Tensions between the US and Israeli governments are escalating. This stems from US domestic considerations relating to this year’s presidential elections and ever-increasing pressures from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and Muslim voters.

Despite early staunch support for disassembling Hamas governance and military abilities in Gaza, Washington is now determined to bring a swift end to the war in Gaza at the expense of Israel; at the cost of Israel failing to realize its war goals.

Although the administration continues outwardly to support the elimination of Hamas as a governing and military entity, in practice it is pressuring Israel to end its military campaign, an end to the war which the administration perceives as a prerequisite for advancing its goals in the region.

The US is pressing Israel on provision of more humanitarian aid to Gaza and is repeating unjust criticisms of Israel regarding the number of civilian casualties. In addition, the administration is pressuring Israel to accept a deal to release the hostages held by Hamas in exchange for a series of long ceasefires, i.e., an end of the war.

Moreover, the administration believes that the Palestinian Authority can be “revitalized” via a thorough and rapid transformation, making it into the governing authority in Gaza on the pathway to a full-fledged Palestinian state.

All this is driven by the administration’s desire for avoidance of regional war and reshaping of the region leading to normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, alongside the Democratic Party’s need to offer American voters some kind of political achievement.

Fear that the war could engulf the entire region in a way that forces the US to play a more significant role in the fighting also explains Washington’s reluctance to target Iranian assets – even though Iran is waging war against American and Israel through proxies; despite the fact that Iran is “the hand that rocks the cradle.”

As far as the US administration is concerned, ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a prerequisite for realizing its regional goals, and the establishment of the Palestinian state is presented as the keystone of its entire approach.

Alas, this perception of Middle East realities is completely detached from logic. The assumption that the Palestinian Authority is ready for and capable of profound reform, in preparation for what Washington calls a “revitalized Palestinian Authority,” is without basis.

Listen to what senior Palestinian Authority officials themselves say concerning their partnership with Hamas. On Dec. 10, 2023, PA prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh declared that “Hamas is an integral part of the Palestinian mosaic. The goal of Israel to eliminate Hamas is unacceptable and doomed to fail.” But the administration continues to nonsensically assume it can prevent Hamas from being part of said “revitalized Palestinian Authority.”

Another assumption that does not correspond with reality is that the Palestinian Authority needs, wants, and can return to the Gaza Strip and take effective control of it, to enable its demilitarization and rehabilitation. As a result, the US is interfering in realization of Israel’s war goals, which puts Israel at risk and raises the risks of regional instability.

Unfortunately, US policy towards Qatar smacks of misplaced deference, even appeasement. Washington ought to take a firmer stand with Qatar regarding its support for Hamas and the need for a reasonable deal to free Israeli hostages, including pressure on Qatar to expel Hamas leaders from Doha.

Qatar continues to cynically play all sides of the game. The Palestinian Authority president made an unusual visit to Qatar, accompanied by Majed Faraj and Hussein al-Sheikh, two of his most senior associates. They sought Qatar’s help in forcing Hamas into a Palestinian “National Reconciliation Government” headed by a technocrat (probably Muhammad Mustafa).

Regardless of PA wishes, it is evident that Qatar’s highest interest is assuring the survival of Hamas as the political and military force in Gaza or at least as a significant player in the Palestinian arena. Qatar and its client Hamas might be willing to pay lip service to establishment of a technocratic, “revitalized” PA government in Gaza, but only in a situation where Hamas is really still in control.

The US continues to hesitantly provide Israel with some space to prosecute the war against Hamas while at the same time threatening to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state. Somehow, all this is supposed to bring about an end to fighting with Hezbollah across Israel’s northern border, restrain Iran’s proxy attacks (such as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping), and prevent war from expanding throughout the region. And this would be an impressive political achievement President Biden could boast of in his re-election campaign.

The downside is that this vision for Mideast peace does not correspond to Middle East realities. Without elimination of Hamas as a governing entity, a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” cannot be established, and Iran will have no incentive to change its subversive and provocative behavior. The mere existence of Hamas as a governing entity will fuel Iranian resistance, serve as an incentive to maintain the struggle against Israel and the US, and as the basis for continuing security instability in the region, while the war in Gaza and other places continues.

The endgame in Gaza must be complete Israeli security control, and establishment of a Palestinian civil government that is subject to supervision of regional or international bodies. The IDF will have to continuously interdict any attempt by hostile actors to rebuild a military/terror presence in Gaza. This is a prerequisite for ensuring a de-Hamasification / deradicalization process in Gaza, which will take years.

As for civilian administration of Gaza, we have proposed (in a previous article) a trusteeship regime that will involve pragmatic neighboring Arab countries, to nurture the development of local civic leadership.

As such, an American rush to impose establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip is detached from realities in the Middle East. The Palestinian Authority must undergo profound change. Israel cannot accept false processes that pay lip service to this goal, while propping-up the current failed and hostile Palestinian “authority.” Step one in this regard is wholesale change in the PA’s school curricula. Step two is an immediate end of the PA’s “pay-for-slay” stipends for terrorism. Step three is replacement of the existing PA leadership alongside an end to corruption and nepotism in the Palestinian Authority.

These developments will not emerge miraculously from thin air, nor are they quick fixes that can be brought about on an urgent American timetable in advance of November US elections. It is both foolish and dangerous to think otherwise.

The Israeli-Egyptian relations met with a fair share of challenges, after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. It is interesting that precisely in the same year, the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran, and the deep and warm friendship forged between Israel and Iran instantly disappeared and was “replaced” by a cold, but strategic, peace with Egypt.

The lack of normalization that characterized the bilateral relations with Egypt from the very start, will continue to accompany the two countries throughout the next four decades, except for a brief respite after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Thus far, the Egyptian and Israeli interests, especially the ones pertaining to security, have prevailed. That is – despite a long series of military operations that Israel conducted against the Palestinians, two intifadas and many other obstacles.

They also managed to overcome the lack of basic affection inherent amidst the Egyptian public towards Israel in general and Jews in particular – a product of long years of indoctrination and the educational system in Egypt. Just this past year, we have witnessed isolated attacks by Egyptian soldiers and police officers against Israelis – one case along the shared border, where an Egyptian soldier attacked and killed two combatants while on guard duty, and another case that occurred immediately after the events of October 7, when an Egyptian security guard shot an Israeli man who was visiting as a tourist. Both countries, however, were quick to try and lower the public profile of the scandals.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, there has indeed been a welcome change in the textbooks in the elementary schools in Egypt. Definitive antisemitic and anti-Israeli messages were removed from the books as part of Egypt’s effort to position itself as a responsible country that respects minorities in the eyes of the West.

This is not a given in a country where things change at an extremely slow pace, sometimes to the point of frustration, but the positive trend has stopped for the time being and has not yet extended to middle schools and high schools. In practice, millions of Egyptians have been consuming antisemitic and anti-Israel information and messages for decades.

Every Ramadan month-long holiday, for example, Egyptians have become accustomed to watching anti-Israeli series dealing with espionage affairs in which the “evil” figure is always embodied by Israeli Mossad agents, while the Egyptian heroes prevail over them. That is, despite that in recent years, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a certain effort to minimize these messages.

Nonetheless, these are just a few of the many examples which demonstrate how the Egyptian public is being nurtured with antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiments, messages and materials. In addition to this, there is the inherent compassion which the Egyptians have towards the Palestinian people and their suffering, as it is portrayed by the social media in the Arab world and in networks such as the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya and the like.

Thus, a rather surreal situation has arisen in which the Egyptian regime, which fosters security interests that are by definition compatible with those of Israel and opposed to those of Hamas, is forced to take into account the very negative public opinion held by the majority of the Egyptian street towards Israel and its very positive attitude towards the Palestinians, and therefore to act almost contrary to its own self-interest. As far as Israel’s current war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is concerned, on the one hand, the Egyptian regime is adamant about preventing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip from entering Egyptian territory.

The Egyptian leadership knows very well why it does not want this and understands that the “temporary” arrival of Palestinians could become absolutely permanent, as can be seen in Jordan and other places where Palestinian refugee camps have existed for decades. Moreover, the Egyptians well understand the ambitions of Hamas – for them the Muslim Brotherhood – which will strive to take advantage of any Palestinians who will “temporarily” settle in the Sinai Peninsula in order to strengthen their own stronghold in that arena.

