The statements coming out of the White House in which it claimed the US was not calling for a ceasefire in Gaza at this point could not undo the harsh impression left by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Israel. So too was the attempt to put the normalization talks with Saudi Arabia back on the agenda.

The Biden administration understands full well the importance of achieving a resounding victory over Hamas in Gaza. It would like Israel to get it done quickly. However, it has been asking many things from Israel – and by doing so it has only prolonged the path to victory and has been imposing a burden on Israeli shoulders.

Washington has been pressuring Israel to scale back the fighting, significantly increase the scope of humanitarian aid (knowing that most of it reaches Hamas), and launch a process with the UN(!) that will allow the return of the residents of northern Gaza to their homes. All this only exacerbates the operational challenges facing our forces. It also provides a backwind for Hamas by having its leaders hope that they will be able to drag Israel into a war of attrition that will end in an “arrangement.”

What’s more – the administration’s demands also make it harder to secure the release of the captives by alleviating the pressure on Hamas and allowing it to harden its stance.

One cannot sweep under the rug Hamas’ tunnels by wishing them away with “regional integration.” Likewise, its many arms and the large military force that remains in the area will not simply disappear. The damage Israel has inflicted on Hamas so far is painful but not fatal. After the events of October 7, this cannot suffice.

Even if it takes a long time to achieve the goals – there should be no compromise on that. Even those who struggle to define Gaza as a “Hamas state” understand that as long as there is a strong, organized, and armed core of the terrorist organization there – it will be the central power broker and everything will call the shots.

Jerusalem will have to continue maneuvering between the desire to maintain Biden’s support and assistance (for which it deserves appreciation) while heeding the demands it has put forth, which constrain Israel.

It would not be right to allow the residents of northern Gaza to return to their homes before the tunnel network beneath them was destroyed. If that happens, the area will be rehabilitated and serve as a base for terror against us. Withholding permission to return northward can also serve as leverage to pressure Hamas on the issue of the captives.

As for the saga of humanitarian aid, it is not too late to establish a “de-escalation zone” in Gaza where such aid can be received and provided – and only there. Likewise, it would be wise not to open the Erez Crossing, which will only add more responsibilities to Israel and increase pressure on it.

The job will have not been completed without dealing with the Rafah area. If the free flow of weapons from Sinai to the Gaza Strip continues, the area will have not been demilitarized and the efforts to locate weapons within Gaza will be in vain. All other arrangements have failed miserably and one should not set their hopes on such.

Israel must end this war with a resounding victory. It is important to drive home this message in Washington so that it too understands that this is a prerequisite for any initiative that seeks to change the regional reality. Reaching this goal serves the interest not only of Israel and most of its neighbors but also of the US in the fight for a new world order.

Hamas will not be satisfied with a ceasefire

Against the background of reports on new proposals for a prisoner exchange deal, it is worth listening to public stances such as the one attributed to senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan, who rejects the option of exiling senior Hamas officials from Gaza and sets the end of the war as a condition for any deal.

It is hard to assume that Hamas in its current state will be satisfied with a “ceasefire and all prisoners for all hostages.” It is more likely that it will try to extort Israel so that it pledges not only to withdraw from the entire strip and refrain from assassinations but also to rebuild Gaza. If that happens, Hamas will have emerged from the war after having launched a successful surprise attack, surviving the Israeli retaliation, securing the release of its prisoners, and establishing a mechanism for rebuilding its capabilities.

Continue targeted killings

Israel will likely reject any proposal that leaves Hamas as the central player in the strip that lacks demilitarization or imposes restrictions on IDF activity. To change the deadlock it is vital to increase pressure on Hamas and Qatar in all areas and push them into a reality similar to the one that led to the previous deal.

Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut is the best evidence of the effectiveness of the targeted killings. It was clearly evident that it rattled the organization.

Eliminating the senior ranks is a vital part of the conflict. It is intended to disrupt command and control, hamper the enemy’s conduct, and frustrate its plans, as well as remove efficient and experienced players from the arena, deter those who act against us, and send a message to their sponsors. It also helps break the enemy’s morale.

Al-Arouri’s assassination dealt a morale blow to Hamas, severely compromised its capabilities, and provided proof of the seriousness of Israel’s threats to pursue terrorist leaders wherever they are found. Carrying out the assassination in the heart of Beirut made it clear that there were no longer any “safe havens.” The subsequent operations showed that this was not a one-off fluke on Israel’s part.

Israel’s capabilities, which enabled precise targeting, are now supposed to have Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Hanieh lose sleep in trepidation. This will add to the already strong impact of the destruction images coming from inside the Gaza Strip.

Escalation dynamics

There is an escalation dynamic in the tit-for-tat between the IDF and Hezbollah. Even if neither side wants it, it can lead to war. This is not to say that we should show restraint or moderate our responses, but that we must be prepared for the possibility of conflagration.

Here, too, this is an unavoidable war. Hezbollah entered a war it has no business entering. It saw it as an opportunity to strike at us alongside Hamas, assuming that Israeli society is fragmented and weak.

The two organizations now see a people rising like a lion, a cohesive society that stands up against those who seek its soul, an army that has gotten its act together quickly and is operating a terrifying war machine, and a home front that conveys resilience and determination to continue until victory is achieved.

Faith, heroism, and unity

The horrors and failure of October 7 showed our true mettle: Our collective DNA interwoven with faith, heroism, and unity. The stream of stories and testimonies about this has not stopped. Our enemies now see this too.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 12, 2023.

Alongside the reports on initial discussions in the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet regarding the post-war situation in Gaza, it is highly advisable to downgrade expectations: there are no good options in Gaza. Had there been any, they would already have been implemented, on one of the many opportunities throughout the long history of this conflict.

When it comes to formulating the official positions regarding the ‘day after’, the policymakers will have to adopt a realistic approach, to adhere to the data and the hard facts regarding the monstrous entity sitting on the other side of the Gaza Strip border, which has dug its claws deep into all aspects of life and layers of the population, and they must assume that is not readily possible to generate any profound cultural change – at least in this generation.

With an extremely high percentage of support for Hamas, as long as a strong, organized, and armed core of the terrorist organization manages to remain in the Gaza Strip, it will clearly continue to be the dominant power in the Gaza Strip, whatever the identity and definition of the entity that is officially charged with running civil affairs there. Therefore, it is imperative to conclude this war with a decisive victory and on terms that will prevent the terrorist organization’s renewed growth.

