The US fails to understand the current dialectic in Israeli politics, whereby harsh Israeli public criticism of the Netanyahu governement coexists with widespread consensus regarding the goals of the war against Hamas and the necessity of achieving them. By distancing itself from Israel, the only US “achievement” is damage to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political fortunes.

For the first time since October 7, the US recently abstained from vetoing two resolutions put forward for approval by the UN Security Council. While the two approved resolutions are non-binding, as they were not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to enforce the resolution by imposing sanctions, nonetheless this is a dangerous and problematic precedent by the US with respect to the war against Hamas in general, and relations with Israel in particular.

Moreover, there are already countries for whom this resolution presented a golden opportunity. The President of Columbia Gustavo Petro, for example, has announced that he will sever diplomatic relations with Israel if it does not abide by the UN resolution.

The US abstention from vetoing the resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan,which makes no reference to the hostages, and the second resolution which includes a call for an immediate ceasefire and the release of the hostages without any preconditions, but does not stipulate that the ceasefire is contingent on the release of the hostages – indicates a fundamental change in the US attitude toward the goals of the war as defined by the government of Israel, and which the US fully and adamantly supported in the first months of the war. 

This is not the first time the US has abstained from vetoing a Security Council resolution against Israel. Thus, for example, it abstained from vetoing Resolution 2334 against the settlements that was passed in December 2016, towards the end of President Obama’s second term. However, that was at the end of a Democratic US president’s term in office, and also not in the midst of a war. Therefore, by any comparative measure, this is an unusual action on the part of the US in its severity and harshness, and may attest to the depth of the crisis between the two countries, and mainly between their leaders.

By abstaining, the US deliberately weakens Israel and helps create conditions for imposing an end to the war by securing a deal for the hostages realease and a long ceasefire, which its clear meaning is finishing the war, even at the cost of not achieving Israeli war goals, which again, were until now supported by the US.

Anyone that doubts the essence of the resolution that was passed due to the US abstention, and its problematic ramifications, needs only listen to how Hamas welcomed the resolution. The fact that Hamas celebrated the resolution affirms that it works in favor of Hamas, and consequently is bad for Israel and harms its vital interests.

There are those who attribute the US decision to internal considerations related to President Biden’s election campaign, and to the need to appease the Muslim electorate and progressives following its low polling ranking and the criticism for supporting Israel. Some attribute this to deep frustration of the President and the Adminstration with Prime Minister Netanyahu, whom they view as foot-dragging and avoiding a discussion about the “day after,” alongside a show of defiance against the US, including the President himself. It is reasonable to assume that these are indeed influencing factors. However, it appears that there are much more fundamental reasons. These pertain to an American desire for a diplomatic achievement that will advance its vision of a new regional architecture to counter the Iranian axis, prevention of the war’s expansion into a regional war, and avoidance at any cost of direct confrontation with Iran which would draw US troops into conflict, in the sense of “boots on the ground.”

The cornerstone of the US vision or strategy is the cessation of the war in the Gaza Strip alongside “rehabilitation” of the Palestinian Authority and its return to Gaza and advancement of the two-state idea. According to the US, cessation of the war also will allow for an end to fighting in the north against Hezbollah and advancement of a diplomatic arragement in the spirit of UN Resolution 1701. This will also enable renewal of the normalization process with Saudi Arabia, and will convince Iran to restrain its proxies, especially the Houthis.   

Since halting the war in Gaza Strip is the cornerstone of the entire process, the US is willing to force Israel to stop the war even at the cost of short-changing Israel’s war goals and forgoeing the full dismantling of Hamas’ governing and military capabilities. The US assumes, at least so it appears, that Hamas will cease to be the sovereign power in the Gaza Strip with the return of the Palestinian Authority or the establishment of some other alternative governing structure.   

It is doubtful whether US senior officials really believe in the feasibility of the return of the Palestinian Authority and in its ability to function as an effective governing body in Gaza. It can be assumed that senior officials also understand that the appointment of Mohammad Mustafa as the Palesitnian Authority’s prime minister is a deception of sorts that will not lead to significant reforms in the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, it is difficult not to view the US decision to abstain from vetoing the UN resolution as reflecting something deeper, a move reminiscent of stopping Israel from destroying the Egyptian Third Field Army in the Yom Kippur War. 

It seems that the motivation was the same in both cases: Preventing Israel from achieving full victory, so that it will continue to hemorrhage for many years, thus deepening its dependence on the US and establishing a reality based on patron-client relations. Perhaps we are now being exposed to a strategic, deep, cold, cynical and callous consideration whose purpose is to secure US interests even at the expense of Israel’s vital interests.

If these are not the considerations guiding US action, then in that case they reflect a deep lack of understanding of processes taking place in the Middle East, and they will cause many in the region, including its close allies, to pay heavy prices.     

The US decision constitutes a fatal blow to Washington’s attempts to advance a regional architecture based on Saudi Arabia and the Abraham Accords countries. If the US abandons its main ally in the Middle East, what should its other allies understand about the US commitment to them?

The US tried to advance a three-way defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and Israel, however this dream now seems farther away than ever, with US allies in the Middle-East facing a broken dream, while Hamas may remain standing as the governing body in the Gaza Strip. This will provide a strong tailwind to all elements of the resistance axis, with an emphasis on Iran, the leader of the resistance axis, as well as a tailwind to the Muslim Brotherhood and to other Jihad organizations in the region. 

Iran is consolidating its power in the comfort zone the US essentially has created for it, clapping its hands in pleasure as it sees Israel becoming isolated from its allies and friends, which in turn enables Iran to continue to challenge the US through its proxies, and of course to move forward with its nuclear weapon project. 

The US decision also has immediate ramifications for Hamas’ motivation to advance a hostage deal. Hamas sees the growing pressure on Israel, so all it needs to do is to continue to delay its response and increase the price it demands. The US abstention and the pressure on Israel to avoid completing the operation in Rafah provide a huge tailwind to Hamas leadership in Gaza, and further consolidates the popular and political support it already has, in addition to providing a tailwind to the resistance axis not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon, and mainly in Iran. 

The only US “achievement” here is damage to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political fortunes. Washington is deepening a rift with the prime minister, knowing that this may lead to elections in Israel and to establishment of a government more favorable to US ideas. This was well expressed by Vice President Kamala Harris, who drew a distinction between the prime minister and the government of Israel and the people of Israel; as well as by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, who in his speech in the Senate stated that Prime Minister Netanyahu has lost his way and then also called for new elections in Israel.

At the same time, Netanyahu’s statement regarding an operation in Rafah – that he would proceed even without US approval – is problematic. Though his statement is logical, he shouldn’t have exacerbated the crisis. Everyone knows that such statements are not helpful.

