A decisive victory in the complex campaign against Iran and its proxies requires a clear outcome in Gaza, as well as Israeli unity. The multi-front war – with Iran and its proxies, chiefly Hamas, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Qatar, Turkey, and their supporters worldwide) on the one hand, and Israel, the US, and parts of Western support on the other hand – has been going on for close to three months now. Each front has its own unique characteristics, derived from how the war began, the considerations of the actors involved, and their capabilities.

According to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Israel is fighting on seven fronts (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran), but in practice, the world stage forms another arena, and this is where Israel is fighting to maintain American backing as well as for the legitimacy of its actions and existence, and against antisemitism.

This is not a war of choice; it has been forced upon Israel, and which began under extremely difficult opening conditions. And for that very reason, both Israel and the US must end it in victory. Achieving this requires several conditions. The first and most important is a clear defeat of Hamas in Gaza and the release of the captives. This means Israeli control at the end of high-intensity fighting over the entire area, including Rafah and the Philadelphi Route (excluding perhaps international management of displaced persons in secured areas designated to ensure the safety of the population during the mopping-up stage, which will likely last several months).

Ending the major combat operations before this goal is achieved just because we’ve reached a predetermined point in time (end of January?) will allow Hamas to claim that it forced Israel to effectively change its war goals in practice, and will encourage supporters of the terrorist organization who set themselves the goal of ensuring Hamas’ survival in Gaza, even if only in a small part of its territory. As long as Hamas controls the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing and is perceived by the population as a governing entity, it would be able to claim it had managed to survive, and by implication – won.

It is also important to drive home the message – in talks with the US – that defeating Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow terrorists to rear their heads.

Therefore, not only Hamas but also the weak and corrupt Palestinian Authority is unsuitable to take over responsibility for Gaza post-war. It remains committed to the armed conflict against Israel, encourages terror (through incitement and payment of salaries to imprisoned terrorists), and sees Hamas as a legitimate organization that should be part of the leadership.

Gaining control over the entire area will also give Israel the necessary leverage to release the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it has no interest in giving up its main asset, other than in return for an Israeli commitment to refrain from completing the takeover of the strip.

The second condition is reaching an understanding with the American administration that this is the US war almost to the same extent as it is Israel’s: Continuation of the current state of affairs on all fronts will damage its standing in the region and globally, and exacerbate threats to the security of American citizens and Washington’s interests.

The Americans understand the importance of Israel’s victory over Hamas in Gaza, but their stated desire to avoid getting dragged into a regional war and have Israel end major combat operations even before completing the takeover of the entire strip encourages Iran and its proxies to continue gradually escalating their use of force, in the hope that the administration will stop Israel.

Defeating Hamas and convincing the US that this is also a war over the regional and global order – and translating this into a willingness to win – are key in the effort to exert diplomatic pressure on Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the pro-Iranian militias, and for effective military force against them if necessary.

This is the condition to create a new security reality along the northern border that will give residents a sense of security and allow them to return home; this is the condition to secure shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait; this is the condition to curb Iran’s nuclear program, which has again accelerated during the war; and this is the condition to promote efforts to establish a pragmatic regional center of gravity with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia at its core.

Israel and the US need each other in these arenas, and Israel must dive home this interdependence and mutual benefit to ensure Washington’s commitment to achieving common goals.

Israel’s ability to meet the two conditions for victory will be greatly impacted by its ability to shake off the self-induced blindness that characterized its attitude towards its enemies’ intentions and display internal unity. This is not only the clear message communicated by the troops and the fallen, but also a strategic imperative. The greater and clearer the unity, the easier it will be for Israel to harness its capabilities and American support in order to achieve its war aims.

Published in Israel Hayom 02.01.2024.

It would be a daunting challenge to map a realistic vision for the Gaza Strip for the coming decade or even, in most likelihood, farther down the road. One will have to choose between a hopeless vision and baseless hope. In formulating its positions regarding the day after, Israel’s civilian leaders will need to adopt a realistic approach, adhering to the hard facts and data about the monstrous entity that has grown in our midst, taking deep root in all systems of life and segments of the population in the area it controls.

It will have to operate on the assumption that it is impossible to effect real change on a profound and cultural level there, at least for our generation. It will be required to set demilitarization as a threshold condition for any future modus vivendi in Gaza, to oppose any initiative or move that would jeopardize this, and not to trust foreign peacekeeping mechanisms.

The upcoming visit to Israel by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken provides an opportunity to set expectations with the US administration on this matter too. While the discourse on the “day after” issue has focused on the question of “who will be” in charge the day after a Hamas regime collapse, no less important is the question of what will be the reality on the ground. In public, Israel’s answer to these questions has been in a negation – emphasizing what will NOT be in the strip: no to a Hamas regime, no to a Palestinian Authority in power there, no to military capabilities threatening Israel, no to restrictions on that would hamper its freedom of action. Israel’s leaders have put forth a general framework but did not flesh it up with details.

Despite criticism of this, the government has been acting properly in postponing any real deliberations on the details. This was designed primarily to keep attention focused on the fighting, but also so as not to create an impression of Israel being in a hurry and already preparing for the conclusion of the campaign (thereby weakening our forces and bolstering the enemy’s hopes). A third reason is to avoid having this issue dividing the public, and a fourth reason is to delay and reduce political friction on this issue with the Biden administration. Finally, another reason for this dithering was the realization that creating the “day after” depends on the achievements of the ongoing combat, and it is best to have that discussion from a position of strength, when one holds assets and leverage, not before.

Although the IDF operation is still in full swing, it is worthwhile to deviate from this line and delve now into one of the characteristics of the “day after,” precisely because deliberating this issue provides an answer to one of the tough dilemmas at this stage of the fighting: coping with the tunnel challenge.

On the one hand, after the price it paid on October 7, Israel cannot allow the monstrous tunnel network and its additional elements to exist in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the price Israel is already paying to expose and destroy this network is high. Continuing the systematic effort to uncover tunnels will prolong fighting, exact further costs on our forces, and also increase political pressure on Israel. What should be done, then?