The Egyptians well understand the ideology that characterizes Hamas. It is not a national ideology, that attaches any importance to gaining independence in the Gaza Strip or Judea and Samaria or even from the entire State of Israel, but rather a religious ideology that strives to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate, including Egypt as well.

On the other hand, the Egyptian public sympathizes with their Palestinian brethren in the Gaza Strip and expects the regime to help them. Hence, Egypt finds itself aiming arrows at Israel, encouraging the transfer of more and more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in the Strip (although it is well aware that a significant part of the supplies is stolen by Hamas) and repeatedly states that the fighting in the Gaza Strip must stop, although in essence and behind closed doors, Cairo would not shed a tear in the face of the destruction of Hamas.

Even more dangerous now is the apparent rapprochement between Iran and Egypt. Although this is almost never discussed in the Israeli media, we must in no way take our eyes off Iran’s tireless pursuit to buy influence in the region. It is perhaps critical to recall that Egypt’s relations with Iran have always been accompanied by more than a tad of suspicion: Cairo remembers Tehran’s efforts to spy on its territory and, over the years, there have been several incidents which included the removal of the Iranian ambassador from Egyptian soil.

While Iran has been working for years inside Jordan, in order to strengthen its positioning there, while taking advantage of the weakness of the Jordanian regime, its attempts so far to do the same in Egypt have come to naught. Therefore, the recent rapprochement between the countries is worrisome and raises questions about the baits offered by Iran to Egypt with regards to the activities of the Houthis against ships passing through the region.

Sisi’s recent statement in this regard – “Attack only ships destined for Israel” – does not leave much room for doubt and is even more worrying since it is possible that it is an Iranian-Egyptian understanding not to damage Egyptian economic assets in exchange for systematic but consistent damage to Egypt’s relations with Israel.

Iran also has great influence on the African continent, which is very important to Egypt, especially in Ethiopia, with which Egypt has a long-standing conflict regarding the Ethiopian dam built on the Nile River and the issue of water distribution – an Egyptian strategic interest. Iran, which has been strengthening its foothold in many countries on the African continent for years, is perhaps the only one that very wisely extends its hand to Egypt on an issue that simply does not concern any other party in the region or outside of it. Iran, of course, will not be satisfied with providing help in this or any other context without adequate compensation…

To add to the above, the relations between Israel and Egypt have indeed been based on excellent and ongoing cooperation in recent years, but mainly on the professional level. The political-strategic discourse is almost nonexistent and the vacuum thereof is astounding, mainly in light of the very high tensions that currently exist around the IDF’s intended activity in the Philadelphi crossing.

Ongoing, high-level political and strategic talks, in which not only security issues will be discussed, but also the issue of decades-long incitement and indoctrination of the Egyptian public against Israel, must serve as an anchor to the relations. The latter is not merely a matter of being a nice-to-have issue resolved, but has far-reaching strategic consequences if not addressed.

Israel has its own leverages which it must exercise within the framework of the aforementioned strategic dialogue. This must be done within the framework of a broad and systematic analysis of the Egyptian and Israeli interests within the regional context of challenges and opportunities and not simply within a tactical framework, as is mostly the case at the moment. What is missing here is a broad and strategic view of the challenges facing Egypt and how Israel can assist it in creative ways. This should be seen first with a view to avoid Cairo from being tempted to rely on Tehran and secondly so that Israel will also benefit from regional inputs over time.

This strategic dialogue with Egypt must be institutionalized, with very senior representation on behalf of the Israeli government, accompanied with experts on Arab culture and language. We have already learned that every truth we were convinced of before October 7th requires a fresh look. A failure to do so vis-à-vis our relations with Egypt would be considered nothing less than pure negligence.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 10, 2024.

US President Joe Biden and his staff would really like to get through the remaining months to the US presidential election with the Middle East issue in pride of place on the list of achievements of the current administration in terms of foreign policy, rather than sticking out like a sore thumb in the failures column.

 “We have succeeded” – is what they would like to announce – “in preventing a regional war, in renewing world maritime trade via the Red Sea, in helping transfer government in the Gaza Strip from Hamas to the Palestinian Authority (PA), resuscitating the discussion on a future Palestinian state and above all promoting the vision of regional integration, with the process of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as its centerpiece.”

 We can assume that they would also have emphasized the significance of this achievement in the competition on the new world order and would rub their hands in glee while presenting their success in returning to the fold of the US-Western camp those countries that have turned towards the Sino-Russian axis and to bolster the US position in the Middle East, without getting entangled in a bloody war.

 In the current, extremely complex reality of the Middle East, such a picture appears to be rather unlikely and highly remote, but as absurd as it might sound, it is actually the war in Gaza that might be perceived by the Americans as a golden opportunity to roll out the new order.   So, just how is this possible?! 

 Saudi Arabia plays a key role in the vision of regional integration. The establishment of normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem is also one of the most important incentives that Washington has in order to exercise leverage on Israeli policy. The recent announcement from the Saudi foreign ministry making the discussions on normalization contingent upon the resurrection of the talks on a Palestinian state and an end to the war in the Gaza Strip is wholly consistent with the existing desire in Washington and may even have been coordinated in advance between the two. According to the Americans, an end to the fighting in Gaza is a sine qua non also for bringing calm to Israel’s ongoing low-intensity conflict with Hezbollah and to end the crisis with the Houthis in the Red Sea, whose knock-on effect on global maritime trade and the Egyptian economy, are already taking their toll. As far as the US administration is concerned, a deal in which Israel receives the hostages back in return for an end to the war and the entry of Palestinian Authority-related entities into management of the civilian government of the Gaza Strip could constitute a sufficiently good solution for both of the key objectives that Israel has defined for the war: toppling the Hamas government and bringing the hostages back home.

 In Washington’s view, this will pave the way to the return of the PA – after some rebranding – to manage the civil affairs of the Gaza Strip, the idea of “the Palestinian state” will once again occupy a key position on the negotiating table (this too after some serious rebranding to make it more palatable for the Israeli public), the ongoing combat along Israel’s northern border will be brought to an end while a “diplomatic component” of unclear nature will be added, the crisis with the Houthis in the Red Sea will end, Saudi Arabia will consent to entering normalization talks while benefiting from the credit it will be given for its contribution to ending the war and restoring the issue of the “Palestinian state” to a place of importance on the agenda, while the Biden administration will be able to clearly applaud this achievement and to showcase it as its own doing.

 However, as the saying goes, all that glitters is not gold and what might appear to be a good way forward on paper is far from providing even an adequate solution to these deeply entrenched, fundamental problems. Firstly, Iran – the hand that rocks the cradle and the prime cause of most of the tensions in the region – will be able to continue to operate without being held in check or having to pay any substantial price for its actions. Secondly, Hezbollah – without the physical removal of its men and ensuring they remain stationed back deep in the Lebanese hinterland – it will not be possible to guarantee the safe return of the residents of northern Israel to their homes. Thirdly – Gaza – though Hamas has incurred severe damage to date, it is still far from being completely routed. Ending the war in such a situation will ensure the rapid recovery of the Gaza-based terrorist organization, essentially making it the effective ruler there.

 Moreover, the idea of the “New Order” does not tally with the way Hamas currently views the situation – which at this stage of the game is still acting as though it believes it can put the squeeze on Israel and dictate terms that will not only ensure the survival of its men but also its continued rule in the Gaza Strip.

 Having said all that, the most important issue is still Israel’s deterrence. Israel must not end the war without restoring the deterrence that simply totally collapsed on October 7. Up-to-date opinion polls in the Arab world (conducted on behalf of the Washington Institute) have indicated a worrying decline in the image of Israel’s power following the brutal Hamas attack. Total victory (attaining all the objectives in full) is essential to rebuilding that deterrence. Without that, Israel will be exposed to an existential threat from its enemies in the various theaters and will also lose the asset that constitutes the mainstay of its diplomatic stance, including with regards to the peace accords and normalization. 

 Published in Israel Hayom 11.02.2024 and in Jewish News Syndicate 12.2.2024. 

Hamas is using the hostages not only to bring about an end to the war but also to ensure the continuation of its rule in the strip, to leverage its achievements, and to shore up its tarnished image among the public in Gaza and the West Bank, which is paying the price of the massacre of October 7.

