Israel can no longer remain silent in the face of Turkey’s extensive support of Hamas and its central role in building the organization’s financial empire. 

With the help of its closest ally, Israel must clarify to Turkey that continuing to sponsor Hamas will have severe consequences for their relationship.

Three weeks after Hamas’s massacre in southern Israel, during a pro-Palestinian mass rally held in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and accused Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza.

In another speech in Ankara in December 2023, Erdogan went so far as to compare Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Hitler in reference to the IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip.

Such rhetoric is not uncommon when it comes to the president of Turkey and aligns with previous antisemitic statements by Erdogan or his affiliates. 

However, Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel is not confined to mere rhetoric. For over a decade, Turkey has been assisting Hamas in various ways: politically, economically, and militarily, enabling it to grow exponentially and afflict catastrophic suffering on innocent Israelis. 

Turkey a safe haven for Hamas

It is no secret that Turkey provides a safe haven for Hamas leadership. Ankara regularly hosts top Hamas figures, and Erdogan himself has openly met with the movement’s senior officials, including the chairman of the political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and the former head, Khaled Mashaal.

Ankara is also the driving force behind Hamas’s global financing apparatus. An investigation by The Wall Street Journal reveals Turkey’s primary role in constructing the financial network of Hamas, led by the organization’s financial chief, Zaher Jabarin. 

According to the WSJ report, from his office in Istanbul, Jabarin oversees Hamas’ comprehensive fundraising system, which involves transferring funds from Iran to the Gaza Strip, managing a portfolio of companies that provide Hamas with annual income, among which are several Turkish firms, and managing a network of private donors.

Strong evidence supports the claim

DESPITE ITS denial, there is strong evidence to support the claim that Turkey assists Hamas militarily as well. In 2018, Israel arrested Kamil Takli, a Turkish law professor who was revealed to be a Hamas financier. 

In his interrogation, Takli confirmed that Hamas operated in Turkey and that it received military aid from Ankara through a private military contractor close to Erdogan. Furthermore, in July 2023, Israel intercepted 16 tons of explosive material on its way from Turkey to Gaza to be used for rocket production.

The damage caused to Israel by containing Turkey’s extreme Islamist approach seems to outweigh the benefits of cooperation with Ankara. Thus, despite the desire to maintain close trade relations, it is time for Israel to make it clear that if Turkey continues to support Hamas, it will pay a heavy price.

The Israeli government should reject any future initiatives to normalize relations with Turkey until Hamas is defined by the Turkish government as a terror organization and Turkey fully complies with American sanctions on its funding. Israel should also freeze any potential cooperation with Turkey in the gas and energy sectors until Turkey responds to these demands.

In accordance with this hardline approach, Israel must engage the United States in its efforts, imploring Washington to exert pressure on Turkey. This pressure should include an American demand that Turkey take legal action against entities on Turkish territory that fund US-designated terror organizations. 

The US should also condition any future arms deal with Turkey on the latter, cutting off all ties with Hamas and enforcing American sanctions in full.

If Turkey continues to back Hamas, the US should amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to facilitate the filing of lawsuits by victims of terrorism. This has been proposed in relation to Qatar and can be applied to any other state that provides material or other forms of assistance to terrorist organizations, Turkey included. 

These measures would send a clear message to Turkey that it must cease backing Hamas or suffer the consequences. 

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2024.

Our war for the safekeeping of Israel is being waged on several levels. The military level is undoubtedly the most important and basic one, as it is undoubtedly the physical battle which shall clear the Gaza Strip of terrorists and weapons. Yet the battle over our narrative is not less important.

Even without the support of the world, we will continue to stand firmly against the evil we face. Even without the international legitimacy we so deserve, we will continue to strive and work for the return of our abducted men, women, children, and the elderly.

Even without the tears of the citizens of the world, we shall continue in our righteous path, simply because it is so undoubtedly just.

Nonetheless, and despite all that, it is important to note that the battle for the acceptance or at least acknowledgment of our narrative in the Muslim world is not lost. The Muslim and Arab world is not exposed to almost any information that puts it at odds with the anti-Israeli messaging to which it is accustomed. Arab governments, which have signed peace agreements with the State of Israel, filter the messages to which their publics are exposed, in a manner which does not expose Israel’s story.

The time has come to change this situation. This is not naïveté and it is not mere wishful thinking. It is doable.

How can Israel change the narrative in the Arab and Muslim worlds?

Why is it important? The Arabs and Muslims make up a significant portion of the world’s population, that has a significant impact on global discourse, whether in international organizations or whether in its ability to harness mass public opinion on various campuses and on the streets of Europe, the US, Australia, and Canada.

Moreover, this is the neighborhood in which Israel is situated and although it is important to acknowledge that it is, indeed, a tough one and prepare accordingly, there is no reason in adopting a defeatist state of mind when it comes to trying to touch the hearts of the masses in this neighborhood.

Some basic principles reinforce the argument that with the right effort, the goal is attainable. First, Arab culture is significantly based on emotion and less so on rationalism. This is not an absolute statement, of course, but the emotional component carries a very significant weight for many in the Arab and Muslim world.

Any Israeli, Jewish or other effort to share the Israeli narrative with the Arab and Muslim world must be based largely – if not entirely – on emotion. And are the atrocities committed on October 7th not heart-wrenching? Are those actions not enough to shake the human soul? Are the testimonies of the abductees and especially the women abductees who were returned from hell not enough to take away one’s breath?

IF WE put our inevitable cynicism aside for a moment, we will realize that these horrors and truths, almost entirely simply do not reach the Arab and Muslim public. It is important to internalize this – and to stop declaring defeat in advance, because “even if they knew, they would disqualify or ignore them, or even be happy that they had happened”… Some will, indeed, be happy. Some of them – in Gaza – even took part in the October 7th “Carnival of Horrors.”

But a very large part of the Arab world simply does not know and is not exposed to what had happened and to what continues to be the lot of our abductees in the Gaza Strip. It is our duty to put this truth in front of their eyes, in cooperation with the Arab governments, and with the help of the US.

