In the best tradition of Hamas’s methods, which it has been gradually refining ever since Operation Cast Lead, Hamas effectively exploits the civil and humanitarian issues in order to bash Israel on the international stage and establish empathy, solidarity and support of the organization and of the Gaza Strip’s residents as being victimized by Israel’s brutality. Hamas, which has adopted and honed the victimhood doctrine [1], is now acting to perfect it while availing itself of entities in the international community and on international media. Hamas makes it a point to frame Israel’s actions as war crimes, culminating in accusing Israel in the International Court in The Hague of committing genocide, through South Africa acting as Hamas’s proxy, with financial and political backing by Qatar [2], as well as for reasons of domestic politics as elections in that country draw near.

The Palestinian Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip and its reports regarding the Palestinian victims are an important tool in the consciousness engineering perpetrated by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. That ministry, just like every national and civil institution in the Gaza Strip (and largely also the U.N. and UNRWA organizations), is under Hamas’s full control and authority. Therefore, it is clear to any reasonable person that the reports of the Palestinian Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip are not objective, neutral or professional, but rather are intended to serve Hamas’s interest in cementing its victimized image among the international media and community, as part of the organization’s doctrine of victimhood.

Beyond the fact that the inflated reports regarding the number of fatalities and injured people do not include even a single Hamas operative (all fatalities are being reported as civilians), the fact that many entities in the media and in the international community tend to treat these reports as reliable is merely a ludicrous and sad absurdity. The reported number of fatalities is close to 23,000, and the number of injured is 60,000 (as of January 14, 2024). Moreover, the Palestinian Ministry of Health’s reports indicate that 70% of the casualties are women and children, and as everyone knows, Israeli bombs can clearly distinguish between men and women and children and consequently are able to specifically target women and children, in the process whizzing past every man in their path.

A previous article on the subject [3] presented quite a few questions that should really have been entertained by all those entities who consider the reports of the Palestinian Ministry of Health – meaning, of Hamas – to be reliable. For example, where exactly have so many fatalities been buried? Where are so many wounded being hospitalized, when the World Bank’s report indicates that the number of hospital beds in the Gaza Strip does not exceed 3,000? Even if we were to assume that civilian facilities such as schools have been converted into hospitals, that hospital beds have been added at field hospitals set up in the strip’s territory, or that the existing hospitals have been tightly packed, doubling the number of hospital beds – the reported number still does not conform with the known data. Moreover, how is that that, with such high numbers of injured and seriously injured people, so few of them have been taken to Egypt to undergo further treatment?

Still, beyond such sporadic questions, the issue requires additional analysis. First, consideration must be given to the casualties in the Gaza Strip injured by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the strip. An analysis of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit’s data (January 14, 2024) indicates that a total of approximately 13,000 rockets have been fired in Israel since the start of the warfare, of which 9,000 entered Israel’s territory. This means that approximately 4,000 of the rockets fired were failed launches which landed inside the strip’s territory; for example, the failed launches which ended up hitting the Al-Ahli and Al-Shifa hospitals in Gaza City. It can safely be assumed that, with such a large number of failed rockets falling within the boundaries of the strip, and in the absence of protective measures, many casualties will occur among the Palestinians themselves. Furthermore, some Gazans have been hurt as a result of being directly fired upon by Hamas gunfire while attempting to flee the warzone to the south of the strip, or after being forcibly held hostage and used as a human shield. Therefore, even if we were to conservatively quantify the scope of Palestinian casualties caused by other Palestinians as a result of the three factors mentioned, it can be assumed that approximately 1,000 of Gaza’s residents were killed as a result of harm done by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the other organizations in the strip.

Therefore, given an official report by the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit (January 14, 2024) stating that over 9,000 Hamas terrorists have been killed since the start of the warfare – with an additional approximately 1,000 more people having been killed by Hamas (either by failed rocket launches or by direct gunfire), we arrive at an estimate of approximately 10,000 fatalities. Even if we were to fully grant the report of the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, it would indicate the number of civilian fatalities to be approximately 13,000. This figure signifies that the ratio of noncombatant to combatant fatalities in the Gaza War is 1/1.3. The known ratio for Western who have in recent decades been involved in the wars in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan is 1/3–1/5. The range was established because not all cases have a consensual number of civilians/noncombatants killed. This is exemplified by the estimates regarding the number of civilians killed in Mosul range between 12,000 and 40,000. In any event, the data indicates the lowest ratio of harm caused to civilians/noncombatants. Even if the numbers we present are merely approximations or a rough estimate, and the numbers may be found to be slightly higher after the war is over – that is still a low rate of harm done to noncombatants. Similar comparisons can also be drawn regarding the scope of the destruction caused to buildings. This is exemplified by the customary estimates regarding the scope of the damage done in Mosul following 9 months of bombings by the U.S.-led international coalition. The range proposed in those estimates is between 65% and 80% of all buildings in the city (whose residents had numbered approximately 1.5 million) having been completely destroyed.

Also, as to the injured, it is important to present an explanation or analysis that has no bearing when talking about fatalities. As stated above, Hamas entirely avoids reporting the scope of casualties from among its ranks; but if the fatalities are approximately 9,000, and if the customary ratio of fatalities to injured casualties is 1 to 5, meaning, for every one fatality there are five injured casualties (and the ratio in the current war among IDF soldiers is regrettably much higher), and even if we were to assume that, in Hamas’s case, the ratio in question amounts to merely 1 to 3 – then the number would be approximately 30,000 injured casualties, which is about one half of the number of injured people reported by the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

In addition to the number of fatalities and casualties from among Hamas’s ranks, consideration must also be given to the incorrect data concerning the number of internally displaced persons in the strip. A U.N. report (apparently relying on reports made by UNRWA, which are dictated by Hamas) has stated that there are 1.9 million IDPs in Gaza [4]. This figure, too, is unfounded, since according to all estimates, the total of evacuees from the north of the strip amounts to approximately 800 thousand (out of one million), with another approximately 200 thousand from Khan Yunis and the camps in the center of the strip; amounting to approximately one million displaced persons – which is about one half of the number reported by the U.N. and quoted as fact by many entities in the international community and media. If we accept the figure presented by the U.N., then almost all of the strip’s residents are displaced persons (1.9 million out of 2.2 million); a patently absurd “fact”.

Hamas has perfected its psychological warfare strategy in every aspect, including in the aspect of the conflict’s victims. The guiding logic behind Hamas’s strategy in this context is exaggeration, dissimulation and taking advantage of, at best the ignorance, and at worst the inherent anti-Israel biases, of media and international community entities. Hamas has certainly been impressively successful in this context. This is exemplified the report of 500 fatalities at Al-Ahli Hospital, on the third week of the war, when competent inquiries conducted since – and not just by Israeli entities – have clearly shown that incident to have been the result of a failed rocket launch which landed in the hospital’s parking lot rather than inside the hospital proper, and that the number of fatalities was about 30. Yet the Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip nevertheless continues to include the number 500 in its reported reckoning of the fatalities. On the other hand, Israel has to this day undoubtedly failed to fight back psychologically and undermine Hamas’s narrative, which is gradually becoming an accepted truth. The time for change has come, and Israel should muster its best talents and abilities to strike back psychologically; better late than never.