Overall, Washington errs in its understanding of Israeli society and politics – a matter which seems even complicated for us, Israelis. It fails to understand the current dialectic in Israeli politics, whereby harsh Israeli public criticism of the Netanyahu governement coexists with widespread consensus regarding the goals of the war against Hamas and the necessity of achieving them. Israelis broadly oppose a return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, and they have a deep lack of trust in the Palestinians and in the feasibility of a two-state solution. The majority of those who oppose Netanyahu also reject blatant US interference in Israeli politics and the attempt to impose an end to the war on Israel before the war goals are achieved.   

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that US actions will not achieve their aims. On the contrary, US pressures may even increase support for Prime Minister Netanyahu. Netanyahu is likely to be perceived by the Israeli public as protecting Israel’s interests and national honor – even at the cost of escalating tensions with the administration.

The Purim tale, retold through the biblical Book of Esther in Jewish communities around the world this weekend, provides an excellent lesson to presidents, prime ministers, and commoners in understanding the link between providence and human endeavor, and the challenges of Jewish history.

The megillah hints that beyond the intrigue of royal courtyards; behind the politics of a White House or a Kremlin; and besides the movement of foreign and threatening military forces – lies a hidden hand operating on a transcendental plane.

Beyond the grasp of man’s finite mind, there is order and purpose. There is a higher divine order into which man has not been initiated. In short, what appears random, isn’t. The “pur” (the “happenstance” hinted at in the word Purim) is really planned.

And thus, over and above the threatening actors around us – from the time of Haman in ancient Persia to the ayatollahs of Shiite Iran, and from Amalek of Exodus to the anti-Jewish and anti-Israel wildly woke intelligentsia (so-called) of today’s Western world – there is an engaged and concerned God. And he acts to protect the Jewish people, especially when we screw up.

The grand sweep of Jewish history is a sustained tutorial against the evils of brutal dictatorships, totalitarian regimes, and arrogant empires. From the oppression implied in the Tower of Babel story to the slavery of pharaonic Egypt, and from Achashverosh to Nebuchadnezzar, the Bible critiques the politics of absolute power and the penchant of dictators to lord over the Jewish people.

None of these empires lasted too long. And none of these bad actors were able to destroy the physical core and indomitable spirit of the Jewish people.

I see this as a warning to the Islamic Republic of Iran – the most acute wannabe totalitarian hegemon of our times; and to the United Nations or the United States of America – who seek to dictate diplomatically to the modern State of Israel. You cannot succeed!

Concurrently this is a message of reassurance to Jews and Israelis as to how we must view our challenges. The ambitions of Iran to global Islamic empire are ephemeral, and so are the pretensions to power of extreme “progressives” in red-green intersectional alliances who are currently savaging Israel. They will not prevail.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks wrote that “Judaism is the unique attempt to endow events with meaning, and to see in the chronicles of mankind something more than a mere succession of happenings – to see them as nothing less than a drama of redemption in which the fate of a nation reflects its loyalty or otherwise to a covenant with God.”

Thus, Jews and Israelis should understand their current strategic straights as ordained trials meant to be tackled with wisdom and bravery, even defiance. We can and should confront the current attacks with confidence in the power of Jewish history.

We should go forward in the knowledge that the Jewish people and the State of Israel are not alone, even though it certainly feels so at the current moment. As Rabbi Yehoshua Weitzman of the Galilee has taught (with his phrase becoming the key line of a currently popular Israeli song): “The eternal people is not afraid of long journeys.”

As for the current moment, it indeed seems, alas, that Israel’s leaders need to take a strong dose of defiance with their morning coffee. The world seems hell-bent on emasculating Israel, of preventing Israel from achieving its necessary and justified war goals of crushing Hamas and restoring Israel’s regional deterrent power.

The emasculation begins with “small” matters like insisting that Israel’s “primary goal” must be provision of humanitarian aid to an enemy population in wartime, which is an absurdity never broached before in the history of wars.

It continues with deference to the evil regime in Qatar which bankrolls and fronts for Hamas. Unbelievably, Washington is now thinking of contracting-out construction and operation of its new humanitarian aid port pier in Gaza to a Qatari company. (Then Iranian and Turkish ships can dock and deliver “aid,” i.e., weapons and terror tunnel rebuilding supplies, to Hamas freely.)

It continues further with American and European insistence that the necessary next stage of the Israeli military campaign to rout out Hamas, in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, is “unacceptable,” a “red line that must not be crossed.” The Biden administration, in particular, outrageously thinks that it can micromanage IDF operations from now on, house-by-house, bullet-by-bullet; handcuffing Israel and driving it into another disastrous draw against Hamas.

The debilitation of Israel continues yet still with arrogant talk of unilaterally recognizing Palestinian statehood and anointing the duplicitous and decrepit Palestinian Authority as a stabilizing force in Gaza – insane, immoral ideas that seed the likelihood of long-term strategic defeat for Israel.

Then there is the new threat of denying arms and munitions to Israel, from spare jet parts to artillery shells. Canada owns the shame of being the first Western country to explicitly declare such a boycott even as Israel fights for its life against a clearly genocidal enemy (Hamas) and prepares to take on yet another (Hezbollah).

The Washington of Joe Biden and Anthony Blinken (and Chuck Shumer, oy) seems to be not too far away from this too, although its arms chokehold on Israel is at the moment more subtle and implicit than public.

And on a broader level, Washington is kowtowing yet again to Iran, unlocking last week upwards of $10 billion in frozen funds for the ayatollahs. This is an Obama administration reflex deeply embedded in Biden’s team that still seeks a grand regional deal with Teheran at Israel’s expense (and that of Israel’s Gulf Arab allies).

Instead of seriously striking at Iran and its proxies (like the Houthis) and countering the IRGC-controlled Shiite crescent running from the Arabian (“Persian”) Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea, or doing anything substantial to halt Iran’s race to nuclear weapons, the Biden administration seems obsessed with thwarting the supposedly malign influence and hegemonic ambitions – of Israel.

In the face of these deleterious developments, Israel obviously must continue to dialogue with leaders in Western capitals to reach understandings where possible, but also be prepared to defy them when necessary.

Finishing off Hamas and maintaining long-term control of a security envelope including Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is an essential goal that justifies Israeli defiance of the world. The State of Israel does not shrink from long and knotty journeys.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, March 23, 2024; and Israel Hayom, March 24, 2024.

Following a call with U.S. President Joe Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially agreed to send an Israeli delegation to Washington to present to senior U.S. officials the IDF’s plans of action in Rafah. Sending such a delegation would have devastating implications.

The Biden Administration’s critical view of Israel’s planned Rafah operation was made clear in a series of statements issued by senior officials. White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby said on February 12 that “Israelis have an obligation to make sure they can provide for the safety of innocent Palestinians throughout any operation in and around Rafah,” and that the United States does not want “to see any forced relocation of people outside Gaza.” President Biden said in an interview to MSNBC on March 10 that an Israeli military operation in Rafah would be his red line.

After speaking to Netanyahu on March 18, Biden said he asked the Israeli Prime Minister to send a team to Washington to discuss ways to target Hamas without a major ground operation in Rafah. If such an Israeli delegation is indeed sent to Washington, as was reportedly agreed to, it would be an unprecedented development in Israel-U.S. relations with far-reaching implications that go beyond the concrete discussion with the U.S. Administration regarding the IDF’s actions in Rafah.

