Hamas’s Oct. 7 rampage of murder, rape and kidnapping has forced a painful but necessary paradigm shift among Israeli policymakers regarding Gaza. A similar change of mindset must occur in regard to the future of Judea and Samaria. If Israel wishes to prevent similar attacks aimed at Israel’s major metropolitan centers, it must maintain both IDF security control and flourishing civilian communities in Judea and Samaria.

For years, the Israeli political and military establishments regarded Hamas as manageable. Israel tried to minimize the rocket threat emanating from the Gaza Strip by periodically responding to Hamas attacks without aiming to eliminate the terrorist organization. All the while, Israel allowed significant amounts of funds for humanitarian purposes to enter Gaza, much of which ended up in Hamas’s hands. Regrettably, this approach blew up in Israel’s face. Not only did Hamas remain undeterred, but it grew stronger and better prepared for each round of fighting. It has become clear that Hamas must be destroyed rather than merely contained, and a complex, methodical ground invasion is now underway.

As the IDF makes substantial progress in Gaza, talks about the day after Hamas are intensifying. U.S. President Joe Biden has called for the revival of the two-state solution and suggested that the Palestinian Authority could replace Hamas. This idea seems to be gaining momentum in some diplomatic circles. Such a vision for a “revitalized” P.A. stems from a false perception that the P.A. is a moderate, pragmatic actor with whom Israel can reach a peaceful resolution. In truth, however, a realistic analysis of the P.A.’s conduct in Judea and Samaria proves that giving it more power will undoubtedly yield grievous consequences.

It is important to remember how the P.A. came about, and especially its ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Founded in 1964 and headed by Ahmad Shukeiri and later Yasser Arafat, the PLO stated in its charter that its goal was to eliminate “Zionism in Palestine” through an “armed struggle.”

These words were not mere rhetoric. The PLO launched numerous terror attacks both on Israeli soil and against Jewish targets globally. Even so, as part of the Oslo Accords gambit, Israel agreed to treat the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The P.A. was established and Fatah, a central member of the PLO coalition, effectively became the ruling body of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Since its inception in 1994, this Fatah-controlled entity has continuously glorified terrorism in its educational system, media outlets and throughout the public sphere. It has collaborated with the BDS movement to boycott Israel and delegitimize its very existence worldwide. It has worked to incite extremists among Israeli Arabs, thousands of whom are enrolled in P.A. higher education institutions. The P.A. also rewards acts of terror by providing security prisoners or relatives of “martyrs” with monthly salaries.

The P.A.’s hatred of Jews supersedes even its deep-seated loathing for its bitter rival Hamas. About two weeks after the Oct. 7 massacre, the P.A.’s Religious Affairs Ministry released a document with guidelines for sermons to be given in mosques that referenced Islamic verses calling for the murder of Jews.

As a matter of fact, in the arena of inciting murder within the territories it controls, the P.A. had done quite “well” on its own long before Oct. 7. The Ramallah lynching (2000) and the horrendous slaughter of the Fogel family (2011)—neither carried out by Hamas in Gaza, but by Palestinian terrorists in Judea and Samaria—are proof of it.

Under these circumstances, Israel has been trying to maintain a degree of security cooperation with the P.A., knowing full well that this is far from being a sustainable arrangement. In fact, in northern Samaria, which to date presents one of the greatest challenges to Israel’s security, the P.A. has no real influence. The city of Jenin and its refugee camp in particular have become a lethal terror haven, responsible for about 50 shooting attacks in just one year.

In addition, most polling indicates that Hamas enjoys overwhelming support among the Palestinian population of Judea and Samaria. Shortly after the murderous rampage of Oct. 7, Hamas successfully incited Palestinians in Hebron, Hawara and other places to participate in violent riots with the potential to ignite the entire area.

It appears, then, that there is no essential difference between the P.A. and Hamas. Although Hamas justifies its war crimes along religious lines and Fatah tends to speak in more nationalistic terms, both seek the annihilation of the Jewish state. Therefore, the danger of both should be equally alarming. In fact, the only reason an attack similar in scale and brutality to Oct. 7 has not taken place in Judea and Samaria is due to Israel’s military presence.

In this context, it is crucial to understand that an effective security presence goes hand in hand with the establishment and nurturing of civilian communities in the territory. Since the military must protect the civilian communities and the roads leading to them, the existence of approximately 250 Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria translates into 250 points around which the military is active, making it very difficult for terror to thrive.

The opposite is also true. The uprooting of four Jewish communities near Jenin as part of the 2005 disengagement is a perfect example. The entire area in and surrounding Jenin has become a breeding ground for terror, forcing the IDF to make repeated incursions to restore law and order.

Therefore, the IDF’s control of Judea and Samaria, coupled with the presence of flourishing civilian communities, is key to thwarting terror plots to carry out mass-casualty incidents. This is why, despite routine Palestinian threats, we have not seen rockets being shot into the heart of Israel from Judea and Samaria. Nor have we seen terrorist-owned Toyota pickups like those that charged into Ofakim on Oct. 7 on the streets of Tel Aviv, despite Tel Aviv being only 20 kilometers from Samaria.

It is time for the State of Israel to view Judea and Samaria as an asset rather than a liability and to treat it as such. Israeli decision-makers should make clear, both domestically and internationally, that the option of loosening either military or civilian control over Judea and Samaria, let alone an Israeli retreat from these strategically critical territories, is not on the table.

On Oct. 7, Israel failed to prevent Hamas’s lethal attack from the relatively small Gaza Strip. While Israel cannot undo this unfathomable tragedy, it must work to prevent the strengthening of a second hostile entity in Judea and Samaria. This is the only way to ensure that the moral imperative of “Never Again” is given concrete meaning on the ground.

Published in JNS, December 14, 2023.

 There’s no question about the need to take on Hamas.  There’s no question about that.  None.  Zero.  They have every right,” President Joe Biden declared once again this week, in a speech he gave at a campaign event, ahead of the presidential elections.

In an attempt to deflect reports about pressure from Washington, he clarified: “We’re not going to walk away from providing Israel what they need to defend themselves and to finish the job against Hamas. He later, at a fundraising event, expressed his concern about the weakening support for it from other countries of the world “following the indiscriminate bombings that occurred.”

One can assume that similar messages were also conveyed by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan who is visiting Israel, as well as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US Secretary of Defense, who are expected to arrive in the coming days.

There is no doubt about the sincerity of the declarations by President Biden and his people. Even if their vision regarding Gaza does not match the emerging stance in Israel, they are fully in lockstep with Jerusalem on the need to topple Hamas and destroy its military capabilities. As far as they see things, this is not only a necessary condition for launching regional change initiatives, but a moral goal in and of itself, as part of the fight against the forces of evil.

