel has found thousands of pieces of weaponry, technological hardware, and documentary evidence of Iran’s material supply networks and military training regimes for Hamas, and Qatar’s multi-layered funding channels for Hamas.

This includes full access to Doha’s banking and investment sectors for globally sanctioned Hamas operatives and money men, as well as luxurious refuge for Hamas leaders.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Instead, according to the JPost articles Qatar is a benevolent and honorable country “striving for a larger purpose on the world stage.”

Qatar actively backs terrorist groups across the Middle East and around the world including the Taliban, Hezbollah, Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda) in Syria, the Houthi in Yemen, Al-Shabab in Somalia, ISIS and Iran’s man Shiite proxies in Iraq, and terrorist groups in Libya and Algeria. It also funds radical Moslem Brotherhood groups in Europe and America.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Instead, we are told that the al-Thani kleptocracy merely “aims at fostering stability in a tumultuous region,” almost heroically “facilitates sustainable solutions from Afghanistan to Yemen and Lebanon,” and plays a helpful, “intricate” role in global security.

The Qatar-based and fully funded Al Jazeera television network is an evil empire. It glorifies Hamas, including its “heroic” massacres of October 7 and ongoing “resistance” against Israel, and all forms of Iranian proxy terrorism against Israel. It aids Hamas by reporting on IDF troop movements in Gaza and on IDF forces concentrated along the Gaza border. It actively drums-up terrorism against Israelis in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv too, with special efforts during Ramadan. Al Jazeera also is a reliable platform for naked antisemitism and explicit Holocaust denial.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. All you would know is that Qatar is blandly “influential through its Al Jazeera Media network.” (A sidebar article by another Post reporter gently allows that Al Jazeera reports lies about Israel and Jews.)

Instead, the Post offers-up an unnamed senior American diplomatic source to tell us that Qatar “is one of the good guys,” that Qatar is “crucial,” no less, for Israel’s security and existence, and that Israel “won’t be able to survive” without cooperating with Qatar.

Wow. Good that the Post reports this, because I really did not know that Israel’s very existence depends on the good graces of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

In the horrible, ongoing saga of trying to obtain release of the more than one hundred Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, Qatar has acted a go-between mediator. Since it funds Hamas and hosts Hamas “political” leadership in Doha, it purportedly has channels of communication to Hamas and influence over Hamas.

But had Qatar really wanted to pressure Hamas into a hostage release deal, it might have, for example, threatened to expel Hamas leaders from Doha or cut-off their funding. There is no indication that Sheikh Al Thani has even contemplated this.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Instead, we were fed Qatari propaganda about a deal for the hostages that supposedly was obtainable in the first or second week of the war but was ignored by Israel.

The “viable deal” that was “missed” by Israel would have freed all (at least civilian) hostages while leaving Yihye Sinwar and his henchmen in charge of Gaza without any Israeli military action, alongside the release of thousands of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli jails. It was all in hand, thanks to the wise and so-well-meaning Qataris; just dumb Israel rejected the magnanimous deal.

The Jerusalem Post ran this Qatari fiction in its lead headline. (Again, in a sidebar article, some skepticism of this ridiculous report was allowed to creep into the newspaper, but the masthead told the Qatari tale.)

Qatar has invested many tens of billions of dollars in Western cultural, sporting, and academic institutions, and bought-up vast tracts of American and European real estate, all in a quite successful attempt to immunize itself from criticism and to very successfully distort teachings and research about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Awash in Qatari cash, US university campuses in particular have become incubators for Moslem Brotherhood interests and radical Islamic indoctrination. The wild anti-Israel riots of recent months on these campuses are a direct result of long-term Qatari influence. The rise of antisemitic and genocidal-against-Israel rhetoric in American academia has gone hand-in-hand with Qatari funding.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Not at all. None of this rated even a whisper of a mention in the profile published about Qatar. Nor were Qatar’s super-tight ties with Iran and its proven money-laundering for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Qods Force commandoes.

All this has been documented by the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI), the Counter Extremism Project, the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, the Misgav Institute for National Security, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and other solid sources. But there was no room over 7,000 words and three full pages of Post reporting to refer to this.

The bottom line: Qatar is a fundamentally dangerous and disingenuous actor which falsely presents itself as an honest broker, a moderating influence, and a friend of the West, even of Israel. Israeli newspapers ought not fall hook, line, and sinker for this sinister fairytale.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 12.04.2024 and Israel Hayom 15.04.2024

The security tensions following the assassination in Damascus of Gen. Mohamed Reza Zahedi have again turned the spotlight toward Tehran. This comes after a period in which Iran enjoyed the benefit of having the world preoccupied with its proxies and various hotspots that are not directly related to it. 

Until Zehdi’s death, Israel has allegedly struck a series of Iranian officers and “advisors” in attacks it has carried out in Syria over recent months. However, the figures killed in those attacks allowed Tehran to swallow its pride and make do with measured responses that didn’t embroil it in a wider campaign.

In contrast, the assassination of Zahedi, for which Israel hasn’t officially claimed responsibility, took out a senior command in the Revolutionary Guard. It’s perceived as an escalation by Israel – exacerbating the regime leadership’s dilemma: How to respond without getting sucked into a mess it can’t get out of. 