And that brings me to the second point that must be taken into account when it comes to the Arab and Muslim world. There are topics that are considered “haram” – absolutely forbidden according to Islam and the Arab tradition. One of these topics, and perhaps the most sensitive, is sexual abuse.

The fact that religious permits were given to the Hamas terrorists to commit acts of rape and even gang rape is not only unacceptable to Israelis and to those in the Western world. To many in the Muslim world, this is a shocking act that tarnishes the very image of their religion. It is our duty to raise what had happened, with all its complexities, with all its gory and horrific details (and God only knows that there are many and there are simply beyond belief), again and again and to fight in order for these shocking, inhumane, despicable acts to be put before the eyes of millions of Muslims around the world.

The United States has much leverage vis-à-vis Arab countries, and therefore has the power to demand that their media broadcast the whole truth. It is not possible for us to accept as a fait accompli the reality that Arab governments prevent the knowledge of the suffering of our people from their public.

No more. Enough is enough. There is an element of Respect. And respect begets respect.

THE ISSUE must be made a condition for cooperation. There are quite a few issues where Israel is also required to be forthcoming, whether it is allowing Egypt to increase its military forces in the Sinai Peninsula beyond what is permitted in the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement or whether it is the humanitarian aid which Israel is required to allow into the Gaza Strip.

This is a condition that is of utmost importance since such exposure will create a real and lasting change in the consciousness of large publics towards Israel’s plight.

As someone who has been involved, for many years, in “hasbara,” or public diplomacy for the State of Israel, I am calling for the first time for a significant and massive fundraising campaign for the purpose of creating a global information campaign intended for the young generation worldwide, and specifically the young generation of Arabs and Muslims. This is a strategic investment which shall have an impact on Israel’s resilience.

Such a campaign must include the best technology that will overcome the numerical weakness that is Israel’s lot. Israel simply does not have the privilege of ignoring or turning a blind eye to the insane incitement against Israelis and the Jewish people, which is the foundation of much of the messaging which is being fed to many in the Arab and Muslim publics by some of their governments.

We must not turn a blind eye to the terrible educational programs that perpetuate the hatred towards us in the Gaza Strip, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jordan, not to mention in other Arab countries. Though, these places have already begun to improve the messages sent out in exchange for incentives from the international arena, especially from the US.

This is a step that will also well serve the moderate Arab governments themselves, since incitement against Israel has always been a double-edged sword wielded by the regimes themselves. Standing by Israel and against terrorism and radical Islam is clearly in their best interest.

October 7 presented the State of Israel and the Jewish people with a difficult, painful, and shocking reality.

The events of that Black Shabbat shook us from our divisions and rifts that many in Israel had been busy with until that very moment. The events oblige us to reexamine old models, reconsider patterns of action that may have seemed impossible until now, to think entirely differently, openly, and creatively. Those who are ready to join this tremendous effort to carry out what I call a Revolution of Consciousness – this is the time to do so.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 15, 2024.

Defense analysts rightly have been focused in recent weeks on how to restore security for Israel on the tactical level. This includes how to topple Hamas rule in Gaza, destroy its weapons production infrastructure and military capabilities, establish a broad security perimeter along the entire length of the Gaza-Israel and Gaza-Egypt border, ensure long-term demilitarization of Gaza as much as possible, and prevent a Hamas build-up in Judea and Samaria.Diplomatic analysts rightly have been focused in recent weeks on durable arrangements for Palestinian life in the territories. This includes administrative models for Gaza involving international supervision and better Palestinian self-government in parts of Judea and Samaria, alongside more decisive Israeli control of key strategic passages and territories. Perhaps long-term enhanced “diplomatic horizon” for peaceful Palestinian entities alongside Israel, too.

None of this has much grounding in reality unless Israel (and the international community) assimilates how many faulty security paradigms and erroneous patterns of diplomacy were shattered on October 7. The Simchat Torah massacres by Hamas wiped-out layers upon layers of conventional wisdom. They must now change the way in which Israelis think about themselves and their path forward.

One of the first thinkers to take a deep dive into these questions is Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, who over 42 years in the IDF always served as an out-of-the-box thinker with an ideological-philosophical bent.

In a 7,600-word, three-part essay published this month by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Hacohen first examines the roots of Israeli failure on October 7 and Israel’s perception of the struggle on the opposing side. Then he outlines ways in which Israeli security doctrines need to evolve in response to enemy plans for ongoing war.

Finally, and most importantly, Hacohen offers components of national vision and renewed ideological-theological principles of action that will anchor the existence of the State of Israel securely into the future.

Underlying Hacohen’s weltanschauung is the notion of ongoing struggle, and deep faith in the righteousness of the Jewish return to Zion. He wants Israel to return the roots of Zionism, to classic Zionist discourse on pioneering, redemption, and settlement – taking themes from the dynamic worldviews of Berl Katznelson and Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook. And in bedrock security terms, he calls for a return to the “Iron Wall” concept articulated by Zeev Jabotinsky and advocated by David Ben Gurion.

General Hacohen begins by explaining that Israel and international observers have misread the map of regional security threats and enemy goals. They believed that in the era of peace with Egypt and Jordan, and with the collapse of Syria’s army in the civil war, the era of threats from state armies had ended; and that the remaining threats from terrorist organizations did not pose an existential threat to the State of Israel. On Oct. 7, Israel received a painful wake-up call that this was a dangerously wrong assessment. Combined with the threat from Hezbollah in Lebanon, terrorist organizations now represent an overarching regional threat.

Furthermore, many argued that economic development and prosperity for the Palestinians were the key to achieving stability and peace. However, Hamas conduct is not guided by Palestinian economic wellbeing but rather by cosmic, annihilationist rationale. Its “resistance” against Zionism expresses a religious-nationalist struggle with enduring motivational roots.

“It is not economic hardship, poverty, and despair that generates Arab terrorism, but hope; hope and faith that Zionist dominance can be consistently challenged and weakened until its ultimate demise.” Therefore, Israel must fight to prove to the radical Islamist butchers “that their time has not come, that the gates of jihadist heaven have not opened before them.”