This too must be mentioned in their favor: The Biden administration’s support for Israel has been expressed not only in statements and speeches, which have significant value but in concrete steps – from vetoing resolutions at the Security Council and arranging special financial assistance and supplying ammunition, to deterrent measures towards Iran and its proxies. This conduct further illustrates how important the strategic relations between the two countries are.

However, at the same time, one cannot ignore the heavy shackles that Washington has placed by setting expectations regarding the conduct of the war, including those that are not formulated as explicit demands.

The simplest way to bring about the collapse of Hamas’ rule in the shortest time and at the lowest cost in soldiers’ lives is through a combination of high-intensity fighting and a tight blockade, whose role is to limit the enemy’s stamina, alongside moves that will prevent Hamas elements from reassuming control through the various governmental agencies (hence the importance of damaging media infrastructure and attacking government buildings that are responsible for coordination, control, and public order, including municipal authorities).

In order to reduce the harm to the population, it would have been appropriate, from the outset, to allow its temporary exit outside the area, as has happened naturally in all the battles fought by the Americans and their allies in Iraq and Syria. However, the objection to this led to improvised alternative solutions, such as tents set up in the strip. 

However the political pressure on this issue did not diminish, and as a result, humanitarian aid and fuel quantities entering the Strip have significantly increased, which in practice means that they go toward strengthening the enemy. At the same time, there was also a noticeable reduction in the intensity of the fighting on the part of Israel and a shift to more pinpointed strikes. All this is happening while Hamas has recovered slightly and reared its head following the temporary respite and while it holds hostages, knowing that they serve as the guarantee from a deadly blow. 

A combination of reduced combat intensity with increased humanitarian aid could prolong the duration of fighting, certainly, if we add to this the morale Hamas can draw from the harm it has inflicted on our forces, the political pressure on Israel, and the bargaining chips it holds. Israel could then find itself slipping into a protracted quagmire, which will necessarily also increase the risk to our soldiers.

In order to avoid this, and as long as there is legitimacy for Israel’s action, it is advisable to conduct the fighting with high intensity, similar to that which characterized the first stage of the war. This will make it possible to increase the effectiveness of efforts to topple Hamas. It will also boost the chances for the release of the captives, just like such action helped bring about the first hostage deal. In any case, in its absence, the pressure on Hamas will also decrease on this issue. The IDF and Shin Bet should also take into account considerations regarding the security of the captives.

The continuation of fighting at later stages, after the collapse of Hamas rule, can be done at reduced intensity. The need and legitimacy for this will continue to exist as part of the prolonged effort to destroy all of Hamas’ military capabilities.

Published in Israel Hayom, December 15, 2023.

“We’re determined to help Israel ensure that October 7th never happens again,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated this week.

This was not the first time he made this promise. Similar statements were made during four (!) solidarity visits he has held in Israel since the massacre. However, concurrently with his statement, under American pressure, the Israeli security cabinet was forced to discuss the increase in fuel deliveries to the Gaza Strip, essentially supplying oxygen to Hamas terrorists fighting our soldiers through terror tunnels.

Soon after this declaration, the spokesperson for the State Department also announced that the United States would oppose the creation of a buffer zone in the Gaza Strip, thus adding more constraints on Israel’s actions, particularly on the options at its disposal when it comes to protecting the towns near the border. 

There were also US statements that the duration of the war is not unlimited along with pressure on Israel before the renewal of hostilities in the southern region to reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid.

There is no room to doubt the commitment of President Joe Biden and his officials in their statements. The administration’s support for Israel is unwavering and deserves much praise. The US has accepted Israel’s right to destroy the military and governance capabilities of Hamas and has provided substantial and vital assistance. However, at the same time, the US has been imposing limitations that prevent Israel from achieving these goals without heavy losses. 

Moreover, the limitations imposed by the US will undoubtedly prolong the conflict, which is something Washington doesn’t want. The practical way to ensure a quick and effective military operation with minimal risk to the uninvolved population is to temporarily relocate this population outside the combat zones. However, there are also objections to this.

The increase in pressure on Israel may be related to Biden’s domestic travails ahead of the 2024 elections. It may stem from differences between how Washington sees Gaza and what the reality is on the ground. 

Nevertheless, Israel cannot compromise on achieving its goals while minimizing the burden on its fighters – regardless of how long this takes. This is the message Israel has to drive home when American National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visits in the coming days.

Those who insist on getting answers from the Israeli government over what happens in the “day after” are doing so despite knowing full well that there are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have presumably been implemented during one of the many opportunities over the years.

There is no obligation to debate between bad alternatives in public now, amid the war. Attention should be solely directed towards victory in the war, maintaining internal unity, and minimizing the necessary involvement in issues that could stir controversy, whether internally or with our friends across the sea.

The way Israel sees it, the question of “the day after” in Gaza is secondary to the more critical goal of the war: reestablishing Israeli deterrence that was shattered on October 7. The endgame of the war must be shaped primarily according to this criterion.

The toppling of the Hamas government, the destruction of its arrays, and capabilities, the killing or neutralization of most of its commanders and its military units, along with the devastation resulting from all these – all this will serve as pieces in the desired endgame puzzle. 

Of course, Israel must not forget the captives, and certainly, it should not leave for “the day after”. Israel’s moral obligation towards the captives and their families requires leaving an open channel for negotiations (preferably Egypt, not Qatar, whose chief interest is to ensure Hamas survives). It must ensure that a sword is swiftly placed on the necks of Hamas leaders until they understand that the captives are their responsibility and they must act to release them.

As the fighting continues, the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency continue to crack down on terrorists in Judea and Samaria. The political leaders need to decide whether to allow  Palestinian workers from the West Bank to return to work in Israel, a right denied since October 7 (except for a relatively small number of essential positions defined as critical even at this time). 

The main argument for allowing them back to Israel is the fear that economic hardship, frustration, and unemployment will push them to act against Israel. Another consideration is the impact on the Israeli economy, particularly on housing construction. Against these considerations stands the concern over attacks they may perpetrate because they are inspired by Hamas in Gaza or because they want to avenge the deaths there, especially in light of the images and propaganda broadcast continuously on Al-Jazeera. 

The successful counterterrorism operations in the West Bank, followed by a not insignificant number of casualties, also add motivation for revenge. The security establishment is fully preoccupied with the fighting in Gaza and the intelligence efforts in the West Bank, and its ability to track terrorist elements and neutralize them in advance is not guaranteed, as we have seen recently in the attacks at the Gush Etzion junction and in Jerusalem.

Today, the public in Israel is vigilant and shows a high degree of awareness regarding any Palestinian in Israel. This contributes to the efforts of detection and neutralization. It will not be the same if tens of thousands of Palestinians are found in Israel. Another consideration, although not mentioned in setting policy, is the perception of the price Israel exacts. 