There are several reasons why sending an Israeli team to Washington to discuss the IDF’s operational plans in Rafah is problematic. First, it means that Israel is, effectively and officially, subjugating its operational freedom and achievement of war goals to the U.S. Administration. The Administration, despite its support for Israel, is driven by American interests, including some that derive from the upcoming presidential elections. Obviously, not all U.S. interests align with Israel’s, and some are even in stark contrast to them.

Second, it creates a precedent between the two countries concerning future actions or operations – whether in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, or other arenas.

Finally, by being public, this step makes Israel seem weak – as may well have been Washington’s intent. This appearance of weakness conveys an encouraging message to Hamas, and particularly its Gazan leadership, increasing the likelihood of Hamas maintaining rigid positions in the hostage negotiations. A similar message is conveyed to the Gazan population whereby Hamas remains the alternative for the “day after” in the Gaza Strip. Israel should have and could have held such discussions with the U.S. covertly and discreetly via the two countries’ professional channels of coordination and collaboration.

This turn of events results from American and international pressure exerted on Israel, which is so strong that it implies that the U.S. Administration might veto Israel’s future actions in the Gaza Strip, effectively denying Israel’s operational freedom. The very idea that an elected Israeli government would not be able to act upon one of its policies or achieve one of its strategic goals, particularly against the backdrop of a severe threat, places Israel’s ability to contend with the range of threats it now faces at extreme risk.

Furthermore, this American step is being taken as part of the special relations between the two countries, and not as part of a formal defense treaty. One must wonder how far things would go if Israel were to partake in such an alliance with the United States, as discussed just weeks before the events of October 7. Indeed, in a paper issued three days earlier, which addressed the possibility of a defense treaty with the United States, we warned of a “bear hug” that could subordinate Israel’s interests to those of the U.S., with the latter always being preferred to the former. Several other reasons why Israel should object to such a defense alliance were also cited in this paper.

The events of October 7 are seminal, and will forever be etched in the Jewish People’s collective memory. Paradoxically and cynically, it is under these harsh and severe circumstances that Israel is turning from a victim to an aggressor in the eyes of many in Washington, as its right to self-defense loses all meaning while Hamas’ deceitful narrative spreads among senior U.S. Administration officials, thereby eroding their support for Israel and enhancing the limitations imposed on it. Netanyahu’s approval of a delegation to Washington perpetuates this problem, draining Israel’s right to self-defense of all content and significance.

Undoubtedly, the State of Israel must make every effort to preserve its special relationship with the United States, as a fundamental pillar of its national security. The United States’ support on both political and military levels – and, in times of great need, on the economic level too – is essential. It is also important to show respect for the United States, as well as its president, ensuring that disagreements are dealt with behind the scenes, instead of in full public view. However, it seems that, with each passing day, a new line is crossed in the U.S. Administration’s attitude toward Israel.

President Biden is fostering Hamas’ narrative with regard to the number of civilian casualties, repeating reports made by “the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza,” which is yet another unit of Hamas, even though the United States likely has its own objective assessment of the number of civilian casualties in Gaza. Indeed, an analysis published by the authors of the present paper shows that the ratio of terrorists killed during the war versus civilians, i.e., collateral damage, is significantly lower compared to that of wars in urban spaces waged by the United States and its allies in recent decades. Similar findings were presented in other analysts’ reports. Nevertheless, President Biden uses false Hamas numbers while declaring that he will not allow Israel to keep killing innocent civilians, as if that was the aim of this war, or typical Israeli conduct.

Furthermore, while talking to a reporter, President Biden was caught on a hot mic saying “I told him, Bibi, and don’t repeat this, but you and I are going to have a ‘come to Jesus’ meeting.” Similar sentiments were expressed by Vice President Kamala Harris, who drew a distinction between the Israeli people and their elected government, and Democratic Majority Leader Senator Chuck Schumer, who said during a speech in the Senate that Netanyahu has lost his way, and called for Israeli elections.

These statements and others are examples of blatant and uncalled-for intervention by U.S. officials in Israeli politics. The United States has meddled in Israeli politics before, and more than once, but these days its interference is particularly public and blunt. America’s conduct depicts Israel as a “banana republic,” as Netanyahu has stated, weakening it in its campaign against Hamas. This conduct gives the terrorist group and its Palestinian supporters a tailwind, encouraging Hamas to insist that its demands be met while it rebuilds its governing and military capabilities, and holds on tightly to what remaining powers it has in and around Rafah.

Instead of sending a team to Washington – especially so overtly – Israel should find a way to present its case to the United States discreetly right here in Israel. The Head of CENTCOM visited Israel several times since the war broke out and has staff permanently based here. That would have at least spared Israel the problematic side effects of this delegation. Sending a delegation to Washington would be blindly running to the American bear’s open arms. Therefore, it should come as no surprise if this bear hug ends in the resounding crunching of bones.

The growing tension between Washington and Jerusalem, which this week escalated into blunt messages towards Benjamin Netanyahu from President Joe Biden, makes it that much worse for the IDF to ensure it would have the freedom of operation in Gaza. It also presents Israel’s civilian leadership with a challenge: Is there a way to achieve the war objectives in Gaza without escalating the confrontation with the Biden administration and losing the support of the White House?

Biden’s standing by Israel at the start of the war will be remembered as one of the high points in the special relationship between the countries. But this has been blunted by the passage of time, the images from Gaza, the disputes over the “day after”, and domestic US politics ahead of the presidential elections, all of which have made relations tense and delicate.

While Biden says that he continues to support the goals Israel has defined for the war, the limits he has placed on Israel make achieving them an almost impossible task.

The points of friction can be summed up as follows:

Israeli action in Rafah

Hamas’ brigade in Rafah, with its four battalions, constitutes one-fifth of the organization’s military force. In addition to its missions, it is also responsible for the stretch of border connecting Gaza to the outside world via Egypt. Through it, weapons, technical equipment, operatives, and commanders are smuggled in. Terrorists from other areas of the strip have found refuge in Rafah during the fighting. Does anyone really think that Hamas’ rule and military capabilities can be defeated without action in Rafah?

Reducing Palestinian casualties

Biden expects the fighting to continue while reducing Palestinian civilian casualties. He relies on data from Hamas’ Ministry of Health, whose reliability is unclear, and is not satisfied with the IDF’s evidence of an extremely low fatality ratio of “uninvolved” vs. combatants, partly thanks to population evacuation and stringent precautions taken by Israeli troops, which some say are overly stringent.

Should the entire burden be on Israel’s shoulders? Have they thought in Washington about persuading Egypt to allow temporary humanitarian refuge in Egyptian Rafah to enable the fighting? At a time when the US, the EU, and other countries are providing billions of dollars in aid to the Egyptian economy, this option could have been seriously considered as well.