In the second part of Hacohen’s treatise, he explains that for Israel the world of warfare has changed completely. The enemy has formulated a concept of warfare based on dense defensive lines containing obstacles and explosives, both above and below ground, in the heart of built-up areas in cities and villages where fighters/terrorists blend into the local (and supposedly “uninvolved”) population. This makes rapid IDF advance into enemy territory an extraordinarily complex task, and guts the longstanding Israeli war strategy for swift, decisive victories.

In the third and most innovative-reflective part of his essay, Hacohen argues for a return to the Iron Wall concept; the negating of Arab genocidal aspirations against Israel by rock solid defense and constant offensive advances by Israel.

Critical components in re-reconstruction of the Iron Wall necessarily include rehabilitation of the communities damaged in Hamas’ October attack and the return of Israeli residents to the Galilee too. This involves far more than simple renovation and construction; it is nothing less than national repair and renaissance. It is the ultimate form of resistance against Palestinian terrorism, and the highest expression of Zionist optimism and fortitude.

Hacohen quotes Ben-Gurion on the sources of strength for victory in 1948: “We reached victory through three paths: the path of faith, the path of pioneering creativity, and the path of suffering.”

Hacohen also takes pages from General Moshe Dayan’s existential philosophy of struggle. In 1969, Dayan said that “Rest and heritage are longed-for aspirations for us, not realities. And if we occasionally achieve them, they are only short intermediate stations – aspirations for the continuation of endless struggle.”

“The only basic answer we can give to the question ‘what will be’ is – we will continue to fight, just as we did in the past, and now too. The answer to the question ‘what will be’ must focus on our ability to withstand difficulties, our ability to cope – more than on absolute and final solutions to our problems. We must prepare ourselves mentally and physically for a prolonged process of struggle.”

Hacohen points out that these sentiments clash with those expressed by Israeli leadership in recent decades. For instance, in a speech at the UN, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett chose to emphasize something much softer: “What Israelis want is a good life for themselves and their families and a rosy future for their children.”

Hacohen’s stark and dark self-conception of a nation at war in endless struggle against Arab-Islamist jihadists, is sobering. Not easy to stomach. But Hacohen argues that reorienting Israeli society in this way is necessary, and that it requires renewed spiritual-ideological commitment.

“The Zionist narrative and success manifests itself in all practical simplicity by demonstrating a readiness to fight without hesitation and without time-limit to defend the people and the country. This is Zionism’s major historical revolution.”

It is the Zionist movement’s central and greatest achievement, especially since the other promises of Zionism (to end global antisemitism, and to physically protect Jews from persecution around the world) haven’t quite panned out. After all, “the movement that was supposed to solve antisemitism has instead generated, over the past two decades, a new and equally dangerous form of it, in the guise of anti-Zionism.”

One can even argue, writes Hacohen, that Israel’s independence and military strength has achieved nothing more than to replace one existential problem, like pogroms in Kishinev, with another existential problem, like the Iranian nuclear threat that threatens Tel Aviv or the Simchat Torah massacre in the northwestern Negev. The enormous historical difference is the Jewish People’s ability to fight back; to resist its enemies forcefully.

Therefore, Israel cannot make do with post-October 7 investigative committees tasked with returning to familiar tracks of tight defensive posture. “That would be making only technical repairs and escaping the magnitude of repair truly required. Israeli leadership, and the defense establishment, must be committed to reformulating Israel’s national security concept; indeed, to reasserting Israel’s identity as a nation at justified abiding war.”

In my view, Hacohen’s analysis is accurate but stops short in assessing the possibilities for a better Middle East. It is Israel’s steadfast struggle, its willingness to combat radical Islam, its necessary and probable military victories, the sacrifices of its brave young men and the stamina of its civilians – that will bring regional peace; that will draw the Saudis and other Arabs into open partnership with Israel and eventually squash or sideline regional jihadists.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 12.01.2024 and Israel Hayom 14.01.2024

The statements coming out of the White House in which it claimed the US was not calling for a ceasefire in Gaza at this point could not undo the harsh impression left by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Israel. So too was the attempt to put the normalization talks with Saudi Arabia back on the agenda.

The Biden administration understands full well the importance of achieving a resounding victory over Hamas in Gaza. It would like Israel to get it done quickly. However, it has been asking many things from Israel – and by doing so it has only prolonged the path to victory and has been imposing a burden on Israeli shoulders.

Washington has been pressuring Israel to scale back the fighting, significantly increase the scope of humanitarian aid (knowing that most of it reaches Hamas), and launch a process with the UN(!) that will allow the return of the residents of northern Gaza to their homes. All this only exacerbates the operational challenges facing our forces. It also provides a backwind for Hamas by having its leaders hope that they will be able to drag Israel into a war of attrition that will end in an “arrangement.”

What’s more – the administration’s demands also make it harder to secure the release of the captives by alleviating the pressure on Hamas and allowing it to harden its stance.

One cannot sweep under the rug Hamas’ tunnels by wishing them away with “regional integration.” Likewise, its many arms and the large military force that remains in the area will not simply disappear. The damage Israel has inflicted on Hamas so far is painful but not fatal. After the events of October 7, this cannot suffice.

Even if it takes a long time to achieve the goals – there should be no compromise on that. Even those who struggle to define Gaza as a “Hamas state” understand that as long as there is a strong, organized, and armed core of the terrorist organization there – it will be the central power broker and everything will call the shots.

Jerusalem will have to continue maneuvering between the desire to maintain Biden’s support and assistance (for which it deserves appreciation) while heeding the demands it has put forth, which constrain Israel.

It would not be right to allow the residents of northern Gaza to return to their homes before the tunnel network beneath them was destroyed. If that happens, the area will be rehabilitated and serve as a base for terror against us. Withholding permission to return northward can also serve as leverage to pressure Hamas on the issue of the captives.

As for the saga of humanitarian aid, it is not too late to establish a “de-escalation zone” in Gaza where such aid can be received and provided – and only there. Likewise, it would be wise not to open the Erez Crossing, which will only add more responsibilities to Israel and increase pressure on it.