If there is any actually encouraging sign, it can be found in the fact that the scope of the casualties – both fatalities and injured – among Hamas and the other organizations, is immense, even dramatically so. This means that Hamas no longer operates as an organized paramilitary organization, that Hamas operatives’ erosion coefficient is very high and that the course of action taken by the IDF is indeed leading to the dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities. Dismantling the military and government capabilities does not mean whittling the organization down to its last terrorist or rocket, but rather neutralizing Hamas’s ability to operate as an effective military organization and government. Hamas will always have some residual capability remaining, which will be expressed in terrorism and guerilla actions, but such residual activity should in time become marginal and controlled, as has been the case with the terrorist capabilities in Judea and Samaria, where the IDF and Shin Bet have been successfully – and rather impressively and effectively – “mowing the grass.”

Our basic assumption and premise should be that, whenever we find ourselves in a reality of a persistent and prolonged conflict with the Palestinians, and being unable to bridge profound and substantial gaps between the two sides – we would have to live with the Palestinians’ terrorist motivations and with actual terrorism. In this context, we would also do well to internalize the fact that, even under conditions that would allow us to bridge the gaps, and even were progress to be achieved toward a diplomatic agreement, or even the implementation of such an agreement – there will always be people deeply motivated to foil any such agreement or arrangement and to continue waging terror against Israel. Therefore, under any conditions, and certainly in a reality where no such agreement is in sight, Israel must have permanent and continuous security and intelligence control and continue retaliating against terrorist instigators wherever they may be. Only thus can we significantly reduce the potential damage threatened by terrorism and guarantee an optimal level of security as a condition for the continued development and prosperity of the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People.

[1] Gabi Siboni and A.G. Will Hamas Be Better Prepared during its Next Confrontation with Israel? Insights on Hamas’ Lessons from Operation Protective Edge, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 7, No. 2, September 2015.

https://www.g-bina.com/_files/ugd/d48d94_84f22a904afd40b892f1f3af7cee5510.pdf

[2] South Africa’s Diplomatic Campaign Against Israel – In Service of Hamas and In Cooperation with Hamas’ Patron, Qatar, MEMRI, January 18, 2024.

https://www.memri.org/reports/south-africas-diplomatic-campaign-against-israel-%E2%80%93-service-hamas-and-cooperation-hamas

[3] Kibi Michael, Hamas’s ‘numbers warfare’, JNS, November 14, 2023.

https://www.jns.org/hamass-numbers-warfare/

[4] Gaza: Forced and protracted displacement of Palestinians would constitute a serious breach of international law and an atrocity crime, National Refugee Council, December 26, 2023.

https://www.nrc.no/news/2023/december/gaza-displacement/

Earlier this week paratroopers in the 55th Brigade wrote a letter to their commander declaring their willingness to carry the fight forward against Hamas “until victory,” even if that means serving in the army reserves for many more months.

The letter, which is circulating widely, decries the decision of the IDF general staff to begin withdrawing from significant parts of Gaza before the mission to destroy all Hamas attack capabilities is completed. “How can we go home to our families before we create the conditions whereby Israeli residents of the Gaza Envelope towns can go home to their towns and families?” They ask for the “honor” of continuing the battle.

Without commenting here on the wisdom of IDF redeployments, the thing to note about the paratrooper letter is the gutsy patriotism and positivity that oozes from every paragraph.

The young Israeli men who signed the letter with their full names and military identification numbers are faithful members of their nation, devoted to Israel’s future, and confident in Israel’s ability to overcome all adversity.

Their buoyant and brave sentiments are of a piece with the resilience demonstrated by broad segments of the Israeli public, from muscular mothers holding down the home front to the hundreds of thousands of Israelis (and Diaspora Jews) who are volunteering in myriad ways to make up labor shortfalls in fields, factories, and hospitals.

A new public opinion poll and market survey of Israel’s younger generation released this week (and unveiled here in English for the first time) makes it crystal clear that Israel is blessed the most believing youth; a generation of future leaders who are upbeat and keen enough to drive Israel towards every success despite all the demanding challenges ahead.

Results of the in-depth report from Glikman, Shamir, Samsanov (The Publicis Group) demolish any aspersions against younger Israelis as being shallow, disconnected from values, or insipid universalists.

Paradoxically, their connection to Tik Tok and Instagram that had linked them to the broader world now has rooted them more than ever in Israeli and Jewish identity; a harsh backlash against the horrors of October 7 and its global antisemitic aftermath.

Most poignantly, the survey contrasts the views of young Israelis (16-25 years old – teens, soldiers, and students) with those of their parents and grandparents. And the contrast is stark.

Turns out that today’s youth are more like their grandparents’ generation (those who fought for independence in 1948) than their parents’ generation. Like their grandparents, they are rough and tough, realistic, and filled with warrior spirit; whereas their parents are earnest about “normalcy” and “the good life.”

The youth are this country’s strongest patriots and optimists. 59% believe that Israel is strong and will win all current wars and has a great future. 49% say they are mobilized to the military or are volunteering in civilian frameworks and are “devoted” to the State of Israel. 42% say that Jews have no other place in the world. (35% are more worried about Israel’s future; and 20% say that are disillusioned and don’t see their future in Israel.)

At the same time, today’s Israeli youth are not wearing rose-colored glasses. 57% recognize that tough times are head and Israel’s path to renewed strength and growth will be a long haul. (29% see a swift recovery from the current crisis and believe that mass Aliyah can be expected soon; while on the other hand, 14% fear that Israel faces insurmountable difficulties.)

There is no escapism in view of the current situation. 82% of Israel youth are prepared (to some or to a great extent) to pause the “good life” in terms of personal plans for work, study, and vacation, and are prepared to forgo travel abroad all-together. 61% very much understand and 25% partially agree that now is the time to restrict their purchases and save for the future.

And when making necessary purchases, 77% categorically prefer to buy “Blue & White” (Israeli-made products), and 84% prefer to buy from Israeli or international companies that contribute to the war/national effort.

Unlike youth around the world at the relevant young ages, Israeli youth clearly understand that they need to focus not on parties and pleasure, but on work and study (54%), family (51%), friends (34%), and volunteering (21%).

IT IS IMPORTANT to contrast the eager and feisty, and at the same time pragmatic and levelheaded, thinking of Israeli youth with the dark and depressive sentiments expressed by a certain swath of Israeli elites. Alas, gloom governs the Israeli airwaves where a privileged class of older journalists and veteran “experts” dominate.