From Iran’s perspective, too weak a response would project weakness. A harsh response could lead to an expansion of the war, endanger strategic assets on its soil and across the Middle East, and also risk dragging it into direct confrontation with the US.

In the days leading up to its attack on Israel during the weekend, there was no need to belabor the potential response scenarios. They are described extensively in the media, and the very discussion allows spokespeople for the Islamic regime to portray Israel as deterred and fearful, seeing it as a down payment on the price it’s yet to pay.

In fact, the current development places the Islamic Republic in a situation it sought to avoid when creating the model of deploying proxy forces. This allowed Iran to reap the successes of the front-line groups without paying the price or suffering failures.

Iran has managed to have the world let the orchestrator off the hook despite sending proxies to do its bidding. This has had it invest in building such forces in the Mideast and other regions – training, equipping, financing them – turning them into key players in their countries and attack dogs against common enemies nearby. It did this without a nuclear umbrella, and it knows full well what having one would have meant in terms of its security. 

Iran has long ceased being just a local or regional problem; it is now a global matter. The US needs to spearhead the effort to counter it, regarding not only the nuclear aspect but also its weapons proliferation, subversion, proxy deployment, funding terrorism, and fueling it. The Biden administration can view this as an opportunity to set new boundaries for Tehran’s conduct, now in the final stretch before presidential elections.

Against the backdrop of Iran’s Ukraine war involvement and partnership in the anti-US, anti-West axis, there lies an opportunity for the US to restore its stature in the Middle East, strengthen the pro-Western front, and impact the global order.

Those who might be concerned in Washington that such a policy would embroil the US in an undesired war should think about the prospect that could occur without such action: An expansion of the war in the Middle East that could drag the US into it. In the eyes of the ayatollahs, Israel is the “little satan.” It stands at the tip of the spear of Western civilization in this region. There is no need to guess who the “great satan” is.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 14, 2024.

The poll conducted at the beginning of March by the Palestinian Center for Policy Survey Research (PCPSR) headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, and whose findings were published towards the end of March, highlights the consciousness of struggle and resistance in Palestinian society and its rigid and unwavering collective psychological foundations. The Center has published quarterly polls since the mid-1990s, with each poll including several identical questions about the respondents’ political preferences and priorities regarding Palestinian national goals and the fundamental pressing problems that need to be addressed. The poll also includes specific questions that change depending on the different contexts following significant events.

The results of the identical questions allow for systematic tracking and comparison over many years, as well as detection of trends and changes, if there are any. The respondent population is broad and represents Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, with the polls conducted by data collectors physically interviewing the respondents in their homes, not an online or telephone poll. Due to the conditions in the Gaza Strip following the war, only Palestinians living in relatively safe places in southern Gaza were polled, and the pollster notes the possibility of certain biases in the results.

The important issues examined in this poll, as well as in the previous poll conducted in December 2023, were the respondents’ position regarding the murderous attack on October 7, the level of support for Hamas and for Yahya Sinwar, the responsibility for the outbreak of the war and for the humanitarian conditions of the population in Gaza, the identity of those who committed war crimes, and expectations and preferences regarding the governing body in the Gaza Strip after the war. The respondents were also asked the identical questions included in all prior polls.

Some of the findings reflect a Palestinian dialectic that needs to be explained beyond the poll findings. Thus, for example, support for Hamas and preference that it remain the sovereign governing entity after the war, alongside harsh criticism of Hamas regarding fair distribution of humanitarian aid, or increased support of a two-state solution. Some will view the increased support of a two-state solution as an awakening realization on the part of the Gazan public, and recognition of the damage brought upon them by the war launched by Hamas. However, past experience shows that support of a two-state solution for the most part expresses a general position that does not address and take into account the essence of such a solution. Other polls conducted by the PCPSR presented the respondents with the elements of a two-state solution, in which case support of this idea and solution declined sharply.

The poll results indicate a growing trend of radicalization, or at least more extreme and militant positions of the Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria compared to those in the Gaza Strip. The explanation, at least in part, appears to stem from the deep disappointment of the Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria with the Palestinian Authority and its President. Hamas, on the other hand, is viewed as successful in producing change, in reviving international attention to the Palestinian issue and in restoring Palestinian national honor by the mere damage it caused Israel. The fact that the residents of Judea and Samaria are far from the battlefield allows for such a position, as it is easier to be nationalistic and unwavering when you don’t have to pay the price of the war or experience it first-hand.

The trends emerging from the poll reflect Palestinian willingness to justify the massacre and atrocities of October 7, as well as their inability to take responsibility for their actions. This, in addition to the stance that prefers inflicting continued damage on Israel instead of a political process or building state, economic and civil society institutions on the path to independence. This approach is part of the Palestinian collective consciousness which chooses “resistance” over negotiation, and views the right of return as the ultimate goal. Accordingly, entities representing these values such as Hamas enjoy broad Palestinian support, while the Palestinian Authority is seen as having abandoned the path of resistance in favor of a political process that does not advance Palestinian national goals, and despite the failure continues to maintain security cooperation with Israel. In effect, the Palestinian Authority is perceived as serving the goals of the “occupation” while it itself is corrupt, excludes local leaders and fails to function as a governing entity.