Increasing humanitarian aid

Biden’s demand to increase humanitarian aid and related initiatives (airdrops, maritime pier) show that his administration has not internalized that the problem is not delivering aid to the strip, but its distribution within it. Hamas will take control of everything that enters. It will use it to supply its fighters (and prolong their ability to fight) and strengthen its rule. The way to prevent this is to deliver the aid to areas that Hamas would not be able to access it, which could also be achieved by establishing a humanitarian refuge in the Egyptian side of Rafah.

An “improved Palestinian Authority” in Gaza

Another issue straining relations with the Americans is the Israeli position regarding the establishment of an “improved Palestinian Authority” in Gaza. The Biden administration has not internalized the suspicion Israelis harbor towards the PA and its current or former leaders, and to the possibility of establishing a Palestinian government in the terror city that will not cooperate with Hamas.

The US’ posture of discounting the extent of public support for Hamas in Gaza, and the fact that it is entrenched in all spheres of life in the strip has had the administration hold on to an optimistic assessment regarding the ability to bring about deep change through governmental models under Arab or international auspices, detached from Hamas. As long as there remains a strong, organized, and armed core of the terror organization in Gaza, it will have effective control over the strip.

“Regional integration” and a “Palestinian state”

Looming over all these issues is the disagreement over America’s vision, which seeks to create regional integration that includes peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The war provided the Biden administration with an opportunity to bring about a new regional order. The president also needs this ahead of his elections, but from Israel’s perspective, normalization with Saudi Arabia will not compensate for Hamas’ non-defeat.

Talk of a “Palestinian state” after the Oct. 7 massacre constitutes a prize for Hamas and also expresses a lack of understanding of the sentiment in the Israeli public. Anyone who thinks that after the October events Israel will take risks like those taken in the past lives in La La Land. 

The root problem

The root of the dispute between Washington and Jerusalem concerns the meaning of the war, which brought Israel back to the realization that it is still fighting for its existence. The Biden administration has not internalized that for Israel, the defeat of Hamas is an existential issue. It is not like America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were conducted thousands of miles away.

The players in our region are keeping a watchful eye on what is unfolding. Their posture and conduct toward Israel will be influenced by the results. The deterrence that collapsed on October 7 will not be restored if Israel stops short of meeting the goals it has defined for the war. An Israeli failure will have it face an existential threat, the temptation to attack it will grow, and its diplomatic standing will be severely crippled. Therefore, the room for maneuver that Israel can afford is highly constricted.

Biden expects the fighting to continue while reducing the scope of civilian casualties.

The administration’s approach plays into Hamas’ hands and has granted Hamas freebies: A delay in action in Rafah and increased humanitarian aid – conditions that help it reassert its control. The pressure from Washington moves Israel closer to a war of attrition, whose costs are high and its duration is difficult to control. They even push away America’s hopes of advancing a deal for the release of the captives.

So what should we do?

First, continue public diplomacy and persuasion efforts with administration officials and the American people despite the slim chances of moving the needle. 

Second, increase efforts in areas where there is no dispute: targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders abroad, raids on targets in the strip where signs of Hamas has been rearing its head. 

Third, promote the establishment of temporary humanitarian shelters, in Egyptian Rafah (with Egyptian consent) or the strip (such as in the Dahaniya area near Rafah), and accelerate preparations for action in Rafah.

In the spirit of President Biden’s words, in the speech he gave after the massacre: “Hamas’ stated purpose is the annihilation of the State of Israel and the murder of Jewish people. Israel has the right to respond — indeed has a duty to respond – to these vicious attacks.”

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 17, 2024. 

• The allegations of a humanitarian crisis are subjecting Israel to greater critical pressure yet fail to touch on the core issue.
• The question of humanitarian aid has also been linked to the issue of “the day after” and has accordingly impeded Israel’s continued waging of the war, particularly with regards the preparations for a military campaign in Rafah, which forms a crucial prerequisite for achieving the war’s objectives and ending it.
• For the humanitarian aid to reach its proper destination, Hamas’s military and government capabilities across the entire strip must be eradicated. This necessitates Israeli control of the area, which would also make it clear to the people that the era of Hamas rule in Gaza is now over.
• In the current state of affairs, the only reasonable, relevant and effective option seems to be the establishment of a provisional Israeli military government, initially in the north of the strip and later, as the circumstances may allow, also in the center camps and Khan Younis area.
• Establishing a military government would serve three key purposes: First, it would provide the civilian population with the humanitarian aid it requires and would do so other than through UNRWA or Hamas, thereby preventing that aid from falling into Hamas’s hands or being looted by the masses. Second, it would debilitate Hamas and send a clear signal to the people of Gaza that Hamas is no longer an option for governing the strip after the war. Third, it would lay the groundwork and set the stage for introducing an international-regional administration that will assume the responsibility for administering the area and the population and for initiating the process of the strip’s rehabilitation, while also mentoring and training a local civilian administration unaffiliated and unassociated with Hamas.
• This process should optimally form part of a broader, more long-term vision, where a prospective alliance is to be based on the establishment of a new regional architecture providing both the Palestinians and Israel with new horizons.

The incident during which 118 Palestinians (according to a report from the Hamas Ministry of Health in Gaza) were crushed to death and run over while looting humanitarian aid trucks has become a sore point of contention between Israel and the U.S. and has occasioned pressures and criticisms both on the part of the international community and of sympathetic Arab countries. Allegations of humanitarian crisis are subjecting Israel to greater critical pressure yet fail to touch on the core issue.

The scope of the humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, as well as that of the aid still waiting to enter due to restrictions imposed by UNRWA, is sufficient to meet the needs of the people. However, the bulk of that aid is being looted by Hamas, both for consumption by the organization’s own members and for the purpose of selling it to the needy at exorbitant prices. This is the main reason for the Gazans’ swarming of the aid trucks and this also what caused the incident in which Palestinians were killed during such an attempt. Aid airdrops fail to provide a proper response. And providing additional aid by sea, without a security system put in place by the IDF – thereby constituting an element of military government – would fail to solve this problem and would serve more as a PR ploy than an attempt to truly address the issue.

The question of humanitarian aid has also been linked to the issue of “the day after” and has accordingly impeded Israel’s continued waging of the war, particularly with regards the preparations for a military campaign in Rafah, which forms a crucial prerequisite for achieving the war’s objectives and ending it.

Decision-makers in the U.S. and international community entities are presumably aware of the facts. It is clear that for the humanitarian aid to reach its proper destination Hamas military and government capabilities must be eliminated. Achieving this objective necessitates Israeli control of the area. This also would make it clear to Gazans that the era of Hamas rule in Gaza is over, eroding the widespread popular support enjoyed by Hamas, and in turn leading Hamas to the realization that it cannot as the governing power.