The price that Israel will be required to pay for the first stage of the new deal is the risk of ending the war without toppling Hamas’ rule while releasing terrorists who will significantly strengthen the organization’s capabilities, especially in the West Bank.

The Israeli leadership’s statements in which they have vowed to achieve all the goals of the war are important, but they are not enough. Since Hamas assumes that the domestic situation in Israel will affect the motivation to resume fighting, it is incumbent that a broad Israeli consensus emerge to continue the fighting after the ceasefire is over. US support for the move is also important, although it is not certain that it can be obtained at a bearable price.

As part of the emerging deal, Israel should seek to ensure that terrorists released from its prisons do not return to the West Bank, or if that is not possible – security officials must formulate a plan to offset the expected threat this could create to Israel. These steps should be taken to allow Israel to be able to go ahead with a deal, but under conditions that significantly reduce the risks it entails.

Just like in the previous round, Hamas hopes that the ceasefire that would accompany the first part of the deal will become a turning point in the war. But this time, perhaps as a lesson from that deal, it wants to stretch the ceasefire over a longer period – about six weeks or more.

In its view, the long period will curb the IDF’s momentum and have everyone get used to a reality of non-combat, change Israel’s day-to-day focus to the point that it would be hard to resume fighting and increase pressure on it from Washington. The large number of hostages it holds allows Hamas to take risks. It believes that the detainees that would not be released in the first stage of the new deal could provide additional leverage if it fails to achieve all this.

In the meantime, the ceasefire will allow it to rehabilitate. Hamas will also use this time to replenish ammunition, gather updated intelligence, formulate operational plans, and, of course, also reassert its authority on the population.

Israel will also have to pay for the deal by releasing terrorists. Paradoxically, if fighting resumes, releasing such terrorists into the rubble of Gaza and Khan Younis may actually bring them closer to their deaths. But the perceptual and operational damage to Israel caused by their release will have already been done.

The release of West Bank terrorists held in Israel will greatly strengthen Hamas’ standing among the Palestinian residents there and bolster its image, which has been damaged as a result of the suffering caused because of the war.

For Hamas, the release of terrorists to the West Bank will not only boost it politically but also an opportunity to intensify its terrorist operations and force Israel to contend with another front simultaneously. The IDF and Shin Bet will be required to further intensify their counterterrorism efforts. They have excelled in this endeavor, and it has been moving forward full steam ahead.

It can be assumed that towards the end of the ceasefire in Gaza, Hamas will try to have the cessation of hostilities become permanent through a semi-official arrangement with Qatar and Egypt. It will likely set a whole host of conditions for the release of the rest of the captives it holds, including the release of top terrorists from Israeli prisons, the IDF’s withdrawal from Gaza border areas to the October 6 lines, an Israeli pledge to refrain from “ground invasions” and targeted killings, and international guarantees to launch a Gaza reconstruction program.

The way Hamas sees it, these are the necessary components for creating the narrative that it had won – first, by having dealt the initial blow on Israel, and then by surviving the offensive and extracting various concessions from Israel. This will give it everlasting fame among Palestinians and shatter Israel’s image as “invincible”.

From Israel’s point of view, such a denouement would be intolerable. It could make it vulnerable to existential threats from its enemies on all fronts and severely undermine its standing in the region, which relies heavily on its security might.

Under these circumstances, Israel must get the job done and meet all its objectives. It must ensure there is a clear-cut victory – a knock-out blow to Hamas, not just a better score.

Published in Israel Hayom, 02.02.2024.

Key Points:

• The international law threat against Israel stems from four main sources: The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), ad-hoc commissions of inquiry, and countries utilizing their own domestic criminal justice system against Israel (universal jurisdiction).
• The present paper will focus on the two international courts, although its rationale is relevant to a large extent to the other two types of threats as well.
• Israel makes three fundamental errors vis-à-vis the international law threat: 1. An error in its classification of the threat. 2. An error in the management of its conduct vis-à-vis the threat. 3. An error in defining Israel’s goals vis-à-vis the threat.
• The international law threat aims to restrict and diminish Israel’s right to self-defense, without authority or justification. As such, and in view of its implications, this threat is no different than an attempt to sabotage military supply or maneuvers. It must be viewed as a diplomatic-security threat, not a legal one.
• Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis the threat should be led by the national security leadership, rather than the legal echelons.
• Even in their function as advisors, the spectrum of legal experts advising the decision-making echelon should be diversified. It is unlikely that decision-makers are currently exposed to the range of opinions available on international law and the international law threats. It is possible that the error in the classification of the threat stems from the legal worldview of the legal practitioners managing Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis this threat.
• Israel should set a clear goal for its foreign and security policy: to diminish the influence of these courts.
• Israel should form an alliance with friendly states to meet this threat. A military-legal defense alliance of sorts. This friendly alliance of militaries and defense ministries would establish shared standards for counterterrorism, actions vis-à-vis the courts, and coordinated prevention of risks to service members.
• Bilateral agreements should be initiated with friendly states to establish shared mutual commitments to protect position holders and combat troops, including the avoidance of cooperation with the international courts based on said commitments.

Background:

 On 26 January 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures against Israel.[i] The court ruled on South Africa’s request that a number of provisional measures be issued against Israel, as part of a lawsuit absurdly accusing Israel of committing the crime of genocide in Gaza. The measures that South Africa requested included, inter alia, ordering Israel to stop its war in Gaza altogether.

In actuality, the ICJ found it sufficient to primarily require that Israel do its best to refrain from committing crimes under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Israel is required to take precautions to ensure that its forces do not commit genocidal acts. Israel is further required to prevent and punish instances of incitement to genocide with regard to the Palestinians in Gaza. Under the provisional ruling issued, Israel is also required to take immediate and effective steps to ensure the provision of basic services and humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza. It is important to note that the last two requirements were surprisingly and regretfully supported by Justice Aharon Barak.[2] Israel is further required to avoid the destruction of evidence pertaining to South Africa’s allegations against it. Moreover, within one month, Israel is required to submit a report listing the steps it had taken to give effect to the court’s order.[3]

The ICJ ruling exemplifies the extent of its anti-Israel bias. It marginally and laconically addresses Hamas’ attack on 7 October 2023 (but not the horrendous and monstrous aspect of it). It does not recognize the extent of the existential risk that Israel is facing and fighting against in Gaza. In contrast, large parts of the ruling are dedicated to depictions of the Gaza war’s outcomes, citing Palestinian figures (which are, in fact, Hamas figures). UNRWA directors are quoted at length describing the situation in Gaza.[4] Yet the widespread use of UNRWA facilities for military-terrorist purposes is missing from the ruling.

The lawsuit filed by South Africa is part of the trend to engage Israel in a legal battle alongside a military one. In fact, the real purpose is to use the international law arena to limit Israel’s ability to use military force for defensive purposes.

The international law arena has four different focal points. The first and most dangerous one is the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The goal in its use against Israel is to investigate, detain, indict and prosecute Israeli individuals for their actions in the line of duty as part of the conflicts in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Such an avenue could deter senior Israeli political and military position holders on both personal and national levels.

The second avenue for international law measures against Israel is the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. This is the court of law in which the current lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel is being deliberated.

There are two potential modes of action against Israel at the ICJ. The first is to file a lawsuit against Israel. At the ICJ, only countries can sue one another. The main aim of such lawsuits against Israel is to try and obtain quick orders based on a short, immediate discussion that would limit Israel’s military capability and room for maneuver. Another aim of such lawsuits is to obtain a ruling that would require that the ICC launch its own investigation.

The second avenue is to utilize the court’s other role as an advisor on international law to the UN’s authorized institutions. The aim of utilizing this avenue is to have the court issue an opinion negating the legality of Israel’s military actions. One example of such a case is the matter of Israel’s security barrier. In 2003, the UN General Assembly asked the ICJ for its opinion on the barrier’s legality. The ICJ, in turn, issued an opinion in 2004 that contains extremely severe international law assertions from Israel’s perspective. Inter alia, the opinion determined that any part of the barrier east of the 1967 borders is illegal and must be taken down immediately.[5]

The recent ICJ ruling issued following South Africa’s request for provisional measures is a prime example of how absurd it would be to view this court as a fair tribunal with respect to Israel. The ruling granting provisional measures lest genocide be committed in Gaza gives credence to South Africa’s unfounded blood libel. The court’s ruling is a document that contains no truth or justice. It pretentiously aims to subject Israel’s war of defense to a permanent judicial oversight mechanism by demanding that Israel submit reports showing that it is following the orders issued. It is designed to limit the Israeli Cabinet and the IDF’s operational freedom using ongoing and immediate legal deterrence.