In any event, we must stipulate the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s freedom of action there as a basic underlying condition for any future state of affairs to be established in Gaza. It is important to be wary of and avoid any initiative or move that might jeopardize this, to be extremely cautious of a puppet government that will simply become a tool to be exploited by Hamas (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon), nor should we place our trust in any foreign supervisory mechanisms.

As far as Israel is concerned, the question of the “day after” in the Gaza Strip is secondary to the more important objective of the war: reestablishing Israel’s deterrence that collapsed within a matter of minutes on October 7. The war’s eventual victory photo should be created, above all, in accordance with this criterion.

Toppling the Hamas government, dismantling its military units, destroying its production infrastructure and its military capabilities, killing or neutralizing the majority of the Hamas commanders and its military forces, establishing a broad security perimeter along the entire length of the border, and maintaining effective security control in the area between Gaza and Egypt – all of these are parts of the overall puzzle that comprises the desired end state for Israel. When Hamas begins to sense that the sword is rapidly coming down on the necks of its leaders and Israel is determined to eradicate its presence in the Gaza Strip, it will be forced to make concessions on the hostage issue too.

Without delving any further into this, we can generally say that in the new surroundings that should evolve in Gaza, Israel will have to ensure the following interests:

1. Security for the Israeli communities located along the border with Gaza.
2. Prevention of acts of terrorism and military attacks.
3. Preserving the demilitarization: preventing any military armament, smuggling, or manufacture of weapons.
4. Preventing the existence of military frameworks, exercises, and other actions for the purpose of military force buildup.
5. Preventing Hamas’ return to power and undermining its influence in the Gaza Strip or from it.
6. Preventing any negative influence it may wield from there on Judea and Samaria.
7. Reduction to the point of the removal of any responsibility in civil spheres.

In all their public statements regarding the “day after”, the politicians have repeatedly chosen to define only what will not be in the Gaza Strip: a Hamas government, an Israeli government, the PA (Palestinian Authority), military capabilities threatening Israel and limiting its freedom of action to engage in security activity.

These definitions leave room for only a limited number of alternatives: firstly – the establishment of a central government based on local players with no links to Hamas and who do not represent the PA. Muhammad Dahlan is a name that has already been bandied about in this context, creating expectations based on extremely shaky, unstable foundations.

Secondly – the establishment of regional administrative bodies to be appointed from among the local clans to run civil affairs in their immediate vicinity. The role of a central government could be fulfilled by a form of “executive council” composed of representatives from a broad spectrum of countries willing to do so. This international involvement should also provide a solution to the sources of finance needed to fund all this.

Thirdly – an external centralized setup for running the Gaza Strip’s affairs, by an international committee based on international mechanisms and institutions, that will operate local elements for this purpose.

Truth be told, the chances of success of these types of administrative models, especially given the almost impossible current conditions prevailing in the Gaza Strip, are extremely slender.

Hamas’ power among the Gazan population, the extent to which it pervades all aspects of life, its well-oiled organizational capacity, and its military strength, will not allow any other entity to bypass it. Any player who decides not to cooperate with Hamas will be regarded by large swathes of the local population as wholly illegitimate. At best it will lose its power to govern and in a worst-case scenario, it might also lose its life.

The danger we face is that in the absence of a viable alternative, Israel will be forced to opt for a solution we may define as “the lesser of two evils”. Though this ‘lesser evil’ might currently not be affiliated with Hamas, in the course of time this solution might readily develop into a Hamas proxy, either openly or via discreet contact. We might then find ourselves working in the Gaza Strip with a puppet administration that is de facto ruled by Hamas and operates at Hamas’ beck and call. As such, we would be unable to harm it for fear of being accused of eradicating Gaza’s new hope.  Israel would be better advised to maintain the Gaza Strip as an area devoid of any solution than an area with a poor solution such as this.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 9, 2024.

Three months into the war in Gaza, Israel’s achievements are admirable, but if it were to attain its goals, it will have to make additional efforts, which will stretch for a protracted period.

The political-security leadership in Israel faces a series of challenges and dilemmas regarding future moves. In order to decide correctly, one only has to watch non-stop reels of the horrific footage from October 7 and remember that this is an unavoidable war that was imposed on Israel and began under extremely difficult initial conditions, and for that very reason, Israel must end it with a resounding victory. In order to achieve the goals that have been set, the State of Israel and the IDF have to meet three challenges.

Dealing with the tunnel network

Israel cannot allow Hamas’ monstrous tunnel network to stay in place in the Gaza Strip. However, uncovering this network and destroying it will come at a heavy price. Continuing the effort to systematically deal with the tunnels will prolong the fighting, will tax our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. In order not to get corralled into tight timetables and to deflect pressure on this issue to the other side, Israel must make it clear that as long as there are tunnels, the state of warfare will continue. An area with tunnels will be defined as a “combat zone”, and anyone in it will be considered an enemy and dealt with accordingly, regardless of the physical presence of ground forces in those areas (for example by air strike). This policy must be in effect indefinitely, so long as there are tunnels.

This means that Gaza City residents and northern Gaza residents will not be able to return so long as there are tunnels under their homes. Eradicating tunnels will be beneficial on its own merits, but it will presumably also increase the public’s pressure and outrage toward Hamas.

Rafah and the Philadelphi Route

If the past is prologue, then it is clear that arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip cannot be prevented without effective control over the Philadelphi Route and the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Supervision mechanisms and reliance on other arrangements in this area have always turned out to be a resounding failure. As long as there is a free flow of weaponry from Sinai to the Gaza Strip, it will not be possible to ensure the security demilitarization of the strip – and the efforts invested by the IDF and the Shin Bet in locating and destroying the weapons within the strip will have been largely in vain.

An effective buffer between Gaza and Egypt will serve not only Israel’s security needs but will also contribute to Egypt’s national security interest – it will prevent Hamas terrorists in Gaza from reaching Egyptian territory. The Muslim Brotherhood, after all, is a bitter foe of the regime in Egypt, and Hamas is the strongest armed group in that movement. Moreover, Egypt’s interest is to prevent Hamas from even reaching the Sinai. The links between Hamas elements in Gaza and global jihad elements in the peninsula have made the threat to Egyptian forces that much greater.

Even if we assume that understandings could be struck between Israel and Egypt on this issue, a response will be required to two operational challenges: How to operate militarily in the crowded area that has absorbed thousands of people evacuated from the northern Gaza Strip; and the method by which it will be possible to safely defend the narrow border strip over a protracted period. The security establishment has vivid memories of the attacks on the Philadelphi Route from 2005 (when Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip) and has therefore incorporated the lessons learned from that period into its current thinking

Minimizing damage from civilian assistance

Much has been said about the price Israel has paid for bringing humanitarian aid into the strip. Even if this is an essential condition for US support and assistance, Israel still has the means to make sure that Hamas will not enjoy the huge benefits of such aid.