This “old guard” is telling us non-stop that Israel is losing the war with Hamas, cannot win against Hamas or Hezbollah, does not have the societal strength to survive long wars, and does not have a future without hewing to the stale paradigms of October 6.

This means acceptance of all Hamas demands for hostage release including an immediate end to military operations in Gaza; far-reaching diplomatic concessions to the Palestinians (despite their corruption, investment in terrorism and antisemitic education, and absolute intransigence); and of course, the political defeat of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his “messianist-radical” coalition government.

All their pessimistic talk handicaps this nation as it fights for its life. Two of my colleagues at the Misgav Institute, professors Gabi Siboni and Kobi Michael, have given the nay-sayers a name. They are the “Dichonistim” movement, the “Depressive” lobby. This is a name meant to rhyme and contrast with “Bithonistim,” staunch believers in the success of bold Israeli security posture and stirring Israeli national identity.

What can be said for certain is that there is a wide and deep gap between the pessimist and depressive discourse dispensed by the “old guard” and the optimism and resilience expressed by Israel’s younger generation and much of Israeli society.

I hope and assume that the negative and self-doubting ruminations of the “Depressive Lobby” will be overcome by the positive thinking and assured posture of Israeli youth and many/most Israelis. Israel cannot afford anything less robust and authentic.

Published in The Jerusalem Post,19.01.2024.

In his statement to the media to mark 100 days since Oct. 7m, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi spoke on the approval of operational plans to continue fighting and increase military pressure on Hamas, emphasizing that “this pressure, and only it, has succeeded in bringing back many captives so far. We have to revisit the circumstances under which the previous hostage deal was made in order to understand why Hamas is not rushing to finalize another such deal. This illustrates the scale of the challenge facing Israel on the way to defeating it.

What made Hamas agree back then to a deal that saw the release of about 100 captives in exchange for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid? First and foremost, it was the desire to stop the momentum of the Israeli attack and open a path that would lead, in a gradual process, to a complete cessation of the war. The scope of casualties and extensive destruction caused by Israel’s airstrikes within a relatively short period of time, along with images of hundreds of thousands of Gazams fleeing southward, increased pressure on the terrorist organization. Hamas had realized that it needed to understand the situation and improve its grip had become critical, compounded by the blockade of the strip, which caused severe shortages of fuel and food, posing a threat not only to Hamas’ ability to govern but also to its terrorists’ survival inside the tunnels.

The cohesive stance of Israeli society around the determined message – “This time we are going all the way” – together with international political backing for its actions, also reinforced Hamas’ understanding that the Israeli operation would be a protracted one. The large number of hostages allowed the organization to give up some of them without worrying about losing its bargaining power in later stages. Hamas even saw it as an opportunity to release hostages whose continued captivity was a burden on the organization and thus gain points that would shore up its image after the barbaric ISIS-style attack on Oct. 7. 

So how have the circumstances changed since? The initial shock in Gaza has passed and residents are beginning to adapt to the difficult reality. The IDF has pulled out some of its forces and the Israeli campaign is more pinpointed, concentrated mainly in the Khan Yunis sector. It is intense, but unfolds in parameters Hamas has prepared for well. Fuel, food, and logistical support have resumed, as has the presence of residents and terrorists in areas recently defined as combat zones. Hamas can now assert itself as a governing entity to a certain extent. Political pressure on Israel has increased, Israelis are no longer rallying around the flag as before and the efforts to “court” Hamas to agree to a deal have intensified, through Egyptian and Qatari mediation efforts.

Such circumstances do not add pressure on Hamas to enter a deal; they only serves its “waiting-out and wear down Israel” strategy it has pursued, as it provides the terrorist organization with the hope that it could withstand the Israeli attack and leverage the “bargaining chips” in its hands to ensure its continued existence as a military and governing entity in the Strip. For Israel, this is an intolerable scenario that will shape a problematic reality not only vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip but on all fronts of the axis of resistance led by Iran.

What is the right course of action? As stated by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi in his remarks, the goals set for the war are hard to achieve and require patience. Continued public support for the IDF’s activities is vital, especially in dealing with an enemy that knows Israeli society well and plans its moves with awareness of its sensitivities.

Pressure on Hamas is key if we want to achieve progress on the captives issue as well. But given that limited time at Israel’s disposal, the intensity and focus of the pressure must be tailored to achieve the desired effect quickly. Thus, instead of preferring moderate intensity over an extended period, it is best to increase intensity over a shorter duration.

On a practical level, it is appropriate to step up airstrikes in any area where ground forces have been reduced. Hamas must not be allowed to establish governance in these areas. Hamas terrorists and officials should be targeted wherever they try to renew their presence. Likewise, Israel should prevent residents from returning to the northern part of the Gaza Strip and designate any area with tunnels as a combat zone.

Diplomatic constraints, it is safe to assume, have prevented Israel from doing the obvious –- reducing humanitarian aid. But even so, Israel can at least prevent Hamas from diverting it to its own needs. Armed Hamas operatives or activists of any kind should be targets for Israeli strikes. It will not be possible to topple Hamas’ rule if its people continue to take the humanitarian aid rather than let the people have this vital commodity. 

It is still not too late to set up de-escalation zones for distributing humanitarian aid – thereby depriving Hamas of controlling the aid shipments. This could be incorporated into plans for the Rafah area.

Targeted killings of Hamas leaders abroad should continue. This will not only add to Israel’s deterrence, but it will also increase pressure on Hamas and Qatar regarding the captives.

As important as all of the above – maintaining Israeli solidarity as one people. In the spirit of the Golani commander’s call to his soldiers – we must bring the cohesion we experienced at the front to the home front. This is a prerequisite for achieving the goals of the war on all fronts and accelerating the return of the captives.

Published in Israel Hayom, January 19, 2024.

Critical voices have surfaced in the Israeli public and in the media concerning the goals of the war, which are presented as presumptuous and impractical, and regarding the tension between destroying Hamas as a military and governing entity and releasing the hostages. Criticism is also heard regarding the political echelon’s vacillation about deciding as to the “day after.”

This criticism, which should properly be heard and discussed even in wartime, recently has morphed into a cascade of gloom and doom on the part of some opinion leaders, culminating in appeals to “concede defeat, accept Hamas’s terms for a hostage release deal, and end the war.

This dispiriting commentary runs up against the sense of achievement felt by Israel’s troops in the field, and by the resolve of the military and political echelon to attain the war’s goals and by their complete confidence in the necessity of the war.

There is a grand incongruity between the dispiriting criticism and widespread public support of the war’s goals and confidence in the ability of Israel to attain those goals – as expressed in every public opinion poll. (See, for example, polls conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies, the Israel Democracy Institute, and others).