The job will have not been completed without dealing with the Rafah area. If the free flow of weapons from Sinai to the Gaza Strip continues, the area will have not been demilitarized and the efforts to locate weapons within Gaza will be in vain. All other arrangements have failed miserably and one should not set their hopes on such.

Israel must end this war with a resounding victory. It is important to drive home this message in Washington so that it too understands that this is a prerequisite for any initiative that seeks to change the regional reality. Reaching this goal serves the interest not only of Israel and most of its neighbors but also of the US in the fight for a new world order.

Hamas will not be satisfied with a ceasefire

Against the background of reports on new proposals for a prisoner exchange deal, it is worth listening to public stances such as the one attributed to senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan, who rejects the option of exiling senior Hamas officials from Gaza and sets the end of the war as a condition for any deal.

It is hard to assume that Hamas in its current state will be satisfied with a “ceasefire and all prisoners for all hostages.” It is more likely that it will try to extort Israel so that it pledges not only to withdraw from the entire strip and refrain from assassinations but also to rebuild Gaza. If that happens, Hamas will have emerged from the war after having launched a successful surprise attack, surviving the Israeli retaliation, securing the release of its prisoners, and establishing a mechanism for rebuilding its capabilities.

Continue targeted killings

Israel will likely reject any proposal that leaves Hamas as the central player in the strip that lacks demilitarization or imposes restrictions on IDF activity. To change the deadlock it is vital to increase pressure on Hamas and Qatar in all areas and push them into a reality similar to the one that led to the previous deal.

Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut is the best evidence of the effectiveness of the targeted killings. It was clearly evident that it rattled the organization.

Eliminating the senior ranks is a vital part of the conflict. It is intended to disrupt command and control, hamper the enemy’s conduct, and frustrate its plans, as well as remove efficient and experienced players from the arena, deter those who act against us, and send a message to their sponsors. It also helps break the enemy’s morale.

Al-Arouri’s assassination dealt a morale blow to Hamas, severely compromised its capabilities, and provided proof of the seriousness of Israel’s threats to pursue terrorist leaders wherever they are found. Carrying out the assassination in the heart of Beirut made it clear that there were no longer any “safe havens.” The subsequent operations showed that this was not a one-off fluke on Israel’s part.

Israel’s capabilities, which enabled precise targeting, are now supposed to have Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Hanieh lose sleep in trepidation. This will add to the already strong impact of the destruction images coming from inside the Gaza Strip.

Escalation dynamics

There is an escalation dynamic in the tit-for-tat between the IDF and Hezbollah. Even if neither side wants it, it can lead to war. This is not to say that we should show restraint or moderate our responses, but that we must be prepared for the possibility of conflagration.

Here, too, this is an unavoidable war. Hezbollah entered a war it has no business entering. It saw it as an opportunity to strike at us alongside Hamas, assuming that Israeli society is fragmented and weak.

The two organizations now see a people rising like a lion, a cohesive society that stands up against those who seek its soul, an army that has gotten its act together quickly and is operating a terrifying war machine, and a home front that conveys resilience and determination to continue until victory is achieved.

Faith, heroism, and unity

The horrors and failure of October 7 showed our true mettle: Our collective DNA interwoven with faith, heroism, and unity. The stream of stories and testimonies about this has not stopped. Our enemies now see this too.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 12, 2023.

Alongside the reports on initial discussions in the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet regarding the post-war situation in Gaza, it is highly advisable to downgrade expectations: there are no good options in Gaza. Had there been any, they would already have been implemented, on one of the many opportunities throughout the long history of this conflict.

When it comes to formulating the official positions regarding the ‘day after’, the policymakers will have to adopt a realistic approach, to adhere to the data and the hard facts regarding the monstrous entity sitting on the other side of the Gaza Strip border, which has dug its claws deep into all aspects of life and layers of the population, and they must assume that is not readily possible to generate any profound cultural change – at least in this generation.

With an extremely high percentage of support for Hamas, as long as a strong, organized, and armed core of the terrorist organization manages to remain in the Gaza Strip, it will clearly continue to be the dominant power in the Gaza Strip, whatever the identity and definition of the entity that is officially charged with running civil affairs there. Therefore, it is imperative to conclude this war with a decisive victory and on terms that will prevent the terrorist organization’s renewed growth.

In any event, we must stipulate the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s freedom of action there as a basic underlying condition for any future state of affairs to be established in Gaza. It is important to be wary of and avoid any initiative or move that might jeopardize this, to be extremely cautious of a puppet government that will simply become a tool to be exploited by Hamas (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon), nor should we place our trust in any foreign supervisory mechanisms.

As far as Israel is concerned, the question of the “day after” in the Gaza Strip is secondary to the more important objective of the war: reestablishing Israel’s deterrence that collapsed within a matter of minutes on October 7. The war’s eventual victory photo should be created, above all, in accordance with this criterion.

Toppling the Hamas government, dismantling its military units, destroying its production infrastructure and its military capabilities, killing or neutralizing the majority of the Hamas commanders and its military forces, establishing a broad security perimeter along the entire length of the border, and maintaining effective security control in the area between Gaza and Egypt – all of these are parts of the overall puzzle that comprises the desired end state for Israel. When Hamas begins to sense that the sword is rapidly coming down on the necks of its leaders and Israel is determined to eradicate its presence in the Gaza Strip, it will be forced to make concessions on the hostage issue too.

Without delving any further into this, we can generally say that in the new surroundings that should evolve in Gaza, Israel will have to ensure the following interests:

1. Security for the Israeli communities located along the border with Gaza.
2. Prevention of acts of terrorism and military attacks.
3. Preserving the demilitarization: preventing any military armament, smuggling, or manufacture of weapons.
4. Preventing the existence of military frameworks, exercises, and other actions for the purpose of military force buildup.
5. Preventing Hamas’ return to power and undermining its influence in the Gaza Strip or from it.
6. Preventing any negative influence it may wield from there on Judea and Samaria.
7. Reduction to the point of the removal of any responsibility in civil spheres.