Any area with tunnels will be declared a battle zone for an indefinite period. First, it must be made clear that as long as tunnels exist – the state of war will continue! Israel should seek consensus (especially by having the US on board) on the idea that the existence of tunnels in the strip violates the principle of demilitarization and that the Palestinian residents will not be able to live their lives in areas with tunnels. This means that these areas will be defined as “combat zones,” and anyone found in them will be considered an enemy combatant and treated as such until the area is tunnel-free.

Opponents of this idea will likely point out that solutions must be found for the population. In a different reality, given Gaza’s conduct as a “Hamas state” and in light of the high levels of support for that organization and its brutal attack on Israel among Gazans, there would be no room for this question at all.

However, given prevailing attitudes today in the world, it can be assumed that ignoring the plea of the population would only increase opposition to Israel’s plans. Thus, Israel must enlist the US to help provide humanitarian solutions that would be defined as lengthy but not permanent. These will be outside the area of combat.

Another argument to support such an approach is the state of destruction in most Gaza neighborhoods. Most of the population has nowhere to return to anyway. Anyone who sees Hamas’ tunnel enterprise – which relied on construction materials intended for civilian purposes – should also lower expectations for rebuilding and rehabilitation in the foreseeable future. Israel cannot afford to let such diversion of construction material happen again.

Published in Israel Hayom 29.12.2023

The recent events in the war require Israel’s political and security leadership to change the conditions under which the IDF operates in the Gaza Strip.

The war machine continues to work well, the IDF wins every battle and delivers gains, but in many cases, these are merely tactical achievements at a very high cost. The nature of the Israeli offensive has changed: Extensive air strikes by fighter jets have become less common; the ground fighting is intense, but it provides Hamas with opportunities to harm our forces using methods for which it has prepared well in advance and through tunnel shafts, ambushes and traps that it had pre-planned.

But while the conditions under which our forces operate are more difficult than in the past, for Hamas fighters, things have improved. They have benefited from the humanitarian supplies that Israel allows to pass through via the Kerem Shalom crossing; the fuel brought into the Gaza Strip is used to keep the tunnels active. Hamas continues to demonstrate resilience and stamina, maintains its senior command, continues to have intermittent control over the area; and it feels re-energized by Qatar and Egypt, slowly shaking off the ISIS stain that stuck to it on October 7. It has also drawn encouragement from the internal pressure in Israel and reports of the diplomatic clock that is ticking for the offensive. All this gives it hope that it could survive as an organization and as the governing authority and exploit the bargaining chips in its hands to end the war through some political arrangement. 

Clear evidence of how it assesses its situation can be found in its intransigence when it comes to reaching another deal to release captives. If in the first stage of the fighting, Hamas begged for a ceasefire and was willing to pay for it by releasing some 100 captives, now it feels confident enough to reject any deal that does not include the complete end of the war, the release of all terrorists imprisoned in Israel and guarantees designed to ensure that it remains the central power broker in the Strip.

Such an endgame would be another disaster for Israel’s security and regional standing, which relies to a considerable extent on its perceived might.

Israel cannot afford to let the war become a stalemate or a war of attrition The scope of casualties we sustain directly affects the nation’s morale and also the public’s support for continuing the war. On the other side of the border casualties only strengthen the morale. 

The actions in the diplomatic, economic, and civilian arenas, just like those on the battlefield, must serve the strategy of reaching our goals in the shortest amount of time and at the lowest cost. Israel should ratchet up the pressure on Hamas in every aspect; we must return to the formula that served Israel in the first stage of the fighting: massive air attacks; evacuation of populations from areas not yet attacked (such as refugee camps in the center of the strip); preventing the return of residents who evacuated from the north (not even to what remains of their homes); targeted assassinations in and out of the strip; and no less important – control over the supply and fuel entering the strip. The aid should be seen as if it were ammunition; namely, it must limited in scope and monitored so that there is no diversion to Hamas.

Without fuel, food, and logistical means, Hamas terrorists will find it difficult to survive inside the tunnels and will be forced out into the open. Allowing in supplies is a serious mistake. Hamas gets to have de facto control over most of the aid entering the strip and uses it to shore up its status as the governing authority over the population. 

Israel has effectively given up on imposing a complete siege, despite such a measure being granted by the laws of warfare whenever there is a well-founded concern that aid reaches the enemy. 

To deal with diplomatic pressure, perhaps Israel could announce a “de-escalation” zone in southern Gaza, which would be the sole destination of humanitarian aid and where any resident can go if they need assistance.

By agreeing to route humanitarian aid via the Kerem Shalom crossing Israel effectively put an albatross on its neck. This invites pressure to increase the scope of assistance and will prevent Israel from stopping the flow when it wants to (lest it be accused by the international community of starving the population). What’s worse is that from a forward-looking perspective, it again entrusts Israel with responsibility for the civilian aspects of the Gaza Strip.

Thus, instead of severing ties with the Strip and its troubles in the wake of October 7, Israel has re-inserted itself by assuming responsibility for Gaza’s humanitarian situation.

If Israel wants to avoid a situation where the Kerem Shalom opening becomes a precedent and model for further agreements, it is advisable now to take apart the Erez crossing and shut it down for good by ending the coordination operations there.  By doing so, Israel will be able to set facts on the ground that will shape the “day after” reality in its favor. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 21, 2023.

What is true in everyday life is true in wartime too: You must focus to succeed. Try to do too many things simultaneously and you’re set for setback, disappointment, or failure.

That is what has happened to Israel over the past three weeks, ever since it agreed to a series of pauses in the war against Hamas and then reignited the ground campaign against Hamas under increased US scrutiny. It has lost focus. It is seeking to concurrently accomplish diverse goals and balance competing interests. And in trying to cover too many bases, Israel risks failure across the board.

Therefore, it is time for Israel’s wartime leaders to concentrate once again their efforts on the one most critical goal of this war; the main, most consensual, and most legitimate objective. Distilled to its essence, this is eradication of the Hamas threat to Israel and the consequent restoration of Israel’s deterrent posture versus all enemies in the Middle East.

This means and requires application of maximum, maximum, maximum military force against Hamas in every hideaway corner and under every school, mosque, and UNRWA facility in which Hamas terrorists are rottenly taking sanctuary. Without letup, without forbearance. With cold, calculated, crushing military force. With all tools at Israel’s disposal, as swiftly as possible, and without unnecessarily exposing Israeli troops to death and injury.