Without having been declared or formally organized, a new movement has effectively been founded in Israel: The Downer Movement (“Dichonistim” in Hebrew). The movement boasts members such as media outlets and opinion leaders who wield extensive influence by virtue of their prominence in public discourse. They are agents of demoralization, steadily and doggedly dripping their despondent messages into public discourse.

They do not necessarily do this maliciously; likely motivated by a profound “downer” conviction – pessimism on steroids – resulting from severe crisis of trust in the resilience of Israeli society and in the IDF’s capabilities, as well as from their harsh, even virulent, disapproval of Israel’s current political leadership.

However, regardless of the causes of such despondency and pessimism, their efforts can adversely affect the fighting spirit of the IDF, boost Hamas’s morale and that of the entire resistance axis, and invite the exertion of heavier and more significant external pressures on Israel, including by the US administration.

The pessimistic analyses and evaluations paint a grim picture of reality, which again is quite different from the situation as perceived by the majority of Israelis. This is borne-out in a study conducted by Dr. Gil Samsonov and his colleagues at Publicis, which shows an immense gap between the spirit inculcated by the Downer Movement and the spirit of Israel’s younger generation. (See: Today’s Youth Against the Background of the Iron Swords War – Among Teenagers, Soldiers and Students, A Study of Israelis 16-25; Glikman, Shamir, Samsonov – The Publicis Group; December 2023).

The study’s authors argue that Israel is undergoing nothing less than a generational upheaval, one that shatters paradigms and entrenches new perspectives: from an disconnected, global generation of Israelis to almost pioneer-like optimistic generation.

According to the study, 59% of young Israelis believe that Israel is strong, will win and has a future. 58% have a purely positive outlook, 28% have both a positive and a negative outlook and only 14% have a purely negative outlook. 70% of people aged 16-18 believe in Israel’s strength and future. Young people understand the difficulties faced by the country, with 57% saying that Israel will gradually regain its standing despite substantial difficulties posed by a hostile Middle East, relying on a strong military. 29% think Israel will quickly regain its strength and resume growing, with many immigrants making their way to Israel.

Young Israelis understand the need to party less and work more (through both university studies and military service). Finally, 57% think Israel will emerge victorious from the current crisis thanks to its strong army.

The survey’s findings indicate a strong spirit exhibited by the younger generation, with impressive optimism, a spirit of volunteering, and belief in the justness of Israel’s path as the nation-state of the Jewish People.

In an interview television, Dr. Samsonov summarized his study’s findings by stating that the younger Israeli generation is more like the rugged, realistic, and scrappy generation of Israelis in 1948 – the generation of their grandparents – than its own parents’ generation.

The Downer Movement sometimes dominates public discourse because Israeli media highlights its members and messaging. But again, the despondent messaging is not truly reflective of mainstream Israeli thinking and feeling.

Part of the despondency stems from the downers fervent and near-religious beliefs in the so-called two-state solution; from being addicted to the notion that no solution exists other than reliance on the Palestinian Authority. They advocate for propping up the PA even at the cost of compromising on critical demands for reform of that problematic body. Their inability to move beyond the PA, their reliance on failed paradigms of the past, leads them to bleak assessments regarding the IDF’s ability to attain Israel’s war goals. Alas, they don’t understand how resilient and determined Israelis are to do things differently.

Originally published in Maariv 16.01.2024

Israel can no longer remain silent in the face of Turkey’s extensive support of Hamas and its central role in building the organization’s financial empire. 

With the help of its closest ally, Israel must clarify to Turkey that continuing to sponsor Hamas will have severe consequences for their relationship.

Three weeks after Hamas’s massacre in southern Israel, during a pro-Palestinian mass rally held in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and accused Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza.

In another speech in Ankara in December 2023, Erdogan went so far as to compare Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Hitler in reference to the IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip.

Such rhetoric is not uncommon when it comes to the president of Turkey and aligns with previous antisemitic statements by Erdogan or his affiliates. 

However, Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel is not confined to mere rhetoric. For over a decade, Turkey has been assisting Hamas in various ways: politically, economically, and militarily, enabling it to grow exponentially and afflict catastrophic suffering on innocent Israelis. 

Turkey a safe haven for Hamas

It is no secret that Turkey provides a safe haven for Hamas leadership. Ankara regularly hosts top Hamas figures, and Erdogan himself has openly met with the movement’s senior officials, including the chairman of the political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and the former head, Khaled Mashaal.

Ankara is also the driving force behind Hamas’s global financing apparatus. An investigation by The Wall Street Journal reveals Turkey’s primary role in constructing the financial network of Hamas, led by the organization’s financial chief, Zaher Jabarin. 

According to the WSJ report, from his office in Istanbul, Jabarin oversees Hamas’ comprehensive fundraising system, which involves transferring funds from Iran to the Gaza Strip, managing a portfolio of companies that provide Hamas with annual income, among which are several Turkish firms, and managing a network of private donors.

Strong evidence supports the claim

DESPITE ITS denial, there is strong evidence to support the claim that Turkey assists Hamas militarily as well. In 2018, Israel arrested Kamil Takli, a Turkish law professor who was revealed to be a Hamas financier. 

In his interrogation, Takli confirmed that Hamas operated in Turkey and that it received military aid from Ankara through a private military contractor close to Erdogan. Furthermore, in July 2023, Israel intercepted 16 tons of explosive material on its way from Turkey to Gaza to be used for rocket production.

The damage caused to Israel by containing Turkey’s extreme Islamist approach seems to outweigh the benefits of cooperation with Ankara. Thus, despite the desire to maintain close trade relations, it is time for Israel to make it clear that if Turkey continues to support Hamas, it will pay a heavy price.

The Israeli government should reject any future initiatives to normalize relations with Turkey until Hamas is defined by the Turkish government as a terror organization and Turkey fully complies with American sanctions on its funding. Israel should also freeze any potential cooperation with Turkey in the gas and energy sectors until Turkey responds to these demands.

In accordance with this hardline approach, Israel must engage the United States in its efforts, imploring Washington to exert pressure on Turkey. This pressure should include an American demand that Turkey take legal action against entities on Turkish territory that fund US-designated terror organizations. 

The US should also condition any future arms deal with Turkey on the latter, cutting off all ties with Hamas and enforcing American sanctions in full.

If Turkey continues to back Hamas, the US should amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to facilitate the filing of lawsuits by victims of terrorism. This has been proposed in relation to Qatar and can be applied to any other state that provides material or other forms of assistance to terrorist organizations, Turkey included. 

These measures would send a clear message to Turkey that it must cease backing Hamas or suffer the consequences. 

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2024.

Our war for the safekeeping of Israel is being waged on several levels. The military level is undoubtedly the most important and basic one, as it is undoubtedly the physical battle which shall clear the Gaza Strip of terrorists and weapons. Yet the battle over our narrative is not less important.

