“Some Western diplomats talk about a post-Hamas Gaza, and I say to them: Let your imagination and dreams run wild, in a couple of years, you will have to deal with the post-Israel region.” This quote was made by former Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashal shortly after the ceasefire with the terrorist organization took effect.

In a sarcastic and arrogant speech broadcast at the gathering of one of the global Islamic forums, Mashal sought to double down on Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s theory that Israel is about to collapse. He pointed out that the October 7 attack proved that Israel is ‘as weak as a spider’s web,’ and that the organization dealt Israel a crushing defeat in intelligence, battle, and perception. He promised that the defeat “‘will be completed soon.”

Israel after Oct. 7 does not need these words from Meshal to remind it of why it is fighting. Those who need this reminder, at the moment, are our friends in the White House, who have so far gone beyond their usual role to assist us in the war and related challenges (for which they deserve all praise and appreciation). Why? Because these very friends could impede Israel as it embarks on the next phase of the war in the pursuit of the goals vis-a-vis Hamas.

The message conveyed by the United States regarding the continuation of the war in Gaza can be summarized in a short sentence: Reduce the intensity of the fighting and increase humanitarian aid. However, each of these demands will hinder Israel in its efforts to topple Hamas’ rule and destroy its military capabilities. Complying with them will only prolong the war and significantly increase the risks to our soldiers.

We still have a ways to go before Israel’s goals are met. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely where we are in relation to the ultimate goal, but it would suffice to remember that the southern region of the strip has not suffered a significant impact so far. This area is where half of the enemy forces are currently located.

Now that the fighting has renewed in the Gaza Strip, the IDF is expected to encounter a Hamas that has changed compared to the pre-ceasefire combat. There is an undisputed moral and national obligation to rescue the Hamas captives, but to advance this goal, Israel has agreed to a ceasefire that came with heavy costs and risks.

The time gained in the deal for the release of the captives might have been used by the terror organization to regain strength in the northern part of the strip to reassess the situation, to overcome key shortcomings, to complete its military preparedness, and refresh its forces for the next stage.

The ceasefire also allowed it to reassert its presence as the governing authority. This was evident in the way it staged the return of the captives.

Operationally, this time allows it to regroup, replenish fuel and logistical means to extend its endurance, gather intelligence, formulate updated operational plans, set traps and ambushes, and tighten operational coordination between its components.

The ceasefire and the events that took place when it was in effect have strengthened the morale of Hamas commanders and fighters, as well as their hopes for ending the war through some arrangement. The indirect negotiations with it, even after it had been compared to ISIS and the Nazis have boosted its confidence. The negotiations’ channel got a boost, as has Qatar’s central role within it. To all this, one has to remember that Hamas also got points from the public in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, thanks to its achievements in freeing prisoners from Israeli jails and its “struggle” against Israel.

When the fighting resumes in the Gaza Strip, the IDF can expect to encounter a Hamas with high operational readiness and strengthened morale. It might be an appropriate time to adopt a more aggressive approach so as to reduce the risks to our forces, even if it runs against the wishes expressed by the White House.

This is also true regarding the scope of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. The expectation that Israel allow humanitarian aid to Gaza (and even increase it) is based on two mistaken assumptions, in my opinion. The first is that the war is being conducted between Israel and the terrorist organization Hamas in a way that is unrelated to the “State of Gaza.” The second is that there is a practical possibility in the Gaza Strip to separate between “aid to Hamas” and “aid to the population.”

The simple reality is that the Hamas organization leads the “State of Gaza” and has taken over all the “state institutions” and resources, and has the support of most of its residents. This is also how it has conducted its war against Israel.

Having announced that one of the goals of the war is to topple Hamas’, our civilian leaders should also seek to sever the links between Hamas and the various Gaza power centers in a way that the Hamas government would no longer be able to provide for the needs of its residents, will not be able to provide them with any services or enforce its rules on them. Massive humanitarian aid undermines this, as it exempts Hamas from its obligations towards its residents thus sparing it from their anger, and preventing the population from turning against it. The aid serves as a temporary solution until things return to normal. This will prolong the war in every possible aspect.

If that is not enough, it is worth remembering that in the reality that has evolved in the Gaza Strip, it is almost impossible to separate between “aid to citizens” and “aid to Hamas.” Hamas is deeply rooted in all aspects of life in the strip. Through its networks, it can receive or take anything that enters the strip for its needs, regardless of the means of transfer or who delivers it.

While Israel usually acts with generosity when it comes to humanitarian issues, in this case, Israel should adopt a strict, suspicious, and minimalist approach: It should allow only the necessary assistance, and only when necessary, and only to the extent required.

The captives will continue to be an issue Israel will have to grapple with. The way Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sees it, the residents of the border towns his organization managed to capture have a dual role: they are the human shields to ensure the survival of Hamas, and they are also the trump card that will make Israel release all the detained terrorists (“emptying all the prisons” in the language of Hamas) and allow the rehabilitation of the strip.

Since we have entered the hostage deal process and are already paying the price for doing so, we must make sure this plays out to its fullest potential. After that, the effort to release the captives should continue while combat operations are underway in a way that addresses all the captives as one unit while shifting the mediation efforts to the Egyptians. The resumption of combat operations is necessary if we are to bring about the destruction of Hamas capabilities, but, as we have seen, it also improves the chances and terms for releasing the captives.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 1, 2023.

It is neither easy nor politically correct to say so, but the serial truces Israel has accepted to obtain hostage releases from Hamas have run their course. At this point, their long-term disadvantage outweighs the immediate advantage achieved. Therefore, it is time to reengage the enemy in full-scale combat until its complete destruction.

Every Israeli man, woman, and child saved from the savagery of Hamas captivity is of course a joyous achievement, a moral priority that the State of Israel could not ignore even if it meant giving momentary victory to the barbarian captors. But the escalating cost of freezing the war against Hamas makes it imperative that Israel now revert to all-out assault on the enemy.

The repeat ”pauses” in the war that Israel has agreed to are extraordinarily dangerous on many levels. First, the IDF has lost momentum in prosecuting its ground campaign against Hamas, a crushing offensive that was grinding Gaza into rubble and throwing Hamas military forces off-kilter.

The senior-most IDF commanders in the field whom I met this week in the Gaza envelope are taking good advantage of the pauses for reequipment and reorganization but are also struggling with the challenge of keeping their troops sharp and focused.

Worse than this is the fact that the enemy is reorganizing and getting resupplied and refueled. Worse yet still, Hamas has risen from its underground bunkers to conduct detailed surveillance of IDF formations deep inside Gaza, marking every IDF nighttime depot, troop headquarters, supply route, and so on.