In all their public statements regarding the “day after”, the politicians have repeatedly chosen to define only what will not be in the Gaza Strip: a Hamas government, an Israeli government, the PA (Palestinian Authority), military capabilities threatening Israel and limiting its freedom of action to engage in security activity.

These definitions leave room for only a limited number of alternatives: firstly – the establishment of a central government based on local players with no links to Hamas and who do not represent the PA. Muhammad Dahlan is a name that has already been bandied about in this context, creating expectations based on extremely shaky, unstable foundations.

Secondly – the establishment of regional administrative bodies to be appointed from among the local clans to run civil affairs in their immediate vicinity. The role of a central government could be fulfilled by a form of “executive council” composed of representatives from a broad spectrum of countries willing to do so. This international involvement should also provide a solution to the sources of finance needed to fund all this.

Thirdly – an external centralized setup for running the Gaza Strip’s affairs, by an international committee based on international mechanisms and institutions, that will operate local elements for this purpose.

Truth be told, the chances of success of these types of administrative models, especially given the almost impossible current conditions prevailing in the Gaza Strip, are extremely slender.

Hamas’ power among the Gazan population, the extent to which it pervades all aspects of life, its well-oiled organizational capacity, and its military strength, will not allow any other entity to bypass it. Any player who decides not to cooperate with Hamas will be regarded by large swathes of the local population as wholly illegitimate. At best it will lose its power to govern and in a worst-case scenario, it might also lose its life.

The danger we face is that in the absence of a viable alternative, Israel will be forced to opt for a solution we may define as “the lesser of two evils”. Though this ‘lesser evil’ might currently not be affiliated with Hamas, in the course of time this solution might readily develop into a Hamas proxy, either openly or via discreet contact. We might then find ourselves working in the Gaza Strip with a puppet administration that is de facto ruled by Hamas and operates at Hamas’ beck and call. As such, we would be unable to harm it for fear of being accused of eradicating Gaza’s new hope.  Israel would be better advised to maintain the Gaza Strip as an area devoid of any solution than an area with a poor solution such as this.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 9, 2024.

Three months into the war in Gaza, Israel’s achievements are admirable, but if it were to attain its goals, it will have to make additional efforts, which will stretch for a protracted period.

The political-security leadership in Israel faces a series of challenges and dilemmas regarding future moves. In order to decide correctly, one only has to watch non-stop reels of the horrific footage from October 7 and remember that this is an unavoidable war that was imposed on Israel and began under extremely difficult initial conditions, and for that very reason, Israel must end it with a resounding victory. In order to achieve the goals that have been set, the State of Israel and the IDF have to meet three challenges.

Dealing with the tunnel network

Israel cannot allow Hamas’ monstrous tunnel network to stay in place in the Gaza Strip. However, uncovering this network and destroying it will come at a heavy price. Continuing the effort to systematically deal with the tunnels will prolong the fighting, will tax our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. In order not to get corralled into tight timetables and to deflect pressure on this issue to the other side, Israel must make it clear that as long as there are tunnels, the state of warfare will continue. An area with tunnels will be defined as a “combat zone”, and anyone in it will be considered an enemy and dealt with accordingly, regardless of the physical presence of ground forces in those areas (for example by air strike). This policy must be in effect indefinitely, so long as there are tunnels.

This means that Gaza City residents and northern Gaza residents will not be able to return so long as there are tunnels under their homes. Eradicating tunnels will be beneficial on its own merits, but it will presumably also increase the public’s pressure and outrage toward Hamas.

Rafah and the Philadelphi Route

If the past is prologue, then it is clear that arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip cannot be prevented without effective control over the Philadelphi Route and the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Supervision mechanisms and reliance on other arrangements in this area have always turned out to be a resounding failure. As long as there is a free flow of weaponry from Sinai to the Gaza Strip, it will not be possible to ensure the security demilitarization of the strip – and the efforts invested by the IDF and the Shin Bet in locating and destroying the weapons within the strip will have been largely in vain.

An effective buffer between Gaza and Egypt will serve not only Israel’s security needs but will also contribute to Egypt’s national security interest – it will prevent Hamas terrorists in Gaza from reaching Egyptian territory. The Muslim Brotherhood, after all, is a bitter foe of the regime in Egypt, and Hamas is the strongest armed group in that movement. Moreover, Egypt’s interest is to prevent Hamas from even reaching the Sinai. The links between Hamas elements in Gaza and global jihad elements in the peninsula have made the threat to Egyptian forces that much greater.

Even if we assume that understandings could be struck between Israel and Egypt on this issue, a response will be required to two operational challenges: How to operate militarily in the crowded area that has absorbed thousands of people evacuated from the northern Gaza Strip; and the method by which it will be possible to safely defend the narrow border strip over a protracted period. The security establishment has vivid memories of the attacks on the Philadelphi Route from 2005 (when Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip) and has therefore incorporated the lessons learned from that period into its current thinking

Minimizing damage from civilian assistance

Much has been said about the price Israel has paid for bringing humanitarian aid into the strip. Even if this is an essential condition for US support and assistance, Israel still has the means to make sure that Hamas will not enjoy the huge benefits of such aid.

First, it is still not too late to define within the enclave a “de-escalation” zone to which humanitarian assistance will exclusively be delivered and handed out. Israel would let anyone interested in bringing such aid to this area do so and invite Gazans to come and benefit from it, so long as this is within the perimeter of that area.

Second, there is no reason why Hamas should be allowed to continue controlling the distribution of aid. This allows it to maintain its power over the area and govern. Israel should take out any Hamas policeman or other affiliated member sent by the organization who engages in such action. To topple Hamas’ rule we must prevent it from having a grip on the distribution and the other resources that only help it cement its status as the governing authority of the Gaza Strip. Israel should not be deterred by the prospect that this would result in chaos. This is the only way that will lead to a real (not superficial) collapse of the regime in Gaza.