Support of the October 7 Atrocities

The poll results reflect the problematic psychological foundations of Palestinian society, as revealed with respect to the atrocities carried out on October 7, almost a half year after they took place. The Palestinians, it appears, do not take responsibility for their actions, and prefer to focus on damaging Israel instead of on building a civil society, institutions and its economy on the path towards its independence. As they see it, they will achieve their goals by waging an armed struggle against Israel, and therefore give their support to those who espouse and act on this plan and position.

Thus, for example, 71% of the Palestinians think that the decision to launch the surprise attack on October 7 was correct and justified – 1% less than the results of a similar poll conducted in December 2023. In the Gaza Strip, support of the massacre increased from 57% to 71%, whereas in Judea and Samaria support of the attack decreased from 82% to 71% compared to December. At the same time, only 19% responded that the attack was incorrect compared to a higher portion of respondents, 22%, in the prior poll. The cumulative significance of the last two findings indicates broader support of the Hamas attack, despite the terrible price the Palestinians have paid.

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March poll: PCPSR, p. 5

Worse still, a majority in fact blames Israel for the current suffering of Palestinians: 64% think that Israel is responsible, compared to 52% in December. Only 7% place the blame for the Palestinian suffering on Hamas, and 6% on the Palestinian Authority. The percentage of Gazans who blame Hamas dropped from 19% in December to only 9% in March, indicating that they have not internalized what the Hamas wrought upon them, mainly showing the breadth and depth of the support for Hamas and for the October 7 attack.

The poll results also show the Palestinian’s inability to take responsibility for their actions, despite the extensive documentation. According to the poll, 90% of the Palestinians think that Israel is the one committing war crimes, and only 5% think Hamas committed war crimes during the current war. The operating mode of the Hamas terror organization – in other words, armed resistance, including acts of massacre and using the civilian population as a human shield – is considered legitimate.

In the long-term as well, the poll results show that the Palestinians are not interested in a solution of peace with Israel. Thus, for example, despite a slight increase in support of the idea of a two-state solution, especially among the respondents in Gaza – supposedly a relatively positive finding, reflecting a realization that Israel will not disappear off the map, as well as a certain duality towards the Hamas – armed struggle still remains the preferred method among all Palestinians (46% among the total population, 51% in Judea and Samaria and 39% in the Gaza Strip) as a means of establishing a Palestinian state and ending the “occupation”. Much smaller support, 18% of respondents, selected non-violent resistance, and only a quarter of the Palestinians that answered the poll selected negotiations with Israel as a means of achieving Palestinian goals. Even worse, exactly one third of the Palestinians believe that the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return for 1948 refugees – a finding reflecting the significance of this element in the national ethos and in the Palestinian collective psychological foundations. The significance of realizing the right of return in practice means denying Israel’s right to exist and its elimination as the nation state of the Jewish people.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 24

Trends in support of armed struggle are also found in Palestinian support of external actors during the current war: among the Arab/regional actors, the highest level of public satisfaction was found with the performance of the Houthis. 83% support the Iranian arm in Yemen that led to the blocking of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and attacks on Israel. This is followed by satisfaction with the performance of Qatar (56%), but also with Hezbollah (48%) and Iran (30%). Jordan and Egypt (22% and 12% respectively) lag far behind. A mirror image of these poll results is satisfaction with the non-regional international actors: the highest level of satisfaction is with Russia (19%), while the US, which seeks to advance negotiation and establish a democratic Palestinian state, received only 1%.

One of the only rays of light in the poll, in addition to the slight increase in support of the two-state solution, is the drop in support of an armed struggle. Since December there has been a decline in support of terror by all Palestinians from 46% to 35%, and even in Gaza support fell from 56% to 39%. There was a similar drop in Judea and Samaria, from 68% to 51%. Nonetheless, it still remains the most preferred means among all Palestinians compared to the other means presented in the poll. If this trend continues to grow, it may indicate the initial effect of the war in Gaza on the Palestinian position on this issue. Conversely, strong support of armed struggle among the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria signals radicalization trends impacted by the war in Gaza, but no less owing to the Israeli war on terror in the Judea and Samaria territories, which is exacting a high price from the Palestinians, in addition to deep disappointment with the Palestinian Authority.

Continued Support of the Hamas

The poll highlights a concerning phenomenon regarding the collective consciousness of the Palestinian public: despite the fact that Hamas has taken a beating in the war, and despite the suffering and destruction the October 7 attack caused Gaza, the terror organization continues to enjoy widespread popularity among the population in Judea and Samaria, and even in Gaza itself. Moreover, and following justification of the massacre and its goals, the Palestinians in general are satisfied with the functioning of the Hamas and with the way it is conducting the war against Israel. They are unable to see the destruction around them as too high of a price, and prefer to uphold terror despite its ramifications. As noted, this is part of the same consciousness that has not changed, despite the war and its costs.

Thus, for example, 70% of the poll respondents are satisfied with the role of Hamas in the current war – satisfaction that remains stable and is identical to the result in December, reflecting a continuing trend. Regarding specific Palestinian actors, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of the Hamas in Gaza, enjoys strong support for his role: 61% are satisfied with his performance. This shows that Sinwar understands the strong public support for him and for the terror organization he leads, as well as for the trajectory he chose to take on October 7, despite its price. Accordingly, he can toughen his position in the negotiations, and place his survival and that of the organization as the sovereign in the Gaza Strip as the first and foremost goal in the hostage negotiations.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 16

Taking a forward-looking view, a large majority (78%) of the respondents indicated that the war in Gaza will revive international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood. This result explains why the war is ‘worthwhile’: it reflects the belief that justifies the violent course chosen by Hamas as a means of achieving the political goal of Palestinian independence, and should therefore be supported. At the same time, the results show that the residents of Gaza prefer the Hamas as the governing entity at the end of the war – when asked about their preference, more than 50% of the Gazans support continued Hamas control over Gaza, an increase compared to the poll in December.