First, it is still not too late to define within the enclave a “de-escalation” zone to which humanitarian assistance will exclusively be delivered and handed out. Israel would let anyone interested in bringing such aid to this area do so and invite Gazans to come and benefit from it, so long as this is within the perimeter of that area.

Second, there is no reason why Hamas should be allowed to continue controlling the distribution of aid. This allows it to maintain its power over the area and govern. Israel should take out any Hamas policeman or other affiliated member sent by the organization who engages in such action. To topple Hamas’ rule we must prevent it from having a grip on the distribution and the other resources that only help it cement its status as the governing authority of the Gaza Strip. Israel should not be deterred by the prospect that this would result in chaos. This is the only way that will lead to a real (not superficial) collapse of the regime in Gaza.

A new reality in the strip

Victory over Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow the resurgence of terrorist elements. Security officials have rightly stated that such a fundamental change requires Israel to act with resolve and over a long period – i.e., without standing with a stopwatch in hand. If Hamas maintains a strong and armed core, it will continue to be the main player in the Gaza Strip of 2024, regardless of who officially manages its civilian affairs.

Israel’s takeover of the entire area – by keeping the northern part of the strip and Gaza City off limits to residents; confiscating humanitarian aid from Hamas; and hitting Hamas’ police and other affiliated entities that allow it to maintain de facto control of the strip – will give Israel the necessary leverage to also secure the release of the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it will continue to show intransigence on hostages.

Published in Israel Hayom, January 5, 2024.

A decisive victory in the complex campaign against Iran and its proxies requires a clear outcome in Gaza, as well as Israeli unity. The multi-front war – with Iran and its proxies, chiefly Hamas, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Qatar, Turkey, and their supporters worldwide) on the one hand, and Israel, the US, and parts of Western support on the other hand – has been going on for close to three months now. Each front has its own unique characteristics, derived from how the war began, the considerations of the actors involved, and their capabilities.

According to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Israel is fighting on seven fronts (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran), but in practice, the world stage forms another arena, and this is where Israel is fighting to maintain American backing as well as for the legitimacy of its actions and existence, and against antisemitism.

This is not a war of choice; it has been forced upon Israel, and which began under extremely difficult opening conditions. And for that very reason, both Israel and the US must end it in victory. Achieving this requires several conditions. The first and most important is a clear defeat of Hamas in Gaza and the release of the captives. This means Israeli control at the end of high-intensity fighting over the entire area, including Rafah and the Philadelphi Route (excluding perhaps international management of displaced persons in secured areas designated to ensure the safety of the population during the mopping-up stage, which will likely last several months).

Ending the major combat operations before this goal is achieved just because we’ve reached a predetermined point in time (end of January?) will allow Hamas to claim that it forced Israel to effectively change its war goals in practice, and will encourage supporters of the terrorist organization who set themselves the goal of ensuring Hamas’ survival in Gaza, even if only in a small part of its territory. As long as Hamas controls the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing and is perceived by the population as a governing entity, it would be able to claim it had managed to survive, and by implication – won.

It is also important to drive home the message – in talks with the US – that defeating Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow terrorists to rear their heads.

Therefore, not only Hamas but also the weak and corrupt Palestinian Authority is unsuitable to take over responsibility for Gaza post-war. It remains committed to the armed conflict against Israel, encourages terror (through incitement and payment of salaries to imprisoned terrorists), and sees Hamas as a legitimate organization that should be part of the leadership.

Gaining control over the entire area will also give Israel the necessary leverage to release the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it has no interest in giving up its main asset, other than in return for an Israeli commitment to refrain from completing the takeover of the strip.

The second condition is reaching an understanding with the American administration that this is the US war almost to the same extent as it is Israel’s: Continuation of the current state of affairs on all fronts will damage its standing in the region and globally, and exacerbate threats to the security of American citizens and Washington’s interests.

The Americans understand the importance of Israel’s victory over Hamas in Gaza, but their stated desire to avoid getting dragged into a regional war and have Israel end major combat operations even before completing the takeover of the entire strip encourages Iran and its proxies to continue gradually escalating their use of force, in the hope that the administration will stop Israel.

Defeating Hamas and convincing the US that this is also a war over the regional and global order – and translating this into a willingness to win – are key in the effort to exert diplomatic pressure on Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the pro-Iranian militias, and for effective military force against them if necessary.

This is the condition to create a new security reality along the northern border that will give residents a sense of security and allow them to return home; this is the condition to secure shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait; this is the condition to curb Iran’s nuclear program, which has again accelerated during the war; and this is the condition to promote efforts to establish a pragmatic regional center of gravity with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia at its core.

Israel and the US need each other in these arenas, and Israel must dive home this interdependence and mutual benefit to ensure Washington’s commitment to achieving common goals.

Israel’s ability to meet the two conditions for victory will be greatly impacted by its ability to shake off the self-induced blindness that characterized its attitude towards its enemies’ intentions and display internal unity. This is not only the clear message communicated by the troops and the fallen, but also a strategic imperative. The greater and clearer the unity, the easier it will be for Israel to harness its capabilities and American support in order to achieve its war aims.

Published in Israel Hayom 02.01.2024.

It would be a daunting challenge to map a realistic vision for the Gaza Strip for the coming decade or even, in most likelihood, farther down the road. One will have to choose between a hopeless vision and baseless hope. In formulating its positions regarding the day after, Israel’s civilian leaders will need to adopt a realistic approach, adhering to the hard facts and data about the monstrous entity that has grown in our midst, taking deep root in all systems of life and segments of the population in the area it controls.

It will have to operate on the assumption that it is impossible to effect real change on a profound and cultural level there, at least for our generation. It will be required to set demilitarization as a threshold condition for any future modus vivendi in Gaza, to oppose any initiative or move that would jeopardize this, and not to trust foreign peacekeeping mechanisms.

The upcoming visit to Israel by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken provides an opportunity to set expectations with the US administration on this matter too. While the discourse on the “day after” issue has focused on the question of “who will be” in charge the day after a Hamas regime collapse, no less important is the question of what will be the reality on the ground. In public, Israel’s answer to these questions has been in a negation – emphasizing what will NOT be in the strip: no to a Hamas regime, no to a Palestinian Authority in power there, no to military capabilities threatening Israel, no to restrictions on that would hamper its freedom of action. Israel’s leaders have put forth a general framework but did not flesh it up with details.