 Hamas in the Gaza Strip gains points in the battle over the hearts and minds in the West Bank because it managed to have Israel release terrorists and because it stood up to Israel. These points, at least among some of the population. But it could lose the hearts and minds of the same people if they blame the terrorist organization for hurting their livelihood. It seems that at this stage, the scale leans towards maintaining the current situation and not letting the workers back to Israel. Caution requires us to avoid unnecessary security risks in the short term. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 7, 2023.

During a UN Security Council meeting on the 24th of October, the secretary general, Antonio Guterres, said that Hamas’ October 7th attacks on Israel “did not happen in a vacuum”. He was not wrong – Hamas’ attacks were planned and executed with the close assistance of Iran, which continues to arm, guide, finance, and activate its proxies in the Middle East.

The Israel-Gaza war has repercussions on the international fight against Iran and its other accomplices. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Syria, Iraq, and recently in Sudan, are all Iranian agents of chaos and terror, who serve Iran’s interests – to create a Shia-dominate strip stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea to shift the leadership of the Muslim world from Sunni countries to Iran, end the US presence in the Middle East and destroy Israel. Besides Iranian direct support, the use of these proxies would not have been effective without an envelope-supporting system of private entities, with the ability to enable money transfers, technologies, communications, etc.

The current situation in the Middle East provides an opportunity to increase global efforts to stop Iran’s malign behavior, not only by sanctioning Iran and its proxies but also use complementary measures to sanctions and target private companies which assist Iran in executing terror activities.

The Military Sphere

After the fog of October 7th atrocities faded away, the Israeli defense forces were able to recover Iranian-produced weapons used by Hamas during the October 7th attack. The Foundation For Defense of Democracies (FDD) reported that 60mm mortar rounds with Iranian-made AZ111 mortar round fuses and M112 demolition charges were used by Hamas in the attack. Evidence shows that these components were produced in Iran and appear in a catalogue of the Defense Industries organization, an Iranian company that is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of Iran. The M112 explosives recovered were identical to those intercepted by US-led operations in Yemen and Bahrain to stop smugglers.

In addition to these familiar weapons, the IDF has also recovered new Iranian-made warheads for Rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG) that were not seen before. In the new warhead, the first charge is designed to penetrate light armoured vehicles and the second charge is thermobaric, aimed at burning the target.

The latest launching of drones and cruise missiles by the Houthis in Yemen towards Israel demonstrated more Iranian weapons variety. Since November last year, the US Navy seized many weapons and munitions en route to Yemen, in the area of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These included explosives, ammunition, weapons and missiles, which are in the use of Hamas and other proxies as well.

Iran’s creativity goes as far as its cruelty in its efforts to maintain a flow of arms to Iranian proxies in the region. Following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria in February 2023, the IRGC used humanitarian assistance as camouflage to transfer weapons and crucial components to assist with Hezbollah’s efforts to turn their rockets more accurate. Recently, Syria accused Israel of launching simultaneous missile attacks against its airports, probably to stop the already known route of weapons transfer from Iran to Syria and further to Hezbollah. After the destruction of these airports, Russia hurried to allow Iranian flights to use the “Khmeimim” air base in Syria. This is happening while Hezbollah and Shia militias in Syria have been targeting Israel with rockets since October 7th.

The technological efforts

Alongside supplying weapons to terrorist organizations, Iran is also very active in the technological sphere, which is crucial for securing funds for terrorism, surveillance, and supporting other terror-related activities inside and outside Iran.

ArianTel, an Iranian wireless communications services provider was pivotal to Iran’s efforts to create a large-scale surveillance network. According to Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity NGO based in Canada, the surveillance and censorship capabilities resulting from this level of integration with mobile service providers cannot be understated.

Prime example for this is MTN Group. MTN entered the Iranian telecom sector in 2005 and launched its services in Iran a year later using a subsidiary named Irancell, a front company of the IRGC, in which MTN owns a 49% stake, the other 51% owned by the Iranian Electronic Development Company. Since then, MTN has been closely involved with ArianTel, as part of its joint venture with the Iranian government. MTN and Irancell, provided multiple Access Points and Roaming agreements, granting ArianTel explicit access to their cellular networks. This allowed ArianTel and the Iranian government to carry out surveillance operations on dissidents and critics within Iran.

MTN group openly and knowingly conducted business with the IRGC and ArianTel despite international sanctions against them. In April 2023, ArianTel was sanctioned by the European Union, for contributing to the telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran. In 2020, a year after IRGC was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) MTN released a statement saying that it would continue its business as usual.

MTN made conscious decisions to engage in misconduct while violating sanctions, and effectively supporting and facilitating Iran’s terrorism. But the use of telecommunication systems does not stop at surveillance and suppressing dissent at home, rather it is used to advance Tehran’s international aspirations as well, supporting Iran’s proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen.

This activity is at the core of the US district court in New York’s high-stakes anti-terrorism act lawsuit against MTN Group. In addition to its direct engagement with the IRGC, the lawsuit revealed the group’s violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act by paying protection money of more than $100M to al-Qaeda and the Taliban so they wouldn’t target its cellular towers, and they deactivated the towers at night, preventing US intelligence operations.

Another dimension of concern is MTN’s decades-long association with Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization and a proxy of Iran. This relationship involved providing equipment that Hezbollah used as detonators and for tracking their adversaries. This history of supporting and enabling terror activity might indicate that other proxies of Iran, such as Hamas were also benefiting from MTN’s services.

There is evidence that Hamas’ brutal attacks against Israel, were accompanied by cyberattacks conducted by a group linked to Iran. The attacks were aimed at stealing, publishing, and deleting sensitive information such as personal data and intellectual property from educational institutions and tech companies. These attacks began in January 2023 but were intensified following the October 7th attacks.

NYT reported that Iranian hackers were waging an espionage campaign targeting rivals across the Middle East, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The cyberattacks are linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. According to Israeli cybersecurity officials, 15 groups of hackers, such as “agonizing serpens” and “LionTail”, affiliated directly or as a proxy, with the IRGC and Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, are responsible for the attacks. During this campaign, there were also attempts by groups affiliated with Hamas and Hezbollah to hack CCTV cameras in Israel.

It’s time to stop Iran

As shown above, Iran’s terror network is broad, and it also serves as a distraction from its efforts to cross the nuclear threshold and reach a nuclear military capability. Following Iran’s involvement in Hamas’ attacks against Israel and the continuous support of other proxies in the Middle East, the international community must to step up joint efforts to stop both Iran and its accomplices.

The most common measure against Iran is sanctions, mainly in relation to the nuclear program. While sanctions took a toll on Iran’s economy, the shadow financial network provided it a lifeline. This year, the US imposed new and broader sanctions on a “shadow banking” network of 39 entities across multiple jurisdictions, including those registered in China, Türkiye, and UAE. These sanctions are targeting Iranian front companies abroad that have generated tens of billions of dollars for the Iranian regime.