Another poll result reflects the Gazan population’s involvement in Hamas activity: according to Hamas data, a total of about 32 thousand Palestinians have been killed so far in the war in Gaza, and according to various estimates about 13 thousand of them are terrorists. At the same time, 80% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip reported that at least one family member (the degree of kinship is unclear from the wording of the question) was killed or injured during the current war. Despite the lack of clarity regarding the figure, and inability to obtain more accurate data, clearly a very large number of families have relatives who were killed or injured and were among Hamas operatives who were killed. This means that very many families are actively and significantly connected to Hamas.

The results indicate how deeply Hamas is embedded in the civilian population in Gaza. The widespread support for Hamas, and the clear and prominent preference to see it as the governing body in the Gaza Strip after the war, points to a society that is mobilized to the struggle and to resistance. This society is not averse to Hamas or feels that it is repressed by the organization. To the contrary, it views Hamas as a torch bearer that is loyal to its cause, and the population is therefore willing to collaborate with the terrorist organization. This is important to bear in mind and to emphasize as part of Israel’s advocacy and awareness-raising efforts against assertions regarding civil society or uninvolved civilians killed or injured in the war. There are of course those who oppose Hamas and do not collaborate with it, but in general this is a mobilized collective that willingly collaborates with Hamas. This enabled the terrorist organization to deepen its hold on civilian life and to operate from civil infrastructures and facilities, as well as from civilian homes.

Nevertheless, and in line with the duality developing in Gaza towards Hamas, certain criticism is evident in Gaza regarding some aspects of the terror organization’s activity in Gaza. Thus, for example, when asked whether the process of aid distribution by Hamas or UNRWA – an organization whose activity in Gaza is to a large degree controlled by Hamas – is fair or discriminatory on political grounds, many residents expressed dissatisfaction. 56% indicated that Hamas distribution was “discriminatory” compared to 41% who said that the terror organization’s aid distribution is “fair”. UNRWA received even a lower percentage: 70% indicated that the agency’s aid distribution is discriminatory.

As for the humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, the poll results contradict the commonly held accounts about heavy famine in Gaza. While almost half the respondents in Gaza said that they have food sufficient for a day or two, almost 80% noted that if they need food or water there is a place they can reach that can provide the assistance, but “at a risk” or with “great difficulty”. Only 4% said that there is no place they can reach where they can have access to food. A particularly high percentage noted that they have access to medical care and electricity to charge a phone.

Extremism and Weakness of the Palestinian Authority

A clear trend that emerged from the poll results is the irrelevance of the Palestinian Authority in the eyes of most of the population, including in Judea and Samaria. The Authority’s weakness stands out both compared to Hamas and overall. Abu-Mazen’s government is viewed as illegitimate and as a burden on the Palestinian people. A vast majority of Palestinians want Abu-Mazen, the President of the Palestinian Authority, to resign. Another worrying trend is the troubling share of support for Hamas particularly among respondents in Judea and Samaria – a percentage even higher than that among the population in Gaza.

An absolute majority of Palestinians does not believe there will be any change in the Palestinian Authority’s policy or in the living conditions in Judea and Samaria as a result of the appointment of Mohammad Mustafa as Prime Minister, and even opposes change of leadership in Ramallah. An even greater majority thinks that the Palestinian Authority is a huge burden. Thus, Palestinian support goes to Hamas: in Judea and Samaria support for the terrorist organization is 35%, compared to 44% in December. At the same time, support for the Fatah is only 12%. In Gaza the secular Fatah organization in fact receives greater support than in Judea and Samaria, 25%, compared to 34% support for Hamas. Overall, Hamas is considered a more popular alternative.

The poll results also show that Abu-Mazen, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, is not at all popular. His support among the Palestinians is especially low: 16% are satisfied with his performance in the war compared to 81% who are dissatisfied. In Judea and Samaria satisfaction with Abu-Mazen stands at only 8% – a drop from 10% in the December poll. Moreover, 84% of the respondents, including 93% in Judea and Samaria, want the elderly Palestinian leader to resign. In the eyes of the Palestinians, Abu-Mazen is not considered an option in order to continue the struggle for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This can be seen from the percentage of support among the respondents as to the preferred scenario in the day after the war, with the return of the Palestinian Authority under Abu-Mazen receiving only 18%, compared to 63% who prefer continued control of the Hamas in Gaza.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 20

Moreover, this trend is also reflected in the poll question regarding hypothetical presidential elections if they were to take place today. The only candidate that could beat Ismail Haniyeh in these elections would be Marwan Barghouti, who is in jail in Israel. Abu-Mazen, Mohammad Mustafa, as well as former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, would lose to the leader of the Hamas if they ran against him.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 18

Accordingly, while 62% of the respondents in Gaza indicated they were satisfied with the role of Hamas in the war, a higher percentage, 75%, of the respondents in Judea and Samaria are satisfied. This is also the case regarding satisfaction with the role played by Yahya Sinwar: 52% in the Gaza Strip, but 68% of the respondents in Judea and Samaria. At the same time, a higher percentage of respondents who would prefer to see continued control of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is found in Judea and Samaria – 64%,overall.