There is significant reason to fear that at the moment the battle is reengaged, Hamas terrorists will pop out of terror attack tunnels inside the operational bases the IDF has built in Gaza. They will attempt, G-d forbid, to capture more Israeli soldiers or kill as many as possible.

Furthermore, after losing control over northern Gaza and widely seen to be on the run, Hamas is now displaying renewed near-sovereign control over Gaza. It is again demonstrating management of Gazan civil affairs including distribution of the food, water, and medical supplies flowing in from Egypt.

It is openly flaunting its fighters in full uniform and black/green celebratory colors in the ghastly nightly torture show of releasing Israeli hostages, to the whooping adulations of hundreds of “innocent, uninvolved” Gazan civilians.

Instead of erasing Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip – which is a key goal of Israel’s war effort – the hostage-negotiation horror show into which Israel has been dragged is reinforcing Hamas’s control. Instead of making it clear that Hamas is not a “partner” for anything at all in Israel-Palestinian futures, the hostage-release horror show is bolstering Hamas claims of a central role in Israel-Palestinian futures.

One outrageous, inflammatory example of this could be seen in videos of the 200-plus trucks of humanitarian aid that convoyed into Gaza every day this week. Somehow, wondrously, every single truck was draped with brand-new banners of the Hamas movement, proclaiming the splendid achievements of the current “Al Aqsa War” replete with pictures of the golden Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

Wouldn’t it have been more appropriate for Israel and the oh-so-concerned-about-Gaza-civilians international community, which funded and provided the truckloads of aid, to prevent the glorification and fortification of Hamas in this way?

At the same time, Hamas is gaining military steam and deepening its sway in West Bank politics. The IDF indeed is operating aggressively every night in Judea and Samaria to interdict Hamas terrorist assemblies, seize armories, destroy weapons factories, and arrest or eliminate Hamas operatives, but by all accounts, the pauses in the Gaza battle only add luster and motivation to Hamas fortunes beyond Gaza.

Then there is Qatar, the ferocious, two-faced financial backer and patron of Hamas that now is adding to its swagger and stature as hostage-release mediator. Israel is making a gargantuan mistake by playing into Qatar’s game. Israel (and the US) never should have agreed to negotiations in Doha, only with representatives of Qatar in Israel or a third country.

Instead of sending the Mossad chief to indirectly negotiate with Hamas chiefs in Qatar, Israel should be sending Mossad operatives to assassinate Hamas leaders in Qatar. Instead of strengthening Qatar’s heft in the region, Israel (and the US) should be acting to crush Qatar’s hoist.

This again is an example of how the long-term disadvantages of truce and tortuous drip-drip hostage release outweigh the immediate advantages offered.

At this point, the only additional hostage-release deal that Israel should consider is a deal for the release of all Israeli hostages in one fell swoop, a deal that can and will come about only when Hamas is under the fiercest and most crushing weight of IDF attack. Only when Sinwar and his henchmen are truly on the brink of elimination and Gaza is about to be pulverized into oblivion for eternity – only when Israel truly threatens real “humanitarian disaster” in Gaza – might Hamas be willing to make a grand deal.

(What the price of that deal might be, in terms of letting Sinwar and his gang flee Gaza alive or in terms of letting the worst Palestinian terrorists out of Israeli jails and expelling them en masse to, say, Turkey – well, that is another, difficult discussion.)

THIS IS THE PLACE to reassert Israel’s legitimate war goals, which have been badly undermined, alas, by this past week of horrifying Hamas hangdogging and hesitant, humiliating (although humane) Israeli responses.

Israel legitimately seeks to eliminate Hamas rule in Gaza, to kill or expel all Hamas fighters and their supporting administrators from Gaza, to destroy all components of military threat in and from Gaza, to reduce Gaza neighborhoods from which Hamas operated to rubble (as a matter of principle and not just for military advantage – and no, this is not a war crime), to create a new security buffer zone inside Gaza and along its entire perimeter (including the Philadelphi corridor on the border with Egypt) that Israel would control indefinitely, and, of course, to facilitate the return to normal, peaceful life of the 40+ Israeli farming villages and cities in the Gaza envelope/northern Negev.

And yes, Israel also seeks to secure by force the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas and its terrorist allies – as many as possible, without any more poisonous pauses or tortuous truces.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 1, 2023; and Israel Hayom, December 3, 2023.

On April 18, 1942, sixteen US B-25 bombers attacked Tokyo. Of those, two were shot down. The rest reached Chinese regions where anti-Imperial forces saved them. Only one of the original 16 landed, in Vladivostok in Russia. All the rest – precious assets for a US army stretched thinner than onion-skin – were shot down or ditched. The surviving crews, all of whom had been handpicked as the best of the best, were gone, captured, or unavailable for months. Eight among the crews were captured by the Japanese. 

The result of the raid: marginal damage to Tokyo, and negligeable damage to the industrial capacity of its empire. Every measure of tactics held this as an irresponsible waste of men and materiel at a time when America could ill afford to waste anything.  And President Roosevelt – whose attentions and energy already were stretched to the limit — sought the raid, monitored its preparations, and then ordered the raid with impatience.  His general staff all thought him mentally unwell and irresponsible.

And yet, the Doolittle raid (as it came to be called after its commander, James Doolittle) was one of the most important actions undertaken by the Americans and arguably represented the war’s turning point.  It was tactically disastrous and useless, but strategically cataclysmic.

Because it turned around American morale. It overshadowed – even erased – the growing wallowing in misery of the memory of December 7 and replaced it with a defined goal of the war through actions, not just words.  Americans understood where they were headed and invested their energies now totally into victory rather sap their energy focused on their wounds. America had passed from fear and foreboding to becoming societally optimistic.

Japanese were unnerved because the impenetrable Islands – the islands which for 1500 years had never been penetrated because of the protective, mystical spirit of the Kamikaze wind – were penetrated and bombed.  The Japanese general staff were humiliated, and their stature which rode so high in the five months since Pearl Harbor was tarnished. The killing of Japanese civilians in their capital, combined with the shame felt by the military command, created inescapable pressure to strike back in retribution. For Japan had understood that the raid had broken their full control of the situation, taken back some of the initiative and thus threatened to reverse its relentless strategic momentum. 

The pressure took its toll: Japan advanced Admiral Yamamoto’s s invasion plans of Hawaii to retake the initiative and force a battle in Midway for which it had not fully prepared.  In June 1942, only 7 months after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were catastrophically defeated there by a far smaller force because Japan had prematurely rushed to avenge its honor.  Its controlled competence had given way to a grave misstep.  While it still took another three years, Midway changed the direction of the war. Japan’s strategic momentum was never regained, and America was on the straight road to victory, which greatly relieved Britain and cast a dark doubt over Hitler’s aspirations in Europe.  Thus, those sixteen planes with few bombs set the course of the whole war.