This is not a matter of Israeli “rage” as some nasty observers in Western capitals have insinuated. It is a matter of smart, rightful, and reasonable policy. It is the only way to decisively win the war and to fix the future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

It is the only way to end the so-called “cycle of violence” versus Gaza (– oh, how I hate that phrase which suggests equivalency of responsibility for decades of conflict!). It also is the only way to restart the drive towards Saudi-Israeli reconciliation and broader Mideast stability and peace.

Everything else is secondary. Every other interest and concern, no matter how poignant, compassionate, or pressing, must remain subordinate to the overarching master goal of erasing Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip. Nothing should distract Israel’s leaders from their focus; nothing should dissuade them from achieving the fullest possible victory over Hamas.

Alas, this means that humanitarian concerns, both for the one hundred or so Israeli civilians still held hostage by Hamas and for the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians held hostage by Hamas, must be relegated to the sidelines. It is not easy or nice to say so, but concern for the hostages (– and yes, Palestinians in Gaza are brutally kept captive by Hamas in every way) cannot dominate Israeli decision-making.

This means that Israel cannot be dragged again into a drip-drip hostage negotiation horror show which reinforced Hamas’ dominance in Palestinian politics and which sapped Israeli national consensus about prosecuting the war to its fullest, necessary completion.

It means that Israel cannot daintily tiptoe through the boobytrapped tulips that Hamas has planted in every kindergarten and classroom, in every bedroom and hospital storeroom in Gaza.

It means that Israel cannot tie itself into knots trying to satisfy every unfair, outrageous, so-called international humanitarian law regulation that was made-up especially for, and is applied only to, Israel – precisely, maliciously to neuter Israel’s military.

It means that Israel cannot succumb to international pressures to provide more fuel for Gaza, literally fueling the enemy.

It means that Israel cannot be so solicitous of Egyptian anxieties (fear of refugee spillover into Sinai), so accepting of European condescension (threatening to hold Israel “accountable”), so consenting of Russian duplicity (partnering with Iran while calling for a ceasefire with Hamas), or so acquiescent in the face of false accusations (like “escalating settler violence” or “indiscriminate bombing”).

It also means that Israel cannot accept nonsensical calls for long-term Israeli territorial withdrawals (based on the fantasy-for-now of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority) or tolerate idiotic international security suggestions (like the landing of Gulf Arab, UN, or forces from Mars to keep the peace in Gaza).

Israeli leaders must repulse such pressures and focus with laser-like sharpness on the imperative of the moment: Obliteration of Hamas to obtain security for Israel and restore Israel’s regional deterrent posture. Otherwise, there will be no peace in the Middle East, and there may be no future at all for Israel.

Those who profess to care about Israel, who aver support for Israel’s “right” to defend itself, cannot play both sides of the game; cannot call in mealy-mouth fashion “on all sides to end the cycle of violence.” Neutrality is complicity in the crimes of Hamas. Calling for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire that does not permanently defang Hamas is a call for Israeli defeat. No thank you.

IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE, Israel must push back against the super-quick global criticism of Israel whenever the IDF gets into actual combat with the likes of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whether in Gaza, Jenin, or Jerusalem. The temerity and hypocrisy of Israeli critics is simply astounding.

I ask: Just who exactly has the right to tell Israel how to defend its borders? Perhaps the EU or UN Security Council – neither of which has done diddly-squat about the 11-year-long civil war slaughter in Syria or Iran’s subversive muckraking across the Middle East?

None of these organizations have the right to jeer Israel’s defensive actions in the territories and along its borders, nor Israeli military operations beyond its borders – even if the IDF were to use indiscriminate or near-nuclear force, which it isn’t.

Israel need not apologize for defending itself against Palestinian terrorist invasions, Palestinian terror attack tunnels, Palestinian rocket barrages, and even pro-terrorist anti-Israel NGOs. Soon enough, we will probably have to say also that Israel need not apologize for striking overpoweringly at Iranian-Hezbollah commando posts and armament depots deep in Lebanon.

Israel also must never apologize for repeatedly reminding the world that Jews are not foreigners in their ancestral homeland. Israel is not an occupying force in the Sharon plains, or the sand dunes of the Negev adjoining Gaza, or the hilltops of Judea and Samaria, or in Jerusalem. It has a right to defend its homeland without being subjected to cheeky censure and supercilious send-guessing.

The nations of the world ought to be exceedingly circumspect in telling Israel what to do, how to conduct its politics, where to erect its security fences, how to conduct its military campaigns, where to draw its borders and how to defend them.

Having failed the Jewish People throughout history all the way through the Holocaust; and having been so wrong with Pollyannaish hopes for the Oslo Accords, the Arab Spring, and the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran – the nations of the world ought to give Israeli leaders the benefit of the doubt. They ought to respect Israeli decision-making, not sneer at it, when Israel’s leaders proceed cautiously in the diplomatic arena or act resolutely in the security sphere.

As former Prime Minister Menachem Begin once challenged and chastised the German Chancellor, “Are we a vassal state? And would you prefer a weak Israel?”

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2023

Hamas’s Oct. 7 rampage of murder, rape and kidnapping has forced a painful but necessary paradigm shift among Israeli policymakers regarding Gaza. A similar change of mindset must occur in regard to the future of Judea and Samaria. If Israel wishes to prevent similar attacks aimed at Israel’s major metropolitan centers, it must maintain both IDF security control and flourishing civilian communities in Judea and Samaria.

For years, the Israeli political and military establishments regarded Hamas as manageable. Israel tried to minimize the rocket threat emanating from the Gaza Strip by periodically responding to Hamas attacks without aiming to eliminate the terrorist organization. All the while, Israel allowed significant amounts of funds for humanitarian purposes to enter Gaza, much of which ended up in Hamas’s hands. Regrettably, this approach blew up in Israel’s face. Not only did Hamas remain undeterred, but it grew stronger and better prepared for each round of fighting. It has become clear that Hamas must be destroyed rather than merely contained, and a complex, methodical ground invasion is now underway.