As noted above, the positions reflected in the poll results are related to the perception of the Palestinian Authority as an irrelevant and corrupt entity, while the residents of Judea and Samaria suffer less than the Gazans from Israeli operations and therefore do not direct their anger at Hamas or think that its decision to launch the October 7 attack was wrong. However, the results indicate a more serious trend: not a steady trend but a trend that is growing stronger, with increased radicalization in Judea and Samaria in espousing an ideology of an armed struggle and support for Hamas. According to the poll, the differentiation Israel tried to make between the residents of Judea and Samaria and those in Gaza in order to manage the conflict is not working. This is the case since in the eyes of the residents of Judea and Samaria the two-state solution is not the preferred solution. Instead, they prefer the Hamas and an armed struggle against Israel. Therefore, if the Hamas terrorist organization were to take control of the Palestinian Authority now, it is not at all certain that it would receive a cold shoulder from the local residents, as they also support the organization and believe in its doctrine and ideology.

Summary

The PCPSR March poll results provide findings about the position of the Palestinian public, both in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip, on a wide range of current issues. Beyond this, they also tell a story and paint a clear picture of the Palestinian collective consciousness regarding the conflict with Israel and its solution. The results point to a rigid Palestinian ideology, an idée fixe that prefers extreme action over moderation and pragmatism, while persistently and defiantly rejecting self-examination.

The poll shows that despite specific criticism of Hamas on particular issues, such as the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza, overall the respondents are satisfied with its functioning as an organization and with its leaders. Furthermore, the Palestinians do not turn their back on Hamas and in fact support it in large numbers, despite the suffering caused them by the war. The respondents’ answers demonstrate the scale and scope of the involvement of the Gazan population in Hamas activity, and how deeply and ubiquitously Hamas is embedded in the civilian population in Gaza and enjoys its support – the same population that is considered “innocent” or “uninvolved”. Concomitantly, the Palestinians give their support to external entities operating in a similar manner and promoting terror and attacks against Israel, whether these are the Houthis or Hezbollah, while they loath the Palestinian Authority which they see as corrupt and detached. If Palestinian elections were held today, the only probable winners would be the leaders of the Hamas or the convicted Marwan Barghouti.

This collective Palestinian approach, as inferred from the poll results, stems from their inability to take responsibility for acts of terror, such as the atrocities of October 7, while placing the blame on others – such as the “occupation” or Israel, which is the only one blamed for committing war crimes. The Palestinians, so it seems, also think that the changing reality perpetuated by Hamas is preferable to the stagnation and unchanging conservatism represented by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The poll respondents believe that this change is the optimal way to awaken and drive the world to help them and to grant them what they want. Therefore, among the Palestinians there is a clear preference for terror and destruction, which as they see it brings about rapid and significant change in reality, as opposed to slow, often difficult and prolonged constructive building of state institutions, conducting a political dialog and diplomacy.

Therefore, despite a certain decline in support of armed struggle according to the poll results, and even a slight increase in support of the two-state solution – two seemingly encouraging results, that may even signal the beginning of a genuine trend stemming from internalization of the lessons of the war – the majority of the Palestinians still show a preference for an armed struggle against Israel in order to gain their independence. A third of the Palestinians even extol the right of return as the ultimate goal, which means the elimination of the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, and not recognizing its right to exist as such. At the same time, the poll shows sharp radicalization among the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, those who do not live under control of Hamas and whose attitude towards the issue is more extreme than that of the residents in Gaza. Regardless of the reasons, the widespread support of terror in Judea and Samaria, and worsening radicalization on a host of current issues, must raise a red flag and be seen as a warning sign by Israel and the Western countries.

In summary, the poll results point to a worrying phenomenon among the Palestinian public: an armed struggle consciousness, support for the Hamas, weakness of the Palestinian Authority and support of the October 7 atrocities – as part of the collective psychological foundations of this population. Palestinian society upholds the idea of the elimination of the State of Israel by means of violence and terror, and of realizing the right of return as a goal that is more important than the establishment of an independent and functioning Palestinian state achieved by peaceful means. Therefore, any progress towards the vision of two nation states, peacefully living side by side, requires deep and profound change in the collective psychological foundations of Palestinian society and its leaders. The poll results show that we still have a long way to go and are still very far from the hoped-for change.

There is an ancient parable about the exodus from Egypt that appears in the midrash (Mekhilta d’Rabbi Yishmael, Parashat Beshalach 1). It is about someone who blundered and tried to evade the punishment he deserved, but ultimately received his punishment as well as additional punishments. The reference is to the Biblical Egyptians who suffered ten plagues, set the Jews free, and also had their money taken. “They ate the stinking fish, received a lashing, and were expelled from the city.”

This parable fits Israel’s current strategic situation. After six months of fighting in the Gaza Strip, the IDF has scored impressive achievements, killing many thousands of Hamas and other terrorist organization operatives. Numerous senior Hamas officials have been eliminated, and terrorist infrastructures above and below ground, which the organization built for years, along with its munitions industry and stockpile of arms, were critically damaged. Nonetheless, the war goals have not yet been completed, and military action has yet to be translated into the desired strategic victory.