What does this have to do with Israel? 

Israel faced its Pearl Harbor on October 7.  The wound had given the Iranian camp great strategic initiative and shown the region that it was the strong horse, while Israel was complacent and possibly even too weak to survive in the long term.  What followed was very much like the five-month period between December 7, 1941 and April 18, 1942 in World War II, where tactically the US might have begun to mobilize, societally it began do what it had to do, but overall the strategic momentum had not been retaken.  American morale was still sinking after the initial anger faded into the grim reality of a long war, and Japanese morale continued to rise as it withered America’s.

Right now, Israel has considerable tactical initiative, but no strategic initiative. Hamas dictates the fate of the hostages and deals.  Hamas governs the agenda of international pressures.  The US state department controls the international diplomatic agenda.  Hizballah defines the parameters of conflict on the Lebanese border.  Yemen chooses when, where and how often it intervenes and caused international shipping to retreat into a defense crouch.  Iraqi militias define how much the US and Israel can feel secure in Syria and on the Golan.  Israel may possess tactical superiority in every theater, but it lacks strategic initiative and control in all of them.  Iran is still driving everything. 

As such, as nation and society, Israeli will remains high but there are signs already now of fraying of focus, internal stresses, and lack of faith in the final goals. Or even their definition. Rhetoric is also misaligned: Iran is seen and blamed as the puppet master in terms of an “either we or they survive” showdown, but the war is fought entirely locally against Hamas as if it is a limited conflict rather than part of such a twilight struggle against Iran.

Wars are won through strategy, not tactics. Israel has reached that point where it needs a Doolittle raid. 

Israel not only needs to prop up Israeli moral to move beyond the shadow of October 7 (as the US had to move beyond the shadow of December 7), but to take actions that strategically signal this is about Iran. Perhaps action Iran regime itself but certainly against theaters right now languishing (Yemen, Iraq, Syria). Israel must take the strategic initiative and set the regional agenda to bear down on Tehran. Israel needs to take control of the agenda in every aspect and force Iran’s hand into missteps. Israel needs a Doolittle raid, or several such raids.

Published by JNS 26.11.2023

For the past two decades there has been a debate raging within Israel regarding the nature of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran. Some have argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose an existential threat to Israel, while others believed that it would indeed be severe, but not necessarily existential.

For many years, Benjamin Netanyahu led the ‘existential threat’ camp, drawing an analogy between Israel’s current situation vis-a-vis Iran, to that of Europe in 1938, facing Nazi Germany. In this view, Israel stands before a fateful decision: will it act to confront its enemies on time despite the immediate costs, or will it hesitate and allow another holocaust?

Others in Israel’s security establishment and political leadership rejected this analogy as wild and inappropriate to the current situation. Leading among them was Ehud Barak. Though he cooperated with Netanyahu in taking a strong stance against Iran as defense minister from 2009-2013, he consistently opposed the idea that they were dealing with an existential threat. As he relates in his 2018 autobiography:

“I was especially upset by Bibi’s increasing use of Holocaust imagery in describing the threat from Iran… We’re not in Europe in 1937. Or 1947. If it is a ‘Holocaust,’ what’s our response: to fold up and go back to the diaspora? If Iran gets a bomb, it’ll be bad. Very bad. But we’ll still be here. And we will find a way of dealing with the new reality.”

This seemingly semantic debate has very real policy implications, including the extent to which Israel should be willing to go in order to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. If this is an existential threat, then Israel must be willing to do everything in its power to prevent it – including, if necessary, taking action that carries the risk of a broader regional war and even if it means acting in defiance of the preferences of a US administration. But if it is a major threat, but not existential, then there are limits to what Israel should be willing to do, such as not acting without at least American acquiescence; weighing the value of a strike against the price of a war with Hezbollah and direct Iranian missile strikes; and ultimately, considering that instead of a costly war, Israel might shift toward a policy of attempting to deter Iran from ever using its newfound weaponry.

The Face of Evil

The massacre of October the 7th, however, should settle this debate once and for all by clarifying for all sides what existential threat really means. Because its seems that even those who claim a nuclear Iran would constitute such a threat – Netanyahu himself included – have not taken themselves seriously enough, nor acted accordingly.

Before October 7th, we had trouble believing that the genocidal evil that we witnessed that day really existed. We may have said that it exists, we may have recited slogans saying that it exists, but we didn’t entirely understand the meaning or the significance of it. We didn’t really internalize that there are, in fact, people who would happily give their lives just so they could murder Jews; people for whom their greatest dream is to “destroy, kill and annihilate all the Jews—young and old, women and children—on a single day,” no matter what the cost.

Yes, we knew that this was possible in theory, as a matter of history. Certainly, in the country founded in the shadow of the ashes of the Holocaust, Israelis remember that the Nazi’s were willing to risk it all to murder just one more Jew. But with the passage of time, we forgot that this was a real thing. The clarity of the lessons learned has been eroded over time, to the point which when it became a practical issue again, we didn’t really know what was required.

But now, after October 7th, we have again witnessed the face of evil. We have encountered it anew and must internalize its meaning anew. The meaning is that we can no longer claim that Iran is animated primarily by national interests, or that its threats are mere rhetoric, not to be taken seriously. We can no longer claim that Iran couldn’t possibly risk the survival of the Islamist regime by undertaking a nuclear attack on Israel, or that it would never risk the destruction of entire Iranian cities that would result from an Israeli counter-attack. Rather, the meaning is that it could and it most likely would.

 The Price of Error: National Annihilation

The Hamas massacre must make clear that people who are consumed by Islamist ideologies, be it the Sunni or Shiite versions, really are willing to commit collective suicide if they could only take Israel down with them. And if we do not recognize this truth and instead continue to believe that our enemies hold the same value system as we do, we will pay the price for this strategic failure, and the price is national annihilation. Because if Israel fails to see this threat with clarity and act appropriately, there will be no more politicians to apologize for the blunder and resign, and there will be no one to demand a committee of public inquiry and no one to report the findings to. This is the meaning of existential threat; it is the type of threat that forces us to choose whether to continue existing or not.

For years, Israel has wrestled with the question of where precisely is the red line beyond which decisive action is imperative. Twenty years ago, some said the very existence of clandestine uranium enrichment facilities justified action. Later, it was the accumulation of any highly enriched uranium, meaning to 20% purity. By 2012, Israel’s red line was the accumulation of 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium. According the most recent IAEA reports, Iran currently has over 500 kg of 20% and an additional 128 kg and counting of uranium enriched to 60%. As of the outset of 2023, Israel’s new red line has apparently become a point just short of military grade, meaning 90%. At each juncture, the question was raised: “why act now if we can continue to deter Iran from any further progress?”; “there is still time to act before they have enough for a bomb, and then some more time before they can weaponize it.” Iran now has anywhere from a few weeks to a few months between it and an operational weapon, given a decision to break out. Perhaps this was good enough before October 7th. Today, it should be considered well beyond the red line.