Even without the support of the world, we will continue to stand firmly against the evil we face. Even without the international legitimacy we so deserve, we will continue to strive and work for the return of our abducted men, women, children, and the elderly.

Even without the tears of the citizens of the world, we shall continue in our righteous path, simply because it is so undoubtedly just.

Nonetheless, and despite all that, it is important to note that the battle for the acceptance or at least acknowledgment of our narrative in the Muslim world is not lost. The Muslim and Arab world is not exposed to almost any information that puts it at odds with the anti-Israeli messaging to which it is accustomed. Arab governments, which have signed peace agreements with the State of Israel, filter the messages to which their publics are exposed, in a manner which does not expose Israel’s story.

The time has come to change this situation. This is not naïveté and it is not mere wishful thinking. It is doable.

How can Israel change the narrative in the Arab and Muslim worlds?

Why is it important? The Arabs and Muslims make up a significant portion of the world’s population, that has a significant impact on global discourse, whether in international organizations or whether in its ability to harness mass public opinion on various campuses and on the streets of Europe, the US, Australia, and Canada.

Moreover, this is the neighborhood in which Israel is situated and although it is important to acknowledge that it is, indeed, a tough one and prepare accordingly, there is no reason in adopting a defeatist state of mind when it comes to trying to touch the hearts of the masses in this neighborhood.

Some basic principles reinforce the argument that with the right effort, the goal is attainable. First, Arab culture is significantly based on emotion and less so on rationalism. This is not an absolute statement, of course, but the emotional component carries a very significant weight for many in the Arab and Muslim world.

Any Israeli, Jewish or other effort to share the Israeli narrative with the Arab and Muslim world must be based largely – if not entirely – on emotion. And are the atrocities committed on October 7th not heart-wrenching? Are those actions not enough to shake the human soul? Are the testimonies of the abductees and especially the women abductees who were returned from hell not enough to take away one’s breath?

IF WE put our inevitable cynicism aside for a moment, we will realize that these horrors and truths, almost entirely simply do not reach the Arab and Muslim public. It is important to internalize this – and to stop declaring defeat in advance, because “even if they knew, they would disqualify or ignore them, or even be happy that they had happened”… Some will, indeed, be happy. Some of them – in Gaza – even took part in the October 7th “Carnival of Horrors.”

But a very large part of the Arab world simply does not know and is not exposed to what had happened and to what continues to be the lot of our abductees in the Gaza Strip. It is our duty to put this truth in front of their eyes, in cooperation with the Arab governments, and with the help of the US.

And that brings me to the second point that must be taken into account when it comes to the Arab and Muslim world. There are topics that are considered “haram” – absolutely forbidden according to Islam and the Arab tradition. One of these topics, and perhaps the most sensitive, is sexual abuse.

The fact that religious permits were given to the Hamas terrorists to commit acts of rape and even gang rape is not only unacceptable to Israelis and to those in the Western world. To many in the Muslim world, this is a shocking act that tarnishes the very image of their religion. It is our duty to raise what had happened, with all its complexities, with all its gory and horrific details (and God only knows that there are many and there are simply beyond belief), again and again and to fight in order for these shocking, inhumane, despicable acts to be put before the eyes of millions of Muslims around the world.

The United States has much leverage vis-à-vis Arab countries, and therefore has the power to demand that their media broadcast the whole truth. It is not possible for us to accept as a fait accompli the reality that Arab governments prevent the knowledge of the suffering of our people from their public.

No more. Enough is enough. There is an element of Respect. And respect begets respect.

THE ISSUE must be made a condition for cooperation. There are quite a few issues where Israel is also required to be forthcoming, whether it is allowing Egypt to increase its military forces in the Sinai Peninsula beyond what is permitted in the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement or whether it is the humanitarian aid which Israel is required to allow into the Gaza Strip.

This is a condition that is of utmost importance since such exposure will create a real and lasting change in the consciousness of large publics towards Israel’s plight.

As someone who has been involved, for many years, in “hasbara,” or public diplomacy for the State of Israel, I am calling for the first time for a significant and massive fundraising campaign for the purpose of creating a global information campaign intended for the young generation worldwide, and specifically the young generation of Arabs and Muslims. This is a strategic investment which shall have an impact on Israel’s resilience.

Such a campaign must include the best technology that will overcome the numerical weakness that is Israel’s lot. Israel simply does not have the privilege of ignoring or turning a blind eye to the insane incitement against Israelis and the Jewish people, which is the foundation of much of the messaging which is being fed to many in the Arab and Muslim publics by some of their governments.

We must not turn a blind eye to the terrible educational programs that perpetuate the hatred towards us in the Gaza Strip, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jordan, not to mention in other Arab countries. Though, these places have already begun to improve the messages sent out in exchange for incentives from the international arena, especially from the US.

This is a step that will also well serve the moderate Arab governments themselves, since incitement against Israel has always been a double-edged sword wielded by the regimes themselves. Standing by Israel and against terrorism and radical Islam is clearly in their best interest.

October 7 presented the State of Israel and the Jewish people with a difficult, painful, and shocking reality.

The events of that Black Shabbat shook us from our divisions and rifts that many in Israel had been busy with until that very moment. The events oblige us to reexamine old models, reconsider patterns of action that may have seemed impossible until now, to think entirely differently, openly, and creatively. Those who are ready to join this tremendous effort to carry out what I call a Revolution of Consciousness – this is the time to do so.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 15, 2024.

Defense analysts rightly have been focused in recent weeks on how to restore security for Israel on the tactical level. This includes how to topple Hamas rule in Gaza, destroy its weapons production infrastructure and military capabilities, establish a broad security perimeter along the entire length of the Gaza-Israel and Gaza-Egypt border, ensure long-term demilitarization of Gaza as much as possible, and prevent a Hamas build-up in Judea and Samaria.Diplomatic analysts rightly have been focused in recent weeks on durable arrangements for Palestinian life in the territories. This includes administrative models for Gaza involving international supervision and better Palestinian self-government in parts of Judea and Samaria, alongside more decisive Israeli control of key strategic passages and territories. Perhaps long-term enhanced “diplomatic horizon” for peaceful Palestinian entities alongside Israel, too.

None of this has much grounding in reality unless Israel (and the international community) assimilates how many faulty security paradigms and erroneous patterns of diplomacy were shattered on October 7. The Simchat Torah massacres by Hamas wiped-out layers upon layers of conventional wisdom. They must now change the way in which Israelis think about themselves and their path forward.

One of the first thinkers to take a deep dive into these questions is Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, who over 42 years in the IDF always served as an out-of-the-box thinker with an ideological-philosophical bent.

In a 7,600-word, three-part essay published this month by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Hacohen first examines the roots of Israeli failure on October 7 and Israel’s perception of the struggle on the opposing side. Then he outlines ways in which Israeli security doctrines need to evolve in response to enemy plans for ongoing war.