One of Iran’s ways to bypass sanctions is the use of cryptocurrencies, which Tehran legalized in 2019. Around 4.5% of global bitcoin mining is done in Iran. International compliance regulations, including those issued by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), have made it more difficult to use cryptocurrencies as a way to evade sanctions but did not entirely stop Iran.

In addition, the US decided to freeze $6 billion that was part of a prisoner swap deal with Iran to free 5 American citizens. Due to Iran’s backing of Hamas, the US reached an understanding with Qatar to prevent access of Iran to the funds. The US also imposed new sanctions on Hamas and members of IRGC for arming, training, and providing financial assistance to the terror organization. The US Department of Treasury emphasizes Iran’s role in providing financial, logistical, and operational support to Hamas.

The EU announced that it is considering imposing similar sanctions against Iran over its support of Hamas. Moreover, the big three European countries refused to lift sanctions on Iran after the 18th of October 2023, a date set by the original deal in 2015 and relates to missile capabilities of Iran.

Although there is still some pressure on Iran, the effectiveness of sanctions is debatable. The Iranian leadership is very flexible in its ways to evade sanctions, leaving the Iranians to suffer as a result of the sanctions, especially when these are focusing on financing channels. Yes, the economy plunged but that did not change the behavior and ambitions of the Iranian regime.

The current situation in the Middle East generates an opportunity and momentum to act now against Iran. This should include complementary means to sanctions, such as cyber tools, a direct credible military threat to Iran’s strategic infrastructure, and dismantle of its proxies. But also, the targeting of target channels of technology transfer and financial support with direct links to IRGC. In this context, the lawsuit against MTN Group is an important step. The Iranian leadership and its accomplices must know that as long as they engage in terrorism and nuclear armament, the international community will react vigorously.

Published in The National Interest 04.12.2023

“The center of gravity is the civilian population and if you drive them into the arms of the enemy, you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat,”  US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said after the truce with Hamas expired renewed fighting followed. His comments showcased just how perceptually divorced the US is from the actual reality on the ground in the Gaza Strip.

The Biden administration’s support for Israel is not in doubt and is commendable. Still, in light of various high-ranking US officials’ recent comments, it appears that they are oblivious to the widespread support Hamas enjoys in Gaza and the solidarity the people have with that movement. As a  result, Biden’s officials have adopted a position that may complicate matters for Israel as the fighting continues.

Secretary of Defense Austin, like his colleagues in Biden’s cabinet, assumes that Hamas forcefully took control of Gaza imposed itself on its population, and uses it as human shields in the war against Israel. They believe that all that is needed in order to change the reality is to weaken the organization’s grip on the population and remove its grip on the people – which would magically have them turn their back on it. This presupposition, which runs against alternative viewpoints, provides a basis for optimism, hence the temptation to adopt it.

The unfortunate truth is that Hamas enjoys broad political support from the population of the Strip, which elected it in the past and may do so again. In the parliamentary elections in 2006 – the last held in the Strip – Hamas won 76 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Out of the 24 seats in the five districts in Gaza, Hamas won 15.

Public opinion polls conducted in recent years indicate continued public support in Gaza for Hamas and its armed struggle against Israel. In its 17-year rule, Hamas has permeated the education system and other governing bodies to spread its ideas and imbue public consciousness with its values. Thus, Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the Strip. In some respects, it has implemented the idea of a “people’s army” and serves as the masses’ representative in the struggle against Israel.

Israeli action won’t lead the civilian population into the arms of the enemy; much of it, if not the majority, is already there by choice. Humanitarian generosity, beyond moral and obligatory considerations, will also not change the public’s preferences. It can be assumed that the main beneficiaries of any aid will be members of Hamas.

The American expectations that Israel reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid will only prolong the conflict and endanger the lives of our soldiers. It would be wiser to avoid imposing additional restrictions and allow the IDF to operate with high intensity until Hamas is toppled and its capabilities are eliminated. Dealing with the complex challenge of de-radicalization in the Gaza Strip will already pre-occupy the region for many years after the war.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 5, 2023.

“Some Western diplomats talk about a post-Hamas Gaza, and I say to them: Let your imagination and dreams run wild, in a couple of years, you will have to deal with the post-Israel region.” This quote was made by former Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashal shortly after the ceasefire with the terrorist organization took effect.

In a sarcastic and arrogant speech broadcast at the gathering of one of the global Islamic forums, Mashal sought to double down on Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s theory that Israel is about to collapse. He pointed out that the October 7 attack proved that Israel is ‘as weak as a spider’s web,’ and that the organization dealt Israel a crushing defeat in intelligence, battle, and perception. He promised that the defeat “‘will be completed soon.”

Israel after Oct. 7 does not need these words from Meshal to remind it of why it is fighting. Those who need this reminder, at the moment, are our friends in the White House, who have so far gone beyond their usual role to assist us in the war and related challenges (for which they deserve all praise and appreciation). Why? Because these very friends could impede Israel as it embarks on the next phase of the war in the pursuit of the goals vis-a-vis Hamas.

The message conveyed by the United States regarding the continuation of the war in Gaza can be summarized in a short sentence: Reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid. However, each of these demands will hinder Israel in its efforts to topple Hamas’ rule and destroy its military capabilities. Complying with them will only prolong the war and significantly increase the risks to our soldiers.

We still have a ways to go before Israel’s goals are met. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely where we are in relation to the ultimate goal, but it would suffice to remember that the southern region of the strip has not suffered a significant impact so far. This area is where half of the enemy forces are currently located.

Now that the fighting has renewed in the Gaza Strip, the IDF is expected to encounter a Hamas that has changed compared to the pre-ceasefire combat. There is an undisputed moral and national obligation to rescue the Hamas captives, but to advance this goal, Israel has agreed to a ceasefire that came with heavy costs and risks.

The time gained in the deal for the release of the captives might have been used by the terror organization to regain strength in the northern part of the strip to reassess the situation, to overcome key shortcomings, to complete its military preparedness, and refresh its forces for the next stage.

The ceasefire also allowed it to reassert its presence as the governing authority. This was evident in the way it staged the return of the captives.

Operationally, this time allows it to regroup, replenish fuel and logistical means to extend its endurance, gather intelligence, formulate updated operational plans, set traps and ambushes, and tighten operational coordination between its components.

The ceasefire and the events that took place when it was in effect have strengthened the morale of Hamas commanders and fighters, as well as their hopes for ending the war through some arrangement. The indirect negotiations with it, even after it had been compared to ISIS and the Nazis have boosted its confidence. The negotiations’ channel got a boost, as has Qatar’s central role within it. To all this, one has to remember that Hamas also got points from the public in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, thanks to its achievements in freeing prisoners from Israeli jails and its “struggle” against Israel.