The third avenue for international law attacks against Israel is via ad-hoc commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions. Two such examples are the Goldstone Commission set up following Operation Cast Lead and the Palmer Commission that followed the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident.[6] This avenue aims to perpetuate constant deterrence by generating inquiry reports that delegitimize Israel’s use of force. Another aim of these reports is to drive other political proceedings against Israel, such as UN Security Council resolutions, and to sustain an ongoing campaign of delegitimization.

The fourth avenue is taking advantage of countries’ domestic doctrines and procedures for universal criminal jurisdiction. Normally, countries limit the utilization of their domestic criminal law systems to events that have taken place in their territory or to events outside their sovereign borders provided that they pertain to the judging country’s interests, such as harming its citizens, its security or economy. However, there is an exception to this rule. The penal code of many countries gives them the right to prosecute severe violations of international law, such as war crimes, even in cases where the country has no direct connection to the event in question. Thus, complaints and requests for arrest warrants against Israeli officials, officers and politicians have been brought before courts in Spain, Belgium, US, UK, and New Zealand in the past.[7]

The present paper aims to shed light on the issues arising from Israel’s current conduct vis-à-vis two of the four avenues mentioned, namely the two permanent courts (the ICJ and ICC). This paper will suggest a new strategy for Israel, the essence of which is to abandon the legal view of this threat and reclassify it as a diplomatic-security threat. Subsequently, elected and professional national security actors should take the lead in addressing it, rather than legal advisors. First and foremost, steps can and should be taken to form a coalition of militaries and defense ministries that would take joint action against this international law threat.

The problem:

The present paper seeks to identify three main issues arising from Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis the international law threat. The first is an error in Israel’s classification of the threat. The second is an error in the management of Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis the threat. And the third is an error in defining Israel’s goals for the actions taken to meet this threat.

An error in the classification of the threat – Israel is viewing and treating the international law threat first and foremost as a legal one. The discourse around it is law-based – for instance, questions related to each body’s authoritative sources or the legal avenues of action available with respect to it. Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis this challenge is led by public sector legal practitioners, such as the Attorney General and international law experts in the Ministry of Justice and IDF Military Advocate General. Yet the threat is only clad in legal clothing. In fact, it is not a legal threat at all, but rather a diplomatic-security one.

The threat is not a genuinely legal one because it is not posed by genuine legal institutions. Thus, it does not meet genuine legal standards. “Conclusive” evidence will not dissipate the threat. And a “good” litigation will not prevent it. The political bias of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is striking. In the 1980s, it ruled against the United States in the lawsuit filed by Iran.[8] Ironically enough, this happened after the United States had exercised its right to self-defense in response to an Iranian naval terror attack against US interests. To this end, the court had made the rules of self-defense unrealistically more stringent. In 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion declaring the parts of Israel’s security barrier located east of the 4 June 1967 borders unlawful.[9] In this ruling, it once again distorted the rules of self-defense and limited Israel’s justification to counter the heinous wave of terror it had been suffering.

The ICC is also clearly biased. Its interpretation of the IDF’s conduct in the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident is consistent with the ICJ’s bias. At the time, the IDF forces were contending with a deliberate breach of a legal naval siege imposed by the Israeli Navy. The forces chose to stop the advancing flotilla in a manner that placed Israeli servicemen at risk, even though they could have opened fire to stop it, thereby avoiding putting IDF troops in harm’s way. Israel’s naval troops who boarded the ships encountered a violent terrorist ambush. Yet the ICC ruled that in this incident, there was a cause for concern that war crimes had been committed by none other than the Israeli troops.[10]

On a separate issue, the ICC ruled in favor of the ICC Prosecutor’s request to determine that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to examine alleged “crimes” committed in Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.[11} This despite the fact that the ICC’s jurisdiction only pertains to incidents in the territories of states that have consented to its jurisdiction, or to those in which suspects are citizens of states that have consented to its jurisdiction.

The Palestinian Authority, which is not a state, and lacks territory and sovereignty, should not be a member state of the court. It certainly cannot grant the court jurisdiction (by virtue of sovereignty over territory) that it lacks itself. The Oslo Accords prohibit the Palestinian Authority from criminal prosecution of Israelis.[12] And, even if it could grant the court such jurisdiction, the Palestinian Authority is not a state with borders that have even been generally outlined. Yet all of the above did not stop the ICC from ruling that the PA is a member state of the court, and that its territory, for the purpose of determining the court’s jurisdiction, is Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip in their entirety.[13] Thus, the ICC views itself as authorized to rule even on events that take place in East Jerusalem, including the Old City, the Western Wall, and even at the Israeli Ministry of Justice on Salah al-Din Street.

Cooperating with these courts is, therefore, a mistake. Expecting to get justice for Israel and Israelis in these courts is an Israeli naiveté that overlooks their clear bias. And if an intelligence-based “conception” and mistaken paradigm was adhered to in the lead-up to Hamas’ October 7 attack, then this is a legal equivalent.

An error in the management of Israel’s conduct vis-à-vis the threat – Given that the threat should be classified as a diplomatic-security one that is merely clad in legal clothing, legal practitioners should not be spearheading Israel’s counter-campaign. Legal practitioners, by their very nature, are accustomed to analyzing events from a legal perspective. They ask questions about the boundaries of jurisdiction and the principles of law. They devise solutions based on these two foundations. They therefore suggest “jurisdiction-based” solutions such as “there is no jurisdiction in this event”. And they offer arguments based on substantive principles, such as “by law, a duty was not breached in this event”. However, in biased legal frameworks, such arguments are ineffective. The reason is simple. The motivation is political from the start. The impact is political. And no legal argument will change this.

A diplomatic-security threat must be dealt with using diplomatic-security instruments. And these must, therefore, be spearheaded by Israel’s national security leadership at both the elected and the professional levels. Even once the legal practitioners’ involvement is limited to advising the decision-makers on the threat, rather than managing the counter-campaign against it, the spectrum of advisors and legal perspectives should be diversified. In Israel and across the globe, there is a wide range of opinions with regards to international law among legal experts in general, and among international criminal law experts in particular. It appears doubtful that this diversity is currently represented around the decision-makers’ table.

An error in defining Israel’s goals – As a result of the legal focus and approach, Israel is erring in its definition of the objectives and goals with respect to the international law threat. For example, Israel should realize that the existence of such biased international courts, and their increasing influence, runs contrary to Israel’s national interests. Israel should therefore set a goal of countering the power and influence of these courts, and exposing their deep-seated bias. Additionally, it should strive to decrease the number of countries who are members of the ICC, while seeking to diminish the ICJ and ICC’s legitimacy as impartial bodies, and the willingness of countries to cooperate with them. From this perspective, the fact that Israel is participating in the proceedings initiated by South Africa creates the impression that Israel has faith in the proceedings. Likewise, appointing a judge on Israel’s behalf was a terrible mistake that could be seen as legitimizing this institution. It undermines what should be Israel’s objective – delegitimizing the deeply-biased court that pretends to be an impartial tribunal.

A second objective should be taking joint action to formulate an alternative normative stance, together with like-minded countries which share similar interests. International courts will find it more challenging to take action against Israel if they know that Israel is acting according to standards and norms that have been agreed upon by other friendly militaries such as those of the US, UK and Germany. To a certain extent, the militaries of like-minded countries, and of all democracies threatened by terror, will be very interested to learn the lessons of the IDF’s war in Gaza. Israel’s operation is writing a new chapter in the history of modern warfare, as it is being carried out against an unprecedented multidimensional and multi-arena threat. The IDF should use this valuable bargaining chip to promote collaboration against international law threats with military advocate generals, defense ministers and other officials from friendly countries. An educated and well-informed discussion with friendly (and other) countries’ militaries and defense ministries will demonstrate the extent to which the international law threat aimed at Israel at present also contradicts their own key interests.