Finally, and most importantly, Hacohen offers components of national vision and renewed ideological-theological principles of action that will anchor the existence of the State of Israel securely into the future.

Underlying Hacohen’s weltanschauung is the notion of ongoing struggle, and deep faith in the righteousness of the Jewish return to Zion. He wants Israel to return the roots of Zionism, to classic Zionist discourse on pioneering, redemption, and settlement – taking themes from the dynamic worldviews of Berl Katznelson and Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook. And in bedrock security terms, he calls for a return to the “Iron Wall” concept articulated by Zeev Jabotinsky and advocated by David Ben Gurion.

General Hacohen begins by explaining that Israel and international observers have misread the map of regional security threats and enemy goals. They believed that in the era of peace with Egypt and Jordan, and with the collapse of Syria’s army in the civil war, the era of threats from state armies had ended; and that the remaining threats from terrorist organizations did not pose an existential threat to the State of Israel. On Oct. 7, Israel received a painful wake-up call that this was a dangerously wrong assessment. Combined with the threat from Hezbollah in Lebanon, terrorist organizations now represent an overarching regional threat.

Furthermore, many argued that economic development and prosperity for the Palestinians were the key to achieving stability and peace. However, Hamas conduct is not guided by Palestinian economic wellbeing but rather by cosmic, annihilationist rationale. Its “resistance” against Zionism expresses a religious-nationalist struggle with enduring motivational roots.

“It is not economic hardship, poverty, and despair that generates Arab terrorism, but hope; hope and faith that Zionist dominance can be consistently challenged and weakened until its ultimate demise.” Therefore, Israel must fight to prove to the radical Islamist butchers “that their time has not come, that the gates of jihadist heaven have not opened before them.”

In the second part of Hacohen’s treatise, he explains that for Israel the world of warfare has changed completely. The enemy has formulated a concept of warfare based on dense defensive lines containing obstacles and explosives, both above and below ground, in the heart of built-up areas in cities and villages where fighters/terrorists blend into the local (and supposedly “uninvolved”) population. This makes rapid IDF advance into enemy territory an extraordinarily complex task, and guts the longstanding Israeli war strategy for swift, decisive victories.

In the third and most innovative-reflective part of his essay, Hacohen argues for a return to the Iron Wall concept; the negating of Arab genocidal aspirations against Israel by rock solid defense and constant offensive advances by Israel.

Critical components in re-reconstruction of the Iron Wall necessarily include rehabilitation of the communities damaged in Hamas’ October attack and the return of Israeli residents to the Galilee too. This involves far more than simple renovation and construction; it is nothing less than national repair and renaissance. It is the ultimate form of resistance against Palestinian terrorism, and the highest expression of Zionist optimism and fortitude.

Hacohen quotes Ben-Gurion on the sources of strength for victory in 1948: “We reached victory through three paths: the path of faith, the path of pioneering creativity, and the path of suffering.”

Hacohen also takes pages from General Moshe Dayan’s existential philosophy of struggle. In 1969, Dayan said that “Rest and heritage are longed-for aspirations for us, not realities. And if we occasionally achieve them, they are only short intermediate stations – aspirations for the continuation of endless struggle.”

“The only basic answer we can give to the question ‘what will be’ is – we will continue to fight, just as we did in the past, and now too. The answer to the question ‘what will be’ must focus on our ability to withstand difficulties, our ability to cope – more than on absolute and final solutions to our problems. We must prepare ourselves mentally and physically for a prolonged process of struggle.”

Hacohen points out that these sentiments clash with those expressed by Israeli leadership in recent decades. For instance, in a speech at the UN, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett chose to emphasize something much softer: “What Israelis want is a good life for themselves and their families and a rosy future for their children.”

Hacohen’s stark and dark self-conception of a nation at war in endless struggle against Arab-Islamist jihadists, is sobering. Not easy to stomach. But Hacohen argues that reorienting Israeli society in this way is necessary, and that it requires renewed spiritual-ideological commitment.

“The Zionist narrative and success manifests itself in all practical simplicity by demonstrating a readiness to fight without hesitation and without time-limit to defend the people and the country. This is Zionism’s major historical revolution.”

It is the Zionist movement’s central and greatest achievement, especially since the other promises of Zionism (to end global antisemitism, and to physically protect Jews from persecution around the world) haven’t quite panned out. After all, “the movement that was supposed to solve antisemitism has instead generated, over the past two decades, a new and equally dangerous form of it, in the guise of anti-Zionism.”

One can even argue, writes Hacohen, that Israel’s independence and military strength has achieved nothing more than to replace one existential problem, like pogroms in Kishinev, with another existential problem, like the Iranian nuclear threat that threatens Tel Aviv or the Simchat Torah massacre in the northwestern Negev. The enormous historical difference is the Jewish People’s ability to fight back; to resist its enemies forcefully.

Therefore, Israel cannot make do with post-October 7 investigative committees tasked with returning to familiar tracks of tight defensive posture. “That would be making only technical repairs and escaping the magnitude of repair truly required. Israeli leadership, and the defense establishment, must be committed to reformulating Israel’s national security concept; indeed, to reasserting Israel’s identity as a nation at justified abiding war.”

In my view, Hacohen’s analysis is accurate but stops short in assessing the possibilities for a better Middle East. It is Israel’s steadfast struggle, its willingness to combat radical Islam, its necessary and probable military victories, the sacrifices of its brave young men and the stamina of its civilians – that will bring regional peace; that will draw the Saudis and other Arabs into open partnership with Israel and eventually squash or sideline regional jihadists.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 12.01.2024 and Israel Hayom 14.01.2024

The statements coming out of the White House in which it claimed the US was not calling for a ceasefire in Gaza at this point could not undo the harsh impression left by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Israel. So too was the attempt to put the normalization talks with Saudi Arabia back on the agenda.

The Biden administration understands full well the importance of achieving a resounding victory over Hamas in Gaza. It would like Israel to get it done quickly. However, it has been asking many things from Israel – and by doing so it has only prolonged the path to victory and has been imposing a burden on Israeli shoulders.

Washington has been pressuring Israel to scale back the fighting, significantly increase the scope of humanitarian aid (knowing that most of it reaches Hamas), and launch a process with the UN(!) that will allow the return of the residents of northern Gaza to their homes. All this only exacerbates the operational challenges facing our forces. It also provides a backwind for Hamas by having its leaders hope that they will be able to drag Israel into a war of attrition that will end in an “arrangement.”

What’s more – the administration’s demands also make it harder to secure the release of the captives by alleviating the pressure on Hamas and allowing it to harden its stance.

One cannot sweep under the rug Hamas’ tunnels by wishing them away with “regional integration.” Likewise, its many arms and the large military force that remains in the area will not simply disappear. The damage Israel has inflicted on Hamas so far is painful but not fatal. After the events of October 7, this cannot suffice.