A new reality in the strip

Victory over Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow the resurgence of terrorist elements. Security officials have rightly stated that such a fundamental change requires Israel to act with resolve and over a long period – i.e., without standing with a stopwatch in hand. If Hamas maintains a strong and armed core, it will continue to be the main player in the Gaza Strip of 2024, regardless of who officially manages its civilian affairs.

Israel’s takeover of the entire area – by keeping the northern part of the strip and Gaza City off limits to residents; confiscating humanitarian aid from Hamas; and hitting Hamas’ police and other affiliated entities that allow it to maintain de facto control of the strip – will give Israel the necessary leverage to also secure the release of the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it will continue to show intransigence on hostages.

Published in Israel Hayom, January 5, 2024.

A decisive victory in the complex campaign against Iran and its proxies requires a clear outcome in Gaza, as well as Israeli unity. The multi-front war – with Iran and its proxies, chiefly Hamas, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Qatar, Turkey, and their supporters worldwide) on the one hand, and Israel, the US, and parts of Western support on the other hand – has been going on for close to three months now. Each front has its own unique characteristics, derived from how the war began, the considerations of the actors involved, and their capabilities.

According to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Israel is fighting on seven fronts (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran), but in practice, the world stage forms another arena, and this is where Israel is fighting to maintain American backing as well as for the legitimacy of its actions and existence, and against antisemitism.

This is not a war of choice; it has been forced upon Israel, and which began under extremely difficult opening conditions. And for that very reason, both Israel and the US must end it in victory. Achieving this requires several conditions. The first and most important is a clear defeat of Hamas in Gaza and the release of the captives. This means Israeli control at the end of high-intensity fighting over the entire area, including Rafah and the Philadelphi Route (excluding perhaps international management of displaced persons in secured areas designated to ensure the safety of the population during the mopping-up stage, which will likely last several months).

Ending the major combat operations before this goal is achieved just because we’ve reached a predetermined point in time (end of January?) will allow Hamas to claim that it forced Israel to effectively change its war goals in practice, and will encourage supporters of the terrorist organization who set themselves the goal of ensuring Hamas’ survival in Gaza, even if only in a small part of its territory. As long as Hamas controls the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing and is perceived by the population as a governing entity, it would be able to claim it had managed to survive, and by implication – won.

It is also important to drive home the message – in talks with the US – that defeating Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow terrorists to rear their heads.

Therefore, not only Hamas but also the weak and corrupt Palestinian Authority is unsuitable to take over responsibility for Gaza post-war. It remains committed to the armed conflict against Israel, encourages terror (through incitement and payment of salaries to imprisoned terrorists), and sees Hamas as a legitimate organization that should be part of the leadership.

Gaining control over the entire area will also give Israel the necessary leverage to release the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it has no interest in giving up its main asset, other than in return for an Israeli commitment to refrain from completing the takeover of the strip.

The second condition is reaching an understanding with the American administration that this is the US war almost to the same extent as it is Israel’s: Continuation of the current state of affairs on all fronts will damage its standing in the region and globally, and exacerbate threats to the security of American citizens and Washington’s interests.

The Americans understand the importance of Israel’s victory over Hamas in Gaza, but their stated desire to avoid getting dragged into a regional war and have Israel end major combat operations even before completing the takeover of the entire strip encourages Iran and its proxies to continue gradually escalating their use of force, in the hope that the administration will stop Israel.

Defeating Hamas and convincing the US that this is also a war over the regional and global order – and translating this into a willingness to win – are key in the effort to exert diplomatic pressure on Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the pro-Iranian militias, and for effective military force against them if necessary.

This is the condition to create a new security reality along the northern border that will give residents a sense of security and allow them to return home; this is the condition to secure shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait; this is the condition to curb Iran’s nuclear program, which has again accelerated during the war; and this is the condition to promote efforts to establish a pragmatic regional center of gravity with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia at its core.

Israel and the US need each other in these arenas, and Israel must dive home this interdependence and mutual benefit to ensure Washington’s commitment to achieving common goals.

Israel’s ability to meet the two conditions for victory will be greatly impacted by its ability to shake off the self-induced blindness that characterized its attitude towards its enemies’ intentions and display internal unity. This is not only the clear message communicated by the troops and the fallen, but also a strategic imperative. The greater and clearer the unity, the easier it will be for Israel to harness its capabilities and American support in order to achieve its war aims.

Published in Israel Hayom 02.01.2024.

It would be a daunting challenge to map a realistic vision for the Gaza Strip for the coming decade or even, in most likelihood, farther down the road. One will have to choose between a hopeless vision and baseless hope. In formulating its positions regarding the day after, Israel’s civilian leaders will need to adopt a realistic approach, adhering to the hard facts and data about the monstrous entity that has grown in our midst, taking deep root in all systems of life and segments of the population in the area it controls.

It will have to operate on the assumption that it is impossible to effect real change on a profound and cultural level there, at least for our generation. It will be required to set demilitarization as a threshold condition for any future modus vivendi in Gaza, to oppose any initiative or move that would jeopardize this, and not to trust foreign peacekeeping mechanisms.

The upcoming visit to Israel by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken provides an opportunity to set expectations with the US administration on this matter too. While the discourse on the “day after” issue has focused on the question of “who will be” in charge the day after a Hamas regime collapse, no less important is the question of what will be the reality on the ground. In public, Israel’s answer to these questions has been in a negation – emphasizing what will NOT be in the strip: no to a Hamas regime, no to a Palestinian Authority in power there, no to military capabilities threatening Israel, no to restrictions on that would hamper its freedom of action. Israel’s leaders have put forth a general framework but did not flesh it up with details.

Despite criticism of this, the government has been acting properly in postponing any real deliberations on the details. This was designed primarily to keep attention focused on the fighting, but also so as not to create an impression of Israel being in a hurry and already preparing for the conclusion of the campaign (thereby weakening our forces and bolstering the enemy’s hopes). A third reason is to avoid having this issue dividing the public, and a fourth reason is to delay and reduce political friction on this issue with the Biden administration. Finally, another reason for this dithering was the realization that creating the “day after” depends on the achievements of the ongoing combat, and it is best to have that discussion from a position of strength, when one holds assets and leverage, not before.