The third objective should be formulating understandings similar to those formulated by the United States based on Article 98 of the Rome Statute, so that countries will resolve, together with Israel, to refuse to enforce arrest warrants and other ICC orders.[14] As part of these understandings, Israel would do well to make it clear to friendly and other countries that any action taken against an Israeli individual would be considered by Israel an unlawful use of force against an Israeli. This is what the United States has done using special legislation.[15} A similar message of deterrence should be conveyed by Israel as well.

Policy recommendations 

1. Israel should define the international law threat as primarily a diplomatic-security threat rather than a legal one. This threat aims to disrupt Israel’s ability to utilize its defense forces in order to exercise its right to self-defense. As such, this threat is no different, in effect, from an attempt to sabotage military supply or maneuvers.
2. Israel’s national security leadership, on both the elected and professional levels, should spearhead Israel’s counter-campaign, rather than the legal practitioners.
3. Even once the legal practitioners assume their proper role as advisors to the national security decision-makers, rather than being the ones managing the counter-campaign against the legal threat, it is important to ensure that the spectrum of legal opinions represented is sufficiently-broad. There is a wide range of opinions on international law and international law threats, yet it appears that this diverse spectrum is not currently represented around the decision-making table.
4. Israel should immediately end cooperation with the ICC and ICJ.
5. Israel should notify the ICJ that, from now on, it will no longer accept its jurisdiction regardless of statements made in any convention.
6. Israel should enter reservations into any convention that allows reservations, while rejecting the court’s jurisdiction unless explicitly consented to, notwithstanding any “jurisdiction” clause in the convention. Israel must withdraw from conventions that have clauses granting jurisdiction to the ICJ, and that do not permit reservations. Israel will have to emphasize that its withdrawal is a result of such conventions being politically-abused to attack the Jewish state in a biased manner via the international courts.
7. A goal of Israeli foreign and security policy should be to diminish the power of biased international courts, to encourage countries to pull out of the ICC, and to form coalitions of states who are not members of such courts.
8. Israel should work to form a united front – a legal-military defense alliance of sorts – between friendly countries to counter the international legal threat. The militaries and defense ministries will set shared counterterrorism standards that will make it harder for the courts to make contradictory normative assertions. Such an alliance will formulate shared action with respect to the courts, and promote the organized prevention of risks to position holders and troops. Military insights from Israel’s current unique war could be used as a bargaining chip for garnering the friendly militaries’ collaboration on the legal front as well.

Israel should initiate bilateral agreements with friendly states to create a shared mutual commitment to protect position holders and combat troops. These agreements should include non-cooperation with the court based on these mutual commitments.

[1] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip, (SOUTH AFRICA v. ISRAEL), ORDER (24 January 2024) (https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf).

[2] The main damage caused by Barak’s decision is a result of several components: First, Barak does not dispute the legitimacy of the court’s biased ruling. Second, under ICJ regulations, an immediate order is not issued unless the infringement of rights serving as grounds for the lawsuit filed is, at the very least, plausible. In this case, the very issuing of a provisional measure requires the court to assume that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is possibly being or may in the future be violated by Israel and that, in the absence of such a measure, the harm caused to the Palestinians in Gaza in this context will be irrevocable. Although Barak has stated that he does not believe this to be the case, any judge who is absolutely convinced that a lawsuit is unfounded must not issue even an interim order designed to immediately ensure the rights regarding which the lawsuit has been filed. The third damage caused by Barak’s decision is that it implies that Israel is engaged in incitement to genocide. And the worst damage is that, by having an Israeli signature on interim measures against Israel in an unfounded lawsuit which claims Israel is committing genocide, Barak has provided a shade of evidential and legal basis to this lawsuit. Barak’s assertion whereby Israel is obligated to provide basic services and humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip is also erroneous and harmful. It was made in accordance with his “worldview” of international law. However, this assertion was made without having engaged in a profound discussion of Israel’s right to impose a legal military siege as part of its war.

[3] The measures issued against Israel are specified in section 86 of the order cited in endnote 1 above.

[4] Sections 49–50 of the order cited in endnote 1 above.

[5] Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ADVISORY OPINION OF 9 JULY 2004, (https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf).

[6] Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (15 September 2009) (file:///Users/rb-main-dir/Downloads/C363802C3F8559AB852576320070599E-Full_Report.pdf); Report of the Secretary-General Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (July 2011).

[7] Anshel Pfeffer, Major General (res.) Doron Almog Feared Arrest – and Cancelled a Visit to London, Ha’aretz (31 May 2012) (https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2012-05-31/ty-article/0000017f-defe-d3ff-a7ff-fffedfdb0000) (Hebrew); A Guide for Cautious Senior Officials – Belgium, New Zealand, Spain and Britain Have Threatened to Sue High-Ranking Israeli Officials, Globes (28 January 2010) (https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000534424) (Hebrew).

[8] Case Concerning Oil Platforms (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA), JUDGMENT (6 NOVEMBER 2003) (https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/90/090-20031106-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf).

[9] See endnote 5 above.

[10] It was clear from the court’s position that, had the prosecution not viewed this event at the time as one that does not cross the minimal severity threshold to fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the flotilla incident would have turned into an inquiry against the Israelis involved.

[11] ICC-01/18 SITUATION IN THE STATE OF PALESTINE, Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine’ (5 February 2021) (https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2021_01165.PDF).

[12] Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) (28 September 1995), Article XVII(2)(c).

[13] All while unconvincingly evading the fact that the Oslo Accords determine that permanent status agreement issues such as borders will be determined in negotiations. Exceptional in this court of law is Hungarian Judge Kovács, whose approach to the matter of jurisdiction was much fairer and topical.

[14] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 98.

[15] American Service-Members Protection Act of 2002.

The overarching goal of Israel’s military operation against Hamas is to reestablish the deterrence that collapsed on October 7. Without fully achieving the goals defined for the war, Israel may find itself facing an existential threat from its various enemies, who are following its every move. This could result in Israel no longer projecting the same status based on its perceived military strength. It is vital to reiterate this in light of recent events, and light of the public debate on the path forward.

The challenge facing Israel is a function of time constraints. To achieve the goals under current conditions, the IDF will have to act methodically for a protracted period. However, time is critical when it comes to the abductees. Assuming it is not possible to influence the intensity of the fighting or renew the blockade of Gaza, the political-security leadership is faced with the question of how to increase pressure on Hamas and shorten this timeframe.

Among the options, it seems that systematically targeting Hamas leaders residing abroad, alongside continued fighting in Gaza, would serve Israel well in advancing this regard and help achieve additional goals.

Such action would clarify to the organization’s leaders that there is a price to their dithering. Moreover, such activity would help disrupt Hamas’ ability to govern and coordinate between its different wings, thus frustrating its attempt to reassert its control over the Gaz Strip

Without an effective command center abroad, after it suffers devastating damage to its military and governing capabilities in Gaza, and following the decimation of its infrastructure in the West Bank, Hamas may lose its status as a movement with regional influence, even if it continues to wield local influence as an organization on the run. Israel and its neighbors have a shared interest in seeing this through. The US should pursue this goal as part of its efforts to shape a new regional order.

While Hamas leaders in Gaza live underground and their voices are not heard, Hamas’ Political Bureau members abroad are presenting the movement’s policies and promoting its interests. They are replacing the hiding leadership in media appearances, on social networks, at conventions, and in policy discussions.

Their activity does not end there: They participate in policy formulation and advocacy and are responsible for raising political support and resources necessary to build the organization’s capabilities and operations in different areas. Some fulfill operational roles – from regional coordination for terrorism purposes to directing specific activities in various arenas. Saleh al-Arouri, who was recently assassinated, was one of those. He was a known figure in the public discourse, but there are more like him.

Khaled Mashaal, Ismail Haniyeh, Mousa Abu Marzook, Basem Na’im, Sami Abu Zuhri, Izzat Rishq, Osama Hamdan and Zaher Jabarin are among them.

The Hamas overseas command’s activity is a force multiplier for Hamas, and it has a critical contribution to the organization’s regional influence, especially given the difficult conditions limiting its activity from the Gaza Strip or the West Bank.

The key role this command plays, as well as its efforts to drag Israel into a multi-arena regional war, make it incumbent upon Israel to take determined and methodical action against it until it is fully neutralized – especially after the monstrous massacre on October 7 it was so proud of, and after the unambiguous wording Mashaal provided regarding Hamas’ absolute commitment to destroying the State of Israel (from the river to the sea, from Rosh Hanikra to Eilat).