Despite criticism of this, the government has been acting properly in postponing any real deliberations on the details. This was designed primarily to keep attention focused on the fighting, but also so as not to create an impression of Israel being in a hurry and already preparing for the conclusion of the campaign (thereby weakening our forces and bolstering the enemy’s hopes). A third reason is to avoid having this issue dividing the public, and a fourth reason is to delay and reduce political friction on this issue with the Biden administration. Finally, another reason for this dithering was the realization that creating the “day after” depends on the achievements of the ongoing combat, and it is best to have that discussion from a position of strength, when one holds assets and leverage, not before.

Although the IDF operation is still in full swing, it is worthwhile to deviate from this line and delve now into one of the characteristics of the “day after,” precisely because deliberating this issue provides an answer to one of the tough dilemmas at this stage of the fighting: coping with the tunnel challenge.

On the one hand, after the price it paid on October 7, Israel cannot allow the monstrous tunnel network and its additional elements to exist in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the price Israel is already paying to expose and destroy this network is high. Continuing the systematic effort to uncover tunnels will prolong fighting, exact further costs on our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. What should be done, then?

Any area with tunnels will be declared a battle zone for an indefinite period. First, it must be made clear that as long as tunnels exist – the state of war will continue! Israel should seek consensus (especially by having the US on board) on the idea that the existence of tunnels in the strip violates the principle of demilitarization and that the Palestinian residents will not be able to live their lives in areas with tunnels. This means that these areas will be defined as “combat zones,” and anyone found in them will be considered an enemy combatant and treated as such until the area is tunnel-free.

Opponents of this idea will likely point out that solutions must be found for the population. In a different reality, given Gaza’s conduct as a “Hamas state” and in light of the high levels of support for that organization and its brutal attack on Israel among Gazans, there would be no room for this question at all.

However, given prevailing attitudes today in the world, it can be assumed that ignoring the plea of the population would only increase opposition to Israel’s plans. Thus, Israel must enlist the US to help provide humanitarian solutions that would be defined as lengthy but not permanent. These will be outside the area of combat.

Another argument to support such an approach is the state of destruction in most Gaza neighborhoods. Most of the population has nowhere to return to anyway. Anyone who sees Hamas’ tunnel enterprise – which relied on construction materials intended for civilian purposes – should also lower expectations for rebuilding and rehabilitation in the foreseeable future. Israel cannot afford to let such diversion of construction material happen again.

Published in Israel Hayom 29.12.2023

What is true in everyday life is true in wartime too: You must focus to succeed. Try to do too many things simultaneously and you’re set for setback, disappointment, or failure.

That is what has happened to Israel over the past three weeks, ever since it agreed to a series of pauses in the war against Hamas and then reignited the ground campaign against Hamas under increased US scrutiny. It has lost focus. It is seeking to concurrently accomplish diverse goals and balance competing interests. And in trying to cover too many bases, Israel risks failure across the board.

Therefore, it is time for Israel’s wartime leaders to concentrate once again their efforts on the one most critical goal of this war; the main, most consensual, and most legitimate objective. Distilled to its essence, this is eradication of the Hamas threat to Israel and the consequent restoration of Israel’s deterrent posture versus all enemies in the Middle East.

This means and requires application of maximum, maximum, maximum military force against Hamas in every hideaway corner and under every school, mosque, and UNRWA facility in which Hamas terrorists are rottenly taking sanctuary. Without letup, without forbearance. With cold, calculated, crushing military force. With all tools at Israel’s disposal, as swiftly as possible, and without unnecessarily exposing Israeli troops to death and injury.

This is not a matter of Israeli “rage” as some nasty observers in Western capitals have insinuated. It is a matter of smart, rightful, and reasonable policy. It is the only way to decisively win the war and to fix the future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

It is the only way to end the so-called “cycle of violence” versus Gaza (– oh, how I hate that phrase which suggests equivalency of responsibility for decades of conflict!). It also is the only way to restart the drive towards Saudi-Israeli reconciliation and broader Mideast stability and peace.

Everything else is secondary. Every other interest and concern, no matter how poignant, compassionate, or pressing, must remain subordinate to the overarching master goal of erasing Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip. Nothing should distract Israel’s leaders from their focus; nothing should dissuade them from achieving the fullest possible victory over Hamas.

Alas, this means that humanitarian concerns, both for the one hundred or so Israeli civilians still held hostage by Hamas and for the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians held hostage by Hamas, must be relegated to the sidelines. It is not easy or nice to say so, but concern for the hostages (– and yes, Palestinians in Gaza are brutally kept captive by Hamas in every way) cannot dominate Israeli decision-making.

This means that Israel cannot be dragged again into a drip-drip hostage negotiation horror show which reinforced Hamas’ dominance in Palestinian politics and which sapped Israeli national consensus about prosecuting the war to its fullest, necessary completion.

It means that Israel cannot daintily tiptoe through the boobytrapped tulips that Hamas has planted in every kindergarten and classroom, in every bedroom and hospital storeroom in Gaza.

It means that Israel cannot tie itself into knots trying to satisfy every unfair, outrageous, so-called international humanitarian law regulation that was made-up especially for, and is applied only to, Israel – precisely, maliciously to neuter Israel’s military.

It means that Israel cannot succumb to international pressures to provide more fuel for Gaza, literally fueling the enemy.

It means that Israel cannot be so solicitous of Egyptian anxieties (fear of refugee spillover into Sinai), so accepting of European condescension (threatening to hold Israel “accountable”), so consenting of Russian duplicity (partnering with Iran while calling for a ceasefire with Hamas), or so acquiescent in the face of false accusations (like “escalating settler violence” or “indiscriminate bombing”).

It also means that Israel cannot accept nonsensical calls for long-term Israeli territorial withdrawals (based on the fantasy-for-now of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority) or tolerate idiotic international security suggestions (like the landing of Gulf Arab, UN, or forces from Mars to keep the peace in Gaza).

Israeli leaders must repulse such pressures and focus with laser-like sharpness on the imperative of the moment: Obliteration of Hamas to obtain security for Israel and restore Israel’s regional deterrent posture. Otherwise, there will be no peace in the Middle East, and there may be no future at all for Israel.

Those who profess to care about Israel, who aver support for Israel’s “right” to defend itself, cannot play both sides of the game; cannot call in mealy-mouth fashion “on all sides to end the cycle of violence.” Neutrality is complicity in the crimes of Hamas. Calling for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire that does not permanently defang Hamas is a call for Israeli defeat. No thank you.

IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE, Israel must push back against the super-quick global criticism of Israel whenever the IDF gets into actual combat with the likes of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whether in Gaza, Jenin, or Jerusalem. The temerity and hypocrisy of Israeli critics is simply astounding.

I ask: Just who exactly has the right to tell Israel how to defend its borders? Perhaps the EU or UN Security Council – neither of which has done diddly-squat about the 11-year-long civil war slaughter in Syria or Iran’s subversive muckraking across the Middle East?

None of these organizations have the right to jeer Israel’s defensive actions in the territories and along its borders, nor Israeli military operations beyond its borders – even if the IDF were to use indiscriminate or near-nuclear force, which it isn’t.

Israel need not apologize for defending itself against Palestinian terrorist invasions, Palestinian terror attack tunnels, Palestinian rocket barrages, and even pro-terrorist anti-Israel NGOs. Soon enough, we will probably have to say also that Israel need not apologize for striking overpoweringly at Iranian-Hezbollah commando posts and armament depots deep in Lebanon.

Israel also must never apologize for repeatedly reminding the world that Jews are not foreigners in their ancestral homeland. Israel is not an occupying force in the Sharon plains, or the sand dunes of the Negev adjoining Gaza, or the hilltops of Judea and Samaria, or in Jerusalem. It has a right to defend its homeland without being subjected to cheeky censure and supercilious send-guessing.

The nations of the world ought to be exceedingly circumspect in telling Israel what to do, how to conduct its politics, where to erect its security fences, how to conduct its military campaigns, where to draw its borders and how to defend them.

Having failed the Jewish People throughout history all the way through the Holocaust; and having been so wrong with Pollyannaish hopes for the Oslo Accords, the Arab Spring, and the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran – the nations of the world ought to give Israeli leaders the benefit of the doubt. They ought to respect Israeli decision-making, not sneer at it, when Israel’s leaders proceed cautiously in the diplomatic arena or act resolutely in the security sphere.

As former Prime Minister Menachem Begin once challenged and chastised the German Chancellor, “Are we a vassal state? And would you prefer a weak Israel?”

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2023

Hamas’s Oct. 7 rampage of murder, rape and kidnapping has forced a painful but necessary paradigm shift among Israeli policymakers regarding Gaza. A similar change of mindset must occur in regard to the future of Judea and Samaria. If Israel wishes to prevent similar attacks aimed at Israel’s major metropolitan centers, it must maintain both IDF security control and flourishing civilian communities in Judea and Samaria.

For years, the Israeli political and military establishments regarded Hamas as manageable. Israel tried to minimize the rocket threat emanating from the Gaza Strip by periodically responding to Hamas attacks without aiming to eliminate the terrorist organization. All the while, Israel allowed significant amounts of funds for humanitarian purposes to enter Gaza, much of which ended up in Hamas’s hands. Regrettably, this approach blew up in Israel’s face. Not only did Hamas remain undeterred, but it grew stronger and better prepared for each round of fighting. It has become clear that Hamas must be destroyed rather than merely contained, and a complex, methodical ground invasion is now underway.

As the IDF makes substantial progress in Gaza, talks about the day after Hamas are intensifying. U.S. President Joe Biden has called for the revival of the two-state solution and suggested that the Palestinian Authority could replace Hamas. This idea seems to be gaining momentum in some diplomatic circles. Such a vision for a “revitalized” P.A. stems from a false perception that the P.A. is a moderate, pragmatic actor with whom Israel can reach a peaceful resolution. In truth, however, a realistic analysis of the P.A.’s conduct in Judea and Samaria proves that giving it more power will undoubtedly yield grievous consequences.

It is important to remember how the P.A. came about, and especially its ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Founded in 1964 and headed by Ahmad Shukeiri and later Yasser Arafat, the PLO stated in its charter that its goal was to eliminate “Zionism in Palestine” through an “armed struggle.”

These words were not mere rhetoric. The PLO launched numerous terror attacks both on Israeli soil and against Jewish targets globally. Even so, as part of the Oslo Accords gambit, Israel agreed to treat the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The P.A. was established and Fatah, a central member of the PLO coalition, effectively became the ruling body of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Since its inception in 1994, this Fatah-controlled entity has continuously glorified terrorism in its educational system, media outlets and throughout the public sphere. It has collaborated with the BDS movement to boycott Israel and delegitimize its very existence worldwide. It has worked to incite extremists among Israeli Arabs, thousands of whom are enrolled in P.A. higher education institutions. The P.A. also rewards acts of terror by providing security prisoners or relatives of “martyrs” with monthly salaries.

The P.A.’s hatred of Jews supersedes even its deep-seated loathing for its bitter rival Hamas. About two weeks after the Oct. 7 massacre, the P.A.’s Religious Affairs Ministry released a document with guidelines for sermons to be given in mosques that referenced Islamic verses calling for the murder of Jews.

As a matter of fact, in the arena of inciting murder within the territories it controls, the P.A. had done quite “well” on its own long before Oct. 7. The Ramallah lynching (2000) and the horrendous slaughter of the Fogel family (2011)—neither carried out by Hamas in Gaza, but by Palestinian terrorists in Judea and Samaria—are proof of it.

Under these circumstances, Israel has been trying to maintain a degree of security cooperation with the P.A., knowing full well that this is far from being a sustainable arrangement. In fact, in northern Samaria, which to date presents one of the greatest challenges to Israel’s security, the P.A. has no real influence. The city of Jenin and its refugee camp in particular have become a lethal terror haven, responsible for about 50 shooting attacks in just one year.

In addition, most polling indicates that Hamas enjoys overwhelming support among the Palestinian population of Judea and Samaria. Shortly after the murderous rampage of Oct. 7, Hamas successfully incited Palestinians in Hebron, Hawara and other places to participate in violent riots with the potential to ignite the entire area.

It appears, then, that there is no essential difference between the P.A. and Hamas. Although Hamas justifies its war crimes along religious lines and Fatah tends to speak in more nationalistic terms, both seek the annihilation of the Jewish state. Therefore, the danger of both should be equally alarming. In fact, the only reason an attack similar in scale and brutality to Oct. 7 has not taken place in Judea and Samaria is due to Israel’s military presence.

In this context, it is crucial to understand that an effective security presence goes hand in hand with the establishment and nurturing of civilian communities in the territory. Since the military must protect the civilian communities and the roads leading to them, the existence of approximately 250 Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria translates into 250 points around which the military is active, making it very difficult for terror to thrive.