As the IDF makes substantial progress in Gaza, talks about the day after Hamas are intensifying. U.S. President Joe Biden has called for the revival of the two-state solution and suggested that the Palestinian Authority could replace Hamas. This idea seems to be gaining momentum in some diplomatic circles. Such a vision for a “revitalized” P.A. stems from a false perception that the P.A. is a moderate, pragmatic actor with whom Israel can reach a peaceful resolution. In truth, however, a realistic analysis of the P.A.’s conduct in Judea and Samaria proves that giving it more power will undoubtedly yield grievous consequences.

It is important to remember how the P.A. came about, and especially its ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Founded in 1964 and headed by Ahmad Shukeiri and later Yasser Arafat, the PLO stated in its charter that its goal was to eliminate “Zionism in Palestine” through an “armed struggle.”

These words were not mere rhetoric. The PLO launched numerous terror attacks both on Israeli soil and against Jewish targets globally. Even so, as part of the Oslo Accords gambit, Israel agreed to treat the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The P.A. was established and Fatah, a central member of the PLO coalition, effectively became the ruling body of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Since its inception in 1994, this Fatah-controlled entity has continuously glorified terrorism in its educational system, media outlets and throughout the public sphere. It has collaborated with the BDS movement to boycott Israel and delegitimize its very existence worldwide. It has worked to incite extremists among Israeli Arabs, thousands of whom are enrolled in P.A. higher education institutions. The P.A. also rewards acts of terror by providing security prisoners or relatives of “martyrs” with monthly salaries.

The P.A.’s hatred of Jews supersedes even its deep-seated loathing for its bitter rival Hamas. About two weeks after the Oct. 7 massacre, the P.A.’s Religious Affairs Ministry released a document with guidelines for sermons to be given in mosques that referenced Islamic verses calling for the murder of Jews.

As a matter of fact, in the arena of inciting murder within the territories it controls, the P.A. had done quite “well” on its own long before Oct. 7. The Ramallah lynching (2000) and the horrendous slaughter of the Fogel family (2011)—neither carried out by Hamas in Gaza, but by Palestinian terrorists in Judea and Samaria—are proof of it.

Under these circumstances, Israel has been trying to maintain a degree of security cooperation with the P.A., knowing full well that this is far from being a sustainable arrangement. In fact, in northern Samaria, which to date presents one of the greatest challenges to Israel’s security, the P.A. has no real influence. The city of Jenin and its refugee camp in particular have become a lethal terror haven, responsible for about 50 shooting attacks in just one year.

In addition, most polling indicates that Hamas enjoys overwhelming support among the Palestinian population of Judea and Samaria. Shortly after the murderous rampage of Oct. 7, Hamas successfully incited Palestinians in Hebron, Hawara and other places to participate in violent riots with the potential to ignite the entire area.

It appears, then, that there is no essential difference between the P.A. and Hamas. Although Hamas justifies its war crimes along religious lines and Fatah tends to speak in more nationalistic terms, both seek the annihilation of the Jewish state. Therefore, the danger of both should be equally alarming. In fact, the only reason an attack similar in scale and brutality to Oct. 7 has not taken place in Judea and Samaria is due to Israel’s military presence.

In this context, it is crucial to understand that an effective security presence goes hand in hand with the establishment and nurturing of civilian communities in the territory. Since the military must protect the civilian communities and the roads leading to them, the existence of approximately 250 Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria translates into 250 points around which the military is active, making it very difficult for terror to thrive.

The opposite is also true. The uprooting of four Jewish communities near Jenin as part of the 2005 disengagement is a perfect example. The entire area in and surrounding Jenin has become a breeding ground for terror, forcing the IDF to make repeated incursions to restore law and order.

Therefore, the IDF’s control of Judea and Samaria, coupled with the presence of flourishing civilian communities, is key to thwarting terror plots to carry out mass-casualty incidents. This is why, despite routine Palestinian threats, we have not seen rockets being shot into the heart of Israel from Judea and Samaria. Nor have we seen terrorist-owned Toyota pickups like those that charged into Ofakim on Oct. 7 on the streets of Tel Aviv, despite Tel Aviv being only 20 kilometers from Samaria.

It is time for the State of Israel to view Judea and Samaria as an asset rather than a liability and to treat it as such. Israeli decision-makers should make clear, both domestically and internationally, that the option of loosening either military or civilian control over Judea and Samaria, let alone an Israeli retreat from these strategically critical territories, is not on the table.

On Oct. 7, Israel failed to prevent Hamas’s lethal attack from the relatively small Gaza Strip. While Israel cannot undo this unfathomable tragedy, it must work to prevent the strengthening of a second hostile entity in Judea and Samaria. This is the only way to ensure that the moral imperative of “Never Again” is given concrete meaning on the ground.

Published in JNS, December 14, 2023.

 There’s no question about the need to take on Hamas.  There’s no question about that.  None.  Zero.  They have every right,” President Joe Biden declared once again this week, in a speech he gave at a campaign event, ahead of the presidential elections.

In an attempt to deflect reports about pressure from Washington, he clarified: “We’re not going to walk away from providing Israel what they need to defend themselves and to finish the job against Hamas. He later, at a fundraising event, expressed his concern about the weakening support for it from other countries of the world “following the indiscriminate bombings that occurred.”

One can assume that similar messages were also conveyed by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan who is visiting Israel, as well as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US Secretary of Defense, who are expected to arrive in the coming days.

There is no doubt about the sincerity of the declarations by President Biden and his people. Even if their vision regarding Gaza does not match the emerging stance in Israel, they are fully in lockstep with Jerusalem on the need to topple Hamas and destroy its military capabilities. As far as they see things, this is not only a necessary condition for launching regional change initiatives, but a moral goal in and of itself, as part of the fight against the forces of evil.

This too must be mentioned in their favor: The Biden administration’s support for Israel has been expressed not only in statements and speeches, which have significant value but in concrete steps – from vetoing resolutions at the Security Council and arranging special financial assistance and supplying ammunition, to deterrent measures towards Iran and its proxies. This conduct further illustrates how important the strategic relations between the two countries are.

However, at the same time, one cannot ignore the heavy shackles that Washington has placed by setting expectations regarding the conduct of the war, including those that are not formulated as explicit demands.