When the fighting resumes in the Gaza Strip, the IDF can expect to encounter a Hamas with high operational readiness and strengthened morale. It might be an appropriate time to adopt a more aggressive approach so as to reduce the risks to our forces, even if it runs against the wishes expressed by the White House.

This is also true regarding the scope of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. The expectation that Israel allow humanitarian aid to Gaza (and even increase it) is based on two mistaken assumptions, in my opinion. The first is that the war is being conducted between Israel and the terrorist organization Hamas in a way that is unrelated to the “State of Gaza.” The second is that there is a practical possibility in the Gaza Strip to separate between “aid to Hamas” and “aid to the population.”

The simple reality is that the Hamas organization leads the “State of Gaza” and has taken over all the “state institutions” and resources, and has the support of most of its residents. This is also how it has conducted its war against Israel.

Having announced that one of the goals of the war is to topple Hamas’, our civilian leaders should also seek to sever the links between Hamas and the various Gaza power centers in a way that the Hamas government would no longer be able to provide for the needs of its residents, will not be able to provide them with any services or enforce its rules on them. Massive humanitarian aid undermines this, as it exempts Hamas from its obligations towards its residents thus sparing it from their anger, and preventing the population from turning against it. The aid serves as a temporary solution until things return to normal. This will prolong the war in every possible aspect.

If that is not enough, it is worth remembering that in the reality that has evolved in the Gaza Strip, it is almost impossible to separate between “aid to citizens” and “aid to Hamas.” Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the strip. Through its networks, it can receive or take anything that enters the strip for its needs, regardless of the means of transfer or who delivers it.

While Israel usually acts with generosity when it comes to humanitarian issues, in this case, Israel should adopt a strict, suspicious, and minimalist approach: It should allow only the necessary assistance, and only when necessary, and only to the extent required.

The captives will continue to be an issue Israel will have to grapple with. The way Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sees it, the residents of the border towns his organization managed to capture have a dual role: they are the human shields to ensure the survival of Hamas, and they are also the trump card that will make Israel release all the detained terrorists (“emptying all the prisons” in the language of Hamas) and allow the rehabilitation of the strip.

Since we have entered the hostage deal process and are already paying the price for doing so, we must make sure this plays out to its fullest potential. After that, the effort to release the captives should continue while combat operations are underway in a way that addresses all the captives as one unit while shifting the mediation efforts to the Egyptians. The resumption of combat operations is necessary if we are to bring about the destruction of Hamas capabilities, but, as we have seen, it also improves the chances and terms for releasing the captives.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 1, 2023.

It is neither easy nor politically correct to say so, but the serial truces Israel has accepted to obtain hostage releases from Hamas have run their course. At this point, their long-term disadvantage outweighs the immediate advantage achieved. Therefore, it is time to reengage the enemy in full-scale combat until its complete destruction.

Every Israeli man, woman, and child saved from the savagery of Hamas captivity is of course a joyous achievement, a moral priority that the State of Israel could not ignore even if it meant giving momentary victory to the barbarian captors. But the escalating cost of freezing the war against Hamas makes it imperative that Israel now revert to all-out assault on the enemy.

The repeat ”pauses” in the war that Israel has agreed to are extraordinarily dangerous on many levels. First, the IDF has lost momentum in prosecuting its ground campaign against Hamas, a crushing offensive that was grinding Gaza into rubble and throwing Hamas military forces off-kilter.

The senior-most IDF commanders in the field whom I met this week in the Gaza envelope are taking good advantage of the pauses for reequipment and reorganization but are also struggling with the challenge of keeping their troops sharp and focused.

Worse than this is the fact that the enemy is reorganizing and getting resupplied and refueled. Worse yet still, Hamas has risen from its underground bunkers to conduct detailed surveillance of IDF formations deep inside Gaza, marking every IDF nighttime depot, troop headquarters, supply route, and so on.

There is significant reason to fear that at the moment the battle is reengaged, Hamas terrorists will pop out of terror attack tunnels inside the operational bases the IDF has built in Gaza. They will attempt, G-d forbid, to capture more Israeli soldiers or kill as many as possible.

Furthermore, after losing control over northern Gaza and widely seen to be on the run, Hamas is now displaying renewed near-sovereign control over Gaza. It is again demonstrating management of Gazan civil affairs including distribution of the food, water, and medical supplies flowing in from Egypt.

It is openly flaunting its fighters in full uniform and black/green celebratory colors in the ghastly nightly torture show of releasing Israeli hostages, to the whooping adulations of hundreds of “innocent, uninvolved” Gazan civilians.

Instead of erasing Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip – which is a key goal of Israel’s war effort – the hostage-negotiation horror show into which Israel has been dragged is reinforcing Hamas’s control. Instead of making it clear that Hamas is not a “partner” for anything at all in Israel-Palestinian futures, the hostage-release horror show is bolstering Hamas claims of a central role in Israel-Palestinian futures.

One outrageous, inflammatory example of this could be seen in videos of the 200-plus trucks of humanitarian aid that convoyed into Gaza every day this week. Somehow, wondrously, every single truck was draped with brand-new banners of the Hamas movement, proclaiming the splendid achievements of the current “Al Aqsa War” replete with pictures of the golden Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

Wouldn’t it have been more appropriate for Israel and the oh-so-concerned-about-Gaza-civilians international community, which funded and provided the truckloads of aid, to prevent the glorification and fortification of Hamas in this way?

At the same time, Hamas is gaining military steam and deepening its sway in West Bank politics. The IDF indeed is operating aggressively every night in Judea and Samaria to interdict Hamas terrorist assemblies, seize armories, destroy weapons factories, and arrest or eliminate Hamas operatives, but by all accounts, the pauses in the Gaza battle only add luster and motivation to Hamas fortunes beyond Gaza.

Then there is Qatar, the ferocious, two-faced financial backer and patron of Hamas that now is adding to its swagger and stature as hostage-release mediator. Israel is making a gargantuan mistake by playing into Qatar’s game. Israel (and the US) never should have agreed to negotiations in Doha, only with representatives of Qatar in Israel or a third country.

Instead of sending the Mossad chief to indirectly negotiate with Hamas chiefs in Qatar, Israel should be sending Mossad operatives to assassinate Hamas leaders in Qatar. Instead of strengthening Qatar’s heft in the region, Israel (and the US) should be acting to crush Qatar’s hoist.

This again is an example of how the long-term disadvantages of truce and tortuous drip-drip hostage release outweigh the immediate advantages offered.

At this point, the only additional hostage-release deal that Israel should consider is a deal for the release of all Israeli hostages in one fell swoop, a deal that can and will come about only when Hamas is under the fiercest and most crushing weight of IDF attack. Only when Sinwar and his henchmen are truly on the brink of elimination and Gaza is about to be pulverized into oblivion for eternity – only when Israel truly threatens real “humanitarian disaster” in Gaza – might Hamas be willing to make a grand deal.