The opposite is also true. The uprooting of four Jewish communities near Jenin as part of the 2005 disengagement is a perfect example. The entire area in and surrounding Jenin has become a breeding ground for terror, forcing the IDF to make repeated incursions to restore law and order.

Therefore, the IDF’s control of Judea and Samaria, coupled with the presence of flourishing civilian communities, is key to thwarting terror plots to carry out mass-casualty incidents. This is why, despite routine Palestinian threats, we have not seen rockets being shot into the heart of Israel from Judea and Samaria. Nor have we seen terrorist-owned Toyota pickups like those that charged into Ofakim on Oct. 7 on the streets of Tel Aviv, despite Tel Aviv being only 20 kilometers from Samaria.

It is time for the State of Israel to view Judea and Samaria as an asset rather than a liability and to treat it as such. Israeli decision-makers should make clear, both domestically and internationally, that the option of loosening either military or civilian control over Judea and Samaria, let alone an Israeli retreat from these strategically critical territories, is not on the table.

On Oct. 7, Israel failed to prevent Hamas’s lethal attack from the relatively small Gaza Strip. While Israel cannot undo this unfathomable tragedy, it must work to prevent the strengthening of a second hostile entity in Judea and Samaria. This is the only way to ensure that the moral imperative of “Never Again” is given concrete meaning on the ground.

Published in JNS, December 14, 2023.

“We’re determined to help Israel ensure that October 7th never happens again,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated this week.

This was not the first time he made this promise. Similar statements were made during four (!) solidarity visits he has held in Israel since the massacre. However, concurrently with his statement, under American pressure, the Israeli security cabinet was forced to discuss the increase in fuel deliveries to the Gaza Strip, essentially supplying oxygen to Hamas terrorists fighting our soldiers through terror tunnels.

Soon after this declaration, the spokesperson for the State Department also announced that the United States would oppose the creation of a buffer zone in the Gaza Strip, thus adding more constraints on Israel’s actions, particularly on the options at its disposal when it comes to protecting the towns near the border. 

There were also US statements that the duration of the war is not unlimited along with pressure on Israel before the renewal of hostilities in the southern region to reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid.

There is no room to doubt the commitment of President Joe Biden and his officials in their statements. The administration’s support for Israel is unwavering and deserves much praise. The US has accepted Israel’s right to destroy the military and governance capabilities of Hamas and has provided substantial and vital assistance. However, at the same time, the US has been imposing limitations that prevent Israel from achieving these goals without heavy losses. 

Moreover, the limitations imposed by the US will undoubtedly prolong the conflict, which is something Washington doesn’t want. The practical way to ensure a quick and effective military operation with minimal risk to the uninvolved population is to temporarily relocate this population outside the combat zones. However, there are also objections to this.

The increase in pressure on Israel may be related to Biden’s domestic travails ahead of the 2024 elections. It may stem from differences between how Washington sees Gaza and what the reality is on the ground. 

Nevertheless, Israel cannot compromise on achieving its goals while minimizing the burden on its fighters – regardless of how long this takes. This is the message Israel has to drive home when American National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visits in the coming days.

Those who insist on getting answers from the Israeli government over what happens in the “day after” are doing so despite knowing full well that there are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have presumably been implemented during one of the many opportunities over the years.

There is no obligation to debate between bad alternatives in public now, amid the war. Attention should be solely directed towards victory in the war, maintaining internal unity, and minimizing the necessary involvement in issues that could stir controversy, whether internally or with our friends across the sea.

The way Israel sees it, the question of “the day after” in Gaza is secondary to the more critical goal of the war: reestablishing Israeli deterrence that was shattered on October 7. The endgame of the war must be shaped primarily according to this criterion.

The toppling of the Hamas government, the destruction of its arrays, and capabilities, the killing or neutralization of most of its commanders and its military units, along with the devastation resulting from all these – all this will serve as pieces in the desired endgame puzzle. 

Of course, Israel must not forget the captives, and certainly, it should not leave for “the day after”. Israel’s moral obligation towards the captives and their families requires leaving an open channel for negotiations (preferably Egypt, not Qatar, whose chief interest is to ensure Hamas survives). It must ensure that a sword is swiftly placed on the necks of Hamas leaders until they understand that the captives are their responsibility and they must act to release them.

As the fighting continues, the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency continue to crack down on terrorists in Judea and Samaria. The political leaders need to decide whether to allow  Palestinian workers from the West Bank to return to work in Israel, a right denied since October 7 (except for a relatively small number of essential positions defined as critical even at this time). 

The main argument for allowing them back to Israel is the fear that economic hardship, frustration, and unemployment will push them to act against Israel. Another consideration is the impact on the Israeli economy, particularly on housing construction. Against these considerations stands the concern over attacks they may perpetrate because they are inspired by Hamas in Gaza or because they want to avenge the deaths there, especially in light of the images and propaganda broadcast continuously on Al-Jazeera. 

The successful counterterrorism operations in the West Bank, followed by a not insignificant number of casualties, also add motivation for revenge. The security establishment is fully preoccupied with the fighting in Gaza and the intelligence efforts in the West Bank, and its ability to track terrorist elements and neutralize them in advance is not guaranteed, as we have seen recently in the attacks at the Gush Etzion junction and in Jerusalem.

Today, the public in Israel is vigilant and shows a high degree of awareness regarding any Palestinian in Israel. This contributes to the efforts of detection and neutralization. It will not be the same if tens of thousands of Palestinians are found in Israel. Another consideration, although not mentioned in setting policy, is the perception of the price Israel exacts. 

 Hamas in the Gaza Strip gains points in the battle over the hearts and minds in the West Bank because it managed to have Israel release terrorists and because it stood up to Israel. These points, at least among some of the population. But it could lose the hearts and minds of the same people if they blame the terrorist organization for hurting their livelihood. It seems that at this stage, the scale leans towards maintaining the current situation and not letting the workers back to Israel. Caution requires us to avoid unnecessary security risks in the short term. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 7, 2023.

During a UN Security Council meeting on the 24th of October, the secretary general, Antonio Guterres, said that Hamas’ October 7th attacks on Israel “did not happen in a vacuum”. He was not wrong – Hamas’ attacks were planned and executed with the close assistance of Iran, which continues to arm, guide, finance, and activate its proxies in the Middle East.