Now is the time to revisit the roots of the so-called ‘Begin doctrine’. It was Menachem Begin, who lived in a generation which had not yet forgotten the reality of genocidal evil, who wrote in 1978 the following passage and applied it in practice just a few years later: “The lesson today and for the future is: First, if an enemy of the Jews comes and says that he desires, with all his heart and blood, to destroy them – do not dismiss him, do not disparage him, do not doubt him. Rather you must take his intentions with completely sincerity, and take his utterances with all the gravity they embody. Believe him. This enemy wants to destroy the Jews. You must prevent from him the power to destroy them. You must prepare yourself every day for the time of action, but you must never again say: ‘They don’t really mean it.’ ”

Published in TheTimes of Israel, November 29, 2023.

Israel has declared its war aims as the destruction of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities, but what should its plan be for the day after? Since the beginning of the war, some prominent figures in the United States and the Israeli media and former establishment have raised the idea of installing the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governing body for civilian affairs. However, such a course of action would inevitably result within a few years in the emergence of a new terrorist state hostile to Israel, possibly even under the control of a re-emerged Hamas. If the IDF fights to eradicate Hamas rule and a similar entity rises in its place, this will constitute a historic failure, a fatal blow to Israel’s national resilience, and an existential threat to the future of the country.

The most feasible alternative is an autonomous Arab civilian entity in Gaza, with Israel maintaining overall security responsibility for as long as required by the security situation and threat assessment. However, to ensure that such an autonomous entity remains viable, does not revert to serving as a base for murderous terror attacks, and would be willing to live in peace with the State of Israel, several conditions must be met.

In Gaza today lives an entire generation that has been indoctrinated into Hamas’ genocidal ideology, and there exists no organized opposition movement to speak of. As a result, if a new leadership would be established tomorrow based upon local or familial allegiances, it would almost certainly be comprised of Hamas sympathizers, if not supporters, opposed to coexistence with Israel.

The only way to create a political entity in Gaza that is not hostile to Israel will be for the public to undergo a deradicalization process, similar to the de-Nazification process carried out in postwar Germany, during which civil society underwent a profound transformation leading it to reject Nazi ideology. This transformation was made possible through numerous steps, including public trials against Nazi criminals, severe bans on expressions and symbols of support for Nazism, and the re-writing of educational material for an entire new generation. In Gaza, such a deradicalization process should be based upon a collective narrative that recognizes the utter failure and moral repulsiveness of the Hamas ideology. It should be recalled that de-Nazification was made possible by the Allied occupation of Germany, followed by the establishment of a local government based primarily on individuals who had opposed the Nazis.

Without such a process of “de-Hamasification,” any Arab-led political entity that arises in postwar Gaza will be hostile to Israel and eventually lead to the re-emergence of the terrorist state. Transferring power to the PA would guarantee this outcome. The PA is itself already a political entity hostile to Israel’s existence. The current model in Judea and Samaria—overall Israeli security responsibility alongside PA civilian rule—is highly unstable, and its future is uncertain even in the near term. The PA is perceived by the public over which it rules as a deeply corrupt institution and holds dismal levels of support. According to a June 2023 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh would defeat PA Chair Mahmoud Abbas by a large margin if Palestinian elections were held today. In the 2006 elections for both Gaza and Judea and Samaria, Hamas won a decisive majority. It is widely recognized that the reason Abbas has not agreed to hold new elections since 2006 is because Hamas would almost certainly win again.

Even if some Palestinians also feel disillusionment towards Hamas as an organization, a vast majority (71 percent) support the formation of new terrorist groups such as “Lion’s Den” and the “Jenin Battalion.” This demonstrates that the goal of murdering Jews and destroying Israel enjoys broad support in much of Palestinian society. The political debate centers around choosing which organization is best suited to attain these goals.

The only reason that Hamas’ attack was launched from Gaza and not from Judea and Samaria is because of the extensive presence of the IDF and Israel’s security services across Judea and Samaria, who are constantly preventing terror attacks and pursuing terror organizations. Creating a similar situation in Gaza under PA control will be just as unstable as it currently is in Judea and Samaria. There is no reason to believe that a PA-led government in Gaza will educate for peace and promote coexistence with Israel. Even today, the PA’s educational materials educate for hatred and hostility towards “the Zionist entity.” As a result of the PA’s institutionalized incitement against Israel, it will constantly face the threat of being taken over by even more extreme entities such as Hamas.

Furthermore, removing Hamas just to install the PA will not achieve the required deterrence vis a vis Hezbollah. On the contrary, it will project Israeli weakness and signal to Hezbollah that there is no tangible price to be paid for a confrontation with Israel, as the latter would likely make a similar move in Lebanon: a limited-duration takeover followed by a swift withdrawal.

If the IDF fights to conquer the Gaza Strip and remove Hamas, but within a few years, a hostile entity once again takes control of the territory, this will have a very significant demoralizing effect on both current soldiers and future draftees. Such a move would be a historic failure, a fatal blow to Israel’s national resilience, and an existential threat to the country’s future.

In order to ensure long-term stability and security in Israel, Gaza, and the broader Middle East, it is necessary to ensure that any future autonomous Arab entity in Gaza meets certain conditions that will ensure its commitment to peace and coexistence. Many relevant conditions can also be found in the “Peace to Prosperity” plan released by the Trump administration in January 2020.

Although the PA rejected the plan due to the Palestinian leadership’s lack of interest in a lasting and viable peace with Israel, many of the conditions outlined in the document can help shape the path forward towards creating an autonomous Arab governing body in Gaza. It is important to emphasize that the PA does not even come close to meeting these conditions, and its involvement would be highly counter-productive.

The following is a list of relevant conditions drawn directly from the “Peace to Prosperity” plan. Where the plan’s original language is applicable, it has been retained and presented in quotations. Otherwise, the substance has been retained, but the language and content have been edited or adapted to fit the current context.

Any Gazan autonomous governing body must recognize the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, and make clear that it rejects the ideologies of destruction, terror, and conflict.

“The Palestinians shall have ended all programs, including school curricula and textbooks, that serve to incite or promote hatred or antagonism towards its neighbors, or which compensate or incentivize criminal or violent activity… It is very important that education focuses on peace to ensure that future generations are committed to peace… Promoting a culture of peace… with the goal of creating an environment that embraces the values of coexistence and mutual respect throughout the region.”