For two months now, heavy U.S. and international pressure is hindering Israel’s plans to operate in the camps in central Gaza and in Rafah, where Hamas’s remaining active military and governmental assets are found. The U.S. is publicly expressing its impatience regarding what it portrays as Israel’s lack of cooperation with its demands to increase humanitarian aid, as well as Israel’s objection to the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the Gaza Strip.

As the U.S. administration sees it, ending the war in Gaza is the cornerstone of any regional strategic vision that is based on building a new regional architecture, in which Saudi Arabia will play a key role. While the U.S., ostensibly, stands by Israel, and while it justifies the goals of the war – underscoring dismantling Hamas’s governing and military systems – the U.S. publicly expressed its doubts regarding the IDF’s ability to achieve this goal, hampering the IDF even to the point of an implicit threat as to the necessary military operation in Rafah. In effect, the U.S. is making every effort to thwart such an operation.

Regarding the need to find an immediate alternative to Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, the U.S. is promoting the idea of the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. This, although it also recognizes that the Palestinian Authority is incapable of filling this function, and that it is unable, at this time and under the current conditions, to step into Hamas’s shoes and to take upon itself the responsibility for the efficient management of the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority has yet to begin to implement actual reforms towards a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority, under the conditions as defined by President Biden.

By advancing this idea, the U.S. in practice relinquished its demand for the necessary reform process, indicating that lip service will suffice. Considering the PA’s level of functioning, and the loathing most of the Palestinians feel for the Authority, and while Hamas retains its governing and military capacity in Gaza, and completing the operation in Rafah is lacking – it is obvious to all that Hamas will regroup itself and find its way back to govern. Thus, in its actions the U.S. is in effect enabling Hamas to remain a de facto partner in governing Gaza, in essence normalizing Hamas, a murderous terrorist organization. The U.S. also does not understand the opposition of the Israeli public to this move, as it tries to distinguish between the government of Israel and the people of Israel.

In addition, there is the humanitarian aid issue which for Israel has turned into a stumbling block. International pressure on Israel is growing and increasing with the adoption of the Hamas narrative, including by the U.S., and regardless of the facts on the ground. Although the U.S. claims that the pressure exerted on Israel to end the war serves the government in Jerusalem, it first and foremost serves the overarching policy goals and the internal politics of the current U.S. administration. Additional countries and international aid organizations have adopted, without any objective investigation, the current “famine” narrative echoed by the Hamas – a narrative that clearly aligns with a pro-Palestinian position and is biased against Israel. The echoing of this narrative may accelerate the end of the war, including thwarting a military operation in Rafah, which will also impede Israel’s ability to achieve its war goals.

Hamas’s success in inculcating and echoing the narrative of Israel as a war criminal, and as causing widespread harm to civilians – mainly women and children – in addition to disproportionate and excessive destruction, is reflected in the condemnation of Israel and in obliterating and repressing the atrocities of October 7. Israel’s marked weakness in its awareness-raising and perception-changing efforts further helps instill the Hamas narrative in the minds of the various audiences and actors in the international arena.

In the meantime, a half year after the beginning of the war, the tension in Israel-U.S. relations has escalated. The U.S. took the gloves off, no longer expressing its dissatisfaction behind closed doors. Worse still, the administration publicly airs its explicit threats against Israel and takes action to circumvent Israel, endangering Israel’s vital interests. Thus, for example, was the decision to build a pier in northern Gaza, and reports of U.S. plans to hand over its operation to the Qataris through a Gazan company that is operated and controlled by Hamas. This is also the case regarding public statements of Israel’s inability to dismantle Hamas’s governing and military systems, in addition to publicly doubting and even discrediting Israel’s ability to evacuate the Palestinian civilians from Rafah and to conduct a military operation to demolish remaining Hamas infrastructures in the city.

The watershed moment was Biden’s call with Netanyahu, after which the White House reported on Biden’s outrage at Netanyahu due to the tragic incident in which seven WCK workers were unintentionally killed, as if the U.S. itself has not been responsible for several unfortunate accidents in war zones in which it operated. Biden, according to the report, defiantly insisted that the Prime Minister change Israel’s policy regarding humanitarian aid, and stated that U.S. policy towards Israel would be determined subject to Israel’s change of policy The President also demanded that Netanyahu temper his position regarding negotiations with Hamas for release of the hostages and for achieving an immediate ceasefire. The fact that Hamas rejected, for the third time, a deal outline put forth by the mediators – a more compromising position than the two prior outlines, to which Israel also agreed to – did not bring about any change in the administration’s policy and demands from Israel to adopt a more flexible position (unless something changed in the negotiations headed by CIA Director William Burns currently underway in Cairo).  Meanwhile, Hamas rejected the fourth deal outline proposed by the US with personal and deep involvement of the CIA director.

In its actions the U.S. is creating a comfort zone for Hamas and removing any incentive it may have to change its positions and to show more flexibility in the negotiations for release of the hostages. Even worse, when Hamas analyzes the current situation, America’s critical position towards Israel and growing international pressure on it, it can detect that the victim narrative – which it acts to instill among audiences and actors in the international arena – has taken root and is echoed worldwide. This conclusion leads Hamas to harden its position and to the understanding that Israel can be compelled to end the war, while it can ensure its survival as a sovereign entity in the Gaza Strip, which it will present as the absolute victory. This outcome will only serve to fuel the axis of resistance, across all its components, that is led by Iran.