The simplest way to bring about the collapse of Hamas’ rule in the shortest time and at the lowest cost in soldiers’ lives is through a combination of high-intensity fighting and a tight blockade, whose role is to limit the enemy’s stamina, alongside moves that will prevent Hamas elements from reassuming control through the various governmental agencies (hence the importance of damaging media infrastructure and attacking government buildings that are responsible for coordination, control, and public order, including municipal authorities).

In order to reduce the harm to the population, it would have been appropriate, from the outset, to allow its temporary exit outside the area, as has happened naturally in all the battles fought by the Americans and their allies in Iraq and Syria. However, the objection to this led to improvised alternative solutions, such as tents set up in the strip. 

However the political pressure on this issue did not diminish, and as a result, humanitarian aid and fuel quantities entering the Strip have significantly increased, which in practice means that they go toward strengthening the enemy. At the same time, there was also a noticeable reduction in the intensity of the fighting on the part of Israel and a shift to more pinpointed strikes. All this is happening while Hamas has recovered slightly and reared its head following the temporary respite and while it holds hostages, knowing that they serve as the guarantee from a deadly blow. 

A combination of reduced combat intensity with increased humanitarian aid could prolong the duration of fighting, certainly, if we add to this the morale Hamas can draw from the harm it has inflicted on our forces, the political pressure on Israel, and the bargaining chips it holds. Israel could then find itself slipping into a protracted quagmire, which will necessarily also increase the risk to our soldiers.

In order to avoid this, and as long as there is legitimacy for Israel’s action, it is advisable to conduct the fighting with high intensity, similar to that which characterized the first stage of the war. This will make it possible to increase the effectiveness of efforts to topple Hamas. It will also boost the chances for the release of the captives, just like such action helped bring about the first hostage deal. In any case, in its absence, the pressure on Hamas will also decrease on this issue. The IDF and Shin Bet should also take into account considerations regarding the security of the captives.

The continuation of fighting at later stages, after the collapse of Hamas rule, can be done at reduced intensity. The need and legitimacy for this will continue to exist as part of the prolonged effort to destroy all of Hamas’ military capabilities.

Published in Israel Hayom, December 15, 2023.

“We’re determined to help Israel ensure that October 7th never happens again,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated this week.

This was not the first time he made this promise. Similar statements were made during four (!) solidarity visits he has held in Israel since the massacre. However, concurrently with his statement, under American pressure, the Israeli security cabinet was forced to discuss the increase in fuel deliveries to the Gaza Strip, essentially supplying oxygen to Hamas terrorists fighting our soldiers through terror tunnels.

Soon after this declaration, the spokesperson for the State Department also announced that the United States would oppose the creation of a buffer zone in the Gaza Strip, thus adding more constraints on Israel’s actions, particularly on the options at its disposal when it comes to protecting the towns near the border. 

There were also US statements that the duration of the war is not unlimited along with pressure on Israel before the renewal of hostilities in the southern region to reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid.

There is no room to doubt the commitment of President Joe Biden and his officials in their statements. The administration’s support for Israel is unwavering and deserves much praise. The US has accepted Israel’s right to destroy the military and governance capabilities of Hamas and has provided substantial and vital assistance. However, at the same time, the US has been imposing limitations that prevent Israel from achieving these goals without heavy losses. 

Moreover, the limitations imposed by the US will undoubtedly prolong the conflict, which is something Washington doesn’t want. The practical way to ensure a quick and effective military operation with minimal risk to the uninvolved population is to temporarily relocate this population outside the combat zones. However, there are also objections to this.

The increase in pressure on Israel may be related to Biden’s domestic travails ahead of the 2024 elections. It may stem from differences between how Washington sees Gaza and what the reality is on the ground. 

Nevertheless, Israel cannot compromise on achieving its goals while minimizing the burden on its fighters – regardless of how long this takes. This is the message Israel has to drive home when American National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visits in the coming days.

Those who insist on getting answers from the Israeli government over what happens in the “day after” are doing so despite knowing full well that there are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have presumably been implemented during one of the many opportunities over the years.

There is no obligation to debate between bad alternatives in public now, amid the war. Attention should be solely directed towards victory in the war, maintaining internal unity, and minimizing the necessary involvement in issues that could stir controversy, whether internally or with our friends across the sea.

The way Israel sees it, the question of “the day after” in Gaza is secondary to the more critical goal of the war: reestablishing Israeli deterrence that was shattered on October 7. The endgame of the war must be shaped primarily according to this criterion.

The toppling of the Hamas government, the destruction of its arrays, and capabilities, the killing or neutralization of most of its commanders and its military units, along with the devastation resulting from all these – all this will serve as pieces in the desired endgame puzzle. 

Of course, Israel must not forget the captives, and certainly, it should not leave for “the day after”. Israel’s moral obligation towards the captives and their families requires leaving an open channel for negotiations (preferably Egypt, not Qatar, whose chief interest is to ensure Hamas survives). It must ensure that a sword is swiftly placed on the necks of Hamas leaders until they understand that the captives are their responsibility and they must act to release them.

As the fighting continues, the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency continue to crack down on terrorists in Judea and Samaria. The political leaders need to decide whether to allow  Palestinian workers from the West Bank to return to work in Israel, a right denied since October 7 (except for a relatively small number of essential positions defined as critical even at this time). 

The main argument for allowing them back to Israel is the fear that economic hardship, frustration, and unemployment will push them to act against Israel. Another consideration is the impact on the Israeli economy, particularly on housing construction. Against these considerations stands the concern over attacks they may perpetrate because they are inspired by Hamas in Gaza or because they want to avenge the deaths there, especially in light of the images and propaganda broadcast continuously on Al-Jazeera. 

The successful counterterrorism operations in the West Bank, followed by a not insignificant number of casualties, also add motivation for revenge. The security establishment is fully preoccupied with the fighting in Gaza and the intelligence efforts in the West Bank, and its ability to track terrorist elements and neutralize them in advance is not guaranteed, as we have seen recently in the attacks at the Gush Etzion junction and in Jerusalem.