“The creation of a culture of peace should include an end to incitement, including in government-controlled media, as well as an end to the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom.”

“It should also prohibit hostile propaganda, as well as textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of [an agreement], including the denial of one another’s right to exist.”

“The Palestinians shall have implemented a governing system with a constitution or another system for establishing the rule of law that provides for freedom of press, free and fair elections, respect for human rights for its citizens, protections for religious freedom and for religious minorities to observe their faith, uniform and fair enforcement of law and contractual rights, due process under law, and an independent judiciary with appropriate legal consequences and punishment established for violations of the law.”

“The Palestinians shall have achieved civilian and law enforcement control over all of its territory and demilitarized its population.”

A Palestinian government should cease to support “Boycott, Divest, and Sanction” (BDS) campaigns, anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and multilateral bodies, and any other efforts intended to delegitimize the State of Israel. Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease.

“All Israeli captives and remains must be returned.”

“It is unrealistic to ask the State of Israel to make security compromises that could endanger the lives of its citizens.”

Gaza must be fully demilitarized, and Israel will maintain full security responsibility and control of the airspace, electromagnetic spectrum, and territorial waters.

All persons and goods will cross the borders into Gaza through regulated border crossings, which Israel will monitor. Israeli border crossing officials, using state-of-the-art scanning and imaging technology, shall have the right to confirm that no weapons, dual-use, or other security-risk-related items will be allowed to enter Gaza.

“Security challenges make the building of a port in Gaza problematic for the foreseeable future.”

“The State of Israel has experienced the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s first doctrine of security – that it must be able to defend itself by itself – is as salient as ever. It is a critical strategic interest of the United States that the State of Israel remain strong and secure, protected by the IDF, and continue to remain an anchor of stability in the region.”

An international fund should be established for infrastructure development, the cost of which is not expected to be absorbed by the State of Israel.

Capital raised through this international effort will be placed into a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank. Accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, and conditionality safeguards will protect investments and ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and effectively.

Significant investments will require a governance structure that allows the international community to safely and comfortably put new money into investments that future conflicts will not destroy.

“The Palestinians shall have established transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies with appropriate governance to prevent corruption and ensure the proper use of such funds, and a legal system to protect investments and to address market-based commercial expectations.”

In the initial stage, to defeat and uproot Hamas, Israel will have no choice but to assume control of the entire Gaza Strip and set up a civilian administration, similar to how it administered Gaza from 1967 to 1994, until the Oslo Accords and transfer of power to the PA. During this period, the IDF maintained control of military affairs and oversight of civilian affairs, which were managed in conjunction with local representatives of the Arab population at the municipal level. It is important to note that during this period, there were far fewer attacks against Jewish soldiers and residents, increased economic prosperity for all of Gaza’s residents, and many examples of mutually beneficial coexistence. Following the installation of the PA in 1994, Hamas’ power grew, terror attacks increased, and institutionalized incitement undermined much of this coexistence.

Israel is, of course, not interested in undertaking a long-term military administration of Gaza. It is, however, necessary that any future autonomous entity in Gaza meet the conditions that will ensure it lives in peace and coexistence alongside Israel. Anything less will ultimately devolve again into an unacceptable and existential threat to the State of Israel.

Published in The National Interest 27.11.2023

On October 7, a most horrific attack was perpetrated by Hamas against humanity.

Babies were burned, women and teenaged girls gang-raped, Tai workers decapitated and tortured, and the list of horrors goes on and on. Senseless atrocities were committed in the so-called name of Islam and for the so-called freedom of the Palestinian people.

“What freedom?” one may ask, given the fact that Israeli forces evacuated the Gaza Strip in 2005. Not only was there not one Israeli soldier in the Strip since then, but there was not even one Jewish person left there, given the forced evacuation of all Jewish inhabitants of the area following a decision made by then-prime minister Ariel Sharon. Furthermore, even graves were dug out, and the bones of Jews who had been buried there, were removed and reburied in Israel.

So, in essence, there was not even one Jewish bone left in the Gaza Strip since 2005.

Hence, freedom is obviously not the reason for the heinous crimes committed by the Hamas terrorists on the very black Shabbat of October 7 against innocent Israeli civilians. What is it then that could have instigated and justified in the minds of the perpetrators such hateful horrifying behavior which they knew would undoubtedly release the great wrath of the Israelis against the Palestinians in the day after the attack?

I have often written about the mastermind of this war.

I have spoken, explained and outlined the grand plan of the mullah entity which stands behind this and that this war, which began with Gaza and was not and is not intended to end in Gaza, but in the entire region and in fact the world. This is the Iranian expansionist game plan which stands behind the obsessive arming, funding, and training of endless proxies by Iran in countless venues throughout the international arena, including the creation of dormant cells in Europe, the United States, Australia, and the rest of the Western World.

This time, however, I wish to delve into the raison d’etre of the Hamas psyche. Although it momentarily serves the Iranian goal and is used, or rather abused, by mullah leadership in Iran to forward its own treacherous goals, it has its own characteristics. It is key to try to comprehend these characteristics, in order to be able to deal with the threat that they pose to humanity.

Hamas is a radical, Sunni Muslim terrorist group, whose ideology is based on the notion that any and all means are justified to reach a most revered and sought-after goal in its own eyes, and that is, similar to ISIS, the establishment of a radical Islamic caliphate first in the region – and then in the entire world.

Whereas ISIS had from the start demonstrated anti-Iranian sentiments and fought the Shi’ite Iranian militias in its various venues of influence (much to the chagrin and irritation of the Iranian regime), Hamas needs Iran and relies upon its weapons, funding, and training – and is thus complicit with its objectives; at least for now.

Hence, when people throughout the world chant slogans about freeing Palestine, they are indeed naively following a brainwashing campaign that has perhaps something to do with the Fatah movement. This is a secular, national Palestinian movement led by PA head Mahmoud Abbas. It is relatively weak and has nothing to do with the Hamas movement. The latter, a sister movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, is a radical Islamist movement that has absolutely nothing to do with national aspirations and everything to do with borderless, religious aspirations of world domination.

Moreover, Hamas has been systematically preparing for the day after Abbas, the president of the Palestinian people, whom the Western World naively perceives as the legitimate leader of the Palestinians. That is, despite the fact that he has denied the Palestinians the freedom of elections since he took office following his predecessor Arafat. Abbas is perceived by many of the Palestinians in the West Bank as a hugely corrupt leader, leading a hugely corrupt and cruel security mechanism and government.