Even if it takes a long time to achieve the goals – there should be no compromise on that. Even those who struggle to define Gaza as a “Hamas state” understand that as long as there is a strong, organized, and armed core of the terrorist organization there – it will be the central power broker and everything will call the shots.

Jerusalem will have to continue maneuvering between the desire to maintain Biden’s support and assistance (for which it deserves appreciation) while heeding the demands it has put forth, which constrain Israel.

It would not be right to allow the residents of northern Gaza to return to their homes before the tunnel network beneath them was destroyed. If that happens, the area will be rehabilitated and serve as a base for terror against us. Withholding permission to return northward can also serve as leverage to pressure Hamas on the issue of the captives.

As for the saga of humanitarian aid, it is not too late to establish a “de-escalation zone” in Gaza where such aid can be received and provided – and only there. Likewise, it would be wise not to open the Erez Crossing, which will only add more responsibilities to Israel and increase pressure on it.

The job will have not been completed without dealing with the Rafah area. If the free flow of weapons from Sinai to the Gaza Strip continues, the area will have not been demilitarized and the efforts to locate weapons within Gaza will be in vain. All other arrangements have failed miserably and one should not set their hopes on such.

Israel must end this war with a resounding victory. It is important to drive home this message in Washington so that it too understands that this is a prerequisite for any initiative that seeks to change the regional reality. Reaching this goal serves the interest not only of Israel and most of its neighbors but also of the US in the fight for a new world order.

Hamas will not be satisfied with a ceasefire

Against the background of reports on new proposals for a prisoner exchange deal, it is worth listening to public stances such as the one attributed to senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan, who rejects the option of exiling senior Hamas officials from Gaza and sets the end of the war as a condition for any deal.

It is hard to assume that Hamas in its current state will be satisfied with a “ceasefire and all prisoners for all hostages.” It is more likely that it will try to extort Israel so that it pledges not only to withdraw from the entire strip and refrain from assassinations but also to rebuild Gaza. If that happens, Hamas will have emerged from the war after having launched a successful surprise attack, surviving the Israeli retaliation, securing the release of its prisoners, and establishing a mechanism for rebuilding its capabilities.

Continue targeted killings

Israel will likely reject any proposal that leaves Hamas as the central player in the strip that lacks demilitarization or imposes restrictions on IDF activity. To change the deadlock it is vital to increase pressure on Hamas and Qatar in all areas and push them into a reality similar to the one that led to the previous deal.

Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut is the best evidence of the effectiveness of the targeted killings. It was clearly evident that it rattled the organization.

Eliminating the senior ranks is a vital part of the conflict. It is intended to disrupt command and control, hamper the enemy’s conduct, and frustrate its plans, as well as remove efficient and experienced players from the arena, deter those who act against us, and send a message to their sponsors. It also helps break the enemy’s morale.

Al-Arouri’s assassination dealt a morale blow to Hamas, severely compromised its capabilities, and provided proof of the seriousness of Israel’s threats to pursue terrorist leaders wherever they are found. Carrying out the assassination in the heart of Beirut made it clear that there were no longer any “safe havens.” The subsequent operations showed that this was not a one-off fluke on Israel’s part.

Israel’s capabilities, which enabled precise targeting, are now supposed to have Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Hanieh lose sleep in trepidation. This will add to the already strong impact of the destruction images coming from inside the Gaza Strip.

Escalation dynamics

There is an escalation dynamic in the tit-for-tat between the IDF and Hezbollah. Even if neither side wants it, it can lead to war. This is not to say that we should show restraint or moderate our responses, but that we must be prepared for the possibility of conflagration.

Here, too, this is an unavoidable war. Hezbollah entered a war it has no business entering. It saw it as an opportunity to strike at us alongside Hamas, assuming that Israeli society is fragmented and weak.

The two organizations now see a people rising like a lion, a cohesive society that stands up against those who seek its soul, an army that has gotten its act together quickly and is operating a terrifying war machine, and a home front that conveys resilience and determination to continue until victory is achieved.

Faith, heroism, and unity

The horrors and failure of October 7 showed our true mettle: Our collective DNA interwoven with faith, heroism, and unity. The stream of stories and testimonies about this has not stopped. Our enemies now see this too.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 12, 2023.

Alongside the reports on initial discussions in the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet regarding the post-war situation in Gaza, it is highly advisable to downgrade expectations: there are no good options in Gaza. Had there been any, they would already have been implemented, on one of the many opportunities throughout the long history of this conflict.

When it comes to formulating the official positions regarding the ‘day after’, the policymakers will have to adopt a realistic approach, to adhere to the data and the hard facts regarding the monstrous entity sitting on the other side of the Gaza Strip border, which has dug its claws deep into all aspects of life and layers of the population, and they must assume that is not readily possible to generate any profound cultural change – at least in this generation.

With an extremely high percentage of support for Hamas, as long as a strong, organized, and armed core of the terrorist organization manages to remain in the Gaza Strip, it will clearly continue to be the dominant power in the Gaza Strip, whatever the identity and definition of the entity that is officially charged with running civil affairs there. Therefore, it is imperative to conclude this war with a decisive victory and on terms that will prevent the terrorist organization’s renewed growth.

In any event, we must stipulate the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s freedom of action there as a basic underlying condition for any future state of affairs to be established in Gaza. It is important to be wary of and avoid any initiative or move that might jeopardize this, to be extremely cautious of a puppet government that will simply become a tool to be exploited by Hamas (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon), nor should we place our trust in any foreign supervisory mechanisms.

As far as Israel is concerned, the question of the “day after” in the Gaza Strip is secondary to the more important objective of the war: reestablishing Israel’s deterrence that collapsed within a matter of minutes on October 7. The war’s eventual victory photo should be created, above all, in accordance with this criterion.

Toppling the Hamas government, dismantling its military units, destroying its production infrastructure and its military capabilities, killing or neutralizing the majority of the Hamas commanders and its military forces, establishing a broad security perimeter along the entire length of the border, and maintaining effective security control in the area between Gaza and Egypt – all of these are parts of the overall puzzle that comprises the desired end state for Israel. When Hamas begins to sense that the sword is rapidly coming down on the necks of its leaders and Israel is determined to eradicate its presence in the Gaza Strip, it will be forced to make concessions on the hostage issue too.

Without delving any further into this, we can generally say that in the new surroundings that should evolve in Gaza, Israel will have to ensure the following interests:

1. Security for the Israeli communities located along the border with Gaza.
2. Prevention of acts of terrorism and military attacks.
3. Preserving the demilitarization: preventing any military armament, smuggling, or manufacture of weapons.
4. Preventing the existence of military frameworks, exercises, and other actions for the purpose of military force buildup.
5. Preventing Hamas’ return to power and undermining its influence in the Gaza Strip or from it.
6. Preventing any negative influence it may wield from there on Judea and Samaria.
7. Reduction to the point of the removal of any responsibility in civil spheres.