Today, the public in Israel is vigilant and shows a high degree of awareness regarding any Palestinian in Israel. This contributes to the efforts of detection and neutralization. It will not be the same if tens of thousands of Palestinians are found in Israel. Another consideration, although not mentioned in setting policy, is the perception of the price Israel exacts. 

 Hamas in the Gaza Strip gains points in the battle over the hearts and minds in the West Bank because it managed to have Israel release terrorists and because it stood up to Israel. These points, at least among some of the population. But it could lose the hearts and minds of the same people if they blame the terrorist organization for hurting their livelihood. It seems that at this stage, the scale leans towards maintaining the current situation and not letting the workers back to Israel. Caution requires us to avoid unnecessary security risks in the short term. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 7, 2023.

Key Messages:

• No other international organization in the past 75 years has enabled, supported, fostered and empowered the Palestinian rejectionist and anti-Israel ideology (the “from the River to the Sea” concept) as UNRWA has done.
• Alternatives exist for providing humanitarian aid, welfare, health and education services to the Palestinians, other than through UNRWA.
• The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip should not have been treated as refugees in the first place, and the provision of aid to the Strip’s residents should not have been tied to refugee status.The promises of a reform in UNRWA should not be relied upon; numerous such attempts have been made in the past – and all have failed.
•  IntroductionOne of the Israeli hostages abducted to Gaza on October 7 revealed, on returning to Israel, that he had been held at the home of an UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) teacher[1]. In the past two weeks, IDF forces have presented evidence of weaponry and ammunition having been found under UNRWA crates[2]. However, the true problem with UNRWA is not one specific incident or another. The true problem with UNRWA is its very existence.No other entity in the past 75 years has enabled, actualized, supported, fostered and empowered the Palestinian rejectionist ideology as UNRWA has done. This ideology denies the basic legitimacy of the existence of a State of Israel, nurtures a perpetual refugee status of the majority of Palestinians, and demands a massive return of those “refugees” into the State of Israel (referred to as the “Right of Return”). This ideology played a key role in the horrors of October 7.

  Background

  UNRWA was founded in December 1949[3] as a temporary agency for 18 months, to rehabilitate the Arab refugees from Israel’s War of Independence. Ever since, the agency has been operating as a temporary entity whose mandate is extended every three years, without having stricken off even a single person’s name from the lists of refugees. Instead of an agency for aiding or rehabilitating the Palestinian refugees, UNRWA has become an agency for perpetuating the Palestinian refugees’ existence until they can ‘return’ en masse to Israel.

  According to the agency’s records, there are 1.6 million “registered Palestinian refugees” in the Gaza Strip today (as of 2022)[4], out of a total of 2.1 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip[5]; i.e., over 75%. The Palestinians and the Arab countries have always refused to include the Palestinian refugees under the auspices of the UN’s global refugee agency (UNHCR). As a result, the definition of a “Palestinian refugee” differs from that of any other refugee in the world.

  In the context of the Gaza Strip, there are several key differences between the definitions. The first is that a refugee anywhere in the world must be located outside their country in order to be considered a refugee, whereas a Palestinian refugee need not be. “Palestinian refugees” currently living in the Gaza Strip view the Strip as part of Palestine; meaning, they are in “Palestine”, yet are nevertheless treated as “refugees from Palestine”. Such a state of affairs does not exist anywhere else in the world. Refugees all over the world are people who have left their country and crossed an internationally-recognized border. The Palestinians who relocated from Jaffa or Ashkelon to Gaza during Israel’s War of Independence did not cross such a border, and accordingly should never have been treated as refugees in the first place.

  Another difference between UNRWA and UNHCR concerns their treatment of offspring. In the case of the Palestinians, any child born to a “registered refugee” is automatically registered as a refugee. UNHCR has a more complex process, with registration not being automatic and being considered on a case-by-case basis[6]. It is only in the case of the Palestinians that a state of affairs has come about where the number of the refugees’ descendants registered as ‘refugees’ far exceeds the number of the original refugees. The result is that hundreds of thousands of the people living in Gaza have never left their homes, are living in what they themselves consider to be Palestine, yet are nevertheless treated as refugees from Palestine. This is completely absurd.

  The Problem

  UNRWA grants a fictitious refugee status to over 75% of Gaza’s population, thereby providing them with international endorsement of their belief that their true home is not in Gaza, but rather in the Israeli cities of Ashkelon, Ashdod, Jaffa or Beersheba. This is a political refugee status, intended to perpetuate the conflict. This refugee status provides the Palestinians with a pretext to continue their war against the Jews.

  Demanding their ‘return’ into Israel is the principal mechanism through which they hope to transform Israel from a Jewish state into an Arab one.

  UNRWA, which is funded by the international community at a cost of about one billion dollars every year, sends the Palestinians the exact opposite message from the one they should receive. Instead of conveying to them an unequivocal message that the world has no intention of supporting the Palestinian delusions to supplant Israel, the world is doing the opposite. The messages conveyed by the mere fact of UNRWA’s existence, and naturally also through the education system and the diplomatic and public mantle provided to the Palestinians by the agency, are that the demand for Israel’s destruction is a legitimate one. UNRWA is the international expression of the antisemitic calls of “from the River to the Sea”, since both mean the same thing: a demand for the elimination of the Jewish state and its replacement with an Arab state.

  For the Palestinians, UNRWA primary importance lies not in its role as a technical agency providing education and health services. For the Palestinians, UNRWA serves as an insurance policy issued to them by the international community, and an endorsement both of their own self-concept as having experienced the greatest calamity in the history of humanity (the “Nakba”) and as being entitled to one day return to the territory of the State of Israel. When, in 2018, the U.S. government decided to cut off the agency’s funding, Palestinians’ reactions did not focus on the possible impairment of the quality of education and health services; rather, they expressed indignation and outrage that their “Right of Return” was being tampered with.

  The Solution

  As long as Gazans believe themselves to be refugees and harbor hopes of one day returning into Israel’s territory, funds and aid delivered to the Strip for purposes of constructing housing will actually be used for constructing terror infrastructure aimed at advancing the vision of ‘Return’.