Criticism of the humanitarian reality and absence of progress for release of the hostages, and of course the number of casualties, is leveled against Israel, while all these statements of condemnation lack any mention of the atrocities perpetrated by Hamas and its murderous actions. In this sense, Israel is forced to ‘eat the stinking fish’, while it is slandered, its image and international standing are harmed, it faces a severe crisis in its relations with the U.S., and its maneuverability is increasingly limited. Moreover, the result in practice is normalization of the Hamas.

At present, after Hamas also officially rejected the third proposed deal outline; when it is clear that its leaders in Gaza do not intend to compromise, and it continues to insist on unreasonable conditions, including in the eyes of the mediators, even though it clearly knows that Israel cannot accept them; when Hamas leaders can draw encouragement from the developing crisis between Israel and the U.S. and from the international pressure exerted on Israel; and when in practice the Hamas has no incentive to compromise – Israel must take action. In the face of this current state of affairs, as Israel anyhow pays a heavy price in the international community and in its relations with the U.S., the government in Jerusalem, that was fed stinking fish, must act so that it will also not be expelled from the city, in the words of the Jewish parable.

Israel must act to completely achieve its war goals: Success in dismantling Hamas’s governing and military systems, release of the hostages, eliminating the serious security threat from Gaza, and resettlement of the communities along the Gaza border. This will be the absolute victory that will convey Israel’s determination and resilience. All this will reestablish Israel’s deterrence against all axis of resistance components, and will ensure Israel’s strategic asset value in the eyes of the regional leaders and the U.S.

The first test will be in the Gaza Strip. Victory will be achieved by completing the destruction of the remaining Hamas systems and capabilities in the central camps and in Rafah, as well as by blocking the tunnel infrastructure along the Philadelphi Route. The operation in Rafah will indeed be complex, and will therefore require operational creativity, which IDF commanders possess. This creativity will ensure minimal harm to the civilian population, and the IDF is well prepared for this operation. An operation in Rafah is significant both in respect of Hamas’s ability to stay standing and the position of its leaders in the negotiations, as well as regarding the civilian population, which continues to support the Hamas because the terrorist organization is perceived as the main alternative for governing the Gaza Strip on the day after the war. Moving ahead with this operation will convey Israel’s determination and its willingness to pay a price, and will counter Israel’s image as weak and hesitant, as established in the eyes of Hamas leadership and the civilian population.

The Israeli operation will exact a price in Israel-U.S. relations, and will inevitably intensify this crisis. However, history of the relations between the two countries proves that in the past they knew how to overcome crises and even tighten their ties. Only destroying Hamas’s governing and military systems and a strong Israel will affirm Israel’s strategic asset value in the eyes of the U.S. and as perceived by its partners in the region. This situation will in practice even weaken the axis of resistance, and will enable Israel to advance towards the necessary strategic victory.

The complex strategic reality Israel faces also rouses problems and tensions internally within Israel, with the cries of the families of the hostages intermingled with calls for elections to be held now. Even if most of the Israeli public is opposed to securing the release of the hostages at any price and under any condition, and even though a large swath of the Israeli public is opposed to holding elections now, Israel may again be perceived by Hamas and its supporters in the axis of resistance as a fractured and fragile society, nearing its internal dissolution and collapse. It will be a mistake on the part of the government of Israel to bow its head to what looks like increasing pressure from within.

At this time the government must ensure Israel’s image as a country and society willing to pay a price to achieve its vital strategic goals. Only this will reduce the danger of finding ourselves as having “eaten the stinking fish,” and also being expelled from the city – precisely when strategic victory is within reach.

The targeted assassination this week in Damascus – allegedly by Israel – of Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Forces in Syria and Lebanon, was long overdue.

As part of its post-October 7 updated doctrine of security, Israel can no longer make do with fighting Iran’s proxies but rather must target Iran itself in response to Tehran’s key role in the current attacks on Israel and destabilization of the region. Israel must now strike directly within Iran, while also taking further action against the Quds Force. Iran’s self-perceived shield of impunity must be pierced.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration purposefully continues to misinterpret Iran’s proxy warfare. Blindly, willfully, and wrongly, Washington asserts that Iran “lacks full control over its proxies.” (This was said in the context of Kataib Hezbollah’s responsibility for the recent drone attack in Jordan that killed three Americans soldiers.) It refuses to finger Iran for all its escalatory muckraking, as detailed below.

Washington prefers to make nice and dream that Iran will calm down. Sure enough, the Biden administration rushed to assure Tehran this week that it had no advance knowledge of or responsibility for the hit on Mohammad Reza Zahedi.

The administration is sticking to its “strategy” (if you can call it that) of “restoring trust” with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, to smooth the way towards a return to former president Barack Obama’s rotten nuclear deal with Iran – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – and to avoid further conflict with Iranian-backed rebels in Iraq and Yemen who threaten both American troops and global shipping and security.

For those who have not been paying sufficient attention, here is a summary of the Iranian record.

• Iran is carving out a corridor of control – a Shiite land bridge – stretching from the Arabian (“Persian”) Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea, including major parts of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, under the control of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Qods Force, various Shiite militias, and the Hezbollah organization. This corridor gives Iran a broad strategic base for aggression across the region.