Why is this relevant? Hamas uses this reality to weave its way into the hearts of young, disillusioned Palestinians in the West Bank and imprint upon their hearts a romantic version of a fair and idealistic claim to leadership, which includes heroic acts of resistance against the Jews.

Hence, armed, trained, and funded by Iran, Hamas has built itself an extremely efficient platform in the West Bank too, and is in essence simply awaiting the passing of Abbas in order to take over this area. Likewise, it has set up camp North of Israel, alongside its Shi’ite “brothers” in Lebanon, temporarily useful for the purpose of promoting its first goal of eliminating Israel.

The educational system enacted in the Gaza Strip, which spews poisonous incitement against Israel, all Jews, and Western culture, is augmented by summer camps and indoctrination centers run by the Hamas movement in mosques, teaching young boys and girls to hate.

The boys are taught that their role in this world is to become martyrs and for this purpose they are often brought to open graves, to become “familiar” with their destiny in this world, which as per their leaders, is to die as soon as possible whilst killing as many Jews as possible.

The aforementioned syllabus and hateful messaging are the very same in the West Bank. There is simply no difference and what is less known to the world is that it is the same in Jordan and in east Jerusalem.

Without eliminating this hateful incitement, alongside the armed radical terrorists of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Jordan, the deaths of Israelis, Americans, and others who stand by the justified fight for the sake of humanity, will be in vain.

The indoctrination of generations of Palestinian children, who are in fact taken hostage by their own, is the untold tragedy that makes an endless circle of death and destruction the inevitable outcome for this region.

The West, together with regional powers such as Egypt, the Jordanian monarchy, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Morocco must stand up to this horrific phenomenon which can still be stopped, and do everything in its power to reinstate a completely different educational system in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jordan.

This must be the underlying condition for any step forward in the day after this horrific war.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 24.11.2023

The decision of the Israeli government to approve the hostage deal is akin to a choice between two terrible options. From Hamas’ perspective, the internal discord in Israel during the run-up to that decision was not just a welcome development; it was a goal in and of itself.

Psychological warfare and efforts to influence the Israeli mindset are part and parcel of Hamas’ modus operandi, not only in acts of terror and warfare but also in negotiations. Creating rifts and fostering division within Israeli society weaken it on the battlefield. Those who opposed the deal initially eventually succumbed to the majority’s position for the sake of social cohesion. We should adopt the unity approach in the future in the face of Hamas’ manipulation and as we grapple with the numerous challenges that lie ahead until a final decision is reached.

One should not bury their head in the sand

However, it is crucial not to underestimate or downplay the prices and risks arising from the ceasefire deal. A positive and clear presentation of these challenges is necessary if we are to properly prepare for them and be able to deal with the difficulties they pose.

Undoubtedly, Hamas would like to see the ceasefire as a turning point in the conflict. It believes the halting of the fire will result in the IDF losing momentum and that it would gradually scale back its operations through a series of limited ceasefires and restrictive conditions until a complete halt to hostilities is achieved. Simultaneously, Israel would lose legitimacy for high-intensity warfare, the international community would increase its diplomatic effort to strike a broader political arrangement, and in the meantime, Hamas would recover.

In the optimal scenario envisioned by Hamas, the top military leadership and most of the organization’s military strength remain unscathed. The political leadership, based in Qatar and other countries, also retains its position. Hamas continues to be the main power in the region, dictating the agenda, and Israel is forced to release its security prisoners and accept limitations on its activities as part of an exchange deal. The final piece of the puzzle is an agreement for an international process to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip.

Such a scenario is entirely contrary to Israel’s desired outcome and is unacceptable. While the IDF and the Shin Bet actions have produced great results so far on the battlefield – which also projects formidable strength to deter enemies on other fronts – achieving the over-arching goals of the war is still a long way off. The ceasefire that has been agreed to as part of the hostage deal will pose numerous operational challenges for Israel.

The biggest challenge is how to ensure the IDF can resume its fire rather than fall into the Hamas honeytrap. The IDF must maintain its war posture, in accordance with the civilian echelon’s stated intention to continue the fight. During the ceasefire, it must carry out moves in anticipation of the next stages of the war, such as distributing leaflets and evacuation notices to areas where renewed hostilities are expected. It is also time to complete the establishment of a broad security perimeter along the entire border and consolidate the IDF’s control of the border to accommodate the new reality that will transpire once the war is over. Simultaneously, and in accordance with the overall political goals, the defense establishment must act against senior Hamas figures and networks outside the Gaza Strip in areas that are not covered by the ceasefire agreements.

Another challenge facing security officials is denying Hamas the opportunity to rearm and stockpile under the guise of the ceasefire. Hamas will try to do that by means of smuggling weapons and other objects from Egypt, as well as through the diversion of humanitarian aid entering the strip. A strict Israeli approach is warranted in this regard, with no reason for Israeli generosity in humanitarian assistance when it is clear that at least some of it will benefit Hamas.

In parallel with the military efforts in Gaza, the IDF must continue its determined struggle against terrorist organizations in the West Bank. The planned attack by a Hamas cell from Hebron that was thwarted this week near Bethlehem indicates that there is high motivation and that there are quite a lot of ideas currently brewing among the top terrorists in the West Bank. Gaza provides them with motivation and inspiration. Only if Israel acts with resolve and with a proactive offensive posture, as demonstrated by the security agencies in recent months, can it successfully curtail this activity.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 24, 2023.

Over the past month, more than 200,000 (!) Israelis have filed applications for gun licenses, permits to always own and carry a firearm. Given the spike in Palestinian terrorism over the past 18 months, and the Hamas massacres of October 7, this is not surprising, and is even welcome. I think that every Israeli grandmother should now pack a pistol.

In saying so I am shocking myself, because I grew-up in Western liberal society where gun toting was rare and frowned-upon. If anything, it was the passion of far-right rednecks who were viewed from afar as irresponsible. The Americas are plagued by too much gun violence, with regular shotgun and machine gun shootings by deranged people in malls, schools, campuses, playgrounds, and even occasionally churches and synagogues.

Furthermore, in this country to which I immigrated many decades ago, guns were considered the province of the military, to which we send our sons and daughters to serve. Soldiers coming home for the weekend with their sophisticated and scary-looking rifles are a regular sight, and troops in the streets to secure major holiday pedestrian traffic and tourist sites are commonplace (and necessary), especially in Jerusalem.

In other words, this country is seemingly well protected by its large citizen-based army, police force, para-military forces, and penetrating intelligence forces. It not necessary for the average citizen in Israel, men and women, to be personally armed. Or so it seemed.

The time when every Israeli working in agricultural fields or walking to work in Tel Aviv needed to have a loaded gun is over, or so we thought. The time when every Israeli needed to display instant readiness to repel attack had passed, or so we thought.