  For this reason, UNRWA must be dismantled, and any aid of any kind that the international community wishes to provide to Gaza must be provided through other avenues. The best option is to provide such aid through the national aid agencies operated by various countries, some of which are already active in Gaza (and in many other places around the world.) Thus, for example, the U.S. provides aid all over the world, and in Gaza as well, through USAID. Similar government agencies exist in the EU, UK, Norway, Sweden and many other European countries. Apolitical U.N. agencies, such as the World Food Programme, can also play a role. In any case, the aid must be completely unassociated with any political aspect of the conflict, and from the fictitious refugee status. Just as the international community has provided aid in numerous countries around the world, such as Haiti or Turkey, in recent years, without tying that aid to refugee status, such should be the case in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority as well.

  Conclusion

  UNRWA fuels the mindset of a Palestinian ‘Return’ and serves as an important pillar of the rejectionist Nakba ethos. Since Israel’s cooperation with UNRWA has been voluntary from the outset, Israel can terminate its cooperation with UNRWA.

  Any international aid to the Gaza Strip, whether in welfare, health and education services or in any other field, must be provided through other channels, and in no case through UNRWA.

  Attempts to “fix” or “improve” UNRWA should in no case be relied upon. This is an agency whose primary purpose is to perpetuate the Palestinian ideology of return. All past attempts to carry out reforms of UNRWA have failed – and for good reason. Such is the organization’s very DNA, and it cannot be changed. Therefore, UNRWA should have no role in a post-Hamas Gaza.

  [1] https://x.com/bokeralmog/status/1729929618742755477?s=20

  [2] https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/6361323ddea5a810/Article-b3b05439b5a2c81027.htm

  [3] UN General Assembly Resolution 302, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, A/RES/302(IV) (December 8, 1949). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/051/21/PDF/NR005121.pdf?OpenElement

  [4] “UNRWA in Action” Factsheet. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/unrwa_in_numbers_eng_1.pdf

  [5] CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/gaza-strip/

  [6] “Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate,” https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/577e17944.pdf.

During a UN Security Council meeting on the 24th of October, the secretary general, Antonio Guterres, said that Hamas’ October 7th attacks on Israel “did not happen in a vacuum”. He was not wrong – Hamas’ attacks were planned and executed with the close assistance of Iran, which continues to arm, guide, finance, and activate its proxies in the Middle East.

The Israel-Gaza war has repercussions on the international fight against Iran and its other accomplices. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Syria, Iraq, and recently in Sudan, are all Iranian agents of chaos and terror, who serve Iran’s interests – to create a Shia-dominate strip stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea to shift the leadership of the Muslim world from Sunni countries to Iran, end the US presence in the Middle East and destroy Israel. Besides Iranian direct support, the use of these proxies would not have been effective without an envelope-supporting system of private entities, with the ability to enable money transfers, technologies, communications, etc.

The current situation in the Middle East provides an opportunity to increase global efforts to stop Iran’s malign behavior, not only by sanctioning Iran and its proxies but also use complementary measures to sanctions and target private companies which assist Iran in executing terror activities.

The Military Sphere

After the fog of October 7th atrocities faded away, the Israeli defense forces were able to recover Iranian-produced weapons used by Hamas during the October 7th attack. The Foundation For Defense of Democracies (FDD) reported that 60mm mortar rounds with Iranian-made AZ111 mortar round fuses and M112 demolition charges were used by Hamas in the attack. Evidence shows that these components were produced in Iran and appear in a catalogue of the Defense Industries organization, an Iranian company that is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of Iran. The M112 explosives recovered were identical to those intercepted by US-led operations in Yemen and Bahrain to stop smugglers.

In addition to these familiar weapons, the IDF has also recovered new Iranian-made warheads for Rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG) that were not seen before. In the new warhead, the first charge is designed to penetrate light armoured vehicles and the second charge is thermobaric, aimed at burning the target.

The latest launching of drones and cruise missiles by the Houthis in Yemen towards Israel demonstrated more Iranian weapons variety. Since November last year, the US Navy seized many weapons and munitions en route to Yemen, in the area of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These included explosives, ammunition, weapons and missiles, which are in the use of Hamas and other proxies as well.

Iran’s creativity goes as far as its cruelty in its efforts to maintain a flow of arms to Iranian proxies in the region. Following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria in February 2023, the IRGC used humanitarian assistance as camouflage to transfer weapons and crucial components to assist with Hezbollah’s efforts to turn their rockets more accurate. Recently, Syria accused Israel of launching simultaneous missile attacks against its airports, probably to stop the already known route of weapons transfer from Iran to Syria and further to Hezbollah. After the destruction of these airports, Russia hurried to allow Iranian flights to use the “Khmeimim” air base in Syria. This is happening while Hezbollah and Shia militias in Syria have been targeting Israel with rockets since October 7th.

The technological efforts

Alongside supplying weapons to terrorist organizations, Iran is also very active in the technological sphere, which is crucial for securing funds for terrorism, surveillance, and supporting other terror-related activities inside and outside Iran.

ArianTel, an Iranian wireless communications services provider was pivotal to Iran’s efforts to create a large-scale surveillance network. According to Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity NGO based in Canada, the surveillance and censorship capabilities resulting from this level of integration with mobile service providers cannot be understated.

Prime example for this is MTN Group. MTN entered the Iranian telecom sector in 2005 and launched its services in Iran a year later using a subsidiary named Irancell, a front company of the IRGC, in which MTN owns a 49% stake, the other 51% owned by the Iranian Electronic Development Company. Since then, MTN has been closely involved with ArianTel, as part of its joint venture with the Iranian government. MTN and Irancell, provided multiple Access Points and Roaming agreements, granting ArianTel explicit access to their cellular networks. This allowed ArianTel and the Iranian government to carry out surveillance operations on dissidents and critics within Iran.

MTN group openly and knowingly conducted business with the IRGC and ArianTel despite international sanctions against them. In April 2023, ArianTel was sanctioned by the European Union, for contributing to the telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran. In 2020, a year after IRGC was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) MTN released a statement saying that it would continue its business as usual.

MTN made conscious decisions to engage in misconduct while violating sanctions, and effectively supporting and facilitating Iran’s terrorism. But the use of telecommunication systems does not stop at surveillance and suppressing dissent at home, rather it is used to advance Tehran’s international aspirations as well, supporting Iran’s proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen.