(What the price of that deal might be, in terms of letting Sinwar and his gang flee Gaza alive or in terms of letting the worst Palestinian terrorists out of Israeli jails and expelling them en masse to, say, Turkey – well, that is another, difficult discussion.)

THIS IS THE PLACE to reassert Israel’s legitimate war goals, which have been badly undermined, alas, by this past week of horrifying Hamas hangdogging and hesitant, humiliating (although humane) Israeli responses.

Israel legitimately seeks to eliminate Hamas rule in Gaza, to kill or expel all Hamas fighters and their supporting administrators from Gaza, to destroy all components of military threat in and from Gaza, to reduce Gaza neighborhoods from which Hamas operated to rubble (as a matter of principle and not just for military advantage – and no, this is not a war crime), to create a new security buffer zone inside Gaza and along its entire perimeter (including the Philadelphi corridor on the border with Egypt) that Israel would control indefinitely, and, of course, to facilitate the return to normal, peaceful life of the 40+ Israeli farming villages and cities in the Gaza envelope/northern Negev.

And yes, Israel also seeks to secure by force the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas and its terrorist allies – as many as possible, without any more poisonous pauses or tortuous truces.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 1, 2023; and Israel Hayom, December 3, 2023.

On April 18, 1942, sixteen US B-25 bombers attacked Tokyo. Of those, two were shot down. The rest reached Chinese regions where anti-Imperial forces saved them. Only one of the original 16 landed, in Vladivostok in Russia. All the rest – precious assets for a US army stretched thinner than onion-skin – were shot down or ditched. The surviving crews, all of whom had been handpicked as the best of the best, were gone, captured, or unavailable for months. Eight among the crews were captured by the Japanese. 

The result of the raid: marginal damage to Tokyo, and negligeable damage to the industrial capacity of its empire. Every measure of tactics held this as an irresponsible waste of men and materiel at a time when America could ill afford to waste anything.  And President Roosevelt – whose attentions and energy already were stretched to the limit — sought the raid, monitored its preparations, and then ordered the raid with impatience.  His general staff all thought him mentally unwell and irresponsible.

And yet, the Doolittle raid (as it came to be called after its commander, James Doolittle) was one of the most important actions undertaken by the Americans and arguably represented the war’s turning point.  It was tactically disastrous and useless, but strategically cataclysmic.

Because it turned around American morale. It overshadowed – even erased – the growing wallowing in misery of the memory of December 7 and replaced it with a defined goal of the war through actions, not just words.  Americans understood where they were headed and invested their energies now totally into victory rather sap their energy focused on their wounds. America had passed from fear and foreboding to becoming societally optimistic.

Japanese were unnerved because the impenetrable Islands – the islands which for 1500 years had never been penetrated because of the protective, mystical spirit of the Kamikaze wind – were penetrated and bombed.  The Japanese general staff were humiliated, and their stature which rode so high in the five months since Pearl Harbor was tarnished. The killing of Japanese civilians in their capital, combined with the shame felt by the military command, created inescapable pressure to strike back in retribution. For Japan had understood that the raid had broken their full control of the situation, taken back some of the initiative and thus threatened to reverse its relentless strategic momentum. 

The pressure took its toll: Japan advanced Admiral Yamamoto’s s invasion plans of Hawaii to retake the initiative and force a battle in Midway for which it had not fully prepared.  In June 1942, only 7 months after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were catastrophically defeated there by a far smaller force because Japan had prematurely rushed to avenge its honor.  Its controlled competence had given way to a grave misstep.  While it still took another three years, Midway changed the direction of the war. Japan’s strategic momentum was never regained, and America was on the straight road to victory, which greatly relieved Britain and cast a dark doubt over Hitler’s aspirations in Europe.  Thus, those sixteen planes with few bombs set the course of the whole war.

What does this have to do with Israel? 

Israel faced its Pearl Harbor on October 7.  The wound had given the Iranian camp great strategic initiative and shown the region that it was the strong horse, while Israel was complacent and possibly even too weak to survive in the long term.  What followed was very much like the five-month period between December 7, 1941 and April 18, 1942 in World War II, where tactically the US might have begun to mobilize, societally it began do what it had to do, but overall the strategic momentum had not been retaken.  American morale was still sinking after the initial anger faded into the grim reality of a long war, and Japanese morale continued to rise as it withered America’s.

Right now, Israel has considerable tactical initiative, but no strategic initiative. Hamas dictates the fate of the hostages and deals.  Hamas governs the agenda of international pressures.  The US state department controls the international diplomatic agenda.  Hizballah defines the parameters of conflict on the Lebanese border.  Yemen chooses when, where and how often it intervenes and caused international shipping to retreat into a defense crouch.  Iraqi militias define how much the US and Israel can feel secure in Syria and on the Golan.  Israel may possess tactical superiority in every theater, but it lacks strategic initiative and control in all of them.  Iran is still driving everything. 

As such, as nation and society, Israeli will remains high but there are signs already now of fraying of focus, internal stresses, and lack of faith in the final goals. Or even their definition. Rhetoric is also misaligned: Iran is seen and blamed as the puppet master in terms of an “either we or they survive” showdown, but the war is fought entirely locally against Hamas as if it is a limited conflict rather than part of such a twilight struggle against Iran.

Wars are won through strategy, not tactics. Israel has reached that point where it needs a Doolittle raid. 

Israel not only needs to prop up Israeli moral to move beyond the shadow of October 7 (as the US had to move beyond the shadow of December 7), but to take actions that strategically signal this is about Iran. Perhaps action Iran regime itself but certainly against theaters right now languishing (Yemen, Iraq, Syria). Israel must take the strategic initiative and set the regional agenda to bear down on Tehran. Israel needs to take control of the agenda in every aspect and force Iran’s hand into missteps. Israel needs a Doolittle raid, or several such raids.

Published by JNS 26.11.2023

For the past two decades there has been a debate raging within Israel regarding the nature of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran. Some have argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an existential threat to Israel, while others believed that it would indeed be severe, but not necessarily existential.

For many years, Benjamin Netanyahu led the ‘existential threat’ camp, drawing an analogy between Israel’s current situation vis-a-vis Iran, to that of Europe in 1938, facing Nazi Germany. In this view, Israel stands before a fateful decision: will it act to confront its enemies on time despite the immediate costs, or will it hesitate and allow another holocaust?