• Iran is establishing air and naval bases on the Mediterranean and Red seas, and especially in Syria, to project regional power. It has also stepped-up its harassment of international shipping and Western naval operations in the Persian Gulf. Iranian UAVs and missiles endanger civilian flights across the region, too.

• Iran’s proxy army in Yemen, the Houthi rebels, seeks control of the Horn of Africa and the entrance to the Red Sea – a critical strategic chokepoint on international shipping. In recent months, the Houthis have struck more than 40 times at commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Eden, through which almost 15% of global seaborne trade usually passes.

• More than 100 American service members suffered traumatic brain injuries from an Iranian ballistic missile strike on US troops in Iraq, four years ago. Last year, Tehran’s proxies in Yemen struck at a base in the UAE housing American military forces; and Iranian proxies struck at US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria. These attacks are part of Iran’s effort to evict America from the Middle East and coerce US partners into accommodating the Islamic Republic. 

• Iran is fomenting subversion in Mideast counties that are Western allies, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. It is particularly focused on destabilizing the Hashemite regime in Jordan to gain access to Israel’s longest border (its border with Jordan) and from there to penetrate Israel’s heartland. Israel this month rushed troops to the northern Jordan Valley following indications that Iraqi Shiite militia groups supported by Iran planned to invade Israel via Jordan and conduct a large-scale terror attack against Israeli communities near the border, like the October 7 attacks by Hamas.

• Iran is threatening Israel with war and eventual destruction. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khomenei, regularly refers to Israel as a cancerous tumor in the Middle East that must be removed and speaks of the complete liberation of Palestine (meaning the destruction of Israel) through holy jihad.

• Iran has armed enemies on Israel’s northern border (Hezbollah and most recently, also Hamas in Lebanon), southern border (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), and terrorist undergrounds in the West Bank. It has equipped Hezbollah with an arsenal of over 150,000 missiles and rockets aimed at Israel and supplied Hamas with the arms and rockets that fueled four significant military confrontations with Israel over the past decade. Since October 7, Hezbollah has struck over 3,000 times at Israel, essentially depopulating the upper Galilee. These attacks have killed ten IDF soldiers and reservists as well as eight Israeli civilians.

• There is dispute as to the extent of Iran’s foreknowledge of the October 7 Hamas attack, but Hamas would not have been capable of the attack without the systematic assistance it has been receiving from Tehran for decades. My colleague Dr. Yossi Mansharof has exposed the boasting of Iranian leaders (like Esmaeil Kowsari of the Iranian Majles Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and formerly a high-ranking commander in the IRGC) about the involvement of former Qods Force leader Qasem Soleimani (who was assassinated by the US in January 2020) in the planning of the Hamas attack and the build-up of its forces.

• In the massive array of Hamas subterranean terror attack tunnels in Gaza, the IDF has found millions of pieces of weaponry, technological hardware, and documentary evidence of Iran’s multi-layered funding channels, material supply networks, and military training regimes for Hamas.

• Iran is sponsoring terrorism against Western, Israeli, and Jewish targets around the world, including unambiguous funding, logistical support, planning and personnel for terrorist attacks that span the globe, from Buenos Aires to Burgas. Iran maintains an active terrorist network of proxies, agents, and sleeper cells worldwide. (It again is threatening to unleash these operatives against Jewish and Israeli diplomatic targets “in response” to the strike on Zahedi.)

• Iran is building a long-term nuclear military option, with enrichment and armament facilities buried deep underground. According to the IAEA, Iran has enriched uranium to near-bomb-ready levels (84%, which is close to the 90% level necessary for a nuclear weapon) and in recent months has tripled its accumulation of weapons-grade uranium, enough for production of an estimated six nuclear weapons within four weeks.

• Iran is developing a formidable long-range missile arsenal of great technological variability, including solid and liquid propellant ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and ICBMs. The latest Iranian ICBM, called the “Khorramshahr,” seems to be based on the North Korean BM25 missile with a range of 3,500 km. The entire Iranian ballistic missile program is in violation of United Nations Security Council prohibitions.

• Like his predecessors, US President Biden has pledged that he will never allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. But American military leaders now say only that the US “remains committed Iran will not have a fielded nuclear weapon” (– Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley to Congress in March 2023). This suggests that the Biden administration is now prepared to tolerate developed nuclear weapons in Iran’s hands, provided the weapon is not “fielded,” in other words, deployed.

• Iran is providing Russia with armed attack drones for President Putin’s war against Ukraine. Experts presume that in return Iran will be getting sophisticated Russian military technologies such as aerial defense systems and fighter jets for its wars against Israel and pro-Western Arab regimes in the Mideast.

• Overall, Iran is strengthening its ties to Russia and China, and tightening ties to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia as part of a unified front against what it calls the “Great Satan,” America, and the “Small Satan,” Israel.

Sorely missing is a US strategy to combat the evil influence and hegemonic ambitions of the mullahs. Prof. Walter Russell Mead has warned that “As Washington shrugs at challengers like China and Iran, world leaders make other plans like partnering with China and Iran.”

But Jerusalem cannot ignore Iran’s pincer war on Israel, its circling of Israel with strangulating “rings of fire,” its drive to enervate and destroy Israel.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 5, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 8, 2024.