The Israel-Gaza war has repercussions on the international fight against Iran and its other accomplices. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Syria, Iraq, and recently in Sudan, are all Iranian agents of chaos and terror, who serve Iran’s interests – to create a Shia-dominate strip stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea to shift the leadership of the Muslim world from Sunni countries to Iran, end the US presence in the Middle East and destroy Israel. Besides Iranian direct support, the use of these proxies would not have been effective without an envelope-supporting system of private entities, with the ability to enable money transfers, technologies, communications, etc.

The current situation in the Middle East provides an opportunity to increase global efforts to stop Iran’s malign behavior, not only by sanctioning Iran and its proxies but also use complementary measures to sanctions and target private companies which assist Iran in executing terror activities.

The Military Sphere

After the fog of October 7th atrocities faded away, the Israeli defense forces were able to recover Iranian-produced weapons used by Hamas during the October 7th attack. The Foundation For Defense of Democracies (FDD) reported that 60mm mortar rounds with Iranian-made AZ111 mortar round fuses and M112 demolition charges were used by Hamas in the attack. Evidence shows that these components were produced in Iran and appear in a catalogue of the Defense Industries organization, an Iranian company that is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of Iran. The M112 explosives recovered were identical to those intercepted by US-led operations in Yemen and Bahrain to stop smugglers.

In addition to these familiar weapons, the IDF has also recovered new Iranian-made warheads for Rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG) that were not seen before. In the new warhead, the first charge is designed to penetrate light armoured vehicles and the second charge is thermobaric, aimed at burning the target.

The latest launching of drones and cruise missiles by the Houthis in Yemen towards Israel demonstrated more Iranian weapons variety. Since November last year, the US Navy seized many weapons and munitions en route to Yemen, in the area of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These included explosives, ammunition, weapons and missiles, which are in the use of Hamas and other proxies as well.

Iran’s creativity goes as far as its cruelty in its efforts to maintain a flow of arms to Iranian proxies in the region. Following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria in February 2023, the IRGC used humanitarian assistance as camouflage to transfer weapons and crucial components to assist with Hezbollah’s efforts to turn their rockets more accurate. Recently, Syria accused Israel of launching simultaneous missile attacks against its airports, probably to stop the already known route of weapons transfer from Iran to Syria and further to Hezbollah. After the destruction of these airports, Russia hurried to allow Iranian flights to use the “Khmeimim” air base in Syria. This is happening while Hezbollah and Shia militias in Syria have been targeting Israel with rockets since October 7th.

The technological efforts

Alongside supplying weapons to terrorist organizations, Iran is also very active in the technological sphere, which is crucial for securing funds for terrorism, surveillance, and supporting other terror-related activities inside and outside Iran.

ArianTel, an Iranian wireless communications services provider was pivotal to Iran’s efforts to create a large-scale surveillance network. According to Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity NGO based in Canada, the surveillance and censorship capabilities resulting from this level of integration with mobile service providers cannot be understated.

Prime example for this is MTN Group. MTN entered the Iranian telecom sector in 2005 and launched its services in Iran a year later using a subsidiary named Irancell, a front company of the IRGC, in which MTN owns a 49% stake, the other 51% owned by the Iranian Electronic Development Company. Since then, MTN has been closely involved with ArianTel, as part of its joint venture with the Iranian government. MTN and Irancell, provided multiple Access Points and Roaming agreements, granting ArianTel explicit access to their cellular networks. This allowed ArianTel and the Iranian government to carry out surveillance operations on dissidents and critics within Iran.

MTN group openly and knowingly conducted business with the IRGC and ArianTel despite international sanctions against them. In April 2023, ArianTel was sanctioned by the European Union, for contributing to the telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran. In 2020, a year after IRGC was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) MTN released a statement saying that it would continue its business as usual.

MTN made conscious decisions to engage in misconduct while violating sanctions, and effectively supporting and facilitating Iran’s terrorism. But the use of telecommunication systems does not stop at surveillance and suppressing dissent at home, rather it is used to advance Tehran’s international aspirations as well, supporting Iran’s proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen.

This activity is at the core of the US district court in New York’s high-stakes anti-terrorism act lawsuit against MTN Group. In addition to its direct engagement with the IRGC, the lawsuit revealed the group’s violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act by paying protection money of more than $100M to al-Qaeda and the Taliban so they wouldn’t target its cellular towers, and they deactivated the towers at night, preventing US intelligence operations.

Another dimension of concern is MTN’s decades-long association with Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization and a proxy of Iran. This relationship involved providing equipment that Hezbollah used as detonators and for tracking their adversaries. This history of supporting and enabling terror activity might indicate that other proxies of Iran, such as Hamas were also benefiting from MTN’s services.

There is evidence that Hamas’ brutal attacks against Israel, were accompanied by cyberattacks conducted by a group linked to Iran. The attacks were aimed at stealing, publishing, and deleting sensitive information such as personal data and intellectual property from educational institutions and tech companies. These attacks began in January 2023 but were intensified following the October 7th attacks.

NYT reported that Iranian hackers were waging an espionage campaign targeting rivals across the Middle East, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The cyberattacks are linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. According to Israeli cybersecurity officials, 15 groups of hackers, such as “agonizing serpens” and “LionTail”, affiliated directly or as a proxy, with the IRGC and Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, are responsible for the attacks. During this campaign, there were also attempts by groups affiliated with Hamas and Hezbollah to hack CCTV cameras in Israel.

It’s time to stop Iran

As shown above, Iran’s terror network is broad, and it also serves as a distraction from its efforts to cross the nuclear threshold and reach a nuclear military capability. Following Iran’s involvement in Hamas’ attacks against Israel and the continuous support of other proxies in the Middle East, the international community must to step up joint efforts to stop both Iran and its accomplices.

The most common measure against Iran is sanctions, mainly in relation to the nuclear program. While sanctions took a toll on Iran’s economy, the shadow financial network provided it a lifeline. This year, the US imposed new and broader sanctions on a “shadow banking” network of 39 entities across multiple jurisdictions, including those registered in China, Türkiye, and UAE. These sanctions are targeting Iranian front companies abroad that have generated tens of billions of dollars for the Iranian regime.

One of Iran’s ways to bypass sanctions is the use of cryptocurrencies, which Tehran legalized in 2019. Around 4.5% of global bitcoin mining is done in Iran. International compliance regulations, including those issued by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), have made it more difficult to use cryptocurrencies as a way to evade sanctions but did not entirely stop Iran.