Others in Israel’s security establishment and political leadership rejected this analogy as wild and inappropriate to the current situation. Leading among them was Ehud Barak. Though he cooperated with Netanyahu in taking a strong stance against Iran as defense minister from 2009-2013, he consistently opposed the idea that they were dealing with an existential threat. As he relates in his 2018 autobiography:

“I was especially upset by Bibi’s increasing use of Holocaust imagery in describing the threat from Iran… We’re not in Europe in 1937. Or 1947. If it is a ‘Holocaust,’ what’s our response: to fold up and go back to the diaspora? If Iran gets a bomb, it’ll be bad. Very bad. But we’ll still be here. And we will find a way of dealing with the new reality.”

This seemingly semantic debate has very real policy implications, including the extent to which Israel should be willing to go in order to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. If this is an existential threat, then Israel must be willing to do everything in its power to prevent it – including, if necessary, taking action that carries the risk of a broader regional war and even if it means acting in defiance of the preferences of a US administration. But if it is a major threat, but not existential, then there are limits to what Israel should be willing to do, such as not acting without at least American acquiescence; weighing the value of a strike against the price of a war with Hezbollah and direct Iranian missile strikes; and ultimately, considering that instead of a costly war, Israel might shift toward a policy of attempting to deter Iran from ever using its newfound weaponry.

The Face of Evil

The massacre of October the 7th, however, should settle this debate once and for all by clarifying for all sides what existential threat really means. Because its seems that even those who claim a nuclear Iran would constitute such a threat – Netanyahu himself included – have not taken themselves seriously enough, nor acted accordingly.

Before October 7th, we had trouble believing that the genocidal evil that we witnessed that day really existed. We may have said that it exists, we may have recited slogans saying that it exists, but we didn’t entirely understand the meaning or the significance of it. We didn’t really internalize that there are, in fact, people who would happily give their lives just so they could murder Jews; people for whom their greatest dream is to “destroy, kill and annihilate all the Jews—young and old, women and children—on a single day,” no matter what the cost.

Yes, we knew that this was possible in theory, as a matter of history. Certainly, in the country founded in the shadow of the ashes of the Holocaust, Israelis remember that the Nazi’s were willing to risk it all to murder just one more Jew. But with the passage of time, we forgot that this was a real thing. The clarity of the lessons learned has been eroded over time, to the point which when it became a practical issue again, we didn’t really know what was required.

But now, after October 7th, we have again witnessed the face of evil. We have encountered it anew and must internalize its meaning anew. The meaning is that we can no longer claim that Iran is animated primarily by national interests, or that its threats are mere rhetoric, not to be taken seriously. We can no longer claim that Iran couldn’t possibly risk the survival of the Islamist regime by undertaking a nuclear attack on Israel, or that it would never risk the destruction of entire Iranian cities that would result from an Israeli counter-attack. Rather, the meaning is that it could and it most likely would.

 The Price of Error: National Annihilation

The Hamas massacre must make clear that people who are consumed by Islamist ideologies, be it the Sunni or Shiite versions, really are willing to commit collective suicide if they could only take Israel down with them. And if we do not recognize this truth and instead continue to believe that our enemies hold the same value system as we do, we will pay the price for this strategic failure, and the price is national annihilation. Because if Israel fails to see this threat with clarity and act appropriately, there will be no more politicians to apologize for the blunder and resign, and there will be no one to demand a committee of public inquiry and no one to report the findings to. This is the meaning of existential threat; it is the type of threat that forces us to choose whether to continue existing or not.

For years, Israel has wrestled with the question of where precisely is the red line beyond which decisive action is imperative. Twenty years ago, some said the very existence of clandestine uranium enrichment facilities justified action. Later, it was the accumulation of any highly enriched uranium, meaning to 20% purity. By 2012, Israel’s red line was the accumulation of 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium. According the most recent IAEA reports, Iran currently has over 500 kg of 20% and an additional 128 kg and counting of uranium enriched to 60%. As of the outset of 2023, Israel’s new red line has apparently become a point just short of military grade, meaning 90%. At each juncture, the question was raised: “why act now if we can continue to deter Iran from any further progress?”; “there is still time to act before they have enough for a bomb, and then some more time before they can weaponize it.” Iran now has anywhere from a few weeks to a few months between it and an operational weapon, given a decision to break out. Perhaps this was good enough before October 7th. Today, it should be considered well beyond the red line.

Now is the time to revisit the roots of the so-called ‘Begin doctrine’. It was Menachem Begin, who lived in a generation which had not yet forgotten the reality of genocidal evil, who wrote in 1978 the following passage and applied it in practice just a few years later: “The lesson today and for the future is: First, if an enemy of the Jews comes and says that he desires, with all his heart and blood, to destroy them – do not dismiss him, do not disparage him, do not doubt him. Rather you must take his intentions with completely sincerity, and take his utterances with all the gravity they embody. Believe him. This enemy wants to destroy the Jews. You must prevent from him the power to destroy them. You must prepare yourself every day for the time of action, but you must never again say: ‘They don’t really mean it.’ ”

Published in TheTimes of Israel, November 29, 2023.

Israel has declared its war aims as the destruction of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities, but what should its plan be for the day after? Since the beginning of the war, some prominent figures in the United States and the Israeli media and former establishment have raised the idea of installing the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governing body for civilian affairs. However, such a course of action would inevitably result within a few years in the emergence of a new terrorist state hostile to Israel, possibly even under the control of a re-emerged Hamas. If the IDF fights to eradicate Hamas rule and a similar entity rises in its place, this will constitute a historic failure, a fatal blow to Israel’s national resilience, and an existential threat to the future of the country.

The most feasible alternative is an autonomous Arab civilian entity in Gaza, with Israel maintaining overall security responsibility for as long as required by the security situation and threat assessment. However, to ensure that such an autonomous entity remains viable, does not revert to serving as a base for murderous terror attacks, and would be willing to live in peace with the State of Israel, several conditions must be met.

In Gaza today lives an entire generation that has been indoctrinated into Hamas’ genocidal ideology, and there exists no organized opposition movement to speak of. As a result, if a new leadership would be established tomorrow based upon local or familial allegiances, it would almost certainly be comprised of Hamas sympathizers, if not supporters, opposed to coexistence with Israel.

The only way to create a political entity in Gaza that is not hostile to Israel will be for the public to undergo a deradicalization process, similar to the de-Nazification process carried out in postwar Germany, during which civil society underwent a profound transformation leading it to reject Nazi ideology. This transformation was made possible through numerous steps, including public trials against Nazi criminals, severe bans on expressions and symbols of support for Nazism, and the re-writing of educational material for an entire new generation. In Gaza, such a deradicalization process should be based upon a collective narrative that recognizes the utter failure and moral repulsiveness of the Hamas ideology. It should be recalled that de-Nazification was made possible by the Allied occupation of Germany, followed by the establishment of a local government based primarily on individuals who had opposed the Nazis.