Some 200,000-300,000 civilians still reside in northern Gaza. Several thousand are terrorists and members of the Hamas apparatus. The IDF is still operating there to destroy terrorist infrastructures and eliminate terrorists, above and below ground. Despite the military achievements attained in that area, and despite the operational freedom of action enjoyed by the IDF and its impressive intelligence capabilities, Hamas persists in its efforts to take military action, in the form of terrorist and guerilla strikes, while also recovering its civilian hold over the area.

The IDF is going to great lengths to transport humanitarian aid into the north of the strip, but Hamas continues looting aid trucks and Gazan crowds continue to swarm the convoys. Any food truck or convoy becomes a source of unchecked chaos and loss of human life. Even airdrops fail to solve the problem of distributing the aid. The U.S. airdrop campaign serves to signal the American dissatisfaction with Israel’s conduct, causing the U.S. to effectively override Israel’s strategy and curtail its area of operation. This sends a message both to Gaza’s civilian population and to Hamas that the international pressure being exerted on Israel could yet bring about a premature end to the war before its objectives have been attained – which would signify a Hamas victory.

The range of options available for improving the current humanitarian situation remain limited. This impairs the international legitimacy of the IDF’s continued campaign for attaining the war’s objectives. It seems that only full Israeli control over aid distribution can solve the problem. Establishment of a provisional Israeli military government, initially in the north of Gaza, and later as circumstances may allow also in the center and Khan Younis, is the only reasonable, relevant and effective option.

Israel has the operational and organizational capability to institute a provisional military government that will assume the responsibility for administering the area and the population.

Establishing such a military government would serve three key purposes:

First, it would provide the civilian population with the humanitarian aid it requires and would do so other than through UNRWA or Hamas, thereby preventing that aid from falling into Hamas’s hands or being looted by the masses. This would be in keeping with the norms of international law and would also serve the purpose of increasing the IDF’s operational freedom of action to attain the war’s objectives.

Second, it would debilitate Hamas, do away with its remaining government and military capabilities in the area and send a clear signal to the people of Gaza that Hamas is no longer an option for governing the strip after the war. Such a signal could certainly chip away at the organization’s considerable remaining support among the strip’s civilian population, increasing the domestic pressure exerted on it.

Third, it would lay the groundwork and set the stage for introducing an international-regional administration that will assume the responsibility for administering the area and the population and for initiating the process of the strip’s rehabilitation, while also mentoring and training a local civilian administration unaffiliated and unassociated with Hamas.

Northen Gaza could be the first area to undergo these changes. The population’s relatively small size, as well as Hamas’s military weakness in that area, form a relatively advantageous foundation for establishing military rule. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories is ready for instituting military rule and would know how to get the job done. A military government, as opposed to a civilian administration, is run by a military commander and backed by armed forces. That military commander, with the aid of professional entities from COGAT, would be able to find the ways to access relevant entities among the civilian population, to have them operate the civil aid mechanisms (or operate it in collaboration with them). The armed forces stationed in the area will secure the humanitarian activity and enable its optimization. Concurrently, the IDF will act to dismantle Hamas’s remaining government and military infrastructures in the area, helping create a safer environment.

Israel must make it patently clear that the military government in question is temporary, and the process must be accompanied by advocacy and awareness-raising activity with the relevant target audiences (the international community, the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip, the public in Israel, and Arab countries). Concurrently, Israel must act in close coordination with the U.S. and with major Arab countries in the region to channel the aid efforts and coordinate them through the military government and to lay the groundwork required for establishing an international-regional administration.

When the war ends, that administration will assume the responsibility for administering the Gaza Strip and its residents and for spearheading the process of the strip’s rehabilitation, while also training a local administration which will then be delegated powers in gradual and responsible fashion, until it reaches functional independence. Israel must persuade its partners that this is a necessary and temporary stage, clarifying the connection between the proposed process and a “day after” plan for Gaza.

This process should optimally form part of a broader, more long-term vision, where a prospective alliance is to be based on the establishment of a new regional architecture resting on the foundation of the normalization processes between Israel and Arab countries in the region, with an emphasis on Saudi Arabia. Israel must build a convincing case indicating that a new regional architecture would provide both the Palestinians and Israel with new horizons of the kind that is currently lacking, and which cannot be formed on the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian level which has long ago run its course.

That regional architecture must provide the framework for the profound change required on the Palestinian side, including the dismantling of the PA’s armed forces in Judea and Samaria, leaving them only the ability to carry out policing work and uphold public order; stopping the payments being made to jailed terrorists and their families; putting an end to the incitement pervasive in the curriculum and replacing their corrupt leadership with a different civil government. This is to be done concurrently with establishing a civil apparatus in the Gaza Strip, as two parallel processes taking place under absolute security control by the IDF both in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip.

Israel’s current avoidance of discussing the option of military government – let alone promoting such a course of action – is detrimental to the attainment of the war’s objectives, accelerates the continued impairment of Israel’s international legitimacy to continue the war, and reduces the likelihood of changing the regional architecture. Stagnation will merely serve to increase the current friction with the U.S. government and lead to the recurrence of deplorable incidents during the looting of aid trucks, putting lives at risk.

Ultimately, whether as a result of U.S. pressure to secure the humanitarian aid set to arrive by sea or following yet another escalation of the humanitarian situation, we would end up at the same outcome, against Israel’s volition and after suffering a heavy toll. Thus, in the absence of other relevant options, it is both proper and imperative that Israel act to shape the reality and take the course of action most necessary at this time.

Even as the fighting in the Gaza Strip continues, Israel faces challenges and threats from another six fronts: The West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and the diplomatic-legal international system. It is vital that Israel act wisely in juggling security and diplomatic efforts, but that is not enough. Recognizing we are in an existential struggle, being confident of our cause, resolve, and solidarity – are key to success on all fronts.

Just like last week’s attack near Ma’ale Adumim and the previous week’s attack at the Masmia Junction, the attack in Eli on Thursday should not come as a surprise. The “inspiration” supplied by the war in Gaza, the calls from terror group leaders to West Bank residents to join the struggle and open an active front against Israel, and Al-Jazeera’s ongoing fanning of the flames of revenge have created an atmosphere conducive to carrying out such attacks.

The availability of arms and the friction with IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians complete the three conditions required for this: motive, means, and targets. What has curbed the potential so far is mainly the intensive thwarting efforts by security forces: the scale of arrests, demolitions of terrorist residences, and operations – including pinpointed raids and steps against terror networks. It is possible the shock from the October 7 attack and fear among West Bank terror groups that they are the main target of the Israeli rage that followed could also explain the Israeli counterterrorism successes as of late. But if that is the case, we would likely see additional attempts to carry out attacks as this effect wears off.

To rise to this challenge, Israeli security forces should lower the suspicion threshold for preventative steps. This could be in part by adopting some elements of the policy practiced in Jenin and northern Samaria to other areas, fast-tracking the decisions to carry out home demolitions, and increasing efforts to thwart weapons production or smuggling. The high presence of security personnel and armed civilians increases the likelihood of quick and effective responses. The IDF and police would be wise to invest in public advocacy to explain to the public how to act when they are caught in a terrorist attack, to minimize risks of friendly fire.