Israel’s War of Independence was over, so we thought. Back then, the battle was for every living room and nursery room. But today, the IDF with its Hellfire missiles, Iron Dome anti-missile defenses, and crack commando units suffices to secure our security. Or so we thought.

But now the second War of Independence is upon Israel. The battle for basic security is underway not just in the towns of the Gaza Envelope but in every border area, and frankly this country is so small that everywhere is a border zone.

Israeli Arabs and Arabs from Judea and Samaria are so integrated in Israeli commerce and industry that the potential for terrorist attack is viscerally felt everywhere, rightfully or wrongly. After all, quite a few Palestinians from Gaza who seemingly worked peacefully in Beeri, Reem, and Kfar Azza apparently provided precise intelligence on Beeri, Reem, and Kfar Azza to the Hamas butchers who invaded on Simchat Torah.

The notion that one can comfortably invite Arab construction workers into one’s home or neighborhood has been seriously undermined. The notion that Modiin, Raanana, or Emek Hefer cities and industrial zones can go without armed civilian guards at checkpoints at every entrance has been genuinely destabilized. Israelis are rightfully afraid, and correctly arming up.

AT LEAST 20 YEARS AGO, Major General (res.) Gershon Hacohen told me that every grandmother in this country should pack a gun. Every citizen should be armed and ready to defend the country. This is a matter of both mental and operational readiness, he told me. Israeli society, he long has argued, has grown too comfortable, too middle class, too bourgeoisie, too blind to the dangers that surround Israel.

If most (sane, responsible) citizens in this country were armed, the signal to our enemies would be clear: Israel is never asleep, and it is ready to defend itself vigorously at any moment – Hacohen has argued. And to prove his point, he will show you the pistol he has permanently strapped to his lower leg underneath his pants.

General Hacohen long has been a mentor to me in strategic and defense affairs. He is an out-of-the-box deep thinker. Throughout his 41-year military career, he was widely considered to be the “thinking intellectual” of IDF generals, although not all his colleagues understood what he was driving at. He is messianic and impulsive in some of his prescriptions, ideologically precise and visionary in others.

I always have liked the revolutionary fervor inherent in Hacohen’s approach. He wants to bring back a Zionist discourse on pioneering, redemption, and settlement – taking themes from the dynamic worldviews of Berl Katznelson, Ben-Gurion, and Rabbi AY Kook.

His book, What’s National in National Security (Hebrew: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2014), is essentially a discourse on the importance of faith, vision, and religious-ideological aspirations in the crafting of national security doctrine. It should now be mandatory reading.

Hacohen’s central insight is this: Those who view Israel as a stepping-stone for redemption and as the Jewish national spiritual homeland will act differently in responding to Palestinian attack than those who view Israel merely as a safe-haven state. If the former, the government should do more than just approve security operations against Palestinian terrorists. It should act to crush Israel’s enemies and approve renewed building in Jerusalem and in Judea and Samaria.

Hacohen’s message is that Israel must reacquire sufficient ideological determination to repulse and overwhelm its adversaries. When enemies such as Hamas-ISIS and Iran are resolutely motivated by revolutionary ideologies, Israel can’t get by with leaders bereft of ideological zeal; stuck in a holding pattern or management mindset.

IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT, Hacohen is relevant for another reason. Over the past decade, he has overseen the IDF’s major war games exercises. The central-most takeaway from the simulations he designed and ran was that Israel must be

prepared with massive ground forces to fight a two-front or even three-front war – exactly the scenario that may be developing right now.

Furthermore, Israel must be proactive, rather than, reactive. “Restoring calm” to Israel’s southern and northern border areas, or “maintaining calm” in Jerusalem and the West Bank (through occasional anti-terrorist operations, plus fences and roadblocks, etc.) is akin to putting a derailed train back on track – no more, Hacohen argues. It is a technical solution, not a goal-oriented chess move that drives a new reality.

The Zionist movement always sought to, and today too should seek to, reshape Israel’s strategic reality according to its preferences. This means maneuvering, expanding, building, and forcing the enemy on the defensive, says Hacohen, in Gaza and the Galilee, in Jerusalem, and in Judea and Samaria.

Underlying Hacohen’s weltanschauung is the notion of ongoing struggle, and deep faith in the righteousness of the Jewish return to Zion.

This first part of this thought-process is somewhat Bolshevik in approach: Israel is engaged in a permanent revolution. Consequently, Hacohen says, Zionism must constantly seek to re-shape and shake-up the strategic environment, never giving up on its ideals despite strategic and tactical difficulties.

Even if Israeli leaders can’t see where the struggle will ultimately lead, they are nevertheless mandated to push forward. So, you shuffle the cards and create game-changing facts on the ground. In Gaza too.

And then, drawing on passionate commitment that comes from true belief in your cause – religious-nationalist faith in the justice of the Jewish People’ return to Zion – you express confidence that the Heavens will help stickhandle the helm of state.

All this starts with getting a gun. Today, I downloaded an application from the Ministry of National Security website.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 19, 2023.

 “The hand of the resistance is long and will reach anyone who tries to disarm it,” former deputy speaker of the Hamas parliament, Ahmed Bahar, said in one of his famous speeches on the job in Gaza. 

Bahar, a member of the founding generation of Hamas, and his colleagues in parliament were not there this week when Golani fighters arrived. In their place, next to the speaker’s table, soldiers of Golani’s 13th Battalion stood for a group photo to capture the moment before this structure too would turn into another heap of rubble. 

The battalion, which lost 41 of its fighters during the surprise attack on October 7, added another milestone in the ongoing war to topple the Hamas regime. 

No place to hide

At first glance, one could be forgiven for thinking that taking out the parliament building is just another symbolic strike, much like the targeting the home of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh or raising the Israeli flag in a deserted position of Hamas. However, in the context of the ongoing military campaign, such action carries great significance.

First, this adds to hundreds of similar strikes, whose cumulative weight shapes a new reality. Second, it does not mark the end of the journey but only its beginning. Like the successful raids on the Rantisi and Shifa hospitals, here too, the IDF’s action emphasizes Israel’s determination and makes it clear to Hamas terrorists: Nowhere is safe.

Alongside taking control of command posts, intelligence facilities, and security installations, the IDF is intensifying attacks on the Hamas police force and local governing bodies. Neutralizing these Hamas organs is essential because it prevents Hamas from being in control or providing services to the public and enforcing its rule.

It is crucial that Hamas’ governing facilities not only be seized but also completely destroyed after being cleared. This is the way to disabuse Hamas’ of its hope that Gaza will return to the days before October 7.