In all their public statements regarding the “day after”, the politicians have repeatedly chosen to define only what will not be in the Gaza Strip: a Hamas government, an Israeli government, the PA (Palestinian Authority), military capabilities threatening Israel and limiting its freedom of action to engage in security activity.

These definitions leave room for only a limited number of alternatives: firstly – the establishment of a central government based on local players with no links to Hamas and who do not represent the PA. Muhammad Dahlan is a name that has already been bandied about in this context, creating expectations based on extremely shaky, unstable foundations.

Secondly – the establishment of regional administrative bodies to be appointed from among the local clans to run civil affairs in their immediate vicinity. The role of a central government could be fulfilled by a form of “executive council” composed of representatives from a broad spectrum of countries willing to do so. This international involvement should also provide a solution to the sources of finance needed to fund all this.

Thirdly – an external centralized setup for running the Gaza Strip’s affairs, by an international committee based on international mechanisms and institutions, that will operate local elements for this purpose.

Truth be told, the chances of success of these types of administrative models, especially given the almost impossible current conditions prevailing in the Gaza Strip, are extremely slender.

Hamas’ power among the Gazan population, the extent to which it pervades all aspects of life, its well-oiled organizational capacity, and its military strength, will not allow any other entity to bypass it. Any player who decides not to cooperate with Hamas will be regarded by large swathes of the local population as wholly illegitimate. At best it will lose its power to govern and in a worst-case scenario, it might also lose its life.

The danger we face is that in the absence of a viable alternative, Israel will be forced to opt for a solution we may define as “the lesser of two evils”. Though this ‘lesser evil’ might currently not be affiliated with Hamas, in the course of time this solution might readily develop into a Hamas proxy, either openly or via discreet contact. We might then find ourselves working in the Gaza Strip with a puppet administration that is de facto ruled by Hamas and operates at Hamas’ beck and call. As such, we would be unable to harm it for fear of being accused of eradicating Gaza’s new hope.  Israel would be better advised to maintain the Gaza Strip as an area devoid of any solution than an area with a poor solution such as this.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 9, 2024.

Three months into the war in Gaza, Israel’s achievements are admirable, but if it were to attain its goals, it will have to make additional efforts, which will stretch for a protracted period.

The political-security leadership in Israel faces a series of challenges and dilemmas regarding future moves. In order to decide correctly, one only has to watch non-stop reels of the horrific footage from October 7 and remember that this is an unavoidable war that was imposed on Israel and began under extremely difficult initial conditions, and for that very reason, Israel must end it with a resounding victory. In order to achieve the goals that have been set, the State of Israel and the IDF have to meet three challenges.

Dealing with the tunnel network

Israel cannot allow Hamas’ monstrous tunnel network to stay in place in the Gaza Strip. However, uncovering this network and destroying it will come at a heavy price. Continuing the effort to systematically deal with the tunnels will prolong the fighting, will tax our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. In order not to get corralled into tight timetables and to deflect pressure on this issue to the other side, Israel must make it clear that as long as there are tunnels, the state of warfare will continue. An area with tunnels will be defined as a “combat zone”, and anyone in it will be considered an enemy and dealt with accordingly, regardless of the physical presence of ground forces in those areas (for example by air strike). This policy must be in effect indefinitely, so long as there are tunnels.

This means that Gaza City residents and northern Gaza residents will not be able to return so long as there are tunnels under their homes. Eradicating tunnels will be beneficial on its own merits, but it will presumably also increase the public’s pressure and outrage toward Hamas.

Rafah and the Philadelphi Route

If the past is prologue, then it is clear that arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip cannot be prevented without effective control over the Philadelphi Route and the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Supervision mechanisms and reliance on other arrangements in this area have always turned out to be a resounding failure. As long as there is a free flow of weaponry from Sinai to the Gaza Strip, it will not be possible to ensure the security demilitarization of the strip – and the efforts invested by the IDF and the Shin Bet in locating and destroying the weapons within the strip will have been largely in vain.

An effective buffer between Gaza and Egypt will serve not only Israel’s security needs but will also contribute to Egypt’s national security interest – it will prevent Hamas terrorists in Gaza from reaching Egyptian territory. The Muslim Brotherhood, after all, is a bitter foe of the regime in Egypt, and Hamas is the strongest armed group in that movement. Moreover, Egypt’s interest is to prevent Hamas from even reaching the Sinai. The links between Hamas elements in Gaza and global jihad elements in the peninsula have made the threat to Egyptian forces that much greater.

Even if we assume that understandings could be struck between Israel and Egypt on this issue, a response will be required to two operational challenges: How to operate militarily in the crowded area that has absorbed thousands of people evacuated from the northern Gaza Strip; and the method by which it will be possible to safely defend the narrow border strip over a protracted period. The security establishment has vivid memories of the attacks on the Philadelphi Route from 2005 (when Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip) and has therefore incorporated the lessons learned from that period into its current thinking

Minimizing damage from civilian assistance

Much has been said about the price Israel has paid for bringing humanitarian aid into the strip. Even if this is an essential condition for US support and assistance, Israel still has the means to make sure that Hamas will not enjoy the huge benefits of such aid.

First, it is still not too late to define within the enclave a “de-escalation” zone to which humanitarian assistance will exclusively be delivered and handed out. Israel would let anyone interested in bringing such aid to this area do so and invite Gazans to come and benefit from it, so long as this is within the perimeter of that area.

Second, there is no reason why Hamas should be allowed to continue controlling the distribution of aid. This allows it to maintain its power over the area and govern. Israel should take out any Hamas policeman or other affiliated member sent by the organization who engages in such action. To topple Hamas’ rule we must prevent it from having a grip on the distribution and the other resources that only help it cement its status as the governing authority of the Gaza Strip. Israel should not be deterred by the prospect that this would result in chaos. This is the only way that will lead to a real (not superficial) collapse of the regime in Gaza.

A new reality in the strip

Victory over Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow the resurgence of terrorist elements. Security officials have rightly stated that such a fundamental change requires Israel to act with resolve and over a long period – i.e., without standing with a stopwatch in hand. If Hamas maintains a strong and armed core, it will continue to be the main player in the Gaza Strip of 2024, regardless of who officially manages its civilian affairs.

Israel’s takeover of the entire area – by keeping the northern part of the strip and Gaza City off limits to residents; confiscating humanitarian aid from Hamas; and hitting Hamas’ police and other affiliated entities that allow it to maintain de facto control of the strip – will give Israel the necessary leverage to also secure the release of the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it will continue to show intransigence on hostages.

Published in Israel Hayom, January 5, 2024.