In its Gaza war, Israel needs a decisive, unambiguous, and indisputable victory. The October 7 deterrence will not be restored if the narrative emerges that Israel had not achieved its goals despite being subjected to the atrocities of Oct. 7 and after so many troops were deployed for this operation. If that narrative were to emerge, it would face an existential threat, its enemies would feel even more inclined to attack, and its diplomatic stature would suffer a lethal blow. Regional and international players – enemies, friends, and neutral actors  – are keeping a watchful eye on developments. Their stance and conduct towards Israel will be affected by Gaza’s results. While not the sole reason, this makes it all the more evident Israel has no alternative but to pursue the war’s goals until they are fully met.

The IDF’s achievements so far are impressive. They have, in themselves, the ability to demonstrate – at least to Hezbollah – Israel’s military prowess and its civilian strength should large-scale hostilities emerge in the north.

But much work remains: Hamas’ Rafah brigade – with its four battalions – has yet to be dismantled. The combatworthiness of Hamas’ top brass and rank and file are intact.  The scale of damage to the tunneling infrastructure and weapons is hard to assess, but it is premature to declare them destroyed.

Under such conditions, Hamas recovery could be swift, especially with the capabilities and mechanisms of many undamaged government institutions at its disposal. Therefore, Israel must not fall for offers that would bring an end to the war, even if the wording is tailored so that it is easier to sell to the public.

On this matter, one cannot compromise, not even in the face of political pressures or attempts to exploit the captive issue to halt the IDF. Hamas will likely not agree to a “grand bargain” without guarantees to end fighting and security/civilian arrangements ensuring the continued rule of the strip. Israel of course cannot agree to such a deal. Thus, the practical path forward, as seen by mediators, is a phased deal. If so, we should strive to release as many captives as possible at the lowest possible price, and in any event, without preventing Israel from resuming combat operations.

Negotiations over the captives should continue while increasing pressure on Hamas, including by targeting its overseas leaders and demanding Washington utilize its significant lever on Qatar.

Even before the facts came out, Arab countries and the world quickly pinned the blame on Israel for the incident that saw some 100 Palestinians trampled to death when running toward aid trucks brought into northern Gaza. There is no reason to doubt the IDF spokesperson’s version and the initial military probe’s findings, but one must assume these will mainly convince those already convinced. Hamas leaders gleefully rubbing their hands at Israeli “entanglement” see the civilians’ deaths as reasonable payment for added political pressure on Israel, especially ahead of the planned Rafah operation.

In the conditions created in Gaza, there is no practical, safe way to enable civilian aid to the population without it being seized by Hamas, unless the IDF distributes it. As we learned with UNRWA, one cannot rely on the “neutrality” of international bodies, or expect them to withstand Hamas pressure. The same holds for foreign states, regionally and beyond. The notion that the Palestinian Authority could do this without being at the mercy of Hamas ignores the intra-strip power dynamic.

To meet this challenge, again consider establishing “de-escalation zones” with no Hamas access, where humanitarian aid would be provided solely to the population. This removes Hamas aid control, preventing both equipping its people and strengthening its standing and governance.

One way or another, the incident must not cause retreat or backing off by Israel in its efforts to dismantle Hamas’ rule. As The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center said in a new report, many Hamas governmental and public institutions continue to function either fully or in some partial capacity, including the government spokesperson’s office and ministries responsible for operating security agencies and the Hamas home front. It makes no sense to let such institutions and apparatuses continue to operate, as they are designed to help Hamas cement its control.

Despite the short-term costs this process may incur, halting their activity is a necessary step in the path toward replacing Hamas.

Published in Israel Hayom,   February 23, 2024.

There is a new, insidious and demeaning narrative taking root in Washington and other Western capitals, as well as in the international media, about Israelis. The storyline is that Israelis are too shocked and wounded by the Hamas attacks of October 7 to think straight; that they are too “traumatized” by the massacres of Simchat Torah to move smartly towards the “necessary and inevitable” two-state solution.

In this account, Israelis are too angry and revengeful to realize that Palestinian statehood is in their own self-interest. Accordingly, the politically correct class of international experts will have to impose Palestinian statehood on Israel for its own good, which it is too “traumatized” to clearly see.

A classic example of such patronizing, condescending analysis was the front-page New York Times story last weekend by Steven Erlanger, its star chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, “who has reported from over 120 countries, including Thailand, France, Israel, Germany and the former Soviet Union.”

Erlanger “reported from Jerusalem, Army Base Julis, Tel Aviv, and Beersheba to try to get a sense of Israel’s mood four months into the war against Hamas.” His conclusion: Israelis are too “traumatized” to move forward. The word “traumatized” appeared no less than six times in his story.

Israelis are “newly vulnerable, traumatized, and mistrustful,” and therefore, “the idea of a Palestinian state seems further away than ever, as Israel’s Jews move rightward (and its Palestinians fear a backlash),” opined the chief European diplomatic correspondent.

A similar snooty analysis appeared yesterday in Foreign Affairs (the prestigious journal of the New York-based Council on Foreign Affairs, which reflects mainstream Democratic administration thinking). The inveterate US peace processor Martin Indyk pumps for the “resurrection of the two-state solution” as the inexorable, logical result of the latest Hamas-Israel “clash.” Sure enough, he argues that the US has to help Israel move past the “trauma that all Israelis suffered on October 7.”

Indyk’s advice to US President Joe Biden is to “make clear the choice facing Israelis.” They can continue on the road to a forever war with the Palestinians, or they can embrace a US day-after plan for solve-all Palestinian statehood and peace with Saudi Arabia. Biden, he argues, should pitch the deal directly to the Israeli public in a way that “would shift its attention from the trauma of October 7.”

So, this is all that needs doing. America and the well-meaning world, whose statesmen are thinking astutely (unlike Israel’s backwards leaders and tormented public), have to “shift Israeli attention” from the “traumas” of attack by Hamas!

They must massage Israeli feelings, give Israel a big hug, offer soothing “guarantees” of Palestinian demilitarization (even though Israel has been given such generous assurances before; remember the halcyon Oslo Accords?), and then nudge (force) Israel “forward” towards the good-old familiar and prudent two-state “solution.”

But what if Israelis are not “traumatized” by October 7, but rather animated and alert? What if they are not intellectual weaklings, wounded babies who have to be coddled and coaxed into making adult decisions? What if Israelis are thinking straight?

Could it be that after 30 years of peace process perfidies and assaults, Israelis have reached intelligent, realistic conclusions that are different than those of Martin Indyk or US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken? Perhaps they have judiciously determined that, at least in the near term, Palestinian statehood is the wrong policy; that this would only give a prize to the genocidal terrorists?

What if Israelis think that only when the well-armed (by Iran) enemies on their southern and northern borders are resoundingly defeated (and this may take a decade of warfare) can a moderate compromise peace emerge?