Although the IDF operation is still in full swing, it is worthwhile to deviate from this line and delve now into one of the characteristics of the “day after,” precisely because deliberating this issue provides an answer to one of the tough dilemmas at this stage of the fighting: coping with the tunnel challenge.

On the one hand, after the price it paid on October 7, Israel cannot allow the monstrous tunnel network and its additional elements to exist in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the price Israel is already paying to expose and destroy this network is high. Continuing the systematic effort to uncover tunnels will prolong fighting, exact further costs on our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. What should be done, then?

Any area with tunnels will be declared a battle zone for an indefinite period. First, it must be made clear that as long as tunnels exist – the state of war will continue! Israel should seek consensus (especially by having the US on board) on the idea that the existence of tunnels in the strip violates the principle of demilitarization and that the Palestinian residents will not be able to live their lives in areas with tunnels. This means that these areas will be defined as “combat zones,” and anyone found in them will be considered an enemy combatant and treated as such until the area is tunnel-free.

Opponents of this idea will likely point out that solutions must be found for the population. In a different reality, given Gaza’s conduct as a “Hamas state” and in light of the high levels of support for that organization and its brutal attack on Israel among Gazans, there would be no room for this question at all.

However, given prevailing attitudes today in the world, it can be assumed that ignoring the plea of the population would only increase opposition to Israel’s plans. Thus, Israel must enlist the US to help provide humanitarian solutions that would be defined as lengthy but not permanent. These will be outside the area of combat.

Another argument to support such an approach is the state of destruction in most Gaza neighborhoods. Most of the population has nowhere to return to anyway. Anyone who sees Hamas’ tunnel enterprise – which relied on construction materials intended for civilian purposes – should also lower expectations for rebuilding and rehabilitation in the foreseeable future. Israel cannot afford to let such diversion of construction material happen again.

Published in Israel Hayom 29.12.2023

The recent events in the war require Israel’s political and security leadership to change the conditions under which the IDF operates in the Gaza Strip.

The war machine continues to work well, the IDF wins every battle and delivers gains, but in many cases, these are merely tactical achievements at a very high cost. The nature of the Israeli offensive has changed: Extensive air strikes by fighter jets have become less common; the ground fighting is intense, but it provides Hamas with opportunities to harm our forces using methods for which it has prepared well in advance and through tunnel shafts, ambushes and traps that it had pre-planned.

But while the conditions under which our forces operate are more difficult than in the past, for Hamas fighters, things have improved. They have benefited from the humanitarian supplies that Israel allows to pass through via the Kerem Shalom crossing; the fuel brought into the Gaza Strip is used to keep the tunnels active. Hamas continues to demonstrate resilience and stamina, maintains its senior command, continues to have intermittent control over the area; and it feels re-energized by Qatar and Egypt, slowly shaking off the ISIS stain that stuck to it on October 7. It has also drawn encouragement from the internal pressure in Israel and reports of the diplomatic clock that is ticking for the offensive. All this gives it hope that it could survive as an organization and as the governing authority and exploit the bargaining chips in its hands to end the war through some political arrangement. 

Clear evidence of how it assesses its situation can be found in its intransigence when it comes to reaching another deal to release captives. If in the first stage of the fighting, Hamas begged for a ceasefire and was willing to pay for it by releasing some 100 captives, now it feels confident enough to reject any deal that does not include the complete end of the war, the release of all terrorists imprisoned in Israel and guarantees designed to ensure that it remains the central power broker in the Strip.

Such an endgame would be another disaster for Israel’s security and regional standing, which relies to a considerable extent on its perceived might.

Israel cannot afford to let the war become a stalemate or a war of attrition The scope of casualties we sustain directly affects the nation’s morale and also the public’s support for continuing the war. On the other side of the border casualties only strengthen the morale. 

The actions in the diplomatic, economic, and civilian arenas, just like those on the battlefield, must serve the strategy of reaching our goals in the shortest amount of time and at the lowest cost. Israel should ratchet up the pressure on Hamas in every aspect; we must return to the formula that served Israel in the first stage of the fighting: massive air attacks; evacuation of populations from areas not yet attacked (such as refugee camps in the center of the strip); preventing the return of residents who evacuated from the north (not even to what remains of their homes); targeted assassinations in and out of the strip; and no less important – control over the supply and fuel entering the strip. The aid should be seen as if it were ammunition; namely, it must limited in scope and monitored so that there is no diversion to Hamas.

Without fuel, food, and logistical means, Hamas terrorists will find it difficult to survive inside the tunnels and will be forced out into the open. Allowing in supplies is a serious mistake. Hamas gets to have de facto control over most of the aid entering the strip and uses it to shore up its status as the governing authority over the population. 

Israel has effectively given up on imposing a complete siege, despite such a measure being granted by the laws of warfare whenever there is a well-founded concern that aid reaches the enemy. 

To deal with diplomatic pressure, perhaps Israel could announce a “de-escalation” zone in southern Gaza, which would be the sole destination of humanitarian aid and where any resident can go if they need assistance.

By agreeing to route humanitarian aid via the Kerem Shalom crossing Israel effectively put an albatross on its neck. This invites pressure to increase the scope of assistance and will prevent Israel from stopping the flow when it wants to (lest it be accused by the international community of starving the population). What’s worse is that from a forward-looking perspective, it again entrusts Israel with responsibility for the civilian aspects of the Gaza Strip.

Thus, instead of severing ties with the Strip and its troubles in the wake of October 7, Israel has re-inserted itself by assuming responsibility for Gaza’s humanitarian situation.

If Israel wants to avoid a situation where the Kerem Shalom opening becomes a precedent and model for further agreements, it is advisable now to take apart the Erez crossing and shut it down for good by ending the coordination operations there.  By doing so, Israel will be able to set facts on the ground that will shape the “day after” reality in its favor. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 21, 2023.

What is true in everyday life is true in wartime too: You must focus to succeed. Try to do too many things simultaneously and you’re set for setback, disappointment, or failure.