Without such a process of “de-Hamasification,” any Arab-led political entity that arises in postwar Gaza will be hostile to Israel and eventually lead to the re-emergence of the terrorist state. Transferring power to the PA would guarantee this outcome. The PA is itself already a political entity hostile to Israel’s existence. The current model in Judea and Samaria—overall Israeli security responsibility alongside PA civilian rule—is highly unstable, and its future is uncertain even in the near term. The PA is perceived by the public over which it rules as a deeply corrupt institution and holds dismal levels of support. According to a June 2023 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh would defeat PA Chair Mahmoud Abbas by a large margin if Palestinian elections were held today. In the 2006 elections for both Gaza and Judea and Samaria, Hamas won a decisive majority. It is widely recognized that the reason Abbas has not agreed to hold new elections since 2006 is because Hamas would almost certainly win again.

Even if some Palestinians also feel disillusionment towards Hamas as an organization, a vast majority (71 percent) support the formation of new terrorist groups such as “Lion’s Den” and the “Jenin Battalion.” This demonstrates that the goal of murdering Jews and destroying Israel enjoys broad support in much of Palestinian society. The political debate centers around choosing which organization is best suited to attain these goals.

The only reason that Hamas’ attack was launched from Gaza and not from Judea and Samaria is because of the extensive presence of the IDF and Israel’s security services across Judea and Samaria, who are constantly preventing terror attacks and pursuing terror organizations. Creating a similar situation in Gaza under PA control will be just as unstable as it currently is in Judea and Samaria. There is no reason to believe that a PA-led government in Gaza will educate for peace and promote coexistence with Israel. Even today, the PA’s educational materials educate for hatred and hostility towards “the Zionist entity.” As a result of the PA’s institutionalized incitement against Israel, it will constantly face the threat of being taken over by even more extreme entities such as Hamas.

Furthermore, removing Hamas just to install the PA will not achieve the required deterrence vis a vis Hezbollah. On the contrary, it will project Israeli weakness and signal to Hezbollah that there is no tangible price to be paid for a confrontation with Israel, as the latter would likely make a similar move in Lebanon: a limited-duration takeover followed by a swift withdrawal.

If the IDF fights to conquer the Gaza Strip and remove Hamas, but within a few years, a hostile entity once again takes control of the territory, this will have a very significant demoralizing effect on both current soldiers and future draftees. Such a move would be a historic failure, a fatal blow to Israel’s national resilience, and an existential threat to the country’s future.

In order to ensure long-term stability and security in Israel, Gaza, and the broader Middle East, it is necessary to ensure that any future autonomous Arab entity in Gaza meets certain conditions that will ensure its commitment to peace and coexistence. Many relevant conditions can also be found in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan released by the Trump administration in January 2020.

Although the PA rejected the plan due to the Palestinian leadership’s lack of interest in a lasting and viable peace with Israel, many of the conditions outlined in the document can help shape the path forward towards creating an autonomous Arab governing body in Gaza. It is important to emphasize that the PA does not even come close to meeting these conditions, and its involvement would be highly counter-productive.

The following is a list of relevant conditions drawn directly from the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Where the plan’s original language is applicable, it has been retained and presented in quotations. Otherwise, the substance has been retained, but the language and content have been edited or adapted to fit the current context.

Any Gazan autonomous governing body must recognize the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, and make clear that it rejects the ideologies of destruction, terror, and conflict.

“The Palestinians shall have ended all programs, including school curricula and textbooks, that serve to incite or promote hatred or antagonism towards its neighbors, or which compensate or incentivize criminal or violent activity… It is very important that education focuses on peace to ensure that future generations are committed to peace… Promoting a culture of peace… with the goal of creating an environment that embraces the values of coexistence and mutual respect throughout the region.”

“The creation of a culture of peace should include an end to incitement, including in government-controlled media, as well as an end to the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom.”

“It should also prohibit hostile propaganda, as well as textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of [an agreement], including the denial of one another’s right to exist.”

“The Palestinians shall have implemented a governing system with a constitution or another system for establishing the rule of law that provides for freedom of press, free and fair elections, respect for human rights for its citizens, protections for religious freedom and for religious minorities to observe their faith, uniform and fair enforcement of law and contractual rights, due process under law, and an independent judiciary with appropriate legal consequences and punishment established for violations of the law.”

“The Palestinians shall have achieved civilian and law enforcement control over all of its territory and demilitarized its population.”

A Palestinian government should cease to support “Boycott, Divest, and Sanction” (BDS) campaigns, anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and multilateral bodies, and any other efforts intended to delegitimize the State of Israel. Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease.

“All Israeli captives and remains must be returned.”

“It is unrealistic to ask the State of Israel to make security compromises that could endanger the lives of its citizens.”

Gaza must be fully demilitarized, and Israel will maintain full security responsibility and control of the airspace, electromagnetic spectrum, and territorial waters.

All persons and goods will cross the borders into Gaza through regulated border crossings, which Israel will monitor. Israeli border crossing officials, using state-of-the-art scanning and imaging technology, shall have the right to confirm that no weapons, dual-use, or other security-risk-related items will be allowed to enter Gaza.

“Security challenges make the building of a port in Gaza problematic for the foreseeable future.”

“The State of Israel has experienced the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s first doctrine of security – that it must be able to defend itself by itself – is as salient as ever. It is a critical strategic interest of the United States that the State of Israel remain strong and secure, protected by the IDF, and continue to remain an anchor of stability in the region.”

An international fund should be established for infrastructure development, the cost of which is not expected to be absorbed by the State of Israel.

Capital raised through this international effort will be placed into a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank. Accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, and conditionality safeguards will protect investments and ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and effectively.

Significant investments will require a governance structure that allows the international community to safely and comfortably put new money into investments that future conflicts will not destroy.

“The Palestinians shall have established transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies with appropriate governance to prevent corruption and ensure the proper use of such funds, and a legal system to protect investments and to address market-based commercial expectations.”

In the initial stage, to defeat and uproot Hamas, Israel will have no choice but to assume control of the entire Gaza Strip and set up a civilian administration, similar to how it administered Gaza from 1967 to 1994, until the Oslo Accords and transfer of power to the PA. During this period, the IDF maintained control of military affairs and oversight of civilian affairs, which were managed in conjunction with local representatives of the Arab population at the municipal level. It is important to note that during this period, there were far fewer attacks against Jewish soldiers and residents, increased economic prosperity for all of Gaza’s residents, and many examples of mutually beneficial coexistence. Following the installation of the PA in 1994, Hamas’ power grew, terror attacks increased, and institutionalized incitement undermined much of this coexistence.

Israel is, of course, not interested in undertaking a long-term military administration of Gaza. It is, however, necessary that any future autonomous entity in Gaza meet the conditions that will ensure it lives in peace and coexistence alongside Israel. Anything less will ultimately devolve again into an unacceptable and existential threat to the State of Israel.

Published in The National Interest 27.11.2023