What if Israelis have coldly concluded that only when the Palestinian national movement is deradicalized (and this might take a decade or more of tough medicine) might a diplomatic deal be possible? And what if a grand takeaway is that less-threatening long-term alternatives must replace the so-called EKP (“every knows paradigm”) involving full-scale, runaway Palestinian statehood?

Yes, Israelis indeed are wounded and angry. However, this has sharpened their thinking, not clouded it. In my view, Israelis hold pertinent, well-rooted understandings of their diplomatic challenges and opportunities. They are informed and enlightened, reenergized patriotically, determined to defeat all enemies and to rebuild Israel more magnificently than ever. They remain ready to grab diplomatic breakthroughs where such are realistically possible.

Let us be clear: Israelis are not enfeebled, immobilized, or confused. They will not brook global contempt.

Another parallel, sinister narrative that can be heard here and there is that Israeli “rage” has dictated IDF battlefield behavior; that the Israeli military has gone berserk, bombing the hell out of Gaza indiscriminately – and committing war crimes along the way.

In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas massacres and rapes, the world “understood” this rage and swallowed the furious IDF counter-assault, but now Israeli “rage” has taken the fight too far. So goes the storyline.

This false, malicious tale must be debunked, too. The opposite is true: Israel has kept its “rage” firmly in check. Its military has fought against Hamas in Gaza with precision and professionalism, accepting upon itself restrictions and limitations far beyond that of any army in history – anywhere, under any circumstances. Unchained rage using Israel’s full firepower would have looked vastly different.

Here too, the insinuation of Israeli “rage” driving government policy and military operations is superciliousness; an arrogant attempt to paint Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet as dangerous actors, as out-of-control lawless children that must be corralled into reason (or prison).

Again, Israel cannot brook such global contempt. By and large, Israelis say to the world: Keep your chutzpah in check. Do not try to lord over Israel with your mistaken assumptions and smug solutions. Israel more than deserves the benefit of the doubt as it fights for its long-term security and makes apt decisions about the right radius of diplomacy.

Published in the Jerusalem Post,  February 23, 2024. 

On February 14, the Washington Post reported that the Biden administration and several Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are seeking to present a detailed and comprehensive plan for a peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians. This plan would include a timeline for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The report further noted that this initiative, tied directly to the intense efforts to reach an Israel-Hamas agreement that would lead to a pause in the fighting and the release of hostages, could be announced within the next several weeks.

A Israel-Hamas ceasefire, projected to last for at least six weeks, would provide time to make such a plan public, and to take concrete steps toward its implementation, including the formation of an interim Palestinian government. Planners hope an agreement between Israel and Hamas can be reached before the beginning of Ramadan on March 10, 2024, but fear that an Israeli operation in Rafah will bring the initiative to a screeching halt.

The “elephant in the room”, say the leaders of the initiative, is, of course, the Israeli Government. It is unlikely that the current Israeli Goverment will acquiesce to the withdrawal of Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, the reconstruction of Gaza, and the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza under one authority. To encourage Israel not to reject the plan, its authors suggest offering Israel security guarantees and normalization with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

Israeli Government ministers, such as Ministers Smotrich and Kisch, were quick to reject the initiative in its entirety. In an interview with ABC, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, when asked about his view on a Palestinian state, embraced a more sophisticated approach: “Everybody who talks about a two-state solution”, he told the interviewer, “I ask, what do you mean by that exactly? Should they continue to teach their children based on text books educating for terrorism and Israel’s annihilation? To that I say, of course not. The most important power that has to remain in Israel’s hands is overriding security control in the area west of the Jordan river”.

According to reports, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent trip to the region and the visits to Washington by Qatar’s prime minister and the King of Jordan, have focused on “the substance and the sequence of all the steps” needed to set “a practical, timebound, irreversible path to a Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with Israel”. Blinken’s initiative has garnered both direct and indirect support from other countries. British Foreign Secretary David Cameron has expressed public interest in early recognition of a Palestinian state. A similar statement was issued by Sven Koopmans, the European Union’s special representative for the Middle East peace process.

US officials said their administration is considering early recognition of a Palestinian state, security guarantees for both Israel and the Palestinians, the pursuit of normalization, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Officials in the Arab world and the Palestinian Authority were very skeptical about this initiative’s chances of implementation. They recalled that similar roadmaps, particualrly under the Obama administration, had failed in the past. Throughout the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, they noted, President Biden has shown little inclination to stand up to Israel’s masive offensive steps in the Gaza Strip, demanding only that Israel allow in more humanitarian aid and reduce civilian casualties.

From Israel and its Government’s perspective, this initiative poses multiple risks. It would most probably involve the demand that Israel cease all fighting even though the objectives set for this war have yet to be achieved. Such a development would be detrimental to Israel’s image of deterrence, leading it to be seen as a country that had sustained a terrible blow on October 7, and that for five months, has been unable to contend with the terrorist group which attacked it in a decisive manner.

Another risk is that countries which have signed peace agreements with Israel, primarily the countries party to the Abraham Accords, will view Israel as a country that cannot take a stand against the United States. Israel’s appeal as an ally would be greatly weakened, and other Muslim countries that may have considered joining the peace process would hesitate to do so.

The question is how Israel should react. We believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s “yes, but” response, as exemplified by his June 14, 2009 ‘Bar Ilan’ speech, given during the Obama Administration, is better than an absolute rejection of the initiative and a complete unwillingness to take part in any of the steps it entails.

At present, Israel can make weighty and justified arguments that would put the planners of the initiative on the defense. It could, for instance, claim that it would be hard-pressed to take on the risk of a Palestinian state so long as it faces the existential threat posed by Iran. It could argue that discussions regarding a Palestinian state must be left until after the Iranian threat has been diffused. Israel could also demand that the Palestinian leadership publicly recognize the State of Israel as the Jewish People’s nation-state, as well as express its willingness to launch a massive reform of the text books used in the Palestinian Authority and Gaza Strip, and stop payments made to terrorists.

On a deeper level, and beyond all of these important conditions, Israel should make it clear that the path to a Palestinian state requires a fundamental change in the Palestinian Authority. The latter must prove its ability to act as sovereign, assuming responsibility for the territory and population of which it is in charge. Since the Palestinian Authority has to make considerable progress and changes to its leadership, while fundamentally altering its conduct, a Palestinian state can only be established at the end of this process, not at its outset. It is further important to emphasize that the very complex reality in the Gaza Strip requires its own unique and elaborate solution, and therefore, any attempt to combine the crumbling Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with the Gaza Strip will lead to utter failure in both.

The right attitude is, therefore, to think and speak in terms of a process and arrangement based on proof of performance, enabling the two territorial Palestinian units to be rehabilitated simultaneously and independently, and only then to discuss the possibility of combining them. This should all be done as part of the new regional architecture that would be based on normalization between Israel and the Arab states, particualrly Saudi Arabia. This new regional architecture could provide the support system for processes required in the Palestinian arena, and create new areas of opportunity that would allow both Israel and the Palestinians greater latitude.