That is what has happened to Israel over the past three weeks, ever since it agreed to a series of pauses in the war against Hamas and then reignited the ground campaign against Hamas under increased US scrutiny. It has lost focus. It is seeking to concurrently accomplish diverse goals and balance competing interests. And in trying to cover too many bases, Israel risks failure across the board.

Therefore, it is time for Israel’s wartime leaders to concentrate once again their efforts on the one most critical goal of this war; the main, most consensual, and most legitimate objective. Distilled to its essence, this is eradication of the Hamas threat to Israel and the consequent restoration of Israel’s deterrent posture versus all enemies in the Middle East.

This means and requires application of maximum, maximum, maximum military force against Hamas in every hideaway corner and under every school, mosque, and UNRWA facility in which Hamas terrorists are rottenly taking sanctuary. Without letup, without forbearance. With cold, calculated, crushing military force. With all tools at Israel’s disposal, as swiftly as possible, and without unnecessarily exposing Israeli troops to death and injury.

This is not a matter of Israeli “rage” as some nasty observers in Western capitals have insinuated. It is a matter of smart, rightful, and reasonable policy. It is the only way to decisively win the war and to fix the future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

It is the only way to end the so-called “cycle of violence” versus Gaza (– oh, how I hate that phrase which suggests equivalency of responsibility for decades of conflict!). It also is the only way to restart the drive towards Saudi-Israeli reconciliation and broader Mideast stability and peace.

Everything else is secondary. Every other interest and concern, no matter how poignant, compassionate, or pressing, must remain subordinate to the overarching master goal of erasing Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip. Nothing should distract Israel’s leaders from their focus; nothing should dissuade them from achieving the fullest possible victory over Hamas.

Alas, this means that humanitarian concerns, both for the one hundred or so Israeli civilians still held hostage by Hamas and for the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians held hostage by Hamas, must be relegated to the sidelines. It is not easy or nice to say so, but concern for the hostages (– and yes, Palestinians in Gaza are brutally kept captive by Hamas in every way) cannot dominate Israeli decision-making.

This means that Israel cannot be dragged again into a drip-drip hostage negotiation horror show which reinforced Hamas’ dominance in Palestinian politics and which sapped Israeli national consensus about prosecuting the war to its fullest, necessary completion.

It means that Israel cannot daintily tiptoe through the boobytrapped tulips that Hamas has planted in every kindergarten and classroom, in every bedroom and hospital storeroom in Gaza.

It means that Israel cannot tie itself into knots trying to satisfy every unfair, outrageous, so-called international humanitarian law regulation that was made-up especially for, and is applied only to, Israel – precisely, maliciously to neuter Israel’s military.

It means that Israel cannot succumb to international pressures to provide more fuel for Gaza, literally fueling the enemy.

It means that Israel cannot be so solicitous of Egyptian anxieties (fear of refugee spillover into Sinai), so accepting of European condescension (threatening to hold Israel “accountable”), so consenting of Russian duplicity (partnering with Iran while calling for a ceasefire with Hamas), or so acquiescent in the face of false accusations (like “escalating settler violence” or “indiscriminate bombing”).

It also means that Israel cannot accept nonsensical calls for long-term Israeli territorial withdrawals (based on the fantasy-for-now of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority) or tolerate idiotic international security suggestions (like the landing of Gulf Arab, UN, or forces from Mars to keep the peace in Gaza).

Israeli leaders must repulse such pressures and focus with laser-like sharpness on the imperative of the moment: Obliteration of Hamas to obtain security for Israel and restore Israel’s regional deterrent posture. Otherwise, there will be no peace in the Middle East, and there may be no future at all for Israel.

Those who profess to care about Israel, who aver support for Israel’s “right” to defend itself, cannot play both sides of the game; cannot call in mealy-mouth fashion “on all sides to end the cycle of violence.” Neutrality is complicity in the crimes of Hamas. Calling for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire that does not permanently defang Hamas is a call for Israeli defeat. No thank you.

IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE, Israel must push back against the super-quick global criticism of Israel whenever the IDF gets into actual combat with the likes of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whether in Gaza, Jenin, or Jerusalem. The temerity and hypocrisy of Israeli critics is simply astounding.

I ask: Just who exactly has the right to tell Israel how to defend its borders? Perhaps the EU or UN Security Council – neither of which has done diddly-squat about the 11-year-long civil war slaughter in Syria or Iran’s subversive muckraking across the Middle East?

None of these organizations have the right to jeer Israel’s defensive actions in the territories and along its borders, nor Israeli military operations beyond its borders – even if the IDF were to use indiscriminate or near-nuclear force, which it isn’t.

Israel need not apologize for defending itself against Palestinian terrorist invasions, Palestinian terror attack tunnels, Palestinian rocket barrages, and even pro-terrorist anti-Israel NGOs. Soon enough, we will probably have to say also that Israel need not apologize for striking overpoweringly at Iranian-Hezbollah commando posts and armament depots deep in Lebanon.

Israel also must never apologize for repeatedly reminding the world that Jews are not foreigners in their ancestral homeland. Israel is not an occupying force in the Sharon plains, or the sand dunes of the Negev adjoining Gaza, or the hilltops of Judea and Samaria, or in Jerusalem. It has a right to defend its homeland without being subjected to cheeky censure and supercilious send-guessing.

The nations of the world ought to be exceedingly circumspect in telling Israel what to do, how to conduct its politics, where to erect its security fences, how to conduct its military campaigns, where to draw its borders and how to defend them.

Having failed the Jewish People throughout history all the way through the Holocaust; and having been so wrong with Pollyannaish hopes for the Oslo Accords, the Arab Spring, and the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran – the nations of the world ought to give Israeli leaders the benefit of the doubt. They ought to respect Israeli decision-making, not sneer at it, when Israel’s leaders proceed cautiously in the diplomatic arena or act resolutely in the security sphere.

As former Prime Minister Menachem Begin once challenged and chastised the German Chancellor, “Are we a vassal state? And would you prefer a weak Israel?”

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2023