In addition, the US decided to freeze $6 billion that was part of a prisoner swap deal with Iran to free 5 American citizens. Due to Iran’s backing of Hamas, the US reached an understanding with Qatar to prevent access of Iran to the funds. The US also imposed new sanctions on Hamas and members of IRGC for arming, training, and providing financial assistance to the terror organization. The US Department of Treasury emphasizes Iran’s role in providing financial, logistical, and operational support to Hamas.

The EU announced that it is considering imposing similar sanctions against Iran over its support of Hamas. Moreover, the big three European countries refused to lift sanctions on Iran after the 18th of October 2023, a date set by the original deal in 2015 and relates to missile capabilities of Iran.

Although there is still some pressure on Iran, the effectiveness of sanctions is debatable. The Iranian leadership is very flexible in its ways to evade sanctions, leaving the Iranians to suffer as a result of the sanctions, especially when these are focusing on financing channels. Yes, the economy plunged but that did not change the behavior and ambitions of the Iranian regime.

The current situation in the Middle East generates an opportunity and momentum to act now against Iran. This should include complementary means to sanctions, such as cyber tools, a direct credible military threat to Iran’s strategic infrastructure, and dismantle of its proxies. But also, the targeting of target channels of technology transfer and financial support with direct links to IRGC. In this context, the lawsuit against MTN Group is an important step. The Iranian leadership and its accomplices must know that as long as they engage in terrorism and nuclear armament, the international community will react vigorously.

Published in The National Interest 04.12.2023

“Some Western diplomats talk about a post-Hamas Gaza, and I say to them: Let your imagination and dreams run wild, in a couple of years, you will have to deal with the post-Israel region.” This quote was made by former Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashal shortly after the ceasefire with the terrorist organization took effect.

In a sarcastic and arrogant speech broadcast at the gathering of one of the global Islamic forums, Mashal sought to double down on Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s theory that Israel is about to collapse. He pointed out that the October 7 attack proved that Israel is ‘as weak as a spider’s web,’ and that the organization dealt Israel a crushing defeat in intelligence, battle, and perception. He promised that the defeat “‘will be completed soon.”

Israel after Oct. 7 does not need these words from Meshal to remind it of why it is fighting. Those who need this reminder, at the moment, are our friends in the White House, who have so far gone beyond their usual role to assist us in the war and related challenges (for which they deserve all praise and appreciation). Why? Because these very friends could impede Israel as it embarks on the next phase of the war in the pursuit of the goals vis-a-vis Hamas.

The message conveyed by the United States regarding the continuation of the war in Gaza can be summarized in a short sentence: Reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid. However, each of these demands will hinder Israel in its efforts to topple Hamas’ rule and destroy its military capabilities. Complying with them will only prolong the war and significantly increase the risks to our soldiers.

We still have a ways to go before Israel’s goals are met. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely where we are in relation to the ultimate goal, but it would suffice to remember that the southern region of the strip has not suffered a significant impact so far. This area is where half of the enemy forces are currently located.

Now that the fighting has renewed in the Gaza Strip, the IDF is expected to encounter a Hamas that has changed compared to the pre-ceasefire combat. There is an undisputed moral and national obligation to rescue the Hamas captives, but to advance this goal, Israel has agreed to a ceasefire that came with heavy costs and risks.

The time gained in the deal for the release of the captives might have been used by the terror organization to regain strength in the northern part of the strip to reassess the situation, to overcome key shortcomings, to complete its military preparedness, and refresh its forces for the next stage.

The ceasefire also allowed it to reassert its presence as the governing authority. This was evident in the way it staged the return of the captives.

Operationally, this time allows it to regroup, replenish fuel and logistical means to extend its endurance, gather intelligence, formulate updated operational plans, set traps and ambushes, and tighten operational coordination between its components.

The ceasefire and the events that took place when it was in effect have strengthened the morale of Hamas commanders and fighters, as well as their hopes for ending the war through some arrangement. The indirect negotiations with it, even after it had been compared to ISIS and the Nazis have boosted its confidence. The negotiations’ channel got a boost, as has Qatar’s central role within it. To all this, one has to remember that Hamas also got points from the public in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, thanks to its achievements in freeing prisoners from Israeli jails and its “struggle” against Israel.

When the fighting resumes in the Gaza Strip, the IDF can expect to encounter a Hamas with high operational readiness and strengthened morale. It might be an appropriate time to adopt a more aggressive approach so as to reduce the risks to our forces, even if it runs against the wishes expressed by the White House.

This is also true regarding the scope of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. The expectation that Israel allow humanitarian aid to Gaza (and even increase it) is based on two mistaken assumptions, in my opinion. The first is that the war is being conducted between Israel and the terrorist organization Hamas in a way that is unrelated to the “State of Gaza.” The second is that there is a practical possibility in the Gaza Strip to separate between “aid to Hamas” and “aid to the population.”

The simple reality is that the Hamas organization leads the “State of Gaza” and has taken over all the “state institutions” and resources, and has the support of most of its residents. This is also how it has conducted its war against Israel.

Having announced that one of the goals of the war is to topple Hamas’, our civilian leaders should also seek to sever the links between Hamas and the various Gaza power centers in a way that the Hamas government would no longer be able to provide for the needs of its residents, will not be able to provide them with any services or enforce its rules on them. Massive humanitarian aid undermines this, as it exempts Hamas from its obligations towards its residents thus sparing it from their anger, and preventing the population from turning against it. The aid serves as a temporary solution until things return to normal. This will prolong the war in every possible aspect.

If that is not enough, it is worth remembering that in the reality that has evolved in the Gaza Strip, it is almost impossible to separate between “aid to citizens” and “aid to Hamas.” Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the strip. Through its networks, it can receive or take anything that enters the strip for its needs, regardless of the means of transfer or who delivers it.

While Israel usually acts with generosity when it comes to humanitarian issues, in this case, Israel should adopt a strict, suspicious, and minimalist approach: It should allow only the necessary assistance, and only when necessary, and only to the extent required.

The captives will continue to be an issue Israel will have to grapple with. The way Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sees it, the residents of the border towns his organization managed to capture have a dual role: they are the human shields to ensure the survival of Hamas, and they are also the trump card that will make Israel release all the detained terrorists (“emptying all the prisons” in the language of Hamas) and allow the rehabilitation of the strip.

Since we have entered the hostage deal process and are already paying the price for doing so, we must make sure this plays out to its fullest potential. After that, the effort to release the captives should continue while combat operations are underway in a way that addresses all the captives as one unit while shifting the mediation efforts to the Egyptians. The resumption of combat operations is necessary if we are to bring about the destruction of Hamas capabilities, but, as we have seen, it also improves the chances and terms for releasing the captives.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 1, 2023.