We believe that Israel should present its own initiative based on an order of actions that begins with the regional setting, and that continues both with the implementaition of the changes required in the Palestinian Authority, and the reconstrucion of the Gaza Strip. Reform of the PA and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip should be seen as two distinct and seperate processes. The reconstruciton of the Gaza Strip must be predicated on the dismantling of Hamas’ governmental and military systems in Gaza, and the release of all the hostages, alongside a demand for full operation security freedom for Israel within the Strip.

We believe that an Israeli proposal that would correspond with the initiative being formulated will be welcomed and understood far better than an absolute rejection of the plan offered. It would be the right approach both topically and tactically, while serving Israel’s strategic interests.

The Qatar-based Al Jazeera television network is an evil empire. It glorifies Hamas, including its “heroic” massacres of October 7 and ongoing “resistance” against Israel, and all forms of Iranian proxy terrorism against Israel. It aids Hamas by reporting on IDF troop movements in Gaza and on IDF forces concentrated along the Gaza border. It is actively drumming up Ramadan terrorism against Israelis too.

There are ways of blocking Al Jazeera’s broadcasts from Israel and the territories and its reception in Israel and the territories, but Israel needs to gum up the gumption to do so despite Qatar’s protected status as a mediator between Israel and Hamas in the hostage matter.

Cutting Al Jazeera down to size on the international scene is long overdue. The network hosts the most virile antisemitic, radical Islamic preachers who poison the minds of millions against Israel and the West.

Closing down Al Jazeera’s operations in Israel by stripping its reporters of their press credentials has been on the agenda ever since then-communications minister Ayoob Kara raised the matter in 2017 after Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE took steps to shutter Al Jazeera offices and block its websites.

These countries are targets for Al Jazeera’s poisons because they are not in the pro-Iranian or radical Islamic camps. Al Jazeera supported Osama bin Laden’s calls to overthrow the monarchy in Saudi Arabia and support for the Muslim Brotherhood overthrow of President Mubarak in Egypt, the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra’s campaign against President Assad in Syria, and more.

Current Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi has made ending Al Jazeera’s incitement to terrorism a key goal since his first day in office. He worked hard to get Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, the General Security Services, the Mossad, and the ministries of justice and defense to sign on.

This week, the full Israeli cabinet voted in favor of regulations that would ban the “operations of a foreign broadcasting operation that harms the security of the state,” and certainly for the duration of the current war, in which, again, Al Jazeera has broadcast sensitive information about IDF operations to Israel’s enemies alongside its usual fare of agitation to violence.

The ban could and should be extended as well to the Qatari-owned Al-Araby station and the Hezbollah-operated Al-Mayadeen outlet.

But the security cabinet and inner war cabinet have not yet decided to carry out the shutdown of Al Jazeera, even though all necessary security and legal consultations have been properly completed and the government has voted in favor. Upsetting the key backer of Hamas and the owner and funder of Al Jazeera, Sheikh Tamim ibn Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, is apparently “problematic” when Israel is (mistakenly, in my view) relying on the emir to deliver a hostage release deal.

Yigal Carmon, the former counter-terrorism adviser to prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin and founder of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), has long warned that Al Jazeera and Al-Araby are “Goebbels-like channels that function as megaphones for Iran’s and Hamas’s military, operational, and propaganda messages. Their impact on both the ideological and operational levels is enormous.”

In 2020, Carmon’s research center published an unassailable, massive study (with an index of over 700 video clips) that proves Al Jazeera’s evils over two decades of reporting on so many levels, showing it to be a strategic threat to the stability of the Middle East and, in particular, to Western interests. Al Jazeera was shown to be a platform for global jihad, antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and the naked support of anti-Israel terrorism.

MEMRI has also tracked and exposed the reporting of Al Jazeera from both sides of the Gaza border in the current conflict, reporting that both endangers IDF forces and celebrates Hamas’s mega-terror attack.

On October 7, the day of the Hamas massacre, Al Jazeera presenter Tamer Almisshal celebrated the events, writing, “Gaza manufactures victory and honor for its homeland and nation.” Al Jazeera anchor Ahmad Mansour circulated a video showing Hamas terrorists dragging two Israeli soldiers on the ground and stated: “This historic picture is worth as much as the hundreds of billions of dollars that the world’s Zionists have invested in Israel in the last decades.”

In a post in response to President Joe Biden’s comment that Hamas “does not represent the aspirations of the Palestinian people,” Al Jazeera presenter Ghada Oueiss wrote, “Seriously? Has brother [Biden] polled our opinion on this?”

Last month, the IDF revealed that two Al Jazeera “journalists” killed by the IDF in Gaza were members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This week, Al Jazeera reporter Ismail Abu Omar, who was wounded in an Israeli airstrike near Rafah, was also exposed as a deputy company commander in Hamas’s East Khan Younis Battalion. He even infiltrated into Israel from Gaza on October 7 and filmed from inside Kibbutz Nir Oz during Hamas’s onslaught. Another reporter, Muhammed Wishah, was discovered to be, according to the IDF, “an Al Jazeera journalist by day and a Hamas terrorist (in an anti-tank unit) by night.”

Which brings us back to Israeli policy. Action against Al Jazeera is urgent because of the approaching Ramadan, which always serves as an excuse or opportunity for ramped-up terrorist activity against Israeli Jews in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, and central Israel. Hamas is openly calling upon Palestinians in these areas to join its “Al Aqsa Flood” assault on Israel through terrorism, and Al Jazeera is echoing and amplifying this message.

Proponents of “free speech” and shills for the Palestinians argue that barring Al Jazeera journalists from operating in Israel is a slippery slope towards dictatorship (as if dictatorship in Gaza or Qatar ever bothered them), and that anyway, such a move would be ineffective since Al Jazeera will continue to broadcast freely from Gaza.

Which is exactly why Israel should go further by blocking internet access in Gaza and hacking into and taking down Al Jazeera websites everywhere it can – at least freezing access to Al Jazeera Arabic sites in Israel. the West Bank and Gaza.

Yes, I know that Al Jazeera broadcasts its news programs into Palestinian homes over satellite and not only the internet, but I have to believe that the “Start-Up Nation,” super-hi-tech wizard Israel, knows how to jam satellite reception of Al Jazeera as well.

A determined Israeli takedown of Al Jazeera should also serve as a clarion call to leaders in Washington and elsewhere to finally act decisively in their domiciles against the dangerous network. If anti-terrorist and police forces in the US, Canada, and Europe were to look closely, I bet they would find that Al Jazeera is fanning the flames of the hateful, aggressive anti-Israel and anti-Western demonstrations that are mushrooming in their major cities.

And all those in Israel and the West who dream of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority forming a peaceful state alongside Israel one day into the distant future surely must understand that acting now to curb the insidious influence of Al Jazeera, which is genocidal towards Israel and the Western-backed Palestinian Authority alike, is imperative.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 16, 2024/