It is hard to ignore the symbolic timing of the judgment rendered by The International Court of Justice’s decision at The Hague and International Holocaust Remembrance Day. The Genocide Convention, drafted on the ashes of the Holocaust of European Jewry, was intended to ensure “Never Again”.

Israel, was by the successors of the Nazis – Hamas – in ways reminiscent of the horrors of the Holocaust. But now it finds itself defending itself against accusations of genocide.

Hamas, which defined the Holocaust as “an invented story without any basis,” continuously commits war crimes and has tried to justify its actions in an 18-page document whose sole purpose is to deny the horrors of its people, discredit Israel, and smear it with mud.

The State of Israel fights many battles all the time on different fronts. The most important of them is the battle for the truth. The claims used against Israel change faces, shapes, and wordings, but their purpose is one: to undermine the legitimacy of the state, its agencies, and its actions. If, after the monstrous massacre, we are still required to respond to ridiculous claims against us, one can only imagine what our image is under normal circumstances.

The massacre and the war have brought us back to basics, made clear that we are still struggling for our existence, and demonstrated Israel’s duty to ensure, once again: Never again.

Published in Israel Hayom, January 28, 2024.

In the best tradition of Hamas’s methods, which it has been gradually refining ever since Operation Cast Lead, Hamas effectively exploits the civil and humanitarian issues in order to bash Israel on the international stage and establish empathy, solidarity and support of the organization and of the Gaza Strip’s residents as being victimized by Israel’s brutality. Hamas, which has adopted and honed the victimhood doctrine [1], is now acting to perfect it while availing itself of entities in the international community and on international media. Hamas makes it a point to frame Israel’s actions as war crimes, culminating in accusing Israel in the International Court in The Hague of committing genocide, through South Africa acting as Hamas’s proxy, with financial and political backing by Qatar [2], as well as for reasons of domestic politics as elections in that country draw near.

The Palestinian Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip and its reports regarding the Palestinian victims are an important tool in the consciousness engineering perpetrated by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. That ministry, just like every national and civil institution in the Gaza Strip (and largely also the U.N. and UNRWA organizations), is under Hamas’s full control and authority. Therefore, it is clear to any reasonable person that the reports of the Palestinian Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip are not objective, neutral or professional, but rather are intended to serve Hamas’s interest in cementing its victimized image among the international media and community, as part of the organization’s doctrine of victimhood.

Beyond the fact that the inflated reports regarding the number of fatalities and injured people do not include even a single Hamas operative (all fatalities are being reported as civilians), the fact that many entities in the media and in the international community tend to treat these reports as reliable is merely a ludicrous and sad absurdity. The reported number of fatalities is close to 23,000, and the number of injured is 60,000 (as of January 14, 2024). Moreover, the Palestinian Ministry of Health’s reports indicate that 70% of the casualties are women and children, and as everyone knows, Israeli bombs can clearly distinguish between men and women and children and consequently are able to specifically target women and children, in the process whizzing past every man in their path.

A previous article on the subject [3] presented quite a few questions that should really have been entertained by all those entities who consider the reports of the Palestinian Ministry of Health – meaning, of Hamas – to be reliable. For example, where exactly have so many fatalities been buried? Where are so many wounded being hospitalized, when the World Bank’s report indicates that the number of hospital beds in the Gaza Strip does not exceed 3,000? Even if we were to assume that civilian facilities such as schools have been converted into hospitals, that hospital beds have been added at field hospitals set up in the strip’s territory, or that the existing hospitals have been tightly packed, doubling the number of hospital beds – the reported number still does not conform with the known data. Moreover, how is that that, with such high numbers of injured and seriously injured people, so few of them have been taken to Egypt to undergo further treatment?

Still, beyond such sporadic questions, the issue requires additional analysis. First, consideration must be given to the casualties in the Gaza Strip injured by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the strip. An analysis of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit’s data (January 14, 2024) indicates that a total of approximately 13,000 rockets have been fired in Israel since the start of the warfare, of which 9,000 entered Israel’s territory. This means that approximately 4,000 of the rockets fired were failed launches which landed inside the strip’s territory; for example, the failed launches which ended up hitting the Al-Ahli and Al-Shifa hospitals in Gaza City. It can safely be assumed that, with such a large number of failed rockets falling within the boundaries of the strip, and in the absence of protective measures, many casualties will occur among the Palestinians themselves. Furthermore, some Gazans have been hurt as a result of being directly fired upon by Hamas gunfire while attempting to flee the warzone to the south of the strip, or after being forcibly held hostage and used as a human shield. Therefore, even if we were to conservatively quantify the scope of Palestinian casualties caused by other Palestinians as a result of the three factors mentioned, it can be assumed that approximately 1,000 of Gaza’s residents were killed as a result of harm done by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the other organizations in the strip.

Therefore, given an official report by the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit (January 14, 2024) stating that over 9,000 Hamas terrorists have been killed since the start of the warfare – with an additional approximately 1,000 more people having been killed by Hamas (either by failed rocket launches or by direct gunfire), we arrive at an estimate of approximately 10,000 fatalities. Even if we were to fully grant the report of the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, it would indicate the number of civilian fatalities to be approximately 13,000. This figure signifies that the ratio of noncombatant to combatant fatalities in the Gaza War is 1/1.3. The known ratio for Western who have in recent decades been involved in the wars in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan is 1/3–1/5. The range was established because not all cases have a consensual number of civilians/noncombatants killed. This is exemplified by the estimates regarding the number of civilians killed in Mosul range between 12,000 and 40,000. In any event, the data indicates the lowest ratio of harm caused to civilians/noncombatants. Even if the numbers we present are merely approximations or a rough estimate, and the numbers may be found to be slightly higher after the war is over – that is still a low rate of harm done to noncombatants. Similar comparisons can also be drawn regarding the scope of the destruction caused to buildings. This is exemplified by the customary estimates regarding the scope of the damage done in Mosul following 9 months of bombings by the U.S.-led international coalition. The range proposed in those estimates is between 65% and 80% of all buildings in the city (whose residents had numbered approximately 1.5 million) having been completely destroyed.

Also, as to the injured, it is important to present an explanation or analysis that has no bearing when talking about fatalities. As stated above, Hamas entirely avoids reporting the scope of casualties from among its ranks; but if the fatalities are approximately 9,000, and if the customary ratio of fatalities to injured casualties is 1 to 5, meaning, for every one fatality there are five injured casualties (and the ratio in the current war among IDF soldiers is regrettably much higher), and even if we were to assume that, in Hamas’s case, the ratio in question amounts to merely 1 to 3 – then the number would be approximately 30,000 injured casualties, which is about one half of the number of injured people reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

In addition to the number of fatalities and casualties from among Hamas’s ranks, consideration must also be given to the incorrect data concerning the number of internally displaced persons in the strip. A U.N. report (apparently relying on reports made by UNRWA, which are dictated by Hamas) has stated that there are 1.9 million IDPs in Gaza [4]. This figure, too, is unfounded, since according to all estimates, the total of evacuees from the north of the strip amounts to approximately 800 thousand (out of one million), with another approximately 200 thousand from Khan Yunis and the camps in the center of the strip; amounting to approximately one million displaced persons – which is about one half of the number reported by the U.N. and quoted as fact by many entities in the international community and media. If we accept the figure presented by the U.N., then almost all of the strip’s residents are displaced persons (1.9 million out of 2.2 million); a patently absurd “fact”.

Hamas has perfected its psychological warfare strategy in every aspect, including in the aspect of the conflict’s victims. The guiding logic behind Hamas’s strategy in this context is exaggeration, dissimulation and taking advantage of, at best the ignorance, and at worst the inherent anti-Israel biases, of media and international community entities. Hamas has certainly been impressively successful in this context. This is exemplified the report of 500 fatalities at Al-Ahli Hospital, on the third week of the war, when competent inquiries conducted since – and not just by Israeli entities – have clearly shown that incident to have been the result of a failed rocket launch which landed in the hospital’s parking lot rather than inside the hospital proper, and that the number of fatalities was about 30. Yet the Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip nevertheless continues to include the number 500 in its reported reckoning of the fatalities. On the other hand, Israel has to this day undoubtedly failed to fight back psychologically and undermine Hamas’s narrative, which is gradually becoming an accepted truth. The time for change has come, and Israel should muster its best talents and abilities to strike back psychologically; better late than never.