This must be done not only through military activity. Israel must destroy the Kerem Shalom and Erez border crossing, so as to make it clear there will never be a return to the situation in which Palestinians can enter Israel. 

The same applies to the role of the District Coordination and Liaison, which still exists, and the Israeli involvement in supplying humanitarian needs to the residents of Gaza. Israel needs to do away with any practice that was in place in the pre-Oct. 7 reality. What was – shall be no more.

Pressure Qatar

The immediate goal of Hamas is to have Israel stop fighting while creating a channel that allows the terrorist organization to maximize its gains from the hostages it holds. Hamas is pinning its hopes on the Qatari mediation efforts, internal pressure in Israel on this issue, and international pressure on Israel regarding humanitarian issues.

The way it sees it, the surprise attack on Israel, along with being able to survive so far and the gains it will get for the hostages, will earn them “worldly glory” and undermine Israel’s reputation as “undefeatable.”

From Israel’s perspective, the difficult conditions under which it entered the war left it no choice but to resort to the direct overthrow of the Hamas government and the destruction of its military capabilities. If this is not achieved, there will be consequences: Deterrence will have been lost vis-a-vis other enemies in a way that could pose an existential threat. Israel has achieved good results so far in the war, but they are not sufficient if it is to meet this challenge.

As expected, with the assistance of Qatar – whose main interest is to ensure Hamas’ survival – Hamas has put out the bait and started waving with their assets to achieve their goals. While they are at it, they are trying to expunge the moral stain caused by their barbaric and inhumane action and also to increase internal divisions and pressures in Israel.

There is no worse job to be in right now than being an Israeli government official and security chief who has to decide on whether to sign off on a deal to release infants and their mothers in exchange for the release of terrorists and a several-day ceasefire.

It is almost beyond human to stay indifferent to the pictures of the abductees or the cries of their agonized family members. On the other hand, going for such a deal will come with a heavy price: risk to our soldiers.

Ceasing the fire will allow Hamas to assess the situation, reorganize, identify vulnerable points on the Israeli side, fortify, lay booby traps, and carry out attacks. Even the fuel that enters will greatly assist them. Hamas will start the next phase of the conflict from a much-improved position compared to its current situation.

Since the proposed deal does not include all the abductees, additional steps will be required until all of them are returned. Regarding this, it is worth remembering that what led to the current proposal is the pressure exerted on Hamas. Accordingly, if Israel wants to get more opportunities to secure the hostages while lowering the price of a deal and increasing its likelihood, it is crucial to continue with the military campaign while ratcheting up pressure on Qatar.

Not only has Qatar not paid a price for its continuous support for Hamas and hosting the leaders of the terrorist organization on its territory, but it has also been courted by the international community because of those ties and is taking advantage of the situation to boost its standing on the world stage. 

It is time to change the policy towards Qatar by demanding that the United States act against it not only with “carrots” but also with “sticks,” to reconsider its relationship with the sheikhdom – including by canceling or reducing economic, diplomatic, and military ties (one of the most important military US bases in the Middle East is less than 12 miles from where Hamas leaders hold their meetings), and imposing sanctions on all Qatari entities involved in supporting Hamas.

It is time to demand that Qatar immediately expel Hamas leaders from its territory. It’s also time to have those people in Israel’s crosshairs, for a potential targeted assassination. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 17, 2023.

While IDF forces are engaged in Gaza, in what is becoming a protracted war, aiming to weaken Hamas and secure the release of captives, the main effort by Hamas and its backers has been focused on reaching a prolonged ceasefire as much as possible.

Such a ceasefire has operational and tactical importance for Hamas, as the pressure on Israel increases. However, its main significance lies in the strategic arena. Hamas hopes a ceasefire will compel Israel to change its war objectives and revert to the softer approach that Hamas initially believed Israel would follow right after the Oct. 7 massacre.

 I believe that Hamas leaders, despite the severe blow inflicted on Israel, were convinced that the Israeli response would focus on targeted airstrikes that would extract a significant price from the Palestinians and perhaps even a limited ground maneuver – but they never anticipated that Israel would launch an all-out undertaking to eliminate the terrorist organization and deprive it of its military-terrorist capabilities along with retaking the strip.

 Hamas likely believed that had Israel subscribed to a small-scale approach, they could build on the success of October 7 and effect a change that would result in a new “equation” between the organization and the Jewish state. Meaning, the release of the imprisoned terrorists, lifting the blockade, and stopping the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Hamas assessed that Israel’s weakness and its problematic relations with the United States, coupled with its inherent reluctance to pay the high price involved in a broad military operation to remove Hamas from Gaza, would ultimately prevent it from completely defeating Hamas, just like in previous flare-ups.

 In previous rounds, whenever the fighting ended, both sides licked their wounds, but Hamas would then quickly recover and posed a threat to the Gaza area and Israel as a whole.

 This time Israel adopted, to the surprise of Hamas, a different approach that could strategically weaken the organization without precedent, thereby also affecting both radical factions associated with the organization: the radical axis led by Iran on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood axis, which includes Qatar and Turkey, on the other.

All actions by Hamas, Iran, and its proxies (Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq), Qatar, and Turkey should be seen in the context of the attempt to persuade President Joe Biden to pressure Israel to stop the fighting and eventually adopt an alternative approach.

 This effort motivates them to create the impression that there is a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza. It is what made Hamas play a cynical game with the captives, and this is also what has prompted the  Shiite militias in Iraq to step up their actions. Likewise, this explains the gradual escalation by Hezbollah in the north and the missile launches from the Houthis, and the potential expansion of the conflict by Iran and its allies

 This is also the context through which we must treat the numerous protests in Western capitals calling for a ceasefire. Even Jordan and Egypt are joining the chorus for various reasons, primarily due to the concern about a flow of Palestinian refugees into their territories. The Palestinian Authority seemingly calls for a ceasefire, but it is unclear if it is genuinely interested in one.

So far, Hamas and its allies’ efforts have been unsuccessful. Biden is under pressure, along with most Western leaders. They understand the importance of Israel’s success in undermining Hamas and the moral justification for it. Israel’s recent moves, such as advancing on the ground, exposing the illicit Hamas activity at the Rantisi Hospital, and continued close coordination with the US. regarding the management of the conflict against Hezbollah, contribute to President Biden’s ability to withstand pressure.

 As the fighting continues, Israel will need to remind Western leaders, led by Biden, that letting Hamas stay in power would be beyond the pale and that Israel can bring about its demise within a reasonable time without causing a humanitarian disaster in Gaza or leading to actions that would escalate the conflict into a regional war. This is how Israel would be able to get room for action and the time needed to achieve its strategic goals, even if it agrees to short ceasefires/pauses to release the captives.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 15, 2023.