This activity is at the core of the US district court in New York’s high-stakes anti-terrorism act lawsuit against MTN Group. In addition to its direct engagement with the IRGC, the lawsuit revealed the group’s violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act by paying protection money of more than $100M to al-Qaeda and the Taliban so they wouldn’t target its cellular towers, and they deactivated the towers at night, preventing US intelligence operations.

Another dimension of concern is MTN’s decades-long association with Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization and a proxy of Iran. This relationship involved providing equipment that Hezbollah used as detonators and for tracking their adversaries. This history of supporting and enabling terror activity might indicate that other proxies of Iran, such as Hamas were also benefiting from MTN’s services.

There is evidence that Hamas’ brutal attacks against Israel, were accompanied by cyberattacks conducted by a group linked to Iran. The attacks were aimed at stealing, publishing, and deleting sensitive information such as personal data and intellectual property from educational institutions and tech companies. These attacks began in January 2023 but were intensified following the October 7th attacks.

NYT reported that Iranian hackers were waging an espionage campaign targeting rivals across the Middle East, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The cyberattacks are linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. According to Israeli cybersecurity officials, 15 groups of hackers, such as “agonizing serpens” and “LionTail”, affiliated directly or as a proxy, with the IRGC and Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, are responsible for the attacks. During this campaign, there were also attempts by groups affiliated with Hamas and Hezbollah to hack CCTV cameras in Israel.

It’s time to stop Iran

As shown above, Iran’s terror network is broad, and it also serves as a distraction from its efforts to cross the nuclear threshold and reach a nuclear military capability. Following Iran’s involvement in Hamas’ attacks against Israel and the continuous support of other proxies in the Middle East, the international community must to step up joint efforts to stop both Iran and its accomplices.

The most common measure against Iran is sanctions, mainly in relation to the nuclear program. While sanctions took a toll on Iran’s economy, the shadow financial network provided it a lifeline. This year, the US imposed new and broader sanctions on a “shadow banking” network of 39 entities across multiple jurisdictions, including those registered in China, Türkiye, and UAE. These sanctions are targeting Iranian front companies abroad that have generated tens of billions of dollars for the Iranian regime.

One of Iran’s ways to bypass sanctions is the use of cryptocurrencies, which Tehran legalized in 2019. Around 4.5% of global bitcoin mining is done in Iran. International compliance regulations, including those issued by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), have made it more difficult to use cryptocurrencies as a way to evade sanctions but did not entirely stop Iran.

In addition, the US decided to freeze $6 billion that was part of a prisoner swap deal with Iran to free 5 American citizens. Due to Iran’s backing of Hamas, the US reached an understanding with Qatar to prevent access of Iran to the funds. The US also imposed new sanctions on Hamas and members of IRGC for arming, training, and providing financial assistance to the terror organization. The US Department of Treasury emphasizes Iran’s role in providing financial, logistical, and operational support to Hamas.

The EU announced that it is considering imposing similar sanctions against Iran over its support of Hamas. Moreover, the big three European countries refused to lift sanctions on Iran after the 18th of October 2023, a date set by the original deal in 2015 and relates to missile capabilities of Iran.

Although there is still some pressure on Iran, the effectiveness of sanctions is debatable. The Iranian leadership is very flexible in its ways to evade sanctions, leaving the Iranians to suffer as a result of the sanctions, especially when these are focusing on financing channels. Yes, the economy plunged but that did not change the behavior and ambitions of the Iranian regime.

The current situation in the Middle East generates an opportunity and momentum to act now against Iran. This should include complementary means to sanctions, such as cyber tools, a direct credible military threat to Iran’s strategic infrastructure, and dismantle of its proxies. But also, the targeting of target channels of technology transfer and financial support with direct links to IRGC. In this context, the lawsuit against MTN Group is an important step. The Iranian leadership and its accomplices must know that as long as they engage in terrorism and nuclear armament, the international community will react vigorously.

Published in The National Interest 04.12.2023

“The center of gravity is the civilian population and if you drive them into the arms of the enemy, you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat,”  US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said after the truce with Hamas expired renewed fighting followed. His comments showcased just how perceptually divorced the US is from the actual reality on the ground in the Gaza Strip.

The Biden administration’s support for Israel is not in doubt and is commendable. Still, in light of various high-ranking US officials’ recent comments, it appears that they are oblivious to the widespread support Hamas enjoys in Gaza and the solidarity the people have with that movement. As a  result, Biden’s officials have adopted a position that may complicate matters for Israel as the fighting continues.

Secretary of Defense Austin, like his colleagues in Biden’s cabinet, assumes that Hamas forcefully took control of Gaza imposed itself on its population, and uses it as human shields in the war against Israel. They believe that all that is needed in order to change the reality is to weaken the organization’s grip on the population and remove its grip on the people – which would magically have them turn their back on it. This presupposition, which runs against alternative viewpoints, provides a basis for optimism, hence the temptation to adopt it.

The unfortunate truth is that Hamas enjoys broad political support from the population of the Strip, which elected it in the past and may do so again. In the parliamentary elections in 2006 – the last held in the Strip – Hamas won 76 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Out of the 24 seats in the five districts in Gaza, Hamas won 15.

Public opinion polls conducted in recent years indicate continued public support in Gaza for Hamas and its armed struggle against Israel. In its 17-year rule, Hamas has permeated the education system and other governing bodies to spread its ideas and imbue public consciousness with its values. Thus, Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the Strip. In some respects, it has implemented the idea of a “people’s army” and serves as the masses’ representative in the struggle against Israel.

Israeli action won’t lead the civilian population into the arms of the enemy; much of it, if not the majority, is already there by choice. Humanitarian generosity, beyond moral and obligatory considerations, will also not change the public’s preferences. It can be assumed that the main beneficiaries of any aid will be members of Hamas.

The American expectations that Israel reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid will only prolong the conflict and endanger the lives of our soldiers. It would be wiser to avoid imposing additional restrictions and allow the IDF to operate with high intensity until Hamas is toppled and its capabilities are eliminated. Dealing with the complex challenge of de-radicalization in the Gaza Strip will already pre-occupy the region for many years after the war.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 5, 2023.