If there is any actually encouraging sign, it can be found in the fact that the scope of the casualties – both fatalities and injured – among Hamas and the other organizations, is immense, even dramatically so. This means that Hamas no longer operates as an organized paramilitary organization, that Hamas operatives’ erosion coefficient is very high and that the course of action taken by the IDF is indeed leading to the dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities. Dismantling the military and government capabilities does not mean whittling the organization down to its last terrorist or rocket, but rather neutralizing Hamas’s ability to operate as an effective military organization and government. Hamas will always have some residual capability remaining, which will be expressed in terrorism and guerilla actions, but such residual activity should in time become marginal and controlled, as has been the case with the terrorist capabilities in Judea and Samaria, where the IDF and Shin Bet have been successfully – and rather impressively and effectively – “mowing the grass.”

Our basic assumption and premise should be that, whenever we find ourselves in a reality of a persistent and prolonged conflict with the Palestinians, and being unable to bridge profound and substantial gaps between the two sides – we would have to live with the Palestinians’ terrorist motivations and with actual terrorism. In this context, we would also do well to internalize the fact that, even under conditions that would allow us to bridge the gaps, and even were progress to be achieved toward a diplomatic agreement, or even the implementation of such an agreement – there will always be people deeply motivated to foil any such agreement or arrangement and to continue waging terror against Israel. Therefore, under any conditions, and certainly in a reality where no such agreement is in sight, Israel must have permanent and continuous security and intelligence control and continue retaliating against terrorist instigators wherever they may be. Only thus can we significantly reduce the potential damage threatened by terrorism and guarantee an optimal level of security as a condition for the continued development and prosperity of the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People.

[1] Gabi Siboni and A.G. Will Hamas Be Better Prepared during its Next Confrontation with Israel? Insights on Hamas’ Lessons from Operation Protective Edge, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 7, No. 2, September 2015.

https://www.g-bina.com/_files/ugd/d48d94_84f22a904afd40b892f1f3af7cee5510.pdf

[2] South Africa’s Diplomatic Campaign Against Israel – In Service of Hamas and In Cooperation with Hamas’ Patron, Qatar, MEMRI, January 18, 2024.

https://www.memri.org/reports/south-africas-diplomatic-campaign-against-israel-%E2%80%93-service-hamas-and-cooperation-hamas

[3] Kibi Michael, Hamas’s ‘numbers warfare’, JNS, November 14, 2023.

https://www.jns.org/hamass-numbers-warfare/

[4] Gaza: Forced and protracted displacement of Palestinians would constitute a serious breach of international law and an atrocity crime, National Refugee Council, December 26, 2023.

https://www.nrc.no/news/2023/december/gaza-displacement/

Earlier this week paratroopers in the 55th Brigade wrote a letter to their commander declaring their willingness to carry the fight forward against Hamas “until victory,” even if that means serving in the army reserves for many more months.

The letter, which is circulating widely, decries the decision of the IDF general staff to begin withdrawing from significant parts of Gaza before the mission to destroy all Hamas attack capabilities is completed. “How can we go home to our families before we create the conditions whereby Israeli residents of the Gaza Envelope towns can go home to their towns and families?” They ask for the “honor” of continuing the battle.

Without commenting here on the wisdom of IDF redeployments, the thing to note about the paratrooper letter is the gutsy patriotism and positivity that oozes from every paragraph.

The young Israeli men who signed the letter with their full names and military identification numbers are faithful members of their nation, devoted to Israel’s future, and confident in Israel’s ability to overcome all adversity.

Their buoyant and brave sentiments are of a piece with the resilience demonstrated by broad segments of the Israeli public, from muscular mothers holding down the home front to the hundreds of thousands of Israelis (and Diaspora Jews) who are volunteering in myriad ways to make up labor shortfalls in fields, factories, and hospitals.

A new public opinion poll and market survey of Israel’s younger generation released this week (and unveiled here in English for the first time) makes it crystal clear that Israel is blessed the most believing youth; a generation of future leaders who are upbeat and keen enough to drive Israel towards every success despite all the demanding challenges ahead.

Results of the in-depth report from Glikman, Shamir, Samsanov (The Publicis Group) demolish any aspersions against younger Israelis as being shallow, disconnected from values, or insipid universalists.

Paradoxically, their connection to Tik Tok and Instagram that had linked them to the broader world now has rooted them more than ever in Israeli and Jewish identity; a harsh backlash against the horrors of October 7 and its global antisemitic aftermath.

Most poignantly, the survey contrasts the views of young Israelis (16-25 years old – teens, soldiers, and students) with those of their parents and grandparents. And the contrast is stark.

Turns out that today’s youth are more like their grandparents’ generation (those who fought for independence in 1948) than their parents’ generation. Like their grandparents, they are rough and tough, realistic, and filled with warrior spirit; whereas their parents are earnest about “normalcy” and “the good life.”

The youth are this country’s strongest patriots and optimists. 59% believe that Israel is strong and will win all current wars and has a great future. 49% say they are mobilized to the military or are volunteering in civilian frameworks and are “devoted” to the State of Israel. 42% say that Jews have no other place in the world. (35% are more worried about Israel’s future; and 20% say that are disillusioned and don’t see their future in Israel.)

At the same time, today’s Israeli youth are not wearing rose-colored glasses. 57% recognize that tough times are head and Israel’s path to renewed strength and growth will be a long haul. (29% see a swift recovery from the current crisis and believe that mass Aliyah can be expected soon; while on the other hand, 14% fear that Israel faces insurmountable difficulties.)

There is no escapism in view of the current situation. 82% of Israel youth are prepared (to some or to a great extent) to pause the “good life” in terms of personal plans for work, study, and vacation, and are prepared to forgo travel abroad all-together. 61% very much understand and 25% partially agree that now is the time to restrict their purchases and save for the future.

And when making necessary purchases, 77% categorically prefer to buy “Blue & White” (Israeli-made products), and 84% prefer to buy from Israeli or international companies that contribute to the war/national effort.

Unlike youth around the world at the relevant young ages, Israeli youth clearly understand that they need to focus not on parties and pleasure, but on work and study (54%), family (51%), friends (34%), and volunteering (21%).

IT IS IMPORTANT to contrast the eager and feisty, and at the same time pragmatic and levelheaded, thinking of Israeli youth with the dark and depressive sentiments expressed by a certain swath of Israeli elites. Alas, gloom governs the Israeli airwaves where a privileged class of older journalists and veteran “experts” dominate.

This “old guard” is telling us non-stop that Israel is losing the war with Hamas, cannot win against Hamas or Hezbollah, does not have the societal strength to survive long wars, and does not have a future without hewing to the stale paradigms of October 6.

This means acceptance of all Hamas demands for hostage release including an immediate end to military operations in Gaza; far-reaching diplomatic concessions to the Palestinians (despite their corruption, investment in terrorism and antisemitic education, and absolute intransigence); and of course, the political defeat of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his “messianist-radical” coalition government.

All their pessimistic talk handicaps this nation as it fights for its life. Two of my colleagues at the Misgav Institute, professors Gabi Siboni and Kobi Michael, have given the nay-sayers a name. They are the “Dichonistim” movement, the “Depressive” lobby. This is a name meant to rhyme and contrast with “Bithonistim,” staunch believers in the success of bold Israeli security posture and stirring Israeli national identity.

What can be said for certain is that there is a wide and deep gap between the pessimist and depressive discourse dispensed by the “old guard” and the optimism and resilience expressed by Israel’s younger generation and much of Israeli society.

I hope and assume that the negative and self-doubting ruminations of the “Depressive Lobby” will be overcome by the positive thinking and assured posture of Israeli youth and many/most Israelis. Israel cannot afford anything less robust and authentic.

Published in The Jerusalem Post,19.01.2024.

In his statement to the media to mark 100 days since Oct. 7m, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi spoke on the approval of operational plans to continue fighting and increase military pressure on Hamas, emphasizing that “this pressure, and only it, has succeeded in bringing back many captives so far. We have to revisit the circumstances under which the previous hostage deal was made in order to understand why Hamas is not rushing to finalize another such deal. This illustrates the scale of the challenge facing Israel on the way to defeating it.

What made Hamas agree back then to a deal that saw the release of about 100 captives in exchange for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid? First and foremost, it was the desire to stop the momentum of the Israeli attack and open a path that would lead, in a gradual process, to a complete cessation of the war. The scope of casualties and extensive destruction caused by Israel’s airstrikes within a relatively short period of time, along with images of hundreds of thousands of Gazams fleeing southward, increased pressure on the terrorist organization. Hamas had realized that it needed to understand the situation and improve its grip had become critical, compounded by the blockade of the strip, which caused severe shortages of fuel and food, posing a threat not only to Hamas’ ability to govern but also to its terrorists’ survival inside the tunnels.

The cohesive stance of Israeli society around the determined message – “This time we are going all the way” – together with international political backing for its actions, also reinforced Hamas’ understanding that the Israeli operation would be a protracted one. The large number of hostages allowed the organization to give up some of them without worrying about losing its bargaining power in later stages. Hamas even saw it as an opportunity to release hostages whose continued captivity was a burden on the organization and thus gain points that would shore up its image after the barbaric ISIS-style attack on Oct. 7. 

So how have the circumstances changed since? The initial shock in Gaza has passed and residents are beginning to adapt to the difficult reality. The IDF has pulled out some of its forces and the Israeli campaign is more pinpointed, concentrated mainly in the Khan Yunis sector. It is intense, but unfolds in parameters Hamas has prepared for well. Fuel, food, and logistical support have resumed, as has the presence of residents and terrorists in areas recently defined as combat zones. Hamas can now assert itself as a governing entity to a certain extent. Political pressure on Israel has increased, Israelis are no longer rallying around the flag as before and the efforts to “court” Hamas to agree to a deal have intensified, through Egyptian and Qatari mediation efforts.

Such circumstances do not add pressure on Hamas to enter a deal; they only serves its “waiting-out and wear down Israel” strategy it has pursued, as it provides the terrorist organization with the hope that it could withstand the Israeli attack and leverage the “bargaining chips” in its hands to ensure its continued existence as a military and governing entity in the Strip. For Israel, this is an intolerable scenario that will shape a problematic reality not only vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip but on all fronts of the axis of resistance led by Iran.

What is the right course of action? As stated by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi in his remarks, the goals set for the war are hard to achieve and require patience. Continued public support for the IDF’s activities is vital, especially in dealing with an enemy that knows Israeli society well and plans its moves with awareness of its sensitivities.

Pressure on Hamas is key if we want to achieve progress on the captives issue as well. But given that limited time at Israel’s disposal, the intensity and focus of the pressure must be tailored to achieve the desired effect quickly. Thus, instead of preferring moderate intensity over an extended period, it is best to increase intensity over a shorter duration.

On a practical level, it is appropriate to step up airstrikes in any area where ground forces have been reduced. Hamas must not be allowed to establish governance in these areas. Hamas terrorists and officials should be targeted wherever they try to renew their presence. Likewise, Israel should prevent residents from returning to the northern part of the Gaza Strip and designate any area with tunnels as a combat zone.

Diplomatic constraints, it is safe to assume, have prevented Israel from doing the obvious –- reducing humanitarian aid. But even so, Israel can at least prevent Hamas from diverting it to its own needs. Armed Hamas operatives or activists of any kind should be targets for Israeli strikes. It will not be possible to topple Hamas’ rule if its people continue to take the humanitarian aid rather than let the people have this vital commodity. 

It is still not too late to set up de-escalation zones for distributing humanitarian aid – thereby depriving Hamas of controlling the aid shipments. This could be incorporated into plans for the Rafah area.

Targeted killings of Hamas leaders abroad should continue. This will not only add to Israel’s deterrence, but it will also increase pressure on Hamas and Qatar regarding the captives.

As important as all of the above – maintaining Israeli solidarity as one people. In the spirit of the Golani commander’s call to his soldiers – we must bring the cohesion we experienced at the front to the home front. This is a prerequisite for achieving the goals of the war on all fronts and accelerating the return of the captives.

Published in Israel Hayom, January 19, 2024.

Critical voices have surfaced in the Israeli public and in the media concerning the goals of the war, which are presented as presumptuous and impractical, and regarding the tension between destroying Hamas as a military and governing entity and releasing the hostages. Criticism is also heard regarding the political echelon’s vacillation about deciding as to the “day after.”

This criticism, which should properly be heard and discussed even in wartime, recently has morphed into a cascade of gloom and doom on the part of some opinion leaders, culminating in appeals to “concede defeat, accept Hamas’s terms for a hostage release deal, and end the war.

This dispiriting commentary runs up against the sense of achievement felt by Israel’s troops in the field, and by the resolve of the military and political echelon to attain the war’s goals and by their complete confidence in the necessity of the war.

There is a grand incongruity between the dispiriting criticism and widespread public support of the war’s goals and confidence in the ability of Israel to attain those goals – as expressed in every public opinion poll. (See, for example, polls conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies, the Israel Democracy Institute, and others).

Without having been declared or formally organized, a new movement has effectively been founded in Israel: The Downer Movement (“Dichonistim” in Hebrew). The movement boasts members such as media outlets and opinion leaders who wield extensive influence by virtue of their prominence in public discourse. They are agents of demoralization, steadily and doggedly dripping their despondent messages into public discourse.

They do not necessarily do this maliciously; likely motivated by a profound “downer” conviction – pessimism on steroids – resulting from severe crisis of trust in the resilience of Israeli society and in the IDF’s capabilities, as well as from their harsh, even virulent, disapproval of Israel’s current political leadership.

However, regardless of the causes of such despondency and pessimism, their efforts can adversely affect the fighting spirit of the IDF, boost Hamas’s morale and that of the entire resistance axis, and invite the exertion of heavier and more significant external pressures on Israel, including by the US administration.

The pessimistic analyses and evaluations paint a grim picture of reality, which again is quite different from the situation as perceived by the majority of Israelis. This is borne-out in a study conducted by Dr. Gil Samsonov and his colleagues at Publicis, which shows an immense gap between the spirit inculcated by the Downer Movement and the spirit of Israel’s younger generation. (See: Today’s Youth Against the Background of the Iron Swords War – Among Teenagers, Soldiers and Students, A Study of Israelis 16-25; Glikman, Shamir, Samsonov – The Publicis Group; December 2023).

The study’s authors argue that Israel is undergoing nothing less than a generational upheaval, one that shatters paradigms and entrenches new perspectives: from an disconnected, global generation of Israelis to almost pioneer-like optimistic generation.

According to the study, 59% of young Israelis believe that Israel is strong, will win and has a future. 58% have a purely positive outlook, 28% have both a positive and a negative outlook and only 14% have a purely negative outlook. 70% of people aged 16-18 believe in Israel’s strength and future. Young people understand the difficulties faced by the country, with 57% saying that Israel will gradually regain its standing despite substantial difficulties posed by a hostile Middle East, relying on a strong military. 29% think Israel will quickly regain its strength and resume growing, with many immigrants making their way to Israel.

Young Israelis understand the need to party less and work more (through both university studies and military service). Finally, 57% think Israel will emerge victorious from the current crisis thanks to its strong army.

The survey’s findings indicate a strong spirit exhibited by the younger generation, with impressive optimism, a spirit of volunteering, and belief in the justness of Israel’s path as the nation-state of the Jewish People.

In an interview television, Dr. Samsonov summarized his study’s findings by stating that the younger Israeli generation is more like the rugged, realistic, and scrappy generation of Israelis in 1948 – the generation of their grandparents – than its own parents’ generation.

The Downer Movement sometimes dominates public discourse because Israeli media highlights its members and messaging. But again, the despondent messaging is not truly reflective of mainstream Israeli thinking and feeling.

Part of the despondency stems from the downers fervent and near-religious beliefs in the so-called two-state solution; from being addicted to the notion that no solution exists other than reliance on the Palestinian Authority. They advocate for propping up the PA even at the cost of compromising on critical demands for reform of that problematic body. Their inability to move beyond the PA, their reliance on failed paradigms of the past, leads them to bleak assessments regarding the IDF’s ability to attain Israel’s war goals. Alas, they don’t understand how resilient and determined Israelis are to do things differently.

Originally published in Maariv 16.01.2024